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Teaching Material THE INTERNAL MARKET: NON-TARIFF BARRIERS J.H.H. Weiler European Union Jean Monnet Professor NYU School of Law AND Martina Kocjan Graduate Member of the Faculty of Law University of Oxford Copyright J.H.H. Weiler & M. Kocjan • 2004/05 These materials are offered as a public service by the Academy of European Law at the EUI in Florence and the Jean Monnet Center at NYU School of Law. They may be used for educational purposes only and cannot be commercialized in any manner. Their origin should be acknowledged in any use made of them. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. RELEVANT TREATY PROVISIONS:..............................................................................1 Note and Questions ........................................................................................................................ 1 2. RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS .......................................................................................5 2.1 From Dassonville to Keck.............................................................................................................. 5 2.1.1 Case 8/74: Dassonville...........................................................................................................................5 2.1.2 Case 120/78: Cassis de Dijon ................................................................................................................7 2.1.3 Case 188/84: Woodworking ................................................................................................................10 2.1.3.1 Opinion of AG VerLoren van Themaat ......................................................................................10 2.1.3.2 Judgement of the Court of Justice ..............................................................................................13 2.1.4 Case 34/79: Henn and Darby...............................................................................................................18 2.1.4.1 Judgement of the Court of Justice ..............................................................................................18 2.1.4.2 Opinion of AG Warner ...............................................................................................................22 2.1.5 Case 145/88: Torfaen Borough............................................................................................................31 2.1.5.1 Opinion of AG van Gerven.........................................................................................................31 2.1.5.2 Judgment of the Court of Justice................................................................................................45 2.1.6 Case 362/88: Inno................................................................................................................................47 2.1.7 Joined Cases C-267 and 268/91: Keck ................................................................................................51 2.2 Post-Keck ...................................................................................................................................... 54 2.2.1 Case C-292/92: Hunermund ................................................................................................................54 2.2.2 Joined Cases C-401 and 402/92: Tankstation’t Heukske.....................................................................57 2.2.2.1 Opinion of AG van Gerven.........................................................................................................58 2.2.2.2 Judgment of the Court of Justice................................................................................................63 2.2.3 Case C-412/93: Leclerc .......................................................................................................................64 2.2.3.1 Opinion of AG Jacobs ................................................................................................................64 2.2.3.2 Judgement of the Court of Justice ..............................................................................................69 2.2.4 Case C-391/92: Commission v. Greece (Infant Milk) .........................................................................71 2.2.4.1 Opinion of AG Lenz....................................................................................................................71 2.2.4.2 Judgement of the Court of Justice ..............................................................................................74 2.2.5 Joined cases C-69/93 and C-258/93: Punto Casa.................................................................................77 2.2.6 Joined Cases 418 etc. /93, 9 etc. /94: Semeraro...................................................................................80 2.2.7 Case C-470/93: Mars ...........................................................................................................................86 2.2.7.1 Opinion of AG Leger..................................................................................................................86 2.2.7.2 Judgement of the Court of Justice ..............................................................................................90 2.2.8 Case C-368/95: Familiapress ...............................................................................................................91 2.2.9 Case C-265/95: Commission v France (Spanish strawberries)............................................................96 Note and Questions..............................................................................................................................96 2.2.10 Case C-122/00: Schmidberger ...........................................................................................................104 Note and Questions............................................................................................................................104 2.2.11 Joined Cases C-34-36/95: De Agostini..............................................................................................112 2.2.12 Case C-379/98: PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG ....................................................................117 2.2.13 Case C-120/95: Decker......................................................................................................................122 2.2.14 Case C-405/98: Gourmet International..............................................................................................128 i 3 RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS ........................................................................................134 3.1 Case 15/79: Horsemeat............................................................................................................... 134 3.2 Case 155/80: Oebel ..................................................................................................................... 136 3.3 Case C-5/94: Hedley Lomas ...................................................................................................... 139 Note and Questions .................................................................................................................... 139 3.4 Case C-1/96: ex parte: Compassion in World Farming.......................................................... 142 Note and Questions .................................................................................................................... 142 3.5 Case C-350/97: Wilfried Monsees............................................................................................. 146 Note and Questions .................................................................................................................... 146 3.6 Case C-388/95: Belgium v Spain............................................................................................... 149 Note and Questions .................................................................................................................... 149 4 ARTICLE 100A (4) [NOW ARTICLE 95]: NATIONAL DEROGATION ........................159 4.1 Case C-319/97: Antoine Kortas................................................................................................. 159 Note and Questions .................................................................................................................... 159 Update finished on: 30/January/2005 ii 1. RELEVANT TREATY PROVISIONS: NOTE AND QUESTIONS Free Movement of Goods (http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/goods/index.htm) Introduction Articles 28 to 30 of the EC Treaty establish the principle of free movement of goods under which Member States may not maintain or impose barriers to trade in areas which have not been the subject of Community harmonisation, except in special circumstances. Products which are lawfully marketed in one Member State may be marketed in all the other Member States. Therefore, the authorities of the Member States of destination will acknowledge the standards to which the product conforms in the Member State of origin: this is known as the principle of mutual recognition. The provision in all the Member States of a broad range of goods from all four corners of the EU must be implemented within a precise framework. Citizens need to be assured that products are safe and that they can obtain compensation for damage caused by defective products. Since 1985, the Single Market has had a product liability regime to deal with these two concerns, as specified in the Directive on liability for defective products. When a Member State hinders free movement or the marketing of a specific
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