Sociology of Reefer Madness

Home , Buster Bennett, Cannabis in Egypt, Legal Drug, Reefer Madness, Reefer Madness (musical), Stash Records

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directty from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any ^pe of conqmter printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dqiendent upon the quali^ of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard marins, and inqnoper alignment can adverse^ affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these wûl be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced 1^ sectioning the original, beghming at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from lefi to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher qualiQr 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for ary photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI A Bell & Howell intormation Com pany 300 Nonr. ZeeD Roao.Ann Amor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 3l3.'76l-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE SOCIOLOGY OF REEFER MADNESS:

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN THE U.S.A.

Michael C. Eisner

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of the American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Sociology; Justice

Signatures of Committee:

Chair:

Dean of the College

Date 1994

The American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

THE AMEBICAH UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. DHI Number: 9529083

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. cCOPYRIGHT

MICHAEL C. ELSNER

1994

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE SOCIOLOGY OF REEFER MADNESS:

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN THE U.S.A.

Michael C. Eisner

ABSTRACT

In the United States of America, no legal sanctions

against marijuana existed on the federal level until the

U.S. Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act in 1937. The

social origins of this law are, in effect, a mystery. There

is a lack of consensus among sociologists and historians,

and no clear, concise explanation of how and why marijuana

came to be criminalized in the United States. This

dissertation attempts to fill that void.

In the 1930s, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics

(forerunner of today's Drug Enforcement Administration) and

the Hearst publishing empire framed marijuana use in the

context of a violence-inducing, insanity-producing "assassin

of youth." "Reefer," a slang term for a marijuana

cigarette, thus came to be associated with "madness."

This dissertation provides its readers with a more

comprehensive explanation of the Marihuana Tax Act than

heretofore has been available. It examines the Act's

passage and its subsequent enforcement in a social context,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that of popular culture and historical studies of marijuana

use. It develops and puts forth a new theory, the Social

Control Hypothesis, of why the Marihuana Tax Act became law.

It is unique in its analysis of the role that 1930s-era jazz

music and anti-marijuana motion pictures played in relation

to the passage and enforcement of the Marihuana Tax Act.

The historical analysis is extended to include in-depth

examinations of the related, but yet distinct, issues of

marijuana's decriminalization, legalization and

medicalizacion. By comparing drug use data in the United

States and Holland (the Netherlands), where cannabis use has

been decriminalized, this study empirically tests and

refutes the "stepping stone hypothesis" (also known as the

"gateway theory"), which claims that marijuana leads the

user to cocaine and heroin.

By examining the anti-marijuana media campaign of the

Partnership For A Drug Free America, "The Sociology of

Reefer Madness" follows the trail of Reefer Madness to the

present day. It is thus demonstrated on two fronts: the

medical marijuana issue and anti-marijuana media propaganda,

that Reefer Madness is alive and well in the 1990s.

Extensive research for "The Sociology of Reefer

Madness: the Criminalization of Marijuana in the U.S.A." was

conducted at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. and

at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and Suitland,

Maryland.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The following people were gracious in taking the time

to allow me to benefit from their areas of expertise and to

learn from their vast ranges of cannabis knowledge: David

Musto (Chapter 2), Bernard Brightman of Jass/Stash Records

(Chapter 3), Michael Starks (Chapter 4), Peter Cohen

(Chapter 5), David Gerstein (Chapter 6), and Kevin Zeese

(Chapters 6 and 7).

For their guidance and support throughout various

stages of this endeavor, I am particularly grateful to

Michael Aldrich, John Galliher, Jerome Himmelstein and John

McWilliams. I am honored to consider this work as an

extension of their own.

For shepherding me down the doctoral road at American

University, I hereby express my thanks to Arnold Trebach and

David Saari of the Department of Justice, Law and Society,

and to Muriel Cantor and Jurg Siegenthaler of the Department

of Sociology.

Finally, I would like to thank my neurosurgeon, Richard

Dennis, and my acupuncturist, Yeh Chong Chan, for correcting

my neck and back problems and enabling me to sit at the

computer terminal and write again.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... il

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

LIST OF T A B L E S ...... viii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Chapter

1. THE RISE OF REEFER MADNESS 9

Marijuana: The Evolution of a D r u g ...... 10

The Roots of Marijuana in the U.S...... 14

The Legislative History of the Marihuana Tax Act .. 16

Indian Hemp Drug Commission Report: 1893-1894 . . . 18

Panama Canal Zone Military Investigations: 1925-1931 21

The LaGuardia Committee Report; 1939-1944 ...... 24

Reefer Madness Solidified ...... 33

2. THE SOCIAL CONTROL HYPOTHESIS ...... 34

Historical Background ...... 36

The Criminology of Reefer Madness ...... 39

The Anslinger Hypothesis ...... 41

The Mexican Hypothesis ...... 45

Drug Control and Social Control ...... 51

The Ideology of the Marihuana Tax A c t ...... 54

The Social Control Hypothesis ...... 56

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Du Pont Hypothesis ...... 61

Reefer Madness Reformulated ...... 65

3. REEFER BLUES ...... 66

Blowing Reefer Smoke ...... 68

Up the River with J a z z ...... 73

Vipin*...... 74

The Anti-Jazz Campaign ...... 79

Examining Reefer Songs ...... 83

4. REEFER M O V I E S ...... 100

Sinister Menace ...... 106

Assassin of Y o u t h ...... 110

Tell Your Children ...... 115

Marihuana: Weed With Roots in H e l l ...... 122

5. TESTING THE STEPPING STONE HYPOTHESIS ...... 128

Historical Foundations of Drug Control ...... 130

Dutch Cannabis Policy ...... 133

Normalization: the Dutch System of Drug Control .. 134

Comparing U.S. and Dutch Drug Control Policies . .145

6. BEYOND CRIMINALIZATION...... 148

Decriminalization ...... 150

Marijuana Decriminalization in the United States.. 152

Civil Law Versus Criminal L a w ...... 153

The Unique Case of A l a s k a ...... 155

The Overreach of the Criminal L a w ...... 156

The "Crime Tariff" ...... 157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Unique Case of A l a s k a ...... 155

The Overreach of the Criminal L a w ...... 156

The "Crime T a r i f f " ...... 157

Labeling and Secondary Deviance ...... 158

Wandering in the Desert of U.S. Marijuana Policy.. 161

The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (NCMDA): 1970-1973 ...... 163

The Report of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences: 1978-1982 . . . 173

7. REEFER MADNESS REBORN ...... 183

Marijuana As a M e d i c i n e ...... 183

The Marihuana Tax Act Revisited ...... 185

The Prohibition on Medical Marijuana...... 190

HHS' "Compassionate Relief Program" ...... 197

Reefer Madness Revisited ...... 205

The Partnership for a Drug Free A m e r i c a ...... 209

Reefer Madness Reborn ...... 224

Conclusion...... 225

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 228

Vll

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES

Tedale 1: Marijuana's Use As a Medicine Over the Ages . . 13

Table 2; Reefer-Related Music: Chronological Listing . . 85

Table 3: Reefer-Related Music: Alphabetical Listing . . 89

Table 4: Possible Reefer Songs ...... 93

Table 5: Cannabis Use Among Students in Secondary Schools (13-18 Years) in the Netherlands and the USA.. 137

Table 6; Illicit Drug Use Among Students in Secondary Schools (13-18 Years) in the Netherlands and the U S A ...... 139

Table 7: Illicit Drug Use in the United States and Amsterdam, the Netherlands (12-70+ Years). . . 143

Table 8: Marijuana Laws in U.S. States That Have Decriminalized the Offense of Marijuana Possession...... 154

Table 9: Marijuana Use By U.S. High School Seniors: 1975-1984 180

Table 10: Current and Potential Uses of Medical M a r i j u a n a ...... 195

Table 11: States With Laws That Permit Marijuana's Medical Use...... 199

Table 12: Public Perceptions of the Most Important Problem Facing the United States: 1985-1989 .. 207

Table 13: Public Perceptions of the Most Important Problem Facing the United States: 1985-1992 .. 208

Table 14: Self-Reported Monthly, Yearly and Lifetime Use of Marijuana, Cigarettes and Alcohol By U.S. High School Seniors: 1979-1991 215

Table 15: Self-Reported Monthly, Yearly and Lifetime Use of Marijuana, Cigarettes and Alcohol By U.S. College Students: 1980-1991 ...... 220

viii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION

"Reefer" is a slang term for a marijuana cigarette.

According to Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (1983: 1515),

the origin of the word "reefer" stems from the similarity

between a rolled marijuana cigarette and a "reef," the part

of a sail which can be folded together and tied down. Yet

according to the High Times Encyclopedia of Recreational

Drugs (1979: 135), the word "reefer" is rooted in a racial

context and is "derived from greefa. New Orleans slang for

the drug smoked by grifo, the offspring of blacks and

mulattoes."

A number of dictionaries of American slang provide

further insight into the origins of "reefer." Partridge's

Concise Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English

(1989:367,ix) informs us that the term surfaced in the U.S.

through the "underworld" and came to be used more popularly

around 1935. According to the New Dictionary of American

Slang (1986:357), "rifa" is thought to have originated from

the Mexican Spanish grifa, and the "g" was "lost because it

is not aspirated or exploded in Spanish pronunciation and

hence not readily heard by English speakers."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2

Simon and Schuster's International Dictionary; Enalish-

Spanish/Spanish-Enolish (1973:457) defines marijuana as

"canamo de la India," or hemp from India (1020). Simon and

Schuster proceed to tell us that "grifa" is slang for

marijuana, and that among its masculine and feminine form

meanings are included "curly, kinky hair" and the "offspring

of a black and an Indian" (1248). Grifa is derived from the

verb engrifar, which is "to curl, crimp; to make (hair)

stand on end" (1179).

As anyone who has seen a marijuana plant can attest to,

the cannabis plant's dried leaves and flowering buds do in

fact resemble curly hair. It is plausible, therefore, that

the origin of the slang term "reefer" may stem from the

Spanish word "engrifar."

In the United States, marijuana, which was then widely

known as Indian hemp, was not outlawed on the federal level

until 1937. The historical record clearly reflects that

through a campaign waged by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics

(FBN) and the Hearst publishing empire, the smokable leaves

of the hemp plant came to be associated with murder, madness

and mayhem. The image of marijuana which was promoted to

the public was that of a "killer weed" and an "assassin of

youth." At various times, marijuana was also touted as a

"stepping stone" which led its users to harder drugs.

The social origins of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,

the federal legislation whereby cannabis became criminalized

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3

in the United States, remain shrouded in mystery. There is

a lack of consensus among sociologists and historians of how

and why the federal prohibition on marijuana came to be

enacted in the U.S. In this dissertation, I am attempting

to put forth a more precise explanation of the social forces

that lay behind the criminalization of cannabis in the

United States.

Historians and sociologists have claimed that the

passage of the Marihuana Tax Act came about due to two

competing theories which have been referred to by

Himmelstein (1983) as the "Anslinger Hypothesis" and the

"Mexican Hypothesis." Scant evidence exists, however, to

support either theory.

By synthesizing the "Anslinger Hypothesis" and the

"Mexican Hypothesis," this dissertation formulates a new

theory which explains the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act;

the "Social Control Hypothesis." This thesis additionally

examines another existing theory that seeks to explain the

social origins of federal cannabis prohibition in the United

States; the "Du Pont Hypothesis."

In the 1960s, marijuana use became more widespread

among young people in the United States. As its popularity

increased and it came to be seen as less of a danger than

other illicit drugs, the legislation of the Marihuana Tax

Act was replaced by the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse

Prevention and Control Act. The 1970 Act both statutorily

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4

separated marijuana from narcotic drugs’ and reduced the

crimes of nonprofit distribution of small amounts and simple

possession of marijuana from felonies to misdemeanors.

Further provisions were made in the law to expunge the

criminal records of first-time offenders who were convicted

of marijuana possession (Himmelstein, 1983:102-104).

Following the federal lead, state criminal penalties

for marijuana possession were decreased nationwide in the

1970s. By 1974, the crime of unlawful possession of

marijuana had been reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor in

virtually all U.S. states.^

Thus, the term "Reefer Madness" has two distinct

meanings: (1) in the United States of the 1930s, Reefer

Madness referred to the supposed causal link between the

marijuana use and insanity; and (2) in the I970s, as

penalties for marijuana possession were reduced nationwide,

the perpetuation of the drug's criminal status was

considered by many to be another form of "Reefer Madness."

This study, which consists of seven chapters, traces

the origin of Reefer Madness and follows its trail to the

present day. Chapter 1, "The Rise of Reefer Madness,"

’cocaine was misclassified as a narcotic by both this law and the grandfather of all U.S. drug laws in the United States, the 1914 Harrison Narcotic Act. Narcotics are analgesics, or pain killers, which slow the respiratory rate. Cocaine is a stimulant which is still inappropriately referred to as a narcotic.

^For an explanation of the unique situation in Nevada, see Morals Legislation Without Moralitv: the Case of Nevada by John F. Galliher and John R. Cross (1982, Rutgers University Press).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5

provides a global historical narrative of marijuana use over

the millennia, and then examines two scientific studies of

cannabis which pre-date the Marihuana Tax Act; the Indian

Hemp Commission Report of 1893-1894 and the Panama Canal

Zone Military Investigations of 1925-1931. The chapter also

focuses on an additional scientific study of cannabis which

was undertaken immediately following the passage of the

Marihuana Tax Act; the New York-city based LaGuardia

Committee Report of 1939-1944. As the chapter ends in 1945,

it is clear that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was

successful in its campaign to solidify marijuana's

criminalized status in the United States.

Chapter 2, "The Social Control Hypothesis," examines

previous theories which attempt to explain the passage of

the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, and it puts forth a new

theory in this regard. This chapter provides the

theoretical base by which the phenomenon of Reefer Madness

is sociologically examined in subsequent chapters.

In Chapters 3 and 4, content analyses of I930s-era

popular culture are conducted within the context of the

Social Control Hypothesis. Chapter 3, "Reefer Blues,"

examines the lyrics of marijuana-oriented jazz songs, most

of which date from the 1930s, while Chapter 4, "Reefer

Movies," studies the plots and propaganda contained within

four anti-marijuana movies that were released in the 1930s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. One of a number of prominent themes within the anti

marijuana "scare" films of the 1930s was the claim that

marijuana leads the user to harder drugs, such as cocaine

and heroin. Formerly known as the "stepping stone

hypothesis," today this notion is called the "gateway

theory." Chapter 5 tests the "stepping stone hypothesis"

via the availability of comparative drug use data in the

United States and the Netherlands (Holland), where cannabis

use has been decriminalized. Chapter 5, "Testing the

Stepping Stone Hypothesis," presents clear and convincing

empirical evidence that refutes today's "gateway theory."

The Dutch system of decriminalization, known as

"normalization," is but one method by which a governmental

entity has enacted a drug control policy. Chapter 6,

"Beyond Criminalization," examines two alternatives to the

criminalization of marijuana: its decriminalization and its

legalization.

Chapter 7, "Reefer Madness Reborn," discusses a third

alternative to marijuana's criminalization: its use as a

medicine. As well, in the context of examining the media

campaign of the Partnership For A Drug Free America, which

originated in the mid-1980s, this concluding chapter draws

parallels between propaganda of the 1930s and the present

day. Thus, on two fronts: medical marijuana and media

propaganda, this dissertation's final chapter demonstrates

that Reefer Madness is alive and well in the 1990s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7

Extensive archival research for "The Sociology of

Reefer Madness" was conducted at the Library of Congress in

Washington, D.C. and at the National Archives in Washington,

D.C. and Suitland, Maryland. Lesser archival research was

conducted at the U.S. Treasury Department's Library, Howard

University's Moorland-Spingam Research Center, and the

Southern Historical Collection at the University of North

Carolina, Chapel Hill.

"The Sociology of Reefer Madness" provides its readers

with a more comprehensive explanation of the social origins

and the enforcement of the Marihuana Tax Act than heretofore

has been available. It examines the law's passage and its

subsequent enforcement in a social context, that of popular

culture and historical studies of marijuana use. It puts

forth a new theory, "The Social Control Hypothesis," of why

the Marihuana Tax Act became law, and it examines the

enforcement of the Act in relation to one specific targeted

group of people who used marijuana: jazz musicians. This

dissertation further explores popular culture and the

passage of the Marihuana Tax Act in relation to anti

marijuana motion pictures of the 1930s that appear to have

been created for propaganda purposes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8

Michel Foucault, in answering the question of why he

authored Discipline and Punish; the Birth of the Prison.

wrote (1979:31):

Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of the present.

With Foucault looking over my shoulder, I have written

a history of the past, a sociological analysis of

marijuana's criminalization in the United States, in terms

of the present.

In developing and applying the Social Control

Hypothesis to popular culture of the 1930s, and in testing

the "Stepping Stone Hypothesis," this dissertation breaks

new academic ground. Perhaps, in the future, it will serve

as food for thought to policymakers who grapple with the

question of whether marijuana should be a decriminalized or

legalized commodity.

For now, however, let us examine the "history of the

present."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1

THE RISE OF REEFER MADNESS

Marijuana is an ancient drug. Throughout the ages,

under various names, and in many languages, marijuana has

been used industrially, as a medicine, as an intoxicant and

for religious purposes. Marijuana is, perhaps, the most

well-studied drug throughout the recorded annals of modern

world history.

The word "marijuana" is of Spanish origin, originated

in Mexico, and is widely used in the United States today.^

Worldwide, numerous other terms for marijuana exist,

including bhang, ganja, dagga, hemp, Indian hemp and

cannabis. This manuscript tends to use these terms

interchangeably, although cannabis is actually a term used

for both marijuana and hashish,^ which is created from

compressed marijuana resin and is said to be from five to

eight times more potent than marijuana (Brecher, 1972:400).

^Since the "j" in Spanish is silent, the word "marihuana" is often found in the marijuana literature. In this text, the term "marihuana" is consistently used as it appears throughout the historical record. Otherwise, the use of the word "marijuana" is preferred.

^The word "hashish," which is an Arabic term for "grass," originally was used to describe marijuana (Abel, 1982:48).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0

Mari-iuana; The Evolution of a Drug

Marijuana's use by humankind can be traced twelve

thousand years ago to the Chinese island of Taiwan. The

first written evidence of marijuana's use as a medicine is

in China, where it is described as "the liberator of sin,"

and dates nearly five thousand years ago to 2737 B.C.

Radiocarbon dating has produced evidence of cultivated

cannabis sativa in China more than five thousand years ago,

where practitioners of shamanism used the plant "primarily

as a hallucinogen and not a textile fiber" (Porter,

1993:20). There is further evidence that the Chinese

cultivated cannabis in 4500 B.C., and the historical record

suggests that marijuana may well have been cultivated as far

back as ten thousand years ago.

Over the ages, cannabis has been used not only in

China, but in India, Japan, South East Asia, the Middle

East, and Africa. "The earliest unmistakable reference to

cannabis in Egypt does not occur until the third century

A.D." (Abel, 1980:26). Centuries later its use spread from

Northern Africa into Persia (today's Iran), Assyria (today's

Syria), and other Arabic-speaking nations. Later, marijuana

use is said to have spread eastward to the Mediterranean and

Europe, and the Spanish slave trade is thought to have

^Aldrich (1971:1-2) claims that the 2737 B.C. Treatise on Medicine fPen-ts'ao) attributed to Emperor Shen Nung "was actually compiled by Han Dynasty scholars whose references go back no further than the fourth century B.C."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1

transported the drug from Africa to Brazil and South

America.*

Marijuana has been credited with playing a major role

in the development of many of the world's great religions,

including Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Zoroastrianism and

Sufism (Abel, 1980:19-22; Aldrich, 1971:1-5; Herer, 1990:49-

51; Snyder, 1971:19-23). Brecher (1972:398) cites sources

which contend that portions of the Judaeo-Christian Old

Testament contain references to marijuana.^ As documented

by Mikuriya (1973:118), Biblical scholars concluded in 1860

that the myrrhed wine "offered to our Saviour immediately

before his crucifixion was, in all probability, a

preparation of hemp."

^Sources for this general historical information on cannabis include: Abel, I976:xiii; Abel, 1980:1-35,101; Aldrich, 1971:1-19; Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:1-2,4; Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1993:3; Hermes and Galperin, 1992:29-30; and Weisheit, 1992:12-14.

^Specific examples cited are the "honeycomb" referred to in the Song of Solomon, 5:1, the "honeywood" found in I Samuel 14:25-45, and the claim that "calamus" in the Song of Solomon (presumably 4:14) is cannabis. Ezekiel 27:19, cited by Abel (1980:27) as containing the word "kaneh," is interpreted by The Prophets. a "new translation of the Holy Scriptures according to the traditional Hebrew text," as: "they trafficked with you in ... calamus." Abel disputes the contention that the Hebrew word kaneh refers to cannabis, stating it "is a very vague term that has disconcerted more than a few distinguished Biblical scholars." Abel claims that kaneh cannot be cannabis because Isaiah 43:24 refers not to a "sweet-smelling" but a "sweet- tasting" plant, and cannabis is not "sweet-tasting." Yet The Prophets (1978) interprets kaneh in Isaiah 43:24 as "fragrant cane." Abel bolsters his contention that kaneh is sugar cane by citing an additional two Biblical passages: Exodus 30:23 and Jeremiah 6:20. The Prophets simply states that the Jeremiah passage refers to "fragrant cane from a distant land." Exodus 30:23 (The Jerusalem Bible. 1968) refers to "fragrant cinnamon" but the next line, 30:24, refers to "scented cane."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2

In A.D. 105, the Chinese reportedly used hemp to invent

paper, a secret they kept hidden for hundreds of years

(Abel, 1980:7-9). Marijuana's first known industrial uses

in China were for weaving clothes and manufacturing shoes.

Chinese archers used cannabis to fashion bow strings which

were far superior to those made from bamboo. In the

centuries to come, hemp provided the rope, sails and webbing

that bound together the ships that sailed the seven seas.

As a fiber and as a textile, hemp: the source of birdseed,

canvas, cloth, oil, paper and twine, was a major industrial

component throughout the world for thousands of years.®

Table 1 provides us with a limited overview of

cannabis' use as a medicine in ancient times. Historically,

cannabis has been used medicinally to alleviate pain for a

wide array of ailments, including arthritis and menstrual

cramps. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the

medicinal use of cannabis (a subject we will return to in

Chapter 7) has proven to be effective in providing relief

for patients suffering from cancer, AIDS, multiple sclerosis

and glaucoma.

®Herer (1991:5-11) cites additional industrial uses for hemp and claims that: (1) from the Fifth Century B.C. onward, "Ninety percent of all ships' sails" were made from cannabis hemp fiber, as were (2) "75-90% of all paper in the world" until 1883, and (3) "Eighty percent of all mankind's textiles and fabrics for clothes, tents, linens, rugs, drapes, quilts... until the 20th century."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3

TABLE 1

MARIJUANA'S USE AS A MEDICINE OVER THE AGES

Africa China India

Childbirth Absentmindedness*** Appetite Loss

Dysentery* Analgesic Headaches

Fatigue* Anesthetic Indigestion

Fevers* Constipation Sleep Inducement Malaria** Female Disorders Venereal Snake Bites Rheumatic Pains Disease

*Cannabis was additionally used for this ailment in India.

**Cannabis was additionally used for this ailment in China.

***Grinspoon and Bakalar refer to cannabis being used in India to "quicken the mind."

Sources: Abel, 1980:12-13; Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1993:5; and Weisheit, 1992:12-14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4

The Roots of Harinuana in the United States

Marijuana is said to have come into the land of Uncle

Sam via Mexican agricultural farm workers in the southwest,

and it surfaced in New Orleans by 1910. In 1915, California

and Utah were the first U.S. states to ban the drug, shortly

after Pancho Villa's revolutionary army used the weed to

march to victory in Mexico to the tune "La Cucaracha"

(Walton, 1938:25; Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:4; Sloman,

1979:29; and Abel, 1980:201):

La Cucaracha, The Cockroach, La Cucaracha, The Cockroach, Ya no puede caminar. No longer can walk, Porque no tiene. Because it doesn't have. Portae le falta. Because it lacks. Marijuana que fumar. Marijuana to smoke.

Contrary to the theory that marijuana did not enter the

United States until Mexican agricultural workers transported

it north is the fact that the hemp plant was thriving in

colonial Jamestown three hundred years earlier. Aldrich

(1971:10) writes that within the slaveholding U.S.:

it seems likely that colonial masters were shown the use of marihuana as a drug by their Africans; this was certainly done in Jamaica and the West Indies at the same time (late 18th century), following the introduction of ganga from India.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5

It has been documented that George Washington recorded

in his personal diary how he carefully separated the female

and male hemp seeds, presumably because the female plant was

thought to yield a more potent strain of cannabis (Brecher,

1972:403)

In the newly-founded United States of America of the

1770s, paper money was practically worthless and the

American economy operated on the barter system. Due to

hemp's recognized value, durability, uniformity and the

"universal and steady demand for it," hemp was actually the

standard economic commodity for the first three or four

decades of the United States (Abel, 1982:90).

After the Civil War, the decline of the labor intensive

hemp industry came about due to three reasons: the cotton

industry's increased use of labor-saving machinery, the

unavailability of slave labor, and the introduction of wire

baling. With hemp fiber no longer a vital cash crop in the

nation, U.S. hemp manufacturers could not compete with

foreign competitors who imported hemp from abroad at less

expensive prices (Abel, 1980:80-83 and 93-96; Abel, 1982:50;

Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:3; and Brecher, 1972:404).

’in a personal communication, Michael Aldrich, perhaps the foremost authority on marijuana in the U.S.A., disputes both Brecher's claim and his own (1971:10) that "Washington separated male from female plants, which is done only when potent resin is desired." "This part is wrong," Aldrich wrote me on December 19, 1990. "Geo. grew it for seeds, not sinsemilla." (Sinsemilla is a potent strain of marijuana which means "without seeds" in Spanish.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6

The hemp industry did not die out in the United States

until marijuana was banned on the federal level through the

Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. In fact, after the U.S. entered

World War II and found its hemp supply in the Philippines

cut off by the Japanese, the ban on hemp cultivation was

temporarily lifted to support the war effort.

Legislative History of the Marihuana Tax Act

The Marihuana Tax Act, originally entitled "The

Marihuana Taxing Bill," was introduced as H.R. 6385 by

Congressman Robert Doughton, chairman of the House of

Representatives' Committee on Ways and Means, on April 14,

1937. Hearings before Congressman Doughton's committee were

held on April 27-30 and May 4, 1937, and it was reported out

of committee, as H.R. 6906, to the full House of

Representatives on May 11, 1937.

On June 10, 1937, when the bill was first brought to

the floor of the House by Congressman Doughton, the speaker

of the House was asked: "What is the bill?" Sam Rayburn of

Texas replied (81 Congressional Record 1937:5575):

It has something to do with something that is called marihuana. I believe it is a narcotic of some kind.

Due to "the late hour of the day," consideration of the

bill was tabled until June 14, when discussion of the

’°The 1942 documentary movie "Hemp for Victory," produced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, encouraged U.S. farmers to grow hemp as part of a patriotic effort to assist the U.S. war effort.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7

Marihuana Taxing Bill covered less than two pages of the

Congressional Record. H.R. 6906 passed the House without a

roll call, and upon being sent to the U.S. Senate, one

hearing was held, on July 12, 1937, before a subcommittee of

the Senate's Committee on Finance. As researched through

the Library of Congress, virtually no other information is

available from the Senate side of the congressional aisle.

H.R. 6906 returned from the Senate as amended, was brought

before the full House on July 26, 1937, and was quickly

considered and adopted (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:174):

The act passed Congress with little debate and even less public attention. ...The Marihuana Tax Act was hastily drawn, heard, debated and passed. It was a paradigm of the uncontroversial law.

When the Marihuana Tax Act was signed into law by

President Franklin Roosevelt on August 2, 1937, the

President made no public statement of any kind, and

virtually no publicity accompanied the Act. No newsprint

whatsoever was devoted to either the passage or the signing

of the Marihuana Tax Act by the Los Angeles Times, the

Chicago Tribune and the New Orleans Times-Picavune

(Himmelstein, 1982:43). Save for it being listed along with

nineteen other bills "pillowed... through the House,"

fJournal and Sentinel. Winston-Salem, N.C., August 22, 1937)

no record of it could be located within the personal papers

of the bill's sponsor, Rep. Robert Doughton of North

Carolina. The New York Times made note of the signing in

one wire-service sentence (Abel, 1980:247):

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8

President Roosevelt signed today a bill to curb traffic in the narcotic, marihuana, through heavy taxes on transactions.

Ignored in the legislative shuffle to criminalize

marijuana in 1937 was a massive amount of published

scientific data concerning cannabis. Specifically, in

enacting a federal prohibition on marijuana in the United

States, the U.S. Congress did not consider two historic sets

of reports, the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report (1893-

1894) and the Panama Canal Zone Military Investigations

(1916-1929).

Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report; 1893-1894

Appointed at the behest of the British government by

India's colonial Government just over one hundred years ago,

this seven member commission produced a thoroughly

researched seven-volume document in which nearly 1200

witnesses (including 335 medical practitioners) were

interviewed in 30 cities. Covering over 3000 pages of text,

the report "sought to inquire" (Indian Hemp Drugs Commission

Report, 1894:1):”

into the cultivation of the hemp plant in Bengal, the preparation of drugs from it, the trade in those drugs, the effect of their consumption upon the social and moral condition of the people, and the desirability of prohibiting the growth of the plant and the sale of ganja and allied drugs.

”The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report will hereafter be cited as "IHCR."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9

The Commission addressed three questions concerning the

hemp/crime connection to its witnesses (IHCR, 1894:256-257):

(1) whether any large proportion of bad characters are habitual consumers of hemp drugs, and whether there is any general connection between such consumption and crime.

(2) whether these drugs are to any considerable extent taken by criminals to fortify themselves to commit premeditated crime of any kind.

(3) whether criminals use hemp drugs to stupefy their victims.

Upon examination of its facts, the Commission concluded

that: "the connection between hemp drugs and ordinary crime

is very slight indeed." The Commission then addressed the

"Reefer Madness" question:

whether excessive indulgence in [hemp] drugs incites to unpremeditated crime and whether they knew cases in which it had led to temporary homicidal frenzy.

After reviewing its body of evidence, obtained from

nearly 600 witnesses, the Commission rejected that "any such

connection" existed between hemp usage and homicidal frenzy

or unpremeditated crime:

... in view of all the evidence[,] the tendency of the drugs often seems to be to develop or bring into play the natural disposition of the consumer.... If he aims at ease and rest and is let alone, he will be quiet and restful; but if he is naturally excitable and ill- tempered, or if he is disturbed and crossed, he may be violent. ...the fact that so many witnesses testify to the peaceable and orderly character of the excessive consumers goes far to prove that in this country experience shows that as a rule these drugs do not tend to crime and violence.

After finding that it "has been clearly established

that the occasional use of hemp in moderate doses may be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0

beneficial" regarding the medicinal use of cannabis, the

Commission focused "on the popular and common use of the

drugs" as they affect "the physical, mental or moral

nature." Among the report's conclusions were (IHCR,

1893:263-264):

(1) In regard to the physical effects, the Commission have come to the conclusion that the moderate use of hemp drugs is practically attended by no evil results at all.

(2) There are also many cases where... the people attribute beneficial effects to the habitual moderate use of these drugs; and there is evidence to show that the popular impression may have some basis in fact.

(3) Speaking generally, the Commission are of opinion that the moderate use of hemp drugs appears to cause no appreciable physical injury of any kind.

(4) In respect to the alleged mental effects of the drugs, the Commission have come to the conclusion that the moderate use of hemp drugs produces no injurious effects on the mind.

(5) It appears that the excessive use of hemp drugs may, especially in cases where there is any weakness or hereditary predisposition, induce insanity. It has been shown that the effect of hemp drugs in this respect has hitherto been greatly exaggerated, but that they do sometimes produce insanity seems beyond question.

(6) In regards to the moral effects of the drugs, the Commission are of opinion that their moderate use produces no moral injury whatever. There is no adequate ground for believing that it injuriously affects the character of the consumer.

(7) [F]or all practical purposes it may be laid down that there is little or no connection between the use of hemp drugs and crime.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1

(8) Viewing the subject generally, it may be added that the moderate use of these drugs is the rule, and that the excessive use is comparatively exceptional. The moderate use practically produces no ill effects. In all but the most exceptional cases, the injury from habitual moderate use is not appreciable.

Although the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission can be

criticized for gathering only narrative evidence which does

not measure up to "present-day scientific standards," it

cannot be disputed that for its time the Indian Hemp Drugs

Commission Report was "a landmark study, impartial and

objective" (Abel, 1980:132 and 1982:56). In the ensuing

years prior to Reefer Madness' rise in the United States,

the U.S. military drew on the findings of Indian Hemp

Commission in conducting a series of investigations

regarding the misuse of marijuana by U.S. military personnel

stationed in Panama (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:134).

Panama Canal Zone Military Investigations: 1925-1931

The Panama Canal Zone studies were a series of three

separate investigations that were conducted over the course

of seven years. The first investigation took place in 1925,

the second took place in 1929 and the last investigation

took place in 1931 (Abel, 1980:205-207).

The investigations were preceded by a 1923 edict by the

U.S. Army which forbade its soldiers in the Panama Canal

from using marijuana. In 1926, after the investigation was

completed, the order banning marijuana use by soldiers was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2

rescinded. Nonetheless, in 1929, high-ranking military

brass ordered that a new inquiry be initiated. Despite the

1929 report's concurrence with the 1925 probe, in 1930, the

prohibition on marijuana use was reenacted. For reasons not

made clear in the available literature, a third

investigation was begun in 1930. Although the third

investigation was in agreement with the findings of the two

preceding reports, the ban on marijuana in the Canal Zone

remained in effect.

The 1925 investigation consisted of three types of

evidence; the anecdotal testimony of officers regarding

marijuana use by troops under their command; medical opinion

by the superintendent of the Corozal Hospital for the

Insane; and a number of controlled lab experiments of a

total of fifteen subjects using marijuana. Although, as in

the case of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report, the

scientific methodology of the controlled use experiments

"may be regarded as primitive" by today's standards, they

represented the best research in the field at the time they

were conducted (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:134).

In 1933, these reports were compiled and published

within the Journal of the Association of Military Surgeons

of the United States, The Military Surgeon, the only

published account available to the public today. Among the

conclusions of the three Canal Zone studies were (1933:269-

280) :

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3

(1) There is no evidence that marihuana as grown here is a "habit-forming" drug in the sense in which the term is applied to alcohol, opium, cocaine, etc., or that it has any appreciably deleterious influence on the individual using it.

(2) The influence of the drug when used for smoking is uncertain and has apparently been greatly exaggerated. Most of the reports appear to have little basis in fact. There is no medical evidence that it causes insanity.

(3) All of the statements to the effect that two or three puffs produce remarkable effects are nonsense, judging from our experience.

(4) [No] acts of violence were observed. The Health Department... and the Police Department of the Panama Canal have no knowledge of any ill effects from the use of the drug in the Canal Zone.

(5) [N]o steps be taken by the Canal Zone authorities to prevent the sale or use of marihuana.

(6) [U]se of the drug is not widespread and...its effects upon military efficiency and upon discipline are not great. There appears to be no reason for renewing the penalties formerly exacted for the possession and the use of the drug.

(7) The evidence obtained suggests that organization Commanders in estimating the efficiency and soldierly quality of delinquents in their commands have unduly emphasized the effects of marijuana, disregarding the fact that a large proportion of the delinquents are morons or psychopaths, which conditions themselves would serve to account for their delinquency.

(8) Delinquencies due to marijuana smoking which results in trial by military court are negligible in number when compared with delinquencies resulting from the use of alcoholic drinks which also may be classed as stimulants or intoxicants.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 4

In 1937, four years after the findings of the Canal

Zone investigations were published in The Military Surgeon,

no mention was even made of them in the congressional

proceedings which resulted in the passage of the Marihuana

Tax Act. Since the conclusions of the Canal Zone studies,

like the Indian Hemp Commission Report, were contrary to the

position of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the FBN "was

able to drown them with silence" (Himmelstein, 1983:70).

The LaGuardia Committee Report f1939-1944f

Within two years after the Marihuana Tax Act became

law, another report on marijuana was commissioned, this time

by Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York City. In 1939,

LaGuardia, who gained some knowledge about marijuana when he

formerly served in the U.S. Congress,sought to conduct

"a thorough sociological and scientific investigation of

"the marihuana problem in the City of New York." In the

introduction to the report which bears his name, LaGuardia

wrote (Solomon, 1966:280):

My own interest in marihuana goes back many years, to the time when I was a member of the House of Representatives, and in that capacity, heard of the use of marihuana by soldiers stationed in Panama. I was impressed at that time with the report of an Army Board of Inquiry which emphasized the relative hazmlessness of the drug and the fact that it played a very little role, if any, in problems of delinopiency and crime in the Canal Zone.

’^It is interesting to note that as a member of Congress, LaGuardia played a pivotal role in the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited alcohol in the U.S. from 1920-1933.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5

Following "widespread publicity describing the

dangerous effects of marihuana usage," Mayor LaGuardia of

New York asked New York's Academy of Medicine for its

"opinion as to the advisability of studying the whole

marijuana problem" (Solomon, 1966:403). Mayor LaGuardia

explained in the report's introduction that the study was

prompted by "rumors [which] were recently circulated

concerning the smoking of marihuana by large segments of

[New York City's] population and even by school children."

