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Brenden Bjerke UNCANNY ECOLOGY Brenden Bjerke ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Gabriel Esquivel COMMITTEE CHAIR Stephen Caffey COMMITTEE MEMBER Andrew Tripp COMMITTEE MEMBER Susanneh Bieber COMMITTEE MEMBER James Haliburton STUDIO PROFESSOR CONTENTS Project Statement 5 Theoretical Framework 7 Aesthetic Theory 11 Drawing Studies 18 Object Creation 19 Site 27 Machines 35 Material 41 Media 49 Uncanny Ecology Brenden Bjerke fig. 1; exterior render fig. 1; exterior PROJECT STATEMENT UNCANNY ECOLOGY denies the artificial divide between humanity and nature, and acknowledges the agency of non-human things in the design process. By scrutinizing aesthetic and philosophical precedents, the created object exists in a way that challenges anthropocentric hierarchies that privilege humans and the human made world above all other things. The resulting project can be understood as an ontological network of objects in which architecture is reinserted into an ecology that includes both the “human” and the “natural” worlds. 5 6 Uncanny Ecology Brenden Bjerke THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK In Dark Ecology, Tim Morton rock would “exist” even in the absence there is something about each object architecture exists in the same argues that everything exists with a gap of any physicality. This is where that remains hidden when objects oppositional relationship with between its appearance and its being. philosophical realism distinguishes interact with each other, and these nature, framing the construction of Any object I interact with “appears” itself from idealism. Idealism theorizes hidden qualities are as real as any architecture as the destruction of to me as a collection of sensorial a reality that exists only in the mind part of the object that appears. nature; “less architecture therefore experiences; reflections of light, sound of the subject (always a human), Within this framework we can yields better ecology” (Gage 100). waves, nerve signals relating to touch, but realism argues for a reality that begin to scrutinize how we as humans To illustrate this point, Morton etc. These phenomena pair together to exists independent of subjective relate to the objects around us in new borrows the idea of the uncanny valley create my understanding of what that experience, or outside the mind of ways. This has obvious implications from robotics. In this idea, as a robot specific object is. We often understand an individual (human) subject. In for our relationship with the idea becomes more and more human-like, these phenomena as the reality of the a realist framework such as OOO, of nature. The preference toward it enters a space of resemblance that we object, but object oriented ontology simply recreating the phenomena of idealism, among other things, has can’t quite categorize as human. This (OOO) argues that the reality of an the rock in my mind does not mean allowed humans to artificially elevate denial of categorization triggers the object is more complex than simply that the rock really exists. There is ourselves conceptually above the uncanny unease that comes from our how it “appears” to other things. A something more to the reality of the nonhuman things around us. This fear of the non-human invading the rock may appear to me as a specific rock beyond what can be accessed by idea, known as anthropocentrism, has human world. In Morton’s discussion set of sensory phenomena, but if the a human subject (or any subject). This warped our understanding of what of ecology, this same uncanny feeling reality of that rock is only defined by is what Morton means when he talks nature is and our place in an ecology, is triggered when we struggle to those phenomena, then the rock can’t about the gap between appearing and conceptually removing humans from categorize something as distinctly be thought of to exist “in itself,” but being. If appearing is the reality of an the natural ecology that surrounds us, human or distinctly natural. This is rather only as a collection of subjective object that can be accessed by another inadvertently creating an oppositional because it threatens our subjective experiences. If you were to remove the object through interactions, “being” relationship between the “natural reality in which nature, as the other, physical rock, but somehow recreate is the reality of the object that can’t be world” and the “human world.” As infringes on “our” world. the phenomena in my mind, then the accessed in this way. In simpler terms, an extensions of the “human world,” The categorization of humans as 7 8 Uncanny Ecology Brenden Bjerke distinctly separate from (and elevated as human or natural objects, above) non-human things in the acknowledging the agency of non- Anthropocene has played a critical human things in the creation of role in the climate crises caused by an architectural object, and giving anthropogenic climate change. This aesthetic attention to objects and has made it clear that