Elterngeld How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies June 2014

Dr. Martin Bujard, Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB)

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Impressum Dr. Martin Bujard (2014): Elterngeld – How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies, cases.regierungsforschung.de, Duisburg. regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 3

Elterngeld

How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies

Author: Dr. Martin Bujardi

______i Martin Bujard holds a doctorate in political science from Heidelberg University. From 2009-2011 he was working at the Hum- boldt-University in Berlin, where he served as a scientific coordinator of the “Future with Children” group (German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina and BBAW). Since 2011, he has been a senior research fellow at the Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB). His research focuses on family policies, fertility, demographic impacts and family sociology. regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 4

1 Changing ministers in the middle of the reform process

Von der Leyen becomes Federal Minister of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth

It’s the afternoon of November 22, 2005. The mood within the Bundestag is at once festive and tense. “I swear, so help me God,” Ursula von der Leyen says as she is sworn in as the new head of the Fed- eral Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ).1

What does one think about in moments like this? Perhaps one reflects on the historical dimensions, asking oneself: What will be my issue? What will be my major project as minister? As her central project, she intends to implement the plans for parental benefits known as Elterngeld. What’s more, this was originally a project of the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) – her political rival, no less – and there isn’t even majority support for the plans within her own center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). So, who is going to support them? Who wants to torpedo them? What political risks will she be taking on herself? Do the reform plans need to be slimmed down and, if so, where? How should everything be timed? And how can she muster the necessary majorities, especially in her own party?

Let’s step back in time: On September 18, 2005, federal parliamentary elections were held. It was the Union – the collective term for the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) – against the SPD; Angela Merkel against incumbent SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. His party was championing the parental benefits, while the Union opposed them and promoted other family- policy measures. Merkel’s Union had more votes than the SPD, but neither side could secure the majority of votes it needed to form a coalition government with its preferred partner parties. When all of the buzz surrounding the election campaign died down and the balance of power became evident, all indications pointed toward a so-called “grand coalition.” After sounding out a number of options, coalition talks began on October 17, 2005. That same day, Merkel publicly nominated Ursula von der Leyen, a fellow CDU member then serving as social minister of the state of Lower Saxony, to become Germany’s next family minister.

Setting the agenda in the coalition committee

During the coalition talks, the two people in charge of leading negotiations in the Family Policy Work- ing Group were von der Leyen, for the CDU, and Renate Schmidt, the family minister in the previous government, for the SPD. Now we jump forward again to November. Von der Leyen is being sworn into office. Everyone knows what the parties’ political stances are – but an enormous number of things have changed.

Schmidt had already formulated a concept for Elterngeld. The agenda-setting had already been successfully carried out during the previous legislative period, but in a different political setting marked by different power constellations and policy priorities. Support for Elterngeld was to be found within the SPD, among politicians focused on women’s issues within the Union, and in the business community. regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 5

Meanwhile, there was opposition to it in large parts of the Union, from the Roman Catholic Church and among politicians specializing in budgetary policies. Schmidt, who knew that her days as family minister were numbered, was strongly advocating the realization of the Elterngeld plans. Von der Leyen endorsed this stance despite knowing that a majority of the members of her party were opposed to it and that she was taking a personal political risk in doing so. For both politicians, the issue now was to make sure that support for the introduction of Elterngeld was written into any coalition agreement signed by their respective parties.

On November 2, 2005, the Union and the SPD agreed to introduce parental benefits linked to previous income.2 Thus, in terms of the ReformCompass model, the second phase of “formulating and decision- making” was initiated. The limits hammered out in the coalition committee stipulated that these parental benefits would be paid for a maximum of one year, and that they would amount to two-thirds of one’s previous net income, with a cap of €1,800 a month. For von der Leyen, the main issue now was to strategically manage the reform process during the 16th legislative period. This involved a series of points requiring critical decisions. The introduction of Elterngeld was agreed to in the coalition agreement finalized on November 11, 2005 (for a summary, see Dossier, Part II). Nevertheless, at this point in time, it was still completely open whether (a) this was really something that could be politically implemented in general and, if so, (b) in which form it could be implemented. Some aspects were not yet settled: what the maximum rate of compensation for lost income during the stay-at-home time would be, what the base (or minimum) allowance would be, how long it would be paid out and what the gender-specific incentives would be.3

Elterngeld as a paradigm shift

At this point, the introduction of Elterngeld doesn’t represent just another social benefit that would be popular among recipients and cost the finance minister several billion euros. Rather, it concerns an enormously far-reaching paradigm shift in German family policy. This shift is based on two aspects4:

(1) The introduction of Elterngeld is a life cycle-related family policy. As such, the level of benefits is aligned with one’s income level before the birth of the child and thereby with the opportunity costs of children. As a result, parents with higher incomes get considerably more than those with lower incomes. In this way, Elterngeld doesn’t follow the principles of previous family policies, such as need, burden-sharing or universality.

(2) Elterngeld creates explicit incentives for fathers to take time off from their careers for the benefit of the family. These kinds of “time-outs” were previously taken advantage of very rarely,5 and the reform tries to influence how couples divide their work- and childcare-related responsibilities. Together with the expansion of childcare infrastructure of children younger than three (which was intensified between 2004 and 2013), Elterngeld made it the norm not only that there would be a two-earner family model, but also that mothers would drastically reduce the amount of time they took off from their careers to have and raise children. Both of these reforms contradict not only previous family policies, but regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 6

also the understanding of family that had formed the backdrop for determining welfare-state and fiscal (tax) policies in Germany.6

Large segments of the CDU and the CSU share this traditional conception of the family. For this reason, many in the Union disagree with the notion of using political measures to provide incentives for shortening the amount of time that mothers take off from work for family reasons to one year. This was further complicated by the fact that the SPD had originally come up with the idea for the Elterngeld reform, but it had been the Union that had won the election after all (and should therefore rightfully have more sway in determining general policymaking directions). Another critically viewed aspect is the fact that couples will get less Elterngeld if the father doesn’t also take time off work. What’s more, the project is supposed to cost roughly €3 billion (according to 2005 estimates), which is hard to justify given tight public budgets.

In November 2005, Von der Leyen is new to her office, and this is her first time as a minister at the federal level. Granted, she can take advantage of the fact that the agenda-setting was successful and that the intention to implement the Elterngeld reform has been written into the coalition agreement. But now she is facing the challenge of pushing the reform through against large parts of her own party. How can she convince the CDU, her own party, and the CSU, in particular, to support a project that was originally championed by the previous left-leaning government, a coalition of the SPD and the Green Party? And the undertaking holds hidden dangers: Von der Leyen might isolate herself within her own party. And if she fails to push through the Elterngeld reform, her ministry’s key project, it could very well spell the end of her ministerial career.

2 Agenda-setting: Dovetailing scientific expertise, alliance partners and communication strategy

In what follows, we will analyze the process leading up to the introduction of Elterngeld with the help of the ReformCompass. Along with this, we will describe the appointment of the core strategic group, the preparation of the agenda-setting phase and the parts of the agenda-setting phase that predated von der Leyen’s term as family minister. Then, for the policy-formulating and decision-making phase, we will present background information in Chapter 3 that will allow us to identify options for strategic man- agement during this phase. Lastly, we will complete our exposition by examining the implementation phase (Chapter 4) and the ongoing impact evaluation (Chapter 5). A table providing an overview of the important dates, events and decisions between 2003 and 2012 for all of the phases can be found in the Dossier (Part II).

Appointment of the strategic group and agenda-setting preparation

The first phase of the Elterngeld reform process began in the 15th legislative period (2002–2005). The central actor in the core executive was Renate Schmidt. The family minister had systematically regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 7

brought in external expertise by commissioning two expert opinions (from economist Bert Rürup and sociologist Hans Bertram) as well as by convening the committee of experts charged with drafting the Seventh Family Report. In addition to bringing in specialized know-how, both of the experts drafting opinions served as actors who publicly lobbied in favor of Elterngeld. These expert opinions and the family report concerned both the competence and communication dimensions. In addition to setting out the scientific foundations of the Elterngeld reform, they also influenced its policies and concrete design.

