Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. V. Barnes & Reinecke, 15 Ny2d
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15 N.Y.2d 443 Page 1 15 N.Y.2d 443 (Cite as: 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68) service of process on it within foreign state--in Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v Barnes & Rei- second action to recover damages for personal in- necke juries and property damage resulting from explo- 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 sion of tractor-drawn steel tank, jurisdiction was N.Y. 1965. not obtained of foreign manufacturer of tank by ser- vice of process on it in foreign state since its im- 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 proper assemblage of tank was “tortious act” not A.L.R.3d 508 committed “within” state--in third action to recover damages sustained when geologist's hammer manu- Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., Inc., Respondent, factured and labeled without state broke, jurisdic- v. tion of foreign manufacturer cannot be sustained on Barnes & Reinecke, Incorporated, Appellant. basis of “tortious act” committed “within” state- John Feathers et al., Respondents, -but can be sustained on basis that manufacturer v. transacted business within state. Elizabeth McLucas, as Administratrix of the Estate of Robert J. McLucas, Deceased, et al., Defendants, (1) The “long-arm” statute (CPLR 302) which, ef- and Darby Corporation, Appellant. fective September 1, 1963, granted jurisdiction to Frederick F. Singer, Individually and as Guardian New York courts over a nondomiciliary who ad Litem of Michael Singer, an Infant, Respondent, “transacts any business within the state” or v. “commits a tortious act within the state” embraces Alan Walker, Doing Business as Walker's Minerals, suits instituted after its effective date but based on Defendant, and Estwing Manufacturing Co., Inc., previously accrued causes of action. Section 302 is Also Known as Estwing Manufacturing Company, of a procedural and remedial nature and thus ap- Appellant. plicable to actions thereafter instituted for the re- Court of Appeals of New York dress of wrongs already done. It does not create new rights but merely facilitates the enforcement Argued January 7, 1965; locally of pre-existing rights. Moreover, CPLR Decided May 27, 1965. 10003 states that the CPLR “shall apply to all ac- CITE TITLE AS: Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v tions hereafter commenced” whether based on pre- Barnes & Reinecke viously or subsequently accrued causes of action. The retroactive application of CPLR 302 is consti- HEADNOTES tutionally valid. Process service on nonresidents (2) In an action for damages for breach of warranty “long-arm” statute (CPLR 302) is procedural in in the manufacture and sale of machines by a for- nature and embraces suits commenced after its ef- eign corporation having its place of business in fective date based on previously accrued causes of Chicago, personal jurisdiction of defendant was action--in action for damages for breach of war- properly acquired by service upon it of a summons ranty in connection with manufacture and sale of and complaint in Illinois, where defendant's activit- machines, foreign manufacturer's activities within ies *444 within this State in connection with the state constituted “transact[ion of] any business sale included substantial preliminary negotiations within the state” within CPLR 302 so as to give through high-level personnel during a period of New York courts jurisdiction of manufacturer by some two months; the actual execution of a supple- mentary contract; the shipment for use here, subject © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 15 N.Y.2d 443 Page 2 15 N.Y.2d 443 (Cite as: 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68) to acceptance following delivery, of two specially The tortious acts of manufacturing and labeling the designed machines, priced at $118,000, and the hammer occurred in Illinois and are insufficient to rendition of services over a period of some three satisfy the requirement of paragraph 2 that the months by two defendant's top engineers in super- “tortious act” be one committed “within” this State. vising the installation and testing of the complex That a product defectively manufactured and mis- machines. Defendant's contacts with this State were leadingly labeled in one state is marketed and sold such that the maintenance of the action does not of- in another cannot serve to change the place where fend traditional notions of fair play and substantial the original tortious acts were committed or to cre- justice. ate a new tortious act. (3) In a second action to recover damages for per- (5) Jurisdiction of the Illinois manufacturer, sonal injuries and property damage resulting from however, can be sustained on the ground that it the explosion in New York of a tractor-drawn steel “transact[ed] ... business within the