German Foreign Policy in 2014 Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany’S Foreign Policy Has Become Erratic

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich N0. 149, March 2014, Editor: Matthias Bieri

More Responsibility? German Foreign Policy in 2014 Twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany’s foreign policy has become erratic. Frank-Walter Steinmeier is determined to set it back on track. The core policy fields are the Franco-German friendship, relations with Russia, and the Middle East. However, Berlin faces structural obstacles in pursuing a more assertive foreign policy.

By Christian Nünlist

“Every new beginning is infused with mag- ic.” Does this famous line of poetry by Her- mann Hesse also hold true for Germany’s foreign policy? At any rate, the new (and former) Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) has gotten off to a furious start. With the return of this veteran foreign policy expert, observers expect things to become more interesting as the passivity of German foreign policy is overcome.

The year 2013 was not a good one for diplomacy in the German capital. First, the scandal set off by the wiretap on Angela Merkel’s mobile phone marked a new low point in relations with the US. Moreover, faced with reports about the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war, Ger- many refused to allow even a debate within NATO on a possible intervention by the Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU party was the clear victor in the federal parliamentary elections West. Merkel’s signature was missing on of 22 September 2013. T. Schwarz / Reuters the Syria communiqué of the St Petersburg G20 summit, which was adopted by the US, the UK, France, Spain, and Italy. Among the Western powers, this raised Chancellor Merkel”. Germany only offered Now that Merkel’s third term in office has skepticism about the reliability of Germa- logistical support and participated in a Eu- begun, it is hoped things will take a turn for ny within the alliance and recalled unpleas- ropean training mission to the French mil- the better. The coalition agreement be- ant memories of Germany’s abstention re- itary operation in Mali. Third, Berlin was tween the SPD and the CDU/CSU states garding the UN Security Council’s Libya disabused of its optimism regarding rela- that Germany is aware of its special re- resolution in 2011. Secondly, François Hol- tions with Moscow when the Russian au- sponsibility in Europe and the world. Al- lande’s election victory brought about a thorities conducted searches of German ready now, after about three months of cooling down of German-French relations. political endowments operating in Russia. “Merkel III”, some new inflections can be An internal memorandum of Hollande’s Federal President Joachim Gauck and discerned in Berlin’s foreign policy. First, Socialist Party, leaked in April 2013, be- Merkel decided not to attend the Winter an effort is underway to improve relations moaned the “egotistical intransigence of Olympics in Sochi in February 2014. with France. Secondly, Germany’s policies

towards Russia are to be predicated on a The Main Foreign-Policy Actors more cooperative template. The crisis in Ukraine marks a first, high-stakes testing Angela Merkel (59, CDU) has Frank-Walter Steinmeier Ursula von der Leyen (55, CDU) has served as chancellor since (58, SPD) already served as previously served as minister of ground for a more assertive foreign policy. 2005. In the past ten years, she foreign minister under family and labor issues under Third, Germany aims to take on more re- was nominated eight times by Merkel from 2005 to 2009. Merkel. The chancellor surprisingly sponsibility in global crises and conflicts. Forbes magazine as “Most Subsequently, he was highly nominated her as Germany’s first Steinmeier believes that the year 2014 will Powerful Woman”. In the past critical of German foreign female defense minister. Von der be a decisive one for the Middle East: Ger- four years, she left foreign-poli- policy and accused Merkel Leyen could use this position to cy questions (apart from EU and Westerwelle of lacking raise her profile as a potential many aims to play a constructive role in and Russian policy) to the weak creative force. Now, he has aspirant to the chancellorship and reaching an agreement in the nuclear dis- former foreign minister Guido been given a second chance. thus as Merkel’s successor. In her pute with Iran, in the realization of a two- Westerwelle. For Merkel, His goal is to repair relations new position, she has positioned state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian domestic policy has always with the US, France, and Rus- herself as an ambitious fellow been more important than sia and to launch a public campaigner of Steinmeier’s for a conflict, and in resolving the Syrian con- foreign policy. debate over strategy. more assertive foreign policy. flict.