Which key messages were communicated? One was that Elterngeld must be viewed within the context of childcare and all-day schools. Another was that family-policy measures (e.g., the expansion of childcare infrastructure and Elterngeld) would have highly important economic impacts because they could boost the labor force participation rate of women as well as the birthrate. This message made it possible to attract support for family policies from areas that went beyond the traditional family-policy actors: business associations, economists and politicians focused on other policy fields. Thus, the status of the policy field that Gerhard Schröder had once derided as “much-to-do-about-nothing” was fundamentally enhanced.7

Renate Schmidt breaks a taboo

One breaking of a taboo contributed to raising awareness about a problem that needed to be ad- dressed through reform. This occurred when Family Minister Schmidt publicly stated that the birthrate in Germany was too low and that something needed to be done on the political level to counteract this:

“Over the intervening years, we in Germany have come to have the fourth-worst birthrate of countries in the European Union. (…) Germany needs more children if we want to maintain our prosperity. Dear [party colleagues], this is not a feeble demographic policy of grim memory, but rather a policy that makes it possible for the wishes and dreams that young people have for their lives to finally become reality.” (Renate Schmidt, Nov. 19, 2003)8

Schmidt had openly acknowledged her goal of boosting the birthrate not only during the presentation of Rürup’s expert opinion for her ministry, but also in interviews and at the SPD’s annual party congress. Breaking this taboo was overwhelmingly accepted in the media and in her party for three reasons: (1) Schmidt’s high degree of authenticity and credibility, (2) a greater grasp within the media of the effects that a declining birthrate would have on the social security system and (3) Schmidt’s simultaneously delivered plea for family policies geared toward gender equality and the realities of people’s everyday lives:

“But what kind of model of life are we offering to the generation of women currently in Western Ger- many, who have never been better educated? To get a good education, then to work for a few years, then the so-called biological clock starts ticking, and then the decision has to be made: Should I have a child or not? If the decision is ‘yes,’ for starters, it means three years away from their careers for the women concerned because we don’t have the necessary childcare [infrastructure]. (…) In many com- regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 8

munities in Western Germany, all-day kindergartens means bringing the child early, picking the child up at around noon or 12:30 so that the poor little thing can get an opened tin of ravioli or fish sticks from the freezer at home, taking the child back at 2 p.m., and then picking the child up at 4:30 p.m. This doesn’t even allow for one to reasonably hold a part-time job. Women are completely fed up. They don’t want that anymore.” (Renate Schmidt, Nov. 19, 2003)9

The groundwork for the “strategic economization”10 of family policies that has been attributed to von der Leyen was originally laid during Schmidt’s term in office. However, with both Schmidt and von der Leyen, it was much less of an issue of economization than one of broadening the goals regarding demographic and labor market policies. The “complementary target structure”11 of family policies was discovered and strategically exploited. During this period, the core executive had with Schmidt a per- sonality who was not only politically powerful, but also willing and able to assume political leadership.12

Networks and alliances

Two collaborations and networks during this phase deserve particular mention: In July 2003, the BMFSFJ and the Bertelsmann Stiftung jointly launched the “Alliance for the Family,” a platform for actors from business and unions to take an active role in promoting a family-friendly work environ- ment. Then, in January 2004, came the launch of “Local Alliances for Families,” a federal initiative that forms networks of actors from business, politics and civil society at the communal level. Within just a few years, alliances had been established in 670 locations, putting a combined population of roughly 56 million people within reach.13 The crux of both projects is to allow people to achieve a better work- life balance. With them, the BMFSFJ has succeeded in establishing a broad networking of communities and businesses. In addition to being sensible for reconciling gainful employment with the tasks of raising and caring for children at the local level, these networks can simultaneously be used to enlist communities and businesses to become alliance partners in efforts to modernize family policies.

During this phase, there was still no public discussion about Elterngeld. Indeed, in 2004, it was the issue of childcare infrastructure that held center stage in family policy debates. The Daycare Expan- sion Act (TAG), which called for the creation of 230,000 new childcare places by 2010, was prepared. While this act was in the pipeline, Schmidt brought up the Elterngeld issue during a closed-door cabinet retreat held in Neuhardenberg, a small town near the German-Polish border, on July 9, 2004. Chancellor Schröder then asked her to “flesh out details.”14

The term “Elterngeld” shows up in the media for the first time: Beginning of agenda-setting in the mass media

Agenda-setting activities related to the public began on September 5, 2004. At a retreat held in Bonn, the cabinet resolved to introduce income-linked Elterngeld. In doing so, the term “Elterngeld” was successfully inserted into the media arena for the first time. An analysis of the archives of national news- papers (e.g., the Frankfurter Allgemeine, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt) provides evidence that the word “Elterngeld” made its first appearance in the media at this time (and has remained the sub- regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 9

ject of regular discussion there ever since).15 For some time, social scientists, economists and demog- raphers had already known about similar parental-allowance schemes that had been introduced in Scandinavian countries. At the very latest, Rürup’s expert opinion brought the term into the specialized policy debate. Worth noting, however, is the fact that Schmidt’s concrete proposal was first brought to the attention of the wider public only after Chancellor Schröder voiced support for it.

“(Chancellor Schröder) alluded to the fact that female university graduates, in particular, were having children more and more rarely. This kind of development had societal consequences, he warned.” (Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Sept. 5, 2004, indirect quotation)16

“It’s about the university graduates who want to have even fewer children than others, which jeopard- izes the already disturbed transmission of cultural knowledge. To change that, Family Minister Renate Schmidt wants to introduce Elterngeld, which, unlike the child-raising allowance [Erziehungsgeld], consists of an amount that varies according to income rather than being a fixed amount that is the same for everyone. As a result, female university graduates, who usually have higher incomes, would get more money per child than saleswomen. In this way, one wants to encourage the educated to have more children.” (Die Welt, Sept. 6, 2004)17

The quotations cited above show that, when the plans for Elterngeld were first announced, one of its central justifications was to address the low birthrates of female university graduates, and that this aspect received increased media attention. In fact, a census from 2008 found that the rate of child- lessness for female university graduates born between 1964 and 1968 was 30 percent (and 32.3 percent for those in Western Germany) compared to a national average of 20.8 percent for all German women in that age cohort.18 Since the statistics available weren’t as clear in 2004, the fully exaggerat- ed figure of 40 percent was making the rounds in many media sources.

However, subsequent efforts – and particularly those of the SPD – put a greater focus on communicating the goals of Elterngeld that related to policies of social and gender equality. In fact, many SPD politicians argued for the introduction of Elterngeld without even mentioning the goal of boosting the birthrate. This can also be seen in the SPD’s election platform, which stated even 10 months after the beginning of the agenda-setting phase:

“In doing so, we ensure that families can maintain their standard of living even if they interrupt their professional lives. This fosters equality for women and gives fathers better opportunities to make use of parental leave.” (SPD election platform, July 4, 2005)19

The CDU and CSU criticize the Elterngeld plans

Meanwhile, the Elterngeld plans were vehemently criticized within the CDU/CSU, whose politicians particularly objected to how the plans called for shortening the period in which benefits were paid to one year in comparison to the three-year limit of Erziehungsgeld. Likewise, the sister parties made a social-policy argument criticizing what they saw as an unjust distribution of benefit money: regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 10

“That is politics along the lines of: Whoever has a lot will get a lot.” (Christa Stewens, CSU social minister of Bavaria, Sept. 12, 2005)20

“Parents are forced to go back to work after one year, but the state isn’t allowed to tell anybody what to do.” (CDU deputy faction leader Maria Böhmer, May 2, 2005)21

Böhmer was alluding to what had happened with Erziehungsgeld, which most parents were claiming during their child’s toddler stage (indeed, just 11 percent of parents were only claiming it during the child’s first year of life). In addition, federal states governed by the CDU and CSU, such as Bavaria and Thuringia, also offered a state-funded child-raising allowance (Landeserziehungsgeld) in the child’s third year of life (i.e., between the second and third birthday). But, unlike the vast majority of her colleagues in the CDU and the CSU, von der Leyen did not speak out against Elterngeld:

“I have a certain degree of sympathy for [having Elterngeld last a year]. But we in the Union have ini- tially chosen another path, namely, the higher tax exemption.” (Ursula von der Leyen, July 15, 2005)22

The Seventh Family Report

The Seventh Family Report, produced by a committee of experts led by sociologist Hans Bertram, was presented to the federal government on August 17, 2005. This report blazed the trail for Elterngeld, whose ultimate success can be attributed to a special combination of argumentation, dissemination and timing.23

Regarding argumentation: This panel of experts, which was neutral in terms of party allegiance, produced a 351-page document that depicted the reality of everyday family life in Germany and recom- mended a sustainable family policy with three dimensions: time, money and infrastructure. The Sev- enth Family Report argued for a “life cycle-related family policy” and took up the issue of “time for the family.”24 Both of these are central lines of argumentation in favor of Elterngeld, and they both go further than the previously mentioned arguments made in the Rürup expert opinion – i.e., reducing opportunity costs and boosting the birthrate.

The Seventh Family Report concretely discusses Elterngeld at three points: First, it is mentioned as a positive example in the “Families and family policy in a European comparison” chapter. The “Sustain- able family policy: A new balance between gainful employment and welfare in the life cycle” chapter describes it as a building block of a sustainable family policy. And the final chapter, titled “Future sce- narios,” designates Elterngeld as the key recommendation of the committee of experts. In addition, the report highlights the parental-allowance models used in Sweden and Finland as positive examples in contrast to Germany’s childcare allowance at the time (Erziehungsgeld).