Two sources of such rumors, as has been mentioned and will

be discussed further in Chapter 2, were the Hearst

publishing empire and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

The research design of the LaGuardia Report was two

pronged and consisted of a sociological component and a

clinical component. As outlined by the New York Academy of

Medicine, the scope of the study was (Solomon, 1966:278):

(1) a sociological study dealing with the extent of marihuana smoking and the methods by which the drug is obtained; in what districts and among what races, classes, or types of persons the use is most prevalent; whether certain social conditions are factors in its use; and what relation there is between its use and crime or antisocial acts; and

(2) a clinical study to determine by means of controlled experiments the physiological and psychological effects of marihuana on different types of persons; the question as to whether it causes physical or mental deterioration; and its possible therapeutic effects on the treatment of disease or of other drug addictions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 6

The LaGuardia Committee was comprised of thirty one

individuals (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:200) who were

appointed by the Mayor upon the recommendation of the New

York Academy of Medicine. The Committee was made up of

medical and social scientists, including four New York City

officials. In addition, six undercover "plain clothes"

investigators were also assigned to the Committee by New

York City's Commissioner of Police for the purpose of

gathering field information regarding marijuana use in the

community.

The six sociological questions which the committee

sought answers to were (Solomon, 1966:290):

1. To what extent is marihuana used?

2. What is the method of retail distribution?

3. What is the general attitude of the marihuana smoker toward society and toward the use of the drug?

4. What is the relationship between marihuana and eroticism?

5. What is the relationship between marihuana and crime?

6. What is the relationship between marihuana and juvenile delinquency?

Among the sociological conclusions of the study were

the following (Solomon, 1966:307):

(1) The practice of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction in the medical sense of the word.

(2) The use of marihuana does not lead to morphine or heroin or cocaine addiction and no effort is made to create a market for these narcotics by stimulating the practice of marihuana smoking.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 7

(3) Marihuana is not the determining factor in the commission of major crimes.

(4) Marihuana smoking is not widespread among school children.

(5) Juvenile delinquency is not associated with the practice of smoking marihuana.

(6) The publicity concerning the catastrophic effects of marihuana smoking in New York City is unfounded.

The clinical portion of the study, subdivided into a

number of lengthy sections, consisted of experiments of

marijuana users both in the laboratory and in social

environments such as "tea pads," where marijuana was smoked

in a communal setting. While the laboratory studies were of

a quantitative nature, the studies of marijuana smoking in

the social environment were qualitative in scope. Most all

of the criticisms of the LaGuardia Committee Report, both

pro and con, have focused on the quantitative laboratory

aspects of the Committee's findings, while the qualitative

social environment studies have virtually been ignored.

Likewise, a review of the literature reveals that in

general, the clinical portion of the report has been

highlighted, while the equally important sociological

portion of the report has been all but forgotten.

The laboratory conditions of the study were comprised

of a hospital setting in which voluntary human subjects were

supplied with varying amounts of marijuana under different

conditions, and the effects were observed, measured and

recorded. Over ninety percent of the study's seventy seven

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 8

participants were prisoners, two-thirds of whom had

previously used marijuana. Two of the most significant

clinical findings of the report, which refuted the image of

marijuana as a "killer weed" and an "assassin of youth" were

(Solomon, 1966:331):

there was no aggressiveness or violent behavior observed. Erotic ideas or sensations when present took no active expression.

In light of the "Reefer Madness" theme examined herein,

clinical conclusions of the LaGuardia Committee Report worth

noting included (Solomon, 1966:363,388-389 and 408):

(1) Indulgence in marihuana does not appear to result in mental deterioration.

(2) Under the influence of marihuana the basic personality structure does not change but some of the more superficial aspects of [the user's] behavior show alteration.

(3) With the use of marihuana, the individual experiences increased feelings of relaxation, disinhibition and self-confidence.

(4) The new feeling of self-confidence induced by the drug expresses itself primarily through oral rather than through physical activity. There is some indication of a diminution in physical activity.

(5) The disinhibition which results from the use of marihuana releases what is latent in the individual's thoughts and emotions, but does not evoke responses which would be totally alien to [the user] in [an] undrugged state.

(6) In general the subject's attitude toward family and community ideologies... did not change markedly as a result of the ingestion of marihuana.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 9

(7) There is definite evidence in this study that the marihuana users were not inferior in intelligence to the general population and that they had suffered no mental or physical deterioration as a result of their use of the drug.

(8) The evidence available then -the absence of any compelling urge to use the drug, the absence of any distressing abstinence symptoms, the statements that no increase in dosage is required to repeat the desired effect in users- justifies the conclusion that neither true addiction nor tolerance is found in marihuana users.

(9) Since psychological factors play a large part in the withdrawal symptoms of at least a certain proportion of morphine addicts, there are grounds for the assumption that a drug having the properties of marihuana might be of aid in alleviating mental distress during the withdrawal period.

(10) [T]hose who have been smoking marijuana for a period of years showed no mental or physical deterioration which may be attributed to the drug.

The final portion of the LaGuardia Committee's clinical

analysis was a lengthy "Pharmacological Study,"” which

constituted "a great step forward in the understanding of

the relationship between chemical structure and

pharmacological activity," according to one historical

observer (Kalant, 1968:23):

Nearly a century of research into the chemical constitution of Cannabis had resulted only in the isolation and partial characterization of one compound, cannabinol, and it was devoid of pharmacological activity.

”Solomon published most, but not all, of the LaGuardia Committee Report. While the pharmacological portion of the original report covered more than sixty pages, Solomon (1966:399- 401) chose to cover the material in about two pages of text.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 0

The sociological and clinical findings of the LaGuardia

Committee Report were in direct opposition to the

pronouncements trumpeted by the FBN and the Hearst

publishing empire. Critics were quick to denounce the

report's conclusions while others wholeheartedly supported

them. As described by Kalant (1968:19-20):

Generally, those who are strongly opposed to the popular use of marihuana, particularly people involved in law enforcement have accused [the LaGuardia Committee Report] of being unscientific and socially harmful; those who are equally strongly in favor of freedom of use of the drug, have accepted it as their gospel.

Kalant, who contends that "from a purely scientific

standpoint this study deserves neither the extravagant

praise nor the vicious attacks to which it has been

submitted," offers us this perspective of the LaGuardia

Report:

This document is unique and of particular interest in the field of the literature on Cannabis not so much because of its scope or contents, as because of the extreme reactions that its publication produced.... [R]eactions stem from the nature of the major conclusions drawn from the study, which tended to contradict the sensational and lurid claims in the popular press of the U.S.A. at that time.... Seen in the social and legal context prevailing at the time... these conclusions seemed to negate the very basis of the campaign against marihuana and could be considered as either courageous or reckless depending on the point of view adopted.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 1

From 1942-1945, an intellectual battle had been waged

in the pages of scientific journals” concerning

preliminary accounts of the clinical laboratory study and

the final report itself, which was published in late 1944.

Samuel Allentuck and Karl Bowman of the LaGuardia Committee

summarized their preliminary findings in the American

Journal of Psychiatry (99, 1942:248-250):

Prolonged use of [marijuana] does not lead to physical, mental or moral degeneration, nor have we observed any permanent deleterious effects from its continued use. Quite the contrary, marihuana and its derivatives and allied synthetics have potentially valuable therapeutic applications which merit future investigation.

Shortly after the LaGuardia Committee Report was

released, a scathing editorial indictment appeared in the

Journal of the American Medical Association (127,

1945:1129). Because of the editorial’s "tone and content...

[and the] subsequent collaboration between Anslinger and

[JAMA]," Bonnie and Whitebread (1974:201) "have little doubt

that the words themselves are Anslinger’s":

For many years, medical scientists have considered cannabis a dangerous drug. Nevertheless... on [a] narrow and thoroughly unscientific foundation, [the LaGuardia Committee] draws sweeping and inadequate conclusions which minimize the harmfulness of marihuana. Already the book has done harm. One investigator has described some tearful parents who brought their 16-year old son to a physician after he had been detected in the act of smoking marijuana. A

^Preliminary results and discussion of the clinical study were published in the Journal of Psvchiatrv 99 (1942). The Journal of the American Medical Association fJAMA) continued the discourse, and ultimately changed its editorial position over time, in volumes 120 (1942); 121 (1943); 124 and 125 (1944); and 127, 128 and 129 (1945).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 2

noticeable deterioration had been evident for some time even to their lay minds. The boy said he had read an account of the LaGuardia Committee Report, and that this was his justification for using marihuana. The book states unqualifiedly to the public that the use of this narcotic does not lead to physical, mental or moral degeneration and that permanent deleterious effects from its continued use were not observed in 77 [sic] prisoners. This statement has already done great damage to the cause of law enforcement. Public officials will do well to disregard this unscientific, uncritical study, and continue to regard marihuana as a menace wherever it is purveyed.

Bonnie and Whitebread (1974:202) maintain that through

the 1945 JAMA editorial, Anslinger succeeded in **forg[ing] a

wedge between the AMA and the acknowledged experts" in the

medical community who questioned the FBN's marijuana/crime

thesis. Thus, the LaGuardia Committee Report "sank quietly

into oblivion."”

^Himmelstein (1983:83-84) points to additional evidence which leads him to the conclusion that "the 1945 editorial bears the unmistakable mark of Anslinger." He notes (1983:95) that: "How the Bureau [of Narcotics] was able to control so decisively the AMA's official stance is unclear. I merely wish to show that it did." In addition, it is interesting to note that in 1937, when the Marihuana Tax Act was being considered by the House of Representatives' Committee on Ways and Means, Dr. William Woodward of the American Medical Association (AMA) testified about the language of a January 23, 1937 JAMA editiorial. The passage in question read, in part: "Closely allied with the opium traffic is the present situation with regard to Indian hemp, or marihuana. There is as yet no Federal legislation penalizing traffic in this drug." Dr. Woodward referred to the language of the editorial as "mirroring the picture of the opium traffic given by Mr. Anslinger" in the FBN's 1936 report: "Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year Ended December 31, 1935." When questioned if whether the JAMA editorial was "other than an editorial comment," Dr. Woodward replied: "In answer to that, I shall have to say, most certainly I can say, that no person of judgment reading that editorial would attribute it to any source other than Commissioner Anslinger's report" (U.S. House of Representatives, 1937:100-101).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 3

Reefer Madness Solidified

The LaGuardia Committee Report shared the same fate as

the Panama Canal Zone Military Investigations and the Indian

Hemp Drug Commission Report in that these three scientific

studies of cannabis have been all but forgotten over the

years. As a result, history has witnessed the Rise of

Reefer Madness in the U.S.A. Its reign, as established by

the Marihuana Tax Act and solidified by the Federal Bureau

of Narcotics, remains entrenched to the present day.

This chapter has traced marijuana's evolution over

thousands of years of human history. It specifically has

examined marijuana's alleged link to insanity and violence,

a theme which became popular in the 1930s. The subsequent

chapter shall explore the social origins of the Marihuana

Tax Act of 1937.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2

THE SOCIAL CONTROL HYPOTHESIS

The social origins of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,

the federal legislation whereby cannabis became criminalized

in the United States, remain shrouded in mystery. Until the

1960s, the passage of the Act generated little academic

interest or discussion, and although the social origins of

the law have since been examined, there is a lack of

consensus among sociologists and historians of how and why

the federal prohibition on marijuana came to be enacted in

the U.S. This chapter aims to put forth a more precise

explanation of the social forces that lay behind the

criminalization of cannabis in the United States.

Historians and sociologists have claimed that the

passage of the Marihuana Tax Act came about due to two

competing theories which have been referred to by

Himmelstein (1983) as the "Anslinger Hypothesis" and the

"Mexican Hypothesis." Scant evidence exists, however, to

support either theory.

The "Anslinger Hypothesis," first put forth by Howard

Becker (1963), posits that a federal bureaucrat was

responsible for the national prohibition of marijuana. This

hypothesis holds that an individual's sense of moral outrage

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 5

against marijuana became manifested as a bureaucratic

crusade. Moreover, this crusade was driven by the pragmatic

need of the bureaucracy (the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

forerunner of today's Drug Enforcement Administration) to

expand and perpetuate itself.

The "Mexican Hypothesis" asserts that the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics was prompted to support national anti

marijuana legislation due to local pressures exerted by

western and southwestern states. It holds that anti-Mexican

sentiment in communities in such states as Colorado and

Texas was exacerbated by the fact that crime and violence

attributed to Mexicans and Mexican Americans there were

causally linked to marijuana. The image of marijuana as

"killer weed" and "loco weed" ("loco" meaning "crazy" in

Spanish) thus emerged.

By synthesizing the "Anslinger Hypothesis" and the

"Mexican Hypothesis," this dissertation formulates a new

theory which explains the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act;

the "Social Control Hypothesis." It additionally examines

another existing theory that seeks to explain the social

origins of federal cannabis prohibition in the United

States: the "Du Pont Hypothesis."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 6

Historical Background

When John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency of the

United States in 1961, he retained three holdovers from the

Eisenhower Administration: Allen Dulles at the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA), J. Edgar Hoover at the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Harry Anslinger at the

Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). While Dulles and Hoover

are well-known historical figures whose deeds and exploits

have been well-chronicled, Anslinger in comparison is a

relatively obscure entity.

Harry Anslinger was to the FBN what J. Edgar Hoover was

to the FBI. Anslinger*s World War I intelligence work paved

the way for his federal career in Washington: he ascended to

the number two position in the Prohibition Unit of the U.S.

Treasury Department before being appointed by President

Herbert Hoover in 1930 as the first Commissioner of the

Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

As the nation's first "drug czar," Anslinger shaped and

directed the federal government's campaigns against the

illicit substances of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.”

Harry Anslinger consistently fought and sought: he

fought the concept of treating addiction as a medical

problem, and he sought harsher prison sentences for those

^Stanley Meisler's February 20, 1960 article in The Nation. "Federal Narcotics Czar, Zeal Without Insight," does a good job of chronicling Anslinger's career and demonstrating how his personal philosophy on drugs guided not only the FBN, but Congress and the nation as a whole.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7

convicted of violating U.S. drug laws. More than any other

person, Anslinger was responsible for the development of

U.S. drug control policies of the I930s-I950s; policies

which have carried over to the present day. Largely through

his efforts, the United States has pursued a drug policy

which is based not on a public health perspective, but

instead on a crime and punishment approach.

Why, one may ask, would the Kennedy Administration

retain the old fossil Anslinger while shaping its image of

the "New Frontier"? The answer, perhaps, can be found in

the words of Harry himself, in which he describes his

relationship with Attorney General Robert Kennedy (DeMott,

1962:48):

Bob called me right in after he took office. He said he got more help during that labor-rackets investigation of his from the Narcotics people than from anyone else in any department.... I've got a book on the Mafia. No a secret book. I gave a copy to Bob but I couldn't to anybody else. No, I couldn't give it to [J. Edgar] Hoover. I just wouldn't risk it.

Yet less than two years after gaining office. President

Kennedy accepted Anslinger's resignation. In 1962,

Anslinger "was unthroned somewhat brusquely..., and his

Bureau itself survived only a few more years." According to

Rufus King (1972:229-239), Anslinger was axed by the

Kennedys as part of their ongoing war with Richard Nixon:

Ironically [Anslinger's] nemesis was the very phenomenon which had made him so powerful for so many years — the irresistible attractiveness of drug issues to politicians when they find themselves shy of better things to talk about.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 8

Pat Brown, then the governor of California and a strong

Kennedy supporter in the i960 presidential election, was

bracing for a gubernatorial challenge from Nixon. Brown,

who was accused of being "soft" on drug offenders, convinced

the White House to convene a conference which ultimately

served to support Brown's California method of treating drug

offenders through "lengthy and extensive parole

supervision."

Not coincidentally, approximately one month prior to

the September, 1962 White House Conference on Narcotic and

Drug Abuse, a new FBN director assumed office. Anslinger

continued in his post as the U.S. representative to the

United Nations' Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which was

established -at Anslinger's behest- just after the end of

World War II, and he attended the White House Conference in

his U.N. capacity. In that Anslinger's remarks take up less

than three pages of the over three hundred page report of

the proceedings, it is clear that the once dominant star of

yesteryear's drug czar, which had risen in 1930, was indeed

setting by 1962. A virtually unknown era of U.S. history

had passed. In this dissertation's pages, that unknown

history will be explored.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 9

The Criminology of Reefer Madness

Criminology, a sub-section of the larger discipline of

sociology, is the scientific study of crime. It is an

enterprise which rests on both a theoretical foundation and

the application of the scientific method. To date, the

field has produced little of value in regards to expanding

our knowledge of the social origins of the federal

prohibition of cannabis in the United States.

In his book Hustlers. Beats and Others. Ned Polsky

(1967) put forth an undeveloped theory of how marijuana use

spread in the United States. Polsky's work, which

emphasizes the importance of studying criminals in their

natural habitat (1967:117-149), emanates from the tradition

of the University of Chicago's "Chicago School" of urban

sociology and can be seen as an extension of William Whyte's

Street comer Societv (1943).

Polsky argues in his book that the ultimate qualitative

task of criminologists is "providing well-rounded

contemporary, sociological descriptions and analyses of

criminal lifestyles, subcultures, and their relation to

larger social processes and structures." Yet, wrote the

historian and prophet Polsky nearly thirty years ago, this

"is just where criminology falls flat on its face"

(1967:122). Polsky thus attempted to fulfill his

sociological quest by focusing on "the hustler" who plays

pool, and on the beatnik who smokes pot.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 0

In delving into the micro in an attempt to explain the

macro, Polsky provided us with a chart, entitled "The Spread

of Marihuana Use in America" (1967:172-173). Other than

providing us with a sketchy diagram, Polsky really does not

explain how marijuana use spread throughout the U.S.; he

devotes a mere paragraph of his text to what his diagram

states is "Culture Contact, Differential Association, and

Subcultural Diffusion."

By implication, however, he combines elements of two

benchmark criminological theories: Clifford Shaw's and Henry

McKay's Social Disorganization theory (also known as

Cultural Transmission), and Edwin Sutherland's theory of

Differential Association.

Sutherland's theory of Differential Association (1939)

can be reduced to the axiom that "crime is learned."

Criminal behavior is learned through association, presumably

with deviants or criminals who are "different" from

non-criminals. In focusing on how criminal attitudes and

behavior are transmitted in society, "differential

association may vary in frequency, duration, priority and

intensity." Sutherland's theory is unique in the

criminological literature in that it can be applied to

persons from all social strata; it explains insider trading

on the stock exchange as easily as it explains shoplifting.

Shaw and McKay's theory of Social Disorganization

(1931), like virtually all positivistic criminological

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 1

theories, focuses on lower-class crime. Using official

arrest statistics in the city of Chicago, the theory sought

to explain juvenile delinquency by mapping delinquency rates

in relation to specific neighborhood characteristics.

Researchers sought to distinguish between high and low

delinquency areas by observing individuals in their

everyday, natural environments.

In specifically examining the "beat" (beatnik) culture,

Polsky followed in the footsteps of Howard Becker's classic

study of marijuana users (1963). It is in this work that

Becker became the first proponent of the "Anslinger

Hypothesis," a subject we shall now examine.

The Anslinger Hvpothesis

The "Anslinger Hypothesis" (Himmelstein, 1983:24)

"argues that the FBN, acting on its own initiative, turned

marihuana use into a public issue and procured passage of

the Marihuana Tax Act." In christening Anslinger a "moral

entrepreneur," Becker theorized that the activities of a

"moral crusader," such as Anslinger, "can properly be called

moral enterprise, for what [he is] enterprising about is the

creation of a new fragment of the moral constitution of

society, its code of right and wrong" (1963:145-148).

For years, Becker's moral entrepreneur analysis was

accepted without question as the definitive sociological

work which explained the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. Today,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 2

it remains the primary model used to analyze why marijuana

was outlawed by the federal government of the U.S.A. Yet

Becker admittedly was not concerned with Anslinger's motives

in seeking anti-marijuana legislation (1963:138):

While it is, of course, difficult to know what the motives of Bureau [FBN] officials were, we need assume no more than that they perceived an area of wrongdoing that properly belonged in their jurisdiction and moved to put it there.

However, others who ascribed to the Anslinger

Hypothesis, such as Lindesmith (1965), Solomon (1966),

Kaplan (1970) and Grinspoon (1971), were concerned with the

motives of Anslinger and the FBN. Dickson (1968) attempted

to expand and improve Becker's notion of the "moral

entrepreneur" by examining the FBN as an organizational

bureaucracy. Wrote Dickson (1968:152):

What Becker ignores is that Anslinger was also a bureaucrat and thus responsive to bureaucratic pressures and demands as well. The distinction between these roles is difficult to make but it is fundamental in analyzing the legislation.

In 1936, through the Secret Service Reorganization Act,

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. sought to

create a law enforcement "super agency" which would rival J.

Edgar Hoover's FBI (McWilliams, 1990:89-91). Anslinger

opposed the FBN being absorbed by other agencies, and he

mobilized his "army" to testify in Congress against the

bill. Thereafter, President Roosevelt announced that he had

abandoned the Treasury reorganization plan. Anslinger, the

bureaucrat, had survived.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 3

Within a year, the Marihuana Tax Act was introduced and

it was soon passed with a minimum of opposition. Through

it, according to King (1972:75), Anslinger sought to

"attract favorable notice" which would "put [him] back in

the limelight on Capitol Hill."

The two "entrepreneur" theories, Becker's "moral" and

Dickson's "bureaucratic," may be viewed as two sides of the

same coin. On each side of the coin, the image of Harry

Anslinger is imprinted. Whether the theory is that of

Becker, Dickson, or other proponents of the Anslinger

Hypothesis, in Himmelstein's view (1983: 25-27) they all

fall short in adequately explaining the passage of the

Marihuana Tax Act of 1937:

The Anslinger Hypothesis ... remains primarily a description of the FBN's actions; it offers no convincing explanations. Its assumptions, moreover, remain unexamined by most of its proponents.

In formulating this position, Himmelstein drew upon the

work of Galliher and Walker (1977:369), who critiqued

previous sociological versions of the Anslinger Hypothesis:

Becker, Lindesmith, and Reasons see a national marihuana panic created by FBN propaganda which propelled the legislation through Congress. Dickson finds this panic to be a result of a FBN propaganda effort designed to increase the scope and power of the Bureau after the bill's passage. Musto finds a marihuana crisis prior to the bill's passage but one localized in the Southwest and not a result of Bureau propaganda. Bonnie and Whitebread see evidence of FBN propaganda but no national marihuana crisis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 4

Galliher and Walker (1977 and 1978) provide a

convincing and excellent case for sociological "systematic

research error" regarding the Marihuana Tax Act and the FBN.

They have demonstrated how a fact (in this case the

Anslinger Hypothesis) can remain unchallenged, be accepted

as truth, and be perpetuated for years despite the lack of

evidence to support the original claim. Galliher and Walker

have revealed that Becker's notion of the moral

entrepreneur, which was accepted without question for

fifteen years as the explanation of why the federal

prohibition of marijuana came about, was a shallow and

unsubstantiated argument. In essence, they revealed the

nakedness of Becker's theory by stripping off its clothes.

Yet the weakness in the work of Galliher and Walker is

that they offered no alternate hypothesis of their own to

account for the federal prohibition of marijuana. Although

they successfully stood Becker's theory on its head, they

failed to fill the theoretical void which they created.

Instead, they pointed to the Mexican Hypothesis, which was

rooted in anti-Mexican racism within the U.S., to suggest

why the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was enacted.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 5

The Mexican Hypothesis

The "Mexican Hypothesis," like the "Anslinger

Hypothesis," is a term coined by Himmelstein (1983:27-30).

First put forth by Musto (1972 and 1973: 218-229 and 244-

245), and expanded upon by Helmer (1975), this thesis posits

that the FBN did not seek a national anti-marijuana law, but

only responded to political pressure which emanated from

anti-Mexican sentiment in western and southwestern states.

The battle cry to criminalize marijuana in the U.S. was

first emitted in El Paso, Texas, and resulted in a

recommendation that "loco weed" be included in the Harrison

Narcotic Act of 1914. Thereafter, from 1914 to 1931, twenty

nine states prohibited the use of marijuana for non-medical

purposes (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:51). Federal

legislation against marijuana was not instituted, however,

until 1937: seven full years after Anslinger was appointed

director of the FBN.

As exemplified by a 1236 letter from the city editor of

an Alamosa, Colorado newspaper, Musto claims (1972:105 and

1973: 2 2 3 ) that Anslinger and the FBN were pushed into

lobbying for the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. However,

Musto's evidence to support his claim — which essentially

consists of a few letters, a few newspaper articles, and

Anslinger's own statements— is quite thin.

’^Also see p. 32 of the 1937 Taxation of Marihuana Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 6

Musto concludes his Marihuana Tax Act argument by

stating (1972:107);

From the evidence exêu&ined, the FBN does not appear to have created the marihuana scare of the early 1930s nor can the law be simply ascribed to the Commissioner's determined will. Such scapegoating offers no more than it did in the era when marihuana was blamed for almost any vicious crime.

Ironically, according to Musto, his explanation of the

origins of the Marihuana Tax Act was shaped in large part by

an interview he conducted with Anslinger in 1970 (1973:

329)

In that Musto's alternate theory to the Anslinger

Hypothesis, which has gained popularity over the years,

relies primarily on Anslinger's own word, it can be argued

that the Mexican Hypothesis represents yet another case of

systematic research error.

Helmer (1975:55) accepts Musto's claim that the federal

ban on marijuana "was a response to growing political

pressure from the Southwest," and he thereafter extends

Musto's brief introduction (1973:219-220) of the concept of

surplus value (i.e., surplus labor) into the anti-Mexican

equation.

As documented by Carey McWilliams (1939), Mexicans and

Mexican Americans who toiled in the agricultural "factories

’®Musto stated to me in a telephone interview on July 14, 1992 that he promised Anslinger that he (Musto) would never release a transcript of their 1970 interview to anyone. Thus, the original source of the Anslinger/Musto claim of "pressure" from the Southwest cannot be further examined.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 7

in the field" of the 1930s were exploited laborers. In

1930, when Mexicans were seen as "the ideal answer to the

state's agricultural needs," California's conservative

governor recognized that (Daniels and Kitano, 1969:70):

[the Mexican]... does tasks that white workers will not or cannot do [and] works— under conditions that are often too trying for white workers.

By 1930, California's power elite viewed the Mexican

and Mexican-American agricultural worker as;

A docile steady laborer who "knew his place"; a laborer who could be replaced easily; a laborer who neither created serious international problems nor raised the hackles of organized labor.

According to Helmer, with the onset of the Great

Depression,’’ Mexican laborers were no longer seen as an

ideal work force, but as an economic threat to the white

majority. Helmer contends (1975:57 and 74-75) that

marijuana laws were selectively enforced against Mexican

laborers as part of "a struggle for a diminishing number of

jobs in the unskilled sector and at declining wage

standards."

This theory holds that once the Mexican and Mexican

American agricultural workers became expendable, marijuana

laws in the U.S. were used as a means of exerting social

control over this population. Explains Morgan (1978:66):

’’Historians generally mark the beginning of the Great Depression with the stock market crash of October 1929 and its end with the U.S.' entrance into World War II.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 8

The Mexican immigrant ...was not the object of a marijuana scare until after their [sic] value as surplus farm labor had been exhausted.

Helmer (1975:74) likens the plight of 1930s Mexican

immigrants in Los Angeles to the earlier U.S. opium

exclusion efforts which were waged against Chinese workers:

Jail on drug or other charges, or repatriation by force or choice - these were the methods adopted for reducing the Mexican labor surplus in the city where surplus... was the fundamental economic threat. The situation was thus similar to the opium and Chinese exclusion campaign 50 years earlier. Then, as now, the use of a "narcotic" drug was one of many personal and social vices of the target group; Mexicans were lazy, dirty, promiscuous, violent, subintelligent, criminal, anarchistic, communistic - and intoxicated with marijuana.

On the basis of citing a 1930 presidential Wickersham

Commission statement: "Mexicans in the United States, both

aliens and citizens, are frequently subjected to severe and

unequal treatment by those who administer the laws," Helmer

concludes (1975:73) that the:

pattern of enforcement of the law against the Mexicans must be understood as an essential ingredient of public policy toward their very existence in the city.

Helmer's thesis is further explained by liyama, Nishi

and Johnson (1976:12):

Although they had been a significant part of the agricultural work force in the Southwest for several decades, it was not until the Depression years of the 1930s that Mexican Americans became surplus labor. At this time campaigns for restricting their immigration and encouraging their deportation were launched in full scale in a movement spearheaded by the American Federation of Labor. It was in this context that Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937, under heavy onslaught from local political leaders who... often cited fears of violent crimes which would be caused by marijuana use among Mexican Americans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 9

Although it is clear that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937

was a child of the Depression, I maintain, as have

Himmelstein (1983) and Morgan (1990) before me, that support

for Helmer's argument is lacking. Through research I have

conducted, no evidence to support the Mexican Hypothesis

could be found.2°

That racist anti-Mexican sentiment played a role in the

passage of the Marihuana Tax Act is undisputed. What I take

issue with is the Anslinger/ Musto contention that

"Southwestern police and prosecuting attorneys... protested

constantly to the federal government about the Mexicans' use

of the weed," (Musto, 1973:220) thus resulting in the

passage of the Marihuana Tax Act.

In refuting the Mexican Hypothesis, Himmelstein

(1983:28-29) states that an "important relationship" has

been identified, but that its nature has been

"misconstrued." Himmelstein argues that Musto and Helmer

fall short in documenting four points:

^°In an exhaustive search of the National Archive record groups for the FBN and the U.S. Departments of Treasury and Justice, I could find absolutely no correspondence or documents to suggest that such pressure existed. An analysis of that research, perhaps to be entitled "Searching for the Mexican Hypothesis," will be published separately as a forthcoming article.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 0

(1) that the fear of marijuana was substantial in California of the early 1930s,

(2) that there was a rise in marijuana arrests at the time,

(3) that a broad coalition of anti-Mexican forces as related to the marijuana issue emerged, and

(4) that significant direct evidence of local pressure on the federal government existed.

Himmelstein (1983:142) summarizes his position:

The Mexican Hypothesis fails because it rests upon too simple a notion of the relationship between the social class of the user and the legal status of the drug - a flaw it shares with much of the drug control literature.... In other words, it does not appreciate the importance of ideology.

Likewise, Morgan (1990:235-236) states that "contrary

to the arguments raised by Helmer and Musto, the Mexican

"anti-drug" crusade of the late 1930s actually had little

basis in fact during the preceding two decades." The FBN's

"anti-Mexican crusade," she concludes (1990:249):

was engineered... in the mid-1930s for reasons that had little to do with the Mexican population in the Southwest or marijuana for that matter.

Morgan takes us up a precipice, however, that leads

nowhere. Instead, she points us in the vague direction of

social control (1990:249), a subject that we shall next

examine.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 1

Drug Control and Social Control

Social control takes many forms. A general definition

of social control offered by Stan Cohen (1985:2-3) includes:

"all social processes to induce conformity... ranging from

infant socialization to public executions." In its most

totalitarian state, it is manifested through fascist

dictatorships, such as in Nazi Germany. In its most

invisible state, television may subliminally influence our

behavior. Social control can be informal, through such

vehicles as culture and the family, or it can be formal,

through such institutions and mechanisms as courts, police

and prisons.

The term "drug control" refers to efforts by

governments to control the consumption, manufacture,

importation, sales and distribution of psychoactive

substances. U.S. drug control policies today may be viewed

as a stool which historically has been supported by three

legs: the Harrison Narcotic Act, which federally outlawed

opium, heroin and cocaine as of 1914; the Volstead Act,

which prohibited alcohol from 1920-1933; and the Marihuana

Tax Act of 1937.

Together, these three drug control laws: the Harrison

Narcotic Act, the Volstead Act, and the Marihuana Tax Act,

form the foundation upon which current U.S. drug policies

are based.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 2

Similarly, the social control of illicit drugs in the

U.S. today can be seen as resting upon the tripartite

foundation of marijuana, cocaine and heroin. The social

control of marijuana in the United States, although distinct

and separate from that of heroin and cocaine, is intertwined

with its brother and sister drugs.

Anti-drug laws, such as the Harrison Narcotic Act, the

Volstead Act and the Marihuana Tax Act, represent formal

means of social control. "In each instance," writes Musto

(1987:244-245) "use of a particular drug was attributed to

an identifiable and threatening minority group."

Certain drugs were dreaded because they seemed to undermine essential social restrictions which kept these groups under control: cocaine was supposed to enable blacks to withstand bullets which would kill normal persons and to stimulate sexual assault. Fear that smoking opium facilitated sexual contact between Chinese and white Americans was also a factor in its total prohibition. Chicanos in the Southwest were believed to be incited to violence by smoking marihuana. Heroin was linked in the 1920s with a turbulent age-group: adolescents in reckless and promiscuous urban gangs. Alcohol was associated with immigrants crowding into large and corrupt cities.

Supporters of the Alcohol Prohibition campaign in the

U.S., which had been building since 1840, saw the struggle

as a defense of their "way of life." The dominant culture,

comprised of largely rural Protestants, associated the drug

with Irish Catholics, German Lutherans and other "alien"

cultures (Gusfield, 1986:50-51,55-57,101-102,123-124).

Meanwhile, since the mid-1850s, opium was symbolically

associated with the Chinese, "who were actively persecuted.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 3

especially on the West Coast" (Musto, 1973:3). As of 1883,

the U.S. Congress passed its first anti-opium legislation,

and in 1887, Congress enacted a federal prohibition on the

importation of opium by Chinese. In 1890, a federal law

which "limited the manufacture of smoking opium to U.S.

citizens" was passed, and in 1909, a total federal

prohibition on the importation of smoking opium was put into

place (Brecher, 1972:44).

Musto documents that as of 1898 in the U.S. South,

white "fear of the cocainized black coincided with the peak

of lynchings, legal segregation, and voting laws all

designed to remove political and social power" from citizens

Of African descent (1973:7 and 282-283).

One of the most terrifying beliefs about cocaine was that it actually improved pistol marksmanship. Another myth, that cocaine made blacks almost unaffected by mere .32 caliber bullets, is said to have caused southern police departments to switch to .38 caliber revolvers. These fantasies characterized white fear, not the reality of cocaine's effects, and gave one more reason for the repression of blacks.

Patricia Morgan writes that drug wars over the past 150

years have been "concerned less with drugs than with the

population perceived to be the principal users" (1990:233).

Unlike any other western industrialized country, the United States seems to have developed a drug war culture [which utilizes] the illicit use of drugs as a crusading mechanism not so much against the drugs themselves, but for other political, economic, or cultural reasons. That this is an element of social control goes without question.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 4

The Ideology of the Marihuana Tax Act

Himmelstein's explanation of the criminalization of

marijuana in the United States varies from those who

preceded him in researching the Marihuana Tax Act. His

theory is unique in that it combines elements of both the

Anslinger Hypothesis and the Mexican Hypothesis.

Himmelstein maintains that local pressure did not serve

as the impetus which resulted in the passage of the

Marihuana Tax Act. Instead, his premise is that Anslinger

exploited prevalent anti-Mexican sentiment in the U.S.,

along with the image of "killer weed," to create an ideology

which served the FBN's own devices. Public discussion of

marijuana was thereafter framed on the basis of its

association with violence, madness, mayhem and murder

(1983:29):

Because Mexican laborers and other lower-class groups were identified as typical marihuana users, the drug was believed to cause the kinds of anti-social behavior associated with these groups, especially violent crime. This led to a particular image of marihuana as a "killer weed," which was then used to justify... the Marihuana Tax Act.

The ideology that Himmelstein speaks of, which

essentially equates the drug with the devil, is exemplified

by an Anslinger quote contained in the April 12, 1937

Washington Herald (Walker, 1989:106):

If the hideous monster Frankenstein came face to face with the monster Marihuana, he would drop dead of fright.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 5

Two weeks later, at the Hearings on the Marihuana

Taxing Bill before the House of Representatives' Committee

on Ways and Means, Anslinger compared marijuana to opium

(April 27, 1937:19):

In medical schools the physician-to-be is taught that without opium medicine would a one-armed man. This is true, because you cannot get along without opium. But here we have a drug that is not like opium. Opium has all of the good of Dr. Jekyll and all the evil of Mr. Hyde. This drug [marijuana] is entirely the monster Hyde, the harmful effect of which cannot be measured.

Himmelstein considers his explanation of why the

Marihuana Tax Act came into existence to be a convergence

between the competing Anslinger and Mexican hypotheses

(1983:30):

Since the proponents of the Anslinger Hypothesis have not developed an effective theory of whv the [FBN] acted as and when it did and the advocates of the Mexican Hypothesis have failed to show that local pressure pushed the bureau into seeking a national law, the basic questions about the [origins of the] Marihuana Tax Act... remain unanswered.... FAIlthouah the Mexican Hvpothesis was developed as a rebuttal to the Anslinger Hypothesis. the intellectual impulses underlying the two are not necessarily contradictory. (Emphasis added.)

Himmelstein demonstrates that the two explanations

which seek to explain the origins of the Marihuana Tax Act

are not necessarily at odds with one another. Himmelstein' s

synthesis of the Anslinger and Mexican hypotheses are

encompassed in what may be referred to as the "Social

Control Hypothesis. "

^’The term "Social Control Hypothesis" is the author's own creation (Eisner, 1994), not that of Himmelstein.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 6

The Social Control Hypothesis

In the aftermath of the alcohol Prohibition Era (1920-

1933), the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 did not represent an

end in itself, but a beginning. The Marihuana Tax Act

enabled the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to articulate and

formulate U.S. drug control policies in a method which

clearly defined the enemy.

For decades to come, on the ideological foundation

which was popularized through the Marihuana Tax Act, a war

could be waged not only against the illicit substance of

cannabis and its users, but on the brother and sister evils

of heroin and cocaine as well. Through the eyes of Harry J.

