Document of The World Bank

Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR1723

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-39720)

Public Disclosure Authorized ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 20.7 MILLION (US$30.3 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

FOR A Public Disclosure Authorized SECOND NATIONAL RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT

December 24, 2013

Transport Sector Country Department AFCW3 Public Disclosure Authorized Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2013)

Currency Unit = Guineans Franc (GNF) SDR1.00 = US$ 1,504 US$ 1.00 = 7030 GNF

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB African Development Bank CAFEX Export Facilitation Center (Centre de Facilitation des Exportations) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CBA Cost Benefit Analysis CEA Cost Effective Analysis CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Report CPS Country Partnership Strategy CRD Rural Development Communities (Communautés Rurales de Développement) DCA Development Credit Agreement DNIR National Directorate for Road Investment (Direction Nationale des Investissements Routiers) DNER National Directorate for Road Maintenance (Direction Nationale de 1 'Entretien Routier) DNGR National Directorate for Rural Engineering ( Direction Nationale de Genie Rural) DNPR National Directorate for Rural Roads ( Direction Nationale des Pistes Rurales) EA Environment Assessment EM Environment Impact Assessment ESMP Environment Social Management Plan EU European Union FDA French Development Agency FER Road Maintenance Fund (Fonds d'Entretien Routier) FPFD Fouta Djalon Farmer Federation (Fédération des Paysans du Fouta Djallon) GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income GNF Guinean Francs GOG Government of Guinea HIMO High Intensity Labor (Haute Intensite de Main d’Oeuvre) HIPIC Highly Indebted Poor Income Country IDA International Development Association KPI Key Performance Indicators LIPW Labor Intensive of Public Works MA Ministry of Agriculture (Ministère de l’agriculture) M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MPW Ministry of Public Work MTPT Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports) MTR Midterm Review NGO Non Governmental Organization PAD Project Appraisal Document PACV Village Community Support Program PCPEA Agricultural Export Promotion Project PDO Project Development Objectives PGES Program of Environmental and Social Management PIM Project Implementation Manual PIU Project Implementation Unit PNIR National Rural Infrastructures Program (Programme National des Infrastructures Rurales PO Producer Organization PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Program PSC Project Steering Committee RER Road Maintenance Levy (Redevance de 1 ‘Entretien Routier) RPF Resettlement Policy Framework SEA Sectoral Environmental Assessment SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises SPTP Prefectural Public Works SPPR Prefectural Sections for Rural Roads TMLP Timbi-Madina Logistics Platform TOR Terms of Reference TSSP Tax on the price of petrol US$ United States Dollars

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Sector Director Jamal Saghir Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn Project Team Leader: Papa Mamadou Fall ICR Team Leader: Aguiratou Savadogo Tinto

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

Second National Rural Infrastructure Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 12 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 19 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 20 6. Lessons Learned...... 22 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 23 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 24 Annex 2. Outputs by Component...... 25 Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 27 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 29 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...... 31 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ...... 32 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 33 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...... 48 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...... 49 MAP ...... 50

A. Basic Information National Rural Country: Guinea Project Name: Infrastructure Project Project ID: P065127 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-39720 ICR Date: 11/25/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GUINEA Original Total XDR 20.70M Disbursed Amount: XDR 19.70M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 20.70M Environmental Category: A Implementing Agencies: Direction Nationale des Pistes Rurales Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 03/01/2001 Effectiveness: 10/04/2005 10/04/2005 12/12/2005 11/15/2007 Appraisal: 04/14/2004 Restructuring(s): 01/30/2011 06/30/2011 Approval: 08/26/2004 Mid-term Review: 04/28/2008 04/21/2008 Closing: 09/30/2008 06/30/2013

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately Unsatisfactory Quality of Implementing Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Supervision: Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Performance: Performance:

i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Quality at Entry Project at any time Yes None (QEA): (Yes/No): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes Moderately Satisfactory time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately

Closing/Inactive status: Unsatisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Agro-industry, marketing, and trade 5 5 Central government administration 10 10 Health 2 2 Primary education 3 3 Roads and highways 80 80

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 14 14 Infrastructure services for private sector development 14 14 Rural markets 29 29 Rural services and infrastructure 29 29 Trade facilitation and market access 14 14

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Callisto E. Madavo Country Director: Ousmane Diagana Mamadou Dia Sector Manager: Supee Teravaninthorn C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Project Team Leader: Papa Mamadou Fall Moctar Thiam ICR Team Leader: Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto ICR Primary Author: Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto

ii F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to provide improved basic infrastructure and sustainable infrastructure management and maintenance systems to rural populations in targeted areas.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads (rural Indicator 1 : network managed by DNPR Value quantitative or 28 NA NA 31 Qualitative) Date achieved 10/22/2002 12/31/2009 12/31/2008 Comments There was no target value because the indicator was introduced at the Mid Term (incl. % Review (MTR) in 2008 and not at the initial stage of the project design. achievement) Indicator 2 : 59 CRD have achieved all weather access to their prefecture centers Value quantitative or 0 59 43 27 Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments 62.8% achieved against the revised target and 45.8% compared the original (incl. % target. The original target was revised during the MTR to fit with the revised achievement) scope of activities. Indicator 3 : 800,000 inhabitants have all-weather access to their prefecture centers Value Dropped at quantitative or 0 800,000 MTR Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement) 23 CRD have restored public services in health, education, police and public Indicator 4 : administration Value 0 23 23 23 quantitative or

iii Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % 100% achieved. achievement) 11 CRD have all weather access to their prefecture centers using labor-intensive Indicator 5 : road maintenance Value quantitative or 0 11 11 11 Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % 100% achieved. achievement) Value of products passing through pilot logistics platform of Timbi- Madina Indicator 6 : (US$) Value quantitative or 0 1,000,000 500,000 607,000 Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments Initial target not achieved: 60.7% achieved compared to initial target. 121% (incl. % achieved compared to revised target. Two platforms were planned to be achievement) constructed but due to budget constraint only one was constructed. Indicator 7 : Share of rural population with access to an all-season road Value quantitative or 0 NA NA NA Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments Study was not done and data not measured. Rural road data baseline was (incl. % established at the last minute and did not allow the measurement of this indicator. achievement) Direct Project Beneficiaries, Indicator 8 : of which female Value quantitative or 0 NA NA 300,000 Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Core Indicator introduced at the MTR. achievement) Indirect Project Beneficiaries of which female (number of female beneficiaries is Indicator 9 : calculated based on an estimation of 50% of direct beneficiaries.) Value 0 NA NA 150,000 quantitative or

iv Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % achievement)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Total km rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 1270 920 800 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments 87% of revised target and 63% of initial target. Road length reduced during the (incl. % MTR. achievement) Indicator 2 : Total km maintained to a minimum access standard Value (quantitative 1,350 1,863 Changed NA or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 This indicator was changed with the following Comments • Roads Rehabilitated Rural (km) (incl. % • Number of Rural Bridges Rehabilitated achievement) • Rural Road database is installed and functional. Indicator 3 : Rural Bridges Rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 6 3 3 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments 50% achieved compared to initial target. (incl. % 100% compared to revised target. achievement) Indicator 4 : Rural Road database was installed at the very end of the project. Value (quantitative No NA Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % This indicator was introduced at the MTR and has been fully achieved. achievement)

v Indicator 5 : Number of targeted public buildings rebuilt/rehabilitated to defined standard Value (quantitative 0 37 37 37 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % Achieved at 100% achievement) Indicator 6 : Kilometers of roads rehabilitated using labor-intensive methods Value (quantitative 0 350 450 450 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments This indicator was replaced by "temporary jobs created through labor-intensive (incl. % works". achievement) Indicator 7 : Number of temporary jobs created (labor-intensive works) Value (quantitative 0 NA NA 4,800 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments This indicator was added at the MTR in lieu of the indicator on road rehabilitated (incl. % through HIMO. There was no baseline value. achievement) Number of additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level Indicator 8 : resulting from project intervention Value (quantitative 0 NA 54 54 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % 100% achieved. Indicator defined at the MTR. achievement) Indicator 9 : Health facilities constructed, renovated, and/or equipped Value (quantitative 0 NA 4 4 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % 100% achieved. Indicator deriving from the split of number of buildings. achievement) Annual targeted pilot logistics centers built to a defined standard and functional Indicator 10 : (a) Potatoes (b) Mangoes and citrus

vi Value (quantitative 0 2 1 1 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 50% achieved compared to initial, 100% compared to revised target. This was Comments replaced by the following "The Timbi-Madina Potato logistics platform is built (incl. % and functional" achievement) Mango and Citrus platform of Kankan as dropped. Indicator 11 : The Timbi-Madina Potato logistics platform is built and functional Value (quantitative 0 NA 1 1 or Qualitative) Date achieved 12/13/2004 09/30/2008 06/30/2013 06/30/2013 Comments (incl. % 100% achieved. This indicator replaced the indicator 10 above. achievement)

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 12/13/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 02/11/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 3 06/25/2005 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 0.00 4 10/15/2005 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 0.00 5 07/26/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.22 6 02/07/2007 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 1.97 7 05/21/2007 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 2.27 8 12/01/2007 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 3.06 9 05/29/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.16 10 11/09/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.72 11 05/23/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 7.87 12 11/04/2009 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 7.87 13 07/13/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.17 14 01/15/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 13.34 15 03/31/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 15.27 16 09/11/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 19.96 17 04/25/2013 Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 24.96

vii H. Restructuring (if any)

ISR Ratings Amount Board at Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change in USD DO IP millions Transfer of DNPR (Direction Nationale des Pistes Rurales) 12/12/2005 MS MU 0.00 from Ministry of Infrastructure to Ministry of Agriculture Disbursement percentage increased from 80% to 100% and cancellation of counterpart funds 11/15/2007 MU MU 2.87 requirements; and 1st closing date extension from September 30, 2008 to December 31, 2009. Retroactive extension of project 01/30/2011 MU MU 7.87 closing date from December31, 2009 to June 30, 2013. Following credit reactivation, the 4th project restructuring consisted in: (i) revision of the scope of project components in light of project activities cost overruns, 06/30/2011 MU MU 10.17 and to maximize the project’s impact without changing the project development objectives (PDOs); (ii) revision of the project’s results framework.

viii I. Disbursement Profile12

1 At the time of the last ISR (April 2013), US$23.90 million was disbursed. At the end of the grace period on October 30, 2013, the disbursement stood at SDR19.7 million or US$30.16 million giving a final disbursement rate of 95.2%.

2 There were no disbursements in 2011

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. Economic situation at appraisal. At the time of appraisal in 2004, Guinea had a population of 8 million and a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of United States Dollars (US$) 410. In 2004, the overall poverty rate for the country was estimated at 40 percent, with a poverty rate of 53 percent in rural areas and 25 percent in urban areas. In 2002, International Monetary Fund programs and the Highly Indebted Poor Income Country (HIPIC) initiative were suspended due to the country’s political instability.

2. State of Guinea’s basic infrastructure at appraisal. At the time of appraisal, the country’s stock of basic infrastructure, such as public buildings, schools, health centers, markets and processing facilities, remained largely in disrepair and wholly inadequate for the country’s economic development needs.

3. Since the mid-1990s, armed conflicts in the sub-region (primarily Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Cote D’Ivoire) had taken a heavy toll on Guinea, causing an influx of refugees and internal dislocation of the Guinean population increasing the pressure on an already weak infrastructure base. The Government’s main policy was to re-establish security, while promoting development partner projects and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) efforts in the affected areas. While international assistance was forthcoming for the international refugees, only limited funding was mobilized to assist displaced Guineans or to help rebuild destroyed infrastructure in affected communities. To address this problem, the Government of Guinea (GOG) proposed an emergency rehabilitation program to rapidly restore basic infrastructure in the hardest hit areas, to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons, and enable the pursuit of poverty reduction objectives in these zones.

4. The road sub-sector. In 2004, the road network consisted of about 7,000 kilometers of national roads, 6,700 kilometers of prefectural roads, 20,000 kilometers of rural roads, and 1,000 kilometers of urban roads. Responsibility for the management of the road network rested with the Ministry of Public Works (MPW). The National Directorate for Rural Roads (Direction Nationale des Pistes Rurales, DNPR), which at the time of appraisal was housed at MPW, was in charge of managing the prefectural and rural road network.

