Sharing Nicely: on Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing As A
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Essay Sharing Nicely: On ShareableGoods and the Emergenceof Sharing as a Modality of EconomicProduction Yochai Benklert CONTENTS INTRODUCTION................... 275 ...................................................... I. CASE STUDIES: CARPOOLINGAND DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING.......... 281 A. Carpools............................................ 281 B. DistributedComputing ........... ............................. 289 II. LUMPINESS,GRANULARITY, AND SHAREABLE GOODS............ 296 A. RenewableResources........................ 298 ..................................... B. RapidlyDecaying Resources ........................ ................ 300 C. in General 301 Lumpiness ............................................................. D. Shareable Goods: Conclusion ....................... 304 ................ III. SHARINGAND MARKETS:TRANSACTION COSTS AND MOTIVATIONS... 305 A. Transaction Costs ............. 306 .................................. t Professorof Law, Yale Law School. I owe thanksto Bruce Ackerman,Ian Ayres, Bob Ellickson, Dan Kahan,Al Klevorick,Michael Levine, Orly Lobel, Daniel Markovits,Richard McAdams,Robert Post, JudithResnik, Carol Rose, SusanRose-Ackerman, Jed Rubenfeld,Alan Schwartz,Henry Smith, and Jim Whitman,who read priorversions of this Essay and provided helpfulcomments. 273 274 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 273 1. Choosing a TransactionalFramework............................. 306 2. The General Shape of Transaction-Costs-BasedChoice AmongFrameworks ........................................ 310 3. TransactionCosts Analysis of Marketsand Sharing........ 315 a. Crispness.......... ................................ 315 b. RenderingRequirements and Lossiness.............. 318 c. DecentralizedSystems and Information...................... 320 B . Motivation ................................... ............................ ... 321 C. Motivationand Information........................... ............ 328 IV. SHARINGAS A MODALITYOF PRODUCTION................................ 330 A. SharingIs a Commonand UnderappreciatedModality of Production ................................... 332 B. SharingIs Sensitive to TechnologyBecause Individual Efficacy Is Subject to Physical-Capital Constraints.............. 339 C. Decentralized,Loosely CoupledSocial Sharing Is an EconomicallyAttractive Modality of Production .................. 342 V. SOMECURRENT POLICY IMPLICATIONS ..................................... 344 A. WirelessCommunications Regulation ..................................... 344 B. Information,Knowledge, and CulturalProduction Policy.......... 348 C. NetworkDesign for a Networkof Shareable Goods................. 353 CONCLUSION......... ................... ... 356 .................... 2004] SharingNicely 275 INTRODUCTION The world's fastest supercomputerand the second-largest commuter transportation system in the United States function on a resource- managementmodel that is not well specified in contemporaryeconomics. Both SETI@home, a distributed computing platform involving the computersof over four million volunteers, and carpooling, which accounts for roughly one-sixth of commutingtrips in the United States, rely on social relations and an ethic of sharing, ratherthan on a price system, to mobilize and allocate resources. Yet they coexist with, and outperform,price-based and government-funded systems that offer substitutable functionality. Neither practice involves public goods, network goods, or any other currentlydefined category of economically "quirky"goods as either inputs or outputs. PCs and automobiles are privately owned, rival goods, with no obvious demand-side positive returns to scale when used for distributed computing or carpooling.1The sharing practices that have evolved around them are not limited to tightly knit communities of repeat players who know each other well and interact across many contexts. They represent instances where social sharing2is either utterly impersonalor occurs among 1. Computersas communicationsdevices do have demand-sidereturns to scale, or network externalities.But as processingunits, the paramountvalue of personalcomputers is the intrinsic value of theircomputation speed and memory, not the networkexternalities they enableowners to capture. SETI@homeand other distributedcomputing projects harness these intrinsic-value aspectsof personalcomputers rather than their capacities as communicationdevices. 