U.S. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL ANNUAL HISTORY (RCS CHIS-6 [R4])

1 JANUARY 2016 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 2016

BY

FIELD ARTILLERY BRANCH HISTORIAN’S OFFICE

FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA

COMMANDANT’S INTRODUCTION

2016 was a significant year for the Field Artillery (FA) branch and the Field Artillery School (USAFAS). Several developments and initiatives came to fruition; at the heart of which was the publication of our Field Artillery Vision.

This vision defined five lines of effort (LOE), comprised from the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPFP) domains. The five LOE are: 1) Enable Readiness in the Operational Force; 2) Educate and Train Competent, Adaptive Professionals; 3) Modernize the Force; 4) Advance Targeting and Joint/Multinational Fires Integration; and 5) Personnel Development and Talent Management. Each encompassed several initiatives and programs.

Our DIVARTYs, FABs, and BCTs performed extremely well in 2016, and have empowered much change, and are invaluable members of the team. Going into 2017, we will continue to support and resource them so they are able to routinely do all that our maneuver forces need them to do as well as serve as experts on standards and competencies.

In 2016, we made a significant impact improving our core competencies. Highlights include inserting Joint Fires Observer (JFO) training into our professional military education, the effort to modify and intensify our Master Gunner Course, embracing the Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC) concept, bringing back and securing funding for the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC), and enhancing our Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Fires Orientation Course by emphasizing what the integration of Brigade Fire Support Element with the Air Defense Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element (ADAM/BAE) cell brings to the fight.

In 2016, our DIVARTYs and FABs also delivered to the Division and Corps Commanders the ability to integrate operational to tactical-level, cross-domain Fires. As the Force Field Artillery headquarters for Divisions and Corps, FA units’ integration and synchronization of Fires is the critical link between Fires and maneuver which will enables maneuver Commanders to dominate in Unified Land Operations.

However, no matter how technical our operations become or how wide our global mission expands, our people will continue to be our greatest strength. Last year the school trained more than 9,000 Soldiers and Marines to be Field Artillery men and women. There are 985K Soldiers in the total force, approximately seven percent of that force is in the Field Artillery. Our field artillery men and women are innovative and dedicated and understand that freedom does not come without cost. It must be fought for and won. I'm proud of what we have accomplished in 2016, and I am looking forward to what we can accomplish together in 2017.

We are the world’s premier Artillery force - modernized, organized, trained, and ready to integrate and employ Army, Joint, and Multinational fires because of the tremendous efforts of you and your Soldiers,

24/7/365, Regardless of weather, In any terrain, Quickly, Accurately, and Danger Close!

Original signed STEPHEN J. MARANIAN Brigadier General, U.S. Army Commandant Field Artillery School

PREFACE

The 2016 Annual History for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School follows the decision-making process as closely as possible. Through interviews, email, messages, staff reports, fact sheets, correspondence, briefings, and other documentation, the Field Artillery School Historian’s Office has recreated as closely as possible how the Field Artillery School made key decisions concerning joint issues, training, leader development, doctrine, force design, and equipment requirements. Because the Field Artillery School was involved in many diverse activities during the year, the Historian’s Office under the direction of the School Commandant selected only those activities deemed to be the most historically significant to include in the History. Preserving historical documents forms a vital part of the historian’s work. After they are collected from the various organizations during the process of researching, they are filed in the historical records and documents collection in the Historian’s Office. All documents are available for use by School staff, other U.S. governmental agencies, and private individuals upon request. Because new documents are often found after research and writing has been completed, this contemporary history is subject to revision. As new documents are discovered, interpretations and conclusions will change. Comments and suggested changes should be directed to the Historian’s Office. In the process of researching and writing the History, the historian becomes indebted to many people for their advice and assistance. The Field Artillery School Historian’s Office would like to thank the people who provided their technical expertise. Without their help writing the history would have been far more difficult.

Original signed

BOYD L. DASTRUP, Ph.D. Field Artillery Branch Historian U.S. Army Field Artillery School

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE i COMMANDANT’S INTRODUCTION ii PREFACE iv TABLE OF CONTENTS v

CHAPTER ONE: MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL Introduction 1 Field Artillery School Mission Statement 1 Organization New Commandant 1 Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell 2 Field Artillery Proponency Office 4 Strategic Communications Office 8 Army Targeting Center 9 Fires Center of Excellence Restructure 12 Modernizing Field Artillery Military Occupational Skills 15 The Role of Women in the Army and the Field Artillery 18

CHAPTER TWO: LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION Introduction 22 Operational Environment in 2016 22 Field Artillery Training Strategy for Fiscal Year 2017 22 Blackboard 23 Modernizing Fire Support Training 23 Interactive Multimedia Instruction 24 Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training 24 Noncommissioned Officer Academy and Noncommissioned Officer Education System 31 Functional Courses 35 Advanced Individual Training 37 Warrant Officer Education System 38 Officer Education System 39 Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course 42

CHAPTER THREE: COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS Introduction 43 Force Design and Doctrine 43 Concept Development Division, Capability Development Directorate 43 Expansion of Cross Domain Fires 43 Force Structure Design and Total Army Analysis 46 The Operational Environmental Branch 47 Fires Doctrine 47 Five Requirements for Accurate Fires 49 Targeting Standards for Accurate Fires 50 Fires Command: Division Artillery and Corps Field Artillery Brigade 51 Electric Fires and Electric Fires Range 54 TRADOC Capabilities Manager Brigade Combat Team-Fires 56 Excalibur Extended-Range Guided Projectile 56 Precision Guidance Kit 63 Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munition 67 M777 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer 67 M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer 73 M109A7 Self-Propelled 155-mm. Howitzer 76 Chrome Tube 83 Next Generation Survey/Location Azimuth Determining System 83 TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell 84 Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble 85 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle 86 Knight Vehicle 89 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 91 Joint Effects Targeting System 94 Profiler 96 Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications Systems 98 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 98 Handheld Command and Control Systems 99 TRADOC Capabilities Manager Field Artillery Brigade-Division 101 Fires Radar Strategy 101 AN/TPQ-53 Radar 101 AN/TPQ-50 Radar 103 Multiple Launcher Rocket System 106 Munitions 106 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead 110 Launcher 114 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 118 Army Tactical Missile System 123 Long Range Precision Fires Strategy 125

CHAPTER FOUR: FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY 127

Glossary 138 Appendix One: Student Production for Fiscal Year 2016 147 Appendix Two: Key FCoE and USAFAS Personnel 148 Appendix Three: Field Artillery School Commandants 149 Appendix Four: Chiefs of Field Artillery 151 Appendix Five: Assistant Commandants 153 Appendix Six: Command Sergeant Majors of USAFAS since 1991 155 Appendix Seven: Command Sergeant Majors of the Noncommissioned Officer’s Academy 156 Appendix Eight: Field Artillery Commandant’s Office Chart, Fiscal Year 2016 157 Appendix Nine: List of Documents 158 Index of Names 159

CHAPTER ONE MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL

INTRODUCTION

Influenced by the new Field Artillery technology introduced after the Spanish- American War of 1898, the development of indirect fire, and the lack of adequately trained Field Artillerymen, the War Department opened the School of Fire for Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on 15 September 1911. While War Department, General Orders No. 72 of 3 June 1911 tasked the school to furnish practical and theoretical field artillery training to lieutenants, captains, field grade officers, militia officers, and noncommissioned officers, War Department, General Orders No. 73 of 5 June 1911 integrated the school into a sequential and progressive educational system for officers. In 2016 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADAS), the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), and the 434th Field Artillery Brigade (basic combat training) composed the training mission of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During the year, the Field Artillery School trained the Field Artillery forces of the United States Army and United States Marine Corps, provided joint training, developed Field Artillery leaders and Soldiers, helped design and develop fire support tactics and doctrine, participated in equipment and weapons development, and supported unit training and readiness.1

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL MISSION STATEMENT

The U.S. Army Field Artillery School trains, educates, and develops agile, adaptive, and decisive Soldiers and leaders; engages, collaborates and partners with other branches, warfighting function proponents, and sister-Services; and other fires warfighting function proponents; and serves as the lead agent for the development and dissemination of Field Artillery doctrine, concepts, and knowledge necessary to the Field Artillery force in support of commanders operating across the full spectrum of conflict and in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national environment.2

ORGANIZATION

New Commandant Brigadier General Stephen J. (Steve) Maranian was born and raised near Boston, Massachusetts. He graduated from Bucknell University in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, in ______12002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 7; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 11 Apr 11, Doc I-1, 2011 USAFAS AH. 2Briefing, subj: The State of the Field Artillery, 19 Jan 16, Doc I-1.

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1988 where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Field Artillery. He earned a Masters of Arts degree in Human Resources Development from Webster University, and a Masters of Strategic Studies degree from the Army War College. His military education included the Field Artillery Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, the Army War College, and the NATO Defense College. General Maranian’s commands included two batteries in the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery, 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, and the 19th Battlefield Coordination Detachment. He has served in Field Artillery staff positions including tours as Brigade Fire Support Officer, 173rd Airborne Brigade; Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery; and Executive Officer, 1st Infantry Division Artillery. Additional staff assignments included service as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G3, 1st Infantry Division; Executive Officer for the Headquarters Department of the Army Director of Training; Special Assistant and later Executive Officer for the Commanding General, United States Army Europe; and most recently Chief of Staff, United States Army Africa/Southern European Task Force. Currently, General Maranian served as the 52nd Commandant of the United States Army Field Artillery School and Chief of the Field Artillery. General Maranian has extensive overseas experience having completed 10 overseas tours in six countries, including deployments to Afghanistan, , and Kuwait, and he graduated from the Defense Language Institute as a trained Greek linguist. His decorations include the Legion of Merit (3rd Award), Bronze Star Medal (2nd Award), the Meritorious Service Medal (5th Award), the Army Commendation Medal (7th Award), the Air Force Commendation Medal (2nd Award), the Army Achievement Medal (5th Award), and the NATO Meritorious Service Medal. He was also authorized to wear the Combat Action Badge, the Senior Parachutist Badge, the Army Staff Identification Badge, and the Canadian Parachutist Badge.3

Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell Established in 2010, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Fires Cell continued to serve as an integral link in coordinating activities to support current priorities and emerging initiatives between the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Throughout 2016 the MCoE Fires Cell worked several initiatives to improve Fires integration at the MCoE. Initiatives included joint fires familiarization courses, capabilities development coordination and participation, maneuver pre-command course support, and maneuver training support. The MCoE Fires team provided world class instruction at all levels of professional military education (PME) at Fort Benning, exceeding previous year’s end states, and taught over 1,750 hours of Joint Fires instruction to well over 12,000 students across the PME spectrum. The Fires team instructors continued their standard courses of instruction to Advanced Individual Training organizations across three training brigades, ______3Official Biography, undated, Doc I-2.

