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European Alliances and Ententes 1879-85 a Study Op EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND ENTENTES 1879-85 A STUDY OP CONTEÎÆPORARY BRITISH INFORMATION. ProQuest Number: 10097177 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest 10097177 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 CONTENTS. page Introduction Chapter I. 1 Developments in European Relations August 1879 - August 1879 Chapter 11. 69 The Austro-German Alliance October 7, 1879 Chapter 111. 134 Developments in European Relations January 1880 - June 1881 Chapter IV. 233 The Dreikaiserbund June 18, 1381 Chapter V. 308 The Triple Alliance May 20, 1882 Chapter VI. 562 Servia, Rumania and Turkey Conclusion 415 Bibliography Index of Political Visits and Meetings INTRODUCTION It is almost a commonplace to say that sound information is essential for successful and active diplomacy. It is scarcely less so to point out that confidence in its accuracy and completeness is equally essential. The present thesis will therefore make an attempt to indicate,within the limits of its title ,first the information actually received by the British Foreign Office, and secondly the degree of their confidence in its accuracy and completeness. With the first purpose in view, the ground will be cleared by distinguishing between certain classes of information and indicating the part played by each in the period under discussion. Under the second head attention will be drawn, as the information IS on the most important developments dealt with, to the sources from which that information was derived and to their relative value. The first class of information concerns the interests of the different Powers. It indicates the action likely to be imposed upon them by economic factors, by the demands of trade or of geographical position, or by the championship of traditional ambitions: in short all that determines in which direction a power is likely to make a move in the diplomatic field. The second class concerns their Internal affairs. It shows the character of the Government of each Power: whether it is likely to lay emphasis on one Interest rather than on another; the situation of the Government within the country: its power to enforce its will, or the possibilities of restrictions being imposed upon its course by internal factors and if so, the strength and scope of these factors; and the military, naval and financial position of each country. This class includes, in fact, all information which goes to show the degree of strength with which any particular diplo­ matic move is likely to be carried through* The third concerns the degree to which either the direction of the move or the strength behind it is likely to be modified by the relations and commitments of one power to another. ■fKx Hxirci In the period under discussion it is t M a class of information that is of vital importance. Various factors brought it about that at the opening of the period information under the first two heads was exceptionally full, and that this information proved with few modifications equally applicable at its close. The simplification which had occurred in the diplomatic field as the result of the constitution of a united Germany and Italy, and the Ausgleich of Austria-Hungary, left the five Powers pitted against each other as never before. This closer contact between them, emphasised by the development of communications, brought about a definition and clarity as regards the interests of the different Powers which had also not previously existed. The demands of a growing public opinion in general, and the influence of the incisive nature of German diplomacy in particular, were factors in accelerating this process. The crises of the last few years beginning with the War Scare of 1875, furnished the opportunity. The Congress of Berlin and the negotiations immediately preceding it, were instrumental in filling in the gaps, recapitulating and formulating what had already been learnt. Not until the emergence of the colonial question was diplomacy influenced by an interest that had not been formulated in this period. Information on internal affairs was also less important in the period under consideration than in earlier or later periods. For many of those who determined the character and position of the Governments from 1879-85 had done the same for those of the preceding period, during which, moreover, they had become personally acquainted. One thinks particu­ larly in this connection of Bismarck and the Emperor William, Francis Joseph and Ahdrassy, Alexander II, Gorehakoff, Giers and the Panslavists in Russia, and the men of the in Italy and in France. With the exception perhaps^ of the advent of Jules Ferry in France, changes in personnel did not effect important changes in policy. Andrassy, as a member of the Austrian Delegations, continued to influence the position of the Government, and Haymerle and Kalhoky carried on his policy. Alexander III maintained the policy of his father. At Berlin,Salisbury and Beacons- field had made personal contacts with the Emperor and Bismarck, Andrassy and Haymerle, Gorehakoff and Waddington. Salisbury in addition, had made the acquaintance of Francis Joseph, of King Humbert, Depretis and Maffei in Rome and established contact throu^ Ignatieff with the panslavist fo influences on Russian policy. The advantage ef the British Foreign Office of these personal contacts was lost when Gladstone and Granville came into power in April 1880. Some slight compensation was afforded, however, by Dilke*s by friendship with Gambetta,,^a personal friendship dating from 1872 between the British Ambassador in Paris and Barthélémy St. Hilaire and by Granville*s personal knowledge of Russia, although the latter was acquired as far back as 1856. Internal factors apart from changes in personnel, of importance for the policy of the different countries dated in origin to the period preceding that with which we are concerned. By 1878 the Foreign Office was sufficiently well-informed as to what these factors were in the different countries and their relative significance, to watch their To development and accurately ^estimate the part they were likely to play under given circumstances. The Importance of such factors as the military party and Hungarian politics in Austria-Hungary, the irredentist agitation and the papal question^ in Italy, the religious question in Germany, Panslavism and Nihilism in Russia, was fully appreciated. Lastly, by 1878 relations and commitments of one Power to another had come to play the predominant part in diplomacy. This was partly the result of the fullness of the information possessed by each Power as to the interests and internal affairs of the others. For it was this information which made possible the development under Bismarck*s leadership of a series of secret and interlocking agreements that made it impossible for one Power to negotiate singly with any other for the settlement of any individual issue. Moreover under his leadership commitments between the Powers assumed a systematised, definite and formal character that had hitherto only existed in isolated instances. Bismarck*s policy, based upon the realisation that behind all diplomacy lies only the ultima ratio of war, produced a series of commitments on the part of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, Rumania and Servia, as to thé attitude they would maintain should war break out in stated contingencies. The secret character of these agreements, and the fact that neither the British Foreign Office nor the British representatives abroad ever anxiously 'accepted the principle on which the system inaugurated by Bismarck was based, added considerably to the difficulties ordinarily experienced in procuring sound information and to the efforts that were devoted to securing it. The period under discussion, therefore, throws more light than usual on the sources from which diplomatic information was derived and on the factors which influenced its accuracy. CHAPTER I . DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN RELATIONS AUGUST 1878 - AUGUST 1879. 1. During the year that immediately followed the Congress information on the movement of Powers towards or apart from each other was conveyed^less by reports specifically dealing with the subject, than by telegrams or despatches communicating the acceptance or disapproval of proposals already made, or the suggestion of fresh combinations, in regard to questions under diplomatic negotiation. These reports collated and interpreted in the light of the knowledge which we have shown the Foreign Office to possess in regard to the interests of the different Powers, testified at once to the existence of a desire to co-operate between any two of them, or to the weakening of former friendships. The degree to which a Power is informed by such means necessarily depends upon its position as a negotiator. If it is itself involved in close negotiations with all the Great Powers on a number of questions, and more particularly if these questions do not touch the vital interests of all of them - so that the decision of some is determined largely by its effect on European relations - then the information a Power derives from this source will be at its fullest and most reliable. These conditions were exactly fulfilled by England in 1878-9, Associated closely with Austria-Hungary and less closely with France, she negotiated on a series of questions in connection with the Ottoman Enpire. Decisions were demanded from all the Signatories of/^Berlin^, but it was evident that those of Germany, France and Italy, were deter­ mined primarily by their alliance policy.
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