2. "Sharing"is an uncommonusage in the economicsliterature, though it is commonin some of the anthropologyliterature. I choose it becauseit is broaderin its applicationthan other, more common, but narrowerterms for associated phenomena-most importantly,"reciprocity" or "gift."I hesitate to use "reciprocity"because of its focus on more or less directlyresponsive reciprocatedreward and punishmentas a mechanismto sustaincooperation in the teeth of the standard assumptions about collective action. See DAN M. KAHAN,THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY: TRUST,COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND LAW (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 31 & Yale Programfor Studiesin Law, Econ. & Pub.Policy, ResearchPaper No. 281, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=361400.Given the presence of purely redistributivepractices like toleratedtheft and demand sharingin the anthropologyliterature, see infra notes 86-87 and accompanyingtext, evidence of nonreciprocalpro-social behavior, see BRUNOS. FREY& STEPHANMEIER, PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, RECIPROCITY, OR BOTH? (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, WorkingPaper No. 107, 2002), and more generally our intuitive experiencesof acts of humanitytoward others whom we will neverencounter again, I suspectthat some formsof redistributionare nonreciprocal except in the broadestsense of the reciprocationof living in a humane society. Mutual aid and cooperationwithout the possibility of reciprocal exchange likely exists, the "Lion and the Mouse" fable notwithstanding.See, e.g., James Woodburn,'Sharing Is Not a Formof Exchange':An AnalysisofProperty-Sharing in Immediate- Return Hunter-Gatherer Societies, in PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICALTRADITION 48 (C.M. Hann ed., 1998). I hesitate to use the term "gift exchange"because the highly developedgift literature,see infranote 6, has focusedvery heavily on the productionand reproductionof social relationsthrough the exchangeand circulationof things. As will soon become clear, I am concerned with the production of things and actions/servicesvalued materially,through nonmarket mechanisms of social sharing."Sharing," 276 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 273 loosely affiliated individuals who engage in social practices that involve contributionsof the capacity of their private goods in patternsthat combine to form large-scale and effective systems for provisioning goods, services, and resources. This Essay seeks to do two things. The first three Parts are dedicatedto defining a particular class of physical goods as "shareable goods" that systematically have excess capacity and to combining comparative transaction costs and motivation analysis to suggest that this excess capacity may better be harnessed through sharing relations than through secondary markets. These first three Parts extend the analysis I have performedelsewhere regardingsharing of creative labor, like free software and other peer production,3 to the domain of sharing rival material resources in the productionof both rival and nonrival goods and services. The characteristicsI use to define shareable goods are sufficient to make social sharing and exchange of material goods feasible as a sustainable social practice. But these characteristicsare neither absolutely necessary nor sufficient for sharing to occur. Instead, they define conditions under which, when goods with these characteristicsare prevalent in the physical- capital base of an economy, it becomes feasible for social sharing and exchange to become more salient in the overall mix of relations of productionin that economy. The fourthPart is then dedicatedto explaining how my observationabout shareablegoods in the domain of physical goods meshes with the literature on social norms, social capital, and common property regimes, as well as with my own work on peer production. I suggest that social sharingand exchange is an underappreciatedmodality of economic production, alongside price-based and firm-based market production and state-based production,4whose salience in the economy is sensitive to technological conditions. The last Part explores how the recognition of shareable goods and sharing as a modality of economic productioncan informpolicy. Shareablegoods are goods that are (1) technically "lumpy"and (2) of "mid-grained" granularity. By "lumpy" I mean that they provision then, offers a less freightedname for evaluatingmechanisms of social-relations-basedeconomic production. 3. Yochai Benkler,Coase 's Penguin,or, Linuxand The Natureof the Firm, 112 YALEL.J. 369 (2002). 4. In this, my position tracksthe tripartitemapping of the universeof organizationalforms thatresulted from the workon nonprofitsin the early 1980s.See HenryB. Hansmann,The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALEL.J. 835 (1980); see also BURTONA. WEISBROD,THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY1-15 (1988); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Introduction, in THEECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS:STUDIES IN STRUCTUREAND POLICY3, 3-17 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). Unlike the nonprofitliterature, my focus is not within the boundariesof firms-whether for- or nonprofit-but on sharingamong individuals in informalassociations more resembling markets in the