Military Essays and Articles
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MILITARY ESSAYS AND ARTICLES by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army 02605 1885 – 1945 1 MILITARY ESSAYS AND ARTICLES by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U. S. Army 02605 1885 – 1945 Edited by Charles M. Province President and Founder The George S. Patton, Jr. Historical Society 3116 Thorn Street San Diego, California 92104-4618 2 COPYRIGHT 2002© All rights reserved. 3 Table of Contents 1929 CAVALRY DIVISION MANEUVERS, THE ARMORED CARS WITH CAVALRY THE ARMY AT THE NATIONAL HORSE SHOW CAVALRY WORK OF THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION CAVALRYMAN, THE CHRISTY CAR, THE COURSE AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE COMMENTS ON “CAVALRY TANKS” DEFENSE OF THE SABER, A DESERT TRAINING CORPS, THE EFFECT OF WEAPONS ON WAR, THE FEDERAL TROOPS IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES FORM AND USE OF THE SABER, THE THIRD ARMY LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION: Letter of Instruction No. 1. Letter of Instruction No. 2 Letter of Instruction No. 3 Letter of Instruction No. 4 LIGHT TANK REPORT LOS ANGELES COLISEUM SPEECH MECHANIZATION AND CAVALRY MECHANIZED FORCES MOTORIZATION AND MECHANIZATION IN THE CAVALRY MOUNTED SWORDSMANSHIP PROBABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEXT WAR, THE NOTES ON COMBAT ARMORED DIVISIONS NOTES ON TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE OF DESERT WARFARE NOTES ON THE DESIRABILITY OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATION OF BEING AN OFFICER, THE PATTON'S POETRY PATTON'S BEST QUOTES PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN THE TANK CORPS PERSONAL GLIMPSES OF GENERAL PERSHING PRESENT SABER; USE FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNED, THE REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY POLO TEAM OF 1922 SECRET OF VICTORY, THE SOME NOTES ON THE EFFECT OF WEAPONS SUCCESS IN WAR TACTICAL USE OF SEPARATE TANK BATTALIONS TANKS IN FUTURE WARS TANKS, PAST AND FUTURE TRAINING MEMORANDA TO HIS REGIMENT VICTORY IN EUROPE SPEECH WAR AS SHE IS WHAT THE WORLD WAR DID FOR CAVALRY WHY MEN FIGHT BRITISH PATTON SOCIETY SPEECH (CHARLES M. PROVINCE; 11/11/90) 4 5 THE 1929 CAVALRY DIVISION MANEUVERS By Major George S. Patton, Jr., Cavalry Cavalry Journal 1930 It is more difficult to write of a maneuver than to judge a horse show. In horse shows one secures a friend with each blue ribbon; in maneuvers there are no blue ribbons. Since, however, the guilelessness which induces one to accept either the judging or the writing job must spring from a forthright mind, we shall try to make our remarks as brief and opposite as are our awards. All the horrid events of October, 1929, leading to and culminating in the Corps Command Post Exercises were arranged so as to follow the probable course of a campaign in which the Browns were the invading Etruscans and the Whites the defending Romans. The two first situations centered around attempts of the invaders to cover the loading and withdrawal of large quantities of stolen property from areas along the railway east and west of El Paso. Special interest is attached to these operations because they were so drawn as to bring out the relative strategic and tactical mobility of two forces the defenders composed of dismounted portee cavalry and armored cars, while the attackers were normal cavalry. The results seemed to us completely to accord with the reported remarks of a French officer commanding portee dragoons to the effect that; “Their strategic mobility was excellent; their tactical mobility zero.” In the third and fourth situations, the Whites had to employ cavalry and armored cars in offensive defensive operations. In the third situation this took the form of an attempt to delay two Brown units approaching Fort Bliss from the southeast and north. In the fourth problem the Browns had to delay the Whites in order to permit a convoy to traverse a bridge. The next two situations the fifth and sixth gave a chance for two cavalry brigades, each with artillery and armored cars attached, to try their mettle in the attack and defense of Filmore Pass. The Whites in each case being the attackers. In the seventh phase it fell to the Second Brigade Whites to hold a bridgehead over the Rio Grande at Mesquite against the attack of the First Brigade Browns. The eighth phase was to have been a division in attack, dismounted, using ball ammunition. Unhappily the intervention of Napoleon's fifth element (mud) in the particularly adhesive form prevalent in the southwest, prevented the staging of this problem. 