The gender-equality aspect played a central role for the report’s authors because they believed that Elterngeld would help ensure the economic independence of women. The authors also cited an additional argument in favor of Elterngeld that would be of major importance to conservatives: In their regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 11

view, Elterngeld would counter a “devaluation of care services.”25 In other words, it argued that Er- ziehungsgeld was based on the rationale that taking care of one’s children is significantly less valuable than gainful employment (i.e., that breadwinning trumps homemaking), whereas Elterngeld would guarantee that they are equally valued due to its income-linked conception.

Regarding dissemination: Already while it was preparing its family report, the commission had carried on an intense dialogue with other actors. Between February 10, 2004 and April 12, 2005, the commission hosted 11 dialogue events with civil society actors and other stakeholders. These included, for example, the Protestant and Catholic churches, family associations (e.g., the AGF umbrella organization of German family organizations, the Zukunftsforum Familie and the German Association for Public and Private Welfare), academic organizations (e.g., the German Sociological Association) and social partners (e.g., the Confederation of German Employer Associations and the Confederation of German Trade Unions). The findings of the Seventh Family Report were disseminated via press conferences, newspaper opinion pieces written by the report’s authors, and scholarly knowledge-transfer publica- tions. Both of these things – dialogue and press activities – played a role in making the PR work have a lasting impact.

Regarding timing: The Seventh Family Report was drafted during the same period as the agenda- setting phase. There were several feedback loops between the scientific work of the commission and the political work related to strategy-development and agenda-setting. On top of that, both the experts and the core executive in the BMFSFJ shared a common goal. The cabinet resolution of September 5, 2004 backing the introduction of Elterngeld came just short of a year before the official presentation of the family report. Thus, political actions strengthened the impact of the family report, and the family report gave additional argumentative impetus to the Elterngeld plans. This impetus related not only to the media, but also to options for political decision-making: By including a detailed discussion of the Finnish and Swedish parental-allowance models, the Seventh Family Report presented two systems with a range of elements that German policymakers could pick and choose from when deciding how to design the country’s Elterngeld reform. The Swedish model provides compensation for up to 80 percent of one’s pre-tax earnings, while the Finnish model provides for 67 percent. Unlike the Swedish model, the Finnish one allows parents to choose between having a place in a childcare facility and receiving a so-called “stay-at-home” childcare allowance (Betreuungsgeld) up until the child’s third birthday. During a phase when Elterngeld and Betreuungsgeld were being debated in Germany as incompatible alternatives, the family report put a spotlight on the Finns, who had successfully combined the two concepts rather than viewing them as either-or options.

Elterngeld plans and early federal elections

Plans for implementing Elterngeld made no further progress under the SPD-Greens coalition government led by Chancellor Schröder. First, this had to do with timing: On September 6, 2004, Elterngeld landed on the political agenda. Then, on May 22, 2005, Chancellor Schröder called for early elections after the SPD lost the election in North Rhine-Westphalia, a traditional party stronghold. Thereafter, all energies were devoted to campaigning for the upcoming election in the fall. Thus, this eight-month regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 12

span of time between agenda-setting and the campaign kickoff was very narrow. Second, the SPD- Greens government presumably judged that the chances of getting the Elterngeld reform passed were slim because they didn’t enjoy a majority in the Bundesrat (the upper house of parliament representing the 16 federal states) and they could expect to face “massive resistance from the conservative camp”26. Indeed, getting Elterngeld passed would be a success for Schröder’s government – and the Union obviously didn’t want to allow its rivals to score this success during the second half of the legislative period and thereby expose itself to criticism from its own voters.

N.B.: Contrary to what had been planned, the Seventh Family Report was presented in the middle of the election campaign. The Elterngeld issue was then “pulled into” the election battle, debated along party lines and discredited somewhat for purely ideological reasons rather than being considered on its objective merits. The SPD’s election platform touted the benefits of Elterngeld and called for the reform to enter into effect on January 1, 2008 (for more details on timing, see the Dossier below. Meanwhile, the CDU and CSU opposed the reform and campaigned instead for a “child bonus” in the pension-insurance system. The business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP), on the other hand, was against Elterngeld for other reasons: It wanted lower taxes and no new social benefits.

3 Policy formulating and decision-making: Reaping the rewards of the agenda-setting phase and forging majorities

Since large parts of the Union had taken a stance against Elterngeld, the core challenge was to change the minds of CDU/CSU members and get them on board. Indeed, having the support of one’s party is a precondition for government action, and it takes a lot more than pointing out what is stipulated in the coalition agreement to get the majority party of a coalition government to change its stance and provide its support. Fischer, Kießling and Novy note that “the ability to push through policy decisions” hinges on “whether these are in normative agreement with the party line. Chances in political course require the assent of the party.”27 In the case of Elterngeld, there definitely wasn’t any agreement with the party line in November 2005, when von der Leyen was sworn in as family minister. On the contrary, the party had just finished an election campaign in which there had been other demands related to family policy, and reducing the amount of time that mothers took off from their careers from three years to one fundamentally contradicted its conservative worldview.

In what follows, we will outline some of the background information for the policy-formulating and decision-making phase of the ReformCompass. The analysis will be presented in subsections correspond- ing to the three dimensions competence, communication and capability to implement. We would like to point out once again that these three dimensions mutually influence each other: In particular, competence appears to be a precondition for successful communication, and the latter is an important element in terms of the ability to get a reform politically passed and implemented.

regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 13

Competence

Family Minister Schmidt had a strategic group that organized the agenda-setting for the Elterngeld reform. But von der Leyen was new to the BMFSFJ, and she had to decide who to appoint to her strategic group: How many would be people she knew and trusted? And how many would be experts who had worked under her SPD predecessor? Malte Ristau, the head of the ministry’s General Policy Divi- sion, had been an important figure in the agenda-setting and had also become a publicly visible figure in the debate, for example, by writing an article on the “economic charm of the family.”28

Scientific debate about Elterngeld had been settled in large part. The BMFSFJ attached much importance to scientific analyses and projected impacts, so one can say that an evidence-based policy approach was used to a certain extent.29 For decades, other countries (e.g., Sweden and Finland) had had experience with parental-allowance schemes similar to the Elterngeld proposal. In Finland, parental benefits (Elterngeld) had been combined with childcare benefits (Betreuungsgeld), which also has to do with the fact that it is hard for such a sparsely populated country to provide a comprehensive system of affordable childcare facilities.

In Sweden, Elterngeld had a significant impact on birthrate trends, particularly as a result of changes in how benefits were calculated for a second child.30 However, since the higher birthrates in those countries can of course also be attributed to a range of factors – including political, institutional, cultural and economic ones – one couldn’t expect to a see a significant rise in the German birthrate imme- diately after the introduction of Elterngeld. What’s more, according to international research on the welfare state, family policy will play an increasingly important role in the success of welfare states.31

The overwhelming majority of academic experts had a positive view of Elterngeld. As a result of the choice of individuals commissioned to draft expert opinions (see above), there were arguments in favor of Elterngeld from the fields of both social science and economics, and these arguments would be made by two men (Bertram and Rürup) who were highly opinionated and influential. At the same time, the experts emphasized the different goals and impacts of Elterngeld: While Rürup’s expert opinion highlighted goals related to demographic and labor market policies, the goals of gender equality and securing one’s income over the course of one’s life (i.e., avoiding a long-term reduction in income because one has opted to have children) played a dominant role in the Seventh Family Report.

Communication

Regardless of whether one looks at the various expert opinions or the subsequent draft legislation, five different goals were associated with the Elterngeld reform:

1. To secure income stability in the family-foundation phase

2. To make it possible for parents to have time and “breathing space” (e.g., financial, etc.) in the first year regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 14

3. To foster increased labor market participation of mothers

4. To support gender equality (primarily by providing stimuli for fathers to assume a larger share of childcare responsibilities)

5. To make it easier to start families (e.g., by boosting fertility rates)

This analysis of Elterngeld aims cited in the mass media confirms that one could distinguish five sepa- rate goals. Figure 1 shows that all five goals were regularly mentioned both before and after the reform. But the analysis also reveals that some goals, such as “boosting the birthrate” and “guaranteeing income stability,” played a crucial role in the public eye.

Figure 1: Goals mentioned in newspaper articles about Elterngeld

Source: Bujard, Martin. “The five goals of the new German parental leave benefit in the focus of politics, media and science.” Zeitschrift für Familienforschung / Journal of Family Research (25) 2: 132–153 (143), 2013.

