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The Great Battles of Epaminondas

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The Great Battles of Epaminondas Introduction these battles solitaire since competi- This module covers the key battles of the famous Theban tive play is not very interesting. general Epaminondas: Leuctra and Mantinea, the swan Important Note songs for both Sparta and Thebes. At the conclusion of the In order to play this module you need to havea copyof theDeluxe Edition of Battle of Mantinea Sparta and Thebes would never again the Great Battles of Alexander and play dominant roles in Greek politics. More importantly, the Diadochoi module. you will get to use the giant Hoplite unit that came with General Notes your copy of Diadochoi. Counters come from either Deluxe Alexander or the Diadochoi module. Several things will become evident ill afford to drag the situation out. The Counters From column in the set after playing these scenarios. Because Hence, once the forces actually came ups indicates the origin of the of the small number of leaders, to blows, the battles were over in counter; either A for Deluxe usually one, there is little ability for about an hour. In the two scenarios Alexander or D for Diadochoi. in this module the game will usually either side to conduct subtle maneu Mod ule Sp ec ia l Ru le be over within two game turns. vers. This was a characteristic of Theban Deep Echelon Unit Hoplite warfare whereby, after a You will have noticed a very large good harangue from the General in Lastly, the scenarios are not very counter that came with Diadochoi. It charge, the Paeu (battle song) was balanced. Epaminondashad just is treated like a Hoplite unit in every sung and the charge was sounded. invented the beginnings of an way, with the following additional This led to a swift outcome, which is evolution in Hoplite warfare that movement rules. The unit is oriented the other critical feature of Hoplite would lead to the Macedonian on the hexfield based on Diagram A warfare. This aspect of Hoplite battles Phalanx. The Spartans,although a (see page 8 .for diagram). is reinforcedby using the set-ups as a professional army, were ill suited to means of limiting the player's deal with this new style of warfare The Theban Deep Echelon unit may maneuver options. Most of the and lost badly in both of these battles. only move into its front hexes as per Hoplites had day jobs, and they could Players may learn more from playing the diagram. It cannot turn while moving forward. It can turn if it is not The Great Battles of Alexander: Official Designer Module in an enemy ZOC, expends 4 move- the Peloponnesian War. Using phalanx at the battle of Delium ment points, and the physical shifting treacherythe Spartans gained control during the Peloponnesian war to of the unit in the hexfield is uninter- of the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes, defeat the Athenians. However, the rupted by any other units (friendly or causing a violent Theban reaction.In major tactic in hoplite warfare enemy). In other words, the unit 379 BC the garrison was ejectedand remained putting the main effort cannot move through another unit's Sparta declared war on Thebes. The against the enemy's left flank. The hex in any manner. Although, Theban general Epaminondas drilled key was to win on the right before physically, the flankhexes at the the populace into a first class military losing on the left. waist of the unit are partially occu- force and prepared to meet a Spartan pied by the Deep Echelon counter, invasion.In 371 BC the Spartans and Epaminondas created three innova- these spaces are considered empty their allies, under King Cleombrotus, tions which broke this tradition. and friendly/enemy units may invaded Bocotia and camped at Epaminondas saw the Spartan occupy thosehexesas per the normal Leuctra near Thebes. Epaminondas right flank as their center of gravity movement rules. In all other ways - broughtup his smaller army and and shifted his main attack to his I'm sure I'll regret saying this - the engaged the Spartans in battle. left flank to directly oppose the Deep Echelon unit acts like a normal Spartan hoplites. hoplite counter. The battle is noteworthy for several key innovations that Epaminondas His second major innovation was to Leuctra (371 B.C.) used againstthe Spartans. The deploy his main attack force into a 50 In 382 BC the Spartans continued to Thebans for some time had experi- deep phalanx. It has been suggested assert their leadership of the Greek mented with deeper hoplite forma- that this force may even have used world, established by their victory in tions.Theyhadused a 25 depth pikesa lei the Macedonian phalanx, The Grea t Batt les of Epam inon das becauseof the unusualshape of executed a flank attack into the other can be moved with one line Theban shields,but there is nodirect Spartan right flank. The results were command as per the Alexander rules. evidence that this wasthecase. the destruction of the Spartan Lastly, the remainderof the Theban hoplites, including the king, and the Echelon Line Commands - One of hoplite line was deployed en echelon, Spartan allies quit the field without the big maneuvers in this battle so as to delay the Spartan allies from actually coming into direct contact besides the deep echelon unit was the engaging them before the Theban left with the Thebans. The fallof Sparta movement of the entire Hoplite line had won the battle. had begun. 