5. The Road Maintenance Fund (Fond d’Entretien Routier, FER) was established in 2000 as a public enterprise under the responsibility of MPW, tasked with the administration of funds destined for the maintenance of the eligible road network. The FER was endowed with funds from a fuel levy and subsidies from the national budget. In 2003, the FER collected Guinean Franc (GNF) 16.5 billion in user fees, which amounted to about 51 percent of its resources. However, that amount was barely sufficient to cover half of the routine maintenance needs of the paved network, leaving the community and prefectural networks largely under maintained.

6. Post-harvest infrastructure. Competitiveness of rural producers was stymied by high farm-to-market intermediation costs due to the lack of an efficient network of rural infrastructure. The shortage of basic post-harvest and agricultural infrastructure was the key

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constraint to export-led growth in agriculture. The World Bank-supported Agricultural Export Promotion Project (PCPEA) implemented between 1993 and 2002, failed to capitalize on Guinea’s considerable export potential. Nevertheless, PCPEA succeeded in the elimination of duties on agricultural inputs and created a “one stop shop” export facilitation center (Centre de Facilitation des Exportations, CAFEX). CAFEX which operated from user fees and budgetary allocations had streamlined export documentation and procedures.

7. The Government’s policies and plans. Fostering sustainable and equitable growth and improving coverage and quality of basic social services were the key priorities of the GOG, as stated in the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP, July 2002). In the context of the International Development Association (IDA) support to the GOG, these objectives were to be achieved through: (i) rehabilitation of essential social infrastructure that was damaged during the border intrusions; (ii) rehabilitation of the country’s rapidly deteriorating road network; (iii) construction of selected economic infrastructure; and (iv) building capacity to ensure that the improved infrastructure are managed in an environmentally and socially sustainable way.

8. The Project. Within this context, three priority needs were identified to be financed by the Second National Rural Infrastructures Program (Programme National des Infrastructures Rurales, PNIR2): (i) Improvement of rural roads and construction of 6 rural bridges to improve all weather accessibility and access to markets and economic opportunities; (ii) Emergency rehabilitation in war-affected areas to restore key rural buildings in targeted areas; and (iii) Pilot agricultural logistics platforms to improve the collection and marketing of potato, mango and citrus. PNIR2 was also designed to complement community-level activities supported by a previous Bank funded project Village Community Support Program (PACV) (P065129). PNIR2 focused on the prefectural network which ensured access to the Rural Development Communities (Communautés Rurales de Développement, CRD) covered by PACV.

9. At the time of appraisal, donor assistance was largely focused on small-scale community level investments or on national highways, leaving the prefectural roads and other medium scale infrastructure (public buildings and commercial infrastructure) without financial support. Since the prefectural road network was the physical linkage of the CRDs with basic infrastructure and markets, it was essential to invest in its rehabilitation and also to establish a sustainable mechanism for its management and maintenance. That is why PNIR2 was primarily designed to support the country’s objective of maintaining a stock of basic infrastructure assets, and also to assist the Government in establishing sustainable rural infrastructure maintenance and management systems.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

10. The PDO. The Development Objective as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) was to provide improved basic infrastructure and sustainable infrastructure management and maintenance systems to rural populations in targeted areas.

11. The key performance indicators were: (i) 59 CRD have all-weather access to their prefecture centers and 800,000 inhabitants have all-weather access to their prefecture centers; (ii) 23 CRD have restored public services in health, education, police and public administration. 11

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CRD have all weather access to their prefecture centers; (iii) The pilot logistics platforms contribute to increased revenue of target population (value of products passing through the pilot logistics platforms). Key Performance Indicators (KPI) were formulated slightly different in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) and the PAD. The DCA page 32 indicates “Seventy (70) CRDs have achieved all-weather access to their prefecture centers no later than the Closing Date”. In the PAD, it is split into two indicators (59 and 11 CRD have all-whether access to their prefecture centers. The reason for this distinction in the PAD was that 59 CRD were for road rehabilitated through conventional construction approach and 11 CRD for roads rehabilitated through labor based construction approach.

12. To sustain the project impact, the project aimed at ensuring that funds were made available through the FER in a timely manner and were expected to progressively increase to meet the maintenance requirements of the prefectural road network. The minimum annual targets of prefectural roads to be maintained under FER financing were: (i) 1,400 km for 2005; (ii) 1,540 km for 2006; (iii) 1,694 km for 2007; and (iv) 1,863 km for 2008.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

13. The objectives of the project were not revised. However, the project was restructured four times mostly to extend the closing dates and the Key Performance Indicators were formally revised once on June 30, 2011. What follows is a short description of the four restructurings.

(a) December 12, 2005: This restructuring was necessary to update the DCA in light of the transfer of responsibility for rural roads from MPW to MA (see paragraphs 24 below). This allowed the project to be declared effective in October, 2005. (b) November 15, 2007: Following the change in the IDA country financing parameters for Guinea, the project’s IDA disbursement percentage was increased from 80 percent to 100 percent. (c) January 30, 2011: This was a batch restructuring for the whole Guinea portfolio following IDA’s reengagement, to retroactively extend the closing date of projects which were closed during the period of suspension. The projects closing date was retroactively extended from December 31, 2009 to June 30, 2013. (d) June 30, 2011: Following IDA’s reengagement in Guinea and the subsequent reactivation of the credit after two years of suspension, the fourth project restructuring was required to: (i) revise the scope of project components in light of project activities cost overruns, and in order to maximize the project’s impact; (ii) revise the project’s results framework, and (iii) amend the DCA to cancel outdated clauses and covenants, and to create a new category of expenditure that merged some of the existing categories of the project. The PDO was not changed.

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Table 1: Revised Key performance indicators (following the June 30, 2011 restructuring) PDO indicators Initially in the (PAD) Revised during Restructuring Explanation for revision  59 CRD‘s have all-  Number of targeted CRD that have  Streamlined wording. The weather access to their achieved all-weather access to their end of project targets will be prefecture centers. prefecture centers (59 CRD). reduced in light of the reduction in the volume of  800,000 inhabitants have  Dropped. activities. all-weather access to their prefecture centers.  23 targeted CRD’s have  Number of targeted CRD that have  Streamlined wording of restored public services restored public services in health, indicator. in health, education, education, police and public police and public administration (23 CRD). administration.  Number of targeted CRD that have all  Streamlined wording of  11 CRD’s have all weather access to their prefecture indicator. weather access to their centers using labor-intensive road prefecture centers. maintenance (11 CRD).

 The pilot logistics  Value of products passing through  Streamlined wording of platforms contribute to pilot logistics platform of Timbi- indicator. increased revenue of Madina. (500,000) target population (value of products passing through pilot logistics platforms) (1,000,000) Share of rural population with access to an mandatory CORE indicator all-season road (%) [Supplemental information: Number of rural people with access to an all-season road] Number of additional classrooms built or mandatory CORE indicator rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project intervention (54) Health facilities constructed, renovated, mandatory CORE indicator and/or equipped (number) (4) Direct project beneficiaries (number), of mandatory CORE indicator which female (%) Indirect project beneficiaries (number), of mandatory CORE indicator which female (%)

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

14. The rural population of targeted CRDs (estimated at 800,000 people) was expected to benefit from the project’s rural roads improvement program which would result in improved all- season accessibility and better access to social services and economic opportunities. 23 strife- affected CRDs were to restore their basic infrastructures (schools, health centers, and public buildings) which were destroyed by wars in neighboring countries. Furthermore, the labor- intensive civil works were expected to provide employment opportunities in 11 CRDs. 4

15. Producers Organizations (PO) of potato in the Fouta Djallon, and mango and citrus in the Kankan region were expected to benefit from the two pilot logistics platforms which were to significantly improve the value-chains of those products and reduce post-harvest losses. The capacity activities of the project targeted the project implementing agency’s staff and other stakeholders contributing to the project implementation. With the restructuring of the project, the targeted number of beneficiaries decreased proportionally with the reduction in project scope.

1.5 Original Components

16. The project had four components which were:

17. Component A: Rural Roads US$23.9 million (Bank financing US$22.8 million): Achieving all season access through rehabilitation of intermediate level prefectural roads and supporting road sector management reforms for roads maintenance.

 Spot repairs on priority roads (Routes Prioritaires, RP1)and key bridges, linking CRD centers with the national road network;

 Provision of goods and technical advisory services and carrying out of training and audit activities for establishment of a coherent road network management program within MTP, including: (i) acquisition of vehicles, motorcycles, and information technology equipment for DNPR; (ii) carrying out of road maintenance organization and management studies and provision of technical advisory services to MTP and DNPR; and (iii) formulation and implementation of a training program for DNPR;

 Rehabilitation of 920 km of prefectural roads in 34 CRDs; and

 Construction of 6 priority rural bridges.

18. Component B: Emergency Reconstruction US$7.5 million (Bank financing US$5.0 million): Assisting rural populations in war-affected areas to restore basic social services through the reconstruction of damaged or destroyed public buildings.  Rehabilitation of public buildings in the following prefectures: Faranah, Forécariah, Guéckédou, Kindia, Kissidougou, Macenta, and Mamou.

 Rehabilitation by local Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) and NGOs of RP2 roads, linking roads within and between CRD centers, in Beyla, Boké, Dabola, Gaoual, Guéckédou, Kissidougou, and Mamou prefectures, and provision of technical advisory services to such SMEs and NGOs for such rehabilitation.

19. Component C: Pilot Commercial Infrastructure:  Activities as follows in areas of product sourcing, export marketing, quality assurance, and contract management skills for market development pilot programs in Timbi-Madina Potato Center and Kankan Mango and Citrus Center;

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 Carrying out of studies for and establishment of logistics platforms for purposes of handling of fruit and vegetables; and

 Provision of technical advisory services and training to private entities managing logistics platforms.

20. Project Management US$1.9 million (Bank financing US$1.5 million): Ensuring the project is managed in compliance with legal and fiduciary requirements as stated in the Credit Agreement.

21. The Rural Roads and Pilot Commercial Infrastructure Components were selected as key priorities under the PRSP and based on lessons learnt on past accomplishments and Bank projects. The Emergency Reconstruction Component was identified in the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) as a key area of intervention, in view of Guinea’s undue burden resulting from instability in the sub-region.

1.6 Revised Components

22. The project scope and components were revised in June 2011 as detailed in the table below.

Table 2: Summary of Projects activities revision by component Components Original activities Revised activities Component A:  Spot improvement of 920  470 km of prefectural roads in 11 CRD Rural Roads km of prefectural roads are to be rehabilitated using using conventional conventional contracting methods. contracting methods,  Rehabilitation of three priority rural  Rehabilitation of six rural bridges in the prefectures of Bridges. Forecariah, Kindia and Dabala.  Definition of the national  Development of a road database for road maintenance DNPR. Strategy. Component B:  37 public buildings are reconstructed  37 public buildings are reconstructed, Emergency or rehabilitated for twenty three (23) rehabilitated and rendered functional Reconstruction CRD (in health, education, police (18 schools, 13 offices, 4 health and public administration). centers, 2 markets)  Maintenance of 350km of prefectural  450 km of prefectural roads in seven roads enabling eleven (11) CRD to prefectures are rehabilitated using have all weather access to their labor intensive methods. prefecture centers. Component C:  Construction of Timbi-Madina potato  Construction of Timbi-Madina Pilot platform. platforms. Commercial  Construction of Kankan Mango and  Construction of 10 transit Infrastructure citrus platform. storage warehouses for Potato production in the areas of Pita, and Lélouma. Source: June 2011 Project Restructuring Paper.

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1.7 Other significant changes

23. Implementation arrangements. At the time of appraisal the DNPR was part of the MPW and was responsible for the implementation of the Rural Roads and Emergency Infrastructure components of the project. The implementation of the Pilot Commercial Infrastructure Component was to be contracted to CAFEX to manage the design, bidding, works supervision and equipment installation.

24. However, shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) challenged the fact that rural roads were the responsibility of MPW due to the fact that the rural road network was critical for access to agricultural production area. Thus, after much debate, GOG decided to transfer3 the responsibility for rural roads from the MPW to MA. Hence, the DCA of PNIR2 had to be amended to effect the change in project responsibility.

25. Disbursement freeze. From December 2008 to May 2011, project’s disbursements were suspended due to military coup in the country on December 23, 2008.