2 the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), Officer Candidate School (OCS) and Infantry and Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course (I/ABOLC) as well as expanding Joint Fires exposure and instruction to all officer instruction. The NCO instructors of Team Fires dedicated freely time to the I/ABOLC Combined Competitive Maneuver Exercise (CCME), a culminating event where Infantry and Armor lieutenants executed a complex mounted and dismounted maneuver and command post exercise in a field environment. Our instructors assisted these young leaders in developing realistic and executable fire support plans at the company and task force level and then aided them in the execution of their combined arms plans. In addition to the CCME, Team Fires executed expanded blocks of instruction to basic course lieutenants during “Enabler Week,” a training event where senior warfighting function representatives discussed in detail the practical application of their craft in the operational force. With a continued focus on the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), Team Fires restructured the Joint Fires program of instruction (POI) into a scalable, modular Joint Fires instruction building block model. This new model allowed better integration into the class to class scheduling challenges attendant to the MCCC, ensuring that the instruction was flexible in scheduling as the remainder of the MCCC POI. This has led to a greater level of Joint Fires instruction to the future Battery/Company /Troop commanders of the MCCC. The Fires Cell continued to expand Joint Fires integration into the MCCC field training exercise, a five day exercise that has grown to include four days of company staff exercise (STX), concluding with a battalion attack on McKenna maneuver operations in urban terrain (MOUT) site. With the inclusion of friendly UAS and live aircraft from Aviation CoE students, the Fires Cell continued to demonstrate to the MCCC students the complexity, synchronization, and integrations required for timely and accurate Joint Fires. The cell continued to expand instruction at the Maneuver Pre-Command Course, particularly focused on re-invigorating maneuver battalion and brigade commanders in the art of integration of Joint Fires, and their roles and responsibilities in that process. It added to the program a detailed block of discussion on the roles and responsibilities of the ADAM/BAE at the Brigade, and how they are part of the Joint Fires equation for planning and synchronization. Additionally, the Fires Team established a Redleg mentorship program, run by the Fires Chief, to ensure that Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery captains who attended the MCCC did not lose sight of their requirements as Joint Fires leaders. The team executed this through monthly brown bag lunches focused on core competencies of the Fires Captain, as well as video teleconferences with the senior fires trainers from the combined training centers to discuss fires trends they can expect to experience. In addition to instruction across the PME spectrum, the MCoE Fires Team provided subject matter expertise to the Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment (MIFX) 2016, How the Army Fights (HTAF) and Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) seminars, BCT Simulations Exercises, AWA 17 and Unified Challenge 17.1 to highlight a few activities. With an experienced field grade officer embedded in the MCoE Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID), the Fires Cell was better positioned to represent FCoE equities and assist in the synchronization and integration of Fires (Field

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Artillery & Air Defense Artillery) capabilities in support of the MCoE Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) solutions for current (approved) and emerging requirements ensuring unity of effort across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. The team continued to see great gains in the coordination and synchronization between FCoE and MCoE CDIDs via this experienced liaison officer. The above provided only a few areas supported by the MCoE Fires Cell in 2016. The Fires Cell continued to provide access, planning, coordination, continuity, and resources necessary to ensure maximum collaboration in efforts to develop future combined arms leaders capable of integrating all Joint Fires capabilities in support of unified land operations.4

Field Artillery Proponency Office During 2016, the Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) maintained a balanced and sustainable branch of officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers to facilitate the execution of the Field Artillery’s missions. FAPO also provided oversight of the eight personnel life-cycle management functions related to all Field Artillery career fields (officer and enlisted), and facilitated personnel related requirements and actions in close coordination with Human Resources Command, the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, and all units, agencies or elements impacted by personnel management decisions, actions and/or functions.5

Chief Warrant Officer. As the second Chief Warrant Officer of the Field Artillery, CW5 Robert D. Wilson continued to build on what his predecessor established by working with Senior Field Artillery Warrant Officers throughout the Fires Center of Excellence and the operational Army in order to support the Field Artillery Commandant’s vision.6

Soldier 2020. On 24 January 2013 the Secretary of Defense rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule and directed the military services to open all occupations and units to women as expeditiously as possible but no later than 1 January 2016. The Army’s campaign to integrate women into combat arms branches and improve readiness across the force was titled Soldier 2020 and aimed to enhance force readiness and warfighting capability by implementing a standards-based, scientific approach for verifying and evaluating military occupation specialty specific performance requirements.7 In 2016 the Field Artillery aggressively implemented Soldier 2020 initiatives with ______4Email with atch, subj: Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell Input to 2016 USAFAS Annual History, 12 Dec 16, Doc I-3. 5Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Proponent Office, 16 Feb 17, Doc I-4. 6Information Paper, subj: Untitled, 16 Feb 17. 7HQDA Execution Order 097-16 to the U.S. Army Implementation Plan 2016-01 (Army Gender Integration) (Extract), 9 Mar 16, p. 2, Doc I-5.

4 the goal of removing barriers so that all Soldiers would have the opportunity to serve in any position where he or she would be capable of performing to the standard. During the year, the branch endeavored to select and train Soldiers, regardless of gender, to be able to perform the physically demanding tasks of the Field Artillery. If the Soldier possessed the necessary qualifications, he or she received the opportunity to perform that job. Early in the year, the Army decided to open Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13B Cannon Crewmember and MOS 13D Field Artillery Automated Tactical Data System Specialist to women. Later in the year, the Field Artillery School graduated its first female 13B, Private First Class Katherine Beatty, from Advanced Individual Training.8 Just before leaving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General William A. Turner explained the importance of Soldier 2020. “We must remember that Soldier 2020 is about talent management; we must put the right Soldier, in the right job, where they not only can succeed but excel,” he noted.9

Redesigning MOS 13F. During 2013-2016, the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Proponency Office participated in the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F redesign to facilitate integrated, sequential, and progressive life-long learning for soldiers from advanced individual training to senior level training using the Army Learning Model 2015 and leader development strategy. This initiative would culminate under Modernizing Field Artillery Fires for 2020 within the enlisted ranks. The School updated Department of the Army Pamphlet, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Development Guide. In 2014 the Field Artillery School conducted a pilot Advanced Individual Training (AIT) course that increased training from six weeks and four days to eight weeks and four days to incorporate significant enhancements to precision targeting skills. The School started training the eight week and four day program of instruction in 2015. In the meantime, the Department of the Army approved expanding the course to 10 weeks and four days to accommodate even more critical tasks from the Joint Fires Officer (JFO) functional course. During 2016, the School was developing the program of instruction to incorporate JFO training in Fiscal Year 2018.10 ______8BG William A. Turner, “Farewell from the 51st Chief of the Field Artillery,” Redleg Update, May-Jun 16, pp. 3-6, Doc I-6. 9Ibid., p. 6. 10“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update (Extract), Jan 14, pp. 1-2, Doc II-23a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Apr 14, Doc II-23b, 2013 USAFAS AH; Cmdt SIGACT, 14 Aug 14, Doc I-9, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Aug 14, p. 1, Doc I- 10, 2014 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 12 Jan 15, Doc I-11, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Aug 15, pp. 3-6, Doc I-24, 2015 USAFAS AH; BG William A. Turner, “Modernizing Fire Support Training,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 14, www.army.mil/firesbulletin, Doc I-26, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Farwell from the 51st Chief of the Field Artillery,” RedLeg Update, May-Jun 15, pp. 3-6, Doc I-6; Briefing, subj: The Army Joint Fires Observer Program, 27 Apr 16, Doc I-7; Briefing (Extract), subj:

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Merging MOSs 13D and 13P to form MOS 13J. During 2013-2015, the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Proponency Officer worked on the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13D Field Artillery Tactical Data Specialist and MOS 13P, Multiple Launch Rocket System Fire Direction Specialist merger. Historically, the Field Artillery had two MOSs for fire control – one for cannon and one for rockets. Because of automation and precision munitions and tools, the Field Artillery and the Field Artillery School did not see the requirement for two separate MOSs for fire control. This led to the initiative to merge MOS 13D and MOS 13P into one MOS 13J (Fire Control Specialist). This merger would build a better model for professional development, would eliminate course redundancy, would build a sustainable MOS for the future, and would develop a more diverse Field Artillery noncommissioned officer. MOS 13J would be capable of filling fire control duties and responsibilities across cannon and rocket formations. In mid-2014 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) concurred with the proposal to merge the two MOSs. On 8 July 2015 the Department of the Army approved the deletion of the MOSs 13D and 13P and the creation of MOS 13J. In addition, the Field Artillery School and Field Artillery Proponency Office decided to assign a transitional additional skill identifier (ASI) Y2 to all personnel awarded 13P prior to 1 October 2015 and created a transitional training requirement for personnel with ASI Y2. It consisted of three black-board based modules that had to be completed by March 2018. In 2016 the School finalized the new program of instruction for 13J and started teaching it the same year.11

Professional Development Model. During the year, FAPO updated the Professional Development Model for a Career Management Field 13 (Field Artillery) Military Occupational Specialties to correlate with the recommended changes in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide.12

______Advanced Individual Training, 30 Jan 17, Doc I-8; In 2015 the Field Artillery School divided JFO training into phase one and two. Phase one was institutional, and phase two was operational. 11“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update (Extract), Jan 14, pp. 1-2, Doc II-23a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc II-23c, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SIGACT, 27 Aug 14, Doc I- 12, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Sep 14, p. 1, Doc I-13, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery: 2025 and Beyond, 6 May 14, Doc I-13a, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Aug 15, pp. 3-6, Doc I-27, 2015 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Oct 15, p. 7, Doc I-24, 2015 USAFAS AH; William A. Turner, “Field Artillery 2016, Beyond,” Fires Bulletin, Jan- Feb 16, pp. 9-14, Doc I-28, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Advanced Individual Training, 30 Jan 17, Doc I-8. 12Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10.