'en echelon'. Only Epaminondas can issue an 'en echelon' line command. Xenophon, who is the main chroni- Map A unitis 'en echelon'if it has a front cler of this battle, wrote in a treatise Use the Lyginiusmap from the hex which is also the flank hex of on cavalry tactics, that horses could Deluxe Edition of the Great Battles of another hoplite unit which is faced in be used to screen infantryforces Alexander. The long map edge where the same direction.The intent here is because of the height of the horse. the terrain key is located is North. that the entire Theban line including Caesar used this tactic at the battle of Note the following terrain modifica- the Deep Echelon unit can move with Pharsalus. The deployment of the tions.Flexes4614to4618and all one line command. Theban cavalrysuggests that this hexes north of them are level 2 hexes. tactic may have prevented the The Spartan camp is in hex3813 and The Theban Sacred Band - This, the Spartans from seeing the deep all adjacent hexes. Use the Baggage most famous individual combat unit Theban phalanx before the dust of the train marker from Alexander to mark in Greek city-state history - andthe cavalry engagement had settled. this location. The baggage train touchstone of Theban supremacy- cannot move in this scenario. was actually quite a small unit in The battle itself went according to numbers. Although composed of plan. The Theban cavalry drove off Historical Scenario only 150 men, its importance to the Spartancavalryand then the Setup allof theunits in the indicated the Greek army in terms of morale Theban leftsmashedinto the Spartan setup hexes. was immeasurable. (However, hoplites. The Sacred Band probably Philistines that we are, we have served the dual purpose of protecting Special Rules measured it.)That is whytheir loss the large open flank of the deep Lines - Hoplite units that are in line (worth 9 TQ points) is so much Theban phalanx and probably (flank to flank) and adjacent to each greater in proportion to its Size. The Great Battles of Alexander: Official Designer Module Epaminondas: Epaminondasis the Theban: The Spartan/Allied army timeswhen killed. The Deep only elite commander in the scenario. nn-1st he rotted. Echelonunitcounts 3 times its TQ rating for army rout purposes. Skirmish Orders: Peltasts, the LP Retreat Edge Mantinea (362 B.C.) units, and cavalry can be given orders Spartan: Northern edge of the map by the Overall commanders Theban: Southern edge of the map With the Spartans driven into (Epaminondas or Cleobrotus) the Peloponnesus,the Thebans regardless of there range from the Army Rout grew in strength and confidence. commander. Spartan: Army Routs when units Epaminondas launchednumerous with TQ totaling 28 have been routed. expeditions into the Peloponnesus Spartan Camp: The Spartan camp is Leaders as always are worth their and probably would have captured hex3813 plus alladjacenthexes.Its activation rating when wounded and Sparta itself if it weren't for the location is designated by the baggage their activation rating times five inspired defense put up by train unitwhich cannot move in this when killed. Spartan Hoplite units King Agesilaus. scenario. If at any time any of these count twice their TQ rating for army hexes areentered by a Thebanunit rout purposes. In 363 BC, an allegation over Olym- the Theban player gains 10 TQ points pian temple funds found Mantinea toward Spartan army rout. Thebans: Army routs when units (pro-Spartan) and Tegea (pro- with a TQ totaling 22 have been Theban) at the head of rival coali- Victory Conditions routed. Leaders as always are worth tions. Epaminondasfirstattempted to Spartan: The Theban Army must be their activation rating when intercept the Athenian contingent routed. wounded and their activation rating before it could join their Spartan The Great Battles of Epamino ndas allies, but failed when these troops was mortally wounded during the Special Rules were moved by sea. He then moved battle. The similarities between Lines - Hoplite units that are in line the Theban army to Tegea, which Epaminondas and Gustavus (flank to flank) and adjacent to each placed his forces between Sparta and Adolphus are interesting. Both other can be moved with one line Mantinea.
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