26. Closing date was extended twice. On November 15, 2007 the project closing date was extended from September 30, 2008 to December 31, 2009 and retroactively on January 30, 2011 to June 30, 2013 following IDA’s reengagement with GOG under Bank’s Operational Policy/Bank Procedure (OP/BP) 7.30. These extensions were necessary to give more time for the implementation of the project following its suspension of about two and half years. The project was also restructured to revise the scope of project components in light of cost overruns, and in order to maximize the project’s impact without changing the PDOs.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

27. The project drew relevant lessons from past experience. The PAD highlighted the importance of sustainable maintenance system for rural infrastructure and put an emphasis on road maintenance system, road fund viability and ownership of infrastructure by local beneficiaries. The labor intensive approach was viewed as a well suited tool for the sustainable maintenance of lower level networks to ensure all-weather accessibility.

3 The dispute led the Government of Guinea (GOG) to decide to modify the mandate of the two Ministries. Ministry of Agriculture was designated as responsible, inter alia, for elaboration and implementation of the Borrower's rural roads policy, including preparation and execution of investment and management programs for rural, regional, and prefectural roads and of annual rural road maintenance programs; Ministry of Public Works was designated as responsible, inter alia, for elaboration and implementation of the Borrower's national roads policy, including preparation and execution of investment and management programs for national and urban roads and of annual national road maintenance programs, and development of a national road map;

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28. Soundness of the project’s concept. The project had relevant development objectives. The project design, scope and components had a strong analytical basis to respond to the key challenges of the rural populations and rural development. The design kept a number of components (three technical components) at a manageable level.

29. The proposed activities were clearly linked to the project’s objectives and to GOG’s priorities. The project design supported GOG’s plans to establish a critical mass of minimum social and economic facilities in high need areas to better spin-off poverty reduction and economic growth benefits. This was all the more relevant since the rural sector suffered from a serious lack of investment and maintenance of basic infrastructure. Therefore, the Bank’s decision to support the GOG in that regard was invaluable and responded to the most urgent needs of the country.

30. The decision to construct pilot logistics platforms was sound, as the lack thereof was a key missing element in the agricultural value chain in Guinea, which was plagued with large post-harvest losses and poor marketing prospects.

31. The emergency rehabilitation of infrastructure was most needed to mitigate the spillover effects of wars in neighboring countries and internal insurgency activity, which had put increased strain on the limited facilities and led to the destruction or abandonment of many public buildings in rural areas. Furthermore, the labor-intensive (“Haute Intensité de Main d’Oeuvre, HIMO”) approach for the improvement of lower level rural roads was sound as it would provide opportunities for jobless youths on one hand, and on the other hand it was in line with the level of investment required to achieve basic all-season access.

32. Quality at entry. Inadequate attention was paid during preparation to the implementation capacity risk of DNPR, especially given the instable institutional set-up for the rural roads sub- sector. In fact, during preparation it was assumed that DNPR had adequate technical and fiduciary capacity since its key staff came from the PACV and the first Rural Infrastructure Project (PNIR1) implemented by the National Directorate of Rural Engineering (Direction Nationale du Genie Rural, DNGR) and supported by the World Bank.

33. Furthermore, measures to mitigate the negative findings of the 2002 Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) do not seem to have been addressed during preparation and early phases of implementation. The CPAR established that the national procurement system was not transparent and lacked economy and credibility, in particular due to weaknesses of institutional capacity and procurement monitoring and supervision as well as the absence of anti- corruption measures. One of the impacts of this was delayed project implementation and low disbursements during the first phase of project implementation.

34. Finally, taking the complex socio-economic-political context of Guinea at the time of project preparation, the costs of the planned works seemed to be under-estimated which lead to a reduction in the overall project scope and activities.

35. Identification of project risks at preparation. Project preparation adequately identified the key project risks, most of which did materialize during project implementation, more

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specifically: (i) the political instability context of Guinea which could affect the implementation of the project; (ii) the institutional instability of the rural sector and the difficult relationship between the MPW and the MA, and (iii) the risk associated with the collection of funds for road maintenance. However, the impact that the country’s political instability had on the capacity of private contractors to deliver works on time and with the required quality was inadequately assessed. The risk was not clearly listed but contracts packaging strategy was suggested to tailor contracts to the private sector capacity. This risk had materialized during implementation (see paragraph 40).

36. The project is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory in terms of quality at entry primarily due to: (i) failure to better assert the critical nature of DNPR’s capacity deficiencies; (ii) lack of putting in place mitigation measures in the project to address the weak country procurement framework; and (iii) weak cost estimation of works; and (iv) inadequate project implementation readiness. Furthermore, the fact that the project attempted too many innovations (road fund reform, service level approaches, and labor-based techniques) at once seems a bit overambitious given the context of instability and the difficult political economy of the country.

2.2 Implementation

37. The implementation of the project has been broken down into two key periods.

(a) From effectiveness in October 2005 until suspension of disbursements in December 2008.

38. Implementation was initially delayed. Effectiveness which was initially scheduled for January 2005 was delayed until October 2005 mainly due to the fact that the institutional set-up was not ready. Indeed, there was a major change in implementation arrangement shortly after Board approval (see paragraph 23 and 24 above). This change not only delayed effectiveness, but it diverted most of the World Bank team’s effort towards nontechnical issues of helping the GOG resolve the institutional dispute between the MA and the MPW.

39. Another consequence of the institutional struggle between MA and MPW (see paragraph 23 above) was the late appointment of the Project Coordinator which only occurred in April 2006, a delay of more than one and a half years. The net effect of all this was the fact that first year works program started only in early 2007, almost two and half years after the project was approved. This led to a low disbursement rate of 17 percent in 2008 after two and half years of implementation.

40. Implementation was also initially hampered by the low capacity of the DNPR in terms of procurement, and contract management. The quality of documents submitted to IDA was often weak and DNPR did not systematically follow up on ongoing contracts. For instance, the GOG took more than three years to cancel a contract for which the lack of performance by the contractor involved was noted at the onset of the project. The project provided capacity building to DNPR and project staff to allow them to better manage their tasks.

41. The packaging and scope of International Competitive Bidding (ICB) contracts for rural roads were well beyond the capacity of the local contractors which won the bids. This means that 9

not enough due-diligence was performed to ensure that eligibility criteria were adequate and that local contractors were selected for works that they could deliver. Consequently, nearly 130 kilometers of awarded rehabilitation works were cancelled as a result of the contractor’s lack of performance.

42. By 2008, unit costs of road construction, in Guinea had recorded a 40 percent increase since the time of appraisal in 2004. It was due to a sharp increase in fuel prices, following the increase in crude oil prices, from an average of US$30 per barrel in 2004, to over US$100 per barrel in 2006/2007; and for other critical construction inputs such as cement, bitumen, diesel, etc.

43. The World Bank conducted a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the project in April 2008 where it was assessed that the following outputs were achieved: (i) the improvement of 152 km of prefectural roads using conventional contracting out of the 920 km planned; (ii) the maintenance of 194 km (out of 350 km) of prefectural roads and 2 small bridges (30 meters) using labor-intensive methods; (iii) the completion of the technical studies and bidding documents for the construction of six bridges; and (iv) the rehabilitation and equipment of 37 war-affected public buildings. Therefore, implementation and progress toward achievement of PDOs were noted as Moderately Satisfactory in spite of the low disbursement rate of 17 percent and the inefficient procurement and contract management by DNPR. Furthermore, at MTR, the project’s funding gap was estimated at US$12.0 million as a result of the sharp increase in unit cost for civil works (see paragraph 41 above) and the initial delay in project start. As a result of this, some of the project activities were cancelled and an action plan was adopted to complete the remaining activities that were deemed critical for the attainment of PDO. However, no particular action was envisaged to deal with the underperforming road fund which fell way below the financial targets agreed at appraisal (see paragraph 59 below).

44. Suspension of project activities due to political instability. Shortly after MTR, due to political instability4 IDA disbursements were suspended between December 2008 and April 2011 (total of 32 months). Project activities were frozen, except for the works of the Timbi-Madina Logistics Platform (TMLP) for which: (i) Bank’s clearance of the contract was secured before the suspension; and (ii) a pre-financing agreement was reached between the government and the contractor.

(b) From retroactive extension of project closing date to project closing on June 30, 2013

45. In early 2011, shortly after the lifting of suspension of World Bank operations in Guinea, the project team carried out a reengagement mission, who enabled the retroactive extension of

4 Political disturbance continued to affect PNIR2 until the project’s closing in June 2013. After project reactivation in 2011 the country’s political situation remained volatile and difficult, characterized by frequent demonstrations and tensions among key political players in the context of the legislative elections. During those frequent events, the administration, including the entities involved in PNIR2, was paralyzed for days.

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the project’s closing date from December 31, 2009 to June 30, 2013. It also paved the way for the implementation of the measures sought during MTR to align the project’s scope with the available resources (See table 2 above). Furthermore, the labor-intensive civil works component was scaled up to maximize the job creation impacts of the project, given the high unemployment context in rural areas after two years of strife. The effected changes were formalized in the June 2011 project restructuring.

46. During the last two years of project implementation, DNPR’s capacity significantly improved thanks to procurement training of project staff and the close technical assistance of the bank team with regards to contract management issues. This has allowed the finalization of the works of the 3 bridges, and the successful implementation of the labor-intensive civil works.

47. The institutional dispute between MA and MPW briefly resurfaced in 2011, and threatened to compromise the restart of project activities. This was due to institutional ambiguity linked to the creation of a National Directorate of Prefectural Roads within MPW. GOG quickly clarified the issue and confirmed that project was to continue to be implemented by DNPR.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

48. M&E Design and Implementation. The selected outcome indicators were reasonable in number and easy to measure. They were clearly linked to the three investment components of the project and their collection was the responsibility of DNPR. Following the reduction in project scope, the target values of the indicators were revised. Also, the World Bank core sector indicators were added to the results framework (see paragraph F of data sheet).

49. M&E Utilization. Great efforts were committed to measure and monitor the indicators, and data were collected for most indicators. Difficulties were encountered in the measurement of the core sector indicators which were added in the 2011 restructuring, more specifically, the Rural Accessibility Index (RAI), and the share of the network in good or fair condition. This was because of the complex methodology on one hand, and the lack of reliable road condition data on the other hand. Nevertheless, conservative estimates were provided.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

50. The Environmental safeguards classification for the project was A. Two safeguard policies were triggered, but effects were limited to their impact and were technically and institutionally manageable. The main safeguards issue was the preparation of Environmental Assessment reports (EA) in compliance with OP 4.01. EA’s reports included a Strategic Environmental Assessment and a Social Impact Analysis carried out in 2001/2002 as well as a recent Environmental Assessment, which primarily focused on project interventions scheduled for the first year. Specific project interventions for subsequent years, which were not known at that time, were to be assessed prior to their implementation. Implementation of the Environmental and Social Management Plans is Satisfactory.

51. Furthermore, an Environment Unit was established in DNPR and its responsibilities were clearly defined regarding the implementation of the Environment Social Management Plan

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(ESMP). DNPR regional and prefectural offices handled compliance with safeguards, including assurance that contracts would cover environmental protection measures.

52. Procurement. Overall procurement performance under the project was Unsatisfactory. The weak procurement capacity at the start of the project contributed to the initial delays in execution of project activities. Poor preparation of bid documents, lack of training, and weak contract management capacity were the main issues that hampered project implementation (see. paragraphs 40 and 41 above). However, strengthening the capacity of staff of DNPR, through intensive training programs for works and consultant services helped raise procurement performance significantly by the time of project closing.

53. Financial management. Financial management by the DNPR was efficient. The quarterly Financial Monitoring Reports (FMRs) were received regularly and were fully compliant with the agreed format. Audits were done annually, on-time, and were unqualified. The capacity building assistance provided under the project has contributed to this good performance.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

54. The GOG has openly expressed its satisfaction of the project’s results in spite of the difficulties encountered during implementation and the reduction in scope (cf. annex 2). Also, the communities at the decentralized level have unanimously praised the project’s impacts in term of opening up rural zones and are expecting a follow up operation on rural roads and economic infrastructures. The communities which were left out by the project as a result of the scaled down activities are expecting GOG and World Bank’s support to deliver the initially planned infrastructure (roads, bridges, and commercial platform).