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Reallocated Intelligence Sergeant Positions in Fires Battalion. FAPO conducted an analysis of all intelligence positions and requested that they be reallocated for all Military Occupational Skills (MOS) at skill level 40 positions to provide equity in the designated developmental position. This position was previously filled indiscriminately with Career Management Field (CMF) 13 (Field Artillery) E-8. The new guidance and allocations enabled the distribution of this position to be across all of the CMF 13 MOSs.13

Categorized Binning Standards. FAPO updated the physical demand standards for 13F. It was incorrectly binned as moderate. It was declared heavy. This change was in congruence with the physical demands which were classified as heavy with the Infantry 11B MOS. The change was made due to the nature of the job that the 13F did.14

Rewrite of DA PAM 600-25 (Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide) and 600-3 (Commissioned Officer Professional Development Management). During the year, FAPO outlined the educational and assignment opportunities, identified and promoted broadening assignments, specified performance criteria for individuals to remain fully competitive for promotion, identified critical duty positions. Field Artillery Soldiers should seek to obtain maximum experience at each rank.15

Promotion Board Analysis for Sergeant Major Board. During the year, FAPO conducted a thorough analysis of various categories to provide the field with a snap shot of how the field faired in several areas such as age, time in grade, educational achievements, and assignment comparisons.16

Assisted U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USAREIUM) in completing the OPAT study. The FAPO assisted TRADOC in collecting the data needed to determine the standards needed for Occupational Physical Assessment Test (OPAT) in the accessions. The FAPO was able to identify key areas that Soldiers performed poorly in to better improve their physical performance of necessary tasks.17

Updated Professional Development Proficiency Codes. In 2016 FAPO reallocated Professional Development Proficiency Codes (PDPC) codes within 13Z E9 positions within key positions at the division artillery and division brigade level.18

______13Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10. 14Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10 15Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10. 16Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10. 17Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10. 18Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10.

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Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber Awards. Named after the father of American artillery, Henry A. Knox who served as the Chief of Artillery in the Continental Army in the American Revolution, the Knox Award recognized the outstanding Active Army Field Artillery battery of the year. The Alexander Hamilton Award was named in honor of Alexander Hamilton, an artilleryman who gallantly fought in the Continental Army during the American Revolution and acknowledged the outstanding Field Artillery battery of the year; and Gruber Award honored the memory of Edmund L. Gruber who wrote “The Caisson Song” while he was stationed in the at the beginning of the 20th Century by recognizing an outstanding Field Artillery professional for superior performance during the year.19 In 2016 a panel of brigade commanders and brigade command sergeant majors selected the Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber winners for the year after given specific guidance to ensure that only the best were chosen. The panel awarded the Knox Award to C Battery, 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery Regiment (Fort Bliss, Texas); the Hamilton Award to B Battery, 1st Battalion 145th Field Artillery Regiment (Utah Army National Guard); and the Gruber Award to Sergeant First Class Zachary Wilson, C Battery 2nd Battalion 15th Field Artillery Regiment (Fort Lewis, Washington).20

Cadet Engagement Strategy. Throughout the year FAPO communicated with thousands of Cadets in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, telling the Field Artillery story, highlighting keys to its profession, describing its team, and discussing the opportunities and experiences that await those that were up to the challenge. Along with ground game enhancers like social media, FAPO continued to develop and foster relationships with Field Artillery units and ROTC programs across the country.21 In 2016 the Field Artillery experienced high turn-over but had success with the engagement of cadets across the country in support of the Field Artillery Commandant’s Line of Effort to “Recruit, Access, and Retain a quality Field Artillery Force.” During the course of the year, FAPO visited 24 ROTC programs (over 170 colleges), notably engaging all six of the Senior Military Colleges and Universities, and conducted three USMA engagements. In total FAPO communicated with over 6,000 cadets between in person visits and social media outreach. Both the Twitter and Facebook media outlets have been a great resource of information and promotion of the impending and recapitulation of the traveling that the office conducted throughout the year.22

Strategic Communications Office In recent years the Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Office in the U.S. ______19Memorandum of Instruction, subj: Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber Award Submissions Requirements, 25 Jul 16, Doc I-9. 20Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10. 21COL Stephen J. Maranian, “State of the Field Artillery 2016,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 17, pp. 5-6, Doc I-11. 22Email with atch, subj: FAPO History Input, 28 Feb 17, Doc I-10.

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Army Field Artillery School assumed greater importance. During 2016, STRATCOM drafted themes, messages, and talking points for dissemination throughout the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery. These messages were distributed via an optimal venue or medium to each leader or Soldier. Specifically, STRATCOM informed Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders about the field’s improvement of core competencies through re-focused training on Decisive Action skill sets conducted at the Combat Training Centers, during Warfighter exercises, and training at home station. Additionally, many Field Artillery programs and initiatives met significant milestones in 2016. Highlights included inserting Joint Fires Observer (JFO) training into professional military education (PME), building a foundation for a more robust Master Gunner Course, embracing the Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC) concept, bringing back and securing funding for the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC), and developing the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Fires Orientation Course, and most importantly the publication of the Field Artillery Vision to “Be the world’s premier Field Artillery force; modernized, organized, trained, and ready to integrate and employ Army, Joint, and Multinational Fires, across multiple domains, enabling victory through Unified Land Operations.” Additionally, 2016 witnessed the sustained impact that the Division Artilleries made on the fires and maneuver forces. They proved that they were an invaluable asset to divisions as Force Field Artillery headquarters and aided BCT commanders with the training, certification, and talent management of Redlegs in BCT formations. To get the message out, STRATCOM employed the School’s and Field Artillery’s news and social media, such as Facebook. It increased the number of School and Field Artillery Facebook followers from 8,664 in 2014 to 17,179 by the end of 2016. STRATCOM also used the Fort Sill Tribune, the Fires Bulletin, RedLeg Update, Army- wide news and social media, and direct contact through speeches and presentations with leaders and Soldiers.23

Army Targeting Center Creating the Army Targeting Center (ATC) dated back into 2014. In May 2014 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command tasked the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) to conduct an operational targeting study to identify gaps in Army targeting. The FCoE compared the Army’s abilities against the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and the Air Force Targeting Center, focusing on target intelligence, target validation, developing no-strike entities, and conducting collateral damage estimation. The study made three recommendations. First, a targeting center should be established. Second, proponency over targeting should be assigned to the FCoE; and third, leadership education should be conducted with a focus on targeting.24

______23Email with atch, subj: STRATCOM Input to 2016 USAFAS Annual History, 30 Jan 17, Doc I-12. 24“Fires Forward,” Mar 15, Doc I-4, 2015 USAFAS AH; Marie Berberea, “Sill Takes on Fires Targeting Mission,” Redleg Update, Apr 15, pp. 6-7, Doc I-5, 2015 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 12 Jan 15,

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Based upon the recommendations, on 19 December 2014 the Commanding General of FCoE, Major General John G. Rossi, decided to disestablish Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI), to move Target Mensuration Only, Collateral Damage Estimation and Weaponeering, Joint Fires Observer, and Special Technical Operations Courses to the 428th Field Artillery Brigade in the Field Artillery School, and to use the remaining JACI personnel to establish a targeting center under the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School to coordinate all targeting issues for the FCoE. JACI’s Electronic Warfare course would eventually become part of the Cyber Center of Excellence (CCoE) at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Until then, a CCoE Detachment at Fort Sill would provide electronic warfare training. As planned, the JACI transformed into the Fires Targeting Center on 2 March 2015 with the mission of addressing Army targeting doctrine, policy, and program oversight within the joint community.25 The FCoE had the goal of extending the targeting center mission beyond the fires warfighting function. In 2015 it advocated creating an Army Targeting Center in the FCoE to represent the Army at joint targeting forums and policy discussions because the Army lacked an appointed authority to synchronize the efforts of all stakeholders for targeting issues, resulting in a lack of integration of fires and information related capabilities to create effects against targets, and because the Army was not properly represented at multiple joint targeting forums. According to General Rossi, establishing proponency would align doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy aspects of Army targeting. Proponency would also establish the authority to represent the Army at joint targeting forums. Given this, General Rossi requested that the FCoE be designated as the Army Force Modernization Proponent for Targeting in Army Regulation (AR) 5-22 and sent the recommendation through TRADOC to the Army.26 ______Doc II-58, 2014 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with John A. Scotto, Dep Dir, JACI, 5 Feb 15, Doc II-59, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Draft Order for Reorganization of JACI, 10 Feb 15, Doc II-60, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Modernizing Field Artillery Instruction, 18 Dec 14, Doc II-61, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JACI Input to 2014 Annual History, 17 Mar 15, Doc II-61a, 2014 USAFAS AH. 25Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 12 Jan 15, Doc II- 58, 2014 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with John A. Scotto, Dep Dir, JACI, 5 Feb 15, Doc II-59, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Draft Order for Reorganization of JACI, 10 Feb 15, Doc II-60, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Modernizing Field Artillery Instruction, 18 Dec 14, Doc II-61, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JACI Input to 2014 Annual History, 17 Mar 15, Doc II-61a, 2014 USAFAS AH; “Fires Forward,” Mar 15; Marie Berberea, “Sill Takes on Fires Targeting Mission,” pp. 6-7. 26Berberea, “Sill Takes on Fires Targeting Mission,” pp. 6-7; Memorandum thru Cdr, TRADOC to Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, subj: Request for Designation as the Army Force Modernization Proponent for Targeting in AR 5-22, 14 May 15, Doc I-6, 2015 USAFAS AH; FA Cmdt SITREP, 6-19 May 16, Doc

10

In September 2015 the Army designated the FCoE as the Army Force Modernization Proponent for Targeting (Army Targeting Center). This gave the FCoE the responsibility to coordinate all doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities functions for the Army associated with targeting. Targeting was one of six responsibilities that the FCoE had according to AR 5-22. It had responsibility for air defense and theater missile defense, Field Artillery, Fires, and Targeting. It also had responsibilities over the branch proponents for Air Defense and Field Artillery.27 The following year in May 2016, the FCoE submitted the packet requesting establishing the ATC as planned through TRADOC to the Army. On 15 July 2016 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark A. Milley, approved establishing the Army Targeting Center at Fort Sill.28 In 2016 the Army Targeting Center (ATC) continued to provide the joint and combined focus for the FCoE and advanced Army targeting. In the former role it routinely interacted with the Joint Staff, Component Commands, the Army’s sister services, Formation Headquarters, Department of the Army, Forces Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). ATC also remained the staff proponent for the Battle Coordination Detachments (BCDs). To further Army targeting it executed a broad set of core missions that included standardization and oversight for the Army’s Target Mensuration Only, Collateral Damage Estimation, and Weaponeering course, represented the Army at numerous joint targeting working groups and forums to include the multi-service and multi-national Military Targeting Committee, serve as the FCoE standing representative to the Joint Fires Support Executive Steering Committee with oversight responsibilities of the Army Joint Fires Observer training program, and served as the Fires lead for the Army’s US-UK interoperability initiatives.29 ______I-12a; FA Cmdt SITREP, 17 May-2 Jun 16, Doc I-12b; BG William A. Turner, “Update on the Fires Targeting Center and DIVARTYs,” Redleg Update, Nov-Dec 15, pp. 3-4, Doc I-12c. 27Email with atchs, subj: 1508158189 Request for Designation as the Army Force Modernization Proponent for Targeting in AR 5-22, 28 Sep 15, Doc I-7, 2015 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Cdr, FCoE, subj: Army Force Modernization Proponent for Targeting, 24 Sep 15, Doc I-8, 2015 USAFAS AH. 28Berberea, “Sill Takes on Fires Targeting Mission,” pp. 6-7; Memorandum thru Cdr, TRADOC to Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, subj: Request for Designation as the Army Force Modernization Proponent for Targeting in AR 5-22, 14 May 15, Doc I-6, 2015 USAFAS AH; FA Cmdt SITREP, 6-19 May 16, Doc I-12a; FA Cmdt SITREP, 17 May-2 Jun 16, Doc I-12b; BG William A. Turner, “Update on the Fires Targeting Center and DIVARTYs,” Redleg Update, Nov-Dec 15, pp. 3-4, Doc I-12c; Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Thomas M. Williams, Dir, ATC, 12 Jan 17, Doc I-13. 29Email with atch, JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II- 98, 2013 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 12 Jan 15, Doc II-58, 2014 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with John A. Scotto, Dep Dir,