“Our generous support for families continues to lead (…) to neither more births nor a reasonable inte- gration of parents into the labor market. Here, we must change course. (…) [Elterngeld is] an interest- ing idea. (…) In addition, given the growing shortage of highly skilled workers, we cannot afford to do without well-qualified women and mothers.” (Dieter Hundt, president of the Confederation of German Employer Associations, Jan. 5, 2005)32

“Overall assessment: The introduction of Elterngeld is viewed as a paradigm change in family policies by being geared toward the professional life and ability to work of both parents. As such, it corre- sponds with something that the DGB, its member unions and, in particular, women in trade unions have been demanding for years.” (German Trade Union Confederation (DGB), June 27, 2006)33 regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 15

The goals and proponents of Elterngeld

These differing goals are central for different parties and stakeholders. For example, these quotations provide evidence that employers supported Elterngeld for reasons related to demographic and labor market policies, and that unions backed it for reasons related to gender-equality policies. Elterngeld’s structure of complementary goals would also be important for the constellations of actors during the negotiation phase. Table 1 provides an overview of the goals and their backers:

Table 1: The goals of Elterngeld and the actors interested in achieving them

Goal Particularly relevant for

SPD, CDU/CSU, Greens, Left Party, Income security family associations, unions, children and parents (voters)

SPD, CDU/CSU, Greens, Left Party, Time and “breathing space” in the family associations, unions, first year children and parents (voters)

Increased labor market SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, participation of mothers employers

SPD, Greens, Left Party Gender equality women’s rights movement, unions

CDU/CSU, parts of the SPD, Increased birthrate employers, churches

Furthermore, the social policy characteristics of the paradigm shift were problematic for different parties and stakeholders (see Table 2):

regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 16

Table 2: Characteristics of Elterngeld and their individual potential for sparking conflict

Characteristics of the Problematic for … paradigm shift

SPD, Left Party, unions, Income-linked benefit low-income voters

FDP, CDU, CSU, Explicit incentives for fathers employers

Making it the norm for mothers to CDU, CSU, Catholic Church, take one rather than three years off voters who had lived under the previous their careers model

Capability to implement: Inconsistencies within the CDU/CSU in the phase between the coalition agreement and the draft legislation

Members of the Union held a wide range of opposing positions on Elterngeld, as can be seen from the following quotations:

“It’s not for us to tell people how they should live and organize their family. (…) The fact that people who earn more get more for their children is socially unjust. That doesn’t correspond to the CDU’s position.” (Jürgen Rüttgers, CDU deputy party chair and minister president of North Rhine-Westphalia, Dec. 1, 2005) 34

“The better educated that young men and women are, the more rarely they decide to have children. (…) [We have] resolved to introduce Elterngeld. It will at first be designed as replacement income and additionally linked with a father component. That is a novel approach in both directions. Already now, I can sense which discussions this will provoke. But businesses – and I say that very explicitly – should view it as their duty more than was previously the case to also grant fathers time off.” (Chancellor An- gela Merkel, November 30, 2005)35

“This is about having more children be born rather than about who does the dishes.” (Saxony Minister President Georg Milbradt, May 20, 2006)36

“Opposition is strongest among [male Union voters] between their mid-40s and mid-50s who have children between 10- and 15-years-old. They view their own way of life as being called into question and, often more importantly, the life history of their own wives.” (‘Someone close to Ursula von der Leyen,’ April 27, 2006)37 regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 17

“The grand coalition is opening a historic window for Elterngeld. To do so, it needs to do some work persuading people in both parties. My predecessor, Renate Schmidt, already pushed through the idea within the SPD before the election. I have made no secret of my sympathy for it. Not fighting against the idea during the election campaign just because it came from the political opponent has paid off. So now we can take this step together.” (Ursula von der Leyen, Dec. 20, 2005)38

“We mustn’t have the diaper apprenticeship (Wickelvolontariat) (...) If it works in families, it can be managed just fine that way, too!” (Peter Ramsauer, head of the CSU state group, April 25, 2006)39

All of these quotations – and one can find plenty of other ones critical of Elterngeld – come from the period between the coalition agreement and the draft legislation. Considering the fact that the parties in the ruling coalition had already agreed to the proposed law, the criticisms that Rüttgers, Milbradt, Ramsauer and many others voiced against the Elterngeld plans were unusually vehement and hit upon a very broad range of issues. Merkel’s statement indicates that she expected employers to be opposed to the aspect of the reform offering months away from the workplace to fathers. Von der Leyen was the only top political figure within the Union who spoke out in favor of Elterngeld during the election campaign. Worth noting is the fact that President Köhler, who (like all German presidents) usually didn’t interfere with daily politics, meddled with day-to-day politics by making a positive statement about Elterngeld:

“Families need practical assistance and financial relief. (...) Elterngeld and the improved tax conces- sion for childcare costs point in the right direction.” (President Horst Köhler, Jan. 18, 2006)40

Actor constellations within parties and associations

The actor constellation was as follows: For the SPD, it would be difficult to oppose Elterngeld since the party had demanded it during the election campaign. However, since the Agenda 2010 reforms of labor market and welfare benefits had already provoked an internal dispute over which policy directions the party should take, promoting an income-linked benefit had the potential to cause problems. This was particularly the case because it is hard to communicate both the “life-cycle approach” (i.e., one that aims to allow people to maintain their previous standard of living) and opportunity costs if someone accuses the state of putting a value of €1,800 on the children of dentists, politicians and civil servants, but one of only €300 on those of the unemployed, low earners and students. Contrary to the method of income redistribution traditionally advocated by the SPD, Elterngeld would especially support highly skilled women, which would amount to an “exclusive emancipation” with consequences for social inequalities.41

In the CDU, politicians specializing in gender issues and the overwhelming majority of the party (especially its conservative wing) were opposed to Elterngeld. And the CSU was adamantly against it. Many politicians specializing in budgetary issues were also opposed to financing a project that would cost billions given the need for budget consolidation. Family Minister von der Leyen, on the other hand, regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 18

was in favor of Elterngeld and had already become an influential force in shaping CDU family policies as former head of the party’s “Parents, Children, Career” committee.

Meanwhile, much hinged on the stance of Angela Merkel, the head of the party and the new chancellor since 2005. Having grown up and lived in the former communist East Germany – which was argu- ably much more progressive in terms of integrating women into the workforce and providing the childcare infrastructure needed to permit this – one could reasonably expect that Merkel wouldn’t share the conservative misgivings prevalent within her party about shortening the amount of time women could take off work to have and raise children. Likewise, one could presume that she would promote Eltern- geld just like the other resolutions in the coalition agreement. However, since she had in no way tied her political fate to it, failing to “deliver” on this reform wouldn’t have called her credibility into question. Thus, Merkel could first sit back and observe von der Leyen’s reform-related efforts, assume the role of a facilitator and then wait and see how the mood toward Elterngeld evolved within the CDU and the wider public. In addition to being bothered by the shorter period that mothers would spend away from their jobs, conservative forces within the party were particularly irritated about the explicit “partner months” (i.e., that couples would get 14 months of support rather than just 12 if both partners took time off), which they interpreted as forcing fathers to take time off. However, this “partner months” aspect was of fundamental importance to the SPD.42

Regarding civil society actors and associations43: Employers had taken a stance in clear support of Elterngeld in order to get mothers to return to the labor market as early as possible. Parts of the Cath- olic Church were opposed to Elterngeld. Several well-known and highly visible scholars were voicing their support for Elterngeld. In the media, praise for and criticism of Elterngeld were fairly evenly bal- anced at the beginning of von der Leyen’s term in office as family minister.

Since Elterngeld was a new policy tool, there were several possible courses of action to take and alternative solutions at that time:

 The length of time that could be taken off didn’t necessarily have to be a year; it could be 10, 12, 14 or even 18 months.

 The level of compensation could be set at the Finnish (67%), the Swedish (80%) or some other level.

 The minimum level of compensation was just as adjustable as the maximum one.

 There was also freedom to negotiate on the issue of whether explicit “partner months” (i.e., months for fathers) would be provided for and, if so, how many.

 Another possible course of action was to have a “package deal,” simultaneously introducing both Elterngeld and Betreuungsgeld. regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 19

 The time at which Elterngeld was to be introduced could be earlier or later.

 Other options included: whether Elterngeld would be paid to people receiving ALG II benefits for the long-term unemployed and, if so, whether it would be counted as income when calculating other benefits; whether there would be additional allowances for siblings and single parents.

4 Implementation within Germany’s federalist structure

This analysis focuses on the phases of the Elterngeld reform that culminated in the passage of the BEEG law on parental benefits in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat at the end of 2006. However, for the sake of completeness, we will also present the key events of the subsequent phases of the Eltern- geld reform and outline the challenges faced in them.