55. The 2013 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) did not propose a follow-on operation to consolidate the impacts of the project. Nevertheless, the CPS will pursue the promotion of commercial agriculture and the improvement of rural services. It is also likely that the FER is included as a trigger of IDA budget support to GOG in view of improving its resources base and its functioning.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

56. The PDO remains relevant. The objective of providing improved basic rural infrastructure and management systems remains a key priority for Guinea given the poor state of the rural road network and the absence of rural infrastructure in general. The GOG remains committed to increase the competitiveness of the agricultural sector by promoting export-led initiatives. All of the above is included in the GOG’s 2013–2015 PRSP-3; which also emphasizes the need to improve access to basic social services. Although there was a restructuring on 2008, the PDO remained the same.

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57. The challenges and activities identified at the project design remain relevant in the current context of the country. The institutional arrangement for implementation and the technical design of the project have been relevant given the country context at the project preparation even though the readiness should have been more ensured before the effectiveness of the project by solving DNPR mapping issue at an earlier stage of the project preparation process. The procurement documents late preparations were not relevant. It should have been better to start procurement process at an earlier stage and solve capacity challenge of implementing agencies and project staff in a context of general difficult political environment of the country.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

58. The PDO rating is Moderately Unsatisfactory for the following reasons.

59. Although the revised output targets during the project restructuring of 2011 were substantially achieved, the initial expected output targets were not. More specifically, only 800 kilometers of prefectural roads (63 percent of initial target) were rehabilitated, 3 rural bridges (50 percent of initial target) constructed, and one commercial platform (50 percent of initial target) was constructed. This means that project was unable to reach a large number of initially targeted rural dwellers (around 500,000 not covered out of the planned 800,000) that were expecting a substantial improvement in their livelihood as a result of the project. Furthermore, the annual prefectural road maintenance program which was to complement project intervention did not materialize as shown in table 4 below.

Table 3: Investment components results Investment Components as of September 2013 Type of works Unit Planned Achieved Rate% Road Works Spot improvements Km 920 350 38 Labor-intensive maintenance Km 350 450 129 War affected Schools, health centers, public Nbr 37 37 100 buildings buildings and markets Commercial Potato Nbr 1 1 100 Platforms Mango & Citrus Nbr 1 0 0

60. At project closing, there is no sustainable rural infrastructure maintenance and management system. The Government had established a Road Maintenance Fund (FER), through which direct financing for road maintenance was supposed to be ensured. The project was designed on the premise that IDA funds would rehabilitate prefectural roads while the FER had to provide funds for roads maintenance. There was a rural road sector strategy for service level based network management and maintenance. The combination of this strategy and the institutional framework and Road Maintenance Fund resources should have provided a solid foundation for addressing the PRSP’s goal of reducing physical isolation for the rural population. However, during the project implementation, the road fund failed to mobilize funds, the designed strategy did not work properly, and resources of FER were not scaled up to a level that would cover the routine maintenance needs of the network. Even though 18 percent of the FER funds were earmarked for prefectural roads, the corresponding amount (US$3.6 million) was barely 13

sufficient to maintain about 1,000 kilometers of roads annually, which represents less than 8 percent of the prefectural road network. Furthermore, the capacity of the DNPR to adequately program rural roads maintenance works remains weak with inadequate knowledge of the network and no effective maintenance management tools in place.

Table 4: Prefectural road maintenance program under FER financing Agreed Annual Roads Actually Percentage of Year maintenance target maintained Achievement (km) (km) 2005 1,400 851 61 2006 1,540 430 28 2007 1,694 147.9 9 2008 1,863 289 16 Total 6,497 1717.9 26

61. What follows is a detailed assessment of the project’s achievements against its specific objectives.

62. Objective 1: Provide improved basic infrastructure to rural populations in targeted areas. The rating is Moderately Satisfactory for the following reasons:

 The prefectural road improvement program financed by the project has successfully delivered about 350 kilometers of improved roads (38 percent of target), providing all- season access to about 300,000 rural dwellers. However, in terms of coverage, the program fell substantially short of its initial target of maintaining 920 km of roads. This means that 500,000 rural dwellers failed to reap the direct benefits of improved access to the road network.

 The three rural bridges of Kaback, Téné, and Madina Oula were critical to connect remote rural areas with high agricultural production potential. Before the construction of the bridges the rural population had to cross the rivers either using old and unreliable ferries for the case of Kaback, or simply by foot in extremely unsafe conditions. The fact that project finally delivered the three bridges is a major achievement with positive socio- economic impacts (see paragraphs 66 and 67 below). Furthermore, about 8,000 hectares of high potential agricultural land were opened up and connected to the road network after the construction of the three bridges. In addition, remote areas which were once more connected to neighboring Sierra-Leone have now access to their regional centers thanks to the project. However, due to budget constraints (see paragraph 41 above); the project cancelled the construction of three other initially planned critical bridges.

 The labor intensive road maintenance program delivered beyond expectations. One hundred additional kilometers of roads were maintained, bringing the cumulative length of road maintained to 450 km. The quality of works was good and the program has

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created 4,800 temporary jobs for youths. Furthermore, 108 small enterprises benefitted from the labor intensive road maintenance program, out of which 16 were owned by women. In terms of accessibility, the labor intensive road maintenance program has provided improved all-season access to 27 CRDs.

 The rehabilitation of war-affected public buildings was fully implemented. The restored buildings were reopened in 2008 shortly after the end of works and functional. This meant that by 2008, about 500,000 rural dwellers had access to restored basic infrastructure services such as health and education. Population of these areas had testified that the restored infrastructures improved their living condition.

 The TMLP was constructed and fully equipped by the project. It is now operational and it is managed by the Fouta Djalon Farmer Federation (Fédération des Paysans du Fouta Djallon FPFD). FPFD is a credible PO with significant technical and managerial capacity which was further strengthened by the project. Furthermore, the project has enhanced the storage and transport of potatoes to the TMLP. Indeed, 10 transit storage warehouses were constructed in the influence area of the platform while DNPR has improved a network of 122 km of rural roads in the same area. This has meant that in 2012, the total value of potatoes that have passed through TMLP was estimated at US$607,000, compared to a revised target of US$500,000 (121 percent achievement) and an initial target of 1,000,000 (60,7 percent). This corresponds to about 1,032 tons of potatoes.

 Preliminary data indicates that potato post-harvest losses have fallen by 10 percent in 2012 in the area covered by the federation (FPFD). Furthermore, the business plan of the platform indicates that the financial break-even point will be reached around 2020, date after which the platform will start generating profits. This means that the Federation will partly finance the functioning of the platform until that date.

63. Objective 2: Provide sustainable infrastructure management and maintenance systems to rural populations in targeted areas. The rating is Moderately Unsatisfactory for the following reasons.

 During project implementation, FER was unable to progressively increase its funding (see table 5 below) through gradual increases in the road user fee. The annual budget of the road fund, which was estimated at US$20 million, covered only about a third of the paved network’s needs in terms of routine maintenance. Eighteen percent of that amount (about US$3.6 million) was earmarked for the maintenance of the 23,000 kilometers of rural network, i.e. US$150 per kilometer. This is grossly insufficient to sustain the rural road asset base.

 The study for the establishment of the rural roads database was completed. However, due to project’s closing, the project could not finance follow up technical assistance for the installation of the database. Until the rural roads database is installed, programming of rural road maintenance would continue to be subjective in the absence of consolidated knowledge of network condition.

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 The project has developed SME’s capacity in labor-intensive road maintenance. The trained labor force (mainly youth) is expected to remain and eventually participate in future maintenance works. Several SMEs were hired for the roads works and constitute a good asset for a strategy of routine maintenance through labor intensive methods. However, the SMEs capacity developed under the project may not be sustained unless a viable maintenance system is put in place with and adequate maintenance funding.

 FPFD as a rural professional organization was strengthened by the project through the technical assistance provided by CAFEX and the training of two staffs in the management of commercial infrastructure. FPFD has now the tools and the effective responsibilities in managing and maintaining the TMLP and using it as a stepping stone to effective market linkage.

3.3 Efficiency

64. The measured cost of works per kilometer increased substantially compared to prices in 2004. This is attributed primarily to: (i) delays in the start of the road works; (ii) spike in oil prices; (iii) lack of competition in the road construction sector in Guinea; (iv) political instability in Guinea and (v) some weaknesses of cost estimates during project preparation;. The increased cost of road maintenance and rehabilitation works during the period was not unique to Guinea, but common throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The achieved activities had a positive effect on the lives of rural populations. Although the original project objectives have not been fully achieved, the implementation of the project activities that were implemented has had a significant and positive impact on the living conditions of targeted population.

65. Some of the revised outcomes were achieved such as the rehabilitation on an emergency basis of rural infrastructure in war affected areas, the platform of Timbi madina and the 3 bridges. These achievements provided better access to rural populations to their prefecture capital allowing them to more effectively sell agricultural products, and access basic social infrastructure (health centers, education centers and public administration). Moreover, Labor Intensive Approach (HIMO) has been developed through rehabilitation of the 450 km rural roads which have provided jobs and contributed in income generation to the population living in that area.

66. Economic analysis. At appraisal, no ex-ante economic evaluation had been calculated for the rural road investments, making it impossible to calculate an ex-post economic analysis of the same. This is why, at completion, the best alternative to an economic analysis is a socio- economic impact analysis to measure the benefits for local communities and farmers in the area of influence of the project.

67. With the construction of the 3 major bridges (Kaback, Madina Oula, and Tèné), the labor-intensive maintenance of 450 kilometers including many small bridges/culverts, and the improvement of 350 kilometers of prefectural roads, the project helped connect 38 rural districts with all-season access roads. It covered an area of influence where more than 300,000 people have seen their mobility improve significantly giving them increased access to health, employment, education and other social services. In terms of efficiency, the project was designed 16

to rehabilitate 1270 km of prefectural roads (using conventional and labor intensive methods) at a unit cost of US$12,500. However, due to implementation delays and cost overruns, only 800 km of roads were constructed at an estimated unit cost of US$17, 000 meaning a 35 percent increase in costs compared to the initial cost estimates. The higher than expected costs in the rural road works significantly reduced the number of people reached (300,000 instead of 800,000) by the project.

68. Although they have not been quantified, the benefits resulting from connecting agricultural production zones were substantial, both in terms of product distribution and financial revenues. The construction of the 3 bridges at Kaback, Madina-Oula, and Tèné has allowed the shipping of agricultural inputs to areas that were inaccessible in the past. Furthermore, the emergence of local markets after the construction of the bridges would allow selling products at a higher farmer’s price because improved accessibility generates more competition among collectors and increased demand. This is especially the case for the area of influence of the Kaback Bridge. See below table 5 and 6 on traffic and cost/benefits of constructing the Kaback, Madina-Oual and Tene bridges:

Table 5: Traffic per rural bridge As of June 2013 Road/Bridge, Link road Number of vehicles per day (June 2013) Madinagbé-Guéméta-Bridge Kaback-Kaback 128 Carrefour-Bokaria (Kindia-Mamou)-Madina Oula, 67 Kolenté bridge Tené Bridge: Mafara-Bodié 35 Télimélé-Thionthian (road) 133 NB: There was no traffic data at the design of the project. Traffic was close to zero during the rainy season.

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Table 6: Key Cost-Benefit elements of constructing the 3 bridges Benefit-Cost Elements Explanatory comments Project Costs Initial capital costs of the 3 US$9 million bridges Routine maintenance costs Periodic maintenance costs Project Benefits Salvage value of bridges Value at the end of economic life of the 3 bridges Avoided ferry operation costs Fuel, staff, and maintenance of ferries. Avoided costs of ferry rehabilitation/replacement Salvage value of ferries Transport time and cost savings Average crossing time on ferry compared to ferry was about 40 minutes. Improved safety compared to There were on average five ferry fatalities a year during the raining season due to the hazardous river crossing conditions and the poor condition of the ferries. Improved access to health More visits to health centers; services Better supply of pharmaceuticals; more health awareness campaigns. Improved access to education Increased primary school enrollment rates; Agriculture Improved distribution of agricultural inputs and productive assets; Access to markets and Emergence of local markets; opportunities higher prices for local products; more exchanges between populations.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory.