11

During the past year, ATC moved forward on many fronts. It began hosting the Army Targeting Working Group to address issues associated with Army targeting across the force and worked to reestablish the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course to educate personnel from all services, American, British, Canadian, and Australian/New Zealand armies, and other government agencies how to integrate joint fires through targeting to create lethal and nonlethal requirements needed to fight and win as a joint organization. ATC also addressed how Army institutional and operational organization could best meet the requirements associated with the Joint Fires Officer program as it transitions from a small functional training base to an integrated component of 13-series initial military training.30

Fires Center of Excellence Restructure In 2009 the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) underwent a restructuring as a result of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiatives of the Department of Defense (DoD). The Air Defense Artillery School moved from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This move consolidated the Army’s two artillery branches (Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery) that comprised the Fires Warfighting Function, at Fort Sill.31 Three years later in 2012, President Barack Obama started withdrawing troops from Iraq and Afghanistan to initiate a reduction in force. The Army had to shrink from 575,000 (Iraqi surge strength) to 450,000. This caused the Army to cut the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) by 5,467 military personnel and 2,365 civilian personnel and prompted the command to develop a five-prong initiative to reduce manpower. TRADOC issued an operational order to eliminate low-priority functions or consolidate like functions to gain efficiencies, executed a 25 percent staff reduction, identified initiatives to gain efficiencies in organization and operations (main effort), reduced manpower requirements, and adopted additional initiatives. As a result of this five-prong effort, the FCoE lost 32 military authorizations and 32 civilian authorizations. However, the TRADOC initiatives failed to meet the Army-directed reductions and forced it to search for additional ways to reduce manpower.32 In response, the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General, Lieutenant General David D. Halverson, formerly the Commanding General of the FCoE, signed a directive on 30 January 2013 to trim the FCoE from three training brigades (Air Defense Artillery [ADA] brigade, Field Artillery [FA] brigade, and 434th Field Artillery Brigade that ______JACI, 5 Feb 15, Doc II-59, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Draft Order for Reorganization of JACI, 10 Feb 15, Doc II-60, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Modernizing Field Artillery Instruction, 18 Dec 14, Doc II-61, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JACI Input to 2014 Annual History, 17 Mar 15, Doc II-61a, 2014 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Thomas M. Williams, Dir, ATC, 12 Jan 17; AR 5-22 (Extract), 28 Oct 15, pp. 1-7, Doc I-14. 30Interview with atch, Dastrup with Williams, 12 Jan 17. 31Memorandum for Record, subj: FCoE Restructure, 2015-2016, 12 Feb 16, Doc I-10, 2015 USAFAS AH. 32Memorandum for Record, subj: FCoE Restructure, 2015-2016, 12 Feb 16.

12 conducted basic combat training) to two training brigades. In a memorandum to TRADOC, the Commanding General of FCoE, Major General James M. McDonald, advocated retaining the three-brigade training structure and gained relief from the directive.33 Pressure to restructure did not go away. In 2014 the ADA brigade continued to receive unresourced missions, such as Counter Rocket and Mortar (CRAM) and Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), simultaneously with the manpower reductions. This taxed the span of control for the ADA brigade and caused the brigade commander to report about the stress caused by increasing unsourced missions in the face of declining personnel.34 This encouraged TRADOC to order an organizational structure review of the FCoE. Tasked by TRADOC on 15 January 2015 to conduct a holistic top-down review of the entire FCoE organization, the Commanding General of the FCoE, Major General John G. Rossi, directed a restructure of the FCoE to balance resources with the mission. Tasked with this guidance, the FCoE conducted a detailed analysis and identified four key weaknesses where risk was growing. First, the lack of resources in the school commandants’ offices hampered the execution of branch propocency responsibilities. Second, the span of control for the training brigades continued to grow. Third, supply accountability requirements placed on commanders of training batteries consumed a distortional amount of time. Last, operator maintenance requirements assigned to instructors levied an almost impossible time requirement on them.35 To address these weaknesses the FCoE outlined three courses of action and briefed them to General Rossi. Course of action one merged the ADA brigade with the FA brigade with each branch having a separate Directorate of Training to create a Fires Brigade and retained the 434th FA Brigade. General Rossi expressed concern about this organization. It would create a Fires Brigade commander who understood the technical aspects of only half of the organization. General Rossi continued that Fires was a Warfighting Function, but it consisted of two separate branch schools.36 ______33Memorandum for Record, subj: FCoE Restructure, 2015-2016, 12 Feb 16; Memorandum for Major General James M. McDonald, Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, 30 Jan 13, Doc I-11, 2015 USAFAS AH. 34Memorandum for Record, subj: FCoE Restructure, 2015-2016, 12 Feb 16. 35Email, subj: Something for your files, 1 Sep 15, Doc I-12, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, 5 Nov 15, Doc I-13, 2015 USAFAS AH; Minutes, subj: FCoE Restructure Decision Briefing to DCG TRADOC, 26 Aug 15, Doc I-14, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Fires Organizational Restructure Brief, 26 Aug 15, Doc I-15, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: FCoE Reorganization Mission Analysis Decision Brief, 3 Feb 16, Doc I-16, 2015 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Record, subj: FCoE Restructure, 2015-2016, 12 Feb 16, Doc I-17, 2015 USAFAS AH. 36Email, subj: Something for your files, 1 Sep 15; Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, 5 Nov 15, Doc I-18, 2015 USAFAS AH; Minutes, subj: FCoE Restructure Decision Briefing to DCG TRADOC, 26 Aug 15, Doc I-19, 2015

13

Course of action two preserved the ADA brigade and the FA brigade, dissolved the 434th Field Artillery Brigade, and moved its basic combat training units under the ADA and FA brigades. This would retain two branch chiefs and their staffs as did course of action one and would follow the precedent established by the Chemical School that had already established a brigade composed of basic combat training units and branch training units. However, this course of action would expand the mission of the ADA and FA brigade commanders to include basic combat training, advanced individual training, and primary military education whereas under the existing model each branch had only primary military education and advanced individual training because the 434th FA Brigade furnished basic combat training. Equally as important, the course of action two would give the brigade commanders two distinct missions (branch and basic combat training).37 Course of action three aligned all basic combat training units under the ADA brigade. This would make the FA brigade vulnerable to further reductions and create an imbalance between the two artillery brigades. After additional discuss on this course of action early in the summer of 2015, General Rossi decided to brief TRADOC about the requirement of retaining the three training brigades.38 Subsequently, the FCoE briefed TRADOC on the courses of action on 16 June 2015. General Rossi told TRADOC about the challenges of restructuring and recommended retaining the three-brigade force structure. Although the Deputy Commanding General of TRADOC found merit in retaining the three brigades and understood the challenges, he asked General Rossi which of the three options that he preferred. General Rossi pointed out that he did not like any of the three options, but if he had to implement any of them that he preferred option two. After additional discussion the Deputy Commanding General noted that constrained resources required the FCoE to drawn down to two brigades and directed the FCoE to make recommendations for a two-brigade force structure. This led the FCoE to develop three options for a two-brigade force structure. The first merged the ADA and FA brigades into a Fires Brigade and left the basic combat training brigade intact. The second dissolved the 434th FA Brigade and integrated its basic combat training battalions into the ADA and FA brigades. The third realigned all basic combat training battalions under the ADA training brigade.39 ______USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Fires Organizational Restructure Brief, 26 Aug 15; Briefing, subj: FCoE Reorganization Mission Analysis Decision Brief, 3 Feb 16; Memorandum for Record, subj: FCoE Restructure, 2015-2016, 12 Feb 16. 37Briefing, subj: Fires Organizational Restructure Brief, 26 Aug 15. 38Minutes, subj: FCoE Restructure Decision Briefing to DCG TRADOC, 26 Aug 15; Briefing, subj: Fires Organizational Restructure Brief, 26 Aug 15; Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, 5 Nov 15; Memorandum for MG John G. Rossi, Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, subj: U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, 4 Dec 15, Doc I-20, 2015 USAFAS AH. 39Minutes, subj: FCoE Restructure Decision Briefing to DCG TRADOC, 26 Aug 15; Briefing, subj: FCoE Restructure, 3 Jun 15, Doc I-21, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing,

14

On 24 October 2015 General Rossi directed inactivating the 434th Field Artillery Brigade and moving its basic combat training battalions to the ADA and FA brigades. This would allow the retention of branch-specific brigades without burdening one brigade with the entirety of the basic combat training mission, would best retain the ADA and FA commands, and would provide high-potential officers the opportunity to advance to positions of increasing responsibilities. It would also permit reconstituting the basic combat training brigade if the Army should grow that would be easier to accomplish than reconstituting a branch brigade, among other reasons. In November 2015 the FCoE started developing a plan to inactivate the 434th Field Artillery Brigade and to move its training battalions under the ADA and FA training brigades.40 Upon becoming the Commanding General of FCoE in the summer of 2016, Major General Brian J. McKiernan, who succeeded General Rossi, changed the direction of restructuring. He did not want to risk basic combat training by splitting it between ADA and FA training brigades. He concluded that the lower risk was merging ADA and FA training brigades to create a Fires Training Brigade composed of Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery units that would provide advanced individual training and primary military education and retaining the 434th Field Artillery Brigade for basic combat training. His plan also retained an ADA commandant and a FA commandant and their staffs. Each commandant would furnish oversight of his branch, while the Fires Training Brigade commander would supervise ADA and FA initial military training and advanced individual training training.41

MODERNIZING FIELD ARTILLERY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SKILLS ______subj: Fires Organizational Restructure Brief, 26 Aug 15; Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, 5 Nov 15; Memorandum for MG John G. Rossi, Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, subj: U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, 4 Dec 15; Briefing, subj: FCoE Reorganization Mission Analysis Brief, 26 Jan 16, Doc I-22, 2015 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Record, subj: FCoE Restructure, 2015-2016, 12 Feb 16. 40Minutes, subj: FCoE Restructure Decision Briefing to DCG TRADOC, 26 Aug 15; Briefing, subj: Fires Organizational Restructure Brief, 26 Aug 15; Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, 5 Nov 15; Memorandum for MG John G. Rossi, Commander, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, subj: U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, 4 Dec 15; Briefing, subj: FCoE Reorganization Mission Analysis Brief, 26 Jan 16; Memorandum for Record, subj: FCoE Restructure, 2015-2016. 12 Feb 16; Email with atchs, subj: FCoE Restructure Planning Notes, 29 Feb 16, Doc I-23, 2015 USAFAS AH. 41Briefing, subj: DRM Update on Ft. Sill ande FCoE Reorganization, 14 Apr 16, Doc I-15; Briefing (Extract), subj: CDID Town Hall, 10 Nov 16, Doc I-16; Briefing, subj: Fires Center of Excellence Reorganization, OPT Meeting, 30 Nov 16, Doc I-17; Interview, Dastrup with Craig Newman, USAFAS DAC, 28 Nov 16, Doc I-18; Email, subj: FCoE Reorganization, 12 Dec 16, Doc I-19; Briefing, subj: OPT Meeting, 30 Sep 16, Doc I-20.