Anslinger, opium trafficking could be blamed on Communist

("Red") China, and domestic marijuana users, such as jazz

musicians, could be seen as potential subversives who were

targeted for surveillance.^

The beauty of the Social Control Hypothesis is two

fold: it allows the Marihuana Tax Act to be seen in the

larger context of U.S. drug control policies, and it enables

drug control to be seen in the larger realm of social

control.

^^The anti-jazz campaign of Anslinger and the FBN (Abel, 1980: 214-222, Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:182-186, McWilliams, 1990:99-100, and Sloman, 1979:133-151) is discussed in depth within Chapter 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 7

In formulating the Social Control Hypothesis, this

dissertation specifically addresses how, through the

estcüDlishment of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the United

States government could exert its influence and establish

its political dominance both domestically and abroad. In

viewing drug control as social control, U.S. drug control

laws can be seen as having served two objectives:

(1) they have been used for the purpose of ensuring domestic social control by the dominant culture over ethnic and cultural minorities; and

(2) they have been used for the purpose of extending and solidifying U.S. political hegemony in other nations throughout the globe.

Although a number of scholars have conducted research

on the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, virtually none, with the

exception of Alan Block and John McWilliams, have addressed

the role of the FBN as other than a law enforcement agency

with the sole purpose of drug control. Therefore, the

political objectives of Anslinger and the FBN have, to a

great extent, been ignored. McWilliams and Block (1989:354

and 368) thus criticize historians and criminologists for

their:

disturbing tendency to concentrate on Anslinger solely as an anti-marijuana zealot, or as a "Neanderthal right-winger." ...[They] have neglected or misunderstood the bureau's agents' full range of diverse activities, preferring to focus on the more obvious and traditional drug enforcement role.

Without stating it as such, historian William 0. Walker

III (1989:107 and 116-117) summarizes the Social Control

Hypothesis:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 8

These forces [which brought about the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937] resulted in a bureaucratic atmosphere which can only be described as one in which the [FBN] under the direction of Harry J. Anslinger possessed hegemony over the development and direction of domestic drug policy.... [T]he presence of the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act served three general purposes:

[1] it perpetuated the existence of an already well- established federal drug law enforcement bureaucracy;

[2] it extended in the guise of liberal reform a continuing, repressive form of social control whose propriety would not soon be challenged; and

[3] it supported the formulation and execution of a foreign policy consistent with the domestic drug control objectives of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

While the Federal Bureau of Narcotics evolved into the

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) and later

into the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Social

Control Hypothesis evolved with it. As stated by Jonathan

Marshall (1987:138):

The ideology of drug control has become a front, and the apparatus of enforcement a tool, for counterinsurgency. Cold War propaganda wars, and covert action campaigns in the Third World.

On the heels of the U.S.’ December 1989 invasion of

Panama, and the January 1990 surrender to the DEA of accused

cocaine-trafficking Panamanian President Manuel Noriega,

three authors: Marshall (Drug Wars. 1991), Scott and

Marshall [Cocaine Politics. 1991) and McCoy [The Politics of

Heroin. 1991) have published books that demonstrate how U.S.

drug control policies over the years have clearly served to

support larger foreign policy concerns.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 9

In The Politics of Heroin, "a completely revised and

expanded edition" of his original The Politics of Heroin in

Southeast Asia (1972), Alfred McCoy has documented "CIA

Complicity in the Global Drug Trade," including extensive

agency involvement with the commodities of opium, heroin and

cocaine. In regards to the historical origins of the Social

Control Hypothesis, McCoy states in his book's Introduction

(1991:16):

Absorbed in domestic drug control, Anslinger did not assign FBN agents abroad before [World War II], and instead relied on the League of Nations or liaisons with foreign police.

After the war, writes McCoy, Anslinger lent his agents

to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), predecessor of

the CIA, "thereby setting a postwar pattern of cross

fertilization between the two agencies."

While not disputing that the FBN and the OSS did in

fact collaborate after the war, McWilliams and Block (1989

and 1990) contend that prior to both the war and the

creation of the OSS, the FBN operated as a clandestine,

overseas counterintelligence agency. The FBN, they claim,

actually served as the prototype for the OSS. The authors

conclude their latter article by stating (1990:187):

What must be stressed is the discovery of the FBN as a secret intelligence agency participating in clandestine programs totally unrelated to narcotics enforcement.... An accurate understanding of the real nature and organization of the FBN reveals several policy-makers posing as law enforcers while engaging in classified and controversial activities affecting American foreign affairs.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 0

Central to the role of FBN as a counterintelligence

agency is Anslinger's connection, in the intervening years

between World Wars I and II, with the "intelligence

subculture": "a secret group of individuals who believed

that peacetime intelligence was important" (1989:356).

Access to the "subculture" was provided to the first FBN

director by his immediate superior, the powerful

industrialist and Secretary of the Treasury Andrew

Mellon.^ McWilliams (1990:15) informs us that:

At least three of the FBN's top agents were on loan to the OSS in the 1940s and continued to perform classified chores for the CIA, yet they remain relatively unknown and obscure. They were involved for years in international activities with the full knowledge and approval of their boss. Consequently, the relationship among the FBN, the CIA, and the OSS is critical in ascertaining the role of Harry Anslinger as intelligence gatherer. Unfortunately, the details of those projects may remain buried in the files of their respective agencies; they are not immediately available, but the existing evidence is worth investigating.

The relationship between Anslinger and Mellon merits

deeper analysis and shall be examined further within the

context of an additional theory which seel:s to explain the

Marihuana Tax Act: "the Du Pont Hypothesis."^*

^As documented by McWilliams (1990:15), members of Mellon's immediate family, including his son-in-law David Bruce, "the well-known Chief of Station (COS) in London," served in the OSS.

^*The "Du Pont Hypothesis" is the author's term (Eisner, 1994).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 1

The Du Pont Hypothesis

An extension of Becker's and Dickson's notions of the

moral and the bureaucratic entrepreneur may be applied to

the "Du Pont Hypothesis," which is simply entrepreneurship

in its rawest form. Very little has been written of the Du

Pont Hypothesis, which posits that the industrialist

billionaire Du Pont family and its corporate interests

worked behind the scenes to secure the passage of the

Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.

According to Herer (1990), the Du Pont Corporation

sought to outlaw hemp, or the entire marijuana plant (as

opposed to its smokable leaves). For centuries, hemp has

been used to create products such as clothing, paper and

rope. Herer theorizes (1990:6 and 22) that by successfully

prohibiting the use of hemp for industrial purposes in the

U.S., the Du Pont Corporation created a situation whereby

two of its new products could be marketed: a new sulfuric-

acid process for wood pulp paper, which would replace paper

made from hemp; and nylon, a new synthetic product referred

to as "plastic fibers," which would replace hemp cloth and

rope. The corporate body of the Du Pont family thus engaged

in "a conspiracy to wipe out the natural competition."

Although Herer provides us with little documentation to

support his hypothesis, further research that I have

conducted cannot refute this theory. In fact, my research

establishes that links among the alleged conspirators did

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 2

exist. Just as Himmelstein has shown that the underlying

impulses of the Mexican and the Anslinger Hypotheses are not

necessarily contradictory, it is my intention to demonstrate

here that the Du Pont Hypothesis and the Social Control

Hypothesis are likewise not necessarily at odds.

Besides the Du Ponts, according to Herer, the

conspiracy to outlaw marijuana on the federal level involved

other influential players. They were: William Randolph

Hearst, the powerful newspaper publisher; Andrew Mellon, the

banker and financier of the billionaire Mellon family; and

Harry Anslinger, director of the FBN.

According to Herer, Hearst stood to gain financially

through utilizing timber acreage (as opposed to hemp) for

his Hearst Paper Manufacturing Division. As Mellon and his

Mellon Bank of Pittsburgh reportedly were Du Pont's chief

financial backers, the Mellon fortune was tied to that of

the Du Ponts.

Anslinger enters the picture not as a moral

entrepreneur "enterprising about... the creation of a new

fragment of the moral constitution of society, its code of

right and wrong" (Becker, 1963:145), but as the husband of

Mellon's niece, the former Martha Denniston (Sloman, 1979:

40). Uncle Andrew, who was Secretary of the Treasury from

1921-1932, appointed Anslinger as the Acting Commissioner of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 3

the FBN in 1930.^ (Two months later. President Hoover

officially appointed Anslinger Chief of the Bureau of

Narcotics.)

The conspiracy comes full circle in light of the

relationship between Hearst and Anslinger.The role

Hearst played in Anslinger's appointment as FBN director is

documented by Musto (1973:209), who obtained his information

in his 1970 interview with Anslinger:

[Anslinger's] patriotism and his belief in the menace of certain foreign ideologies, such as Communism, gained ..., in Anslinger's opinion, the crucial support of William Randolph Hearst.

Hearst was widely known for promoting racist views in

his San Francisco-based newspaper chain. His anti-Chinese

and anti-Asian sentiments were embodied by his newspapers'

use of the term "the yellow peril." His tirades against

Hispanic people in relation to the 1898 Spanish American War

and the Mexican Revolution (1911-1914) are legendary, and he

expanded that anti-Latino rhetoric to include Mexican and

Mexican American laborers in the U.S. Headlines of Hearst's

^Musto told me in our July 14, 1992 interview that Anslinger denied to him that he was related to Mellon. In a technical sense this may be true, for he was related to Mellon through marriage.

^^he subject of the Hearst/Anslinger relationship merits a separate study in itself, as stated by Bonnie and Whitebread within a footnote in their otherwise definitive book (1974:320): "Someone should do a study on the activity of the Hearst papers on the drug front during the formative years."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 4

publications linked vices and minorities: Chinese with

opium, blacks with cocaine, and Mexicans with marijuana.

Hearst used Anslinger and Anslinger used Hearst.

Together they successfully framed the image of drug use

within the U.S. in the context of violence, insanity and

racial minorities. Thus, in 1937, when the Lawyers

Legislative League of America "moved to end the deadly

narcotic menace of marihuana cigarettes" by agreeing "to

sponsor Federal legislation outlawing the weed," they also

passed a unanimous resolution which commended William

Randolph Hearst and the Hearst newspapers "for pioneering

the national fight against dope" (Silver,1979:276).

Becker writes (1963:145-146) that:

[w)henever rules are created and applied ... we should expect to find people ... using the available media of communication to develop a favorable climate of opinion. Where they do not develop such support, we may expect to find their enterprise unsuccessful.

We can apply Becker's theorem not only to the Hearst/

Anslinger newsprint relationship, but also to two altogether

different forms of media by which ideas are conveyed to the

public through popular culture. Music, in this case

specifically jazz music of the 1930s, shall be examined in

Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 shall explore the motion picture

industry.

^^Mustc related to me (July 14, 1992 interview) that according to Anslinger, Hearst purportedly personally wrote all of his newspapers' editorials on drugs. Anslinger, according to Musto, "was astounded that Hearst would be involved in something so grubby."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 5

Reefer Madness Reformulated

This chapter has examined four theories that seek to

explain why the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was enacted: the

Anslinger Hypothesis, the Mexican Hypothesis, the Du Pont

Hypothesis, and the Social Control Hypothesis. Of the four,

the Social Control Hypothesis stands alone in offering an

all-encompassing explanation of why the federal prohibition

against cannabis came to be instituted.

Since 1914, despite the failure of alcohol

prohibition, the prohibition model has been dominant in the

U.S. "war" that has been waged against heroin, cocaine and

cannabis. Upon the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of

1937, the United States has utilized the issue of

international and domestic drug control to maintain its

hegemony abroad while stifling internal dissent at home.

No clearer example of the latter form of social control is

more evident than the campaign waged by the FBN against jazz

musicians and jazz music, a subject the next chapter shall

address.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 3

REEFER BLUES

Jazz is a unique form of music which originated in the

United States and evolved from "the blues." As slaves

toiled in the cotton, tobacco and agricultural fields of the

South, the blues emerged as a musical byproduct of forced

labor. The blues were thus born in slavery, and jazz was

-and is- its offspring.

Detached from their homeland, the chants and work songs

of captured West Africans came to reflect their lives in

captivity. As the sons and daughters of Africa grew up

enslaved in a foreign society, the lyrics of their work

songs were sung not in their native or ancestral tongues,

but in English.

After black slaves in the United States were declared

to be free by the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, the

blues took on a new life. The post-Civil War blues, steeped

in a new economic form of exploitation, gave a musical voice

to the sweat, blood and toil of ex-slaves, who now, as field

hands and farmers, could be likened to serfs laboring in a

quasi-feudalistic society.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 7

Jazz has been described as instrumental blues. Jazz

evolved as wordless music, and the feelings evoked by it

cannot be discussed in any meaningful fashion by the

literary word. We can look at sheet music and follow the

notes, but the essence of the music itself: how the sounds

of the trumpet, the clarinet, the saxophone and the piano

blend together and crescendo, cannot be captured on paper.

Jazz has emanated from slavery, but it cannot be enslaved by

the written page.

In the 1920s, "jazz -the most distinctive form of black

music- was influential enough to pose an unmistakable

challenge to white cultural domination" (Ogren, 1989:11). A

common criticism of jazz was that its listeners were liable

to lose self-control, sexual and otherwise. Ogren

(1989:158) captures the racist overtones of such criticism:

The most strident critics feared that jazz would lead to a degeneration of "civilized" refinements to "primitive" instincts.... To illustrate this point, the sounds of jazz were compared, unfavorably, to animal noises in order to emphasize some presumed bestiality in the music. "The noble trombone is made to bray like an ass, ...and moan like a cow in distress. The silver-tongued trumpet, ...is made to screech and produce sounds like ...the wailing of a tomcat." The writer concluded that jazz "would lower the prestige of the white classes."

By the 1930s, the freedom of jazz and its free-flowing

form made many conservative white middle Americans

uncomfortable. The music of jazz was out of their reach and

beyond both their control and understanding. The status-quo

was threatened by a new type of music and a new way of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 8

looking at the world. As stated by Baraka (Jones, 1963:152-

153)

Music, as paradoxical as it might seem, is the result of thought. It is the result of thought perfected at its most empirical, i.e., as attitude or stance.... Negro music can be seen to be the result of certain attitudes, certain specific ways of thinking about the world.

The thoughts associated with jazz music are what Harry

Anslinger, and the social forces that guided him, feared.

In the early 1930s, wrote Abel (1980:220), reefer songs

"were the rage of the jazz world." In the context of those

times, Harry Anslinger expressed his opinion about jazz

within some personal notes (Sloman, 1979:134-135):

Music hath charms, but not this music. It hails the drug [marijuana]. The well-informed would just as soon hear a song about sitting in the pleasant shade of the hood of a cobra.

Blowing Reefer Smoke

In the passage just cited, Anslinger specifically

referred to seven marijuana-related jazz songs: "Reefer

Man, Smoking Reefers, Chant of the Weeds, Send in the Viper,

Muggles, Vipers Moan, and Texas Tea Party."

Although Anslinger's unpublished manuscript is undated,

to a degree, we can pinpoint when he put his thoughts to

paper. Chronologically, the marijuana-oriented jazz songs

mentioned by Anslinger were recorded between 1928 and 1936:

^oted jazz critic Leroi Jones, who wrote Blues People in 1963, is known today as Amiri Baraka. He is referred to as Baraka in this text, although he is cited as Jones.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6 9

"Muggles" was recorded by Louis Armstrong and His

Orchestra on December 12, 1928 (Rust, 1978:44).

"Chant of the Weed" (not "Chant of the Weeds, as cited

by Anslinger), was recorded by Harlan Lattimore and His

Connie Inn's orchestra on September 24, 1931 (Rust,

1978:1279).

"The Reefer Man," was recorded by Cab Calloway and His

Orchestra on June 9, 1932 (Rust, 1978:255).

"Texas Tea Party" was recorded by Benny Goodman and His

Orchestra on October 27, 1933 (Rust, 1978:593).

"Sendin' the Vipers" (not "Send in the Viper," as cited

by Anslinger) was recorded by Mezz Mezzrow and His Orchestra

on May 7, 1934 (Rust, 1978:1052).

"A Viper's Moan" (not "Vipers Moan" as cited by

Anslinger) was recorded by Willie Bryant and His Orchestra

on January 4, 1935 (Rust, 1978:191).

"Smoking Reefers" was first recorded by Larry Adler in

April, 1936 (Rust, 1978:3). In 1932, however, the song was

copyrighted under the title "Smokin' Reefers" as part of the

Broadway play "Flying Colors."

Based on when the seven cited songs were recorded, it

is likely that Harry's telling words were written no earlier

than 1936, and certainly not prior to 1935, when "A Viper's

Moan" was first recorded.

Ironically, the first two songs cited by Anslinger,

"Muggles" and "Chant of the Weed" were purely instrumental

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 0

compositions. As the songs had no lyrics, no meaning could

be conveyed through them. Other than their titles, which

refer to slang terms for marijuana, what could Anslinger

have found to be so upsetting about these two songs? The

answer can be found through the words of Dr. James Hunch, a

pharmacologist who was associated with Anslinger and the

Federal Bureau of Narcotics (Sloman, 1979:145-146):

the chief effect [of marijuana] as far as they [the FBN] were concerned, is that it lengthens the sense of time.... In other words, if you're a musician, you're going to play [the music] the way it's printed on a sheet. But if you're using marijuana, you're going to work in about twice as much music in between the first note and the second note. That's what made jazz musicians. The idea that they could jazz things up, liven then up, you see.

Within an article entitled "Marihuana - Assassin of

Youth,Anslinger wrote in 1937 (Anslinger and Cooper,

1938:5):

Although an ancient drug, the menace of marijuana is comparatively new to the United States. It came in from Mexico, and swept across the country with incredible speed.... Among those who first spread its use were musicians. They brought the habit northward with the surge of "hot" music.... Along the Mexican border in southern seaport cities it had long been known that the drug has a strangely exhilarating effect

^This article first appeared in the July, 1937 edition of American Magazine, a Hearst publication, and portions of it were thereafter reprinted in 1938 within the pages of Reader's Digest. Co-written by Anslinger with Courtney R. Cooper, the 1937 article was entitled "Marihuana: Assassin of Youth." The condensed 1938 version of the article, however, replaces the word "Marihuana" with the correctly spelled Spanish "Marijuana." It is interesting to note that although the 1938 version appeared in print after the Marihuana Tax Act had become law, the article ends as does the 1937 version: "Every state except one has laws to cope with the traffic, but unfortunately there is no federal law dealing with it."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 1

upon the musical sensibilities. The musician who uses it finds that the musical beat seemingly comes to him quite slowly, thus allowing him to interpolate improvised notes with comparative ease. He does not realize that he is tapping the keys with a furious speed impossible for one in a normal mental state.

"Tea puts a musician in a real masterly sphere, and

that's why so many jazzmen have used it," clarinetist Mezz

Mezzrow wrote in his autobiography, which was first

published in 1946 (Mezzrow and Wolfe, 1990:74):

You hear the basic tones of the theme and keep up your pattern of improvisation without ever getting tangled up.... Nothing can mess you up. You hear everything at once and you hear it right. When you get that feeling of power and sureness, you're in a solid groove.

What Anslinger and the FBN saw as detrimental is just

what Mezzrow and his fellow "cats" saw as beneficial.

Reefer enhanced their music, and they prided themselves on

their ability to improvise (Mezzrow and Wolfe, 1990:125):

We were all music-makers too, instrumentalists as well as creators- to us the two things were one, a guy composed as he played, the creating and the performing took place at the same time- and we kept thinking what a drag it must be for any musician with spirit to have to sit in a symphonic assembly-line.... A creative musician is an anarchist with a horn, and you can't put shackles on him. Written music is like handcuffs; and so is the pendulum in white-tie-and-tails up on the conductor's stand. Symphony means slavery in any jazzman's dictionary. Jazz and freedom are synonyms.

Jazz, with or without reefer, clearly is improvisation.

Improvisation, which Anslinger found so distasteful, is "the

best known musical element in jazz [and]... is central to

all jazz performance" (Ogren, 1989:13).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 2

Baraka found that Negro Creole musicians in middle

class downtown New Orleans, who were trained in the European

musical tradition, shared Anslinger*s dislike of the music

of their lower class "uptown" musical brothers (Jones,

1963:74-75 and 79-80):

the Downtown Creole bands would have nothing to do with the "raw and raucous playing of those dark folks." ...The Creoles resisted "Negro" music because they thought they had found a place within white society which would preclude their being Negroes.

With the segregation acts of the late nineteenth

century, however, the "uptown" and the downtown black

musicians of New Orleans came to merge their music. As

music evolved in New Orleans, the black middle class*

disdain for jazz dissipated (Jones, 1963:74-80).^

What Negro Creole musicians, and later Harry Anslinger

and white "middle America" in general feared about jazz was

its freedom. This fear can explain if not the passage of

the Marihuana Tax Act, its enforcement. This fear is best

exemplified by the lyrics of the 1932 song "Smokin*

Reefers":

It's the kind of stuff that dreams are made of. It's the thing that white folks are afraid of.

^°The division between "uptown" and downtown black New Orleans could be seen as late as late as 1955, notes Baraka, when "out of respect for PaPa," no jazz was played at the funeral of the great New Orleans trumpet player PaPa Celestin.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 3

Up the River with Jazz

In the 1960s, Ned Polsky, a sociologist who was

discussed in the previous chapter, followed up on

Anslinger*s scenario of how marijuana use "swept across the

country." In a diagreua entitled "The Spread of Marihuana

Use in America" (1967:173) Polsky traced marijuana's origin

in the U.S. to Mexico.

Mexican laborers in the southwestern U.S. are said to

have brought the weed into the land of Uncle Sam around

1910. By 1920, Mexican Americans in New Orleans supposedly

introduced so-called Negroes to marijuana. This scenario of

marijuana's geographical distribution has been repeated with

authority by the likes of Abel, Musto and others. Today, it

is widely accepted today as fact, and it holds that

marijuana use was transfused into both black and white

America by the jazz culture. Reefer, wrote marijuana

historian Michael Aldrich (1971:14):

went up the [Mississippi] River from New Orleans with jazz, quickly adopted by ghetto Blacks and Puerto Ricans and a few white musicians.

The "Reefer Menace," Aldrich later wrote in the High

TimesEncyclopedia of Recreational Drugs (1978:137):

... crept up the river in a burst of jazz. Newspapers ran hot articles about white kids being turned on by black and Spanish speaking reefer puffers. Louisiana banned the weed in 1927, Texas and Colorado in 1929, Illinois and New York in 1931 and 1933.... It was a blatant attempt to suppress the first great flowering of black and Latino culture in America- the Jazz Age. Musicians toured the country in buses, providing an underground distribution network, and were singled out as special targets.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 4

Yet the notion of jazz emerging in New Orleans and

spreading to Chicago and other locations has been disputed

by Baraka (Jones, 1963:70);

Jazz began in New Orleans and worked its way up the river to Chicago," is the announcement most investigators of mainstream popular culture are apt to make when dealing with the vague subject of jazz and its origins. And while this is certainly a rational explanation, charmingly simple, etc., it is more than likely untrue. Jazz, or purely instrumental blues, could no more have begun in one area of the country than could blues.

"The true history of jazz," according to Aldrich

(1978:137-138):

is a progression from stompin' booze blues to eerie dope bop a switch heard distinctly in Louis Armstrong's classic "Muggles" (1929) and other dope tunes of the era. [T]he real Jazz Age did not emerge in Scott Fitzgerald's stories, but in the autobiographies of reefer peddlers like Malcolm X and Mezz Mezzrow.^’

Vipin'

Milton "Mezz" Mezzrow, a white jazz musician who lived

exclusively in a black world, grew to some distinction in

Harlem as a marijuana supplier. The slang term "mezz,"

which can be found within literature and reefer-related jazz

music of the time, came to describe "the kind of fat.

^’Malcolm X's accounts of his "Jazz Age" take place in the early 1940s (1973:99), post-dating both Fitzgerald and Mezzrow. In a paragraph deliberately written "to display a bit more of the slang that was used by everyone I respected as 'hip' in those days," Malcolm X wrote (1973:56): "Shorty would take me to groovy, frantic scenes in different chicks' and cats' pads, where with the lights and juke down mellow, everybody blew gage [reefer] and juiced back and jumped. I met chicks who were fine as May wine, and cats who were hip to all happenings."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 5

well-packed and clean [marijuana] cigarette I used to roll,"

Mezzrow wrote in his autobiography (Mezzrow and Wolfe,

1990:215).

The term also had a second meaning, Mezzrow tells us in

the first person:

I was knocked out the other day when I picked up a copy of Cab Calloway's Hipster's Dictionary and found "mezz" defined there as "anything supreme, genuine"; and in Dan Burley's Original Handbook of Harlem Jive the same word defined as meaning "tops, sincere"!

Mezzrow, known as "the Reefer King, the Link Between

the Races... [and] the White Mayor of Harlem," was unique

not only because he claimed that "I became a Negro,"

(Mezzrow and Wolfe, 1990:210) but also because as a good

friend of Louis Armstrong's, he chronicled many a tale about

Satchmo' within his book Really the Blues. "If we look at

jazz history without benefit of maps, but with only the

concrete musical evidence of recordings," Williams has

written (1966:75-78):

the first firm artistic fact we encounter is that from the mid-Twenties through the late Thirties Louis Armstrong's genius as an intuitive improviser affected the work of every jazz musician.... It is no coincidence that the word swing came into use among musicians while the music was under Armstrong's tutelage, for it is their word to describe his idea of jazz rhythm.... In short, his influence was profound, and from 1923 to 1943, most jazz, big band or small, is significantly "Louis Armstrong Style."

Louis Armstrong was not only the most influential jazz

musician of his day, and perhaps of all time, but he was

also a notorious user of marijuana, or in the argot of the

period, a "viper."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 6

Armstrong's song "Muggles," recorded in 1928, is one of

the earliest jazz records which refers to marijuana. "To

us," Mezzrow expounded, (Mezzrow and Wolfe, 1990:93):

a muggle [a marijuana cigarette) wasn't any more dangerous or habit-forming than those other great American vices, the five-cent Coke and the ice-cream cone, only it gave you more of a kick for your money.

Armstrong, who was arrested on a marijuana possession

charge in 1931 and spent nine or ten days in the Los Angeles

County jail, said of marijuana (Jones and Chilton, 1971:113

and 116):

Speaking of 1931 - we did call ourselves Vipers, which could have been anybody from all walks of life that smoked and respected gage. That was our cute little name for marijuana, and it was a misdemeanor [sic] in those days.... We always looked at pot as a sort of medicine, a cheap drunk and with much better thoughts than one that's full of liquor. But with the penalties that came, I for one had to put it down though the respect for it (gage) will stay with me forever.... Mary Warner, honey, you sure was good and I enjoyed you 'heep much'. But the price got a little too high to pay (law wise). At first you was a 'misdomeanor.' But as the years rolled on you lost your misdo and got meanor and meanor. (Jailhousely speaking.) Sooo 'Bye Bye,' I'll have to put you down. Dearest.

Of course, in speaking of the long arm of the law,

Louis was referring to the enforcement of the Marihuana Tax

Act. In this regard, Mezzrow (1990:214) expressed a similar

sentiment to that of his friend Louis Armstrong:

I laid off five years ago, and if anybody asks my advice today, I tell them straight to steer clear of it because it carries a rap. That's my final word to all the cats: today I know of one very bad thing the tea can do to you -it can put you in jail.

Such a confession must have made Harry Anslinger proud.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 7

Anslinger, in making a point within his "Marijuana:

Assassin of Youth" article, took the liberty of paraphrasing

and mixing two verses of the 1932 song "Reefer Man"

(1938:5)

Have you seen That funny reefer man? He says he swam to China; Any time he takes a notion. He can walk across the ocean.

^^he actual lyrics of the copyrighted 1932 song "Reefer Man," which was written by Andy Razaf, are as follows. Each of the six verses begins with the two line refrain:

Have you ever met that funny Reefer Man. Have you ever met that funny Reefer Man.

1. If he says he swam to China, wants to sell you South Car'lina, Then you know you're talking to that Reefer Man.

2. If he says that Hoover writes him, to the White House he invites him Then you know you're talking to that Reefer Man.

3. If he says he walks the ocean, any time he takes the notion Then you know you're talking to that Reefer Man.

4. If he trades you dimes for nickels and calls watermelon pickles Then you know you're talking to that Reefer Man.

5. If he gets a sudden mania, want to give you Pennsylvania Then you know you're talking to that Reefer Man.

6. If he says Wall Street is frantic, 'cause he won't sell the Atlantic Then you know you're talking to that Reefer Man.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 8

"It sounded funny," Anslinger wrote:

Dancing girls and boys pondered about "reefers" and learned that these cigarettes could make one accomplish the impossible. Sadly enough, they can - in the imagination. The girl who decides suddenly to elope with a boy she did not even know a few hours before, does so with the confident belief that this is a thoroughly logical action without the slightest possibility of disastrous consequences. Command a person "high" on "mu" or "muggles" to crawl on the floor and bark like a dog, and he will do it without a thought of the idiocy of the action. Everything, no matter how insane, becomes plausible.

Conversely, in referring to marijuana as "muta,"

Mezzrow (1990:95-96) painted a picture of reefer that was

diametrically opposed to the image projected by the FBN:

Muta takes all the goddam hardness and evil out of you.... and makes you think straight, with your head instead of your fists; it digs the truth out and dangles it right in front of your nose. Everything comes out in the wash starched and clean. A viper doesn't like lies -he's on the-up-and-up and makes you get on the ground floor with him. You call your shots all the way in viperland.

The battle of the dueling images of marijuana continues

as Anslinger's unpublished notes go on to say (Sloman,

1979:135):

And when some Harlem nightclub entertainer flashes pearly white teeth while extolling that "Reefer Man," it may seem like a lot of nonsense to us, but to him and many of his theatrical brothers, both white and black, that "Reefer Man" is just about as real and important as the milkman to the average American family.

Here, Anslinger introduces evidence that supports the

view that middle class norms are universal to U.S. society.

In sociological terms, this is called the consensus

ideology. Promulgated by sociologists such as Talcott

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 9

Parsons (1937) and Robert Merton (1949), this

structural-functionalist model of U.S. society holds that

that which is outside the norm is deviant. Societal norms

were defined by the likes of Merton, Parsons and Anslinger,

all of whom were White Anglo Saxon Protestant males. From

this perspective, ethnic, cultural, religious, and class

differences among individuals and groups are viewed as

foreign and "unAmerican." This consensus ideology guided

Harry Anslinger in his anti-marijuana campaign.

In the world of Harry Anslinger and those of his ilk.

Middle America resides in a quaint home surrounded by a

white picket fence. While Middle America is sustained by

the milkman, the Reefer Man, who promotes values different

than the so-called societal consensus, belongs in jail.

The Anti-Jazz Campaign

The Social Control Hypothesis holds, in part, that the

passage of the Marihuana Tax Act enabled the U.S. law

enforcement net to be expanded against targeted individuals

and groups who were perceived to be a threat to the status

quo. In respect to the jazz world of the 1930s and the

1940s, evidence which confirms the ideological basis of the

Social Control Hypothesis is ample.

The anti-jazz campaign of the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics first surfaced in February 1938, when two Mexicans

were arrested in Minneapolis and charged with violating the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 0

Marihuana Tax Act (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:182). The

arrest prompted the FBN District Supervisor there to tell

the Minneapolis Tribune (Sloman,1979:135):

The tempo of the present-day music and the big apple dance and these jcun sessions seem to do something to the nerves. As a result, use of marihuana is on the increase. Not only is it being used by dance band musicians, but by boys and girls who listen and dance to these bands. They seem to think they need a stimulant for their nerves.

By 1940, wrote Sloman, "the time was right for another

great marijuana crusade" (1979:132):

And here was a ready-made enemy; an alien subculture of kooks, strange musicians and bizarre habits, who played late into the night, partied well into the morning, slept smack into the afternoon. Refugees from the American Protestant Ethic, flaunting their new-fashioned (and fashionable) morality with every hot lick of their licorice sticks and every tinkle of their ivories. The story of the forties with respect to marijuana is the story of the prosecution and assassination of the Marquis de Swing, as performed by the agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and their extremely handy adjunct, the informer man.

Sloman may be overstating his case, but it is has been

documented by others that the FBN investigated a number of

jazz musicians who were suspected of marijuana use. FBN

files were maintained on such artists as Louis Armstrong,

Count Basie, Cab Calloway, Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillespie,

Lionel Hampton and Thelonius Monk, among others (Bonnie and

Whitebread, 1974:184 and McWilliams, 1990:99).:%

^^Although Bonnie and Whitebread were granted access to the FBN's files by what presently is the Drug Enforcement Administration (1974:307), researchers today are unable to gain access to said files without undergoing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. As of this writing, the FOIA request that I filed with the DEA on July 7, 1992 has not been processed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 1

In a 1943 memorandum, Anslinger urged his FBN field

agents to coordinate a nationwide roundup of jazz musicians

who were suspected of marijuana use. Anslinger's plan did

not yield fruit, however, because his field agents reported

that there were few cases involving big name musicians.

Nonetheless, throughout the 1940s, Anslinger's idea of

conducting a nationwide roundup of jazz musicians remained

alive (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:183):

Each time a musician was alleged to smoke marihuana, particularly if his group were well known or had a large following among young people, the commissioner would send letters to all agents urging them to prepare a number of cases so that a nationwide, synchronized arrest could be executed.

Two incidents in which Anslinger took a personal

interest involved the 1943 arrest of jazz drummer Gene Krupa

(McWilliams, 1990:100) and the 1944 investigation of Tommy

Dorsey and his band (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:183-184).

In the midst of World War II, Anslinger attempted to

build cases against jazz musicians by working closely with

the Selective Seirvice System. Lists were developed of

musicians who were suspected of "dodging the draft via the

marijuana 'addiction' route" (Sloman, 1979:140).

Investigations were then conducted of these suspected draft

dodgers' bands and of their known associates. Efforts to

build cases against prominent jazz musicians "were doomed,"

according to Bonnie and Whitebread (1974:185), because of

"the unwillingness of anyone inside the jazz world to become

an informant."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 2

Mezzrow (1990:220-221), in discussing "jive," the

language of the hip, graphically illustrates the problems

that the FBN must have had in attempting to both recruit

informants and initiate undercover law enforcement

operations:

How can any outsider latch on to the real flavor of a secret code in which tick twenty means ten o'clock and line forty means the price is twenty dollars; friends are addressed as gate or slot,... they or them people means, not two or more persons, but a man's wife or mistress; Tenth Street isn't a city thoroughfare but a ten-dollar bill; specific places are known by special nicknames -New York as The Apple, Seventh Avenue as The Stroll, the Savoy Ballroom as The Track; doubletalk nonsense syllables like lozeerose, that resemble no regular words in any regular language, are invented to refer to private matters like marihuana? Guys talk that way when they don't want to be spied on, resent eavesdroppers; when they're jealously guarding their private lives, which are lived under great pressure, and don't want the details known to outsiders -[including] detectives [and]... informers[.]

Despite its inability to infiltrate the jazz world, the

FBN's anti-jazz campaign continued into the 1950s. In

testifying about marijuana before a committee of the U.S.

House of Representatives in 1949, Anslinger stated (Bonnie

and Whitebread, 1974:185 and Sloman, 1979:148-149):

We have been running into a lot of [marijuana] traffic among these jazz musicians and I am not speaking about the good musicians but the jazz type.

In 1952, concerned about the spread of both jazz and

marijuana overseas, Anslinger proposed that the U.S.

Department of State cancel the passports of musicians who

had court involvement with marijuana. Although the plan was

rejected by the State Department, Reefer Madness lived on.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 3

Examining Reefer Songs

To date, only one author has conducted a serious

content analysis of marijuana-related songs from the 1930s

and 1940s. In his book Reefer Madness. Sloman (1979:126-132

and 150-151) traces the lyrics and themes of thirteen such

songs, ranging in time from Cab Calloway's 1932 "Reefer

Man," to the "Spinach Song" by Julia Lee and her Boy

Friends' in "the late 1940s.

To better understand Polsky's theory ("Culture Contact,

Differential Association, and Subcultural Diffusion") that

marijuana use in the United States was spread by jazz

musicians, we can apply Williams' suggestion (1966:75-78)

that "we look at jazz history without reference to maps, but

with only the concrete musical evidence of recordings."

If we specifically examine jazz recordings that pertain to

marijuana, we can better trace the road to Reefer Madness.

Locating recordings and sheet music of reefer-related

music from the 1920s-l940s is an arduous and difficult task.

One of the only auditory sources available is Jass/Stash

Records of New York, with whom Sloman collaborated in 1979.

By supplementing works cited by Sloman and others with

Jass/Stash recordings, and then conducting extensive

^The actual title of "The Spinach Song" is "I Didn't Like It the First Time (The Spinach Song)," according to out-of-print liner notes for the 1977 Stash Records album entitled "Weed, A Rare Batch." The 1947 recording date that I use is based on Julia Lee and Her Boy Friends' recording of "Lotus Blossom" in the same year.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 4

research at the Library of Congress' Recorded Sound

Reference Center and its Copyright Office, it was possible

to compile Tables 2 and 3, which alphabetically and

chronologically list all known marijuana-related songs of

the era.

Tables 2 and 3 utilize recording dates and copyright

dates, both of which may not be ascertainable for certain

songs. When available, the tables cite a song's recording

date rather than its copyright date. "Smokin' Reefers," for

instance, was copyrighted in 1932, but it was not recorded

(as "Smoking Reefers") until 1936.