state” (CPLR tank manufactured in Kansas by a Kansas corpora- 302, subd. [a], par. 1) and that the pleaded cause of tion, sold to a Missouri corporation which mounted action is one “arising” therefrom. Paragraph 1 is it on a wheelbase and then in turn sold to a licensed not limited to actions in contract and applies to tort interstate carrier in Pennsylvania whose agents actions when supported by a sufficient showing of were driving its tractor in this State when the tank facts. Defendant shipped substantial quantities of exploded, personal jurisdiction was not obtained, its products into this State as the result of solicita- pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2), of the tion here through a local manufacturer's represent- Kansas corporation by service of a summons and ative and through catalogues and advertisements complaint upon it in Kansas. The Kansas corpora- and the injury causing hammer, purchased from a tion never transacted business in New York, and the New York dealer, was one of such products. De- tortious act charged against it -- that it improperly fendant's activities in this *445 State are sufficient designed and assembled the tank -- occurred in to satisfy the statutory criterion of transaction of Kansas. The language of paragraph 2 conferring business as well as the constitutional requirement personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary if he of minimum contacts. It is not determinative that “commits a tortious act within the state” cannot be the formal execution of its sales contracts may have read as synonymous with “commits a tortious act occurred in Illinois rather than New York. Nor is it without the state which causes injury within the a controlling consideration that the actual injury state”. The occurrence of the injury in this State happened to take place in Connecticut, since the cannot serve to transmute an out-of-state tortious cause of action asserted is clearly one “arising act into one committed here within the sense of the from” the purposeful activities engaged in by de- statutory wording. (Gray v. American Radiator & fendant in this State in connection with the sale of Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, not followed.) its products in the New York market. (4) In a third action to recover damages for person- Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Rei- al injuries sustained when a geologist's hammer necke, 21 A D 2d 474, affirmed. manufactured in Illinois by an Illinois corporation which marked it “unbreakable”, and purchased for Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A D 2d 558, reversed. infant plaintiff in New York, broke in Connecticut, Singer v. Walker, 21 A D 2d 285, affirmed. and damaged infant plaintiff's eye, personal juris- diction of the manufacturer on the ground that it SUMMARY committed a tortious act within the State within CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 2) cannot be sustained. Appeal, in the first above-entitled action, by per- © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 15 N.Y.2d 443 Page 3 15 N.Y.2d 443 (Cite as: 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68) mission of the Appellate Division of the Supreme aside the service of the summons and complaint and Court in the First Judicial Department, from an or- denying such motion?” der of said court, entered July 2, 1964, which af- firmed an order of the Supreme Court at Special POINTS OF COUNSEL Term (Samuel M. Gold, J.), entered in New York Chester Bordeaufor appellant in the first above- County, denying a motion by defendant for judg- entitled action. I. Section 302 of the CPLR, a juris- ment dismissing the complaint. The following ques- dictional statute creating remedies heretofore tion was certified: “Was the Appellate Division cor- nonexistent in New York, should be applied pro- rect in affirming the order of the Supreme Court, spectively only to acts postdating its effective date, New York County, entered on March 17, 1964, September 1, 1963. (Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. denying defendant's motion to dismiss the action 235;Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378;Ogdon v. Gi- for lack of jurisdiction?” anakos, 415 Ill. 591;Kurland v. Chernobil, 260 N. Appeal, in the second above-entitled action, by per- Y. 254;Gruber v. Wilson, 276 N. Y. 135;Kitchen v. mission of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Farm & Home Broadcasting Co., 30 Misc 2d 962; Court in the Third Judicial Department, from an or- Hasse v. American Photograph Corp., 299 F. 2d der of said court, entered July 23, 1964, which (1) 666;Franklin v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W., 145 reversed, on the law and the facts, (a) an order of Okla. 159;In re Layman's Estate, 208 Okla. 174; the Supreme Court at Special Term (Isadore Book- Nevins v. Revlon, 23 Conn. S. 314; McGee v. Inter- stein, J.; opinion 41 Misc 2d 498), entered in Rens- national Life Ins.