6 Next came the division on the defensive against an outlined enemy. And, finally, the maneuvers ended with a twenty-four hour Corps Command Post Exercise in which some physiological change having occurred, each headquarters, down to the regiment, found itself suddenly translated into the next higher sphere of the military hierarchy. It is quite patent, though seldom admitted, that being human we are fallible. The purpose of maneuvers is to show up these errors, to “plow” as it were, the hardpan of our self complacency so as to admit the sunlight of experience in the hope of germinating some seeds of added understanding. In essaying the role of the “plow” mentioned in the above paragraph we claim no infallibility of understanding and simply state our personal opinions as to the lessons taught. ARMORED CARS Due to the fact that these exercises marked the debut of the armored car in maneuvers with our cavalry, it is probable that the machines attracted more than their due share of attention. Yet it is undeniable that they put up a splendid performance and that the officers and men manning them deserve the greatest praise. Their ability for delaying actions was most marked; while, due to the fact that most of the Texas roads are unditched and unfenced, they were able to leave them with more facility than will usually be the case. Another local characteristic which induced some to over value their performance lay in the fact that in dry weather the plains of the southwest can be quite readily traversed by wheeled vehicles so that in many cases the cars assumed the duties of light tanks and performed them in a most efficient manner. Their invisibility was surprising. On one occasion a number of observers, hearing firing, searched a slope some 800 yards distant with their glasses, but could only locate several clumps of bushes. Suddenly, one of these clumps rolled out of view. It was an absolutely uncamouflaged car. The principal lesson learned with respect to fighting against armored cars is that, since they go best on roads, the best place to fight them is off the roads. Another lesson was that in rolling country they possess considerable ability to support the attack of mounted or dismounted cavalry with oblique fire. Efforts to cover their withdrawal by the use of smoke emitted from the car were disappointing, due probably to the everlasting wind and treeless nature of the country. Further experiment in wooded or hedged country may well prove the value of such screening methods. Umpires had a tendency to over value the effect of moving fire from cars. When blank ammunition limits fire effect to noise they are certainly quite impressive, but our experience with moving fire from tanks leads us to be skeptical of it's lethal value. COVERING DETACHMENTS AND ADVANCE GUARD 7 In many cases it seemed that the distance to which these forces were pushed out was insufficient. As a consequence the main body was frequently subjected to fire from enemy in position or else the information secured as to his location and movements arrived too late to be of tactical value. Another cause for the delay in the utilization of the information derived from these detachments sprang from the custom highly commended by our service schools of having the commander remain back with the main body instead of accompanying the leading elements. Such a system may be conducive to longevity but is hardly compatible with speed. This is particularly true in cavalry versus operations. PATROLS There was constant comment by all observers on the lack of information secured by this means. This defect was partly due to unavoidable restrictions imposed by the situations which prevented patrols from being sent far out. This taken in connection with the rapid rate of cavalry movements prevented the patrols getting the information back in time for it to be of value. The conduct of the patrols we observed and the energy of their personnel were most excellent. BOLD RIDING The ability of the regiments to move rapidly for long distances either by road or across country was remarkable, while the excellent condition of the horses at the end of the maneuvers spoke volumes for the care and efficiency of their conditioning and training. Another surprising circumstance was the very small number of shoes lost, despite the fact that the going was often deep and always rough. THE 37MM GUN Four methods of carrying this weapon were used. In pack, as a field piece with a limber, in light wagons, and on a two wheeled, two horsed cart. Though all functioned well, it was generally believed that for all purposes the pack method was most useful. A shorter trail, or one capable of being hinged, would add to the ease of packing. The Cavalry Board is developing such a trail. If our memory serves us, Frederick the Great was once informed that his Austrian enemy had only one flank, the right, exposed as the left was resting on an impassable obstacle. When he heard this Frederick said to the officer, General Lloyd, who had made the reconnaissance; “Are you quite certain that his left can't be turned?” “Yes, Sire,” replied the Scotsman. Then, said Frederick, “We shall envelop his left for, if you are certain it is safe, he will be also.” A captain of cavalry stationed at Fort Bliss must have heard of this story for he not only took his troop over an impassable mountain but also dragged a 37MM gun along with him.