Contrary to Polsky's claim (1967:173) that Louis

Armstrong's 1928 "Muggles" is "the earliest of many jazz

records whose titles refer to marihuana," the earliest

reefer-related recording that can be located is "Golden Leaf

Strut," recorded by the New Orleans Rhythm Kings on January

23, 1925 (Rust, 1978:1132) .25

25jones and Chilton (1971:113-114) cite "Golden Leaf Strut," along with a number of other titles, as examples of marijuana- related songs of the 1920s and 1930s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 5

TABLE 2

REEFER-RELATED MUSIC; CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING

Song Title Year Recorded Bv

Golden Leaf Strut 1925 New Orleans Rhythm Kings

Golden Leaf Rag 1925 Manone's San Sue Strutters

Muggles 1928 Louis Armstrong and Earl Hines

Jive Man Blues 1929 Frankie "Half Pint" Jaxon

The Viper's Melody 1930 Copyright; Lillian Armstrong

Viper's Drag 1930 Cab Calloway and His Orchestra

The Viper Song 1931 Garland Wilson

Chant of the Weed 1931 Don Redman and His Orchestra

Reefer Man 1932 Cab Calloway and His Orchestra

The Man From Harlem 1932 Cab Calloway and His Orchestra

Texas Tea Party 1933 Benny Goodman and His Orchestra

Reefer Lady 1933 Copyright: Frank Crolene

The Stuff Is Here 1934 Mills Blue Rhythm Band And It's Mellow

Sendin' the Vipers 1934 Mezz Mezzrow and His Orchestra

Marahuana 1934 Copyright: Paramount Productions Music Corporation

Garden of Weed 1934 Lee Stone and His Band

A Viper's Moan 1935 Willie Bryant and His Orchestra

Mellow as A 'Cello 1935 Joe Venuti and His Blue Four

Weed Dream 1935 Copyright: George Caffrey

Viper's Dream 1935 Freddy Taylor and His Swing Men From Harlem

Blue Drag 1935 Freddy Taylor and His Swing Men From Harlem

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 6

TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)

REEFER-RELATED MUSIC: CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING

Song Title Year Recorded Bv

Blue Reefer Blues 1935 Richard Jones and His Jazz Wizards

My Blue Heaven 1935 Jimmy Lunceford and His Orchestra

All The Jive 1936 Andy Kirk and His 12 Clouds Is Gone Of Joy

You'se A Viper 1936 Stuff Smith and His Onyx club Boys

When I Get Low 1936 Chick Webb and His Orchestra I Get High

Smoking Reefers 1936 Larry Adler

Weed Spook 1936 Copyright: Bobby Lutz

Vipers Dream 1936 Copyright: Jack Gleason, Jack Palmer, Savy Martin and Roy Masters

Here Comes the Man 1936 Stuff Smith & His Onyx Club Boys With the Jive

The Weed Smoker's 1936 The Harlem Hamfats Dream (Why Don't You Do It Now?)

Viper Mad 1937 Noble Sissle's Swingsters

Reefer Smoke 1937 Copyright: W.R. Calaway and Mack Rinehart

The Onyx Hop 1937 Frank Newton and His Uptown Serenaders

Reefer Man's Dream 1937 Sammy Butler and His Nite Owls

If You're A Viper 1937 Rosetta Howard

The Stuff Is Here 1937 Georgia White

Jack, I'm Mellow 1938 Trixie Smith

Reefer Head Woman 1938 Jazz Gillum and His Jazz Boys

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 7

t a b l e 2 (CONTINUED)

REEFER-RELATED MUSIC; CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING

Song Title Year Recorded Bv

01' Man River 1938 Cootie Williams and His Rug Cutters

Feelin' High 1938 Gene Krupa and His Orchestra and Happy

Reefer Hound Blues 1938 Curtis Jones

Weed 1938 Bea Foote

Light Up 1938 Buster Bailey's Rhythm Busters

Killing Jive 1939 The Cats and the Fiddle

The Jive Is Here 1939 Rosetta Howard

Junker's Blues 1940 Champion Jack Dupree

Knockin' Myself Out 1941 Lil Green

Reefer Rhapsody 1942 Copyright: Albert E. Garrett

The Reefer Song 1943 Fats Waller

Save The Roach 1944 Buck Washington For Me

Weed Dreams 1944 Copyright: Thomas R. Talbert

The "G" Man Got 1945 Cee Pee Johnson and His Band the "T" Man

Reefer Head Woman 1945 Copyright: Joseph (Buster) Bennett and Lester Melrose

Sweet Marijuana 1945 Barney Bigard Sextet Brown

Weed Dream 1945 Copyright: Joseph A. Levey

Lotus Blossom 1947 Julia Lee and Her Boy Friends (Sweet Marijuana)

I Didn't Like It 1947 Julia Lee and Her Boy Friends The First Time (The Spinach Song)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 8

When a given song has been recorded by more than one

artist. Tables 2 and 3 list the earliest recorded version of

the song. The song "Reefer Man," for instance, was

copyrighted in 1932. The cover of its sheet music states

"Introduced by Don Redman," and it is accompanied by a

photograph of the musician. Although Gold (1964:247) links

the song with Don Redman in 1931, "Reefer Man" was first

recorded on June 9, 1932 by Cab Calloway and His Orchestra

(Rust, 1978:255). Soon thereafter, other recorded versions

followed. Two bands which featured Don Redman, Harlan

Lattimore and His Connie's Inn Orchestra and Baron Lee and

His Blue Rhythm Band, respectively recorded "Reefer Man" on

June 17 and August 17, 1932 (Rust, 1978:935 and 1072). Yet,

since Cab Calloway's version of "Reefer Man" was recorded

first. Tables 2 and 3 associate him, and not Don Redman,

with the song.

Other songs were re-released over the years under

different names. Perhaps the most well known of these is

Fats Waller's 1943 "The Reefer Song," which he also recorded

as "You're A Viper" in the same year (Sears, 1980:921). The

song was originally recorded in 1936 as "You'se A Viper,"

and later as "If You're A Viper."

In cases where a copyright date was discovered well

after the song was recorded ("Reefer Head Woman"), or where

a song title has two copyright dates ("Weed Dreams") the

song title is listed twice.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 9

TABLE 3

REEFER RELATED MUSIC: ALPHABETICAL LISTING

Song Title Year Recorded Bv

A Viper's Moan 1935 Willie Bryant and His Orchestra

All The Jive 1936 Andy Kirk and His 12 Clouds of Is Gone Joy

Blue Drag 1935 Freddy Taylor and His Swing Men From Harlem

Reefer Blues 1935 Richard Jones and His Jazz Wizards

Chant of the Weed 1931 Don Redman and His Orchestra

Peelin' High 1938 Gene Krupa and His Orchestra and Happy

Garden of Weed 1934 Lee Stone and His Band

Golden Leaf Rag 1925 Manone's San Sue Strutters

Golden Leaf Strut 1925 New Orleans Rhythm Kings

Here Comes the Man 1936 Stuff Smith and His Onyx Club With the Jive Boys

I Didn't Like It 1947 Julia Lee and Her Boy Friends The First Time (The Spinach Song)

If You're A Viper 1938 Bob Howard and His Boys

Jack, I'm Mellow 1938 Trixie Smith

Jive Man Blues 1929 Frankie "Half Pint" Jaxon

Junker's Blues 1940 Champion Jack Dupree

Killing Jive 1939 The Cats and the Fiddle

Knockin' Myself Out 1941 Lil Green

Light Up 1938 Buster Bailey's Rhythm Busters

Lotus Blossom 1947 Julia Lee and Her Boy Friends (Sweet Marijuana)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 0

TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)

REEFER-RELATED MUSIC: ALPHABETICAL LISTING

Song Title Year Recorded Bv

Marahuana 1934 Copyright: Parêunoiint Productions Music Corporation

Mellow As A 'Cello 1935 Joe Venuti and His Blue Four

My Blue Heaven 1935 Jimmy Lunceford and His Orchestra

Muggles 1928 Louis Armstrong & Earl Hines

01' Man River 1938 Cootie Williams and His Rug Cutters

Reefer Head Woman 1938 Jazz Gillum and His Jazz Boys

Reefer Head Woman 1945 Copyright: Joseph "Buster" Bennett and Lester Melrose

Reefer Hound Blues 1938 Curtis Jones

Reefer Lady 1933 Copyright: Frank Crolene

Reefer Man 1932 Cab Calloway and His Cotton Club Orchestra

Reefer Man's Dream 1937 Sammy Butler and His Nite Owls

Reefer Rhapsody 1942 Copyright: Albert E. Garrett

Reefer Smoke 1937 Copyright: W.R. Calaway and Mack Rinehart

Save The Roach 1944 Buck Washington For Me

Sendin' the Vipers 1934 Mezz Mezzrow and His Orchestra

Smoking Reefers 1936 Larry Adler

Sweet Marijuana 1945 Barney Bigard Sextet Brown

Texas Tea Party 1933 Benny Goodman and His Orchestra

The "G" Man Got 1945 Cee Pee Johnson and His Band the "T" Man

The Jive Is Here 1939 Rosetta Howard

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 1

TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)

REEFER-RELATED MUSIC; ALPHABETICAL LISTING

Song Title Year Recorded By

The Man From Harlem 1932 Cab Calloway and His Orchestra

The Onyx Hop 1937 Frank Newton and His Uptown Serenaders

The Reefer Song 1943 Fats Waller

The Stuff Is Here 1937 Georgia White

The Stuff Is Here 1934 Mills Blue Rhythm Band And It's Mellow

The Viper Song 1931 Garland Wilson

The Viper's Melody 1930 Copyright; Lillian Armstrong

193 6 The Harl em H amfat sThe Weed Smoker's 1936 The Harlem HamfatsThe Dream ((Why Don't You Do It Now?)

Viper Mad 1938 Noble Sissle's Swingsters

Viper's Drag 1934 Fats Waller and His Rhythm

Viper's Dream 1936 Freddy Taylor and His Swing Men From Harlem

Vipers Dream 1936 Copyright: Jack Gleason, Jack Palmer, Savy Martin and Roy Masters

Weed 1938 Bea Foote

Weed Dream 1935 Copyright: George Caffrey

Weed Dream 1945 Copyright: Joseph A. Levey

Weed Dreams 1944 Copyright: Thomas R. Talbert

Weed Spook 1936 Copyright: Bobby Lutz

When I Get Low 1936 Chick Webb and His Orchestra I Get High

You'se A Viper 1936 Stuff Smith and His Onyx Club Boys

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 2

In cases of obviously entitled reefer songs, such as

"The Viper's Melody," "Reefer Lady," "Reefer Smoke," and

"Vipers Dream," for which recording dates could not be

ascertained. Tables 2 and 3 list the copyright holder and

the copyright date in lieu of performers. For other songs,

such as "Weed Blossom Blues," "Weed Chains," and "Spinach,"

the song title alone could not determine if the composition

was in fact marijuana-related. Since, in the absence of

lyrics, it could not be verified that the subject matter of

these compositions pertained to marijuana, these possible

reefer songs are listed together in Table 4.

Another difficult grouping of song titles, which may or

may not be reefer-related tunes, involve the word "jive."

Although one of jive's many former meanings was as a slang

term for marijuana, another acceptes meaning since 1930 was

"as the trade name for swing music" itself (Gold, 1964:168).

Without written or auditory verification of the lyrics to

such tunes as "Jive Lover" and "The Jive's Been Here and

Gone," we cannot assume that they pertain to marijuana,

despite their being performed by artists who have recorded

other reefer songs. Thus, said compositions are also listed

in Table 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 3

TA BLE 4

POSSIBLE REEFER SONGS (NO LYRICS AVAILABLE)

Song Title Year Performer or Coovrioht Holder

Jive Me Blues 1930 Clifford Gibson

Spinach 1932 Edward Gruber and Leo Kleinman

Jive (Stomp) 1932 Duke Ellington and His Jive Famous Orchestra

Weed Chains 1935 Frank Martinez Miranda

I'm Reelin' High 1936 Marion Sunshine and Happy

Spinach 1936 Nancy Clancy

Jivin' the Vibres 1937 Lionel Hampton

Jive Lover 1938 Bea Foote

Weed Blossom Blues 1938 Charles L. Clover

Jive At Five 1938 Cab Calloway and His Orchestra

Jive (Page One of 1938 Cab Calloway and His Orchestra the Hepster's Dictionary)

The Jive is Jumpin' 1939 The Four Clefs

Hep, Hep! 1939 Cab Calloway and His Orchestra The Jumpin' Jive

Hep, Hep! 1939 Edward B. Marks Music Corporation The Jumpin' Jive, Jim Jamp Jump

J iveinformation, 1939 Cab Calloway and His Orchestra Please

Jive Me, Baby 1940 Johnnie Temple, Buster Bailey and Lil Armstrong

Spinach 1940 Augusta Zuckerman Cassel

The Jive's Been 1943 Cab Calloway, Buster Harding Here and Gone and Jack Palmer

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 4

Sloinan contends that the "Marihuana Tax Act had a

visible effect on the music culture, as seen through the

[reefer] songs." He writes that after the Act was passed

(1979:129):

The references to marijuana became more muted, the argot became more obscure, and the attitude toward the drug itself much more critical.

Upon examining the reefer songs contained in Tables 2

and 3, I cannot refute Sloman's claim. My only dispute with

Sloman's analysis is that he overstates his case. For

instance, Sloman cites Georgia White's version of the song

"The Stuff Is Here," which was recorded on October 5, 1937,

four days after the Marihuana Tax Act became law:

Close the window and lock the door Take the rug up off the floor Hey, hey, let's all get gay The stuff is here.

The song, writes Sloman, "was no longer a cause for

public celebration." Yet, in 1935, two years prior to the

passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, the copyrighted version of

the song, entitled "The Stuff Is Here And It's Mellow" and

sung by Cleo Brown, contained nearly identical lyrics:

Lock the windows, close the door Start the party rollin' once more Hey let's get gay The stuff is here and it's mellow.

Sloman's analysis assumes that the public, or at least

the jazz world, was aware of the enactment of the Marihuana

Tax Act. Yet since the Act's passage received virtually no

publicity, this assumption may not be valid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 5

Due to the fact that the year 1938 produced more new

reefer songs than did the year 1937,^ it is quite possible

that the impact of the Marihuana Tax Act was not felt within

the jazz world by 1938.

Sloman, however, depicts a different scenario. In

December 1938, he contends, Buster Bailey and his Rhythm

Busters were "celebrating the weed in 'Light Up,' yet at the

same time, cautioning their fellow vipers" (1979:131):

Light up, I know how you feel You find what I mean in any old field. Now get your gig going. I'll say that's the thing. Don't let that man getcha. Just puff on your cig and blow those smoke rings.

Sloman obviously interprets "that man" as the

embodiment of the FBN: "the G-man, the government agent who

could bust a hundred vipers in a single collar." Sloman,

however, takes a long step in assuming that "that man" means

"the G man"; could it not just as easily mean "the white

man"?

After discussing "Light Up," Sloman skips seven years

of musical history to tell us that "C.P. Johnson and his

band spoke for a multitude of muggle-heads in 1945 when they

told the sad saga of the day as the 'G Man Got the T Man'"

(1979:131):

ta b l e s 2 and 4 reveal that a minimum of seven and perhaps as many as eleven reefer songs were recorded in 1938, whereas six, or possibly seven, such songs were recorded in 1937.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 6

Cats can't buy their jive at night So now they hurry home, since the G Man got the T Man and gone... Boy one night when the joint was jumping and a knock came at the door In stepped a man with a shiny badge and a brand new forty four They've arrested my connection And I can't find it any more •Cause the G Man got the T Man and gone.

The lyrics of "The G Man Got the T Man" support the

Social Control Hypothesis. Coupled with the diminishing

number of reefer songs that appear in the historical record,

this song clearly tells us that the ramifications of the

selective enforcement of the Marihuana Tax Act had affected

the jazz world by the year 1945.

By 1947, the clandestine nature of marijuana-smoking is

evident in examining Julia Lee and Her Boy Friends' "Lotus

Blossom." Compare its lyrics with the original 1934 version

of the song "Marahuana," from the motion picture "Murder At

the Vanities" (Meeker, 1977:1286):

Marahuana (19341 Lotus Blossom fl9471 Soothe me Soothe me with your caress with your caress Sweet Marahuana Sweet Lotus Blossom Marahuana Lotus Blossom Help me in my distress Help me in my distress Sweet Marahuana Sweet Lotus Blossom Please do. Please do.

You alone can bring Now you alone can bring My lover back to me My lover back to me Even tho I know Even tho I know It's all a fantasy. It's just a fantasy.

And then- And then- Put me to sleep Knock me clear out Sweet Marahuana Sweet Lotus Blossom Marahuana. Lotus Blossom.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 7

Sloman contrasts "the image of the weed smoker" in the

pre-Marihuana Tax Act reefer songs as being "diametrically

opposed to the [FBN's] conception of the homicidal, mentally

impaired [marijuana] fiend" (Sloman, 1979:129). This

positive image of marijuana is captured by Bea Foote's 1938

song, "Weed":

Key Gate, I think I'm goin' to settle myself "What you gonna do, bud?" I'm goin' to light up. Jack. I'm the queen of all vipers, I mean I smoke my weed. You know it makes me feel kind of happy When I'm in need. Dreams come from my weed all day long. Put my heart at ease In sweet dreams.

Sloman theorizes (1979:130) that:

One consequence of the Tax Act was to make the marijuana subculture more furtive, more ritualized. By virtue of its prohibition, reefer was seen to be more attractive, a weed powerful enough to move legislators and bureaucrats to action. If anything, smoking marijuana became more romantic to most on the scene; however, its illegal status dictated a less casual attitude toward its use.

Despite Sloman's claim, we can see that in the

intervening years between 1938 and 1945, the lyrics of a

number of reefer songs demonstrate that marijuana was still

being used in a light-hearted way. Let us examine, for

instance. Fats Waller's 1943 "The Reefer Song" and Buck

Washington's 1944 composition, "Save the Roach for Me."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 8

Waller's song begins with a narrative introduction and

then is followed by its melody and accompanying lyrics:

Here we are in Harlem. Everybody's here but the police an' they'll be here any minute. It's high time, so catch this song. Here it 'tis:

Dreamed about a reefer five feet long A mighty mezz but not too strong You'll be high but not for long If you're a viper.

I'm the king of everything I gotta gotta gotta gotta be high before I swing Let the bells ring: ding dong ding If you're a viper.

Say you know you're high when your throat gets dry Mmmmm! Everything's dandy! You run down to the candy store Bust your conk on peppermint candy.

Then you know your little brown body's sent You don't give a d a m if you don't pay rent Cause the sky is high and so am I... Oh dear, oh dear - viper!

Buck Washington's 1944 "Save the Roach for Me" refers

not to an insect, but to the end of a marijuana cigarette:

Folks say that I'm lonesome Say I'm as blue as I can be Well, if your smokin' that jive when I pass by. Then save that roach - Ain't talking 'bout Camels Then save that roach - I Ain't talkin' 'bout Luckys Save the roach for me.

Compare these light, fanciful depictions of marijuana

smoking with Harry Anslinger's image of the crazed piano

player described in "Marijuana: Assassin of Youth" (1938:5):

"He does not realize that he is tapping the keys with a

furious speed impossible for one in a normal state."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 9

In 1936, that literary image of the "reefer mad" piano

player could visually be seen in movie houses across the

country within a film originally entitled "Tell Your

Children." In the next chapter, we will further explore the

Social Control Hypothesis in relation to this and other

anti-marijuana films of the 1930s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4

REEFER MOVIES

It has been the conclusion of more than one historical

commentator (Cloyd, 1982:68; Starks, 1982:51 and 102; and

Woodiwiss, 1988:31) that Harry Anslinger collaborated with

Hollywood in the 1930s to produce a number of motion

pictures that were meant to sway public opinion against

marijuana. In so doing, it has been theorized, a favorable

climate was produced whereby the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937

could be passed.

Becker has written (1963:145-146) that we should expect

the moral entrepreneur to use the available media of

communication to develop a favorable climate of opinion in

relation to the creation and application of laws. Although

Becker's study of the moral entrepreneur focused on Harry

Anslinger's manipulation of the print medium in relation to

the passage and enforcement of the Marihuana Tax Act, others

have applied this theorem to 1930s and 1940s Federal Bureau

of Narcotics anti-marijuana propaganda in general.

An anti-marijuana poster distributed by the Inter-State

Narcotic Association, allegedly on behalf of the FBN, is

credited with having been "effective in molding attitudes"

100

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101

against the drug (Witters and Venturelli, 1988:127-128).

Said to be "widely circulated," (Woodiwiss, 1988:31) the

poster reads as follows (M. Cohen, 1985:43):

BewareI Young and Old - People in All Walks of Life! This [picture of a marijuana cigarette] may be handed to you by a friendly stranger. It contains the Killer Drug "Marihuana"— a powerful narcotic in which lurks MURDER! INSANITY! DEATH!

WARNING! Dope peddlers are shrewd! They may put some of this drug in the [picture of a tea or coffee pot] or in the cocktail or in the tobacco cigarette.

These same fears were captured on motion picture video

within a number of anti-marijuana "scare" films that were

released prior to the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of

1937. In this chapter, we will review available 1930s-era

anti-cannabis films, including 193l's "Sinister Menace,"

1935's "Assassin of Youth," and two 1936 films: "Tell Your

Children" and "Marihuana, Weed With Roots in Hell."

What kind of messages did these 1930s anti-marijuana

films send to their audiences? The answer is clear: fear of

youths becoming homicidal maniacs, fear of high school girls

losing their virginity, and fear of the criminal class in

general. While the extent to which these films helped shape

public opinion of the time has thus far been unexplored, it

can be assumed that they played at least some kind of role

in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.

Cloyd (1982:68) claims that the U.S. public and its

legislators were influenced by a these anti-marijuana movies

"which depicted young and naive high school students being

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102

enticed into using the drug by unprincipled criminals." "In

the end," writes Cloyd, "the youths find only personal

deterioration, crime and insanity as the outcome of their

actions." Woodiwiss (1988:31) writes that these films

exploited public interest and "have messages which are

basically the same": "Nice, well-brought-up kids smoke

marijuana. This experience is quickly and inevitably

followed by sexual depravity, rape, crime and murder."

When the most well-known of these films, "Tell Your

Children," was re-released in the 1970s under the title

"Reefer Madness," its "simpleminded scare tactics" were seen

as "more comical than instructive." ABC Television then

called Reefer Madness (Hermes and Galperin, 1992:58):

a major influence in forming the attitudes that led to the present legal situation regarding marijuana... Hilarious when viewed from the other side of the generation gap, a gap this film did so much to create.

These anti-marijuana movies were independently produced

without the sanction of Hollywood because of the Motion

Picture Code that outlawed references to drugs. Although

introduced in 1930, "the year that talkies made it big," the

code was not effectively enforced until 1934 (Starks,

1982:51). Independent films were those which were not

produced and distributed by the "big eight" film industry

companies: Fox, Loew's (MGM), Paramount, RKO, Warner,

Columbia, United Artists and Universal. Together, these

companies earned 95 percent of all domestic film rental

receipts for 1935-1939 (Parker, 1986:147). While the "big

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 3

eight" also accounted for 95 percent of all large budget or

"A" films produced in those years, 34 percent of all U.S.

feature films made from 1935-1939 were small budget "B"

films, which included motion pictures about crime. The

anti-marijuana films reviewed in this chapter clearly were

"B" films.

At first, the Motion Picture Code was not taken

seriously by Hollywood's movie producers, but by 1934, the

major motion picture studios acquiesced to pressure exerted

by backers of the code, such as the Catholic Church's Legion

of Decency. "An admission to an Independent Movie is a

ticket to Hell," read a placard wielded by parochial school

children (Atkins, 1984:62). In an address to an annual

convention of Catholic Charities in 1933, a high church

official stated:

Catholics are called by God, the Pope, the Bishops and the priests to a united and vigorous campaign for the purification of the cinema, which has become a deadly menace to morals.

At Catholic mass on one Sunday per year, a given

church's priest read the Legion's pledge aloud for his

congregation to repeat. In part, the pledge read (Parker,

1986:148):

I shall do all that I can to arouse public opinion against the portrayal [in moving pictures] of vice as a normal condition of affairs, and against depicting criminals of any class as heroes and heroines, presenting their filthy philosophy of life as something acceptable to decent men and women.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 4

When the Legion of Decency threatened to order their

ten million members to boycott Hollywood's films, the "big

eight" tailored its scripts to comply with the church's

demands (Atkins, 1984:62). "The vision of millions of

unsold movie tickets spurred Hollywood to action" (Gardner,

1987:xix).

The Motion Picture Production Code consisted of three

general principles (Gardner, 1987:207-208):

1. No picture shall be produced which will lower the moral standards of those who see it. Hence the sympathy of the audience shall never be thrown to the side of crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin.

2. Correct standards of life, subject only to the requirements of drama and entertainment, shall be presented.

3. Law -divine, natural, or human- shall not be ridiculed, nor shall sympathy be created for its violation.

Twelve particular applications were cited by the code:

crime, brutality, sex, vulgarity, obscenity, blasphemy and

profanity, costumes, religion, special subjects, national

feelings, titles, and cruelty to animals. In that marijuana

was neither a well-known drug nor one which was necessarily

considered to be addicting, the language of the sub-section

of the crime section is worth noting (Gardner, 1987:209):

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 5

Drug addiction or the illicit traffic in addiction- producing drugs shall not be shown if the portrayal:

a. Tends in any manner to encourage, stimulate, or justify the use of such drugs,; or

b. Stresses, visually or by dialog, their temporarily attractive effects; or

c. Suggests that the drug habit may be quickly or easily broken; or

d. Shows details of drug procurement or of the taking of drugs in any manner; or

e. Emphasizes the profits of the drug traffic; or

f. Involves children who are shown knowingly to use or traffic in drugs.

Although the subject matter of the anti-marijuana films

to be discussed in this chapter was forbidden by the Motion

Picture Production Code, these films certainly abided by the

code's three general principles. In reviewing the anti

marijuana films of the 1930s, it is clear that while these

films may have violated the letter of the code, they

followed its spirit. While the anti-marijuana movies showed

"drug procurement [and] the taking of drugs," they portrayed

such activity in a negative light.

These anti-cannabis movies of the 1930s will now be

reviewed, beginning with the earliest of these films,

"Sinister Menace."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 6

Sinister Menace

In "Sinister Menace," produced in 1931, the hidden hand

of Harry Anslinger is self-evident. Directed by Dwain Esper

and produced by the government of Egypt, footage for the

this motion picture was taken from a number of films on file

under the Federal Bureau of Narcotics at the National

Archives, including: "Dope Fiends: What They Are and How

They End," Central Narcotics Bureau of Egypt, 1931 (10

minutes, silent and subtitled); "The Drug Evil in Egypt,"

filmed for the Central Narcotics Bureau of Egypt by H.

Helbawy, 1931 (47 minutes, silent and subtitled); "Dope In

Egypt," Central Narcotics Bureau of Egypt, 1931 (11 minutes,

silent); and "The Drug Evil In Egypt, 1931 (11 minutes,

sound).

"The Drug Evil in Egypt" contains the same sound track,

albeit distorted, as that of "Sinister Menace," a poor

quality version of which is available for viewing within the

FBN film archives at the National Archives' Motion Picture,

Sound and Video Research Room.

Because of a written narrative which immediately

follows the movie's opening credits, this film may be

confused with a later 1937 Dwain Esper film entitled

"Narcotic." According to Starks (1982:80), however, the

plot of "Narcotic" centers on a morphine-addicted doctor.

The first words to appear on screen inform the viewer of

"Sinister Menace" that:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 7

The following films were made by the Egyptian Government, shown at the Geneva Anti-Narcotic Conference and presented to the producers of "Narcotic" by HARRY J. ANSLINGER Federal Narcotics Commissioner and one of the United States representatives to Geneva in 1932.

Since "Sinister Menace" was produced in 1931, and the

opening subtitled narrative includes a reference to the year

1932, it is plausible that in 1937, "Sinister Menace" may

have been part of a double feature that included "Narcotic."

Moreover, since the introduction uses the word "films," we

can assume that one or more of the aforementioned films

produced by the Egyptian government were shown in

conjunction with Dwain Esper's 1937 and 1931 movies.

Following the preamble, the viewer of "Sinister Menace"

is provided with a subtitled introduction to the movie;

As the illicit narcotic trade from Europe and the Near East diminishes, the Far East steps in to supply the demand. How does that effect [sic] America? Our Pacific Coast has become the danger spot of the smuggled dope traffic.... Unless there is an immediate estoppal the country will be cursed with a deplorable increase of narcotic addiction.

New York American^^

The introduction continues:

These remarkable pictures are random shots taken in Egypt's drug infested areas. It is to be hoped that they may enlighten other countries and individuals to the horrible curse of drug addiction.

^^The New York American was one of many newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 8

Sound then is added to the picture, as the Egyptian

footage rolls to "a single man, barefoot and in the boiling

sun," carrying a 300 pound bale of cotton. Other "common

but powerful examples of Egypt's young manhood" are shown

conducting manual labor with no mechanical support, only

"primitive, hard endurance." The movie's narrator tells the

viewer that in these muscular male workers:

One can readily see the mark of the builders of the pyramids and the Sphinx. But there is a sinister menace undermining the workers. Egypt, for the past few years, has been the center of drug traffic from the east. Great quantities of destructive narcotics have been smuggled into this country in shipments of fruit. A very wholesome-looking orange can shelter destruction....

"Sinister Menace," which does not distinguish between

opium and hashish, shows us that drugs can not only be

smuggled in fruit, but in bread as well. Additional

footage shows smugglers being detected in attempting to

conceal hashish within the fake fur of a caravan of camels.

The film equates hashish with opium: both drugs are depicted

as addicting narcotics which cause irreparable harm to the

unfortunate user.

Contrasted with the physical specimens who "compare

favorably with our own football huskies" are decrepit, gaunt

drug addicts who are shown walking single file in prison

garb as the film's narrator tells us;

The plight of these victims is pathetic. See their pitiful attempts at bringing back their health. Look at their miserable bodies creeping along the backyard of the prison.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 9

At the root of this evil are not only "ruthless

smugglers" who possess "the craftiest underworld minds," but

also the despicable "dope peddler" who:

creates his vile trade by promise of greater sexual ability. He is not even satisfied with creating addicts but also keeps his trade by adulterating drugs with crushed human skulls.

The narrator tells us: "Not content with assuming

control of the forces of the body, drugs make their

onslaught on the mind." It is explained to the movie-goer

that "before the habit has formed its grip upon the nerve-

strings of its victim":

the effect is soothing, stimulating and excitingly pleasurable. But once the habit becomes mastered and has fastened deep its hold, the picture changes.... Gone are the pleasurable sensations of the drug. Now to feel normal he must take his narcotic.

The victim of drugs, the movie-viewer is told, "is a slave

[who] must obey the weight of this world curse":

Gone is their desire for work. Gone are the thoughts and glories of Egypt. Gone are ambitions, health and friends.... Where is his vaunted will power? Where is his physical resistance, his resolution, his strength, his optimism? The flesh cringes under the demand. The nervous system is ripped into shreds; the toll: its physical pain and mental chaos. It is only a question of hours until the will surrenders. The mind is obsessed by the delusion that tomorrow it will conquer, but tomorrow never comes. Every drug fiend goes through a daily battle, the battle of reason against havoc.... Drugs ruin health, wreck careers, fill prisons and asylums.

Bringing to mind the Social Control Hypothesis, the

viewer of "Sinister Menace" is told "drug addiction is a

municipal, state, national, and international problem"

against which there are three avenues of attack:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110

(1) reduce the number of addicts by isolating them and curing them, thus reducing the demand for drugs.

(2) the discouragement and arrest of the street trafficker and distributor, thus striking at supply.

(3) coordinate all law enforcing agencies by information records and movement of the narcotic criminal through an international clearinghouse.

As the movie draws to a close, the scene shifts to a

massive graveyard as we are told:

Here is the pleasant end to which all must come sooner or later. The addict is fortunate indeed who is properly buried, for there are very few who have any money left.

A lone, impoverished man walking with the aid of a stick

then is shown suddenly keeling over and slumping to the

ground. A man approaches the presumably dead body and

pushes it over a cliff as the viewer is informed that:

he, without sufficient money for burial, has but one alternative: the pit where the dying go to await the end, to be devoured by vultures in death as they were devoured by drugs in life.

"THE END" abruptly flashes across the screen.

Assassin of Youth

In the background of the opening credits of "Assassin

of Youth," which was released in 1935 (Starks, 1982:102),

shadowy figures of men and women are shown dancing in the

midst of swirling smoke. The film's first scene is that of

a car crash, and we next see three successive newspaper

headlines:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Ill

AGED WOMAN KILLED,

MARIJUANA CRAZED YOUTH KILLS,

MARIJUANA DEALS DEATH.

A newspaper editor then unleashes a young cub reporter

on the story, which includes an "eccentric clause" in the

will of the deceased: "a morals clause that might make news

again." Another newspaper headline then informs the viewer:

ACCIDENT VICTIM LEAVES WILL WITH MORALS CLAUSE Wealthy Woman Leaves All To Her Granddaughter Upon Provision of Good Behavior.

The young newspaper reporter ventures to the unnamed

town where the movie is set, and he befriends the youths

there. The first character we see in the town is played by

Fern Emmett, who is more well known for her portrayal of the

Wicked Witch of the West in the Wizard of Oz. The plot

involves a number of related tangents: the plight of Joan

Barrie, the heiress in question; Joan's sister, Marjorie,

who espouses the "free love" doctrine and smokes marijuana;

and their scheming cousin Linda, who sells reefers to the

town's youths and plots with Jack Howard, to whom she is

secretly wed, to corrupt Joan's morals and thereby gain her

grandmother's inheritance.

As "muggles" enters the picture, the newspaper editor

has his cub reporter view a film, "The Marijuana Menace,"

which has been "compiled from articles published by some of

our best magazines, newspapers, and from lectures delivered

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112

by the eminent A.E. Fessier and other noted crusaders

against this dreaded weed.

In one prison, the movie within a movie tells us, 125

of 450 prisoners are marijuana addicts. In one police

district, 17 of 37 murderers committed their crimes due to

marijuana intoxication.^’ The Marijuana Menace" movie

goes on to depict talcs of suicide, murder and insanity,

including the myth that the word "assassin" has its

“ a .E. Fossier was the author of a 1931 article entitled "The Marihuana Menace," which contended that marijuana use led to insanity and violence. On the basis of Fossier's article. New Orleans' local district attorney Eugene Stanley circulated a pamphlet in 1931 that contained "a sweeping assertion which was to be reproduced in practically every commentary on marihuana published during the 1930s" (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:67-69);

It is an ideal drug to cut off inhibitions quickly.... At the present time the underworld has been quick to realize the value of this drug in subjugating the will of human derelicts to that of a master mind. Its use sweeps away all restraint, and to its influence may be attributed many of our present-day crimes. It has been the experience of the Police and Prosecuting Officials in the South that immediately before the commission of many crimes the use of marihuana cigarettes has been indulged in by criminals so as to relieve themselves from the natural restraint which might deter them from the commission of criminal acts, and to give them the false courage necessary to commit the contemplated crime.

^’These facts concerning prisoners, murders and the hashish myth were taken directly from Fossier's New Orleans-based article, which Stanley repeated in his 1931 publication. Upon examining Fossier's 1931 article, the inherent racism contained within it is evident (Bonnie and Whitebread, 1974:152):

The debasing and baneful influence of hashish and opium is not restricted to individuals but has manifested itself in nations and races as well. The dominant race and most enlightened countries are alcoholic, whilst the races and nations addicted to hemp and opium, some of which once attained to heights of culture and civilization[,] have deteriorated both mentally and physically.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 3

etymological roots in the word "hashish," which the movie

informs the viewer is "known to us as marijuana.

We first see marijuana smoking in "Assassin of Youth"

at a "wienie bake" where one youth tells another: "Say,

you've missed a real kick, something different!" "That's

right!" chimes in another, "and Linda says the man who sells

them said they wouldn't hurt us." — Soon, of course, the

viewer of the movie sees just how harmful marijuana can be.

At a party where the kids are dancing to jazz music and

reefer is being smoked, Joan's sister Marjorie undresses and

exposes a bare breast to the camera for a brief, fleeting

moment before she and her male companion bed down. After

another party, at which a marijuana-intoxicated Marjorie

nearly stabbed a female party goer to death, a physician

explains the true nature of marijuana to Marjorie's mother:

Your daughter is a psychopathic case. She is on the verge of insanity. She has marked symptoms of drug addiction and I strongly believe she has been using marijuana, a cigarette made out of a narcotic weed. Your daughter is the fourth case I've examined today, all young people with similar symptoms.

^°It is perhaps no coincidence that Harry Anslinger, within his 1937 article entitled -like the movie- "Assassin of Youth," perpetuated the assassin myth. In his congressional testimony on the Marihuana Tax Act before the House Ways and Means Committee (1937:29-30), Anslinger repeated the myth: "In fact, from the Arabic "hashishan" we have the English word "assassin.... It is said that Mohammedan leaders, opposing the Crusaders, utilized the services of individuals addicted to the use of hashish for secret murders."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 4

Soon, the young newspaper reporter, Arthur Brighton,

reveals his true identity to Joan Barrie and convinces her

to assist him in an undercover capacity to expose the deadly

weed. •’You've got your story," Joan says. "Why don't you

print it?" Arthur replies:

But it's more than a story, Joan. Terrible things are happening to young people like your sister all over the country. If these boys and girls won't admit it when they're so sick, why then what chance have I got to prove it? You've got to help me get more evidence.

At the film's end, within a courtroom where Joan stands

accused of moral turpitude. Art Brighton reveals that he is

really a reporter. He reads his hot-off the presses front

page article to the Court:

Marijuana, the assassin of youth, the scourge of our country, is reaching out like a mad killer, mowing down the youth of our land, distorting their minds and leading them in lives of degradation and crime.

The reporter then addresses the judge:

This evil has struck here, your honor, right into your own homes, and has turned innocent play into tragic orgies. Why at this very moment your courtroom is filled with smokers of this terrible weed. How dare anyone accuse Joan Barrie? She was helping me to uncover the source of this living death in your town.