15

In recent years the Field Artillery School conducted a comprehensive 13 series Military Occupational Skill review. Based upon the review, the School decided to consolidate seven military occupational specialties into five by 2020 based upon technological developments. Going forward from 2016, the School planned to focus on 13M Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember; 13B Cannon Crewmember; 13J Fire Control Specialist; 13R Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator; and 13F Joint Fires Support Specialist.42

Redesigning Military Occupational Skill 13F During 2013-2016, the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Proponency Office participated in the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F redesign to facilitate integrated, sequential, and progressive life-long learning for soldiers from advanced individual training to senior level training using the Army Learning Model 2015 and leader development strategy. This initiative would culminate under Modernizing Field Artillery Fires for 2020 within the enlisted ranks. The School updated Department of the Army Pamphlet, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Development Guide. In 2014 the Field Artillery School conducted a pilot Advanced Individual Training (AIT) course that increased training from six weeks and four days to eight weeks and four days to incorporate significant enhancements to precision targeting skills. The School started training the eight week and four day program of instruction in 2015. In the meantime, the Department of the Army approved expanding the course to 10 weeks and four days to accommodate even more critical tasks from the Joint Fires Officer (JFO) functional course. During 2016, the School was developing the program of instruction to incorporate JFO training in Fiscal Year 2018.43

Merging Military Occupational Skills 13D and 13P to form Military Occupational ______42“Farewell from the 51st Chief of the Field Artillery,” RedLeg Update, May-Jun 16, pp. 3-6, Doc I-21. 43“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update (Extract), Jan 14, pp. 1-2, Doc II-23a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Apr 14, Doc II-23b, 2013 USAFAS AH; Cmdt SIGACT, 14 Aug 14, Doc I-9, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Aug 14, p. 1, Doc I- 10, 2014 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 12 Jan 15, Doc I-11, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Aug 15, pp. 3-6, Doc I-24, 2015 USAFAS AH; BG William A. Turner, “Modernizing Fire Support Training,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 14, www.army.mil/firesbulletin, Doc I-26, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Farwell from the 51st Chief of the Field Artillery,” RedLeg Update, May-Jun 15, pp. 3-6, Doc I-6; Briefing, subj: The Army Joint Fires Observer Program, 27 Apr 16, Doc I-7; Briefing (Extract), subj: Advanced Individual Training, 30 Jan 17, Doc I-8; In 2015 the Field Artillery School divided JFO training into phase one and two. Phase one was institutional, and phase two was operational.

16

Skill 13J During 2013-2015, the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Proponency Officer worked on the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13D, Field Artillery Tactical Data Specialist, and 13P, Multiple Launch Rocket System Fire Direction Specialist, merger. Historically, the Field Artillery had two MOSs for fire control – one for cannon and one for rockets. Because of automation and precision munitions and tools, the Field Artillery and the Field Artillery School did not see the requirement for two separate MOSs for fire control. This led to the initiative to merge MOS 13D and MOS 13P into one MOS 13J (Fire Control Specialist). This merger would build a better model for professional development, would eliminate course redundancy, would build a sustainable MOS for the future, and would develop a more diverse Field Artillery noncommissioned officer. MOS 13J would be capable of filling fire control duties and responsibilities across cannon and rocket formations. In mid-2014 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) concurred with the proposal to merge the two MOSs. On 8 July 2015 the Department of the Army approved the deletion of the MOSs 13D and 13P and the creation of MOS 13J. The Field Artillery School taught the first 13J class in October 2015.44 In addition, the Field Artillery School and Field Artillery Proponency Office decided to assign a transitional additional skill identifier (ASI) Y2 to all personnel awarded 13P prior to 1 October 2015 and created a transitional training requirement for personnel with ASI Y2. It consisted of three black-board based modules that had to be completed by March 2018. In 2016 the School finalized the new program of instruction for 13D/13P and started teaching it the same year.45 ______44“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update (Extract), Jan 14, pp. 1-2, Doc II-23a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc II-23c, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SIGACT, 27 Aug 14, Doc I- 12, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Sep 14, p. 1, Doc I-13, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery: 2025 and Beyond, 6 May 14, Doc I-13a, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Aug 15, pp. 3-6, Doc I-27, 2015 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Oct 15, p. 7, Doc I-24, 2015 USAFAS AH; William A. Turner, “Field Artillery 2016, Beyond,” Fires Bulletin, Jan- Feb 16, pp. 9-14, Doc I-28, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Advanced Individual Training, 30 Jan 17, Doc I-8. 45“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update (Extract), Jan 14, pp. 1-2, Doc II-23a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc II-23c, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SIGACT, 27 Aug 14, Doc I- 12, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Sep 14, p. 1, Doc I-13, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery: 2025 and Beyond, 6 May 14, Doc I-13a, 2014 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Aug 15, pp. 3-6, Doc I-27, 2015 USAFAS AH; “From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Oct 15, p. 7, Doc I-24, 2015 USAFAS AH; BG William A. Turner, “Field Artillery 2016, Beyond,” Fires Bulletin,

17

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY AND THE FIELD ARTILLERY

In November 2011 the Department of the Army issued a short suspense to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to review women in the Army (WITA). Specifically, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno, directed an analysis of modifying the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule restriction that was adopted on 1 October 1994 because it did not adequately reflect the current operational environment in Iraq and Afghanistan where non-linear warfare persisted. The rule declared that service members were eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they were qualified. Women however would be excluded from assignments to units below the brigade whose primary mission would be engaging in direct combat on the ground.46 After careful analysis the Department of the Army announced a significant policy change in 2012 concerning women in the Army. Army Directive 2012-16 opened three Field Artillery Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) of 13M, Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember; 13P, Multiple Launch Rocket System Fire Direction Specialist; and 13R, Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator to women. Previously, only MOS 13T (Field Artillery Surveyor/Meteorological Crewmember) was open to women. Effective 14 May 2012, females could serve in units or positions that were doctrinally required to collocate physically with ground combat units. For females, the change in policy permitted them to serve in all duties in Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalions. This change also allowed the Field Artillery to grow female officers into senior leaders with a firm understanding of gunnery and delivery.47 In 2012-2013 more than 90 percent of the female officer population in the Field Artillery was second or first lieutenant. Female officers were serving as platoon leaders ______Jan-Feb 16, pp. 9-14, Doc I-28, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Advanced Individual Training, 30 Jan 17, Doc I-8. 46Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, et al, subj: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, 13 Jan 94, Doc I-15, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 18-23 Nov 11, Doc I-16, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Women in the Army Assignment Policy, Jul 11, Doc I-17, 2011 USAFAS AH; Congressional Research Service, Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, 8 Nov 11, p. 5, Doc I-18, 2011 USAFAS AH; 1998 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 83-86. 47Fires Forward, Jul 2012, Doc I-13, 2012 USAFAS AH; Redleg Update, Jul 2012, Doc I-14, 2012 USAFAS AH; Talking Points for St. Barbara Celebrations, Nov 12, Doc I-15, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Army Directive 2012-16, 27 Jun 12, Doc I-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; Fires Forward, Oct 2012, Doc I-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, Doc I-21, 2013 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Record (FOUO), subj: Executive Summary for the Fires Brigade Warfighter Forum, 3 Dec 12, material used is not FOUO, Doc I-22, 2013 USAFAS AH.

18 in a MLRS or HIMARS unit. Soon, women would be serving as firing battery commanders, battalion executive officers, and battalion operation officers, would have the opportunity to compete for tactical battalion and brigade command in the Field Artillery, and would serve as mentors for those females that followed them.48 In 2013 the Field Artillery School passed significant milestones. On 15 March 2013 the first females for the newly opened MOSs 13M and P arrived for advanced individual training (AIT). Two months later in May 2013, the first AIT classes of 13M and 13P with female soldiers graduated. All active duty females were assigned to the 18th Fires Brigade. In June 2013 another 13P class with females graduated with the active duty females being assigned to the 214th Fires Brigade. On 11 June 2013 the first class of 13Rs with females graduated. On 13 November 2013 the Army opened all Field Artillery officer (MOS 13A) positions to female officers. Officially, all 13A positions would be changed to gender non-specific positions. Also, the Army permitted the assignment of female Field Artillery officers to brigade combat teams where they could serve as fire support officers at all levels and announced in December 2013 that female officers could serve in a direct support field artillery battalion in a brigade combat team and a cannon battalion in a fires brigade as a fire direction officer, a cannon platoon leader, and an executive officer. Fire support positions at the company and battalion level were still closed until the Infantry and Armored MOSs accepted females.49 The Field Artillery School continued to experience the impact of decisions of 2012-2013 concerning women in the Army and the Field. During 2014, the School continued to prepare for integrating females in MOS 13B, Cannon Crewmember, and 13F, Fire Support Specialist. Just as important, the Field Artillery experienced a ______48Fires Forward, Jul 2012, Doc I-13, 2012 USAFAS AH; Redleg Update, Jul 2012, Doc I-14, 2012 USAFAS AH; Talking Points for St. Barbara Celebrations, Nov 12, Doc I-15, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Army Directive 2012-16, 27 Jun 12, Doc I-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; Fires Forward, Oct 2012, Doc I-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, Doc I-21, 2013 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Record (FOUO), subj: Executive Summary for the Fires Brigade Warfighter Forum, 3 Dec 12, material used is not FOUO, Doc I-22, 2013 USAFAS AH. 49Marie Berberea, “Women Cross More Combat Lines,” 19 Dec 13, www.army.mil/article/117287, Doc I-23, 2013 USAFAS AH; C. Todd Lopez, “Army to Open 33,000 Positions to Female Soldiers in April,” 27 Jan 14, www.army.mil/article/118930, Doc I-24, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Integration of Females into MOS 13M, P, R, 22 May 13, Doc I-25, 2013 USAFAS AH; Marie Berberea, “Female NCO Makes History,” sill-ww.army.mil/article, 9 May 13, Doc I-26, 2013 USAFAS AH; Caitlin Kenney, “Army Opens More Jobs to Women,” 19 Jul 12, www.army.mil/article/83951, Doc I-27, 2013 USAFAS AH; Marie Berberea, “Field Artillery Training Integrates Women into Combat Specialties,” www.army.mil/article/101378, Doc I-28, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 13 Mar 14, Doc I-29, 2013 USAFAS AH; C. Todd Lopez, “Army Describes Plans for Integrating Women into Combat,” www.army.mil/article/105814, 18 Jun 13, Doc I-30, 2013 USAFAS AH.