this conception ecological interactions previously of reality is no longer appropriate seen as unworthy of it, we can begin to for us today. We can no longer think imagine an ecology in which humans of nature simply as “that stuff out are not removed from but deeply there.” Contemporary notions of integrated into the ecology around us, sustainability, while important to equal actors among many. slow the addition of harmful actions, continue to operate within the same understanding of reality which has enabled the current crises to exist. It is likely that long lasting relief from these dangers will require a new understanding of how we think about our place in the world. Uncanny Ecology aims to imagine a new relationship between humans and nature, using architecture as the driver. By developing aesthetic approaches that deny categorization 9 10 Uncanny Ecology Brenden Bjerke fig. 2; The Hay Wain - John Constable (1821) Constable - John Wain fig. 2; The Hay AESTHETIC THEORY Constable’s Hay-wain, a classic we are interacting with this kind of example of picturesque aesthetics, curated and controlled idealization of presents an image of an idealized nature, alienating us further from nature in which limited human the idyllic wilderness that we think intervention allows for a pristine nature represents. image of a relatively untouched and pure landscape, nature at its best. But this idealized image does not represent a replication of an existing pristine landscape, but is instead an imagined one in which the artist has created a fantasy of what they believe a beautiful landscape could (or perhaps should) look like. Picturesque representations of nature, such as Constable’s Hay-wain, show an idealized version of nature that has been imagined and curated to elicit an emotional response for a human subject. Rather than depicting nature as it is, it is altered solely to make it more appealing to a human subject. When we scrutinize our interactions with nature, we find that most of the 11 12 Uncanny Ecology Brenden Bjerke The sublime, an example of which is shown in John Martin’s painting to the left, can also alienate us from the idea of nature. By depicting scenes of nature which elicit fear and deny a sense of understandable scale, nature becomes a transcendental threat. Something that exists outside of us, as the other, and creates a sense of anxiety and fear due to our inability to fully grasp it. fig. 3; The Great Day of His Wrath - John Martin (1851-1853) Martin - John Wrath of His fig. 3; The Great Day 13 14 Uncanny Ecology Brenden Bjerke fig. 4; The Skeletons, from Grotteschi (Grotesques) - Giovanni Battista Piranesi (1748) Battista Piranesi - Giovanni (Grotesques) from Grotteschi fig. 4; The Skeletons, Piranesi’s Grotteschi series drawings can be misread as representing a different conception of reality. By depicting a collection of objects, both human and non-human, in a way that doesn’t privilege any singular object or figure, the scene can be seen as representing a more inclusive ecology of objects, one that includes human and non-human things as equal actors. This misreading provides a starting point for the development of aesthetic characteristics that challenge anthropocentric realities. 15 16 Uncanny Ecology Brenden Bjerke DRAWING STUDIES fig. 5; ontocartographic drawing based on Piranesi drawing fig. 5; ontocartographic based on ontocartography drawing fig. 6; speculative Using Piranesi as a base, a series of drawings were created as studies to begin to develop a formal logic that capitalizes on the ontological implications of the drawing. The first of these is a simple exercise of grouping objects as a kind of ontocartographic map of the relationships between the objects in the drawing (fig. 5). Extracting an ordering logic of grids and circles from this allowed for the creation of new figures that follow a similar formal logic (fig. 6). Finally, these new figures were fragmented to expose a potential logic of joinery and overlayed onto a topographic drawing to imagine this process as a mapping of a speculative site with the trace of Piranesi (fig. 7). fig. 7; exploring drawing studies as speculative site map as speculative studies drawing fig. 7; exploring 17 18 Uncanny Ecology Brenden Bjerke fig. 9; extrusion object isometric view object isometric fig. 9; extrusion OBJECT CREATION fig. 8; extrusion object top view fig. 8; extrusion fig. 11; loft object elevation view elevation object fig. 11; loft A series of objects were created from the speculative figures of the drawing studies using a set of simple digital operations - extrude, revolve, and loft (figs 8-14). Using these operations begins to acknowledge the agency of the software in the design and creation of the objects. The inherent logic and parameters of the software impart a certain sensibility onto the object depending on the specific command used. Human object top view fig. 10; loft agency is reasserted upon evaluation view object isometric fig.
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