After Joan is acquitted, she and Arthur announce their

engagement and presumably live happily ever after.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 5

Tell Your Children

Later released under its more popular title, "Reefer

Madness," the 1936 film "Tell Your Children" parallels

"Assassin of Youth" in a number of ways: both films are

initially set at local soda fountains, they depend on

newspaper headlines to inform the viewer, they utilize the

educational device of a movie within a movie, and their

plots involve jazz music, dancing, sex, murder, insanity,

and courtroom drama. The films also share the same musical

director (Abe Meyer) and a lead actress (Dorothy Short).

The movie begins with a written disclaimer that any

similarity between it and "actual occurrences & living or

deceased persons is coincidental." We are then warned:

The motion picture you are about to witness may startle you. It would not have been possible, otherwise, to sufficiently emphasize the frightful toll of the new drug menace which is destroying the youth of America in alarmingly increasing numbers. MARIHUANA is that drug — a violent narcotic and unspeakable scourge— THE REAL PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE! Its first effect is sudden, violent uncontrollable laughter; then come dangerous hallucinations — space expands— time slows down, almost stands still.... fixed ideas come next, conjuring up monstrous extravagances — followed by emotional disturbances, the total inability to direct thoughts, the loss of all power to resist physical emotions... leading finally to acts of shocking violence... ending often in incurable insanity. In picturing its soul-destroying effects no attempt was made to equivocate. The scenes and incidents, while fictionalized for the purposes of this story, are based upon actual research into the results of Marihuana addiction. If their stark reality will make you think, will make you aware that something must be done to wipe out this ghastly menace, then the picture will not have failed in its purpose.... Because the drug Marihuana may be reaching forth next for your son or daughter.... or yours.... OR YOURS!

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 6

Five newspaper headlines next appear in succession on the

screen:

POLICE WAGE WAR ON NARCOTIC RING!

DOPE PEDDLERS CAUGHT IN HIGH SCHOOL,

POLICE RAID MARIHUANA FLAT,

FEDERALS AID POLICE IN DRUG WAR,

SCHOOL-PARENT ORGANIZATIONS JOIN DOPE FIGHT.

The viewer then sees a flyer which exhorts its reader to:

Come! Hear! Learn! Meeting Tonight 8:30 P.M. School-Parents Association Subject: Tell Your Children.

Dr. Alfred Carroll then urges his parent audience:

You, and all the school-parent groups about the country, must stand united on this and stamp out this frightful assassin of our youth. You can do it by bringing about compulsory education on the subject of narcotics in general, but dreaded marihuana in particular. That is the purpose of this meeting, ladies and gentlemen, to lay the foundation for a nationwide campaign by you to demand by law such compulsory education because it is only through enlightenment that this scourge can be wiped out.

The parents are then told by Dr. Carroll that the

"ceaseless fight against the drug traffic is directed by the

Department of Narcotics, Washington," and he proceeds to

read a letter of "vital importance from the Narcotics

Bureau." In part, the letter reads:

The suppression of the use of marihuana, and of the forces lurking behind it, are the most important jobs this department is now engaged in.... The school- parent associations of this country... can be invaluable in stamping out this scourge. Their help, their eternal vigilance, could be the deciding factor in our fight against it. The weed marihuana is grown in every state in the union.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 7

Dr. Carroll then shows us film footage, similar to that

of the FBN which is now housed in the National Archives, in

the movie within the movie. We see marijuana plants grown

in Brooklyn, New York, where "the weed was... being

cultivated regularly, stripped, dried and sold in schools

and government army posts in and around New York." We are

shown how "the dried leaves and berries are ground up and

made into cigarettes by a simple hand machine. The deadly

narcotic is then quickly and easily prepared for its

market."

Next, more FBN-like footage reveals how heroin,

morphine and opium can be hidden and smuggled within the

false heels of shoes, in fake jewelry cases, in hollowed

shaving brushes, in the back of pocket watches, within books

with false centers, and in large olive oil barrels. Yet, we

are told:

The sale of marihuana is even more difficult to detect and halt than the traffic in drugs such as opium, morphine and heroin.... more vicious [and] more deadly than these soul-destroying drugs is the menace of marihuana!

Dr. Carroll then leads us into the actual plot of "Tell

Your Children" by saying:

No doubt many of you do not believe that these things do happen, that they cannot happen to you. You may also believe that the facts have been exaggerated. Let me tell you of something that happened right here in our own city. You probably read about it in the paper. However, I'll give you the real facts behind the case. There was an apartment near one of our high schools. It was run by a woman named Mae Coleman.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 8

He are soon introduced to who may be the best-

remembered character in any of the anti-marijuana movies of

the 1930s: the film's crazed jazz piano player who smiles

maniacally and smokes reefers incessantly. The main

protagonists in the plot are high school students: Mary,

her brother Jimmy, and her boyfriend. Bill Harper. Jimmy

and Bill are soon enticed into the apartment of Mae Coleman,

where Mae and her companion Jack Perry introduce the kids to

marijuana and soon have them hooked. Ralph, a reefer

smoking fiend who leads the innocents to the den of

iniquity, is reduced by movie's end to a state of total

insanity. His hysterical fits of laughter are followed by

frantic screams of "Get me some reefers!" which lead him

into a near-catatonic state.

In the meantime. Dr. Carroll enters the story by

traveling to the "Federal Offices" of the "Bureau of

Investigation" to tell an agent there that "You government

men have got to find some way to put an end to it," it being

"an organized gang distributing the narcotic [marijuana] to

students; not only in my school, but all over the city."

The G-Man agrees with Dr. Carroll and explains that:

Marijuana is not like other forms of dope.... it grows wild in almost every state in the union, therefore there is practically no interstate commerce in the drug. As a result, the government's hands are tied....

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 1 9

The G-Man continues, in language eerily similar to that

later used by Anslinger in his "Assassin of Youth"

article:*’

In 1930, the records on marijuana in the Washington office of the Narcotics Division scarcely filled a small folder like this. Today, they fill cabinets.

Dr. Carroll is then shown information contained in a

number of case files: a would-be robber: "sixteen years old

and a marijuana addict!"; "a flagrant case" in West

Virginia; "a most vicious case" in Michigan where a

seventeen year old reefer-smoking girl was arrested in a

raid along with five young men; and "a tragic case" in which

"a young boy under the influence of the drug killed his

entire family with an ax.The federal officer tells Dr.

Carroll that there are "hundreds" of such cases, and "new

ones every day." With records in hand. Dr. Carroll returns

home to combat "the evil" in his school.

*’The specific language used by Anslinger (1938:5) was: "In 1931, the marijuana file of the United States Narcotic Bureau was less than two inches thick. The traffic's most rapid growth came in 1935 and 1936, and today our reports crowd many large cabinets. They indicate that high school students particularly are the prey of the reefer peddlers."

*^The story of the youth who killed his family with an ax was based on the Victor Licata case, "Anslinger's favorite" (McWilliams, 1990:59). "Crazed Youth Kills Five of Family With Ax in Tampa," read the 1933 headline. Although Anslinger and others attributed the murders to marijuana, substantial evidence indicated that "his crime resulted from a long-standing psychosis rather than from any drug effect" (Kaplan, 1970:94-97). Anslinger nonetheless cited the Licata case as an example of the dangers of marijuana in his Marihuana Tax Act hearing testimony before the House of Representatives (1937:23), and he continued to recount the case more than twenty years later (Anslinger, 1961:38).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120

There, Dr. Carroll confronts Bill, "an excellent

student" whose grades have slipped: "Isn't it true that you

have, perhaps unwillingly, acquired a certain harmful habit

through association with certain undesirable people?" Bill,

whose "mother says he never lies," then lies to Dr. Carroll:

"No, sir."

Soon thereafter, Mary, looking for her brother, goes to

Mae's apartment and smokes a cigarette, presumably unaware

that it is marijuana. Within minutes, she is laughing, high

as a kite. Ralph forces himself upon her and begins

unzipping her dress as she screams: "Leave me aloneI" The

stoned Bill emerges from a bedroom where he had been having

sex, comes to the aid of Mary, and is knocked out by Jack,

whose gun accidently discharges and kills Mary. Bill is

framed for the murder, is found guilty, and is saved only

after Mae pleads guilty to a charge of fostering moral

delinquency and confesses all before throwing herself out of

a window to her death.

In testifying as a character witness at Bill's trial.

Dr. Carroll informs the Court of changes that he has noticed

in Bill over the last three months: "disassociation of

ideas" and "errors in time and space," both of which "could

be attributed to the use of marihuana."

Justice prevails as newspaper headlines inform us:

HARPER CASE GANG LEADERS CAPTURED All Higher-Ups of Gang Behind Scenes In Harper Case Taken Into Custody.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121

Bill is ordered by the judge to witness the next court

case on the calendar, so that he can see what he "so

narrowly escaped." "We can express only the hope that your

experiences may not alone keep you but thousands of others

from the vicious pitfalls of marihuana," the judge tells

Bill. The next court case is that of Ralph, who in a

marijuana-induced frenzy had earlier beaten Jack to death

with a club of some kind. Ralph is declared to be

"hopelessly and incurably insane, a condition caused by the

drug marihuana, to which he was addicted." The lawyers in

his case stipulate that he be sent to an institution for the

criminally insane for the rest of his natural life.

The film concludes with Dr. Carroll back at the School-

Parents Association meeting;

Yes, that happened right here to your neighbors. It is not too much to say that in your hands lies the possibility of arresting other tragedies like it. We must work untiringly so that our children are obliged to learn the truth, because it is only through knowledge that we can safely protect them. Failing this, the next tragedy may be that of your daughter, or your son, or yours [Dr. Carroll points to his right], or yours [Dr. Carroll points to his left], OR YOURS [Dr. Carroll points to the movie audience]I

The concluding message of the movie, in capital letters that

fill the screen, pleads with its audience to:

TELL YOUR CHILDREN.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122

Marihuana; Weed w ith Roots In Hell

The motion picture "Marihuana: Weed With Roots In Hell"

was originally released in 1936 under the title "Marihuana"

(The Library of Congress Copyright Office, 1951:522). In

later years, an art theater version of the film, with

spliced-in nudity, was released under the title of "The

Pusher." Following its initial credits, which emerge in the

midst of swirling smoke and bare-breasted women, the format

of "Marihuana" is quite similar to that of "Tell Your

Children." The movie begins with a written foreword that

warns the viewer:

For centuries, the world has been aware of the narcotic menace. We have complacently watched Asiatic countries attempt to rid themselves of DRUGS [sic] CURSE, and attributed their failure to lack of education. We consider ourselves enlightened and that never could we succumb to such a fate. But— did you know that the use of Marihuana is steadily increasing among the youth of this country? Did you know that the youthful criminal is our greatest problem today? And that Marihuana gives the user false courage and destroys conscience, thereby making crime alluring, smart? That is the price we are paying for our lack of interest in the narcotic situation. This story is drawn from an actual case history on file in the police records of one of our large cities. NOTE: MARIHUANA, Hashish of the Orient, is commonly distributed as a doped cigarette. Its most terrifying effect is that it fires the user to extreme cruelty and license.

Like "Assassin of Youth," a major part of the plot of

"Marihuana: Weed With Roots in Hell" takes place at a

"wienie bake." Like "Tell Your Children," the film begins

with jazz music and dancing before moving to newspaper

headlines. Directed by Dwain Esper, who also directed

"Sinister Menace," this 1936 movie juxtaposes and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 3

interchanges the evil imagery of marijuana with that of hard

narcotics.

The cast of characters of the movie includes Burma, her

friend Joan, her boyfriend Dick, her sister Elaine, and the

wealthy Morgan Stewart, to whom Elaine is first engaged and

is later married. The lead gangster's name is Tony, and his

partner in crime, who speaks English with a halting Spanish

accent, remains nameless throughout the film.

The movie begins in a beer hall, where the movie's

youths are dancing wildly in varying stages of intoxication.

"In the old days," a non-teenage man says to his female

companion, "parents knew what their kids were doing

evenings." "If my mother and dad came to places like this,"

responds the companion, "I wouldn't be here now."

In the midst of befriending Burma, Dick and their

friends, Tony the gangster takes leave to transact a drug

sale in the bathroom. Interestingly, the small packet of

drugs is concealed in a hollow shoe heel, as depicted by the

1931 FBN-like footage in "Tell Your Children." Tony soon

invites the young innocents to have a party at his house,

where all hell breaks loose. Tony signals his silent

partner, who takes a stash of marijuana from a hiding place

in the wall and places it by the bottles of booze. Two of

the young female high schoolers exclaim: "These are the

funniest cigarettes I ever saw!" and "The funniest I ever

tasted!"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 4

Burma takes one puff and her somber facial expression

is instantly transformed into one of joyful laughter. All

six girls are laughing hilariously, and Joan suddenly strips

down to her underwear before embarking on a swim in the

ocean. Burma's four companions decide to go skinny dipping

in the moonlight, laughing, frolicking and giggling all the

while, while Burma and Dick roll around on the beach. It is

there, we later learn, where Burma was impregnated.

The scene shifts to Tony and his nameless associate,

who says, in a stilting, heavy Spanish accent: "This bunch

sure uses up the joy weed don't they." Tony responds:

"Well, that's one way of creating business. When they're

that age they're not suspicious and easily hooked."

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the gangsters and the partying

kids, Joan has drowned in the ocean. Tony gathers the kids

around and tells them:

Under no circumstances are you to say you were in this house. The police will pass as an innocent wienie roast on the beach, but should they know of your actions here, that there's been a drinking party, nude bathing, an investigation will surely take place, and that will mean your becoming wards of the juvenile court.

Newspaper headlines then begin to cover the screen:

DROWNED AS AFTERMATH OF BEACH PARTY Body of Joan Marsh, Fairmont High School Student, Found on Beach Today.

Burma's sister Elaine is concerned that word of Burma's

involvement in the affair could leak to her beau's wealthy

family. The sisters argue, and Burma decides that she

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 5

cannot live in the same house with her mother and Elaine.

"Dick," she says, "you must marry me." It is then we learn

that Burma, as a result of the wild beach party, is

pregnant. Dick agrees to marry Burma, but he has no job or

money. "I'll do anything," he says. "I'll see Tony."

A day after seeing Tony, Dick, the nameless gangster,

and others are observed smuggling bales of marijuana by

plain-clothed police of the narcotic squad who have been

staking out a harbor. Dick flees, is chased, and is shot

and killed. The next day's newspaper carries two stories

side-by-side which affect Burma's family in different ways.

The two headlines read:

POPULAR YOUNG BACHELOR, MORGAN STEWART TO WED

and CRIME DOES NOT PAY YOUTH KILLED AS POLICE SEIZE MARIHUANA SHIPMENT.

Burma confronts Tony, and threatens to turn him in to

the police, but the wily gangster puts some unnamed powder

in glass, mixes it in a drink, and says: "Try this. It

will quiet your nerves." He then convinces Burma that he

should send her away to have her baby, and once the baby is

b o m , he convinces her to give it up for adoption and to

work for him. Dick and Elaine marry, and unbeknownst to

Burma, they adopt her daughter.

As Burma becomes "Blondie," a heartless dope pusher,

Tony congratulates his new partner in crime:

The way your marijuana customers are hooked on the stronger stuff like H and C [Heroin and Cocaine], you'll soon be ice queen of the snow family, Blondie.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 6

In the midst of numerous hands exchanging cash and

small packets of dope, the movie viewer next sees a

newspaper headline take form:

MARIHUANA SMOKING SHOWS ALARMING INCREASE Drug Evil, Of Which Marihuana Often the First Step, Is A Fast Growing Menace.

As the scene quickly shifts to a background voice on a

police radio saying "Calling All Cars," and then to the

screams of women, another headline take shape:

NARCOTICS BRING RUIN The Drug Habit Is Expanding And The Usefulness Of The Victim Is Gone.

Still another headline brings us news that the federal

government must act against the killer weed:

FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT POWERLESS TO SURPRESS [Sic] •MARIHUANA' TRAFFIC No Jurisdiction Over Sale, Use Or Growth.

With the wailing of police sirens and the moaning of

human voices in the background, the last of the barrage of

newspaper headlines tells us:

WAVE OF BRUTAL CRIMES LINKED TO MARIHUANA SMOKING.

As the movie watcher hears the sound of machine gun

fire and other sound effects, we witness the ruthless Burma

demand a woman customer's engagement ring in exchange for

five dollars she is owed as part of a heroin buy. Burma

returns to her partners with "a $150,000 idea" which she

shares with them only after shooting some dope in her arm.

She proposes that the trio of criminals kidnap her sister's

child and demand a ransom. Soon, the kid is snatched.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 7

Meanwhile, the police are on Burma's trail, who they

suspect of having stolen the ring that she exacted in

exchange for five dollars worth of heroin. In searching for

the ring in the gangsters' apartment, the police instead

find not only a cache of dope, but the missing daughter of

the socialite Morgan Stewart. Burma has meanwhile learned

that the kidnapped child is actually her own daughter. She

takes another "pop" of dope before entering the apartment,

and overdoses. As she enters the doorway and takes one last

look at her child, she collapses to the ground and dies.

Seconds before "THE END" flashes across the screen, the

viewer sees marijuana cigarettes -first three, then four,

and then more than a dozen- fall to the ground around

Burma's dead body.

The lesson of "Marihuana: Weed With Roots In Hell" is

clear: reefer kills. Its message, that marijuana use leads

to heroin and cocaine, will be empirically examined in the

next chapter: "Testing the Stepping Stone Hypothesis."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 5

TESTING THE STEPPING STONE HYPOTHESIS

In Harry Anslinger's day, the notion that marijuana use

leads to harder drugs was referred to as the "stepping stone

hypothesis." In 1937, the "stepping stone hypothesis" was

flatly rejected by the Commissioner of Narcotics in his

testimony before Congress concerning the Marihuana Tax Act

(U.S. House of Representatives Hearings before the Committee

on Ways and Means, 1937:24):

Mr. Dingell. I am just wondering whether the marihuana addict graduates into a heroin, an opium, or a cocaine user.

Mr. Anslinger. No, sir; I have not heard of a case of that kind. I think it is an entirely different class. The marihuana addict does not go in that direction.

Whereas Anslinger definitively stated in 1937 that

marijuana use does not lead to the use of harder drugs, by

1951 the Commissioner of Narcotics had changed his tune

(U.S. News and World Report, as cited in Kaplan,1970:234):

Q[uestion]: Is marijuana habit forming? Is it as dangerous as other narcotics?

A[nslinger]: It is habit forming but not addiction forming. It is dangerous because it leads to a desire for a greater kick from narcotics that do make addicts.

128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 9

In 1955, Anslinger articulated the stepping stone

hypothesis in testimony before the U.S. Senate. However,

the FBN director (Himmelstein, 1983:87):

omitted any reference to violent crime or any other danger tied directly to marihuana.... He gave no rendition of marihuana crimes and even de-emphasized the importance of the crime connection.

Clearly, the public image of marijuana that Anslinger

and the FBN had promoted in the 1930s and 1940s had indeed

changed. Whereas marijuana was seen as an "assassin of

youth" and a "killer weed" in the 1930s, in the 1950s it was

considered to be "stepping stone" to harder drugs.

In the aftermath of Anslinger, in the 1960s and beyond,

the public image of marijuana in the U.S. has shifted even

more. Whereas opponents of reefer formerly portrayed the

marijuana menace as a catalyst to violence, in recent times

anti-marijuana zealots such as PRIDE (National Parents'

Resource Institute for Drug Education, Inc.) have labeled

the drug an amotivational dullness producer. Himmelstein

refers to this evolution of marijuana as "From Killer Weed

to Drop-Out Drug" (1983:121-136).

Meanwhile, yesteryear's stepping stone hypothesis has

survived into the 1990s with a new name: the "escalation" or

"gateway" theory. Trebach (1987:82) describes the "gateway"

theory as one in which;

medical experts seem to imply that... [marijuana use] sucks many young occasional users through that gate and on to harder drugs and into the whole drug culture. Thus if the gate is kept closed to our youth, then that illegal culture is never entered.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 0

The polar opposite of the gateway theory is the "filter

theory" of the British psychiatrist Dale Beckett, who claims

that the availability of marijuana "may actually filter off

some adolescents who... [otherwise] would be likely to use

narcotics" (Trebach, 1987:84). This theory holds that "for

many young people, marijuana acts as a filter to keep them

away from harder drugs, rather than as a gateway to those

more potent substances" (Trebach, 1987:92). Beckett's drug

control philosophy is shared by the government of the

Netherlands (Holland), which has established a drug control

policy, called "normalization," that we shall soon discuss.

Historical Foundations of Drug Control

The origin of drug control policies in both Holland

(the Netherlands) and the United States can be traced to the

Hague Opium Convention of 1912, which sought to solve the

opium problems of China and the Far East.*^ Until then,

anti-drug legislation was virtually non-existent throughout

the nations of the globe.

*^The Hague Convention of 1912 attempted to provide for effective domestic control of opium, morphine and cocaine, and their derivatives. Its aims were to gradually suppress the abuse of these drugs and to prevent their use for other than "medical and legitimate purposes" through an international agreement. The Convention specifically targeted the production, manufacture, export, trade and distribution of opium. It also sought to classify the illegal possession of opium, morphine and cocaine as penal offenses (Renborg, 1947:15-16).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 1

While the U.S. passed the Harrison Narcotic Act in 1914

and thereafter spearheaded an international effort to assure

compliance with the Convention, Dutch legislation introduced

in 1919 paralleled the U.S. Harrison Act. Each nation's

drug control policies, however, have been shaped within the

context of distinct nationalistic and cultural factors.

In the U.S., a "twin campaign" provided the impetus for

the prohibition of alcohol (1920-1933) and the Harrison

Narcotic Act, which outlawed cocaine and heroin for

nonmedicinal uses. In many ways, the prohibition of alcohol

has served as the prototype in the United States for the

continual and present day prohibition of cocaine, heroin and

cannabis.

In 1914, U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings

Bryant, "a man of deep prohibitionist and missionary

convictions and sympathies," urged that the Harrison

Narcotic Act be enacted as a means of the U.S. fulfilling

its international obligations under the new treaty (Brecher,

1972:48-49). After the Harrison Narcotic Act became law in

the United States, the U.S. led an international movement

whereby other nations would comply with the Hague

Convention. Thus, domestic and international drug law

enforcement were born.

"The Anti-Drug Campaign" became manifested first

through the League of Nations and then through the United

Nations. In the years prior to World War II, international

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 2

treaties came about through drug control conventions which

took place at the Hague in 1912, and at Geneva, Switzerland

in 1925, 1931 and 1936 (Bailey, 1936 and Renborg, 1947).

In 1948, the U.S. launched a United Nations campaign,

with Hariry Anslinger at the helm as the U.S. Commissioner of

Narcotics at the U.N., "to consolidate all international

drug agreements into a new Single Convention" (King, 1972:

91). Behind this effort was Harry Anslinger, who remained

in his United Nations post for eight years following his

1962 retirement from the FBN. In 1964, through "the

remarkable phenomenon of direct international manipulation"

by the U.S., the Single Convention finally came into force

(King, 1972:220).

In dmig control matters, largely through the efforts of

Harry Anslinger, the international community succumbed to

the will of the United States of America. Anslinger, as

has been mentioned, was equally effective in formulating,

executing and instituting domestic drug control policies

within the United States.** Yet, despite the worldwide

prevalence of the prohibition model of drug enforcement that

Anslinger promoted, in 1976, the government of the

Netherlands chose to steer a separate drug control course

from that of their U.S. counterparts.

**The reader is again referred to Stanley Meisler's 1960 article from The Nation which chronicles Anslinger's career.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 3

Dutch Cannabis Policy

The Dutch approach to drug control has largely been

ignored, misunderstood or misrepresented by proponents of

the "war on drugs" in the United States. The Netherlands'

somewhat contradictory drug control policy permits "soft"

(cannabis) and "hard" (heroin and cocaine) drug use but

vigorously prosecutes trafficking in "hard" drugs.

Frits Ruter (1988), a law professor at the University

of Amsterdam, has described the drug control system of the

Dutch as "a policy of encirclement, adaptation, integration

and normalization, rather than a policy of social exclusion

through criminalization, punishment and stigmatization."

While hemp products (cannabis; i.e., marijuana and

hashish) remain illegal in the Netherlands, their use and

small-scale sales are permitted. In other words, through a

policy of prosecutorial discretion, marijuana and hashish

laws remain on the books but are not enforced by the Dutch

authorities. In fact, cannabis may be purchased off menus

in numerous coffee houses throughout Holland, and it is also

available through "youth centres" (in both instances, the

sale of cannabis to youths under the age of sixteen is not

condoned).

The underlying philosophy by which the Dutch have

shaped their cannabis policy is this: if "hard" and "soft"

drugs were viewed by the government in the same way, then

drug-seeking youths would have to purchase illicit

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 4

substances from a "pusher." Access to "hard" drugs would

thereby be easy for the youths of Holland, and this would

run contrary to the Dutch government's goal of preventing

drug abuse among its citizens.

In developing their cannabis policy, the Dutch

authorities have sought to create two markets: above-ground,

where cannabis may used by youths without fear; and

underground, where the Dutch authorities do not want their

youths to venture. Holland's cannabis policy, however,

cannot be separated from its larger overall drug control

policy of "normalization," which is worthy of further

examination.

Normalization: the Dutch Svstem of Drug Control

In response to the same pressures that brought forth

the U.S. Harrison Narcotic Act, the first criminal drug

legislation was introduced in the Netherlands in 1919. This

Act remained virtually unchanged until 1976, when maximum

penalties for "hard drugs" were, in keeping pace with the

trend set by the international community, significantly

increased.

The Amended Opium Act of 1976 draws a distinction

between "drugs presenting unacceptable risks," such as

cocaine, opiates, LSD and amphetamines, and "hemp products,"

such as marijuana and hashish. In keeping in line with

their international commitment through treaties, the Dutch

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 5

have tried to steer a course that is a compromise between a

"war on drugs" and "legalization" (Engelsman, 1588:7).

The Dutch view drug abuse as a public health problem,

not one of the police or the criminal justice system. Thus,

national drug policy in the Netherlands is coordinated by

the Minister for Welfare and Public Health. The role of

drug law enforcement in Holland is to reduce the supply, and

not to criminalize the use, of drugs. Rather than utilizing

a policy which criminalizes, stigmatizes and punishes drug

users, the Dutch integrate drug users into their society

(Engelsman, 1990:50-51).

The Dutch view this policy of "normalization" as a

pragmatic and conservative one. It is based on the

realization that a nation surrounded by water, such as the

Netherlands, cannot conquer the sea. Rather, by building

dikes and locks, Holland adapted and learned to live with

the water in its midst. Just as the Dutch control the sea

to the best of their ability, their social control policy of

normalization is applied to illicit drug use and its

consequences.

Because "the function of Dutch criminal law is an

instrument of social control rather than an instrument for

expressing moral values," the Dutch distinguish between

policies aimed at drug users and policies aimed at drug

traffickers (Engelsman, 1990:51-52). Therefore, in 1976,

when the Amended Opium Act was adopted, so were a set of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 6

guidelines that set national policy regarding the

investigation and prosecution of drug offenses. It is under

these guidelines that priorities are set and "prosecutorial

discretion" is employed (Ruter, 1990:193);

(1) sale of cannabis in small quantities by a "reliable person" (known as a "house dealer") in a "youth center" results in no prosecution unless a dealer trades provocatively or openly advertises.

(2) possession of a small quantity of "hard" drugs for personal consumption results, as a rule, in no police investigation, no pretrial detention and no prosecution.

(3) dealing, possessing and producing a maximum of thirty grams of marijuana results, as a rule, in no police investigation, no pretrial detention and no prosecution.

(4) when confronted with users who deal in "hard" drugs to provide for their own needs, or those found in possession of more than a small quantity, the public prosecutor employs discretion in determining the prison sentence that must be demanded.

The question of how effective Dutch cannabis policy is,

then, is a logical one. If cannabis use can be considered

to be a viable measure of the effectiveness of policy, then

Holland's program of normalization may be viewed as a

success. In Table 5, it can be seen that the prevalence of

cannabis use among students in the Netherlands is quite low,

particularly when contrasted with similarly aged students in

the United States.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 7

TABLE 5

CANNABIS USE AMONG STUDENTS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS

(13-18 YEARS) IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE USA*®

13-14 Years 15-16 Years 17-18 Years

Male Female Male Female Male and Female

USa-HL USA-HL USA-NL USa-HL USA-NL

Lifetime: 15% 3% 14% 2% 40% 12% 30% 9% 44% 18%

Last Mo.: 5% 2% 5% 1% 17% 7% 13% 4% 17% 5%

*®These data concerning cannabis use in the Netherlands and the U.S. were taken from a larger table entitled "Substance Use Among Students In Secondary Schools (13-18 Years) In The Netherlands And United States of America," which was provided to the author via a September 28, 1990 personal communication with Eddy Engelsman, who directs the Alcohol, Drugs and Tobacco Branch of the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs for the Netherlands. Engelsman, who has been called the Dutch "drug czar," interpreted the table from Dutch to English as it originally appeared in a Dutch publication (1990): Roken. Alcohol-Endruaaebruik Onder Scholieren Vanaf 10 Jarr (Smoking. Alcohol and Drug Use Among School Students from 10 Years! by HN Plomp, H. Kuipers and M. Van Oers. Stratified by age group and gender, the table lists "lifetime" and "last month" prevalence not only for cannabis, but also for tobacco, alcohol, inhalants, cocaine, heroin, stimulants, sleeping tablets and tranquilizers. The data provided, for an unknown reason, are not stratified by gender for the 17-18 age group. The larger table has been published in a volume edited by Arnold Trebach and Kevin Zeese (1990a:58), Drug Prohibition and the Conscience of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Drug Policy Foundation). The sources for the U.S. data are cited as: American Health Association, 1989, and Johnston, Lloyd, The National High School Survey, NIDA, 1990.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 8

While Table 5 convincingly demonstrates that rates of

cannabis use among youths are much lower in the Netherlands

than they are in the United States, comparative rates of

cannabis use do not constitute a test of the "stepping stone

hypothesis." Moreover, the underlying assumption of the

"gateway" or "escalation" theory: that cannabis use precedes

the use of "harder" drugs, may not necessarily be valid.

Nonetheless, if we accept this assumption for the sake of

argument, a test of the "stepping stone hypothesis" must

analyze not only cannabis use trends, but also use patterns

for other substances, such as heroin and cocaine.

Table 6 provides us with such a measurement of

cannabis, cocaine and heroin use among youths in the United

States and the Netherlands. It clearly refutes the

"stepping stone hypothesis" by revealing that the prevalence

of illicit drug use among students in the Netherlands is

quite low in comparison to similarly aged students in the

United States. This holds true not only for cannabis use,

but for the substances of heroin and cocaine, as well. It

can be argued, therefore, that the Dutch policy of

normalization has been successful on two fronts: (1) it has

separated the cannabis and "hard drug" markets; and (2) it

has limited the size of the cannabis market through programs

of education and social control.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 9

TABLE 6

ILLICIT DRUG USE AMONG STUDENTS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS

(13-18 YEARS) IN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE USA*^

13-14. Years 15rl6_ Years 17-18 Years

LIFETIME ML USA ML u m ML USA CANNABIS 2.6% 14.6% 10.8% 35.0% 17.7% 43.7%

COCAINE 0.6% 3.6% 1.2% 7.7% 1.6% 10.3%

HEROIN — — — — —— — — 0.5% 1.3%

PAST MONTH NL USA ML USA ML USA CANNABIS 1.3% 5.4% 5.2% 14.9% 4.6% 16.7%

COCAINE 0.2% 1.6% 0.5% 2.7% 0.2% 2.8%

HEROIN — — — — ---- —— 0.3% 0.3%

^ h e source of these data are the same as for Table 5. Again, in the original Dutch source, the data are not stratified by gender for age category 17-18 years. Here, I have likewise chosen to combine the gender categories for age groups 13-14 and 15-16 years.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 0

Table 6 reveals that U.S. secondary school students use

cannabis and cocaine at considerably higher rates than do

their Dutch counterparts. This is true for both lifetime

and past month prevalence.

In terms of past month drug use prevalence, U.S. youths

use cannabis and cocaine at significantly greater rates than

do Dutch youths. The "past month" data indicate that

thirteen and fourteen year olds in the U.S. use both

cannabis and cocaine more frequently than do any age group

of Dutch youths. The ratio of U.S. to Dutch past month use

rates range from a low of 2.9 times as great (for fifteen

and sixteen year olds who have used cannabis) to 14 times as

great (for seventeen and eighteen year olds who have used

cocaine).

When the same age groups are compared for lifetime

prevalence, it is seen that U.S. youths use cannabis,

cocaine and heroin at significantly greater rates than do

Dutch youths. The ratio of U.S. to Dutch lifetime use rates

range from a low of 2.5 times as great (for seventeen and

eighteen year olds who have ever used cannabis) to 6.4 times

as great (for both fifteen-sixteen and seventeen-eighteen

year olds who have ever used cocaine). On a lifetime basis,

U.S. seventeen and eighteen year olds use heroin at 2.6

times the rate than do their Dutch age cohort.

To further test the "stepping stone hypothesis," it

would be logical to compare Dutch and U.S. illicit drug use

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 1

trends of adults in addition to youths. Such a comparison

would be possible if two similar data bases could be

analyzed, one Dutch and one U.S.

Due to qualitative and quantitative differences between

nations in research design methodology, including how a

given data set is gathered, how data categories are defined,

and statistical techniques utilized for the sake of

analysis, comparing transnational data sources may be a

misleading, or even an inaccurate, undertaking.

Measuring and comparing crime rates across borders, for

instance, may be a useless exercise if the nations in

question define their crime categories in vastly different

ways. An assault in Country A may not be defined as an

assault in Country B. Countiry C may differentiate between

larceny below and above a given monetary amount while

Country D may make no such distinction. Country E may

classify the crimes of robbery, burglary and larceny as

separate offense categories while Country F simply

categorizes them all as theft.

In the case of illicit drug use, however, we are

fortunate in that there are available comparative data bases

in the United States and the Netherlands that stand up to

statistical scrutiny. In the United States, the National

Household Survey on Drug Abuse, which is conducted annually

by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) of the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services, provides us with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 2

the best possible demographic measurement of nationwide drug

use. In the Netherlands, a similarly conducted survey,

perhaps more rigorous in its statistical design, is

conducted annually in the city of Amsterdam. Both surveys

cover the same year (1990) and the same aged population (12

years and older)

While comparing a nation's overall rate of illicit drug

consumption to that of a city may be seen as comparing

apples and oranges, in this case, we can assume that the

rate of illicit drug use in Amsterdam is greater than that

of the entire nation of Holland. This assumption can be

made because drug use is known to occur more in urban areas

than in rural areas, and much of the Netherlands is

comprised of rural areas. Thus, the Dutch figures contained

in Table 7 would undoubtedly be lower if the numbers for

Amsterdam were replaced by overall numbers for the

Netherlands as a whole.

‘^While the Amsterdam data presented do not distinguish between age groups, but simply list all age groupings in one category, the U.S. data divide the population by ages 12-17, 18-25, and 26 and older. By multiplying given percentages for each age group by the sample number for each, and then dividing that sub-total into the whole population sampled (N), I was able to create a U.S. category that was comparable to the Amsterdam age category of "12-70 years and older."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 3

TABLE 7

ILLICIT DRUG USE IN THE UNITED STATES AND

AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS (12-70+ YEARS)

Lifetime Use Past Year PastHonth

ML USA ML USA ML USA CANNABIS 24.1% 32.3% 9.8% 12.1% 6.0% 6.0%

COCAINE 5.3% 10.8% 1.3% 3.5% 0.4% 1.0%

HEROIN 1.1% 0.8% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% N/A^

Sources: Licit and Illicit Drug Use In Amsterdam: Report of a Household Survey in 1990 on the Prevalence of Drug Use Among the Population of 12 Years and Over by J.P. Sandwijk, P.D.A. Cohen and S. Husterd (University of Amsterdam, Instituut voor Sociale Geografie, 1991), Table 3.2, page 20; National Household Survey on Drug Abuse; Main Findings 1990. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991) pp. 20-30.

^ h i s category, "heroin use-past month," was unavailable in the U.S. data because "estimates based on only a few respondents are omitted because one cannot place a high degree of confidence in their statistical accuracy."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 4

Table 7 demonstrates that despite the Dutch

normalization policy being in place in the city of

Amsterdcun, illicit drugs are used there at lower rates,

among both adults and youths, than they are in the United

States. On a lifetime basis, more than one third times as

many of the U.S. sample have used cannabis than have their

Dutch counterparts, and the U.S. group has used cocaine at a

rate which is over two times the rate (more than two hundred

percent) than that in Amsterdam. While the U.S. lifetime

rate of heroin use is slightly lower than that in Amsterdam,

the difference is statistically insignificant, for when

rounded off, both figures stand at a mere one percent of the

populations' sampled.

Past year use figures are similar, in that the U.S.

sample population uses all three drugs: cannabis, cocaine

and heroin, at a greater rate than does the sample

population in Amsterdam. Past year cannabis use is slightly

higher in the U.S. than in Amsterdam, past year cocaine use

is more than two times as great in the U.S. than in

Amsterdam, and past year heroin use is three times as great

among the sampled U.S. population than it is among the

Amsterdam sample.

For the past month figures, due to a U.S. statistical

concern, rates of heroin use cannot be compared, but

literally zero percent of the Amsterdam sample used heroin

in the last thirty days. While cannabis use was comparable

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 5

in the two samples, past month cocaine use was two and a

half times as great in the U.S. as in Amsterdam.