69. Although the project had a positive impact on all-weather accessibility in targeted areas, its contribution to improving the condition of the overall rural road network (23,000 km) is marginal. As of today, about 31 percent of the rural road network is in good or fair condition compared to an estimated baseline value of 28 percent. This is mainly because of the following factors: (i) the annual maintenance works under the FER only covered a small portion of the network (less than 2 percent); and (ii) the project fell significantly short of its initial target of improving 920 km of prefectural rural roads.

70. Furthermore, the project was unable to lay a strong foundation for the management and sustainability of rural infrastructure. The sustainable maintenance approaches introduced by the project (labor intensive maintenance methods) and the local capacity created cannot be sustained in the absence of predictable financing and programming of road maintenance. 18

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

a. Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

71. Improved access to health services. The construction of the 3 bridges has significantly improved access of targeted populations to health centers. In fact, compared to 2011, the average number of daily visits to health centers in the project influence area of the 3 bridges has increased from 2 to 5 times. In the case of Kaback and Madina Oula, shortly after the construction of the bridges, the local health centers were equipped with “motorbike ambulances” to evacuate patients from remote areas. More specifically, the trip to the nearest health centers using the ambulances takes on average about one hour from the most remote areas compared to 3 days before the construction of the bridges. Furthermore, the supply of pharmaceutical products to villages and health centers in the area is now more regular and reliable thanks to the improved accessibility of the local districts in the influence area of the bridges. The frequency of hygiene and children health awareness campaigns in the project area has increased from 2 campaigns in 2011 to 5 campaigns in 2013.

72. Improved access to education. Following the construction of the 3 bridges, primary education enrollment has gone up on average by 15 percent in 2013 compared to 2012 in the local districts of Koroumaninka (influence area of Téné Bridge), Bantanko, and Kaback. Furthermore, in Kaback, the number of academic inspection audits from the Ministry of Education has significantly increased from one visit per year to 6 visits in 2013. In Madina Oula, the number of academic audits has increased from one every two years before the construction of the bridge to 4 visits in 2013. The purpose of the academic audits is to improve the quality of education and strengthen the capacity of teachers in local schools. b. Institutional Change/Strengthening NA c. Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

73. Before the construction of the three bridges, local populations reported an average of five losses of life during the rainy season due to unsafe river crossing conditions. This is no longer the case in Kaback, Téné and Madina Oula bridge influence areas.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops NA

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High

74. The sustainability of the project’s outcome is unlikely due to the weak performance of the FER. Unless strong measures are taken by the GOG to scale up the resources of the FER, improve its functioning, and rationalize its interventions, the project’s investments in the prefectural network will not be adequately sustained.

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75. The success of the TMLP will depend on sustained support to the FPFD and close follow-up of the performances of the platform by CAFEX. Furthermore, facilitation measures will be needed to assist the FPFD in the exportation of its production. The performance of the TMLP will also depend on the quality of the road network in its area of influence to allow for the transport of produce in a cost-efficient and reliable manner.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

76. The technical preparation was adequate and of acceptable quality. However it overestimated the capacity on the ground to implement relatively complex and demanding project. Furthermore, it did not adequately estimate the cost of the works and the project had low readiness for implementation. The net result of these factors (overestimation of implementation capacity of implementing agency, low readiness for implementation and inadequate cost estimates of works) is that project implementation was initially very slow and the outputs supported by the project had to be reduced in both scope and size.

77. The project did not have enough leverage to push though sensitive reforms such as the establishment of a second generation road fund endowed with enough user fees to finance maintenance of the road network. This reform should have been more closely linked with the World Bank budget support programs and also through a closer coordination with other donors, especially the European Union.

78. The project did introduce some innovation in the roads subsector such as spot improvements and high intensity labor maintenance methods which were most relevant to the Guinea context. However, their long term sustainability is inadequate.

(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

79. The overall actions taken by the World Bank were appropriate and adequate to implement the project taking into account the difficult Guinea context. In addition, although with some delay, the project team was instrumental in resolving key project implementation issues. This is especially after the disbursements resumed and the project was restructured. Moreover, while the Task Team focused on making the project “effective”, it should have done more on ensuring implementation readiness. This is especially the case with the tardy preparation of the first year’s works program. Similarly more could have been done towards strengthening institutional capacity to more effectively implement the project. Furthermore, although interaction between the headquarters based task team leaders and field staff was good, and the field staff was fully empowered to deal with the daily supervision activities, the field staff could have been more effective if there was a clearer supervision strategy due to the status of the project as “problem project”.

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80. Finally, the project team was effective in ensuring that project was restructured and activities restarted after the lifting of the disbursement suspension in January 2011. This enabled critical activities, like the 3 bridges, to be completed before the extended project closing date.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

81. Although project preparation should have been more thorough in identifying institutional bottlenecks to implementation, ensuring a higher degree of implementation readiness and more adequate cost estimates, the political environment prevailing in the country during preparation and implementation was complex and played a pullback role. For example, there was inadequate attention and/or capacity by GOG to adequately address key early implementation issues such as making the project effective and to quickly modify the institutional set up to implement the project or undertaking the first procurement process while waiting for effectiveness. These two issues were only resolved by the proactive intervention of the World Bank.

82. Furthermore, once project implementation got under way, the World Bank was proactive in working with the GOG to implement the project during a difficult period for Guinea, which included a long suspension of project activities. This means despite the difficult environment that the project faced especially during implementation, thanks to the proactive effort by the World Bank and project team, the project was still able to achieve part of the key project objectives.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

83. Although, GOG had a clear vision for responding to the needs of the rural population in terms of improved infrastructure, the delays in project’s effectiveness and in appointing the project coordinator indicate that it lacked commitment to the project during its earlier implementation stages. In addition, the institutional struggle between the MPW and MA who should implement the project had a negative impact on the early implementation of the project. Furthermore, despite earlier commitments, GOG was not able to increase the resources of the FER which in the long run will undermine the sustainability of the project investments. Finally, MA took several years to cancel an underperforming contract due to the fact that some of the systemic procurement issues identified early in the project life were not adequately addressed. However, towards the end of the project GOG’s implementation performance improved marginally. This allowed the construction of the three bridges and the Timbi Madina Platform.

84. However, during the final years of project implementation, the GOG displayed significantly more commitment to the project.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

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85. Project implementation was negatively impacted by the long and heavy administrative procedures, long procurement delays and poor capacity of contractors. The works execution had suffered from lack of close supervision of implementing agencies leading to long delay in works delivery. The weak capacity of the implementing agencies (see paragraph 40) and consequently the poor supervision of the project activities, had led to late contract cancellation and its negative impact on the scope of road length executed (nearly 130 kilometers of awarded rehabilitation works were cancelled as a result of the contractor’s lack of performance). This situation was worsened by the institutional instability of the project implementing agency and the lack of motivation and instability of staff working for the project.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

86. The performance of the GOG and implementing agencies is Moderately Unsatisfactory. First, the borrower should have taken proactive decision to quickly solve the issue of institutional arrangement during the project preparation. This led to a long delay in making the project effective, having the project in place and starting the project execution. Second, the borrower had poorly supervised the project activities leading to delays in completing works. Furthermore, the borrower took three years to cancel a contract of works despite the recommendation to do so during the project supervision missions. Third, the borrower did not do enough in increasing the resources and improve the functioning of the FER. After project restructuring, the implementation agency tried to reduce the implementation delays. With the support of the World Bank, project team substantive efforts allowed the achievement of some revised targeted activities (the platform of Timbi-Madina and the 3 bridges). In addition, the entire planned post- civil strife areas emergency rehabilitation activities were implemented.

6. Lessons Learned

87. Ownership of project activities. The labor intensive maintenance components had strong ownership by project beneficiaries and the targeted length was entirely executed. This is because the beneficiaries of this particular component and local contractors worked together to ensure the implementation of labor intensive maintenance works.

88. Clearer institutional framework. A well-functioning institutional arrangement for the project is a critical factor to ensure implementation success. In the case of the project, this risk should have been mitigated as part of the preparation process, even if it would have resulted in a delay in project approval. As the project implementation unit is key to project implementation, earlier training program should have been put in place for project key staff.

89. Mainstreaming of project implementation. When the conditions are met, project implementation can be mainstreamed within the relevant ministries. This is because it can have a positive impact in term of capacity building but can slow down project implementation if there is not a proper incentive framework. For example the lack of incentives of staff working for the project was one of the reasons for slow project implementation. Thus, wherever possible, for next operation with mainstreamed in public administration, incentives should be negotiated for

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staff involved in the project implementation during the project preparation and funds secured for that.

90. A good maintenance system is important to ensure the sustainability of roads/rural roads. Rural roads require regular maintenance due to their high vulnerability to climatic factors such as rains and quick degradation caused by heavy traffic. In the case of Guinea which is a country with heavy rains and long period of rainy season, it is recommended to take into account this constraint in the future design of road maintenance program. For such maintenance program, the Road Funds should have financial, administrative, and regulatory autonomy (resources must not be channeled through the Government’s budget).

91. Introduction of spot improvement. The introduction of the spot improvement concept on rural roads requires careful preparation/advocacy/planning for it to work properly due to a tendency of road administration to do a full rehabilitation of roads. Furthermore, training and 1st phase pilot program should be implemented to ensure ownership and good understanding of the system before scaling up its implementation.

92. Contractors’ capacities are a key element of project success. The project scope and type (rural roads) required works to be executed by small contractors over a large geographic area. For this to happen in better conditions, the capacities of the local SME contracting industry should have been assessed and the works planned accordingly. In addition, the geographical location of works should be a parameter for the package of contracts to facilitate implementation by small contractors and follow up by administration and supervision firms.

93. Project components/activities should be properly funded to achieve PDOs. The project included an indicator on road maintenance while the project did not support this activity directly since it did not provide funding to the Road Maintenance Fund. This means that there is need for a careful selection of indicators and a need to ensure that sufficient leverage exists at the project level for some indicators and even reforms.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies NA

(b) Cofinanciers NA

(c) Other partners and stakeholders NA

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions) Rural Roads 23.90 19.00 79.50 Emergency Reconstruction 7.50 7.40 98.67 Pilot Commercial Infrastructure 1.20 2.20 183.33 Project Management 1.90 1.70 89.47 Total Baseline Cost 34.50 30.30 87.83 Physical Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 34.50 30.30 87.83 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00 Total Financing Required 34.50 30.30 87.83

(b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 4.20 0.00 0.00 International Development 30.30 30.30 100.00 Association (IDA)

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Original activities Revised activities Outputs Component A: Rural Roads  Spot improvement of 920  470 km of prefectural  350 km of prefectural roads were rehabilitated km of prefectural roads roads in 11 CRD to using conventional contracting methods in 11 using conventional be rehabilitated using CRD contracting methods, conventional  3 priority rural bridges were rehabilitated in the  Rehabilitation of six rural contracting methods, prefectures of Forecariah, Kindia and Dalaba. Bridges.  3 priority rural  Rural road database for DNPR was developed.  Definition of the national bridges are  technical study for 6 bridges completed road maintenance rehabilitated in the  Environmental study for 3 bridges completed Strategy. prefectures of  Socio economic studies for 3 bridges Forecariah, Kindia  Technical study of 632 km of prefectural roads and Dalaba.  Control of 920 km of prefectural roads  Development of a  Technical study for 75 ml of bridges with 80 km rural road database of prefectural roads for DNPR added to the activities. Component B: Emergency Reconstruction  37 public buildings are  37 public buildings to  37 public buildings were reconstructed, reconstructed or be reconstructed, rehabilitated and rendered functional rehabilitated for twenty rehabilitated and . 18 schools, three (23) CRD (in rendered functional . 13 offices, health, education, police (18 schools, 13 . 4 health centers, and public offices, 4 health . 2 markets administration). centers, 2 markets)  450 km of prefectural roads in 7 prefectures  Maintenance of 350km of  450 km of prefectural were rehabilitated using labor intensive prefectural roads enabling roads in 7 prefectures methods. eleven (11) CRD to have are rehabilitated  works control and supervision of 14 emergency all weather access to their using labor intensive infrastructures (Kindia and Mamou) prefecture centers; methods.  works control and supervision of 22 emergency infrastructures (Faranah and Gueckedou)  Implementing agency for 350 km HIMO hired  Technical study for 100 km of HIMO  Control and supervision of 196 km in Dabola, Kissidougou and Gueckedou  Control and supervision of 196 km in Boke, Gaoul and Mamou Component C: Pilot Commercial Infrastructure,  Construction of Timbi-  Construction of Timbi  The Timbi Madina platform was constructed Madina potato platform Madina platforms  10 transit storage warehouses for potato  Construction of Kankan  Construction of 10 production were constructed in the areas of Pita, Mango and citrus transit storage and Lélouma. platform warehouses for Potato  Management services contract production in the  Design study for areas of Pita, and o Potato platform Works Lélouma. o Mango platform Works  Control of platform works  Equipment of platforms