After four years of restrained foreign policy, Berlin aims to be more assertive internationally, as confirmed by the perfectly synchronized keynote speeches delivered at In 1999, Germany lived up to its increased joint overseas mission is seen as highly this year’s Munich Security Conference by international responsibility by engaging in symbolic. In the recent past, Paris had ex- President Gauck, Foreign Minister Stein- a more active foreign policy. Based on the pressed its exasperation at being unable to meier, and Defense Minister Ursula von argument of “Auschwitz – never again”, deploy the brigade into action due to Ger- der Leyen. However, the effort to trans- Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign man concerns. Also, Germany will contrib- form German foreign policy under “Mer- Minister Joschka Fischer advocated for ute transport and refueling aircraft to the kel III” is hampered by structural impedi- Germany’s participation in the Kosovo EU mission in the Central African Repub- ments. War and discarded the pacifist tradition lic (CAR). The increased German engage- that had guided West Germany’s policy ment is seen in Paris as an important step The Taming of a Key European Power since World War II (“War – never again”). towards a joint EU strategy for Africa. The year 1990 marked an important turn- However, in 2003, Schröder strictly refused ing point for Germany’s foreign policy: to take part in the US attack on Iraq. The Moreover, Steinmeier is planning to visit Until then, alignment with the West and US was deeply aggrieved by this break with political hotspots on the EU periphery to- Ostpolitik had been the guiding principles. Kohl’s foreign policy. gether with his French colleague Laurent Under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer Fabius. While French foreign policy has so (CDU), NATO and European integration Under Angela Merkel (CDU), the govern- far been focused on North and West Afri- were keystones of German’s external rela- ment’s attention was almost entirely taken ca, while German’s strategic interests lay up by the European debt crisis. towards the East, Berlin and Paris aim to Germany’s European policy be- coordinate their efforts both in the Medi- After four years of restrained came an executive matter for terranean and in Eastern Europe. Also, foreign policy, Berlin aims to be the chancellor. At the same Steinmeier and Fabius have agreed to align time, Merkel’s second cabinet their positions ahead of important future more assertive internationally. included the extremely weak EU summits. The two already practiced Foreign Minister Guido West- this advance consultation in January 2014 erwelle. The chancellor allowed in the case of the EU mission to the CAR. tions. Under Willy Brandt (SPD), they him to pursue a passive “culture of military In February 2014, working together with were complemented by a policy of détente restraint”. In March 2011, the German ab- Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikor- with Eastern Europe. stention in the UN Security Council re- ski, they negotiated between the govern- garding the Libya intervention resulted in ment and the opposition in Kiev – thus Following Germany’s reunification, Hel- a diplomatic shambles. successfully reactivating the “Weimar Tri- mut Kohl (CDU) continued to pursue the angle” (Germany-France-Poland) as a con- formula of “a European Germany, not a Starting Over with France tinental leadership troika within the EU. German Europe” (in the words of Thomas The new coalition agreement emphasizes Mann) and emphasized transatlantic con- the importance of cooperation with France Steinmeier regards the US turn towards tinuity in order to dampen latent resent- as a “partnership that is unique in its Asia as an opportunity for Europe to ad- ment and prejudices among neighboring breadth as well as its depth”. A Foreign vance the common EU foreign policy and countries, some of whom feared an overly Ministry strategy paper makes mention of to take on more global responsibility. How- strong Germany might resurge as “Gulliver “starting over” in this relationship. Germa- ever, the close harmony between Berlin and Unchained”. Out of a sense of historic ny wants to help carry France’s burden in Paris could aggravate a “Deauville Com- guilt, the generation that had experienced military missions in Africa. As part of the plex” among the smaller EU states – in au- the Nazi years voluntarily offered to par- EU mission to Mali, the number of Ger- tumn 2010, Merkel and Sarkozy met in the ticipate in limiting its own power through man military instructors is to be raised French town of Deauville and bilaterally institutional constraints – in a move de- from a maximum of 180 to a ceiling of 250 determined the next steps in dealing with scribed aptly as the “taming of power” by troops, some of whom will be detached the euro crisis. Subsequently, “Merkozy” political scientist Peter Katzenstein. from the German-French Brigade. This monopolized the management of the euro