When it came to implementing the Elterngeld reform, there was one challenge that had to do with politics and administration and another that concerned content-related and pragmatic issues. The former had to do with the fact that Elterngeld would be financed by the federal government but disbursed by the federal states. This meant that each state had to find institutions to build up the necessary capaci- ties within the brief period of time between when the BEEG was signed into law (Dec. 5, 2006) and when disbursements were scheduled to begin (for children born on and after Jan. 1, 2007). Directives to help with this were set on Dec. 18, 2006, and these included guidelines that federal and state officials had jointly agreed on. The speed at which things could be arranged was essential given the fact that Elterngeld was supposed to replace earned income lost as a result of not working, and that had to occur in a timely fashion. The fact that applications for Elterngeld must contain the child’s date of birth presented a major challenge because Elterngeld benefits were supposed to be disbursed no more than two weeks after the application had been submitted.

The content-related challenge had to do with calculating one’s previous income. This had to be pre- cise as well as available quickly, which particularly made more complicated constellations of pragmatic solutions necessary. On June 3, 2008, the ruling coalition proposed a draft amendment to the BEEG. This first amendment included special procedures for simplifying how income was calculated. If the goals of Elterngeld (see Chapter 2c) were to be met, it was crucial for the reform to be quickly and pragmatically implemented on the administrative level.

regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 20

5 Ongoing impact evaluation and communicating the positive impacts of Elterngeld

Ongoing impact evaluation was anchored in the Elterngeld reform in a particularly systematic manner. The causes for this lay in the specifics of the agenda-setting phase. Here, one can see how the various reform phases mesh with and influence each other. The communication of different goals during the agenda-setting phase prompted an evaluation especially focused on these goals. This evaluation was carried out by commissioning the Federal Statistical Office to collect data related to Elterngeld and other research institutes to analyze individual impacts. Furthermore, in 2008, the Federal Ministry of Finance and the BMFSFJ jointly decided to conduct a comprehensive overall evaluation of family- policy measures.

This impact evaluation led to – and continues to lead to even today – discussions about modifications to Elterngeld. When it comes to elements of the reform that have turned out to be particularly successful, there have been calls for an expansion of Elterngeld. One example is the rate of participation of fathers, which has skyrocketed from roughly 4 percent to almost 40 percent.44 But since some other goals have met with less success, the relevant stakeholders and party wings have demanded that Elterngeld be trimmed down or even abolished. This became particularly clear on July 6, 2012, when Volker Kauder, the parliamentary flood leader of the CDU/CSU, called Elterngeld into question because he had been disappointed by its demographic impacts.45

Communicating the findings of various evaluations of various goals plays a central role in how Eltern- geld is perceived by the public. Experts and the communication strategy of the core executive have a major influence on the degree to which Elterngeld is accepted and, thereby, on its long-term survival.46

regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 21

Part II: Dossier Chronology of the Elterngeld reform process

Table 3: Key dates and events of the reform phases47

Phases of the Date Event ReformCompass

02.20.2003 Family Minister Renate Schmidt convenes committee of experts to draft Seventh Family Report

July 2003 The BMFSFJ and the Bertelsmann Stiftung launch the “Alliance for the Family” platform for businesses and unions

11.13.2003 Rürup expert opinion published 48 ; proposes Appointment of the strategic Elterngeld; Renate Schmidt designates expand- group and preparation for ed childcare infrastructure as a prerequisite49 agenda-setting 11.19.2003 Renate Schmidt calls for “boosting the birthrate” at an SPD party congress in Bochum50

January 2004 “Local Alliances for Families” initiative launched

07.09.2004 Renate Schmidt brings up issue of Elterngeld at cabinet retreat in Neuhardenberg; Chancellor Schröder asks her to “flesh out details”51

09.05.2004 Cabinet passes resolution to introduce income- linked Elterngeld at retreat in Bonn

05.03.2005 Bertram expert opinion published52

Agenda-setting 05.22.2005 SPD loses election in North Rhine-Westphalia; Party Chair Franz Müntefering and Chancellor Schröder announce early elections

06.06.2005 Publication of special issue of Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (23-24/2005) on family policies, including essays by Rürup, Bertram and Ristau regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 22

08.17.2005 Seventh Family Report presented to the federal government53; press release by Renate Schmidt

09.18.2005 Election for 16th German Bundestag held

10.17.2005 Start of coalition talks between the CDU, CSU and SPD

10.17.2005 Angela Merkel nominates Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), social minister of Lower Saxony, to be next federal family minister

11.02.2005 Coalition committee agrees to Elterngeld; key points: compensation for 67% of lost net income with a maximum of €1,800 beginning in 200854

11.11.2005 The coalition agreement for the “grand coalition” is completed (signed on Nov. 18)

11.22.2005 Angela Merkel is elected chancellor of Germany

01.09.2006 Details for Elterngeld hammered out at cabinet Formulating and Decision- retreat in Genshagen making 04.26.2006 Federal government issues statement on Sev- enth Family Report (Drucksache 16/1360)

05.01.2006 Coalition committee in the Chancellery agrees to 12+2 version (rather than 12-2)

06.20.2006 CDU/CSU and SPD factions publish joint draft bill for introduction of Elterngeld (Drucksache 16/1889)

08.25.2006 Federal government publishes draft bill for introduction of Elterngeld (Drucksache 16/2454)

09.27.2006 Bundestag Committee for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth publishes recommendation for BEEG law on parental benefits and leave (Drucksache 16/2785) regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 23

09.27.2006 Bundestag Budget Committee publishes report on the draft bills of the factions and federal government (Drucksache 16/2788)

09.29.2006 BEEG passed in Bundestag

11.03.2006 BEEG passed in Bundesrat

12.05.2006 President Köhler signs BEEG into law

12.18.2006 Publication of directives providing guidelines for implementing BEEG (agreed on by federal and state governments)

01.01.2007 Parents have a right to claim Elterngeld for all children born on or after this date

Since 2007 Various state-government agencies have disbursed federally financed Elterngeld benefits (e.g., in Baden-Württemberg, it is the state- owned Landesbank)

Fall 2007 Federal and state officials hold meetings on BEEG implementation (see Drucksache 16/5858) Implementation

06.03.2008 CDU/CSU and SPD factions present joint draft of first amendment to BEEG (Drucksache 16/9415)55

07.02.2008 Bundesrat publishes draft bill for making it easier to calculate previous income when parents apply for Elterngeld (Drucksache 16/9897)

08.13.2008 Federal government publishes draft bill for first amendment to BEEG (Drucksache 16/10118)

10.21.2008 Bundestag Committee for Family Affairs publishes recommendation on first amendment to BEEG (Drucksache 16/10689) regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 24

Since 2007 Federal Statistical Office begins collecting statistics related to Elterngeld (§ 22 BEEG); related press releases are published on a quarterly ba- sis56

03/2007 – Elterngeld Evaluation Phase I: Opinion polls and 06/2007 business surveys

07/2007 – Elterngeld Evaluation Phase II: Social impacts, 09/2008 comparisons with other countries

03.01.2008 – Feasibility study on overall evaluation of family 12.31.2008 policy measures; conducted by Prognos with the ZEW, DIW and ifo; commissioned by BMF and BMFSFJ

04.28.2008 Competence Center for Family Policy Studies publishes report57

10.30.2008 Federal government publishes report on impacts of BEEG (Drucksache 16/10770) Ongoing impact evaluation 2009 Elterngeld Evaluation Phase III: Effects on the labor market, business surveys

2009–2013 Overall evaluation of family policy measures (11 individual studies) carried out by various research institutes

04.24.2009 Ursula von der Leyen calls for parents to be able and to claim partial benefits (half) for a longer period 06.02.2009 (up to 28 months) (Drucksache 16/13275)

03.24.2010 Bundesrat publishes draft bill on simplifying process for claiming Elterngeld (Drucksache 17/1221)

05.29.2012 Bundestag Committee for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth publishes recommendation on draft bill on simplifying process for claiming Elterngeld (Drucksache 17/9841) regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 25

09.10.2012 Passage of law for simplifying process for claiming Elterngeld58

Source: Author’s own diagram.

Table 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the important events and decisions in the Elterngeld reform process. It is in chronological order and presents a rough delineation of the phases of the ReformCompass model. Two aspects are decisive for the analysis: First, in reality, the phases cannot be definitively separated and put in successive order; instead, parts of it take place in parallel or over- lap with each other. Second, the steps of these phases build on one another. This can especially be seen with the strategic group and agenda-setting, which represent central prerequisites for the formulating and decision-making phase. Thus, a key to understanding the Elterngeld reform process lies in analyzing the continuities and discontinuities between Phase 2 and Phase 3, as differentiated according to the dimensions competence, communication and capability to implement.