Thus, on the basis of analyzing available comparative

transnational data, it is clear that the "stepping stone

hypothesis" must be rejected. Just as Tcible 6 revealed that

youths in the U.S. use both cannabis and "hard" drugs at

considerably higher rates than do their Dutch counterparts.

Table 7 shows us that for adults and youths alike, illicit

drugs are used at lower rates in Amsterdam than they are in

the United States. No empirical evidence examined herein

supports the "gateway" or "escalation" theory in any way,

shape or form.

Comparing U.S. and Dutch Drug Control Policies

Although the U.S. and the Netherlands are bound by the

same international drug control treaties, aspects of each

nation's drug policies are quite distinct from one another.

In the Netherlands, through a system of "normalization,"

illicit drug users are not treated as criminals, but instead

are integrated into society. Through the de-facto

decriminalization of both "hard" and "soft" drugs, heroin,

cocaine and cannabis are available to users although they

remain illegal substances. While the Dutch have adopted

innovative strategies to cope with illicit drug use and

related social harms, the U.S. prohibitionist stance has

remained virtually unaltered since the 1930s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 6

Drug policy in the Netherlands further differs from

that of the United States. Whereas the U.S. is content to

tell drug users to "just say no," the Dutch have a national

"harm reduction" strategy in place. Part of this strategy

is based, as we have seen, on the idea of separating the

"hard" and "soft" drug markets. Another aspect of Dutch

drug control policy, which this chapter has not discussed,

targets the injectable drug using population. By providing

clean syringes and hypodermic needles to intravenous drug

users (Engelsman, 1990:55 and Ruter, 1988:4), Dutch drug

control policy aims to prevent the spread of the AIDS virus.

Clearly, the U.S. could benefit from devoting serious

study to the "harm reduction" and "normalization" models of

drug control that are in effect in the Netherlands. Just as

the Dutch have developed their own innovative drug control

programs within the context of distinct cultural and

nationalistic factors, so can the United States.

The Social Control Hypothesis not only places marijuana

control within the larger context of drug control, but it

places drug control within the larger context of social

control. In this regard, it is important to point out

differences between the public health and public welfare

policies of Holland and the U.S.A., in that the user of

illicit drugs may be in need of either governmental service.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 7

While the Dutch have a program of nationalized medicine

in place, the United States not only has yet to adopt such a

system, but there is a question as to whether the national

health plan currently being debated in Congress will cover

drug treatment services. In addition, the system of "social

security" in place in the Netherlands is widely considered

to be far superior to the "welfare" program of the United

States, a system that President Clinton has proposed to

reform.

Data presented in this chapter have refuted the

"stepping stone hypothesis," the notion that marijuana use

leads to harder drugs. Utilizing the drug control system of

the Dutch as a model, it has been demonstrated that the

adoption of a national cannabis decriminalization policy

does not necessarily lead to an increase in illicit drug

use.

The Dutch policy of normalization is but one form of

drug decriminalization. Since the mid-1970s, twelve states

in the United States have enacted methods of marijuana

decriminalization that operate similarly to the way traffic

laws are enforced. The next chapter will further examine

marijuana decriminalization. As well, it will distinguish

between the cannabis policy options of marijuana

decriminalization and marijuana legalization, two terms that

are often mistaken for, and inappropriately interchanged

with, one another.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 6

BEYOND CRIMINALIZATION

The Dutch policy of normalization discussed in the

previous chapter is but one form of decriminalization.

The prefix "de" denotes a reversal or undoing, and

decriminalization policies permit nations, states or

localities to selectively enforce -or not enforce- cannabis

laws. Under a policy of decriminalization, marijuana use or

possession is not condoned, but is instead treated on a non

criminal basis.

As we have seen, the Dutch view drug control as social

control. In that all governments aim to control the people

under their jurisdiction, governmental drug policies:

whether viewed as liberal, conservative, socialist or

fascist are -at their root- social control.

Under the Dutch system of normalization, laws against

cannabis and other controlled substances are still on the

books, but they are ignored through either police or

prosecutorial discretion.

The fact that coffee houses and youth centers in the

Netherlands openly sell cannabis to their customers, while

such transactions are technically illegal, adds to the

murky, grey area that lies between the realms of legalized

148

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 9

and decriminalized cannabis. Although the concepts of drug

legalization and drug decriminalization are quite distinct,

the ambiguous cannabis policy of the Dutch may well serve to

create confusion, rather than clarification, in regards to

marijuana decriminalization discussions in the U.S.A.

Decriminalization has been defined as "[c]rime without

punishment" (Packer, 1968:19). Marijuana decriminalization

differs from its legalization in that under the latter,

marijuana would be available for consumers to purchase in

the licit marketplace, as are alcohol, cigarettes, coffee or

tea.

Opponents of marijuana decriminalization and marijuana

legalization argue that even the medical use of marijuana,

to relieve suffering from diseases such as AIDS, cancer,

glaucoma and multiple sclerosis, cannot be justified. They

fear that the medical use of marijuana would send the "wrong

message" to the rest of society, namely that recreational

marijuana use would be unofficially condoned.

This chapter examines two distinct but related issues

which pertain to national marijuana policy in the United

States: (1) the decriminalization and (2) the legalization

of marijuana. While this chapter sets out to clarify how

the concepts of marijuana decriminalization and marijuana

legalization differ, the following chapter addresses

marijuana's use as a medicine.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 0

Decriminalization

In their book entitled The Honest Politician's Guide to

Crime Control. Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins cite seven

areas of the criminal law for which they advocate legal

reform through decrimiralizatiir.. Morris and Hawkins

initially provide their readers (1970:3) with "a bare

statement" of their program, which targets seven areas of

the criminal law. In the more than two decades which have

since passed, substantial changes have occurred in each of

these areas:

Abortion: Abortion performed by a qualified medical practitioner in a registered hospital shall cease to be a criminal offense.

Disorderly Conduct and Vaarancv: Said laws will be replaced by laws precisely stipulating the conduct proscribed and defining the circumstances in which the police should intervene.

Drug Offenses: Neither the acquisition, purchase, possession, nor the use of any drug will be a criminal offense. The sale of some drugs other than by a licensed chemist (druggist) and on prescription will be criminally proscribed; proof of possession of excessive quantities may be evidence of a sale or of intent to sell.

Drunkenness: Public drunkenness shall cease to be a criminal offense.

Gambling: No form of gambling will be prohibited by the criminal law; certain fraudulent and cheating gambling practices will remain criminal.

Juvenile Delinguencv: The juvenile court should retain jurisdiction only over conduct by children which would be criminal were they adult.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 1

Sexual Behavior; Sexual activities between consenting adults in private will not be subject to the criminal law. The role of the criminal law is excessive in regards to adultery, bestiality, bigamy, fornication, homosexuality, illicit cohabitation, incest, obscenity, pornography, prostitution, sodomy and statutory rape/ carnal knowledge.)

Today, abortion presently is legal throughout the

United States. While Disorderly Conduct is still a crime

across the nation. Vagrancy has been declared to be

unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. Public

drunkenness has likewise been declared unconstitutional and

is no longer a crime. Gambling, formerly the exclusive

domain of organized criminal syndicates, now is sanctioned

and operated by many states throughout the United States via

lotteries, which serve as a major revenue source for state

operating budgets. Status offenses, wrongful behavior

committed by juveniles for which adults cannot be arrested

(such as truancy), are no longer treated as delinquent acts

by the juvenile courts. Sexual behavior by consenting

adults, while not legal, for the most part is widely ignored

by the net of criminal justice throughout the United States.

— And although drug offenders continue to be caught in the

net of the U.S. criminal law, in the 1970s, twelve U.S.

states decriminalized marijuana possession.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 2

Marijuana Decriminalization in the United States

As of 1978, nearly twenty five percent (twelve) of the

fifty states in the U.S. decriminalized the offense of

possession of marijuana. Across the nation, a few local

jurisdictions, including Ann Arbor, Michigan, Berkeley,

California, and Madison, Wisconsin also decriminalized the

possession of marijuana for personal use. An additional

decriminalization city, Seattle, Washington, was forced to

revert to the recriminalization of marijuana in 1987 when

its state legislature invalidated the city's legal

jurisdiction to decriminalize.

Of the twelve states which have decriminalized

marijuana, one state legislature (South Dakota) voted to

recriminalize after one year. In the state of Alaska, which

will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter,

voters passed a referendum that recriminalized marijuana

possession in that state as of 1991. Despite the passage of

the Alaskan referendum, the criminalized status of marijuana

in the forty ninth remains tenuous, for Alaska's state

Supreme Court has ruled that marijuana possession is a

protected legal right under its state Constitution.

Each of the remaining ten decriminalization states has

chosen its own method of enforcing, or not enforcing, laws

that govern the possession of marijuana for personal use.

Thus, in these states, the crime of marijuana possession is

enforced in a similar fashion as are traffic violations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 3

Civil Law Versus Criminal Law

Enforcing or ignoring the criminal law through the

discretion of police or prosecutors, as is done in the

Netherlands, is but one form of decriminalization. In quite

a few states within the U.S., for instance, the criminal law

is not used to enforce parking violations. Instead, the

civil law is utilized. When it is time for a "scoff law"

violator (someone who ignores their parking tickets) to

either register their automobile or renew their automobile

insurance, one is unable to do so until his or her legal

obligations have been met.

Another method by which parking tickets are enforced

through the civil law is when "the Denver boot," a

mechanical device which prohibits a motor vehicle from being

moved, is locked to the vehicle's wheel. Thus, for the

scoff law violator's vehicle to be driven again, the

violator's civil responsibilities must first be fulfilled.

As is seen in Table 8, of the ten marijuana

decriminalization states in the U.S., five employ a civil

system of law enforcement while five utilize a petty offense

(or a minor misdemeanor) type schemata.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 4

TABLE 8

LAWS IN U.S. STATES THAT HAVE DECRIMINALIZED

THE OFFENSE OF MARIJUANA POSSESSION

Maximum Maximum Amt. Classification State Fine Possessed Of Offense

California $100 1 Ounce Misdemeanor

Colorado $100 1 Ounce Petty Offense

Maine $200 1.25 Ounces Civil

Minnesota $100 1.50 Ounces Civil

Mississippi $250 1 Ounce Civil

Nebraska $100 1 Ounce Civil

New York $100 0.89 Ounces Violation (25 Grams)

No. Carolina $100 1 Ounce Misdemeanor

Ohio $100 3.57 Ounces Misdemeanor (100 Grams)

Oregon $1000 1 Ounce Civil

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 5

The Unicrue Case of Alaska

The state of Alaska is a former marijuana

decriminalization state that employed the civil law, rather

than the criminal law, in enforcing marijuana possession

violations. Although not reflected in Table 8, it is

important to understand how Alaska differs from the ten

decriminalization states. In 1975, the Alaskan state

Supreme Court ruled in Ravin v. State that the possession of

marijuana by adults for personal use within the privacy of

the home is a protected right, and not subject to a fine.

Since 1975, when Alaska's decriminalization statute was

ruled to be unconstitutional, the possession of marijuana by

adults for personal use within the privacy of their own home

has been legal in Alaska. Possession of up to one ounce of

marijuana outside the home, however, remained a civil

offense which was subject to a $100 fine.

In November 1990, via a ballot proposition, Alaskan

voters recriminalized the offense of marijuana possession by

replacing the civil penalties that were on the books with

criminal penalties. The law took effect in February 1991,

but its constitutionality has subsequently been challenged

in court. In October 1993, in the first test case of

marijuana recriminalization in Alaska (McNeil v. State) an

Alaskan lower court ruled that Ravin is still the law of the

land in the forty ninth state. A decision of the state

Supreme Court takes precedent over a voter referendum, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 6

Alaskan lower court ruled. Until the constitutionality of

the new recriminalization law is resolved, marijuana's

illegal status in Alaska remains tenuous.

The Alaskan debate on marijuana recriminalization

served as the last stand of "drug czar" William Bennett, who

served as President Bush's first director of the Office of

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). In his final days in

office, Bennett, an outspoken, controversial figure who

personified President Bush's drug control strategy,

campaigned in Alaska for the recriminalization initiative.

On the day after Alaska's historic election to recriminalize

marijuana, William Bennett announced his resignation as

director of the ONDCP.

The Overreach of the Criminal Law

Morris and Hawkins use the terms "overreach of the

criminal law" and "overcriminalization" in arguing that the

enactment of criminal statutes to enforce such laws as drug

offenses is counter-effective. Samuel Walker, expounding on

Morris and Hawkins' treatise, states that decriminalization

has four principal rationales (1989, 236-237);

1. Many laws are criminogenic (or cause crime).

2. Overly broad statutes tend to build disrespect for the law.

3. Overcriminalization places serious burdens on the criminal justice system.

4. Laws that legislate morality ("victimless crimes") violate individual rights.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 7

According to Walker, laws may be criminogenic in three

interrelated ways; (1) by creating a "crime tariff,"

(2) by labeling, and (3) by encouraging secondary deviance.

The "Crime Tariff"

When demand for a given commodity is said to be

inelastic, economists theorize that the price for the

commodity will not have an effect on the rate at which it is

purchased. Economists speculate in this regard about

consumer buying habits for such goods as cigarettes and

motor fuel. A "crime tariff" is essentially a kind of risk-

taking tax that the retail consumer of an illegal commodity

pays to the wholesaler. Packer (1968;278) explains;

The tariff in question is the criminal law, or more precisely, the particular criminal statutes that make it illegal to do such things as traffic in narcotics [or] run a gambling enterprise[.]

Both Packer and Morris and Hawkins (1970;5-6) discuss

the "crime tariff" in terms of supply and demand. When the

demand for "goods and services" such as drugs, gambling and

prostitution drives up prices, this leads to the development

of large-scale organized crime groups who control the

market. These groups then tend to diversify their

operations and both finance and promote additional criminal

activity. Due to the high prices of a given commodity, the

consumer may resort to crime to pay for his or her vices.

Alcohol prohibition provides us with "a classic case of

the crime tariff" in action (Packer, 1968;279);

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 8

Traffic in liquor became the monopoly of the lawbreakers, who proceeded to eaim enormous monopoly profits and, behind the protective wall of the crime tariff on liquor, to build criminal organizations that could rapidly take advantage of any other crime tariffs.

After alcohol prohibition was repealed, the void

created in the marketplace of the criminal underworld came

to be filled by the illicit drug industry. Notes Packer

(1968:279):

With the disappearance of the crime tariff on liquor, a similarly profitable traffic in narcotics developed... What we have done is... to drive the price of the commodity to new heights.

Although few people would contend that marijuana users

commit crimes to support their habits, it is obvious that

marijuana's high price is due to its illegal status. The

criminalization of marijuana additionally results in

increased criminal justice system costs for police,

judicial, and "correctional" operations.

Labeling and Secondary Deviance

In the classic words of Howard Becker (1963:9),

labeling, also known as the social reaction perspective

(Taylor, Walton and Young,1973;139-171), is defined;

Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application [of] rules and sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 9

Labeling "implies that social control leads to, and

creates, deviance" (Pearson, 1975:187). The labeling or

social reaction perspective begins when an original act is

defined as "deviant" and continues when negative social

sanctions are applied to the "offender," who then becomes

stigmatized and thereafter accepts his or her deviant status

and the label (e.g., "criminal") that is attached to it.

Primary deviance is the original act, such as drug-

taking, which is viewed outside the norm. When negative

social sanctions are applied to the act, secondary deviance

(Lemert,1951:75-78), also known as "deviance amplification"

(Wilkins, 1964), may ensue. Using the Dutch drug control

policy of normalization as an illustrative example, we can

see how primary deviance differs from secondary deviance

(Engelsman, 1990:50):

From the beginning of the 1980s, Dutch political leaders have acknowledged the existence of primary and secondary effects of illicit drug use. Primary effects, such as tolerance, mood swings and addiction, are those caused by the drug use itself. Secondary effects, such as drug-related crimes, prostitution and AIDS, are at least partly induced by the mere illegality of the drug. Unfortunately, the secondary and primary effects of drug use are often confused with one another. In other words, the effects of drug use are often mistaken for the effects of drug policies.

Morris and Hawkins comment that (1970:10) "by treating

marihuana as equivalent to opiates, [the law] may well

foster the belief that there is no difference between them."

Underlying this sentiment, as we have seen in Chapter 5, are

two central objectives of Dutch normalization policy:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 0

(1) to avoid stigmatization on part of the drug user, and

(2) to separate the "soft" (or cannabis) and the "hard" drug

markets. Thus, it is clear that the national drug control

policies of Holland are grounded in the labeling or social

reaction perspective and strive to avoid secondary deviance.

Engelsman (1990:50) notes that internationally, the

secondary effects of drug use manifest themselves and are

amplified in three ways, through: "organized crime, [the]

erosion of the judicial system, and [the] high costs for

police, justice and prison apparatuses."

In the United States, a case can likewise be made that

the criminalization of drug use, including cannabis, has

resulted in similar secondary effects. Firstly, it cannot

be disputed that the tentacles of organized crime grip the

illicit drug market. Secondly, it cannot be disputed that

the processing of drug cases by law enforcement agencies,

the courts and "correctional" institutions (which include

probation and parole services, as well as prisons) certainly

has a high price tag attached to it. Thirdly, it is

abundantly clear that judicial system calendars and dockets

throughout the country are inundated with drug cases, while

other pressing criminal and civil cases must be placed on

the back burner of the stove of justice.

U.S. marijuana policy has not been created in a vacuum

apart from heroin and cocaine policy, but in conjunction

with it. Cannabis policy in today's United States,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 1

originally formulated and developed by the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, can be viewed as a rudderless ship that is

sailing on the ocean of time.

Wandering in the Desert of U.S. Drug Policv

On August 2, 1977, forty years to the day after the

Marihuana Tax Act was signed into law. President Jimmy

Carter recommended that criminal sanctions for marijuana use

and related non-profit transfers of the drug be removed. In

a word. President Carter recommended that marijuana use in

the United States be decriminalized.

The view epitomized by President Carter: that marijuana

is a relatively benign drug, was a fleeting one which seemed

to dissipate in a cloud of smoke over the next decade. In

retrospect. President Carter, who was fond of Biblical

analogies, can be seen as a lone voice crying out in the

wilderness.

The "backlash" against marijuana decriminalization, the

reverberations of which were felt within the Carter White

House, was rooted in three elements (Himmelstein, 1986):

[1] federal officials virtually reversed their stance on marijuana;

[2] the New Right became a major social force and made an antimarijuana stance part of its program; and

[3] hundreds of parents' groups concerned about marijuana use by adolescents emerged.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 2

By 1980, with the coming of the "Reagan Revolution,"

the marijuana decriminalization pendulum reversed its

direction. President Reagan marked the official change in

attitude about marijuana by declaring in a 1982 radio

address that (Wisotsky, 1986:3-4,223):

The mood toward drugs is changing in this country and the momentum is with us. We are making no excuses for drugs -hard, soft, or otherwise. Drugs are bad and we are going after them.

The sentiment of President Reagan is perhaps best

evidenced by the 1988 Congressional testimony of two

distinguished law enforcement professionals, Jerald Vaughn

and John Lawn. Lawn and Vaughn can be seen as being

spiritual descendants of what has been termed the "Anslinger

Philosophy" (Schur, 1962:191-198).

Vaughn, who then was the Executive Director of the

International Association of Chiefs of Police, voiced his

concern about illicit drugs this way (U.S. House of

Representatives, 1988:76): "Drugs are diabolical and

destructive not only to the human system, but to the

democratic way of life and a responsible citizenry."

Lawn, who then served as the Administrator of the DEA

(Drug Enforcement Administration) and thus testified as the

chief federal drug law enforcement officer in the United

States, expressed himself through the following statement

(U.S. House of Representatives, 1988:70-72): "Drugs are not

bad because they are illegal. They are illegal because they

are bad."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 3

President Carter's 1977 recommendation to decriminalize

marijuana nationwide, however, had historical roots in a

previous President's Commission: President Nixon's National

Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, known as the Shafer

Commission.

The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse: 1970-1973

Chaired by Raymond Shafer, the former governor of

Pennsylvania, the Commission was established in 1970 and

consisted of thirteen members: nine presidential and four

congressional appointees. In the report's March 22, 1972

cover letter to President Nixon, Raymond Shafer defined the

1972 report as:

an all inclusive effort to present the facts as they are known today, to demythologize the controversy surrounding marihuana, and to place in proper perspective one of the most emotional and explosive issues of our time.... We hope this Report will be a foundation upon which credibility in this area can be restored and upon which a rational policy can be predicated.

The Commission published its findings in two volumes:

Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding (1972) and Drug Use

In America: Problem in Perspective (1973). Whereas the

latter report expounded on the larger issue of drug use in

general, the former report focused solely on marijuana, for,

as stated by the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug

Abuse*’ (1972:2):

49t'Hereafter, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse will be referred to as the NCMDA.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 4

By separating [marihuana] from the rest of the drug controversy, we have been better able to analyze the unique position marihuana occupies in our society.

Covering a broad mandate, the NCMDA sought to examine

the nature and scope of marijuana use, the effects of the

drug, its relationship to other behavior and "the efficacy

of existing law” (1972:1). As federal funds were made

available by Congress to enable the NCMDA to conduct a

comprehensive research and fact-finding effort, the inquiry

consisted of more than fifty projects, which included formal

hearings, informal hearings, and "a nation-wide survey of

public beliefs, information and experience” which came to be

known as the National Survey.

Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding refuted the

marijuana/crime thesis by declaring (1972:91 and 94):

... the weight of the evidence is that marihuana does not cause violent or aggressive behavior; if anything, marihuana generally serves to inhibit the expression of such behavior.... No evidence exists that marihuana use will cause or lead to the commission of violent or aggressive behavior by the large majority of psychologically and socially mature individuals in the general population.... In essence, neither informed current professional opinion nor empirical research, ranging from the 1930*s to the present, has produced systematic evidence to support the thesis that marihuana use, by itself, either invariably or generally leads to or causes crime, including acts of violence, juvenile delinquency or aggressive behavior.

Despite the lack of evidence to support the

marijuana/crime thesis, the NCMDA noted that the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 5

"perceptions of 1937 were perpetuated"^® when the U.S.

Congress included marijuana in provisions of the Boggs Acts

of 1951 and 1956, which greatly increased penalties for

narcotic offenses. The NCMDA (1972:132) thus quoted Senator

Price M. Daniel, Chairman of the Senate subcommittee which

considered the 1956 Act:

Marihuana is a drug which starts most addicts in the use of drugs. Marihuana, in itself a dangerous drug, can lead to some of the worst crimes committed by those who are addicted to the habit. Evidently, its use leads to the heroin habit and then to the final destruction of the persons addicted.

With the passage of the 1956 Boggs Act, however,

marijuana arrests on the federal level did not greatly

increase. It was not until the 1960s, when marijuana use

become more popular in the U.S., that federal marijuana

arrests rose. From 1965-1970, arrest statistics gathered by

the Commission (1972:133-134) revealed that federal

marijuana arrests increased six-fold: from about 500 to in

excess of 3000. State marijuana arrests increased even more

dramatically, from nearly 19,000 in 1965 to nearly 190,000

in 1970.

Although the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention

and Control Act lessened criminal marijuana penalties on the

®°The NCMDA report utilizes the word "perpetrated," not "perpetuated," in the quoted sentence in question. Due to the context of the sentence, I am assuming that the report contains a typographical error, and have therefore chosen to use the word "perpetuated" in place of "perpetrated" for the following sentence: "The perceptions of 1937 were perpetuated in the comments of Senator Price M. Daniel, Chairman of the Senate subcommittee considering the 1956 Act...."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 6

federal level, from 1970-1973, marijuana arrests still

continued to rise at a significant rate. It was not until

after the publication of the 1972 NCMDA report that the

majority of states followed suit and lessened criminal

marijuana penalties.^’

The NCMDA found, after administering opinion surveys to

a variety of citizens and criminal justice officials in

regards to the enforcement of marijuana laws, that the

consensus of public and criminal justice system opinion was

that the punishment being meted out for marijuana-related

crimes was excessive. The report concluded (1972:157);

In sum, the existing system is not supported by the consensus of public opinion that once existed. There is a consensus that punitive measures are generally inappropriate. There is also a predominant opinion that the legal system should not abandon formal control.

Moving from the foundation that the criminalization of

marijuana is excessive, the Commission next wrestled with

the question of a "social control policy for marihuana.

In so doing, it identified four social control options for

marijuana use (1972:161):

^’Marijuana arrests virtually doubled in the U.S. from 1970, when nearly 200,000 marijuana arrests took place nationwide, to 1973. Despite the lessening of penalties for marijuana possession that took place across the U.S. following the publication of the NCMDA report, marijuana arrests have remained constant for the past twenty years, at approximately 400,000 annually.

^^Although the Commission used the term "social control," it did not define it. Social control, which has been discussed in earlier chapters, refers to the regulation of human behavior in or by a social group.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 7

I. Approval of Use. II. Elimination of Use. III. Discouragement of Use. IV. Neutrality Toward Use.

Using the following rationale, the Commission then

rejected option one. Approval of Use, and option two.

Elimination of Use (1972:162-164):

(I) official approval would inevitably encourage some people to use the drug who would not otherwise do so.

(II) the eliminationist policy..., if taken seriously, would require a great increase in manpower and resources in order to eliminate the use of a drug which simply does not warrant that kind of attention.

The question then before the Commission was whether to

urge the adoption of an official policy of neutrality or

discouragement. In answering this question (1972:165), the

Commission drew a historic parallel between contemporary

marijuana policy with the repeal of alcohol prohibition in

1933:”

There are many today who feel that if the social impact of alcohol use had then been more fully understood, a policy of discouragement rather than neutrality would have been adopted to minimize the negative aspects of alcohol use. Misunderstanding also played an important part when the national government adopted an eliminationist marihuana policy in 1937. The policy makers knew very little about the effects or social impact of the drug; many of their hypotheses were speculative and, in large measure, incorrect.

”Alcohol prohibition was initiated by the U.S. Congress in 1919 through the passage of the Volstead Act, which upon ratification by the states became the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It went into effect in 1920, and was repealed by Congress in 1933 through the enactment of the Twenty First Amendment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 8

"Nevertheless," the Commission continued, "the argument

that misinformation in 1937 automatically compels complete

reversal of the action taken at that time is neither

reasonable or logical." Apparently fearing anarchy, chaos

and social unrest if a neutrality policy were to be adopted,

the Commission instead opted for a policy of discouragement

(1972:164-166):

a sudden abandonment of an official policy of elimination in favor of one of neutrality toward marihuana would have a profound reverberating impact on social attitudes far beyond the one issue of marihuana use. We believe that society must have time to consider its image of the future. We believe that adoption of a discouragement policy toward marihuana at this time would facilitate such a reappraisal while official neutrality... would impede it.

Thus, the Commission put forth its first recommendation

(1972:168):

For these reasons, we recommend to the public and its policy-makers a social control policy seeking to discourage marihuana use, while concentrating primarily on the prevention of heavy and very heavy use.

To implement its marijuana discouragement policy, the

Commission considered three legal policies, "each with a

wide range of alternatives" (1972, 173-190):

(1) Total Prohibition,

(2) Regulation, and

(3) Partial Prohibition.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 9

Total Prohibition

Total Prohibition is similar in philosophy to the

marijuana use Elimination Policy option. The NCMDA rejected

Total Prohibition as a legal policy option, for it was

viewed as an impossible means of implementing the

Commission's social control model of choice, the

Discouragement Policy.

The three arguments put forth by the Commission against

Total Prohibition were (1972:175-184):

(1) Application of the Criminal Law to Private Possession Is Philosophically Inappropriate: it stigmatizes marijuana users as criminals;

(2) Application of the Criminal Law Is Constitutionally Suspect: the possibilities of invasion of personal privacy and selective enforcement of the law would continue;

(3) Total Prohibition Is Functionally Inappropriate: the symbolic status of marihuana smoking as an anti-establishment act would be perpetuated.

The Commission concluded that (1972:183-184):

the [marijuana] possession offense is of little functional benefit to the discouragement policy and carries heavy social costs.... the better method is persuasion rather than prosecution.

Regulation

Another word for regulation is legalization. "The

distinguishing feature of this technique is that it

institutionalizes the availability of the drug [b]y

establishing a legitimate channel of supply and

distribution" (1972:184). The NCMDA unanimously found the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 0

regulation policy alternative to be unacceptable, "no matter

how tightly it might restrict consumption," citing the

following four reasons (1972:184-188):

(1) Adoption of a Regulatory Scheme At This Time Would Inevitably Signify Approval of Use;

(2) Adoption of a Regulatory Scheme Might Generate a Significant Public Health Problem;

(3) Adoption of a Regulatory Scheme Would Exacerbate Social Conflict and Frustrate a Deemphasis Policy;

(4) Lack of Knowledge About Cannabis Regulatory Models.

The Commission ended its discussion of marijuana

regulation marijuana by speculating that " [f]uture policy-

planners might well come to a different conclusion" on the

basis of five "ifs" (1972:187):

(1) if further study of existing schemes suggests a feasible model;

(2) if responsible use of the drug does indeed take root in our society;

(3) if continuing scientific and medical research uncovers no long-term ill effects;

(4) if potency control appears feasible; and

(5) if the passage of time and the adoption of a rational social policy sufficiently desymbolizes marihuana so that availability is not equated in the public mind with approval.

Partial Prohibition

Partial Prohibition is decriminalization. This legal

policy option keeps criminal penalties in place for

marijuana sales but removes them for personal use and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 1

nonprofit distribution of small amounts of the drug. In

choosing the Partial Prohibition model as the means of

implementing its Discouragement Policy, the NCMDA stated

(19721188-189):

The total prohibition scheme was rejected primarily because no sufficiently compelling social reason, predicated on existing knowledge, justifies intrusion by the criminal justice system into the private lives of individuals who use marihuana. ...we have also rejected the regulatory or legalization scheme because it would institutionalize availability of a drug which has uncertain long-term effects and which may be of transient social interest.

The NCMDA then listed seven reasons to support its

policy choice. Paraphrased here, they are (1972:189);

1. Symbolic societal discouragement of marijuana use.

2. Scientific pursuit of knowledge about marijuana.

3. Encouragement of a multidimensional approach to reducing the irresponsible use of marijuana.

4. Removing criminal stigmatization of marijuana use.

5. Freeing law enforcement to pursue more serious crime.

6. Relieving the courts of the burden of processing a large volume of marijuana possession cases.

7. Maximizing the flexibility of future public policy choices regarding marijuana use.

Thus, among the most significant recommendations of the

Commission's 1972 report were the following:”

(1) Possession of marihuana for personal use would no longer be an offense, but marihuana possessed in public would remain contraband subject to summary seizure and forfeiture.

”The NCMDA's recommendation regarding the medical use of marijuana is included in Chapter 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 2

(2) Casual distribution of small amounts of marihuana for no remuneration, or insignificant remuneration not involving profit would no longer be an offense.

Although the NCMDA recommended that a second Commission

be appointed to review the marijuana situation four years

after its 1973 report was published, the recommendation was

not implemented. Instead, that responsibility was assumed

by a committee of the National Research Council, which is

the research arm of the National Academy of Sciences

(NAS).” As we shall see, the NAS Committee's report not

only fell on deaf ears, but was virtually buried. According

to one of the report's authors” , after the initial impact

generated by publicity about the report, it "dropped like a

stone into the ocean and the ripples disappeared and it

hasn't been heard from since." In the following pages, we

will resurrect the National Academy of Sciences report by

reviewing its seemingly long forgotten contents.

”Thc National Academy of Science's report by its National Research Council's Committee on Substance Abuse and Habitual Behavior will hereafter be cited as "NAS."

”july 19, 1993 personal communication with Dean Gerstein, who was the report's Study Director.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 3

The Report of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences; 1978-1982

In 1978, the Committee on Substance Abuse and Habitual

Behavior of the National Academy of Sciences' National

Research Council commenced a study of marijuana policy with

the support and at the request of the U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services' National Institute on Drug Abuse

(NIDA).

The National Academy of Sciences Committee "took as a

framework for its task" the NCMDA's recommendation that a

follow-up commission be established (NAS, 1982:xi).

The findings of the Committee were published in a 1982

monograph entitled An Analysis of Marijuana Policy, which

begins where the report of the National Commission on

Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Marihuana; A Signal of

Misunderstandina. left off.

Specifically, the Committee addressed the policy option

alternatives presented by the NCMDA: Total Prohibition

(prohibition of use and supply), Partial Prohibition

(prohibition of supply) and Regulation (legalization). In

commenting on the dominance of the total prohibition model

in U.S. marijuana policy, the Committee noted that " [i]t is

important to recognize that to allow the inertia developed

by existing policies to prevent change is itself a choice."

In the report's preface, the Committee stressed that

policy-making is part and parcel of a political process

which involves "value-governed" choices (1982:xii).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 4

Although fifteen of the eighteen Committee members were

considered to be "hard," as opposed to "social"

scientists,” An Analysis of Marijuana Policy ultimately

came to be criticized for being political, and not

scientific, in nature.

Such sentiment was typified by a Louisiana newspaper

editorial encaptioned "Risky Departure From Science" fBaton

Rouge State-Times. July 10, 1982):

Suppose for a moment that someone in your immediate family required brain surgery. Would you go to an architect, to an engineer, to an attorney, or to a neurosurgeon? Of course it's a silly question, but it points up a fundamental error in a recommendation made recently by a committee of the National Academy of Sciences.... the fact that the report was issued by a committee of the National Academy of Sciences begs the question: what discipline of science - biology, chemistry, physics, medicine - was used to reach the conclusions in the report? Of course there is none. The recommendations are political in nature, and ... for a committee of scientists to go beyond the investigation and analysis of scientific data, yet issue a report under the NAS banner, risks the reputation of the [NAS].

The claims that the report was unscientific permitted

its critics to reject its two scientific premises: (1) a

policy of partial prohibition of marijuana does not lead to

increased use of the substance, and (2) scientific evidence

does not support generally held negative beliefs about

®^The three "social scientists" included as committee members were sociologist Howard Becker, economist Thomas Schelling and law professor John Kaplan. Additional committee members were pharmacologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, a geneticist and an epidemiologist. Kaplan, in a 1982 letter to the editor of Science magazine, was of the opinion that psychologists are not social scientists, a point that may be disputed by medical doctors.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 5

marijuana use. The second point was bolstered by findings

of a 1982 National Academy of Science's Institute of

Medicine report. Marijuana and Health, the summary of which

was attached as an appendix to An Analysis of Marijuana

Policy. The Committee thus stated (1982:4):

Over the past 40 years, marijuana has been accused of causing an array of antisocial effects, including: in the 1930s, provoking crime and violence; in the early 1950s, leading to heroin addiction; and in the late 1960s, making people passive, lowering motivation and productivity, and destroying the American work ethic in young people. Although beliefs in these effects persist among many people, they have not been substantiated by scientific evidence.

The first scientific premise of the report: that a

policy of Partial Prohibition does not lead to increased

marijuana use, was formulated on the basis of reviewing

available data of states which had decriminalized marijuana

since the NCMDA report was published. The NAS Committee

found (NAS, 1982:13):

Reports from California, Oregon and Maine indicate no appreciable increase in use following decriminalization of use, at least in the short term.

Like the NCMDA, the NAS Committee concluded that while

marijuana is not a harmless drug, it could not support a

national marijuana policy of Total Prohibition (which it

renamed as "Complete Prohibition"), a policy which it found

to be harmful to both the individual and society at large.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 6

The Committee found that aside from the economic costs

of considerable law enforcement-related expenditures, the

social costs of maintaining a Complete Prohibition policy

included (NAS, 1982:18-21):

(1) the corruption of public officials

(2) illegal marijuana market-related violence, and

(3) a likelihood that through the illegal drug market, marijuana users gain access to illicit drugs which are more harmful than cannabis.

The Committee thus concluded (NAS, 1982:29):

the present federal policy of complete prohibition falls far short of its goal — preventing use.... It can no longer be argued that use would be much more widespread and the problematic effects greater today if the policy of complete prohibition did not exist: The existing evidence on policies of partial prohibition indicates that partial prohibition has been as effective in controlling consumption as complete prohibition and has entailed considerably smaller, social, legal and economic costs. On balance, therefore, we believe that a policy of partial prohibition is clearly preferable to a policy of complete prohibition of supply and use.

Thus, the question before the Committee (1982:24) was

whether to support a policy of Partial Prohibition or that

of Regulation. "In pragmatic terms," the Committee stated:

the issue is whether more harm would be done, overall, by retaining the partly effective, costly prohibition of supply or by moving to a system of legalized regulated sales— wherein presumably more people would use more marijuana, but some of the costs imposed by prohibition of supply would be removed.

Under a Regulation policy, marijuana possession,

cultivation, manufacture, importation, distribution and

sales would no longer necessarily be illegal. Instead, as

with regulatory alcohol policies adopted by U.S. states upon

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 7

the 1933 repeal of alcohol prohibition, individual states

would regulate the market as they saw fit. In today’s

United States, statewide alcohol control policies vary from

some state to state. Some "dry" states have retained

alcohol prohibition, some utilize monopoly control through

state stores, and others utilize licensed private stores for

retail purposes.

Under a regulatory marijuana policy, states and

localities would regulate "taxes, retail sales, hours of

availability [and] age limits," while national marijuana

controls would be placed on "importation, potency,

packaging, labeling [and] advertising." In addition,

controls on marijuana use could be placed within federal

jurisdictions, such as national parks, and among such

systems as air transportation, which are regulated by the

federal government (NAS, 1982:24-25).

Potential advantages and disadvantages of adopting a

Regulation policy, according to the NAS Committee, would

include (NAS, 1982:17):

the disappearance of most illegal market activity, the savings in economic and social costs of law enforcement directed against illegal supply systems, better controls over the quality and safety of the product, and, possibly, increased credibility for warnings about risks. The major disadvantages are a consequence of increased marijuana use— increases in harm to physical health and to individual development and behavior.