crisis at the expense of the institutional EU predecessor Westerwelle openly frater- criticism of its settlement policies, Israel decision-making process. nized with the protest movement on Kiev’s placed its trust in Berlin when the countries Maidan square. When the violence esca- agreed that Germany would represent Is- A New Russia Policy? lated in February 2014, however, Steinmei- raeli citizens in states without Israeli embas- In Merkel’s first cabinet, Steinmeier was at er travelled to Kiev, where he and his sies (e.g., Indonesia or Malaysia). pains to continue the Social Democratic French and Polish colleagues together with tradition of German Ostpolitik. His idea of the Russian side negotiated an agreement Germany supports US Secretary of State “Change through Integration” was a refer- between the pro-Western opposition and John Kerry’s shuttle diplomacy and Wash- ence to Egon Bahr’s “Change through the pro-Russian government that brought ington’s current efforts to achieve a Middle Rapprochement” (1963). Merkel refused to about an intermittent lull in the violence. East peace agreement between Israel and countenance NATO memberships for With great personal dedication, Steinmeier Palestine in the West Bank (cf. CSS Anal- Georgia and Ukraine, a decision that Rus- contributed significantly to the temporary ysis No. 144). If Kerry’s mission should fail, sian President Vladimir Putin Steinmeier might reactivate his own Mid- highly appreciated. The 2008 dle East diplomacy. Berlin is an acceptable war in Georgia did not bring Steinmeier sees Russia not dialog partner for Arab countries, too, with about a fundamental change in as a problem, but as part of the relations being unencumbered by a colonial Berlin’s policy vis-à-vis Russia, past or interests based on power politics. even though Merkel has be- solution. The controversial decision to abstain in the come increasingly critical of Libya vote of 2011 might give Germany Putin in recent years. Putin’s au- credibility here. On the one hand, as a thoritarian style, both domestically and ex- resolution of the crisis. It remains to be NATO and EU member, Germany is com- ternally, has been viewed with suspicion in seen whether Berlin will manage to achieve mitted to a Western position. On the other, the Berlin chancellery and has increasingly a resolution for Crimea as well that is ac- it has the necessary standing to mediate highlighted the shortcomings of the Rus- ceptable both for the West and for Russia. credibly in global crises between Russia, sian-German “modernization partnership”. China, and the US and to intercede with a Middle East Mediator moderating effect, for instance in the Syria Now, the intention is to return relations Similarly to the diplomatic coup in Kiev, a conflict. with Russia to a more cooperative track. more assertive German foreign policy could Gernot Erler (SPD) replaced the previous also raise its mediation profile in the Middle Some minor concrete steps have already Russia coordinator Andreas Schockenhoff East. During his first period in office, Stein- been taken: Steinmeier decided to partici- (CDU), who had repeatedly criticized Pu- meier spent about one third of his time pate actively in the destruction of residual tin’s autocracy. Erler and Steinmeier, on the dealing with the Middle East. Merkel, for material from Syria’s chemical weapons other hand, emphasize the strategic impor- her part, had declared on several occasions within the framework of the UN and to tance of German-Russian relations. Ger- that the security of Israel was a non-nego- have them incinerated in German installa- many as an export-oriented country is eco- tiable part of Germany’s reasons of state. tions in Munster – a move that his prede- nomically dependent on imported However, relations between Germany and cessor Westerwelle had categorically re- resources. Germany is the world’s largest Israel have been tense since Germany ab- jected. importer of Russian oil and gas; about 40 stained from voting in the UN at the end of per cent of Germany’s gas imports are 2012, when Palestine applied for status as a Transatlantic Trouble sourced from Russia. The German nuclear non-member observer state. At the end of The refusal to participate in the George W. phase-out and the completion of the Nord February 2014, despite regular German Bush government’s invasion of Iraq placed Stream Pipeline will likely cause this share to increase even more in the future.

The wording of the coalition agreement in- cludes the following statement, which may Federal Expenditures on External and Domestic Affairs, 1981 – 2014 be regarded as Steinmeier’s article of faith regarding Russia, “the EU’s biggest and most important neighbor”: “Security in Europe can only be achieved with, but not against Russia.” Generally speaking, Stein- meier sees Russia not as a problem, but as part of the solution. He does not want Russia to become even more isolated within Europe. As in Merkel’s first period in office, Berlin’s Russia policy is likely once more to become a bone of contention between the Chancellery and a resurgent Foreign Ministry.

Berlin’s treatment of Ukraine marks an interesting test case for the new policy vis-à- vis Russia. At the end of 2013, Steinmeier’s