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Original activities Revised activities Outputs  Startup support  Startup costs  10 Storage warehouses  Technical study for 10 stores  PGES Plat form of Timbi-Madina  Commercialization study of potato for Timbi- Madina Platform  Intermediate mean of transport (MIT) utilization study  Control and supervision of works for Platform yard  Financial analysis of platforms  Economic and financial study for platform  Technical study and bid document preparation for Platforms  Training provided for the committee in charge of Timbi Madina platform management  Design of administrative, financial procedures manual for the potato commercialization (platform of Timbi Madina)  Equipment of the platform of Timbi-Madina o Air conditioner and others o 1 Borehole equipped o doors for refrigerating room o conditioning chain for potato o Elevator o 600 palox

Component D: Project management  7 vehicles pick up and 50 motorcycles  ICT Equipment (computers etc...)  Equipment for schools in prefecture of forecariah, kindia, Mamou, faranah, Kissidougou, Guekecdou, macenta  Equipment for Health centers of Mamou and Macenta  2 vehicle 4X4 and 5 motorcycles  Financial audit

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Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis

1. At appraisal, no ex-ante economic evaluation was calculated for the rural road investments, making it impossible to calculate an ex-post economic analysis of the same. This is why, at completion, the best alternative to an economic analysis is a socio-economic impact analysis to measure the benefits for local communities and farmers in the area of influence of the project.

2. On one hand, with the construction of the 3 major bridges (Kaback, Madina Oula, and Tèné), the labor-intensive maintenance of 450 kilometers including many small bridges/culverts, the improvement of 350 kilometers of prefectural roads, the project helped connect 38 rural districts with all-season access roads. It covered an area of influence where more than 300,000 people have seen their mobility improve significantly giving them increased access to health, employment, education and other social services. In terms of efficiency, the project was designed to rehabilitate 1270 km of prefectural roads (using conventional and labor intensive method) at a unit cost of US$12,500. However, due to implementation delays and cost overruns, only 800 km of roads were constructed at an estimated unit cost of US$17, 000 meaning a 35 percent increase in costs compared to the initial cost estimates. The higher than expected costs in the rural road works significantly reduced the number of people reached (300,000 instead of 800,000) by the project.

3. On another hand, although they have not been quantified, the benefits resulting from connecting agricultural production zones were substantial, both in terms of product distribution and financial revenues. The construction of the 3 bridges at Kaback, Madina-Oula, and Tèné has allowed the shipping of agricultural inputs to areas that were inaccessible in the past. Furthermore, the emergence of local markets after the construction of the bridges would allow selling products at a higher farmer’s price because improved accessibility generates more competition among collectors and increased demand. This is especially the case for the area of influence of the Kaback Bridge.

4. The TMLP construction and the technical assistance provided to FPFP, allowed prolonged storage time for potatoes. The added value of the TMLP has increased by the construction of 10 hauling stores for potatoes collection. The platform unit cost has increased tremendously. It was initially planned to build 2 platforms at the unit cost of US$1.2 million. However, only one platform was built at the cost of US$2 million. Moreover, in order for the platform to be operational, number of unplanned, but necessary equipment had to be purchased.

Table 3.1: Traffic per rural bridge As of June 2013 Road/Bridge section Number of vehicles per day (June 2013) Madinagbé-Guéméta-pont Kaback-Kaback 128

Carrefour-Bokaria (Kindia-Mamou)-Madina Oula Pont de 67 Kolenté Pont de Tené : Mafara-Bodié 35 Télimélé-Thionthian (road) 133 NB: There was no traffic data at the design of the project. Traffic was near to zero during the rainy season

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Table 3.2: Key Cost-Benefit Elements of the 3 bridges Benefit-Cost Elements Explanatory comments Project Costs Initial capital costs of the 3 US$9 million bridges Routine maintenance costs Periodic maintenance costs Project Benefits Salvage value of bridges Value at the end of economic life of the 3 bridges Avoided ferry operation costs Fuel, staff, and maintenance of ferries. Avoided costs of ferry rehabilitation/replacement Salvage value of ferries Transport time and cost savings Average crossing time on ferry compared to ferry was about 40 minutes. Improved safety compared to There were on average five ferry fatalities a year during the raining season due to the hazardous river crossing conditions and the poor condition of the ferries. Improved access to health More visits to health centers; services Better supply of pharmaceuticals; more health awareness campaigns. Improved access to education Increased primary school enrollment rates; Agriculture Improved distribution of agricultural inputs and productive assets; Access to markets and Emergence of local markets; opportunities higher prices for local products; more exchanges between populations.

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members Unit Names Title

Lending Robert Fishbein Consultant MNSIF - HIS Felly Akiiki Kaboyo Sr. Program Assistant AFTTR Moctar Thiam Sr. Transport specialist (TTL) AFTTR .Alexandre Dossou Sr. Highway Engineer AFTTR Alain Labeau Lead Specialist AFTTR Omar Fye Sr. Environment Specialist AFTMW Bella Diallo Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Sammena Dost Legal Counsel LEGES Hugues Agossou Financial Management Specialist AFTME Renee Desclaux Disbursement Officer CTRLD Zie Coulibaly Infrastructure Specialist AFTU2 Robert Robelus Consultant AFTWR

Supervision/ICR Alpha Mamoudou Bah Procurement Specialist AFTPC Tabara Barry Communications Associate AFREX Racky Dia Camara Program Assistant AFMGN Zie Ibrahima Coulibaly Senior Infrastructure Specialist AFTUW William Dakpo Procurement Specialist AFTPC Thierno Hamidou Diallo Disbursement Assistant. AFMGN Bella Lelouma Diallo Sr. Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Mamadou Diarrassouba Monitoring & Evaluation Spec. AFTRL Yvette Laure Djachechi Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Jane C. Hopkins Senior Agriculture Economist AFTAR Assiata Houedanou Soro Sr. Program Assistant. AFCF2 Alain L. Labeau Consultant AFTTR Gnoleba Mathieu Meguhe Consultant AFTFM Ibrahim B. Nebie Sr. Agric. Extension Specialist. AFTAR Lydie Anne Billey Program Assistant AFTTR Africa Eshogba Olojoba Sr. Environmental Specialist. AFTEN C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Sector Manager AFTTR Cheikh A. T. Sagna E T Consultant AFTCS Siele Silue Sr. Transport. Specialist.(TTL) EASIN Papa Mamadou Fall Transport specialist (TTL) AFTTR

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(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY00 23.84 114.82 FY01 24.32 55.81 FY02 2.20 3.21 FY03 24.56 128.51 FY04 22.25 53.47 FY05 22.25 50.20 Total: 119.42 406.02 Supervision/ICR FY00 0.00 0.00 FY01 0.00 0.00 FY02 0.00 0.00 FY03 0.00 0.00 FY04 3.25 16.84 FY05 28.64 93.55 FY06 35.14 114.79 FY07 39.49 144.10 FY08 19.09 70.38 FY09 3.30 15.49 FY10 12.63 35.77 FY11 35.81 59.76 FY12 33.78 114.79 FY13 6.98 144.10 Total: 218.11 809.57

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results (if any)

Not applicable (optional for a core ICR)

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results (if any)

Not applicable (optional for a core ICR)

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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. Objective of the Evaluation and Context

1. The preparation and implementation of the Second National Rural Infrastructures Program (Programme National des Infrastructures Rurales, PNIR2) coincided with a general economic climate characterized by a substantial macroeconomic framework. Since 2001, the financial and socio-economic situation of the country has been undergoing an irregular variation in growth rate which moved from 3.8 percent in 2001 to 4.2 percent in 2002 before coming down in 2013 to 1.2 percent and gradually increasing to 2.7 percent in 2004 and 3.3 percent in 2005.

2. This shows a high instability of macroeconomic instability. On local level, the most striking crises were shortage of water and electricity supplies, worsening of budget deficit which approximates 5 percent from 2001 to 2004, inflationary pressures which affected national economy particularly in 2005 where the higher rate level was reached (30.9 percent) further to the increase of fuel cost.

3. Another instable situation includes the Treasury’s debts vis à vis the Central Bank, the marked falling-off in currency assets which moved (in terms of importation month number) from 2.7 percent in 2001 to 1.4 percent in 2004, the continuing depreciation of the national currency which reached 24 percent in 2004 in comparison with US dollars and the permanent increase of prices since 2003. On a year-on-year basis, the consumer price index moved from 6.1 percent in 2002 to 14.8 percent in 2003 and to 27.6 percent in 2004.

4. These lapses in macroeconomic management brought out serious consequences on mobilization of external funding and implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) policy.

5. In order to reverse the trend, the Government adopted in January 2002, the PRS paper which formed a reliable basis for the Government to promote economic development and poverty reduction. Implementation of PRS however faced these last three years, various difficulties related to the effects of sub regional instability, mobilization of external funding and financial and economic management of the country.

6. As far as food security in concerned, it is still an emergency situation: anthropometric data about kids under 5, reveal that real nutrition issues do exist. According to QUIBB data, 11.2 percent (against 9 percent in 1999) of kids from this category in 2002-2003 contracted emaciation (acute malnutrition). The situation remains of concern as far as adult population is concerned.

7. In order to reverse the trend, the Government adopted in January 2002, a PRS paper and also issued in 2003 with FAO support, a national strategy for food security in compliance with the results of diagnostic survey related to the nutrition and food situation of the country.

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8. It is in this general context that the Government gave precedence to the funding and implementation of a Rural Infrastructures Program (PNIR2) which perfectly complies with the objectives of national strategy for food security related to survey results about nutrition and food situation in the country.

9. As a reminder, this strategy aims at reducing in half underfed persons by 2015 and particularly focused on (i) the emergence of a private agricultural sector, the development of rural infrastructures, improvement of input supply conditions and the development of support services to the benefit of rural population (research, outreach services etc…), (ii) improvement of access to food products and farm workers’ skills development.

10. Thus, the World Bank and Guinea agreed in October 2004 on a credit (amounted 30 million US Dollars) for funding PNIR2 project of an initial target period of 4 years. In this regards, the credit agreement included funding participation to budget as far as the State commitments are concerned.

11. The Project was implemented by the Agriculture Ministry through the National Directorate for Rural Roads (Direction Nationale des Pistes Rurales, DNPR), the National department for rural roads operating as the implementing agency. DNPR entered into an agreement with the Export Facilitation Center (Centre de Facilitation des Exportations CAFEX) to implement the marketing and conservation pilot infrastructures component and the setting into management of platforms. Thus, DPNR coordinates PNIR2 project activities including fiduciary aspects, annual budgets consolidation; funds transfer operations and ordinary financial reporting.

12. Apart from IDA support in PNIR2 project, the African Development Bank (ADB) and the IDB funded, in the context of the improvement of some village roads on the prefectural and community network, for PA/PNIR2 US$10,460 million (credit no. 6955GUI) and the IDB for the SNCP, an amount of US$9,01 million (credit no. 2100150006955) respectively. a. Objective and Design of the Project

13. The PNIR2 project includes four components: component A: rural roads, component B: emergency infrastructures, component C: conservation and marketing infrastructures and finally, component D: coordination and management of the project.

14. The overall objective of the PNIR2 is: (i) the improvement of access to production areas by reducing of 25 percent the transport, (ii) the emergency rehabilitation of infrastructure in areas affected by rebel incursions and the creation of jobs and (iii) the establishment of conservation and commercialization infrastructures meant to improve the productivity and the income of the producers.

15. To reach this overall objective, 920 Km of prefectural roads have been renovated for an easy access to areas of agricultural production in 20 prefectures, 350 km of slopes have been renovated by LIPW method in 7 prefectures, 6 rural bridges have been constructed, 37 public buildings have been constructed in communities affected by the war in 7 prefectures and 2 conservation and marketing infrastructures have been built.

