Bureaucratic Discretion, Regulatory Uncertainty, and Private Investment in the Russian Federation
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RISK IN THE REGIONS: BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION, REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY, AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Quintin Hayes Beazer, B.A./M.A. Graduate Program in Political Science The Ohio State University 2011 Dissertation Committee: Irfan Nooruddin, Advisor Timothy Frye, Advisor Marcus Kurtz William Minozzi c Copyright by Quintin Hayes Beazer 2011 ABSTRACT This dissertation identifies bureaucratic discretion { agents' leeway in making sub- jective determinations about when and how rules apply { as a primary source of un- certainty that deters long-term investors by undermining the predictability of firms’ regulatory environment. Using a principal-agent framework, I argue that where regu- latory bureaucrats exercise greater discretion in interpreting and applying laws, eco- nomic actors experience greater uncertainty about how those policies will be put into practice. This unpredictability deters investment by making it difficult for economic actors to predict how the regulatory environment will affect their projects' future returns and costs. Whereas existing studies tend to focus on the economic effects of particular policies or government decisions, the dissertation's focus on the predictabil- ity of policy application calls attention to the consequences for private actors related to how government agents carry out those decisions. In arguing that bureaucratic discretion can be a source of uncertainty for investors, my argument challenges an existing literature based upon studies within developed democracies that emphasize the economic benefits of insulating state actors, such as bureaucrats, from the pressures of the political arena. Faced with this apparent conflict, I provide a theoretical framework for explaining why bureaucratic discretion might create more uncertainty in some locations than in others. Arguing that bu- reaucratic discretion should generate greater or lesser uncertainty depending upon ii the broader institutional context in which it is granted, I call attention to one par- ticular conditioning factor: the level of political competition. I argue that political competition makes policy application more predictable by making politicians more responsive to constituents' concerns about bureaucratic discretion and by spreading the costs of monitoring bureaucrats across non-state actors and supporting institu- tions. In contrast, economic actors bear the full brunt of regulatory uncertainty in politically-uncompetitive regions | investors face more unpredictable behavior from discretionary bureaucrats and fewer formal channels for handling disputes that may arise. I develop this argument by examining private investment across the regions of the Russian Federation. Using a survey of Russian firm managers (Frye 2006), I find that firm managers who perceive bureaucrats to have high discretion are less likely to plan fixed-capital investments for the immediate future, ceteris paribus. In addi- tion, I rely on qualitative evidence from field interviews with Russian firm managers, business association leaders, and policy experts to provide insight into exactly how uncertainty over bureaucrats' application of regulatory laws shapes firms' decisions about where and how to invest. After finding that, on average, discretion corresponds with reduced incentives for firms to invest, I merge the firm-level survey data with regional data on political competition to demonstrate that the negative relationship between discretion and investment is most pronounced in regions of Russia where surrounding institutions limit political competition. Among firms that perceive bu- reaucrats to have high discretion, those located in politically-uncompetitive regions have a much lower probability of investing than their counterparts in regions with high political competition. Additional analyses bolster confidence that these results do arise via the theory's proposed causal mechanisms; in the final empirical chapter, I iii find evidence supporting the link between political competition on the one hand and increased government responsiveness and better-behaved bureaucrats on the other. iv For my parents, Sherman and Lorilee Beazer, and my wife, Brooke Petersen Beazer. