The Political Economy of Primary Education Reform in Cambodia

ESID Working Paper No. 58 The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia Tim Kelsall, Sothy Khieng, Chuong Chantha and Tieng Tek Muy1 June, 2016 1 Tim Kelsall is a Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute in London; Sothy Khieng, Chuong Chantha and Tieng Tek Muy work at the Cambodian Development Resource Institute in Phnom Penh Email correspondence: [email protected]; [email protected] ISBN: 978-1-908749-59-8 email: [email protected] Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) Global Development Institute, School of Environment, Education and Development, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK www.effective-states.org The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia Abstract This paper examines the quality of primary education provision in Cambodia using a ‘political settlements’ framework developed at the University of Manchester. The framework characterises Cambodia as a ‘hybrid’ settlement with a weak dominant party and predatory administration, albeit with some islands of administrative effectiveness. Such states can achieve developmental progress in circumscribed areas with multi-stakeholder support, but more wide-ranging, top-down reforms will normally disappoint. We use the framework retrospectively to explain the balance between quantity and quality in Cambodia’s education provision, and also prospectively to assess the prospects for reform. We conclude that, although new leadership in the education ministry promises to bring faster, deeper reform than ever before, powerful forces for inertia still exist. These forces could potentially be alleviated with enhanced international support, but development partners’ current ways of working leave much to be desired. The paper concludes by outlining a number of policy options. Keywords: Cambodia, development, education, political economy, political settlements Acknowlegement: The individuals and organisations who helped in the production of this paper are too numerous to mention by name. The authors would like to thank them all, however, while stressing that the views contained herein are their own. Kelsall, T. et al. (2016) The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia. ESID Working Paper No. 58. Manchester, UK: The University of Manchester. Available at www.effective-states.org This document is an output from a project funded by UK Aid from the UK government for the benefit of developing countries. However, the views expressed and information contained in it are not necessarily those of, or endorsed by the UK government, which can accept no responsibility for such views or information or for any reliance placed on them. 2 The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia Abbreviations CESSP Cambodia Education Sector Support Project CFS Child-friendly schools CNRP Cambodia National Rescue Party CPP Cambodian People’s Party DOE District office of education DTMT District training and monitoring teams ESWG Education sector working group FUNCINPEC Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant Neutre Pacifique Et Coopératif (a royalist political party) JTWG Joint technical working group KPRP Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (the forerunner of the CPP) MOEYS Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports PB Programme budget PCK Pedagogical content knowledge POE Provincial office of education PS Political settlement SOS A Secretary of State ‘A’ (MOEYS’ most powerful technocrat) SSG School support group SIG School improvement grant TPAP Teacher Policy Action Plan TPS Teacher professional standards TTC Teacher training college TTD Teacher training department Interview codes EA Expatriate advisor FG Focus group NGO Non-governmental organisation IS International scholar LMA Local MOEYS official, province A LMB Local MOEYS official, province B NE National expert NM National MOEYS official SSA School staff, province A SSB School staff, province B TTCA Teacher training college, province A TTCB Teacher training college, province B 3 The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia Introduction In August 2014, Cambodian students up and down the country sat for their Grade 12 national exit exams. Unlike in previous years, elaborate measures had been taken to ensure that exam questions were not leaked by education officials, students were frisked for mobile phones, calculators or other cheating aids by thousands of volunteers, and in some cases, exam halls and papers were protected by armed Anti-Corruption Unit guards. 1 One student summed up the situation with the statement, ‘It’s damn strict this year’ (Brehm, 2014)(NE2, TTCA). When the exams were graded, it transpired that of the 75,000 students who sat them, a mere 26 percent had passed – a striking contrast to the 87 percent that passed the previous year – with only 11 individuals receiving an ‘A’ grade (Ponniah and Heng, 2014).2 Dismal though they were, these results came as little surprise to experts on Cambodia’s education, since they reflect a system which, while successful in building infrastructure and getting large numbers of children into school, has been much less adept at delivering educational quality. The exam reforms were the brainchild of Dr Hang Chuon Naron, a new education minister with the mandate to shake up the sector and deliver tangible results prior to the birth of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, and to what are expected to be hard-fought general elections in 2018. He has explained them as both a tool for diagnosing the ills of the sector, and as one part of a wide-ranging reform agenda (2014b). In this paper, we delve into the politics of the reforms, applying a ‘political settlements’ framework developed at the Centre for Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) at the University of Manchester. Political settlements analysis focuses on the power relations that lie behind formal institutions, and categorises regimes according to how power is organised and exercised. In this paper we use the framework to explain, retrospectively, how Cambodia’s political settlement has conditioned the emergence of an education system that focuses on quantity rather than quality, and also prospectively, to help us assess the prospects for reform. The paper is based on a review of secondary literature and official documents, one focus group with national NGOs and expatriate advisors, 25 national-level interviews, and 26 local interviews.3 It begins by discussing the politics of primary education up to 2013, incorporating a discussion of educational outcomes, and the national and sectoral political settlements that underlie these. It then proceeds to the present period, examining, among other things, the government’s new Teacher Policy Action Plan, and the international, national and local stakeholder interests surrounding it. It 1 In fact, there was also a clampdown on cheating in 2002, which also saw a dramatic decline in the pass rate. However, subsequent years saw a return to cheating as normal (Brehm, 2014). 2 Following protests, failing students were given a second chance to sit exams in October. However, regulations were again strictly enforced, and the failure rate was 82.06 percent (Barron, 2014a). 3 A list of interview codes is given at the start of the paper. 4 The political economy of primary education reform in Cambodia concludes that although there is now definite political will at national level to improve quality throughout the system, powerful actors, especially those charged with implementing the reforms, remain ambivalent. Much effort will be needed to provide appropriate incentives for them, while difficult challenges of sequencing, coordination, and capacity must also be overcome. Development partners can assist here, but current aid modalities leave much to be desired. The ESID framework The ESID ‘political settlement’ framework, in common with other work in the political settlements genre, is an attempt to specify how different societies solve the problem of endemic violence or civil war, and the implications this has for developmental progress. It is based on the assumption that durable peace depends at a basic level on a balance of power between social groups and classes, and a common understanding (at least among elites) about how power should be organised and exercised.4 Political settlements vary greatly in their economic dynamism, but all presuppose a type and level of economic activity sufficient to support the existing political arrangements. Political settlements are not static and do evolve over time; however, because powerful groups are heavily invested in them, change tends to be gradual: sharp, discontinuous changes imply either a collapse or transformation of the political settlement (DFID, 2010; Di John and Putzel, 2009; Hickey, 2011; Khan, 2010; Levy and Walton, 2013; Levy 2014; North et al., 2009). ESID classifies the diversity of the world’s political settlements along two main axes. The first axis concerns the degree of competition in the political system. In ‘dominant’ settlements, it is very difficult to remove the leader or ruling party from power, while in ‘competitive’ settlements, this is much easier. The other axis concerns the degree of organisational or institutional complexity, for which the degree to which institutions are ‘impersonal’ or ‘rule-governed’ provides a proxy. In ‘impersonal’ settlements, Weberian legal-rational norms are adhered to, while in ‘personalised’ settlements, the opposite is the case (Levy and

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