19 significant growth in the number of female second lieutenants between 2012 and 2014. In 2012 the branch had 21 female second lieutenants, and in 2014 it had 84 female second lieutenants. Also, in 2014 the branch had 176 females in the commissioned ranks.50 Further progress integrating women into the Field Artillery occurred in 2015. In March 2015 the Army announced that it was opening all Field Artillery positions to women except for MOS 13F, Fire Support Specialist. Beginning in October 2015, women were eligible to serve in the newly opened cannon crewmember and field artillery automated data system specialist MOSs and U6 additional skill identifier that was field artillery weapons maintenance. This measure continued the policy of opening all MOSs to women and ending the policy of prohibiting women from serving in traditionally male combat jobs. The Army planned to keep MOS 13F closed until decisions were made about integrating women into infantry and armor units because the specialists were embedded in those kinds of units.51 Secretary of Defense Ash Carter overrode the Army’s decision to keep women out of MOS 13F. On 3 December 2015 he announced that all military occupations and positions would be open to women without exception beginning in January 2016. As long as they were qualified and met specific standards, women would be able to contribute to the Defense of Department’s mission with no barriers in their way. According to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark A. Milley, this action would increase the Army’s military effectiveness. As directed, the Army submitted a detailed integration implementation plan in 2016 that opened all MOSs, career fields, and branches to accession by women. This opened all MOSs 19 Armor, MOSs 11 Infantry, and MOS 13F Forward Observer to women.52 ______50Interview with atch, Dastrup with Craig Newman, Dep Assist Cmdt, USAFAS, 6 Nov 14, Doc I-19, 2014 USAFAS AH. 51“Army to Open All Field Artillery MOSs to Women – Except One,” www.army.com, Doc I-30, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Odierno: Army to Open Most Field Artillery Jobs to Women,” Army Times, 3 Aug 15, www.armytimes.com, Doc II-31, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Army to Open All Field Artillery MOSs to Women – Except One,” www.military.com, Doc II-32, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Army Opens 19,700 Field Artillery Jobs to Women,” Army Times, 29 Oct 15, www.armytime.com, Doc II-33, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Fires Forward,” Aug 15, Doc I-34, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Fires Forward,” Mar 15, Doc II-35, 2015 USAFAS AH; Msg, subj: Release of Army Directive 2015-41, Expanding Positions for the Assignment of Enlisted Female Combat Field Artillery Soldiers, 20 Oct 15, Doc I-36, 2015 USAFAS AH; “All Cannon Military Occupational Specialties Could Soon Open to Females,” Army News Services, undated, Doc I-37, 2015 USAFAS AH. 52Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Opens All Military Occupations, Positions to Women,” www.defense.gov, 3 Dec 15, Doc I-38, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Full Integration of Women in the Army, 4 Dec 15, Doc I-39, 2015 USAFAS AH; David Vergun, “13-Forward Observer – Open to Women as of 1 April 16,” Army News Service, 2016, Doc I-22; “Army Outlined Gender Integration Implementation Plan,”

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Subsequently, the Field Artillery experienced a notable first. Private First Class Katherine Beatty became the branch’s first woman cannoneer upon graduating from MOS 13B Advanced Individual Training Class 12-16 on 11 March 2016. She graduated as the distinguished honor graduate and was assigned to the 4th Infantry Division.53

______Army Public Affairs, 10 Mar 16, Doc I-23; Memorandum, subj: Full Integration of Women in the Army, 4 Dec 15, Doc I-24; Cindy McIntyre, “Army’s First Woman Cannoneer Finishes Top of Class,” RedLeg Update, Mar-Apr 16, pp. 5-7, Doc I-25; Memorandum for The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., 21 Jul 15, Doc I-26. 53Army’s First Woman Cannoneer Finishes Top of Class,” Fort Sill Tribune, undated, Doc I-27; HQDA Execution Order 097-16 to the U.S. Army Implemention Pan 2016-01, Army Gender Integration, (Extract), 9 Mar 16, Doc I-28; FA Cmdt SITREP, 25 Feb-10 Mar 16, Doc I-28a.

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CHAPTER TWO LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

During 2016, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School trained Army and Marine Field Artillerymen to meet the needs of the nation’s operational forces. The School focused on developing Field Artillery core competencies and a closer synchronization with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill, and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) in the FCoE. To train Soldiers and leaders, the School employed institutional training and distance learning and leveraged interactive multimedia instruction and training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations and computer applications to enhance training, continued implementing Army Learning Model 2015 and modernizing Fire Support training, and continued developing blackboard capabilities to facilitate student learning.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN 2016

In 2016, the U.S. Army was globally engaged with more than 190,000 Soldiers in over 140 countries. These Soldiers conducted combat operations, deterred aggression, and reassured American allies and partners of the country’s commitment to peace and stability. The Army continued to engage the enemy in Afghanistan and to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National Defense Security Forces. The Army was building a partner level capacity in Iraq to fight the ruthless terrorism of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. At the same time, the Army continued to engage with partners in Africa and through the Americas, had almost 100,000 Soldiers committed in the Pacific, and helped deter aggression in the Korean peninsula. In Europe and Asia, the Army reassured allies in the face of emerging challenges and deterred Russian aggression. Throughout the world, the Army stood ready to resist threat aggression.1

FIELD ARTILLERY TRAINING STRATEGY FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

In 2016 the Field Artillery School wrote a Field Artillery training strategy. The strategy conveyed the direction for Field Artillery, in consonance with the Army Capstone Concept, for training in 2017 and guided the transformation of the Army’s Field Artillery forces. It included the vital role that the Field Artillery had in integrating and delivering Cross-Domain Fires as a deterrent in peacetime and a force multiplier in conflicts.2 ______1Memorandum for All Army Leaders, subj: Army Readiness Guidance, Calendar Year 2016-17, 20 Jan 16, Doc II-1; U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Strategy 2017 (Extract), Oct 16, p. 7, Doc II-2. 2U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Strategy FY 2017 (Draft), Oct 16, preface;

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BLACKBOARD

To modernize field artillery education and align it with Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015, the Field Artillery School examined implementing Blackboard in 2014. Extensive coordination among the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), Air Defense Artillery School Captain’s Career Course, the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader’s Course (FA BOLC), the School’s Warrant Officer Education department, and the Blackboard section created a user friendly platform to provide course material, strategic communications information, and an avenue of Soldier self-development, both inside the classroom and out. At the end of 2014, the Blackboard initiative serviced approximately 500 Army lieutenants and approximately 200 Army captains as well as U.S. Marines and international students across multiple iterations of FA BOLC and the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course. In 2015-2016 the Field Artillery School used Blackboard as a self-development tool for second lieutenants and captains to modernize the learning environment and to create, utilize, and modernize online courses. Blackboard also allowed students to access learning materials in and outside of the classroom.3

MODERNIZING FIRE SUPPORT TRAINING

While technical fire direction was conducted in the Fire Direction Center and on weapon systems using automated systems as both a primary means and as a secondary independent check in operational units, the Field Artillery School continued to employ manual or analog methods in 2013 to teach gunnery but pushed to abandon them in favor of automated methods to satisfy Army Learning Model 2015 with its focus on leveraging technology for instructional purposes. By 2016 institutional training employed digital systems and devices that a military occupational specialty used as part of the Field Artillery system of systems. The School also employed interactive multimedia instruction, simulations, and the Blackboard. Yet, it continued to seek new and improved simulations that would increase repetitions and that would train everything from gunnery to crew drills and leadership skills. Immersive and semi-immersive simulators, such as the Call-for-Fire Trainer with its submersive modules, enhanced training. For example, the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill was working with the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, on the next generation of simulations with the Soldier Virtual Training so that Fires would be accurately represented and integrated into ______U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, preface, Doc II-3. 3Email with atch, subj: BOLC Academic Stats, 27 Jan 15, Doc II-6, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Blackboard Implementation Information Brief, 18 Sep 14, Doc II-7 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Blackboard Training Information Brief, 8 Dec 14, Doc II-8, 2014 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Record, subj: TRADOC I/IT Study, 3 Oct 14, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Modernizing Field Artillery Instruction, 9 Mar 15, Doc II-2, 2015 USAFAS AH; OPORD 15-007 (Blackboard Implementation), 28 Oct 14, Doc II-3, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: BOLC, CCC, and WOES, 13 Jul 16, Doc II-4.

23 maneuver simulations and training. As funding and resources become more limited, the Center and School aimed to expand employing simulations.4

INTERACTIVE MULTIMEDIA INSTRUCTION

For the past several years, the Field Artillery School worked to improve instruction by adopting interactive multimedia instruction. The past year proved to be no exception. In April 2016 the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence directed the Field Artillery School to take advantage of commercial off-the shelf interactive multimedia instruction products to enhance gunnery and ballistics theory instruction in the school and to enhance refresher training throughout the world. Power point based instruction and training and lack of deployable media based tools was a critical training gap; and the Commanding General’s direction intended to eliminate that gap and to build upon its already extensive base of interactive multimedia instruction technology being employed.5

LIVE, VIRTUAL, CONSTRUCTIVE, AND GAMING TRAINING

In the world of constrained budgets and ever-increasing demands on the Soldiers’ duty time in 2016, the Field Artillery School invested in effective and efficient means to sustain core competencies through live, virtual, constructive, and gaming technologies. Simulations enabled more repetitions in the same amount of time as live training, allowed for near realistic conditions, and avoided some of the resource costs, such as ammunition, fuel, and aircraft, and time required to train in live conditions. To this end, the School leveraged the virtual environment where soldiers felt that they were actually in the field by employing simulations/gaming capabilities to enhance the training and educational experience. During the year, the School employed training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations to support institutional training and digital sustainment requirements.6

Close Combat Tactical Trainer The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) was a collective training program ______4Briefing, subj: FA BOLC-B Modernization COA Brief, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-17, 2013 USAFAS AH; “Update on Modernizing Gunnery,” Redleg Update, Apr 13, p. 2, Doc II-18, 2013 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “The Field Artillery Force of 2020,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 13, pp. 6-9, Doc II-19, 2013 USAFAS AH; Cmdt SIGACT, 17 Jul 14, Doc II-9, 2014 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 38-39, Doc II-3; COL Stephen Maranian, “Redlegs Look to Close Gaps in Core Competencies, Future Training,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 16. p. 7, Doc II-5. 5Memorandum for Administrative Contract Review Board, subj: Contract Requirement Validation – Functional Requirement Review Board, 19 Apr 16, Doc II-6. 6U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Oct 16, p. 23, Doc II-2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 41, Doc II-3; Information Paper, subj: Mission Simulation Center, 24 Mar 16, Doc II-7.

