Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial

Case Western Reserve Law Review Volume 71 Issue 1 Article 5 2020 Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial Mary Nicol Bowman Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Mary Nicol Bowman, Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial, 71 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 39 (2020) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol71/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial Mary Nicol Bowman† Contents Introduction .................................................................................... 40 I. How and Why is Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric So Problematic? ........................................................................... 44 A. Overview of Foundational Concepts for Understanding Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric ......................................................................... 44 B. How Race Affects Juror Decision-Making ............................................ 50 1. Ingroup versus Outgroup Bias......................................................... 51 2. The Power of Stereotypes ............................................................... 53 3. Priming for Prejudice ...................................................................... 57 4. Framing and Recency Bias .............................................................. 62 5. Neuroscience and Neurorhetoric ...................................................... 64 6. Group Decision-Making Can Help But Does Not Cure Individual Biases ............................................................................................. 67 II. Courts’ Current Approaches Are Ineffective at Dealing with Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial ....................... 69 A. Prosecutors Use Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric .................................... 69 B. Appellate Courts Often Refuse to Recognize Improper Language ......... 72 C. Appellate Procedural Doctrines Prevent Meaningful Remedies ............ 77 III. Focus on Trial Courts for Solutions About Controlling Biases ....................................................................................... 83 A. Trial Courts are Better Positioned than Appellate Courts to Spur Change ................................................................................................. 84 B. Trial Courts Should Focus on Prosecutors ........................................... 87 C. Overview of Debiasing Strategies from Social Science Research ........... 89 IV. Specific Proposed Solutions ..................................................... 94 A. Create an Effective Foundation ............................................................ 95 1. Use Voir Dire to Make Race Salient ............................................... 95 2. Give Jury Instruction(s), including a Debiasing Instruction, Before Opening Statements ........................................................... 96 B. Prevent Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric .................................................. 99 1. Use a Checklist to Clarify What Language is Potentially Racist .... 99 a. Prohibit Use of Racial Slurs and Explicit References to Stereotypes ............................................................................. 101 † Clinical Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University. Thanks to the College of Law for supporting this project; to Kathryn Stanchi and my colleague Judy Stinson for their detailed feedback; and to my colleagues Sue Chesler, Amy Langenfeld, Rachel Stabler, Tamara Herrera, and Ann Ching for their encouragement and suggestions. I am grateful for the outstanding research assistance provided by Lauren Pauls and Sharon Foster. Any errors are my own. 39 Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial b. Coded Language to Invoke Race or Stereotypes ..................... 103 c. Balancing the Probative Value Against the Prejudicial Effect of Racial Language ...................................................... 106 2. Require a Motion in Limine by Prosecutors for Proposed References to Race on a Case-by-Case Basis ............................... 108 C. Responses When Problems Arise at Trial ........................................... 111 1. Act Sua Sponte When a Problem Occurs Rather Than Requiring an Objection ................................................................................ 112 2. Admonish the Prosecutor in Front of the Jury for Appealing to Bias and Give a Specific Curative Instruction ............................. 112 3. Grant a Mistrial for Particularly Serious or Repeated Violations During the Same Trial ................................................................. 114 D. Track Repeat Violators Across Trials ................................................ 116 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 118 Appendix A: Possible Checklist for Courts to Use in Prohibiting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric: ........................................... 119 Introduction “Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.”1 “Theories and arguments based upon racial, ethnic and most other stereotypes are antithetical to and impermissible in a fair and impartial trial.”2 We are in a moment of reckoning about the influence of racial bias on the criminal justice system.3 To give only a few examples, increased scrutiny is being placed on racially-motivated police brutality and other 1. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979). 2. State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 557 (Wash. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dhaliwal, 79 P.3d 432, 444 (Wash. 2003) (Chambers, J., concurring)). 3. While this reckoning seems to be gaining traction and speed now, it is not entirely new; many voices have been calling for this reckoning for a long time. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 89 Geo. L.J. 2227, 2235 (2001) (noting that “[r]acial contamination of the criminal law in the sway of bias and discrimination is well documented” and citing sources documenting that history). 40 Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 Confronting Racist Prosecutorial Rhetoric at Trial misconduct,4 and on the racial dimensions of mass incarceration.5 The United States Supreme Court recently described racial bias as “a familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.”6 In the last few years, the Court has frankly acknowledged ways that individual actors’ racial biases can affect the criminal justice system, including through jury selection7 and race-based arguments during jury deliberation.8 And earlier this year, the Court acknowledged the “clear” racist origins of a structural issue, the use by two states of nonunanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases.9 An overlooked piece of this reckoning, however, is the racist rhetoric10 that prosecutors sometimes use in arguing cases. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.” 11 4. See, e.g., Isabel Bilotta, Abby Corrington, Saaid A. Mendoza, Ivy Watson & Eden King, How Subtle Bias Infects the Law, 15 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 227, 229 (2019) (discussing bias in policing generally and statistics showing disproportionate police killings of unarmed Black and Latino individuals). Beyond police brutality, there is increased scrutiny on the role of police in the disproportionate outcomes for people of color within the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Warren, Hidden in Plain View: Juries and the Implicit Credibility Given to Police Testimony, 11 DePaul J. Soc. Just. 1 (2018) (arguing that jurors often make unfounded assumptions regarding police credibility). 5. See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2020) (discussing racial imbalances and the mass incarcerations of Black men). 6. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017). 7. See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019) (holding that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the state’s peremptory challenge of a Black juror “was not ‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent’” (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016))). Although the court articulated its holding very narrowly, the court explicitly relied on four “critical facts” that each showed racial bias in the prosecutor’s actions. See id. 8. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (holding that an exception to the non-impeachment rule about jury verdicts is needed to allow trial courts to consider juror reports about racially biased comments or actions). 9. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020) (noting the “clear” racist origins of laws in Oregon and Louisiana allowing for criminal convictions without jury unanimity). However, the Supreme Court has only rarely used the terms “racist” or “racism,” and there is reason to be cautious about the extent to which the Court is ready to

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