Ultimately, whether a policy of Partial Prohibition or

Regulation were to be in place in the United States, the

Committee concluded that marijuana use could be better

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 8

discouraged and controlled through a system of informal

social controls (mechanisms such as public, family and

community education) rather than through formal methods of

social control (e.g. law enforcement and the courts).

In light of available contemporary marijuana use data

(to be discussed further in Chapter 7), what the NAS

Committee stated more than a decade ago in regards to a

RégulaLion policy may perhaps ring even truer today (NAS,

1982:27):

Because in the past two decades informal norms for controlling marijuana use have spread in the United States under conditions of greatly increased availability of marijuana, there is reason to believe that widespread uncontrolled use would not occur under regulation. Indeed regulation might facilitate patterns of controlled use by diminishing the "forbidden fruit" aspect of the drug and perhaps increasing the likelihood that an adolescent would be introduced to the drug through families and friends, who practice moderate use, rather than through their heaviest-using, most drug-involved peers.

Like the LaGuardia Report forty years earlier. An

Analysis of Marijuana Pollev received a rash of negative

publicity not so much because of its contents, but because

of how critics of the report interpreted those contents.

The President of the National Academy of Sciences, Frank

Press, began the barrage of media coverage by releasing a

June 21, 1982 cover letter to the report which disputed its

findings:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 9

My own view is that the data available to the Committee were insufficient to justify on scientific or analytical grounds changes in current policies dealing with the use of marijuana. In this respect I eim concerned that the Committee may have gone beyond its charge in stating a judgment so value-laden, that it should have been left to the political process.

Thereafter, the controversial story of the National

Academy of Sciences' director refuting an NAS report was

covered by the likes of Time magazine, the New York Times.

the Washington Post and the CBS Evening News. William

Pollin, then the director of NIDA, stated that it "would be

a terrible mistake and a public health tragedy" for the

government to do "anything that suggests a greater societal

acceptance of the use of marijuana, particularly by young

people" fNew York Times. July 8, 1982).

According to one of the report's author's. Dean

Gerstein (see note 56), Pollin criticized the report for

"sending the wrong message," and the then-NIDA director

"viewed it as an endorsement of decriminalization, which

went a couple of steps beyond what it says."

In the midst of high school marijuana use declining at

the time, Pollin voiced the concern that a change in

marijuana policies would "undercut that achievement." As

can be seen in the accompanying Table 9, self-reported

marijuana use by U.S. high school seniors did decline during

President Reagan's first term.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 0

TABLE 9

MARIJUANA USE BY U.S. HIGHS SCHOOL SENIORS (SELF-REPORTED): 1975-1984

Use CategqrY TSTÊTlTâlâSOMSlMM Within 30 Days: 27% 32% 35% 37% 37% 34% 32% 29% 27% 25%

Within 12 Months: 40% 45% 48% 50% 51% 49% 46% 44% 42% 40%

Ever Used: 47% 53% 56% 59% 60% 60% 60% 59% 57% 55%

Source: Smoking. Drinking and Illicit Drug Use Among American Secondary School Students. College Students, and Young Adults. 1975-1991. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 1

As a prelude to the marijuana control policies which

would emanate from the White House in the next ten years.

Science magazine reported on July 16, 1982 (228-229):

In recent years, the increasing use of marijuana among younger people has resulted in sharp demands from parents, in many cases well organized, for tighter controls. The Reagan Administration is regarded as likely to react negatively to any recommendations for what would be regarded as more permissive policies on marijuana.

It is fitting that a review of the NAS report and its

aftermath constitute this chapter's final steps down the

evolving road of Reefer Madness. Unlike the National

Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, but similar to the

Indian Hemp Commission Report, the Panama Canal Zone

Military Investigations, and the LaGuardia Committee Report,

the recommendations contained with An Analysis of Marijuana

Policy were not heeded by state and federal policymakers in

the United States.

"Prohibition creates crime: it does not solve crime,"

writes Aldrich (1990:544), who further notes that

philosophical differences about drug prohibition were

spelled out nearly 2500 years ago by Euripides, the Greek

tragedian:

In the fundamental drug myth of Western civilization fThe Baccchael, ... a never-ending struggle between prohibition and tolerance [is portrayed]. Pentheus, the tyrant of Thebes, tries to imprison Dionysus, the god of wine. For this hubris, Pentheus is torn apart by his own mother -emblematic of the tearing asunder of society. Those who side with Pentheus wish to control human behavior by clapping drug users in jail; those who side with Dionysus recognize the basic human desire to alter consciousness with drugs[.]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 2

This chapter has examined two alternatives to the

criminalization of marijuana: its decriminalization and its

legalization. This chapter has attempted to demonstrate

how these two policy options, which are often confused and

inappropriately interchanged with one another, differ.

The next chapter will examine an additional policy

option which is an alternative to cannabis criminalization

in the United States: the medicalization of marijuana.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 7

REEFER MADNESS REBORN

Marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active substances known to man.... In strict medical terms marijuana is far safer than many foods we commonly consume.

Administrative Law Judge Francis L. Young, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) September 6, 1988

The phenomenon of Reefer Madness is not merely a

historic artifact which we can date -like a fossil- in the

context of human history. Rather, it is an ongoing,

evolving force: an organism that is thriving in the present

day. The concluding chapter of this manuscript focuses on

two contemporary aspects of Reefer Madness in the United

States of America: (1) marijuana's prohibition as a

medicine, and (2) the anti-marijuana media campaign of the

Partnership for a Drug Free America.

Marijuana As a Medicine

In ancient times (as has been discussed in Chapter 1),

the medical use of cannabis was widespread. In modern times,

cannabis was first introduced into Western medicine in 1839

by W.B. O'Shaughnessy, a British physician serving in India

who used it in treating rabies, rheumatism, epilepsy and

183

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 4

tetanus. O'Shaughnessy found tincture of hemp (a mixture of

cannzLbis and alcohol which is taken orally) to be an

effective analgesic and muscle relaxant, and he referred to

it as "an anticonvulsive remedy of the greatest value"

(Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1993:4).

In 1850, cannabis was recognized as a medicine in The

United States Pharmacopoeia, a "highly selective" registry

of the country's most widely accepted drugs (Brecher, 1972;

405). In "its heyday" in the West, from 1840 to 1900,

cannabis was recommended for a variety of illnesses and

ailments, and more than one hundred papers were published in

the Western medical literature concerning its usefulness as

a therapeutic agent (Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1993:4).

Cannabis was used, according to the Disoensarv of the

United States of America published in 1918, "to relieve

pain, to encourage sleep, and to soothe restlessness"

(Mikuriya, 1973:343). As an analgesic, it was used to treat

migraine and other pains of neuralgic origin, and its

sedative properties were utilized in cases of hysteria and

mental depression. Cannabis remained listed in the U.S.

Pharmacopoeia until 1941, where, in the aftermath of the

passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, it was removed (Bakalar

and Grinspoon, 1993:8).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 5

The Marihuana Tax Act Revisited

In 1937, when the Marihuana Tax Act was passed in the

U.S., the stated intent of the law was not to prohibit the

use of the drug for medicinal purposes. It is clear from

reading U.S. Treasury Department statements, however, that

the Treasury Department questioned the utility of marijuana

as a medicine. R.R. Spencer, the Senior Surgeon of the U.S.

Treasury Department's Public Health Service, stated in

December, 1936 (6)

The therapeutic use of cannabis indica by physicians is today very limited. It has been used for the relief of nueralgic pain, to encourage sleep and to soothe restlessness. It is often used in corn remedies, but medical authorities do not believe it has any anaesthetic affect when applied to the skin. Its use in medicine is fast disappearing and probably can be dispensed with altogether.

In summarizing "the effect of the marihuana bill upon

legitimate industry," Clinton Hester, Assistant General

Counsel of the Treasury Department, inserted the following

®®The source cited is a U.S. Treasury Department, United States Public Health Service, Office of Public Health Education revised reprint of an article entitled "Marijuana," which originally was published in The Health Officer. Vol. 1, pp. 299-305 (December 1936). The revised reprint itself is not dated, but from the following paragraph, it appears to have been published in 1938: "As has been stated in this article, the use of marijuana as a medicine is extremely limited and it is interesting and encouraging to note that the Bureau of Narcotics has already observed a tendency among pharmaceutical firms to withdraw from the market certain products containing this drug. The early months of 1938 have witnessed an increased and more widespread interest in bringing the marijuana problem -with the serious implications of this traffic among school children- to the attention of the public."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 6

statement into the legislative record of H.R. 6385 (U.S.

House of Representatives' Committee on Ways and Means,

1937:47):

Marihuana for medicinal use.— All persons who produce, manufacture, import, or deal in marihuana or its byproducts for medical use, as well as practitioners, would be compelled by the bill to pay occupational taxes. All transfers to manufacturing chemists, druggists, and practitioners would be subject to the transfer tax and order form requirement but, such persons all being entitled to registry, the transfer tax would amount only to $1 per ounce. The final dispensation by a practitioner to a patient in the course of his professional practice or by druggists to the patients of such practitioners in pursuance of a written prescription would, however, be exempted from the transfer tax and order form provisions. Incidentally, it appears that the marihuana drug is not indispensable by the medical profession (emphasis added).

Hester's testimony before the House Committee on Ways

and Means was followed by Dr. James Munch (1937:47-52), who

was affiliated with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.”

Munch testified that:

in 1910 and in 1920, the [U.S.] Pharmacopoeia accepted cannabis as one drug for use in human medicine[.] ...In 1930 we found... that the International Committee on Standardization of Drugs of the League of Nations had not admitted cannabis because it is not used throughout the world.

Thus, stated Munch:

at this time the product which may be used is used without being standardized. But the use of it is definitely decreasing, as is shown by production

5’The reader may recall that it was Dr. James Munch who explained to us in Chapter 3 one reason why the FBN was opposed to jazz music (Sloman, 1979:145-146): "the chief effect [of marijuana] as far as they [the FBN] were concerned, is that it lengthens the sense of time.... That's what made jazz musicians. The idea that they could jazz things up, liven then up, you see."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 7

statistics and surveys of prescription ingredients___ It is disappearing; that is, its use in human medicine is decreasing.“

Munch was then asked a series of questions by a member

of the House committee:

Q: Is it [marijuana] a harmful drug?

A: Any drug that produces the degeneration of the brain is harmful. Yes; it is.

Q: In some cases does it not bring about extreme inertia?

A: Yes; it does.

Q: And it other cases it causes violent irritability?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And those results lead to a disintegration of personality, do they not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That is really the net result of the use of that drug, no matter what other effects there may be; its continued use means the disintegration of the personality of the person who uses it?

A: Yes; that is true.

The only witness to testify before Congress in

opposition to the Marihuana Tax Act was Dr. William Woodward

of the American Medical Association (AMA). His first

statement before the House Ways and Means Committee

(1937:90-91) was: "There is nothing in the medicinal use of

Cannabis that has any relation to Cannabis addiction."

“Munch stated later in his testimony (U.S. House of Representatives, 1937:52) that "In 1932 and 1933 an ingredient survey was made, a study of the components of 122,000 prescriptions. It was found that cannabis was prescribed only four or five times per 10,000."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 8

Dr. Woodward stated that marijuana's "medicinal use has

greatly decreased," in part because of the "variations in

the potency of the drug as coming from particular plants,"

and then went on to comment:

To say however, as has been proposed here, that the use of the drug should be prevented by a prohibitive tax, loses sight of the fact that future investigation may show that there are substantial medicinal uses for cannabis.

Dr. Woodward cited three specific areas where cannabis

proved useful as a medicine (1937:91):

(1) for the preparation of corn cures; (2) as a sedative; and (3) as an anti-spasmodic.

Citing Indian hemp's "remarkable properties in

revealing the subconscious," Dr. Woodward additionally

stated that cannabis "can be used for psychological,

psychoanalytical, and psychotherapeutic research."

Dr. Woodward testified that physicians would not object

seriously to the payment of a tax of a dollar a year, but

that they would "object to paying fees that they have to pay

and the execution of forms and special records" (1937:107).

When asked, he voiced his opinion that federal anti

marijuana legislation was unnecessary (1937:115). From that

point onward, his testimony was continually cut off by

members of the House Ways and Means Committee (1937:115-

118). Chairman Robert Doughton of North Carolina, the

sponsor of the Marihuana Tax Act, then chastised the AMA

representative (1937:116):

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 9

If you want to advise us on legislation, you ought to come here with some constructive proposals, rather than criticism, rather than trying to throw obstacles in the way of something that the Federal Government is trying to do.

Dr. Woodward responded:

We cannot understand yet, Mr. Chairman, why this bill should have been prepared in secret for 2 years without any intimation, even to the profession, that it was being prepared.

When hearings on H.R. 6906 were held before a

subcommittee of the Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate

two months later, the Treasury Department's Assistant

General Counsel, Clinton Hester, ignored Dr. Woodward's

House testimony but incorporated that of Dr. Munch into his

own (U.S. Senate, 1937:5):

The drug is used only to a negligible extent by the medical profession. In fact, last year only 4 out of every 10,000 prescriptions contained marihuana. The drug is prescribed as a sedative, but it is used very rarely by the medical profession because the effect of the drug is so variable that a physician cannot tell how his patient will react to the drug and because there are so many better substitutes.*’

Dr. Woodward's foreseen objections by the medical

community proved to be prophetic. After the Marihuana Tax

Act became law, burdensome paperwork requirements and FBN

"anti-diversion" regulations served to effectively

*’Besides the two reasons mentioned: the development of new and better drugs and the variability of available preparations of cannabis, two additional factors contributed to the declining rate at which cannabis was prescribed. They were: (3) that cannabis is "very insoluble in water and thus not amenable to injectable preparations," and (4) when taken orally, cannabis "has an unusually long (1- to 2- hour) latency to onset of action" (Ray and Ksir, 1987:312).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 0

discourage physicians from prescribing cannabis (Bakalar and

Grinspoon, 1993:8). Once removed from the United States

Pharmacopoeia and National Formularv. cannabis became a

medical dinosaur. Marijuana's legal status as a medicine

remain unchanged until 1970, when it was prohibited for

medical use through Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse

and Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which is also known

as the 1970 Controlled Substances Act.*^

The Prohibition on Medical Marijuana

The 1970 Controlled Substances Act classified cannabis

as a Schedule I drug, one with no accepted medical use and

a high potential for abuse.“

In 1972, the National Organization for the Reform of

Marijuana Laws (NORML) filed a petition with the U.S.

Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration

(DBA) to enable cannabis to be used in the U.S.A. for

*^Over the years. Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 has been referred to as the Controlled Substances Act. Trebach (1982:300) clarifies the confusion that has led "some observers to believe that two laws, rather than one, are involved."

*%nder the U.S. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which also decreased criminal penalties for marijuana nationwide, all controlled substances (drugs) were categorized within one of five categories, called schedules. A Schedule I drug, such as heroin, is considered to have a high potential for abuse and no accepted medical use. A Schedule II drug, such as morphine, has a high potential for abuse and accepted medical value. Schedule III, IV and V drugs are available for medicinal purposes under successively less restrictive conditions than Schedule II drugs, with Schedule V being the least restrictive.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 1

medicinal purposes. Citing marijuana's "accepted medical

uses in treatment" and claiming that the drug "is safe for

use under medical supervision," the petition requested that

cannabis' drug control status be changed from a Schedule I

drug, which is prohibited for medical use in the United

States, to a Schedule II drug, which can be used for

medicinal purposes.

In 1980, after years of delay, the case, then-entitled

NORML V. PEA.** was remanded by the United States Court of

Appeals to the Drug Enforcement Administration for further

proceedings. Years later, in 1987, the actual

administrative hearings, before DEA's Administrative Law

Judge Francis L. Young, finally commenced.

In 1988, Judge Young recommended to the DEA

Administrator that cannabis be transferred from Schedule I

to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. Among

Judge Young's "Findings of Fact" and "Conclusion and

Recommended Decision" were (Young, 1988:56-68);

1. First, the record on marijuana encompasses 5,000 years of human experience.

2. Second, marijuana is now used daily by enormous numbers of people throughout the world [including] from twenty million to fifty million Americans.

**In more recent years, the case has been entitled Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics fACTI v. DEA. The three petitioners in the case: ACT, NORML (the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws) and the Drug Policy Foundation, were later joined in their legal challenge by the Physicians Association for AIDS Care and the Lymphoma Foundation of America.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 2

3. Nearly all medicines have toxic, potentially lethal effects... [but] marijuana is not such a substance. There is no record in the extensive medical literature describing a proven, documented cannabis-induced fatality.

4. By contrast aspirin, a commonly used, over-the- counter medicine, causes hundreds of deaths each year.

5. In strict medical terms marijuana is far safer than many foods we commonly consume. For example, eating ten raw potatoes can result in a toxic response. By comparison, it is physically impossible to eat enough marijuana to induce death.

6. Marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active substance known to man. By any measure of rational analysis marijuana can be used within a supervised routine of medical care.

7. There are those who, in all sincerety [sic], argue that the transfer of marijuana to Schedule II will "send a signal" that marijuana is "OK" generally for recreational use. This argument is specious.

8. The fear of sending such a signal cannot be permitted to override the legitimate need, amply demonstrated in this record, of countless suffers [sic] for the relief marijuana can provide when prescribed by a physician in a legitimate case.

9. The evidence in this record clearly shows that marijuana has been accepted as capable of relieving the distress of great numbers of very ill people, and doing so with safety under medical supervision. It would be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious for the DEA to continue to stand between those sufferers and the benefits of this substance in light of the evidence in this record.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 3

10. The administrative law judge recommends that the [DEA] Administrator conclude that the marijuana plant considered as a whole has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, that there is no lack of accepted safety for use of it under medical supervision and that it may lawfully be transferred from Schedule I to Schedule II. The judge recommends that the Administrator transfer marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule II.

On December 29, 1988, John Lawn, then the DEA

Administrator, rejected Judge Young's recommendation,

contending that medicalizing marijuana would "send the wrong

signal" to the citizens of the United States. In doing so,

the DEA Administrator characterized claims of marijuana's

medical usefulness as a "dangerous and cruel hoax." "The

judge seems to hang his hat on what he calls a respectable

minority of physicians," asserted DEA Administrator Lawn.

Ignoring a 1991 Harvard University study which found that

nearly half of 1035 cancer specialists who responded to a

survey reported that they would prescribe marijuana to their

patients if it were legal to do so. Lawn asked: "What

percent [of physicians] are you talking about? One half of

one percent? One quarter of one percent?" (Grinspoon and

Bakalar, 1993:17)

The DEA Administrator's decision was appealed, and in

1991, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered the

DEA to reexamine its standards used to prohibit the medical

*®Within months of this decision, the then-DEA Administrator, John Lawn, resigned from the DEA to become Vice President and chief of operations for the New York Yankees major league baseball team.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 4

use of marijuana. Despite the court's suggestion that the

standards were "illogical," it did not challenge the DEA's

contention that marijuana lacks therapeutic value"

(Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1993:17).

In 1992, DEA's new administrator, Robert Bonner,

formulated an official policy which simply incorporated the

position previously articulated by former DEA Administrator

Lawn. That 1992 policy was then appealed by the plaintiffs

in the case. On February 18, 1994, the DEA's decision was

upheld by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of

Appeals.**

Despite the positions of the DEA and the U.S. Court of

Appeals, as depicted in Table 10, patients and doctors alike

attest that cannabis has proven to be an effective, or at

least a promising, therapeutic agent for a variety of

maladies and ailments.

**Judge James L. Buckley, who wrote the opinion for the court, was joined by Chief Judge Abner J. Mikva and Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg. Somewhat ironically, Ginsburg's earlier nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court had been upended when it was revealed that he had smoked marijuana in the past.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 5

TABLE 1 0

CURRENT AND POTENTIAL USES OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA

Disease Use

AIDS Appetite Stimulant Builds Up Immune System

Asthma Relieves Bronchial Spasms and Reverses Bronchial Constriction; as a Bronchodilator Allows a Freer Air Flow In and Out of Lungs

Cancer Reduces Severe Nausea and Vomiting Caused By Chemotherapy Treatments

Chronic Pain Analgesic and Sedative, in Ointment, Oral THC and Smoked Form, with Fewer Physical Side Effects than other Commonly Used Analgesics

Depression Anti-Depressant Without the Side Effects and Mood Associated with Conventional Chemical Disorders Treatments

Dystonias Improves Abnormal Movements and Postures that Result from Prolonged Spasms or Muscle Contractions Often Produced by Anti-Psychotic Neuroleptic Drugs

Epilepsy Anti-Convulsant Properties Prevent Epileptic Seizures

Glaucoma Relieves Intraocular Pressure Within the Eye, thus Preventing Blindness

Hyperemesis Relieves Chronic Nausea and Vomiting Gravidaram with this Greatly Heightened Form of Morning Sickness; Intravenous Feeding or Standard Antiemetic Drugs are Considered to be a Greater Risk to the Fetus than is Cannabis

Infections Anti-Bacterial Effects On Micro-Organisms, Including Strains of Staphylococcus, that Resist Penicillin and Other Antibiotics

Insomnia Hypnotic Effects Produced by Cannabinol Induce Sleep

Kidney Controls Spasms of Severe Nausea and Failure Hiccoughs Caused by Renal Failure

Labor Pain Pain Relief

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 6

TABLE 10 (CONTINUED)

PRESENT DAY AND POTENTIAL USES OF CANNABIS AS A MEDICINE

Disease Use

Menstrual Pain Relief Cramps

Migraine Prevents and Alleviates Symptoms of Intractable Headaches

Multiple Muscle Relaxer Prevents Muscle Spasms and Sclerosis Restores Motor Coordination; Minimizes Side Effects, Including Weight Gain, Mood Swings, Drowsiness and Lethargy, of Conventional Treatments

Muscular Muscle Relaxer Prevents Muscle Spasms and Dystrophy Restores Motor Coordination

Paraplegia & Pain Relief and Suppresses Muscle Jerks and Quadriplegia Tremors Caused by Weakness or Paralysis of Muscles in the Lower Body

Pruritis Relieves Severe Itching and Enables Related Patches of Inflamed Skin to Heal

Tumors Animal Studies Suggest that Some Cannabinoids Have Tumor-Reducing Properties

Sources: Grinspoon (1971), Grinspoon and Bakalar (1993), Mikuriya (1973), and Randall (1990, 1991a, 1991b)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 7

Marijuana's status as a "forbidden medicine" (Grinspoon

and Bakalar, 1993), one which is used illegally by patients

suffering from the effects of AIDS, cancer, glaucoma and

other diseases, continues to the present day. Despite its

current prohibition for medical use, on an extremely limited

basis, a few patients across the country receive marijuana

from the federal government through an experimental research

program administered by the Department of Health and Human

Services (HHS). That program, built around the concept of

an Investigative New Drug (IND), was begun in the late 1970s

because of pressure exerted upon the federal government by

the states.

HHS' "Compassionate Relief Program"

In 1972, The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug

Abuse stated (1972: 222):

Historical references have been noted throughout the literature referring to the use of cannabis products as therapeutically useful agents. Of particular significance... would be investigations into the treatment of glaucoma, migraine, alcoholism and terminal cancer. The NIMH-FDA Psychotomimetic Advisory Committee's authorization of studies designed to explore therapeutic uses of marihuana is commended.

The NCMDA thus recommended:

Increased Support of Studies which evaluate the efficacy of marihuana in the treatment of physical impairments and disease is recommended.

In 1976, a patient became the first person to receive

medicinal marijuana from the federal government. Through

the medicinal use of marijuana, that patient, Robert

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 8

Randall, who was diagnosed with glaucoma in 1972 told that

he had a maximum of five years of remaining sight, has

retained his vision to the present day. Randall describes

the scenario which led him to become the first individual

Treatment, or compassionate Use, IND recipient (Grinspoon

and Bakalar, 1993:46-52):

[S]omeone gave me a couple of joints. Sweet weed!... So simple!... You smoke pot, your eye strain goes away.— So, I accept that an illegal, medically prohibited weed may help me not go blind.... [In 1975] I phoned around the federal bureaucracy. Needless to say, I was startled when at least three bureaucrats point-blank told me, "Oh, we know marihuana helps glaucoma. We have lots of data..." They knew, but did not want anyone else to know.... In May 1976, I petitioned federal drug agencies for immediate access to government supplies of marihuana.... In November 1976, the bureaucrats cracked. They delivered a tin of three hundred pre-rolled marihuana cigarettes to my new doctor.... My first year of smoking was not tranquil. In fact, it turned into a running battle. I'd speak out. The bureaucrats would try to clamp down. Very unpleasant. Increasing news coverage unhinged the bureaucrats. Other patients were expecting help. [In] 1978, the feds... cut off my legal line of supply. I countered by suing. Twenty-four hours after the suit was filed, we arrived at an out-of-court settlement which is still in effect. This settlement assures me of medically appropriate (non-research) access to marihuana to meet my legitimate therapeutic needs.

Table 11 shows us that from 1978-1991, thirty five

states in the United States passed laws that allow marijuana

to be used for treatment purposes. More than two thirds of

these state laws (twenty four, or sixty nine percent) were

passed while President Carter was in office, twenty six

percent (nine) were passed during the Reagan presidency, and

six percent (two) were passed while President Bush occupied

the White House.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 9

TABLE 1 1

STATES WITH LAWS THAT PERMIT MARIJUANA'S MEDICAL USE

State Date Sianed Into Law

Alabama July, 1979

Alaska "early 1980s"

Arizona April, 1980

Arkansas April, 1981

California July, 1979

Colorado June, 1979

Connecticut July, 1981

Florida June, 1978

Georgia February, 1980

Illinois September, 1978

Iowa June, 1979

Louisiana May, 1978 (amended; July, 1991)

Maine August, 1979

Massachusetts December, 1991

Michigan October, 1979

Minnesota April, 1980

Montana April, 1979

Nevada June, 1979

New Hampshire April, 1981

New Jersey March, 1981

New Mexico February, 1978

New York June, 1980

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200

TABLE 11 (CONTINUED)

STATES WITH LAWS THAT PERMIT MARIJUANA'S MEDICAL USE

State Date Sianed Into Law

North Carolina June 1979

Ohio March, 1980

Oklêihoma March, 1981

Oregon June, 1979

Rhode Island May, 1980

South Carolina February, 1980

Tennessee April, 1981

Texas June, 1979

Vermont April, 1981

Virginia March, 1979

Washington March, 1979

West Virginia March, 1979

Wisconsin April, 1982

(Source: Randall and O'Leary, 1993)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201

Despite state laws which permit marijuana's use as a

medicine, the federal classification of cannabis as a

Schedule I drug has severely limited marijuana's use for

medicinal purposes in those states. For marijuana to be

legally used as a medicine in those states, one of two

scenarios would have to take place: (1) the federal

government would authorize states to dispense marijuana as a

medicine in conjunction with establishing formal IND

research programs, or (2) the state legislature would have

to pass a law which allows the cultivation of a small amount

of marijuana for medical purposes.*^

If marijuana is an effective drug which doctors

recommend to ameliorate the effects of diseases such as

cancer and AIDS, how could it possibly be a prohibited

medicine in the United States? Quite simply, the answer is

politics. Just as the demise of the marijuana

decriminalization movement in the U.S. can be traced to a

lack of federal leadership (DiChiara and Galliher, 1994),

the same case can be made to explain why cannabis cannot be

prescribed for patients who would benefit from its medicinal

use. As has been illustrated by the 1992 case of Maine,

moreover, this lack of leadership is absent not only on the

federal level, but also on the state level. Any of the

*^In 1992, the legislature in Maine passed such a marijuana cultivation bill, but it was subsequently vetoed by the governor, and the legislature thereafter failed to override the veto (Randall and O'Leary, 1993:54).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202

thirty five states which have medicinal cannabis laws on the

books could pass a law which would permit the cultivation of

small amounts of marijuana for medicinal purposes. We can

assume that such laws have yet to be proposed in state

legislatures, however, because of the fear of "sending the

wrong message." Political leadership on the state and

federal levels would at least create the opportunity for

public dialogue on the issue of medical marijuana.

The federal IND program, created in the late 1970s at

the behest of a number of the states listed in Table 11, is

ironically also referred to as the "Compassionate Relief

Program." Administered by the Department of Health and

Human Services, the program was begun during the presidency

of Jimmy Carter and was abruptly discontinued by the Bush

administration in March, 1992. The experimental program

was designed to provide medicinal marijuana to patients

suffering from a variety of diseases, including cancer and

glaucoma.

Like the doctors who attempted to prescribe marijuana

in the late 1930s and early 1940s, physicians who applied to

the federal government for INDS during the late 1970s

through the early 1990s experienced a similar "regulatory

nightmare" (Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1993:18). Saddled with

burdensome bureaucratic paperwork and frustrated by forms

and requirements, physicians were discouraged from applying

for INDS to the federal government. As a result, few

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 3

patients were granted "Compassionate INDS." Nationwide,

from 1976-1989, only fourteen patients were admitted to the

program and thereby able to legally smoke medicinal

marijuana.

In 1991, the medical marijuana issue was brought to the

public's attention after the news media reported the story

of Kenneth and Barbra Jenks. Kenneth, a hemophiliac, had

contracted AIDS through a blood transfusion and thereafter

transmitted the disease to his wife. "Both were suffering

from nausea, vomiting, and appetite loss caused by AIDS or

AZT [an anti-AIDS medication]; their doctor feared that

Barbra Jenks would die of starvation before the disease

killed her." The couple learned about marijuana's use as an

illicit medicine through an AIDS support group, and they

began to smoke it. "They felt better, regained lost weight

and were able to stay out of the hospital; Kenneth Jenks

even kept his full-time job" (Grinspoon and Bakalar,

1993:21-22).

In 1990, the Jenks' were arrested and convicted of the

felony charge of cultivating marijuana. On appeal, their

conviction, on the basis of their medical necessity

defense,*® was overturned. Thereafter, the Jenks' formed

*®In 1976, the rarely-used "medical necessity" defense was successfully employed in a District of Columbia Superior Court to acquit Robert Randall of cultivating marijuana (Grinspoon and Bakalar:49-52). Despite Randall's claim that his case marked the "first successful articulation of the 'medical necessity' defense in the history of English Common Law," Trebach (1987:314) cites its successful use in New Hampshire at the turn of the century.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 4

the Marijuana-AIDS Research Service, a project of the

Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, an organization founded

by Robert Randall. The MARS Project helped more than four

hundred AIDS sufferers submit valid applications for a

"Compassionate IND."

In June of 1991, in the midst of the anti-drug climate

which emanated from the Bush White House, the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services announced that it

would phase out its "Compassionate Relief Program."

Utilizing the exact argument that Judge Young had declared

to be specious three years earlier, the chief of the Public

Health Service, James Mason, stated why the decision had

been made to cut off the legal access of marijuana to sick

people (Isikoff, 1991):

If it's perceived that the Public Health Service is going around giving marijuana to folks, there would be a perception that this stuff can't be so bad. It gives a bad signal. I don't mind doing that if there's no other way of helping these people.... But there's not a shred of evidence that smoking marijuana assists a person with AIDS.

The program was not terminated until March 1992, a few

months after the CBS television program "60 Minutes"

reported on the Jenks' and MARS. With the closing of the

program, the hundreds of pending IND applications were

simply filed away, and the twenty eight patients whose post-

MAR5 applications had been approved will not receive legal

medicinal marijuana. As of March 1992, twelve patients

would continue to receive medical marijuana through the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 5

"Compassionate IND Program," but with the death of Barbra

Jenks that month, the number of nationwide IND patients

dropped to eleven. When Kenneth Jenks succumbed to AIDS in

July 1992, the number of patients in the program fell to

ten.

Reefer Madness Revisited

When DEA Administrator Lawn rejected DEA Administrative

Law Judge Young's recommendation to reclassify cannabis from

Schedule I to Schedule II in December 1988, George Bush had

recently been elected president. Unlike when President

Carter was in office a decade earlier, marijuana, as

reflected in public opinion polls and through its portrayal

by the media, was no longer seen as a relatively benign

drug. Clearly, whatever momentum that had existed in the

1970s to lessen criminal penalties against marijuana had

dissipated by 1990.**

Table 12 reports on Gallup Poll responses to the

question: "What do you think is the most important problem

facing the country today?" While in January 1985, only two

**The following two tables have been devised from the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, published by the U.S. Department of Justice. It is interesting to note that while the 1987 Sourcebook lists "MARIHUANA Decriminalization" in its index and in Table 1.79 (1988:112-115 and 610), such information is absent in the 1988 Sourcebook (1989) and in subsequent years.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 6

percent of the respondents cited "drugs" or "drug abuse,

the answer rose to twenty seven percent by May 1989, and a

mere six months later, in November 1989, to thirty eight

percent. In the same period of time, from 1985 to 1989, the

answers in two other categories: "crime," and "the economy

(general)" remained relatively stable.

Table 12 reveals that as concern about drugs rose, the

three categories of "high cost of living," "unemployment,"

and "the federal budget deficit" collectively declined as

the most important problem facing the nation (from forty

nine percent in 1985 to twelve percent in November 1989).

In 1989, undoubtedly influenced by the break up of the

Soviet Union and the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the

category of "fear of war," was cited by only one percent of

the U.S. public as the country's most important problem,

whereas twenty seven percent of those polled cited it in

1985.

Table 12 shows us that as the decade of the 1980s came

to a close, the public's fear of Communism had been replaced

by the fear of drugs. Concerns about the economy,

meanwhile, had been swept under the proverbial rug.

Drugs" and "Drug Abuse" were first listed as responses to the Gallup Poll's "Attitude Toward the Most Important problem Facing the Country" in 1985.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 7

TABLE 1 2

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING THE UNITED STATES: 1985-1989

Cateaorv 1/85 7/86 4/87 9/88 5/89 11/89

Crime 4% 3% 3% 2% 6% 3%

Drugs 2% 8% 11% 11% 27% 38%

Economy (general) 6% 7% 10% 12% 8% 7%

Fear of War 27% 22% 23% 5% 2% 1%

Federal Budget Deficit 18% 13% 11% 12% 7% 7%

High Cost of Living 11% 4% 5% 2% 3% 2%

Unemployment 20% 23% 13% 9% 6% 3%

Source: Various issues of The Gallup Report, as cited in Table 2.1 of the 1991 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1992: U.S. Department of Justice, p. 172).

Table 13 reveals that in 1992, a presidential election

year, the problem of drugs took a back seat in the vehicle

of public opinion to the related issues of the economy and

unemployment. Whereas only twelve percent of the public had

cited the categories of "high cost of living,"

"unemployment," and "the federal budget deficit" as the most

important problem facing the U.S. at the end of 1989, by

March 1992, that figure had risen to thirty nine percent,

with twenty five percent of those respondents citing

"unemployment" as the country's most pressing problem.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 8

The category of "the economy (general)" jumped from

seven percent (1989) to forty two percent (1992), replacing

"drugs," which fell from thirty eight percent to eight

percent in the same time period, as the most important

problem perceived by the U.S. public. Meanwhile, the

category "fear of war" was removed as a response by the 1992

Gallup Poll.

TABLE 13

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING THE UNITED STATES: 1985-1992

Cateaorv 1/85 7/86 4/87 9/88 5/89 11/89 7/90 3/91 3/92

Crime 4% 3% 3% 2% 6% 3% 1% 2% 5%

Drugs 2% 8% 11% 11% 27% 38% 18% 11% 8%

Economy 6% 7% 10% 12% 8% 7% 7% 24% 42% (general)

Fear of War 27% 22% 23% 5% 2% 1% 1% 2% NA

Federal 18% 13% 11% 12% 7% 7% 21% 8% 8% Budget Deficit

High Cost 11% 4% 5% 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 6% of Living

Unemployment 20% 23% 13% 9% 6% 3% 3% 8% 25%

Source: Various issues of The Gallup Report, as cited in Table 2.1 of the 1991 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (1992: U.S. Department of Justice, p. 172).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 9

The Partnership for a Drug Free America

Most significant in the shaping of U.S. public opinion

about drugs during the Reagan/Bush years and beyond has been

the Partnership for a Drug Free America. A non-profit

corporation established in 1986, the Partnership routinely

receives free advertising space and air time in and on radio

stations, television networks, newspapers and magazines

across the country. The self-described^’ mission of the

Partnership, whose board of directors includes executives of

the major print and electronic media in the U.S., is to use;

the power of advertising [in] unselling illegal drugs, "de-normalizing" their use by making them unattractive, unpopular and unacceptable as a way of life in our society. And the program, as conceived, is working, by building individual and social intolerance to any use of any illegal drugs by anyone at any time.

The premise of the Partnership for a Drug Free America,

which aired its first television advertisement in 1987, is

simple; "As advertising increases [illicit] drug use

declines" (Colford, 1989a:118). The Partnership's

advertisement campaign, in which marijuana has been

portrayed as a modern day "assassin of youth," "killer

weed," and "stepping-stone" to harder drugs, is reminiscent

of that of yesteryear by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

The origin of the Partnership for a Drug Free America

can be traced to the anti-drug "parents' movement" mentioned

^’This quote is taken from an undated fact sheet which was provided to the author by the Media Advertising Partnership for a Drug Free America, Inc. in July 1989.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210

by Science magazine in its 1982 article concerning the

National Academy of Science's An Analysis of Marijuana

report. The "parents' movement" is embodied by two

organizations: the Parents' Resource Institute for Drug

Education (PRIDE) and the National Federation of Parents for

Drug Free Youth. Its autobiographical history is chronicled

in two 1977 and 1983 NIDA-funded books by Marsha Manatt:

Parents. Peers and Pot, and Parents. Peers and Pot II.

