Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 1966 Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod Henry Paul Monaghan Columbia Law School,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Henry P. Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L. J. 127 (1966). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/575 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod Henry P. Monaghan* In a widely admired article, Harry Kalven argued that the New York Times case' embodies the "central meaning" of the First Amend- ment. On his view, in a free, open society, maximum protection must be accorded to "political" speech.2 He concluded that the right freely to criticize the government must lie at the center of any adequate theory of the First Amendment.3 It is not so easy to make a comparable claim about the relationship between obscenity and the First Amendment. The Supreme Court's conception of obscenity is partially responsible. While the Court in Roth v. United States (1957) explicitly barred "obscenity" from the protection of the First Amendment, it defined the term so that only a marginal class of writings warranted the label.4 Obscenity was given enough precision so that obscenity prosecutions were unlikely to result in the loss of much of value, a result which was reinforced by the Court's parallel concern with local enforcement methods-a First Amendment due process, if you will.i In this respect, the 1966 obscenity Assoc.