24 composed to two subsystems: CCTT and the Reconfigurable Vehicle Tactical Trainer (RVTT). During 2016, CCTT supported training of Infantry, Armor, Mechanized Infantry, Cavalry, Fires, and Armored Reconnaissance units from the squad through the battalion/squadron to include their staffs. The primary training audience operated from full-crew simulators, mock-up command posts, and live battalion command posts to accomplish their combined arms training tasks.7 The CCTT system consisted of computer-driven, manned module simulators replicating the vehicles found in close combat units such as the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle (BFIST). Semi-automated forces populated the battlefield and functioned through emulators to work interactively with the manned modules. The simulators and semi-automated forces were connected via a local area network to provide real-time, fully-interactive, collective task training on computer-generated terrain.8 Although the trainer provided effective training in 2016, the Field Artillery School wanted to improve it. The School needed to enhance the CCTT to enable the Fire Support Team (FIST) to maneuver simultaneously and independently in the simulator while calling for fire, preferably both voice and digital with their assigned digital equipment, while the fires needed to be accurately portrayed. The BFIST crews required a fully functional mission equipment package, correctly replicated, integrated with the maneuver CCTT module to integrate fires accurately into the brigade combat team maneuver collective training events.9

Call for Fire Trainer III With the growing importance of the Joint Fires Observer (JFO) and fully trained fire support specialists, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) recognized the importance of immersive virtual simulation furnished by the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) for forward observers, fire support specialists, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC), and JFOs. The system represented a cornerstone of the U.S. Army Field Artillery and Fire Support virtual simulation training strategy and provided faster learning and better retention of critical observed fire training tasks, including surface fires and close air support, among others.10 CFFT III, the third generation CFFT, operated in stand-alone mode as well as part of a network, could support training up to Secret, and had three configurations – classroom, transportable, and immersive. The classroom configuration was a fixed site, dual screen/dual projector, virtual trainer and was fielded to major installations with a large training audience, while Army National Guard and active component brigade ______7U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 30, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 41, Doc II-3. 8U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 30, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 41-42, Doc II-3. 9U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft) , Oct 16, p. 31, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 41-42, Doc II-3. 10U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, pp. 31-32, Doc II-2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 42-43, Doc II-3.

25 component teams used the transportable configuration. The immersive configuration provided a dynamic, immersive, virtual environment to support more advanced training capabilities. This system had eight modules which incorporated individual and team training systems oriented on training the cognitive skills required by the Warfighter.11 Despite the system’s capabilities, the Field Artillery School urged improving it. The CFFT needed to continue leveraging the digital call-for-fire chain and incorporate the latest digital JFO devices into the scenarios. The School envisioned that the system would train the entire call for fire system with the JFO sending a call for fire to the fire direction center, and then the effects would be portrayed on the screen.12

Soldier Virtual Trainer The Soldier Virtual Trainer (SVT) was scheduled to be the next-generation Call for Fire Trainer. The trainer would provide a scalable, tailorable Fires training capability for indirect fires (mortar and Field Artillery), Joint Close Air Support, Naval Surface Fire Support, Army Attack Aviation, and Unmanned Aerial Systems-Unmanned Aerial Systems Armed counter operations. It would also provide the capability to conduct precision targeting with precision munitions in all environments.13

Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer The Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (FSCATT), a high-fidelity simulator enabled training M109A6 howitzer crews, fire direction center and platoon operations center personnel, and forward observers. FSCATT had the ability to operate in a stand-alone mode, interactive mode, and closed-loop mode. The stand-alone mode allowed each element, the howitzer crew, fire direction center personnel, and forward observer to train independently. The interactive mode linked the fire direction center and the howitzer crew trainer. The closed-loop mode allowed the interaction of the howitzer crew trainer, the fire direction center, and the forward observer nodes.14

M270A1/High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Fire Control Panel Trainer The Fire Control Panel Trainer (FCPT) trained the 13M on the operation of the M270A1/HIMARS fire control panel. It was a stand-alone system which could be tied to other devices or simulators, such as the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Direction System. FCPT simulated the M270A1 or HIMARS tactical fire control panel, while accompanying software program provided training scenarios that aided the operator in improving the skills required to perform tactical fire missions on the launcher platform.

______11U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 32, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 42-43, Doc II-3. 12U.S. Army Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 32, Doc II-2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 42-43, Doc II-3. 13U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 43, Doc II-3. 14U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 34, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 45, Doc II-3.

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In the institutional mode the scenarios were instructor driven for feedback on the student skill growth.15 A commercial desktop computer, FCPT used unique FCPT software that supported training for the MLRS/HIMARS systems (M270A1/HIMARS). The FCPT provided training for the basic tasks performed by the MLRS/HIMARS crewmen. These tasks included the simulation of fire missions and digital communication, display of prompts and information to the operator, processing of operator inputs, and the exercise of mission scenarios. The three main modes of operation included a free play mode where the student operated the console in non-scripted or free play exercises, the institutional mode where one to six student consoles interfaced with an instructor station to run scripted scenarios, and the stand-alone mode where a single student console ran scripted scenarios without interaction with an instructor station.16

Virtual Battlefield System The Virtual Battlefield System (VBS), a 3D first-person games-for-training platform, provided realistic semi-immersive environments; large, dynamic terrain areas; a broad catalogue of simulated military and civilian entities; and a range of geo-typical (generic) terrain areas, as well as actual, geo-specific terrains from U.S. Army areas of operation. VBS was typically loaded on high-end desktop computers to achieve training outcomes, operating the simulation from the first person perspective. VBS3 represented huge capability for collective/distributive simulation training. VBS Fires, an advanced, call-for-fire module for VBS, simulated artillery, mortars, multiple launch rocket system, and naval gunfire support to a high level of detail. It allowed offensive support specialists to construct a call-for-fire mission, which was then processed and actioned accordingly within VBS. Simulating exterior and terminal ballistics, VBS Fires enabled gun-to-target visualization of artillery orders in VBS. The wide array of munitions, fuse types and firing platforms allowed instructions to range from basic skills to decision making from individual to battalion level. Seamless integration of VBS Fires with the existing VBS training programs enabled call-for-fire training to be conducted simultaneously with other Soldier skills in the same virtual environment. VBS Strike, a close air support training application combined the flexibility and stunning visuals of VBS with a sophisticated training and simulation system. VBS Strike facilitated training a Forward Air Controller and used its internal AI engine to determine aircraft flight patterns and attack profiles, based on the values entered into the system. VBS Fire Support Team was a new combination of VBS Fires and VBS Strike that enabled training and certification of fire support teams and joint fires teams.17 ______15U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 34, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 46, Doc II-3. 16U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 34, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 46, Doc II-3. 17U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, pp. 35-36, Doc II-2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 46-47, Doc II-3.

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FIRESIM XXI FireSim XXI was an event-sequenced simulation of friendly and enemy artillery forces. It simulated the target acquisition, command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), weapon/target allocation, logistics, firing platforms and munitions to a high level of detail. It was a large scale (up to corps level for many applications) and high resolution (individual sensors, weapons, fire direction centers, munitions, messages, etc.). It was highly interactive and communicated with all Field Artillery (FA) Tactical Command and Control systems and the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) through the FS C4ISR systems. The simulation accepted and issued fire missions to and from live and simulated units and provided battle damage reports resulting from both simulated and live-fire missions. Fires could be scripted or generated dynamically by live tactical players or the FireSim operator.18

Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) was a high resolution, multi- sided, multi-service, entity level simulation with integrated capabilities used for training, analysis, planning and mission rehearsal. JCATS evolved from a merger of the Joint Tactical Simulation (JTS) and the Joint Conflict Model (JCM) and was capable of supporting training and exercises from the lowest military echelons through the Joint Task Force (JTF) level. Its high-resolution object oriented systems and aggregated units had the capability of simulating tactical and a limited number of operational levels of exercise. Although designed to support force-on-force training at the company level and below, JCATS also supported force-on-force combat training at and above battalion level. JCATS supported joint and coalition warfare simulating up to ten sides. The JCATS simulated realistic operations in urban and rural environments through the use of detailed buildings, natural terrain features, and road models. JCATS allowed detailed modeling of small group tactics in rural and urban terrain and environments to include day or night operations with artificial lighting and various weather conditions. JCATS allowed variable digitized terrain scaling and displays similar to standard military maps with contour lines, roads, rivers, vegetation, and urban areas employing National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) products to include Digital Elevation and Terrain Data (DTED) elevation data.19

Simulator/Stimulator Simulator/Stimulator (SISTIM) was a message stimulation and simulation product that supported testing and training for fire support systems. It was capable of transmitting and receiving fire support messages using communications protocols and performing simple message response generation for several common fire support systems. SISTIM included a Time-Ordered-Event-List (TOEL) and Event Ordered Event List (EOEL) ______18U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 36, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 48, Doc II-3. 19U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, pp. 36-37, Doc II-2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 48, Doc II-3.