Armed with "the latest scientific research" which

disputed portrayals of "marijuana as less harmful than

alcohol and tobacco," the parents' movement emerged in the

late 1970s in Atlanta, Georgia, President Carter's own

backyard, to wage a cultural war against "subcultural

values" (Manatt, 1983:1-3)

Feeling reinforced by credible medical information, the parent group decided to base a strict antidrug position in their families on a health hazard argument, according to which the parents have the right and responsibility to protect their children's health.

The growth of the parents' movement can be traced from

a lowly-attended 1978 conference entitled "The Family Versus

the Drug Culture" to the fifth national PRIDE conference in

1982, which was attended by "more than 1,000 parents and

teens from 40 states and four foreign countries" (Manatt,

1983:24):

^In The Great Drug War. Trebach, who characterized Manatt's first book as "the Bible of the parents' movement," vividly chronicles the cultural war on drugs waged by the parents' movement and their allies. See particularly the chapter entitled "The First Lady's Cirusade for Drug-Free Youth" (1987:117-146).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211

Atlanta parents were proud of their role in initiating the statewide parent movement for drug-free youth. But the hard-working mothers and fathers were even prouder that thousands of other parents in every State in the Union had heeded the call to action.

By 1985, as the parents* movement gathered strength, it

came to be championed by Nancy Reagan, who popularized the

"Just Say No To Drugs" slogan and adopted the "war on drugs"

campaign as her own. "If youngsters say no to pot and

hashish," Marsha Manatt told the assembled 1985 PRIDE

convention, "they say no to the whole culture" (Trebach,

1987:118-120). Actor William Shatner (better known for his

television portrayal of Star Trek's Captain Kirk) declared,

in his role as the official PRIDE spokesperson, that:

We have just begun the fight! ...I want you to know that I will fight with you all the way! ...Responsible drug use is an attack on the health of the youth of the country by the illegal drug industry.... We are no longer willing to let the illegal drug industry provide information to our children.

The parents' movement expanded the war's ideological

battlefield by claiming that in addition to marijuana still

being a "killer weed" (Trebach, 1987:67-68), it was now also

a devious "drop-out drug" (Himmelstein, 1983:121-136) which

caused an "amotivational syndrome." The parents "sensed"

(Manatt, 1983:3) that the:

biochemical process might explain the puzzling personality and behavioral changes in their children. The lethargy, irritability, loss of motivation and drive, and in some of the boys, the deficient pubertal development.... If the Atlanta family group was not to remain a lonely island in the tide of the drug culture, then parents who hoped to raise drug-free children needed more support from the media and the government.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212

In 1989, President Bush, in his first nationally

televised address to the nation, launched his anti-drug

strategy. In the speech, the President publicly commended

the Partnership for a Drug Free America. Later that year,

at a special briefing. Bush lavished praise on one hundred

and fifty media and corporate leaders gathered at the White

House (Colford, 1989b):

By applying your marketing experience and advertising talent to unsell drug use and users, your ads are managing to induce a nationwide ideological allergy to illegal drugs.

When James Burke, the former chair of Johnson and

Johnson, was named chairman of the Partnership for a Drug

Free America in 1989, Fortune magazine (October 9, 1989:189)

asked: "Who would be better equipped to fight the war on

drugs than the former CEO [Chief Executive Officer] of a

major U.S. pharmaceutical company?" Between 1988 and 1991,

corporate funders of the Partnership, whose identities are

usually kept secret, included the following pharmaceutical

companies and their beneficiaries (Cotts, 1992:302):

the J. Seward Johnson, Sr., Charitable Trusts ($1,100,000); Du Pont ($150,000); the Proctor and Gamble Fund (($120,000); the Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation ($110,000); Johnson and Johnson ($110,000); SmithKline Beecham ($100,000); the Merck Foundation ($75,000); and Hoffman-LaRoche ($50,000).

For the same years, said and similar companies donated

at least fifty four percent of the $5.8 million that the

Partnership garnered from its major contributors. Because

this fifty four percent figure does not include donations

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 3

under $90,000, it is a conservative estimate of the overall

financial clout of the pharmaceutical drug industry's

influence on the Partnership for a Drug Free America.

From 1988 to 1991, the Partnership additionally

received an unknown total amount of donations from a

different licit drug industry, "the tobacco and alcohol

kings," including (Cotts, 1992:300-302):

$150,000 each from Phillip Morris, Anheuser-Busch and RJ Reynolds, plus $100,000 from American Brands (Jim Beam, Lucky Strike).

In 1991, the Partnership, which received $800 million

of donated media time and space for a three year period

(Levine, 1991:116), disseminated approximately $1 million

worth of free advertising per day in and on the nation's

electronic and print media. According to Forbes, its

advertising clout was five times greater than Coca-Cola, and

ranked second only to McDonald's.

Cotts (1992:302) poses the question: "if the

Partnership's mission is to stop kids from experimenting

[with drugs] in the first place, why not go after cigarettes

and beer?" The answer, we are informed, is that the

Partnership "is living off free advertising product and

space, and the media and ad agencies live off alcohol and

tobacco advertising." It would therefore be "suicidal" for

the Partnership to take on the likes of the Marlboro Man, or

to swim upstream against the tide of Coors beer.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 4

Thus, the Partnership overlooks "the dangers of

tobacco, alcohol and pills." Cotts additionally points out

that:

statistics show that 40% of tenth graders report drinking within the past month and getting very drunk within the past year [and]... smoking has not dropped among young people for a decade. Nineteen percent of high school seniors are daily tobacco smokers, and hundreds of thousands of them... will die of lung cancer one day.

Support for Cotts* contention that a symbiotic

relationship exists between the Partnership for a Drug Free

America and the legal drug industries in the United States

is further evidenced by the following two tables. Tables 14

and 15 reflect federally-published National Institute of

Drug Abuse (NIDA) data regarding the use of drugs by high

school and college youths in the United States. We will

first examine high school use patterns (Table 14) before

turning to college data (Table 15).

Table 14 reveals monthly, yearly and lifetime use of

marijuana, cigarettes and alcohol by U.S. high school

seniors from 1979-1991. The table shows the same basic

trend: alcohol is the most popular drug, followed by

cigarettes and then marijuana. On all three measured levels

of usage patterns: monthly, yearly and lifetime, marijuana

is the drug with the most significant decrease in use. Of

the three drugs, the lowest decrease in use alternated

between the substances of cigarettes and alcohol.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 5

TABLE 1 4

SELF-REPORTED MONTHLY, YEARLY AND LIFETIME USE OF MARIJUANA, CIGARETTES AND ALCOHOL BY U.S. HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS: 1979-1991

Drug 84 85 86 87 88 82 20 21 MJ:

25% 26% 23% 21% 18% 17% 14% 14%

40% 41% 39% 36% 33% 30% 27% 24%

55% 54% 51% 50% 47% 43% 41% 37%

CIGS:

29% 30% 30% 29% 29% 29% 29% 28%

(Yr.) N/A

70% 69% 68% 67% 66% 66% 64% 63%

ALCO:

67% 66% 65% 66% 64% 60% 57% 54%

86% 86% 85% 86% 85% 83% 81% 78%

93% 92% 91% 92% 92% 91% 90% 88%

Source: Smoking,.Drinking and illicit Drug Use Among American Secondary School Students. College Students, and Young Adults. 1975-1991. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 6

Based upon the information contained in Table 14, the

"tobacco and alcohol kings" who have donated generously to

the Partnership For a Drug Free America can be satisfied

with the knowledge that today's youth are well on their way

to becoming legal consumers within tomorrow's tobacco and

alcohol marketplaces.

Since alcohol and cigarettes are legal for adults, the

alcohol and tobacco industries must undoubtedly consider

adolescents to be potential market shares of the future.

Adolescents may illicitly use alcohol and tobacco, but their

value as consumers will not be realized until they reach

legal age to purchase these substances. Thus, trends that

reflect rates at which high school youth indulge in alcohol

and cigarettes may be indicators of their adult usage of

these commodities. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the

alcohol and tobacco industries view high school cigarette

and alcohol use as part of a continuum in which these

substances are consumed in adulthood.

Table 14 depicts 1979-1991 monthly use trends by U.S.

High School Seniors for alcohol, cigarettes and marijuana.

For the thirteen year period, reported monthly marijuana use

was cut in half, from thirty four percent (1979 and 1980) to

seventeen percent (1990 and 1991). The same years saw

monthly alcohol use fall from a high of seventy two percent

to a low of fifty four percent, and cigarette use decline

less, from thirty four percent to twenty eight percent.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 7

On the basis of examining the median (or middle range)

figures for the monthly rates at which U.S. high school

seniors use marijuana, cigarettes and alcohol (Table 14), we

can see that from 1979-1991, sixty six percent of the high

schoolers in this survey used alcohol within the past thirty

days, twenty nine percent used cigarettes in the past thirty

days, and twenty five percent used marijuana in the past

thirty days. The lowest marijuana use figure deviates

eleven percent from the median, the lowest alcohol use

figure deviates twelve percent from the median, and the

lowest cigarette use figure deviates only one percent from

the median.

Table 14 also reveals that from 1979-1991, the great

majority of U.S. High School Seniors report having used

alcohol during the past year, with a median of eighty six

percent. While annual alcohol use has slowly declined over

the years, from highs of eighty eight percent in 1979 and

1980 to a low of seventy eight percent in 1991, monthly use

among U.S. high school seniors has remained stable.

The annual NIDA High School Survey, which is conducted

by the University of Michigan's Institute for Social

Research, does not address annual cigarette use. According

to a NIDA spokesperson,^ this is because:

^Personal telephone conversation with Ms. Mona Brown of NIDA on August 5, 1993. Ms. Brown inquired of Dr. Patrick M. O'Malley at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research before providing me the comments quoted herein.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 218

They [the researchers] can't ask everything they would've liked to ask but more importantly, they thought that current usage or past thirty days' was a better measure of cigarette smoking for teenagers[.]

Although annual cigarette use patterns for U.S. High

School Seniors are unavailable through NIDA research,

reported annual marijuana use patterns for U.S. High School

Seniors are available. In examining said data, we find that

annual marijuana use for high schoolers in this survey for

the thirteen year period averaged forty percent. Over the

years, annual marijuana use for this population was more

than cut in half, ranging from a high of fifty one percent

in 1979, to a low of twenty four percent in 1991.

In examining the median for alcohol and marijuana

annual use patterns in Table 14, we find that the lowest

percentage for alcohol deviates from the median at eight

percent, while the lowest annual marijuana use figure

deviates from the median at a higher rate of sixteen

percent.

Table 14 further depicts lifetime use trends among U.S.

high school seniors for alcohol, cigarettes and marijuana

from 1979-1991. Lifetime use trends all were lowest in 1991

and highest in 1979, with the most dramatic change being

evident in marijuana use patterns. Alcohol use was

virtually stable and cigarette use declined slightly for the

thirteen year period.

The highest percentage of high school students who

"ever used" alcohol remained at ninety three percent for six

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 9

years, from 1979-1984, while its low was eighty eight

percent (1991). The highest "ever used" category for

cigarettes was seventy four percent in 1979, and its low, in

1991, was sixty three percent. The highest percentage of

high school students who "ever used" marijuana remained at

sixty percent for three years: 1979-1981, and it descended

annually until its low, thirty seven percent, in 1991.

Table 14 tells us that lifetime alcohol and cigarette

use for U.S. high school seniors, much like annual use

patterns for the same population, reflect a stable trend.

An examination of lifetime use patterns for the three

substances reveals that the medians for alcohol, cigarettes

and marijuana were, respectively, ninety two percent,

seventy percent and fifty four percent. The lowest

percentages of lifetime use of the three substances deviate

from the median at four percent for alcohol, six percent for

cigarettes, and seventeen percent for marijuana.

Based upon a review of high school drug use patterns as

depicted in Tables 14, investing in the Partnership does not

appear to have cut into the alcohol and tobacco industries'

potential profit margins from the next generation of smokers

and drinkers. In fact, if the "alcohol and tobacco kings"

were to speculate about their markets on the basis of

smoking and drinking patterns of U.S. college students

(Tables 15), then investing in the Partnership must appear

to be a wise investment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220

TABLE 1 5

SELF-REPORTED MONTHLY, YEARLY AND LIFETIME USE OF MARIJUANA, CIGARETTES AND ALCOHOL BY U.S. COLLEGE STUDENTS; 1980-1991

Drug Used 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 82 90 91 MARIJUANA;

(Mo.) 34% 33% 27% 26% 23% 24% 22% 20% 17% 16% 14% 14%

(Yr.) 51% 51% 45% 45% 41% 42% 41% 37% 35% 34% 29% 27%

(Lf.) 65% 63% 61% 63% 59% 61% 58% 56% 54% 51% 49% 46%

CIGARETTES:

(Mo.) 26% 26% 24% 25% 22% 22% 22% 24% 23% 21% 22% 23%

(Yr.) 36% 38% 34% 36% 33% 35% 35% 38% 37% 34% 36% 36%

(Lf.) N/A

ALCOHOL:

(Mo.) 82% 82% 83% 80% 79% 80% 80% 79% 77% 76% 75% 75%

(Yr.) 91% 93% 92% 92% 90% 92% 92% 91% 90% 90% 89% 88%

(Lf.) 94% 95% 95% 95% 94% 95% 95% 94% 95% 94% 94% 94%

Source; Smoking. Drinking and Illicit Drug.Use Among American Secondary School Students. College Students, and Young Adults. 1975-1991. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221

Table 15 reveals monthly use trends of alcohol,

cigarettes and marijuana by U.S. college students surveyed

by NIDA. For the twelve year period from 1980-1991,

reported monthly marijuana use was more than cut in half,

from thirty four percent (1980) to fourteen percent (1990

and 1991). While monthly alcohol use declined from a high

of eighty three percent (1982) to a low of seventy five

percent (1990 and 1991), monthly cigarette use among college

students declined less, from a high of twenty six percent

(1980 and 1981) to a low of twenty one percent (1989).

On the basis of examining the median (or middle range)

figures for the monthly rates at which U.S. college students

use alcohol, cigarettes and tobacco, we can see that the

lowest marijuana use figure deviates eight and a half

percent from the median, the lowest alcohol use figure

deviates four and a half percent from the median, and the

lowest cigarette use figure deviates only two percent from

the median.

Table 15 tells us that from 1980-1991, the great

majority of U.S. college students reported that they had

used alcohol during the past year, with a median of ninety

one percent. While annual alcohol use has slowly declined

over the years, from highs of ninety three percent (1981) to

a low of eighty eight percent in 1991, monthly use among

U.S. college students has remained consistently high. As

well, annual cigarette use among those college students

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222

surveyed also remained stable, from a high of thirty eight

percent (1981 and 1987) to a low of thirty three percent

(1984).

As with the previous high school and college data

examined, reported annual marijuana use among college

students has dropped off considerably over the past years,

from a high of fifty one percent (1980 and 1981) to a low of

twenty seven percent (1991).

In examining the median for alcohol, cigarette and

marijuana annual use patterns in Table 15, we find that the

lowest percentage of use for both alcohol and cigarettes

deviates from the median at only three percent. The lowest

use figure for marijuana, meanwhile, deviates from the

median at fourteen percent.

Table 15 reflects that for more than the past decade, a

median of ninety four and a half percent of college freshmen

have consistently reported using alcohol. The table further

tells us that from 1980-1991, lifetime marijuana use among

college students has remained stable, with a median of fifty

three percent. (Lifetime cigarette use by college students,

as with the annual cigarette use category among high

schoolers, is not ascertained by NIDA's researchers at the

Institute for Social Research at the University of

Michigan.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 3

Table 15 reveals that lifetime alcohol use trends among

U.S. college students were highest, at ninety five percent,

in 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. The lowest

lifetime alcohol use figure for the population surveyed was

ninety three percent, in 1990.

As with NIDA's high school data, lifetime marijuana use

trends among college students surveyed annually declined

from 1980-1991, with a high of sixty five percent (1980) to

a low of forty six percent (1991).

When we examine lifetime alcohol and marijuana use

patterns of college students we can see a definite trend.

The lowest percentage for lifetime alcohol use deviates from

the median at a mere one half of one percent, while that of

marijuana is thirteen percent. In other words, from 1979-

1991, lifetime alcohol use among U.S. college students

remained constant and consistent, at ninety five percent,

while lifetime marijuana use declined at a considerable

rate. While NIDA did not ascertain lifetime cigarette use

by college students, we can assume, on the basis of annual

use patterns, that lifetime cigarette use by college

students has also remained constant and consistent.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 4

Reefer Madness Reborn

In the best known advertisement of the Partnership for

a Drug Free America, the viewer is shown an uncracked egg

and is told: "This is your brain." The egg is then cracked

and dropped into a hot frying pan as the print and

television audiences are told: "This is your brain on

drugs." The last frame of the ad asks the viewer/reader:

"Any questions?"

In 1990, according to Forbes. ninety two percent of

U.S. teenagers stated that they had seen the fried egg

commercial. Ironically, according to published reports in

Adweek and Advertising Aoe. a generation of young U.S.

citizens are refusing to eat fried eggs out of fear that

their parents are "trying to do bad things to their

brains."

Clearly, parallels can be drawn between the 1930s, when

marijuana was portrayed as a violence-inducing, insanity-

producing "assassin of youth," and the present day anti

marijuana media campaign of the Partnership For A Drug Free

America. Today, opponents of marijuana decriminalization

and marijuana legalization argue that drugs are the enemy of

a civilized society, and that we must not tolerate drug use.

Marijuana, they claim, is a "stepping stone" whereby youths

are led down the path of drug abuse.

The final chapter of this dissertation has shown the

absurdity of U.S. marijuana policy in denying potential

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 5

relief to patients who suffer from ailments related to the

diseases of cancer, AIDS, glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, and

arthritis, among others. This chapter has thus demonstrated

on two fronts: the medical marijuana issue and the media

campaign of the Partnership for a Drug Free America, that

Reefer Madness is alive and well in the 1930s.

Conclusion

Today, Drugs the Enemy tend to be viewed not as inert

objects that people may or may not take, but as objects with

actual life qualities of their own. In the true

sociological sense, illicit drugs have become reified:

people do not take drugs, but drugs take people.

Yet the only drugs included in the category "Drugs the

Enemy" are illicit substances. Not included as the Enemy

are equally harmful but legal drugs that have been: (1)

manufactured by factories on Main Street, (2) financed by

institutions on Wall Street, and (3) packaged for

consumption by public relation firms on Madison Avenue.

A future question that may be before us is whether Wall

Street and Madison Avenue can manipulate Main Street to

produce, package and consume a new legal commodity:

marijuana. Questions we must ask ourselves in this regard

are: (1) Do we want the same forces that control the illicit

drug market ("organized crime") to control the licit

marijuana market? (2) Do we want the same forces that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226

control the licit alcohol and tobacco markets (Mr. Busch,

Mr. Coors, R.J. Reynolds and the like) to control the licit

marijuana market? (3) Do we want to permit licit marijuana

to be advertised as are alcohol and cigarettes?

In tracing cannabis' evolution over thousands of years

of human history, "The Sociology of Reefer Madness" has

followed the origin of Reefer Madness to the present day.

From the 1930s onward, we have specifically examined

marijuana's alleged link to insanity and violence and as a

"stepping stone" (or "gateway") and "drop-out drug."

In examining the social roots of marijuana's

criminalization in the United States of America, this

dissertation has provided its readers with a more

comprehensive explanation of the Marihuana Tax Act than

heretofore has been available. It has developed a new

theory, the Social Control Hypothesis, which explains why

the Marihuana Tax Act became law, and it examines the Act's

passage and subsequent enforcement in a social context, that

of popular culture and historical studies of marijuana use.

In applying the Social Control Hypothesis to reefer-

related jazz music and anti-marijuana motion pictures of the

1930s, "The Sociology of Reefer Madness" is unique. By

comparing contemporary drug use data in the United States

and Holland (the Netherlands), where cannabis use has been

decriminalized, this study empirically tests and refutes the

"stepping stone hypothesis."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 7

In these pages, the distinction has been drawn between

the often confused, and inappropriately interchanged

concepts of marijuana's decriminalization and its

legalization. Moreover, in this study we have examined a

further policy option alternative to marijuana's

criminalization, its medicalization.

"The Sociology of Reefer Madness" has been written to

provide a window through which its readers can view a

fleeting image barely discernable to the naked eye: an

apparition which lives in both the present and the past.

That apparition, embodied in the ghost of Harry Anslinger,

smiles at us from beyond.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abel, Ernest L. 1982. A Marihuana Dictionary. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

------1980. Marihuana. The First Twelve Thousand Years. New York: Plenum Press.

------1976. A Comprehensive Guide to the Cannabis Literature. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Aldrich, Michael R. 1990. "Legalize the Lesser to Minimize the Greater: M o d e m Applications of Ancient Wisdom," The Journal of Drug Issues 20(4):543-553.

1971. A Brief Legal History of Marihuana. Phoenix: Do It Now Foundation.

Allentuck, S. and K.M. Bowman. 1942. "The Psychiatric Aspects of Marihuana Intoxication," American Journal of Psychiatry 99:248-251.

Alpert, Mark. October 9, 1989. "A New General Enlists in the Drug War," Fortune 120:189.

Anslinger, Harry J. and Courtney R. Cooper. 1938. "Marijuana: Assassin of Youth." Reader's Digest. February, 1938:3-6.

------1937. "Marihuana: Assassin of Youth." American Magazine. July, 1937:18-19,150-153.

Anslinger, Harry J. and Will Oursler. 1961. The Murderers: The Story of the Narcotics Gangs. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy.

Atkins, Thomas R. 1984. Sexuality in the Movies. New York: De Capo Press.

Bailey, Stanley H. 1936. The Anti-Drug Campaign: An Experiment in International Control. London: P.S. King and Son.

Baton-Rouge. Louisiana State Times. July 10, 1982. "Risky Departure From Science," editorial.

228

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 9

Beale, Paul, ed. 1989. Partridge's Concise Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English. New York: MacMillan.

Becker, Howard S. 1963. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Boffey, Philip M. July 8, 1982. "Sponsors Criticize A Marijuana Study," New York Times. A12.

Bonnie, Richard J. and Charles H. Hhitebread. 1974. The Marihuana Conviction: A History of Marijuana Prohibition in the United States. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

Chapman, Robert L., ed. 1986. New Dictionary of American Slang. New York: Harper and Row.

Cloyd, Jerald W. 1982. Drugs and Information Control: the Role of Men and Manipulation in the Control of Drug Trafficking. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Cohen, Miriam. 1985. The Encyclopedia of Psvchoactive Drugs; Marijuana. Its Effect on Mind and Bodv. New York: Chelsea House.

Cohen, Peter. 1991. Licit and Illicit Drug Use in Amsterdam. Amsterdam: Instituut voor Sociale Gecrgrafie, Universtiteit van Amsterdam.

Cohen, Stanley. 1985. Visions of Social Control. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Colford, Steven W. November 6, 1989. "'Extraordinary': Bush Praises Anti-Drug Effort," Advertising Age 60:1,69.

------. September 11, 1989. "Bush Call Too Much For Media?" Advertising Age 60:1,118.

Cotts, Cynthia. March 9, 1992. "Hard Sell in the Drug War," The Nation 254:300-302.

Daniels, Roger and Harry H. L. Kitano. 1970. American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

de Gamez, Tana, ed. 1973. Simon and Schuster's International Dictionary: English/Spanish. Spanish/English. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Demott, Benjamin. 1962. "The Great Narcotics Muddle." Harper's Magazine. March:46-54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 0

DiChiarra, Albert and John F. Galliher. 1994. "Dissonance and Contradictions in the Origins of Marihuana Decriminalization." Law and Society Review 28(1): 41-77.

Dickson, Donald T. 1968. "Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective On A Moral Crusade." Social Problems 16:143-156.

Eisner, Michael C. 1994. "The Sociology of Reefer Madness: The Criminalization of Marijuana in the United States," in Drug Use in America: Social. Cultural and Political Perspectives: 269-279, Peter Venturelli, ed. Boston: Jones and Bartlett.

------1993. "A Transnational Comparison of Drug Control Policies in the U.S., England, and the Netherlands," in Altered States of Mind: Critical Observations of the Drug War: 207-228, Peter B. Kraska, ed. New York: Garland Publishing.

Engelsman, Eddy L. 1990. "The Pragmatic Strategies of the Dutch Drug Czar" in Drug Prohibition and the Conscience of Nations: 49-55, Arnold Trebach and Kevin Zeese, eds. Washington, D.C.: Drug Policy Foundation.

------1988. "Responding to Drug Problems; Dutch Policy and Practise." Unpublished paper.

Flanagan, Timothy J. and Kathleen Maguire, eds. 1992. 1991 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

— 1989. 1988 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

------1988. 1987 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Fossier, A.E. 1931. "The Marihuana Menace." New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 84:247-252.

Foucault, Michel. 1979. Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison. Translated from the French. 2nd American edition. New York: Vintage Books.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 1

Galliher, John F. and John R. Cross. 1982. Morals Legislation Without Morality; the Case of Nevada. Camden, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Galliher, John F. and Allyn Walker. 1978. "The Politics of Systematic Research Error: The Case of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as a Moral Entrepreneur." Crime and Social Justice 10:29-33.

1977. "The Puzzle of the Social Origins of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937." Social Problems 24: 367-376.

Gardner, Gerald. 1987. The Censorship Papers; Movie Censorship Letters from the Havs Office. 1934 to 1968. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.

Gold, Robert S. 1964. A Jazz Lexicon. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Grinspoon, Lester. 1971. Marihuana Reconsidered. Harvard University Press.

Grinspoon, Lester and James B. Bakalar. 1993. Marihuana. the Forbidden Medicine. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gusfield, Joseph. 1986. Symbolic Crusade. Second Edition. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Helmer, John. 1975. Drugs and Minority Oppression. New York: The Seabury Press.

Merer, Jack. 1991. The Emperor Wears No Clothes; the Authoritative Historical Record of the Cannabis Plant. Hemp Prohibition, and How Marijuana Can Save the World. Revised Edition. Van Nuys, Ca.: Hemp Publishing.

------1990. The Emperor Wears No Clothes: the Authoritative Historical Record of the Cannabis Plant. Hemp Prohibition, and How Marijuana Can Save the World. Revised Edition. Van Nuys, Ca.: Hemp Publishing.

Hermes, William J. and Anne Galperin. 1992. The Encyclopedia of Psvchoactive Drugs: Marijuana. Its Effects on Mind and Body. New York: Chelsea House.

High Times Encvlopedia of Recreational Drugs. 1978. New York: Stonehill Publishing Co.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 2

Himmelstein, Jerome L. 1986. "The Continuing Career of Marijuana: Backlash... Within Limits." Contemporary Drug Problems, special reprint.

------1983. The Strange Career of Marihuana: Politics and Ideology of Drug Control In America. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

liyama, Patti, Setsuko Matsunaga Nishi and Bruce D. Johnson. 1976. Drug Use and Abuse among U.S. Minorities: An Annotated Bibliography. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Johnston, Lloyd D., Patrick M. O'Malley and Jerald G. Bachman. 1992. Smoking. Drinking and Illicit Drug Use Among American Secondary School Students. College Students and voung Adults. 1975-1991. Volume I: Secondary School Students Tandl Volume II: College Students and Young Adults. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), National Institute on Drug Abuse.

Jones, Alexander, ed. 1968. The Jerusalem Bible. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co.

Jones, Leroi. 1963. Blues People. New York: William Morrow and Company.

Jones, Max and John Chilton. 1971. Louis: The Louis Armstrong Storv 1900-1971. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Journal and Sentinel. August 22, 1937. "Doughton Puts 20 Major Bills Through Congress." Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

Journal of the American Medical Association. 1945. 129:1105-1109,1187.

« 1945. 128:383,899-890.

- 1945. 127:1129.

- 1944. 125:376.

- 1944. 124:1010-1011.

- 1943. 121:212-213.

- 1942. 120:1128-1129.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 3

Kalant, Oriana Josseau. 1968. An interim Guide to the Cannabis fMarihuana^ Literature. Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation.

Kaplan, John. July 30, 1982. "Letter to the Editor," Science 217:686.

— . 1970. Marijuana - The New Prohibition. New York: The World Publishing Company.

------^ ed. 1969. Marijuana. Report of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission: 1893-1894. Silver Spring, Maryland: Thomas Jefferson Publishing Co.

King, Rufus. 1972. The Drug Hang-Uo: America's Fiftv Year Folly. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas.

Lemert, Edwin L. 1951. Social Pathology : A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociooathic Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Levine, Joshua. February 4, 1991. "Don't Fry Your Brain," Forbes. 147:116-117.

Library of Congress Copyright Office. 1951. Motion Pictures: 1912-1939. Catalog of Copyright Entries, Cumulative Series.

Lindesmith, Alfred. 1965. The Addict and the Law. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Malcolm X. 1973. The Autobiography of Malcolm X. New York: Ballantine Books.

Manatt, Marsha. 1983. Parents Peers and Pot II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human services. National Institute on Drug Abuse.

1977. Parents. Peers, and Pot. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse.

Marshall, Jonathan. 1991. Drug Wars. Forestville, Ca.: Cohan and Cohen.

1987. "Drugs and United States Foreign Policy" in Dealing With Drugs: 137-179, Ronald Hamoway, ed. San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy.

McCoy, Alfred W. 1991. The Politics of Heroin. New York: Lawrence Hill Books.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 4

McWilliams, Carey. 1939. Factories in the Field: the Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

McWilliams, John C. 1990. The Protectors; Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 1930-1962. Newark: University of Delaware Press.

McWilliams, John C. and Alan A. Block. 1990. "All the Commissioner's Men: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Dewey-Luciano Affair, 1947-54." Intelligence and National Security 5:171-192.

------1989. "On the Origins of American Counter intelligence : Building a Clandestine Network." Journal of Policy History 1:353-372.

Meeker, David. 1977. Jazz At the Movies. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House.

Meisler, Stanley. 1960. "Federal Narcotics Czar, Zeal Without Insight." The Nation. February 20: 159-162.

Merton, Robert K. 1949. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.

Mezzrow, Mezz and Bernard Wolfe. 1990 (1946). Reallv the Blues. New York: Citadel Press.

Mikuriya, Tod H., ed. 1973. Marijuana: Medical Papers 1839-1972. Oakland: Medi-Comp Press.

Morgan, Patricia A. 1990. "The Making of a Public Problem: Mexican Labor in California and the Marijuana Law of 1937," in Drugs in Hispanic Communities: 233-252, Ronald Glick and Joan Moore, eds. Camden, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

------1976. "John Helmer: Drugs and Minority Oppression." Crime and Social Justice 5:65-67.

Morris, Norval and Gordon Hawkins. 1970. The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control. University of Chicago Press.

Musto, David F. 1973. The American Disease. New Haven: Yale University Press.

— 1972. "The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937." Archives of General Psychiatry XXVI:101-108.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 5

National Research Council, Commission on Behavioral and Social Services and Education, Committee on Substance Abuse and Habitual Behavior. 1982. An Analysis of Marijuana Policy. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Ogren, Kathy J. 1989. The Jazz Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press.

Packer, Herbert L. 1968. The Limits of the Criminal Sanction. Stanford University Press.

Parker, James J. 1986. "The Organizational Environment of the Motion Picture Sector" in Media. Audience and Social Structure: 143-160, Sandra J. Rokeach and Muriel G. Cantor, eds. Beverly Hill, California: Sage Publications.

Parsons, Talcott. 1937. The Structure of Social Action. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Pearson, Geoffrey. 1975. The Deviant Imagination: Psychiatry. Social Work and Social Change. London: The MacMillan Press.

Polsky, Ned. 1967. Hustlers. Beats and Others. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.

Porter, Bill. 1993. Road to Heaven. San Francisco: Mercury House.

The Prophets Nevi'im. Second Edition. 1978. Philadelphia: the Jewish Publication Society of America.

Randall, Robert C. 1991. Marijuana and AIDS: Pot. Politics and PWAs in America. Washington, D.C.: Galen Press.

— , ed. 1991. Muscle Spasm. Pain and Marijuana Therapy. Washington, D.C.: Galen Press.

------ed. 1990. Cancer Treatment and Marijuana Therapy. Washington, D.C.: Galen Press.

Randall, Robert C. and Alice M. O'Leary. Marijuana as Medicine. Initial Steps: Recommendations for the Clinton Administration. 1993. Washington, D.C.: Galen Press.

Ray, Oakley and Charles Ksir. Drugs. Society, and Human Behavior. Fourth Edition. 1987. St. Louis: Times Mirror/Mosby College Publishing.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 6

Reasons, Charles E. 1974. "The 'Dope' on the Bureau of Narcotics in Maintaining the Criminal Approach to the Drug Problem," in The Criminologist: Crime and the Criminal: 144-155, Charles Reasons, ed. Palisades, Ca.: Goodyear.

Renborg, Bertil A. 1947. International Drug Control: A Study of International Administration Bv and Through the League of Nations. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Rust, Brian. 1978. Jazz Records 1897-1942. Fourth Revised and Enlarged Edition. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House Publishers.

Ruter, C.F. 1990. "Basis of Dutch Policy" in The Great Issues of Drug Policy: 191-194, Arnold S. Trebach and Kevin B. Zeese, eds. Washington, D.C.: The Drug Policy Foundation.

------1988. "The Pragmatic Dutch Approach To Drug Control: Does It Work?" unpublished paper presented at a forum of the Drug Policy Foundation in Washington, D.C. on May 25, 1988.

Schur, Edwin M. 1962. Narcotic Addiction in Britain and America. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Science. July 16, 1982. "Frank Press Takes Exception to NAS Panel Recommendations on Marijuana," 217:228-229.

Scott, Peter Dale and Jonathan Marshall. 1991. Cocaine Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sears, Richard S. 1980. V-Discs. A History and Discograohv. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Shaw, Clifford R. and Henry D. McKay. 1931. Social Factors in Juvenile Delinguency. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Siler, J.S., et al. 1933. "Marihuana Smoking in Panama." Military Surgeon, the Journal of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States. 73:269-280.

Silver, Gary, ed. 1979. The Dope Chronicles. 1850-1950. San Francisco: Harper and Row.

Sloman, Larry. Reefer Madness. 1979. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 7

Snyder, Solomon H. 1971. Uses of Marijuana. New York: Oxford University Press.

Solomon, David, ed. 1966. The Marihuana Papers. New York: Signet Books.

Spencer, R.R. 1936. "Marijuana," The Health Officer 1:299- 305. Revised Reprint. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Treasury Department, United States Public Health Service.

Stanley, E. 1931. "Marihuana as A Developer of Criminals," American Journal of Police Science 2:256.

Starks, Michael. Cocaine Fiends and Reefer Madness: An Illustrated History of Drugs in the Movies. 1982. New York: Cornwall Books.

Sutherland, Edwin H. 1939. Principles of Criminologv. Third Edition. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Taylor, Ian, Paul Walton and Jock Young. 1973. The New Criminologv: for a Social Theory of Deviance. New York: Harper and Row.

Trebach, Arnold S. 1987. The Great Drug War. New York: MacMillan.

------1982. The Heroin Solution. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Trebach, Arnold S. and Kevin Zeese, eds. 1990. The Great Issues in Drug Policy. Washington, D.C.: The Drug Policy Foundation.

— , eds. 1990. Drug Prohibition and the Conscience of Nations. Washington, D.C.: The Drug Policy Foundation.

United States Congress. June 14 and July 26, 1937. Congressional Record 81:5575,5689-5692,7624-7625. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

United States Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute on Drug Abuse. 1991. National Household Survey on Drug Abuse; Main Findings 1990. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

United States House of Representatives. 1988. Legalization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and Feasibility. Part I . Hearing Before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives 100th Congress, Second Session, September 29. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 8

United States House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means. April 27-30 and May 4, 1937. Taxation of Marihuana. Hearings on H.R. 6385. Seventy Fifth Congress, First Session. Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office.

------May 11, 1937. House Reports. Report No. 792; The Marihuana Taxing Bill. Seventy Fifth Congress, First Session. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing office.

United States National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse. 1973. Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

------1972. Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

United States Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Finance. July 12, 1937. Taxation of Marihuana. Hearings on H.R. 6906. Seventy-Fifth Congress, First Session. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Victorek, D. 1972. "Dave O'Brien Achieved His Goals As A Man With No Pretensions As An Actor," in Films In Review XXIII (8):449, Charles P. Reilly, ed. New York: National Board of Review of Motion Pictures.

Walker, Samuel. 1989. Sense and Nonsense About Crime. Second Edition. Pacific Grove, Ca.: Brooks/Cole.

Walker III, William 0. 1989. Drug Control in the Americas. Revised Edition. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Walton, Robert P. 1938. Marihuana: America's New Drug Problem. Reprinted in 1976, New York: A m o Press.

Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionarv. Second Edition. 1983. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Weisheit, Ralph A. 1992. Domestic Marijuana; a Neglected Industry. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse. 1962. Proceedings; September 27 and 28. 1962. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Whyte, William F. 1943. Street Corner Society. University of Chicago Press.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 9

Wilkins, Leslie T. 1964. Social Deviance; Social Action. Policy and Research. Englewood Cliffs, New -Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Williams, Martin. 1966. Where's the Melody?. Third Edition. New York: Pantheon Books.

Wisotsky, Steven. 1986. Breaking the Impasse on the War On Drugs. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Witters, Weldon L. and Peter J. Venturelli. 1988. Drugs and Society. Second Editon. Boston: Jones and Bartlett.

Woodiwiss, Michael. 1988. Crimes. Crusades and Corruption. Prohibitions in the United States: 1900-1987. Totowa, New Jersey: B a m e s and Noble Books.

Young, Francis L. 1988. "In the Matter of MARIJUANA RESCHEDULING PETITION: Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision of Administrative Law Judge," United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration. September 6, 1988. Docket No. 86-22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.