An Austro-Libertarian Theory of Voluntariness: a Critique

An Austro-Libertarian Theory of Voluntariness: A Critique Igor Wysocki AN AUSTRO-LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF VOLUNTARINESS: A CRITIQUE TORUŃ 2021 Reviewed by: Walter E. Block Technical editing: Dawid Iwanowski Cover design: Dawid Iwanowski This book is published in cooperation with Copernicus Foundation for Scientific Development © Wydawnictwo Wydziału Nauk o Polityce i Bezpieczeństwie UMK © Igor Wysocki Toruń 2021 Published on the principles of non-exclusive license Creative Commons ISBN 978-83-953642-2-8 Wydawnictwo WNoPiB UMK 87–100 Toruń, ul. Batorego 39L Printing: Machina Druku, www.machinadruku.pl PREFACE Although the book takes as its starting point the various papers I wrote (whether co-authored or not and whether already published or not), its spirit is purely polemical, or critical if you will. The present book is by no means a collection of essays published elsewhere. Quite the contrary, apart from the appendix, which is a proofed copy of the paper I published with Łukasz Dominiak (its senior author), the chapters constituting the book take my prior publications as their respective targets. But because doubting (and let alone repudiating) one’s former beliefs is apparently a rare thing, a word of explanation is due to the reader at this point. In fact, what I have to offer is both an explanation (citing a motivating reason) and a justification (citing a normative reason). So, as to the former, I can never psychologically afford to be complacent about whatever I produce. This translates into a desire to ceaselessly refer back to my works with an intention to improve upon them. On the other hand, it seems to be a happy coincidence that what motivates me (i.e. the fact of permanent dissatisfaction with whatever I commit to writing coupled with the desire to improve it) is probably also well justified. After all, the vast majority of schol- arly works (natural science inclusive) is rightly presumed to be false. And it is this very fact that gives us a normative epistemic reason to criticize and try to correct the currently held views. So, given my natural dissatisfaction with the quality of my output, one can readily explain why I embarked on writing this book in the first place. But additionally, whether I desired to pursue truth or 6 Preface not, I am objectively justified in critically scrutinizing my prior publications. For I might still do the right thing (epistemically) without being (psychologically) motivated to do it; that is, in the case under scrutiny, I may only want to correct my papers only because I desire to appear diligent in the eyes of my friends or whatever. However, I can imagine that the reader might at this point grow suspicious of whether I properly respond to the standards of epistemic rationality. So, it is high time to assure the reader that not only am I motivated by maniacally striving for perfection but also by truth itself. That is, I do believe that truth matters and it is also to the callings of truth that I respond by trying to critically assess my intellectual corpus. Given the above points, one can easily grasp why it took me so little time to grow sufficiently disillusioned with my works to subject them to critical scrutiny. This in turn explains a well-deserved paucity of quotes from my works. And if I do quote myself (my former self), this mainly serves to set this former self as a target for my present self. Having said that, it is high time for me to touch upon the order of the book. As mentioned, the successive chapters of the present book track the inac- curacies of my papers written thus far. Chapter 1 further analyzes “Freedom and Property Rights – Avoiding Circularity” published in Political Dialogues in 2018. Perhaps, my main intuition to the effect that the concept of freedom as property ought to be rejected has survived over time; however, this chapter makes a whole bunch of new arguments and is clearly much sharper than the original publication. Additionally, I start arguing positively that (thin) libertar- ians, given their suspension of judgements concerning what constitutes a good life, should be interested in freedom neutrally (viz., non-morally) conceived. Chapter 2 scrutinizes my paper “Problems with the Notion of Freedom and Voluntariness in Right Libertarianism” published in Studia Humana in 2020, while taking the thought included therein much further and with much greater analytical clarity. Chapter 3 critically assesses the paper I wrote with Block and Dominiak; that is, “Rothbard’s Welfare Theory: Some Support”, published in 2019 by New Perspectives in Political Economy. This chapter actually disowns my former standpoint on that issue and starts appreciating the criticism made