a heavy strain on German-US relations in determined that Germany and the EU want their country to become more strong- 2003, as it was the first time that Germany should reduce their dependence on the US ly engaged within NATO. More than 60 had openly opposed the US. While Merkel by strengthening their own intelligence ser- per cent are opposed to the use of military engaged in transatlantic damage limitation vices and investing in European technology. force and thus reject that demand by Presi- from 2005 onwards, the relationship re- dent Gauck that Germany should engage mained tense: In 2008, Merkel placed a Vox populi “earlier, more decisively, and more substan- hold on NATO’s eastward expansion and Due to structural constraints, it is unlikely tially” in global conflict resolution – “not successfully opposed membership for that German foreign policy will change just politically, but also with military Georgia and Ukraine. Germany’s absten- radically in the next four years. A signifi- means”. It remains to be seen whether tion (together with China and Russia) in cant shortfall remains between the claim to Merkel will extend her support to the ap- the UN Security Council regarding the greater foreign-policy standing as a Euro- peals of the speakers at the Munich confer- Libya intervention in 2011 cost ence – appeals that are unpopular among it a great deal of sympathy the German public. among its European and North The multilateral institutions American allies. On the one that underpin German foreign There are also geostrategic reasons why hand, Berlin was criticized for Berlin is unlikely to interfere actively in having stepped out of line with policy are currently in crisis. global conflicts and take on responsibility, the Western camp (the simulta- including through military force as a last neous opposition to France and resort. In particular, it lacks a familiar part- the US being regarded as a particular viola- pean economic heavyweight and the sec- ner who can impose a global order: The US tion of taboo); on the other hand, Germany ond-largest NATO state on the one hand, as the leading Western power is in retreat, was censured for having abandoned a value- and the actual funding made available for and its enthusiasm for global diplomatic based foreign policy after previously advo- foreign and security policy issues. Since and especially military engagement is di- cating prominently for the principle of the 1990, expenditures on diplomacy, defense, minishing. Western interventions without responsibility to protect. and development cooperation have been the US are unrealistic. Furthermore, the sharply cut back (see info box p. 3). US multilateral institutions that underpin Conversely, in Germany, too, the revela- Secretary of State Kerry therefore called on German foreign policy – the EU and tions of NSA whistleblower Edward the German government at the Munich NATO, but also the UN and the OSCE – Snowden in 2013 brought about an enor- Security Conference to supply the neces- are currently in crisis. mous loss of trust in the US. The secret sary resources to match the new sense of bugging of Merkel’s mobile phone in par- responsibility and mission as a source of The scope for action is therefore limited. ticular caused a big stir in Germany. The new impulses for the EU’s Common For- The cornerstones of German foreign policy close cooperation between the German eign and Security Policy. – allegiance with the West, European inte- and US intelligence service was also sharp- gration, Ostpolitik, and multilateralism – ly criticized. The German government is The media’s focus on Steinmeier’s return to will not change substantially, even if Ber- under public pressure to protect the privacy the Foreign Ministry has also so far dis- lin’s foreign policy should become more of its citizens better. tracted from the fact that Berlin’s Europe- active once more, especially in the fields of an policy has become more presidential crisis prevention and mediation of diplo- In the meantime, both sides are making ef- during the euro crisis, at the expense of the matic solutions to conflicts. At least under forts to show goodwill again: The transat- Foreign Ministry and the foreign minister’s Steinmeier, a return to reliable, pro-West- lantic partnership is being talked up, and influence. Tellingly, in his inaugural speech, ern German foreign policy may be expect- the foundation of shared values and inter- Steinmeier criticized the move towards ed. The new dynamics of the Franco-Ger- ests is emphasized. It is true that the US “foreign policy by summit”. He demands man pair are promising. Steinmeier’s government shows little willingness to that authority be restored from the Chan- success in Kiev was an impressive demon- meet German demands for a “no-spy” cellery back to the Foreign Ministry and stration of a confident, diplomatically agreement and continuously stresses how that Germany’s EU and Russian policy no adroit German foreign policy working in much the German intelligence services longer be left to Merkel. combination with EU partners and in con- benefit from their cooperation with the US sultation with Russia. services. However, in early 2014, the US Merkel, for her part, has not yet made any government sent Secretary Kerry to Berlin public statement on a possible change of to pour oil on the troubled waters. Merkel course in foreign policy. However, being a for her part accepted an invitation from US rather cautious politician, the chancellor is Dr. Christian Nünlist is Senior Researcher at the President Barack Obama to visit the US highly responsive to popular opinion. Only Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich and this year. At the same time, however, it was 20 per cent of the German population directs the team «Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security».

CSS Analyses is edited by the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. Most recent issues: Each month, two analyses are published in German, French, and English. The Interreligious Tension in South and Southeast Asia No. 148 CSS is a center of competence for Swiss and international security policy. The Sino-Swiss Free Trade Agreement No. 147 Editors: Christian Nünlist and Matthias Bieri The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe No. 146 Translation and lectorship: Christopher Findlay The Proliferation of Advanced Conventional Weapons No. 145 Layout and graphics: Miriam Dahinden The Kerry Initiative: Cometh the Hour, Cometh the Man? No. 144 ISSN: 2296-0244 Debating European Defence and Security No. 143 Feedback and comments: [email protected] More issues and free online subscription: http://www.css.ethz.ch/cssanalysen © 2014 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 4