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16. Also through PNIR2, the Government should set up a coherent system of management and sustainable maintenance of the entire network by providing a Road Maintenance Funds (Fonds d’entretien routier, FER) that would help support rural roads maintenance works.

17. The expected results of this project are as follows: (i) A regular access to capital prefecture guaranteed for 70 CRD, that is over 800,000 inhabitants, (ii) improve access to basic social services by the rehabilitation of public buildings for 23 CRD affected by rebels’ incursions with job opportunities offer through roads construction by LIPW method (iii) and finally provide targeted professional organizations with platform facilities to maintain and market local production.

b. Evaluations

18. For the purposes of monitoring and evaluating the project, the project was mid-term evaluated, monitored with the Bank monitoring missions that led to the preparation of interim reports. The current review is the final evaluation of the project that leads to the preparation of a completion report which major objectives and application fields relate to the results of the completed project, the effectiveness of the means used to implement the project and the contribution of the project to development and its sustainability. In this perspective, a mission was undertaken by the consultant to carry out an assessment of PNIR2 from its conception to the closing step in order to write the completion report in compliance with the standards in force.

19. The main objectives and the scope of the project completion report consist in evaluating the results of the completed project, the effectiveness of the means used to implement the project, as well as its contribution to development and its sustainability. This document is not only a self-evaluation task, but also a source of lessons for the Bank and the borrower that could help improve ongoing projects as well as future projects.

20. Specifically, the mission aims at carrying out critical analyses of project implementation with the assistance of the coordination unit. At each stage of the project cycle, the point is to identify the strengths and weaknesses, learn lessons and make recommendations for future programs and projects in the sector of rural infrastructure project between Guinea and the World Bank.

2. Achievement of the objectives and results of the project

a. Project Implementation

21. The credit agreement amounting to US$30,300 million was signed on 14 October 2004 under the No. 39720 with the World Bank to finance the second Rural Infrastructure National Project (PNIR2).

22. However the project underwent several changes during its implementation. During the evaluation of the project, the Government's participation was set to US$4.2 million. During execution, the country faced a macroeconomic imbalance as a result of the disturbances recorded during the rebel attacks of 2000. This made it hard for the State to fulfill its contribution to the

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financing of the project activities. Thus, the Government issued a request for amendment of the credit agreement with the Bank’s Board of Directors so that IDA supports the entire project cost (100 percent) instead of 85 percent as initially scheduled when signing the credit agreement. This provision came into force in June 2008.

23. The second major amendment related to reallocation of activities which negatively influenced the achievement of the project’s initial objectives. Caused by fuel, construction materials, and labor surge price as well as the suspension of project activities following the political events in 2008, that relocation did negatively influence the achievement of the initial objective. The available credit balance was consequently used for on-going activities before funding discontinuation, as well as some new additional activities identified as priorities. That reallocation resulted in: (i) the postponement of Kankan plat form construction. (ii) the programming of three (3) major bridges instead of six (6) as initially planned; (iii) The reduction of more than 50 percent of planned rural roads network. Other events and changes in the project are summarized in the table below:

Table 7.1: Events that occurred in the life of the PNIR2 project (2004-2013) Activities Period Comments Loan approval August 26, 2004 Signing of the credit October 14, 2004 credit effectiveness October 4, 2005 A year before effectiveness

1st Amendment of credit December 12, 2005 Relating to DNPR designation agreement as Executive agency Project Launching date May 18, 2006 7 months and 1/2 after effectiveness 2nd Amendment of credit November 15, 2007 2nd completion Date: agreement December 31, 2009 IDA contribution reset to Initial completion date December 2008 2e completion Date December 31, 2009 On amendment of November 15, 200715, 2007 Mid-term review April 2008 Freeze and suspension of credit Dec. 2008 May 2011 2 years and 5 months of duration 1era restructuring January 2011 2nd restructuring June 2011 Credit Reactivation May 1st, 2011 Steering Committee held in 23-24February, 2012 Kindia Closing date June 30, 2013

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24. The major constraints identified during the implementation include:

 On the administrative front: (i) long administrative procedures. (ii) long procurement cycle, (iii) lack of contractualization of key posts in the team project, (iv) Unstable project institutional framework and coordination team, (v) lack of motivation in positions, (vi) low capacity of the private sector (companies).

 On the technical front: (i) heavy allotment of 1st cycle works, (ii) poor performance of SMEs due to the lack of work equipment, lack and/or shortage in qualified support personnel for local SMEs and poor organization and mismanagement of construction sites and lack of financial support from the banking sector for contractual guarantees.

 On the financial front: (i) Very long implementation and effectiveness periods affecting the performance of the project, (ii) the instability of the cost of materials affecting expenses related to the management of contracts, (iii) and the reallocation of the project cost affecting specific objectives. b. Project Objectives Evaluation

25. During the formulation, a logical framework summarizing material elements and objectives’ assessment was provided. The logical framework that has been implemented sets out the objectives and performances with guidance on required quantification and measures. This predisposition has been useful for the monitoring and evaluation of the achievement of the project’s objectives.

26. The evaluation revealed that set objectives are consistent and relevant in compliance with the country's development priorities and achievable with regard to contributions to the project and the expected time. Indeed, the formulation of the project aimed to provide a solution to the need for opening up of production rural areas which is in close coherence with the PRSP priorities and the objectives of the letter (LPDA II) which is specifically expected to provide national food security. The objectives of the project are also consistent with the Bank’s intervention policy on behalf of developing Member States; interventions which aim at contributing to economic development that would help reduce poverty and with other donors’ interventions in the fields of opening up rural areas. Furthermore, based on consensus, specific objectives have been optimally defined with all development actors.

27. Moreover, the evaluation revealed that with lessons learned from the first experience of the PNIR1, the improvement of production areas access by the opening-up, the improvement of basic infrastructure access and the increase of revenues are easily achievable. However the renovation of conservation and marketing infrastructures thanks to pilot experience could make it hard to implement the project. Its realization was made easy thanks to the participatory approach and the acquisition of a consensus from stakeholders on the objectives of the project. c. Results Evaluation and performance of the project

28. Overall assessment. In terms of results, the project provided the following:

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 Components A: Rural roads

- Markets National tenders: 151 km rural roads renovated, - Markets International tenders: 235.400 km including 98 km received and 137.4 terminated, - The construction of 336ml of Rural bridges in the prefectures of Dalaba-Kindia- Forecariah, - The construction of the Tene Bridge (length 100 m) in the rural community of Mafara - Dalaba Prefecture, and - The construction of the Kaback Bridge (length 100 m) in the rural community of Forécariah Kaback Prefecture.

29. LIPWs: 450 km of rural roads. With the labor intensive work, the achievement rate is as follows: - 350 km of rural roads have been rehabilitated, 100 km are running, 213 ml built crossing structures and 70 ml of crossings running; and - 108 companies involved include 16 women's businesses with 4800 jobs created, 106421 served populations and 22 CRD covered.

 Component B Emergency Infrastructures. 36 buildings have been rehabilitated and become operational. They include: 18 primary schools of 3 classes each, 12 offices for the District Administration, 3 positions in health sector, 2 village markets and 1 Prefectural Section Office for rural roads.

 Conservation and marketing infrastructures. Construction of Timbi-Madina platform.

 Coordination and project management. Under the coordination of the project, the mid- term review has been carried out as well as the holding of three steering committees other than supervision and periodic and close monitoring missions executed on the ground. Accounts financial audits for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 have been carried out. The establishment of database is in progress. The project team has benefited, in terms of the Bank's contribution, from several domestic and foreign training courses. This training was very beneficial and conducive to the project coordination effectiveness.

3. Performance of the Project

a. Overall performance of the project

30. The results of this project did positively and substantially affect lives of population. Indeed, although entire original objectives have not been achieved, the implementation of activities has changed significantly and positively the living conditions of population targeted. Project key outcomes in terms of results include: The works carried out under the PNIR2 helped provide accessed rural areas by granting population with easy access to their prefecture capital city with the guaranteed transport of a huge quantity of agricultural products. Access to social basic infrastructures by populations affected by the rebel incursions of targeted areas was made

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possible due to emergency infrastructures renovated. Moreover, LIPWs developed through rehabilitation of the 350 km rural roads, were an opportunity of jobs creation and thus income generation to the benefit of population living that area.

31. Moreover, the Government has set up a Road Maintenance Funds (FER) that would directly support road maintenance. This FER under the project, annually assured maintenance funding of one part of rural roads program presented by DNPR. The establishment by the Government of this new institutional framework is meant to facilitate adequate support for the entire road network is a secure and promising starting point to reduce systematically populations’ physical isolation as well as the difficult access to production areas.

32. However it is necessary to note that the project failed to achieve the original and revised objectives; which did impact performances. Indeed, despite the second restructuring of project activities meant to provide efficiency, objectives set after revision of activities are still unachieved.

33. Furthermore, factors that negatively affect the performance and results of the project include: substantial delays noted during project effectiveness and implementation of project activities (October 2005 – June 2013, 7 years 9 months) with the virtual non-existence of production during the period of credit freeze and suspension: December 2008-April 2011(ii) the institutional instability within Ministries and DNPR and (iii) the ineffectiveness of the project team’ motivation.

34. In conclusion, we note that positive planned impacts from achieved results have been eroded by counter-performances from delays in implementation, institutional instability and the project team, of non-achievement of the initial objectives and the problems encountered during project implementation. In consideration of the above, the performances of the project are considered Moderately Unsatisfactory. b. The Bank's performance

35. The Bank’s participation in the financing of Guinea rural infrastructures is appropriate. Credit granted by the Bank is, for the Government a valuable support in its policy for the promotion of the national food security program in agricultural sector through the development of rural infrastructures for a better access to rural production areas. Missions of the Bank during the project entire cycle were an appropriate contribution. Assistance was also quite useful during definition of objectives, activities, results expected and especially to the project team during implementation. The deadlines for response to stakeholders’ loads were satisfactory for project implementation. The Bank's performance is considered Satisfactory. c. Performance of the Borrower

36. The borrower has achieved results that positively impacted the populations through a successful project preparation with a relevant definition of objectives for the economic development of the country. It also succeeded in managing (i) negotiations and signature of the credit; (ii) met the Bank’s general conditions required to project effectiveness. (iii) the adoption

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of the Project Implementation Manual, (iv) the establishment of a Project Coordination Team and (v) the opening of an account for the project and payment of initial deposit to the concerned account; (vi) the implementation of the project with the Bank’s collaboration and support.

37. It is however necessary to note that the borrower showed substantial delay during project implementation. This caused the postponement of completion date on two occasions (from Moreover existence of a retrospective reactivation). Just for the only Credit Agreement implementation, the State has virtually shown a year's delay for its effectiveness. Shortcomings were also noted (i) on the institutional instability with many changes during project life cycle. (ii) at project opening step, lack of mobilization of necessary resources in time for its contribution on project activities financing. (iii) The unreached objectives revised despite restructuring of activities.

38. In consideration of the above, the borrower’s performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory . d. Performance of the unit and the implementing agencies

39. Executing agency (DNPR) led the project to achievement of the above listed - results. Coordination helped achieve real beneficial outcomes for populations and contributed to the achievement of the objective of rural roads opening-up initiated by the Government. The team appropriately worked well with the World Bank’s Heads and the environmental and social safeguard measures have been identified and implemented in a satisfactory manner.

40. However despite the fact that the executing agency officials have provided much effort to complete the project, coordination of the activities met several obstacles that did impact its effectiveness. They include: (i) the motivation of the project team that was not effective, (ii) the socio-political and economic situation in the country, (iii) many institutional changes occurred in the team during project implementation. Furthermore, the project went through much delay which in turn did affect the performance of the implementing agency.

41. In consideration of the above, the performance of the coordination unit is generally regarded as Moderately Satisfactory.

e. Performance in terms of Environmental protection is satisfactory

42. A Program of Environmental and Social Management (PGES) was developed based on the specificities of each site. In the whole, implementation of mitigation measures focus on the entire environment elements (soil, water, air, vegetation cover...), with a particular emphasis on the restoration of vegetation cover, monitoring of the balance of the environment as well as the mitigation of impacts on the human and social environment.