Key information and sources for the reform process

In what follows, we provide select passages from documents that were important in the establishment of Elterngeld in order to offer a glimpse into the key sources. Brief comments on them are also included. To see how they fit into the overall chronology of the reform, refer to Table 3.

Expert opinions

The Rürup expert opinion, which had been commissioned by the BMFSFJ, was released on Nov. 16, 2003 and jointly publicized by Family Minister Renate Schmidt. It designates the introduction of Elterngeld as the first concrete measure needed for a sustainable family policy. It already proposes setting the level of compensation at 67 percent of previous pretax earnings.

“The central idea is to reduce the opportunity costs that arise from the loss in income by paying a so- called ‘Elterngeld’ to a parent who has interrupted or reduced his or her gainful employment in order to raise the child. This loss in income is supposed to be kept low by an Elterngeld, which would be fundamentally aligned with the level of net wages before the birth. An Elterngeld would replace Er- ziehungsgeld and, on average, it should be significantly higher than the maximum amount of Er- ziehungsgeld paid today. A relatively high benefit [amount] for parents during the time they take off from work [Elternzeit] has also contributed to the ‘success’ of family policy in Scandinavian countries. (…) For an Elterngeld, one could imagine, for example, a level of 67 percent of the net salary.” (Rürup and Gruescu 2003: 56)

The Bertram expert report, published on May 3, 2005, anticipates an argument that would be made in the Seventh Family Report soon thereafter. regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 26

“However, we are also of the opinion that the introduction of an Elterngeld as compensation for lost income can positively support not only models of full-time employment, but also the model of leading one’s life in an adaptive manner. In a model of Elterngeld as compensation for lost income, it is made clear that the decision to responsibly look after one’s own child for a certain period of time is just as important from a societal point of view as the career that is being pursued at that moment. This kind of Elterngeld also makes it clear that those who assume personal responsibility for [caring for] their children must not relinquish their own economic independence for this reason.” (Bertram et al. 2005: 48)

The press statement on the Seventh Family Report was published on Aug. 17, 2005, which fell in the middle of the election campaign because early federal elections had been called in May. In it, Re- nate Schmidt makes a clear statement in support of Elterngeld. In addition, she provides concrete details on how long it should last, what the level of compensation for lost income should be and when it should be introduced (in this case, in 2008).

“We will further develop the existing Erziehungsgeld into an Elterngeld lasting one year as compensation for lost income. This path has particularly proven its worth in Scandinavia. Elterngeld replaces roughly two-thirds of one’s previous income (with a maximum level) and benefits the parent who inter- rupts his or her career to raise the children. Doing so ensures that families can maintain their standard of living even if they interrupt their professional life. Since the material losses to families will be small- er, fathers will have better opportunities to make use of parental leave [Elternzeit]. (…) The introduction of the new Elterngeld should be carried out beginning in 2008 because the prerequisite for this benefit is a significant expansion of the childcare infrastructure for children under three.” (Schmidt 2005: 2)

Election manifestos of 2005

The SPD election manifesto from July 4, 2005 includes more detailed plans for Elterngeld benefits linked to previous income. Although it mentions a 12‐month duration, it doesn’t designate any con‐ crete figures related to the allowance design or any explicit “father months.”

“We will transform the Erziehungsgeld currently in place into an Elterngeld paid for one year with a function of replacing lost income. In doing so, we ensure that families can maintain their standard of living even if they interrupt their professional lives. This fosters equality for women and gives fathers better opportunities to make use of parental leave [Elternzeit]. By means of better childcare opportunities for children under three and Elterngeld, we particularly avoid child and family poverty in single- parent households, and we secure an uninterrupted employment history for all parents. We hold fast to [a policy allowing] three years of child-rearing time with a job guarantee and a right to work part- time.” (SPD 2005: 31)

The government program of the Union, published on July 11, 2005, makes no mention of Eltern- geld. Instead, it criticizes the low birthrate in Germany as a policy failure of the SPD-Greens government under Chancellor Schröder and backs alternatives, such as devoting special attention to safeguarding marriage and families as well as promoting education. In addition to proposing measures regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 27

related to tax policies and the expansion of childcare facilities (Kitas), the Union also pledges to introduce a “child bonus” into the pension-insurance system.

“While the vast majority of citizens in Germany view starting their own family as a personal life goal, fewer and fewer people are realizing the existing wish to have children. Germany is at the bottom of the list in Europe in terms of birthrates! In recent years, the federal government has increasingly rela- tivized the value of marriage and family. (…) We stand for especially safeguarding marriage and family.” (CDU/CSU 2005: 23)

“Beginning on Jan. 1, 2007, we will introduce a ‘child bonus’ for newborn children of €50 per month as a reduction in the pension-insurance contribution. This benefit exists for children until they turn 12.” (CDU/CSU 2005: 29)

Coalition agreement of the CDU, CSU and SPD

In the coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD, dated Nov. 11, 2005, the plan for an Elterngeld reform is mentioned explicitly and in detail in two places. The first mention comes in Chap- ter II, on fiscal and budgetary policies (titled “Sustainable fiscal consolidation – a tax system fit for the future”), and the second mention appears in Chapter VI (titled “A family-friendly society”). It is worth noting how these two sections define the goals of Elterngeld in different ways. While financial policymakers stressed motives related to increasing the birthrate, family policymakers focused on goals related to income and freedom of choice. Furthermore, one can already see in the coalition agreement some of the key elements that would make it into the BEEG law, which went into effect on Jan. 1, 2007. However, some other elements changed during the process of formulating and decision-making.

“Germany needs more children. The welfare of families and children and the goal of enabling more people to fulfill their desire for children are the most important societal concerns in the coming years for the Federal Government. Thus, beginning in 2007, we will introduce a parental allowance package worth €3 billion under which parents of newborns will receive income-related support payments. One parent will receive, for a period of one year, an amount equal to 67% of the last net income, up to a monthly ceiling of €1,800. The needs of low-wage parents will be accounted for by way of a guaran- teed minimum amount, thus ensuring social equity. The parental allowance [Elterngeld], together with the expansion of childcare [infrastructure], will allow current and future parents to fulfill their desires for a family and thus make an important contribution toward solving the urgent societal, economic and social problems we are facing.” (CDU, CSU, SPD 2005: 79)

“We want to provide effective and sustainable financial support for families from the moment their children are born. This will take the form of a parental allowance [Elterngeld] that: avoids any interruption in income flows by providing a replacement income; creates a genuine choice between maternal and paternal care; and facilities economic independence for both parents, with appropriate compensation for opportunity costs.” (CDU, CSU, SPD 2005: 117) regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 28

Some of the key elements of the concrete design of Elterngeld had already been fixed in the coalition agreement:

 The parental allowance [Elterngeld] will take the form of a replacement income amounting to 67 percent of previous averaged net earned income (to a maximum of €1,800 per month) and will be paid to the person who has reduced their working hours or given up work in order to care for the child. As an alternative, consideration may be given to using the parents’ joint net earned income (in the interests of gender equality) – or, in the case of lone parents, the single parent’s net earned income – as the basis for assessment.

 The parental allowance will be topped up by an additional element for parents on low incomes or non-working parents (e.g., a basis amount that depends on the family income) (…)

 Welfare benefits will be taken into account when calculating the parental allowance [Eltern- geld]. The parental allowance is not deemed to be income for the purpose of calculating the housing benefit.

 The parental allowance will be paid for one year, with account being taken of the maternity benefit [Mutterschaftsgeld], which is intended to achieve the same objectives. Parents can choose whether to spread the full parental-allowance budget over a period of up to two years.

 Parents can opt to split the 12-month benefit period between themselves. Two months are re- served for the father, and two months for the mother.

 The benefit is funded from taxation, is tax-free and is not subject to social contributions. How- ever, the “exemption with progression” rule applies.

 The current rules on parental leave will remain in force. Part-time activity is permitted while claiming the parental allowance. The amount of parental allowance that can be disbursed if the parent takes on paid work during parental leave, and the level of household income at which eligibility for the parental allowance may lapse, have yet to be determined.

 The introduction of the parental allowance is planned for 2007.” (CDU, CSU, SPD 2005: 117)

Elterngeld in the context of expanding childcare infrastructure

Noteworthy here is that this calls for Elterngeld to be introduced in 2007, that is, a year earlier than Schmidt had planned. The reason behind this was that Minister Schmidt had viewed it as necessary to make progress on the expansion of early-childcare facilities before Elterngeld was introduced.