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would not have been happened without the help and support of many people. While it would be impossible to name all those whose help has been invaluable along the way, I wish to express my gratitude to a number of individuals that have made a difference to me, both professionally and personally. Among my blessings in life, I count as especially choice the opportunity that I have had to work with my committee members. As scholars and as individuals, there are few people with whom I'd rather spend my time. I took my first graduate seminar from Marcus Kurtz, and since that time I have looked to him as a guide and authority on all things comparative. I have always benefited by heeding Marcus's trademark skepticism and by listening to his generous advice. Even before William Minozzi ever became part of my committee, he had spent hours helping me frame my dissertation ideas and recognize their contribution to broader literatures. I thank William for going above and beyond the call of duty in all respects and for opening my eyes to what it means to be a social scientist. I am especially grateful to Timothy Frye and Irfan Nooruddin for their work in co-chairing this dissertation. They are role models for me in the truest sense, and I look forward to continuing to work closely with them for many more years to come. Tim's political economy research in Russia and the post-communist countries stands as the gold standard for what I hope my work can one day become. Tim deserves special thanks, not only for the use of his survey data vi in this dissertation, but for bringing me to Ohio State and providing an open door whenever I have needed guidance. Even after his departure to Columbia University, I have continued to profit from his patience, enthusiasm, and unerring instincts about which ideas were dead-ends and which ideas were worth pursuing. Similarly, I am forever grateful to Irfan for taking me under his wing. Irfan has taught me about research, about the discipline, and about what it means to give freely to others. As an advisor, he has encouraged, restrained, corrected, questioned, demurred, vetoed, demanded, promoted, pushed, chastised, defended, and applauded at all the right times. Irfan's indelible mark is evident on every page of this dissertation, just as I hope it will be in all the academic research that I will ever do. He has been an exceptional mentor, and I consider Irfan among my closest of friends. In addition to the members of my committee, I owe a debt of gratitude to Sarah Brooks, Mike Neblo, Massimo Morelli, Philipp Rehm, Alex Thompson, Herb Weis- berg, Alan Wiseman and many others in the Political Science Department at Ohio State for their superb instruction, their sage advice, and their open doors. Spe- cial thanks go to Craig Volden and Jeremy Wallace for numerous conversations at multiple stages of this project; their thoughtful comments and suggestions have left lasting impressions on the way I see both my own research and the discipline in gen- eral. One of the defining moments of my graduate career was the chance to work with Janet Box-Steffensmeier as the Junior Fellow in the Program in Statistics and Methodology. A consummate professional, a committed parent, an enthusiastic re- searcher, and a warm friend { Jan continues to be one of my heroes. Beyond Ohio State, I also thank Noah Buckley, Scott Cooper, Michael Findley, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Scott Gehlbach, Bonnie Meguid, Graeme Robertson, Konstantin Sonin, Joshua Tucker, Katia Zhuravskaya, and three anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Politics for comments, questions, and encouragement that have helped to move this vii project forward. Likewise I am indebted to the Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy, the Mershon Center, the Ohio State University and the Frances Aumann family for helping to fund travel for the dissertation field research. In Russia, my deep thanks go to Sergei Guriev, Maria Bolotskaya, and the Cen- tre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) at the New Economic School for granting me office space in Moscow and access to one of the most vibrant research environments one could imagine. I am very grateful to those experts and profession- als who generously shared their time to participate in my interviews. The pain of leaving my family at home during my field work in Russia was made tolerable by good friends and surrogate family: to Noah Buckley, Kolya Makarov, Misha Moiseev, and my Moscow branches of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, I say spasibo. Finally, I express my love to Lyuba and Lena Morozova, my adopted sister and mother in Russia, for opening their home to me during my returns to Moscow as eagerly as they did nearly a decade earlier. Graduate study at Ohio State has been a journey filled with fabulous traveling companions from whom I continue to learn much, including Soundarya Chidambaram, Michael Cohen, Dinissa Duvanova, Ryan Kennedy, Carolina Mercado, Jason Mor- gan, Banks Miller, Yoonah Oh, Autumn Lockwood Payton, Allyson Shortle, Anand Sokhey, Sarah Wilson Sokhey, Dana Wittmer, Byungwon Woo, and Kadir Yildirim. In particular, graduate school has provided me with three remarkable friends and fellow musketeers { Daniel Blake, Dino Christenson, and Scott Powell { upon whom I rely daily for honesty, laughs, and sound advice. There is no amount of thanks that I can give to my parents, Sherman and Lorilee Beazer, that could ever sufficiently convey the depth of my gratitude for what they have given me. Throughout my life, my parents have been the very models of selfless sacrifice, unconditional love, and unwavering dedication. Their support, along with viii that of my two sisters, Mary and Alynne, has been a endless source of motivation. During my seven years of graduate school, parenthood has brought me three little assistants: Lydia, Corbin, and Graham.