43. Implementation of the PGES activities focused on: (i) its validation by the Guinean Office for Environmental Evaluation; (ii) its implementation by the company, the Control Mission and supervision through the project coordination, (iii) the establishment of the follow-up

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Committee composed of representatives of several ministerial departments by an administrative act signed by the delegated Ministry responsible for Water and Forest Environment.

44. An environmentalist was hired at each site level for PGES implementation and an inter- ministerial Committee monitors through monthly supervision under the chairmanship of the Guinean Office for Studies and Environmental Evaluations. The National Directorate for Rural Roads did improve implementation based on advice and recommendations of the supervisory missions. In consideration of the above, the environmental backup performance is Satisfactory.

4. Investments socio-economic and environmental impact

45. The socio-economic impact of the project to the benefit of beneficiaries is certain. The results of the project did significantly improve (i) conditions of accessibility of concerned rural areas, the opening up of production areas for populations, (ii) development of the concerned rural areas ( Example of Kabak: according the beneficiaries, a market for the sale of agricultural products emerged following the construction of the road and the bridge); (iii) Producers’ incomes (with Pankaj Madina, the conservation of seeds and production platform is possible and rot of potato losses will be eliminated; (iv) producers became more courageous and optimistic in increasing growing areas because of the new flow conditions, production conservation and marketing offered by the project;) (v) with the project’s new emergency infrastructures, accessibility of the population to basic services (schools, medical, markets, areas of production, etc.), and the connection between the villages, sub prefectures, departments or regions did substantially improve, (vi) Fighting poverty in targeted areas through the construction under LIPW, of 350 km by creating revenue opportunities for population living in that area.

a. Socio-economic impact of each component:

46. Component A Rural Roads. A substantial improvement in access to concerned production areas through the opening-up as well as a reduction of the cost of transportation has been reached (significant improvement of service infrastructure level, journey times and risk for access to rural areas significantly reduced, other more efficient transportation modes develop etc.) Populations impacted positively by the project now have an easy access capital town prefecture.

47. Component B Emergency Infrastructures. The renovation of emergency infrastructures in areas affected by rebel incursions and job creation. The construction of these emergency infrastructures was of a large contribution to economic and especially socially in the areas of concern. Armed-affected and conflict-affected populations in the sub region (especially Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and recently in Côte d'Ivoire) since the mid-1990s, benefited from basic social services, essential and critical to any human being’s life. For example, markets, schools and health stations renovation did respectively contribute to creating revenues for women, schooling kids and access to health care.

48. The emergency rehabilitation program carried out through PNIR2 allowed a quick restoration of basic infrastructure in most affected areas, which also facilitated the return of displaced people, security establishment, and further help for PRSPs objectives achievement in

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these areas. Moreover, work Organization by LIPW method allowed generating income for the conflict-affected populations of those areas of concern.

49. Component C: conservation and marketing infrastructure. The implementation of these infrastructure conservation and marketing in the example of that of Timbi-Medina has promoted (i) a better involvement of local producers’ organizations and effective ownership of the works by the people with a strong impact on women’s participation, (ii) an increase in productions with the possibility of conservation areas offered by the project (30 to 40 percent of the lost production are now recoverable with the platform); (iii) increased production with a notorious decline of rot and especially for potato losses; (iv) promotes a new craze for producers to invest more in potatoes cultivation; (v) a better organization of producers and an increase in the creation of income and jobs for local people. The operation of the platform is going to be a stabilizing element for social life of these populations by occupying the young who tended to leave rural zones.

50. Moreover, it is noteworthy that this pilot platform is a relevant example of development and production poles in rural areas. This should serve as an example in other parts of the country considering local speculation. Indeed, the platform has allowed increasing the volume of seed from 300 to 500 tons between 2011 and 2012; 500-725 tons between 2012 and 2013 and projection up to 1200 tons in 2013-2014. The development of the platform allowed also Timbi- Madina producers’ Federation to install ten (10) young producers for the purposes of extension of cultures boundaries. On average, each young man is expected to landscape 10 ha for the extension. Women’s participation in this federation was also highly significant (approximately 64 percent of members are women).

51. As a conclusion, restoration of these infrastructures comply with DSRP objectives for rural sector which aims at providing: (i) an economic growth, (ii) a stimulation of the rural economy, capitalizing on the emergence of local professional organizations, and potential business partners to initiate effective link of farmers in the most profitable distribution channels, and, (iii) in the long term facilitate their integration into supply chains for export to the international and regional levels, (iv) strengthen the capacities of farmers’ organizations in the management of quality logistics and marketing skills to ensure an adequate and continuous supply while developing a contractual framework that would ensure the functioning and sustainable maintenance of these facilities.

52. Component D: Coordination and project management. With credit effectiveness conditions, the Government recently set up a FER that would directly finance road maintenance. Under the project, this fund annually provided funding for maintenance of PNIR2 program. It is noteworthy that the total budget available for the project did not fully cover the service needs of PNIR2. Initially, the transfer of rural roads responsibility was carried by the Department of public works and transport, DNPR was created as the structure of this Ministry. Thus, DNPR was put under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. The establishment by the Government of this new institutional framework supporting the funding of management and maintenance of road network strategy is a safe and promising starting point to reduce systematically the physical isolation of both the populations and production areas.

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53. Establishment of a database of rural roads by DNPR. This activity will allow the DNPR to have a good knowledge of the State of its rural roads network and have a management and programming tool of its maintenance, renovation and extension works. According to DNPR, the consultant in charge of database establishment started his activities and the base is being gradually installed.

54. In consideration of the above, the socio-economic impact of the project is a reality given the results achieved with the project.

b. Sustainability of the results

55. The involvement of the beneficiaries in the project implementation process and the participatory approach adopted by the Government during the project entire cycle is a pledge for the sustainability of the achieved results. Indeed, these arrangements since DRSP preparation helped ensure (i) a good fit populations’ needs with the objectives and activities of the project; (ii) an effective ownership of the project by populations; which constitutes liable and sustainable element of the project expected results.

56. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Guinea is currently working to facilitate an additional economic situation that could favor further investments to be apportioned and managed so that they contribute to the consolation of achieved results... Additionally, Guinea reached the completion point of the HIPC initiative and an exploitation of this situation would constitute a pledge for the extension of the sustainability of the project results impact on populations.

57. Moreover, still in the perspective of results sustainability, the Government will have to take the following measures: (i) better associate and involve local decentralized structures in rural roads activities and populations to ensure ownership, (ii) the road maintenance fund should be provided with sufficient and sustainable resources in order to cover the needs in maintenance of rural roads. (iii) Also renovate prefectural roads that are an extension of the community roads on the network, (iv) develop on the one hand standards and maintenance strategies by defining roads tasks and unit costs in compliance with required standards and on the other hand, the programming and maintenance of rural roads network to assure optimal control of maintenance management.

5. Lessons learned

a. The most significant positive lessons

58. Despite the fairly average overall level of the results recorded by PNIR2 project, positive lessons have been identified such as:

59. Guinean authorities are aware of the scopes of impacts that can bring the project to economic development and its contribution to the fighting poverty. Indeed, the State has demonstrated its willingness to complete the project by suggesting appropriate solutions, measures and the establishment of means to help improve performance (measures to reactivate credit, etc.). As a result, PNIR2 project helped highlight the constraints related to the renovation

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of rural infrastructures; this constitutes a significant step forward the achievement of rural areas’ opening objectives.

60. Furthermore the advantages in terms of institutional reforms are more or less important (this project helped the State establish a useful tool, which is the FER. However important improvements on the diversification and increase of resources, their mobilization, their sustainability and their security must be made by the Government in the management of the railway to ensure road network maintenance sustainability.

61. Finally the project resulted in DNPR project team skills development and the beginning of database that would be of a certain interest for the establishment of the road maintenance system. b. The most significant negative lessons

62. The following key weaknesses can be noted:

 The project initially suffered from the impacts of institutional reforms established by the Government and changes in the management team (change of DNPR guardianship, change of the project coordinators of the project change, movement of unit management staff);

 Mobilization, sustainability and the securing of resources to ensure proper road maintenance could not be carried out appropriately by the Road Maintenance. Pay/weigh could not be established and the implementation of the reform on the road maintenance did not favor the constitution of a successful company’s tissue in the sector. Indeed, the absorption capacity of the market generated by PNIR2 remained low due to delays on works;

 The project suffered from delay during project implementation for the credit effectiveness. The 7 years and 9 months delay did negatively influence the general timeline for project completion and deficiencies noted on the application of procedures ; and

 The lack of political stability in Guinea strongly affected the performance of the project. Indeed, multiple socio-political unrest, the suspension of disbursement and institutional instability were punitive factors on the performance of the project.

6. Recommandations

63. In consideration of the above listed lessons, the following recommendations are suggested:

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a. To Guinea Government

64. Apply systematically positive lessons learned with PNIR2 in the implementation of future and current projects.

 Ensure a better involvement of populations and decentralized structures and all stakeholders in the identification, preparation and implementation of the project;

 Develop LIPW techniques and use it as much as possible to eradicate poverty and enable local populations to appropriate the project;

65. Regarding the Road Maintenance Fund (RMF):

 Establish weighing and toll road on the network to create new resource for the RMF;

 Develop a three year or Five road maintenance program (Highway Design Manual (HDM) and Road Network Evaluation Tool (RONET) are powerful tools to assist in planning and decision-making for road maintenance);

 The allocation of resources for the network works should be consistent with the results of the Five-year road maintenance program;

 Improving resources mobilization by diversifying sources and by increasing taxes rate on petroleum products;

 Make more direct and fluid the resources collection process (including taxes petroleum products collection);

 Ensure that the private and civil society are well represented on the Board of Directors of the RMF;

 Ensure that the RMF has a better autonomy in its management;

 Create an executive road agency to perform works in the road network;

 Finalize the road database and extent it in the whole national road network;

 Ensure a better allotment of works which considers local businesses capacity and improve the quality of technical studies;

 Establish assistance and support plan to SMEs which considers funding, equipment, organization and management issues;

 If need be, consult a chattered Assistant and Advisor and Assistant to project coordinator in the process of implementing project activities;

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 Take appropriate measures timely to revive or punish defaulters stakeholders during project implementation. This would help avoid lengthening the period of the project.;

 Take the required measures and adjustments to favor the good continuation of the project should an unpredicted even occurred in the course of project implementation.;

 Develop skills of structures in charge of internal and external project monitoring and establish a reliable archiving system for projects;

 Consider the level of qualification of the human resources of Governments from central departments during preparation and possibly reinforce their skills before starting project activities;

 Establish a high-performance system of sensitization and communication of all actors for a better ownership of the works and a perpetuation of the results; and

 Assure to reach a consensus on the objectives and the means to implement with all stakeholders to favor efficient results. b. To the Bank

66. The Bank has fully played its role by providing the Government with substantial resources to complete the project. Unfortunately, major malfunctions did not help fully achieve project original objectives.

 Study ways or possibilities to assist Guinea State in its policy of opening up of rural areas by developing rural infrastructures. In fact, Guinea which has just reached the HIPC completion point would require support for the financing of infrastructure by opening up, as far as its vision based on food security is concerned;

 Systematically organize supervision missions jointly with other financial and technical partners for a better efficiency of interventions;

 Guarantee from project identification and preparation steps, functionality of the institutional framework, and the reliability of information on local actors, projects and initiatives in progress, data reference so as to better project objectives and expected results from the project;

 Ensure during project evaluation the effective provision of institutions governmental partners in the implementation of activities;

 Help the State to continue the capacity-building on the new needs identified in the framework of the implementation of the reforms; indeed, at the end of PNIR2 project, each executing agency resources persons are sufficiently well known to identify training needs. Strengthening the skills of these experts must continue during post-project step to improve the project results dynamics by actors of the sector. This training should also

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incorporate the expertise requirements for securing the sustainability of the project achievements; and

 For future projects of the same complexity in the example of PNIR2, the need to observe a certain flexibility in the project formulation and preparation as well as a better evaluation of risks. This provision would provide alternative solutions in order to ensure a better success chance in project implementation depending changes in socio-political situation and ownership of the results by beneficiaries.

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Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable (optional for a core ICR)

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Project Appraisal Document

Development Credit Agreement

Development Credit Agreement amendments

Restructuring papers

Mid Term Review report (April 2008)

Implementation Status Result Reports

Aide Memoires

Socio- economic studies

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