Indeed, there is a logical connection between Elterngeld and childcare: Elterngeld is supposed to be paid for the first 12 months of the child’s life and to make it possible for mothers to eventually return to regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 29

their jobs. But, for them to do so, childcare places must be available. The expansion of early-childcare infrastructure was advanced by two laws: the Daycare Expansion Act of 2004 (calling for the creation of 230,000 new childcare places by 2010) and the Childcare Funding Act of 2008 (giving parents a legal right to a childcare place for small children). However, this ambitious expansion would (and still will) require several years to complete, and if Elterngeld was to be introduced in 2008 (or even in 2010), there still wouldn’t be enough childcare places (except in the Eastern German Bundesländer).

Between the time when von der Leyen became family minister and today, the childcare rate for children under three in Germany has roughly tripled. In 2005, it was below 13 percent; in 2009, at 20.2 percent; and, in 2013, at 29.3 percent (as of March 1 for each year). Then, it saw steep growth between March and August 2013, when the legal right to a childcare place went into effect (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Childcare rates in Germany

Source: Author’s own depiction based on data from the OECD (2003), BMFSFJ (2006) and Federal Statistical Office (2007–2013).59 Notes: Whereas the Federal Statistical Office reported that the childcare-place rate in 2013 was 29.3 percent, the BMFSFJ (2013) published the significantly higher childcare rate of 40.3 percent. There are two reasons for this discrepancy: First, the childcare-place rate is based on a report of the federal states (Länder) on the childcare- financing investment program published on June 30, 2013, while the childcare rate of the BMFSFJ is based on the report for March 1, 2013, with only the former taking into account the places that arose in the “final spurt” of the expansion of childcare facilities (Kitas). Second, the childcare rate of the BMFSFJ does not count twice children who attend a childcare facility and also receive care at another childcare establishment, such as an after- hours facility (Kindertagespflege) or with a publicly subsidized child-minder (Tagesmutter).60 regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 30

Until 2012, women in Western Germany (i.e., the federal states that were not once part of the GDR) who claimed Elterngeld for a year could not rely on subsequently receiving a childcare place for their 1-year-old child in order to be able to go back to work. Women in Eastern Germany, on the other hand, could depend on being able to have a sufficient number of available places in childcare facilities (Kitas) already during the GDR era. Indeed, in 2006, the childcare rate in the Eastern Germany stood at roughly 40 percent, whereas it had only reached 7.8 percent in Western Germany. Thus, the mea- gre offerings of places in Kitas was a strong argument in support of allowing a reduced Elterngeld amount to be paid out over several years (and thereby allowing parents to work at least part-time during this period) rather than just having the full amount for a single year, as envisioned in the coalition agreement.

Endnotes / Comments All of the citations for objects found online are from June 3, 2014.

1 Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht, 3. Sitzung. November 22, 2005: 69. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16003.pdf.

2 “Koalitionsverhandlungen: Viele Punkte sind noch ungeklärt.” Spiegel‐Online, November 2, 2005. www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/koalitionsverhandlungen‐viele‐punkte‐sind‐noch‐ungeklaert‐a‐382983.html.

3 Cf.: Henninger, Annette, and Angelika von Wahl. “Das Umspielen von Veto‐Spielern. Wie eine konservative Familienministerin den Famili‐ alismus des deutschen Wohlfahrtsstaates unterminiert.” In Die zweite Große Koalition. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2005–2009, edi‐ ted by Christoph Egle and Reimut Zohlnhöfer. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010: 377.

4 Bujard, Martin. “Elterngeld und Elternzeit in Deutschland: Ziele, Diskurse und Wirkungen.” Zeitschrift für Familienforschung (25) 2: 123– 131, 2013. www.bib‐demografie.de/elterngeld2013.

5 According to the statistics on Erziehungsgeld, less than 4 percent of eligible fathers took parental leave (Elternzeit) in 2006.

6 Cf. also: Ostner, Ilona. “Paradigmenwechsel in der (west)deutschen Familienpolitik.” In Der demographische Wandel: Chancen für die Neuordnung der Geschlechterverhältnisse, edited by Peter Berger and Heike Kahlert. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2006: 165–199. Ostner sees a paradigm shift from a “familization” (single‐earner model) to a “defamilization” (two‐earner model), whereas labor market issues were a decisive incentive under the SPD‐Greens government.

7 Cf : Klammer, Ute, and Marie‐Thérèse Letablier. “Family Policies in Germany and France: The Role of Enterprises and Social Partners.” Social Policy & Administration (41) 6: 672–692, 2007. Regarding the thesis holding that the demographic problem directed attention to‐ ward family policies and especially to the issue of reconciling family and working life, cf. also: Hardmeier, Sibylle, and Angelika von Wahl. “Gebären und arbeiten. Die Zukunftsfähigkeit deutscher Familien‐ und Arbeitsmarktpolitik.” In Zukunftsfähigkeit Deutschland. Sozialwis‐ senschaftliche Essays, edited by Jürgen Kocka. Berlin: Sigma, 2007: 315–337.

8 Schmidt, Renate. Speech delivered at the SPD party convention on November 19, 2003 in Bochum.

9 Ibid.

10 Leitner, Sigrid. “Ökonomische Funktionalität der Familienpolitik oder familienpolitische Funktionalisierung der Ökonomie?” In Sozialpoli‐ tik. Ökonomisierung und Entgrenzung, edited by Adalbert Evers and Rolf G. Heinze. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008: 67–82. regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 31

11 Bujard, Martin. Geburtenrückgang und Familienpolitik. Baden‐Baden: Nomos, 2011: 371.

12 Cf.: Glaab, Manuela. “Politische Führung als strategischer Faktor.” Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft (17) 2: 303–332, 2007.

13 www.lokale‐buendnisse‐fuer‐familie.de/ueber‐die‐initiative/die‐initiative.html

14 “Mehr als nur Geld.” Interview with Renate Schmidt. Die Zeit, September 23, 2004. www.zeit.de/2004/40/Interview_Schmidt.

15 Bujard, Martin. “Die fünf Ziele des Elterngelds im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Medien und Wissenschaft.” Zeitschrift für Familienforschung (25) 2: 132–153, 2013.

16 “Schröder: Der Umbau des Sozialstaates wird fortgesetzt. Klausurtagung in Bonn / Elterngeld statt Erziehungsgeld.” Frankfurter Allge‐ meine Zeitung, September 6, 2004.

17 Kamann, Matthias. “Eltern.” Die Welt, September 6, 2004. www.welt.de/print‐welt/article338688/Eltern.html.

18 Both refer to women born between 1964 and 1968. Source: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Mikrozensus 2008: Neue Daten zur Kinderlosigkeit in Deutschland, überarbeitete Version. Wiesbaden: Destatis, 2010. www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressekonferenzen/2009/Kinderlosigkeit/Tabellenanhang_erweitert_pdf.pdf?__blob=publica tionFile.

19 Social Democratic Party (SPD). “Vertrauen in Deutschland.” SPD campaign platform of July 4, 2005. http://library.fes.de/pdf‐ files/bibliothek/downl/040705_wahlmanifest.pdf.

20 Bonstein, Julia, Alexander Jung and Merlind Thiele. “Generation Kinderlos.” Der Spiegel (37/2005), September 12, 2005. www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d‐41768190.html.

21 Soldt, Rüdiger. “Elterngeld: Motivation für Väter.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 2, 2005. www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/elterngeld‐ motivation‐fuer‐vaeter‐1236431.html.

22 Thelen, Peter. “CDU‐Familienpolitikerin von der Leyen für höheres Kindergeld.” Handelsblatt, July 15, 2005. www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/union‐will‐bei‐wahlsieg‐das‐kinderbetreuungsgesetz‐der‐spd‐kassieren‐cdu‐ familienpolitikerin‐von‐der‐leyen‐fuer‐hoeheres‐kindergeld/2526910.html.

23 Bujard, Martin. “Die fünf Ziele des Elterngelds im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Medien und Wissenschaft.” Zeitschrift für Familienforschung (25) 2: 132–153 (136 f.), 2013.

24 The German debate about “time policies” (Zeitpolitik) has no parallels elsewhere in the world. In fact, it is so influential in Germany that the subsequent family report, the Eight Family Report, was completely devoted to the subject.

25 Deutscher Bundestag. Siebter Familienbericht. Familie zwischen Flexibilität und Verlässlichkeit. Perspektiven für eine lebenslaufbezogene Familienpolitik. Drucksache 16/1360. 2006. www.bmfsfj.de/doku/Publikationen/familienbericht/download/familienbericht_gesamt.pdf. (English summary: www.bmfsfj.de/RedaktionBMFSFJ/Abteilung2/Pdf‐Anlagen/familienbericht‐ englisch,property=pdf,bereich=bmfsfj,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf).