by Kvasnička – our former target. Chapter 4 investigates the paper I wrote in 2019 with Dawid Megger, viz. “Austrian Economics: A Critical Approach” published by Ekonomia – Wroclaw Economic Review. The concession I make therein is that our denial of Rothbard’s welfare economics was too quick and not sufficiently grounded, the shortcoming I both try to rationalize and finally remedy. Even- Preface 7 tually, this paper constitutes a point of departure for chapter 5, which in turn critically evaluates another publication I co-authored with Dawid Megger; that is, “Rejoinder to Wiśniewski on the Austrian Welfare Economics”, published in 2020 by the very same journal. Chapter 5 might make the reader dizzy: not only is there polemics with then Wiśniewski (his self from 2019) but also with our then selves, with everything being spiced up with general considerations on the fallacy of begging the question. Chapter 6 evaluates my yet (as of 2021) unpub- lished manuscript “Justice vis-à-vis Welfare: How Austrian Welfare Economics Should Fit in the Austro-Libertarian Framework”, wherein I attempted to put forward – contra Rothbard – a descriptive criterion that would distinguish between Pareto-superior and inferior moves within the universe of all voluntary exchanges. The chapter concludes with rather forlorn skepticism – as opposed to my original enthusiasm and optimism – as to hitting upon the relevant baseline against which proposals could be classified as either offers or threats, and the exchanges stemming therefrom as either Pareto-superior or Pareto-inferior moves, respectively. The appendix, as mentioned, is a direct copy of the paper Łukasz Dominiak co-authored with me in 2016; that is, “A Libertarian Theory of Threat”, published by Studia Polityczne. I am ineffably grateful to Studia Poli- tyczne for granting me the permission to reprint the said paper here. Still, I am most grateful to Łukasz Dominiak for his ceaseless friendship and intellectual guidance. Our seemingly casual peripatetic conversations actually brim with razor-sharp philosophy and I owe to them very much indeed. I cannot but mention my other co-authors. Walter Block has been my men- tor since I learned about libertarianism and Austrian economics. Whenever I asked him for some assistance, he delivered. This reminds me of capitalism: the consumer demands, and the system delivers. I am also indebted to Dawid Megger, my co-author and a rising star in Austrian economics. We literally spend hours discussing the problem of a (the?) relevant baseline on which Pa- reto-superior or inferior moves should rest. Moreover, I would like to thank Jeffrey Herbener who took his time to instruct me via e-mails on the rela- tion between property rights and efficiency, the e-mails which made me think harder on the problem than ever. It is also Stanisław Wójtowicz that deserves a mention. He kindly reviewed chapter 3 without even being asked to do so. Fi- nally, I would like to thank my wife for her patience and for setting right con- ditions for book-writing. There are also innumerable people outside academia that I would like to thank but for the lack of space I cannot mention them all here. I promise to remedy this shortcoming in person. CONTENTS Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 11 Chapter 1. Freedom and property rights – circularity problem ............................. 19 Chapter 2. Property rights and voluntariness .................................................................. 41 Chapter 3. Supporting Rothbard’s welfare economics: a rejoinder to Kvasnička ................................................................................................................ 63 Chapter 4. Intuitive attempt to debunk Rothbard’s welfare theory ...................... 83 Chapter 5. Is Rothbard’s economic argument for the free market dialectically fallacious? ......................................................................................... 107 Chapter 6. (Un)productive exchanges and how I woke up from a dogmatic slumber .......................................................................................................................... 129 Appendix Łukasz Dominiak, Igor Wysocki, A Libertarian Theory of Threat ........................................................................................................................ 151 References ................................................................................................................................................... 169 INTRODUCTION Chess aficionados are well aware of the famous dictum by Siegbert Tarrash1: “Before the endgame, the Gods have placed the middlegame”. I suppose a sim- ilar remark applies to books: before chapter 1,

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