26 Henniger, Annette, and Angelika von Wahl. “Das Umspielen von Veto‐Spielern. Wie eine conservative Familien‐ministerin den Familialis‐ mus des deutschen Wohlfahrtsstaates unterminiert.” In Die Zweite Große Koalition. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2005–2009, edi‐ ted by Christoph Egle and Reimut Zohlnhöfer. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010: 361–379.

27Fischer, Thomas, Andreas Kießling and Leonard Novy. “Einführung in die Konzeption des Strategietools für politische Reformprozesse (SPR).” In Politische Reformprozesse in der Analyse: Untersuchungssystematik und Fallbeispiele, edited by Thomas Fischer, Andreas Kieß‐ ling and Leonard Novy. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008: 9–84.

28 Ristau, Malte. “Der ökonomische Charme der Familie.” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 23–24: 16–23, 2005. regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 32

29 Jun, Uwe, and Karsten Grabow. Mehr Expertise in der deutschen Politik? Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008.

30 Andersson, Gunnar. “Fertility developments in Norway and Sweden since the early 1960s.” Demographic Research (6) 4: 67–86, 2002. Andersson, Gunnar, Jan Hoem and Ann‐Zofie Duvander. “Social differentials in speed‐premium effects in childbearing in Sweden.” De‐ mographic Research (14) 4: 51–70, 2006.

31 Esping‐Andersen, Gøsta. Why We Need a New Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Castles, Francis G. The Future of the Welfare State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

32 Quote from the Handelsblatt, according to: “Familie: Zu teuer?” Die Zeit, January 5, 2005. www.zeit.de/2005/15/hundt_familie.

33 Position statement of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB) on the BEEG draft bill on parental benefits (Elterngeld) and parental leave (Elternzeit) of the parliamentary factions of the CDU/CSU and SPD. Bundestag Drucksache 16/1889. www.elterngeld.net/quellen/Elterngeld‐Stellungnahme6.pdf.

34 “Rüttgers hält geplantes Elterngeld für verfassungswidrig.” Die Welt, December 1, 2005. www.welt.de/print‐ welt/article181601/Ruettgers‐haelt‐geplantes‐Elterngeld‐fuer‐verfassungswidrig.html.

35 Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht. 4. Sitzung. November 30, 2005: 80. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16004.pdf.

36 Wolber, Cornelia. “Elterngeld – Rückendeckung für Ministerin von der Leyen.” Berliner Morgenpost, April 20, 2006. www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/politik/article269976.

37 “Männer an den Herd.” Die Zeit, April 27, 2006. www.zeit.de/2006/18/CDU.

38 Vowinkel, Heike, and Jan Rüberl. Interview with Ursula von der Leyen. Welt am Sonntag, December 18, 2005. www.bmfsfj.de/BMFSFJ/aktuelles,did=64402.html.

39 Szent‐Ivanyi, Timot, and Daniela Vates. “CSU will kein Wickelvolontariat.” Berliner Zeitung, April 26, 2006. www.berliner‐ zeitung.de/archiv/kleinster‐koalitionspartner‐verlangt‐aenderungen‐am‐elterngeld‐csu‐will‐kein‐ wickelvolontariat,10810590,10381630.html.

40 Keynote speech on family policy at the Evangelische Akademie Tutzing. Information from: “Einigung: Steuervorteile schon für Kleinkin‐ der.” Berliner Morgenpost, January 19, 2006. www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/politik/article259825/Einigung‐Steuervorteile‐schon‐ fuer‐Kleinkinder.html. www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/politik/article259825/Einigung‐Steuervorteile‐schon‐fuer‐Kleinkinder.html.

41 Henninger, Annette, Christine Wimbauer and Rosine Dombrowski. “Geschlechtergleichheit oder “exklusive Emanzipation”? Ungleich‐ heitssoziologische Implikationen der aktuellen familienpolitischen Reformen.” Berliner Journal für Soziologie 18: 99–128, 2008.

42 Cf.: Ehlert, Nancy. “Die Familienpolitik der Großen Koalition.” In Die Große Koalition: Regierung – Politik – Parteien 2005–2009, edited by Sebastian Bukow and Wenke Seemann. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010: 142–158.

43 Cf.: Klammer, Ute, and Marie‐Thérèse Letablier. “Family Policies in Germany and France: The Role of Enterprises and Social Partners.” Social Policy & Administration (41) 6: 672–692, 2007.

44 Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Öffentliche Sozialleistungen: Statistik zum Elterngeld. Wiesbaden: Destatis, 2013.

45 “Kauder will Eltengeld überprüfen.” Interview with Volker Kauder. Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 10, 2012. Longer print version from July 6, 2010, not available online. www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sinkende‐geburtenrate‐kauder‐will‐elterngeld‐ueberpruefen‐1.1404240.

46 Bujard, Martin. “Die fünf Ziele des Elterngelds im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Medien und Wissenschaft.” Zeitschrift für Familienforschung (25) 2: 132–153, 2013.

47 The chronological manner in which the phases of the Policy Cycle and the ReformCompass are presented serves to provide an overview of which phase was dominant at which time. In reality, however, these phases overlapped, especially because their sequences of actions were tightly intertwined. regierungsforschung.de Dr. Martin Bujard – Elterngeld: How Agenda-Setting and New Stakeholder Coalitions Facilitated a Paradigm Shift in German Family Policies 33

48 Rürup, Bert, and Sandra Gruescu. Nachhaltige Familienpolitik im Interesse einer aktiven Bevölkerungsentwicklung. Gutachten für das BMFSFJ. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2003.

49 Bauer, Dominik. “Land ohne Kinder: Schmidt und Rürup wollen Deutschen Lust machen.” Spiegel‐Online, November 13, 2003. www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/land‐ohne‐kinder‐schmidt‐und‐ruerup‐wollen‐deutschen‐lust‐machen‐a‐273816.html .

50 Schmidt, Renate. Speech delivered at the SPD party convention on November 19, 2003 in Bochum. www.pressrelations.de/new/standard/result_main.cfm?pfach=1&n_firmanr_=108645&sektor=pm&detail=1&r=140064&sid=&aktion=jo ur_pm&quelle=0&profisuche=1.

51 “Mehr als nur Geld.” Interview with Renate Schmidt. Die Zeit, September 23, 2004. www.zeit.de/2004/40/Interview_Schmidt.

52 Bertram, Hans, Wiebke Rösler and Nancy Ehlert. Nachhaltige Familienpolitik. Zukunftssicherung durch einen Dreiklang von Zeitpolitik, finanzieller Transferpolitik und Infrastruktur. Gutachten für das BMFSFJ. Berlin: Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2005.

53 Deutscher Bundestag. Siebter Familienbericht. Familie zwischen Flexibilität und Verlässlichkeit. Drucksache 16/1360. 2006. www.bmfsfj.de/doku/Publikationen/familienbericht/download/familienbericht_gesamt.pdf. (English summary: www.bmfsfj.de/RedaktionBMFSFJ/Abteilung2/Pdf‐Anlagen/familienbericht‐ englisch,property=pdf,bereich=bmfsfj,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf).

54 “Koalitionsverhandlungen: Viele Punkte sind noch ungeklärt.” Spiegel‐Online, November 2, 2005. www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/koalitionsverhandlungen‐viele‐punkte‐sind‐noch‐ungeklaert‐a‐382983.html.

55 The changes involved matters such as a uniform minimum time frame of two months for claiming Elterngeld and making the application process more flexible.

56 Regarding Elterngeld statistics, cf.: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). Öffentliche Sozialleistungen: Statistik zum Eltern‐ geld. Wiesbaden: Destatis, 2013.

57 A number of the actors were also co‐authors of the Seventh Family Report. Cf.: “Bundesministerin Ursula von der Leyen: “Neue Famili‐ enpolitik ist wirksam und zahlt sich aus.”” BMFSFJ press release. April 28, 2008. www.bmfsfj.de/BMFSFJ/Presse/pressemitteilungen,did=109792.html.

58 On the long genesis of this law in the deliberations of both houses of Germany’s federal parliament, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, since 2009, see: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP17/227/22752.html.

59 Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development. OECD Family Database. Paris, OECD: 2014. www.oecd.org/social/soc/oecdfamilydatabase.htm. Sharma, Manon Rani, and Michael Steiner. “Dossier. Ausbau der Kinderbetreuung – Kosten, Nutzen, Finanzierung. BMFSFJ: Berlin, 2008. www.bmfsfj.de/RedaktionBMFSFJ/Broschuerenstelle/Pdf‐Anlagen/Dossier‐Ausbau‐ der‐Kinderbetreuung.pdf. Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). “Statistiken der Kinder‐ und Jugendhilfe.” Wiesbaden: Destatis, 2013.

60 Cf.: Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). “Unter 3‐Jährige: Betreuungsquote versus Betreuungsplatzquote.” November 14, 2013. www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/ImFokus/Soziales/Betreungsquote.html.