28 generation and execution capability, providing the operator with a means of creating and “playing back” a sequence of actions to the live fire support system. This capability then stimulated the fire support system to stimulate system actions. SISTIM provides the capability to train Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) mission processing threads.20

Army-Tactical Engagement Simulation System The Army-Tactical Engagement Simulation System (A-TESS) was an Army training system that supported live Force-on-Force (FOF) training. The Army used A- TESS with Soldiers and combat capabilities at all levels from individual/crew up to Brigade Combat Team (BCT) along with associated opposing force (OPFOR) capabilities. A-TESS was not simply the next iteration of Instrumentable-Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (I-MILES) but took advantage of and expanded upon features currently available within the I-MILES training support capabilities. A- TESS provided new and improved capabilities incrementally for supporting live training engagements involving direct and indirect fires, pre-surgical real-time casualty assessment (RTCA), improved battle damage assessment (BDA), grenade launchers, air defense systems, aviation systems, unmanned systems (ground and air), mine/mine sensors/mine clearing operations and capabilities, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosive (CBRNE) operations, non-lethal systems, directed energy capabilities, active protection systems, and improved weapons effects/Soldier feedback.21

OneSAF OneSAF was a next-generation, entry-level simulation that supported both Computer Generated Forces and Semi-Automated Forces applications. This enabled it to support a wide range of constructive and virtual simulator system solutions. OneSAF had been integrated as the replacement SAF for the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT), the Non-Rated Crew Member Manned Module (NCM3), and Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). It served as the basis for subsequent modernization activities across the U.S. Army for simulators such as the Longbow Crew Trainer (LCT) and Transportable Flight Proficiency Simulator (TFPS). OneSAF was built to represent the modular and future force and provided entities, units and behaviors across the full spectrum of military operations. OneSAF has been crafted to be uniquely capable of simulating aspects of the urban operating environment and its effects on simulated activities and behaviors. Special attention has been paid to urban operations details including interior rooms, furniture, tunnels and subterranean features, and associated automated behaviors to make use of these attributes. OneSAF was unique in its ability to model unit behaviors from fire team to company level for all units for both combat and ______20U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 37, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 49, Doc II-3. 21U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, pp. 37-38, Doc II-2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 49, Doc II-3.

29 non-combat operations. Intelligent, doctrinally-correct behaviors and a range of constructive, gaming and virtually-based user interfaces were provided to increase the span of control for workstation operators. OneSAF combined with the U.S. Army Night Vision Image Generator (NVIG) Toolkit provided a range of high-fidelity sensor system training capabilities and supporting analysis of future system capabilities. The OneSAF Environmental Runtime Component provided a range of terrain database services and capabilities already supporting LVC applications across the world and bridging a critical interoperability gap by establishing a common terrain basis.22

Desk Top Trainers Desktop trainers trained weapon system crew drills, Fire Support Tasks, and howitzer (U6) maintenance tasks. These trainers are on compact disk and on-line accessible in order to facilitate reach-back training and task sustainment for deployed units. In 2016 the Field Artillery did not have a Military Occupational Skill (MOS) 13B U6 Field Artillery Weapons Maintenance training enablers which supported currently configured weapons platforms; and there was no virtual trainer. The Program Manager Self-Propelled Howitzer System (PM-SPHS), PM Towed Artillery Systems and TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM) Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Fires worked to provide a series of desk top trainers to address self-propelled and towed artillery systems. Outside of the live environment, 13B U6 soldiers did not have the capability to learn or sustain Unit Level Maintenance skills in real time.23 M777A2 Computer Based Trainer/Computer Aided Instruction (CBT/CAI) Interactive Multimedia Instruction (IMI). This new trainer aided Soldiers by providing an interactive review of the proper procedures on how to safely and accurately perform critical M777A2 crew tasks. It did not replace live fire but instead enhanced training by allowing the trainee to select a duty position on the howitzer and to perform critical tasks and allowed for refresher and sustainment training on crew drill and key tasks of the M777A2. The trainer would benefit National Guard and other soldiers who did not have ready access to their howitzers.24 Paladin Desk Top Trainer. Training crew and individual tasks on the M109A6 as currently configured required the Paladin Desk Top Trainer to reflect as accurately as possible the actual layout of the howitzer, such as the detailed replication of the Paladin Digital Fire Control System (PDFCS). The Paladin Desktop Trainer did not accurately reflect the keypad and display of the currently fielded M109A6 Paladin Digital Fire Control System (PDFCS).25

______22U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 38, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 49-50, Doc II-3. 23U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 44, Doc II-. 24U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, pp. 32-33, Doc II-2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 44, Doc II-3. 25U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 33, Doc II- 2; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 45, Doc II-3.

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NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Background. On 5 February 1959 Fort Sill established the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Academy. The first pilot course began in April 1959 with the first students graduating in May 1959. The first expansion of the program of instruction came in 1963 with the development of the two-week Leadership Preparation Course. By 1971 the Academy had responsibility for the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the Leadership Preparation School, the Instructor Training Course, and the Drill Sergeant School. To reflect its diverse missions the Academy underwent a name change to the Fort Sill Institute. In March 1973 Command Sergeant Major Clifford L. Lewis became the first enlisted commandant of the Institute. In October 1975 the Institute started the Primary Noncommissioned Officer Course for Combat Arms. In May 1977 the Institute only taught noncommissioned officer courses; and the Institute’s name changed to the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Career Development Center.26

2016 In Review. 2016 was a busy year for the U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA). The Basic Leader Course graduated 330 students, the Advanced Leader Course graduated 768 students, and the Senior Leader Course graduated 483 students. The 1,581 total graduates exceeded the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) projected 1,442-student load by 139 students. Although graduate numbers increased, dismissals decreased by 50 personnel over 2015 dismissals.

USANCO Academy 2015 / 2016 Dismissals Course Academic Administrative APFT AR 600-9 Discipline Denied Other Total

BLC 8/1 1/3 17/8 7/12 13/12 10/6 2/0 58/42

ALC 4/0 4/1 15/4 9/2 1/6 2/8 2/1 37/22

SLC 13/0 5/2 7/5 4/0 0/1 5/8 1/0 35/16

Total 25/1 10/6 39/17 20/14 14/19 17/22 5/1 130/80 NOTES • Administrative Dismissals are: temporary profile, Red Cross message dismissal without prejudice or no fault of the Soldier • Discipline: Late, DUI, SHARP, Conduct ______26Email with atch, subj: NCOA Input to 2016 USAFAS AH, 28 Dec 16, Doc II-8. The entire section on the Noncommission Officer Academy comes from this email.

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• Other: Unit Recall for urinalysis, UCMJ etc.

With the implementation of Select, Train, Educate, and Promote (STEP) this past year, graduating from BLC, ALC, SLC, MLC, and SMC became a promotion requirement. Course deferment, decision authority for the first deferment was the first General Officer (GO) in the Soldier’s chain of command, and subsequent deferment authority was first Major General in the Soldier’s chain of command. In 2015, 115- Soldiers and NCOs, and in 2016, 73-Soldiers and NCOs were either denied enrollment (failed to meet enrollment criteria), or dismissed (failed to meet graduation requirements).

NCO 2020, Talent Management This is an excerpt of an Article, originally published in the Redleg Update, May- June 2016.

Is Serving as a Noncommissioned Officer Academy Small Group leader or Senior Small Group Leader, Something you should Consider doing? “NCO’s must “OWN” NCOPD-S. Send the “Best” to instruct.” (SMA Daily, AUSA Convention, OCT 2015)

Are you a technically, tactically competent Staff Sergeant (SSG) or Sergeant First Class (SFC) Artilleryman and Army leader? Have you spent most or all of your Army time “on the line” and have one or more deployments “under your belt?” Have you asked, “What do I do next or how do I advance my career?” Is it time for you too seriously think about and consider serving as an instructor at the USAFCOEFS, United States Army, Noncommissioned Officer Academy? The NCO Academy mission was to train various levels of Noncommissioned Officers with leader technical and tactical war fighting skills through resident, mobile, and distributed learning platforms, which were relevant to their missions and maintain the critical skills and core competencies of Air Defense Artillery, Field Artillery, and Electronic Warfare NCOs. To accomplish its mission, the NCO Academy had to attract, train, and certify the best technically and tactically proficient SSGs and SFCs who were the most competent leaders. Were you an NCO who was thoroughly familiar with Army leader attributes of character, presence, intellect, and Army leader competencies of leading, developing, achieving? Were you an NCO who was a natural teacher or who was the “go to guy” when the battalion or battery required a teacher/trainer for a class, block of instruction or to present leader development training? Do you have a “knack” for teaching, commitment to teaching others and can communicate clearly and effectively? Do you want to make positive impacts in other NCOs and lasting contributions to the Army? An important part of leader development was “Talent management.” Talent management “takes into account the individual talents of an NCO and best applies the unique distribution of his or her skills, knowledge and behaviors and the potential they represent.” Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Parsons, CSM of the Field Artillery, wanted to leverage enlisted Field Artillery talent by identifying and challenging the very

32 best of NCOs. Do you have the “talent” necessary to succeed and thrive as an educator, teaching other NCOs; do you want to make positive and lasting impacts on other NCOs? The NCO Academy’s instructors total 26 FA instructor positions, three positions in the Basic Leader Course, 16 positions in the Advanced Leader Course and seven positions in the Senior Leader Course. The instructors in these 26 positions were responsible for providing Professional Military Education (PME) for Specialist Promotable, FA Sergeant Promotable, through FA SSG promotable from across the Army. The NCO Academy successfully developed and trained and graduates up to 2200 Soldiers and NCOs annually. The old days of the, “sage on the stage” instructor who knew it all, and could tell you about everything, because he had, “been there and done that” were long over. Today’s professional military education instructors underwent a demanding credentialing process for up to 90 or 120 days before they were facilitating classes in front of their own students. Leaders in today’s institutional domain created the conditions for quality leader development by having clear plans to promote the achievement of desired learning outcomes. They actively monitored, evaluated, and provided to guide and refine leader development systems and practices. They assessed individual readiness to learn before a classroom experience and facilitated “sense-making” afterwards. They provided qualified, inspirational instructors who have been prepared to teach/facilitate in an adult learning environment. They crafted current and relevant curriculum that promoted critical and creative thinking, interpersonal skill development, and communication skill development. They provided access to information and technologies that could provide leaders with relevant practice in the classroom and in the field. They provided individuals in resident PME and CES an opportunity to reflect and put into context what they have learned and experienced. They provided a robust capacity to create, archive, and deliver digitized learning products to individuals at the point of need, creating a continuum of learning opportunity that is available in all three domains. Today, successful Small Group Leaders (SGL) placed the responsibility for learning on the individual students or groups of students. SGLs focused on “learner centric” and “Outcomes Based Training & Education (OBT&E)” courseware delivery techniques. SGLs provided students with a desired or specified “end state” or “outcome” of individual/group learning and empower, and if necessary guided the student/group discussion, for them to best answer questions, develop solutions or solve problems. All the while, SGLs closely monitored and ensured students did not stray out of the context of their assignments, lessons, or requirements. SGLs beyond any doubt, had to be subject matter experts in leader development, leader education and most competent in all tasks through their MOS teaching skill level. Successful NCO Academy instructors were highly competitive with their peers across the Army, on DA centralized promotion boards. On the 2015 SFC selection list, the Board selected 11 of 15 eligible SSGs, or 73 percent of SSGs, on the 2016 SFC selection list, the Board selected 10 of 17 eligible SSGs or 59 percent who were still teaching or had recently moved on to other assignments. On the 2015 Master Sergeant (MSG) selection list, the Board selected four of 18 eligible SFCs, or 22 percent of SFCs who were still teaching or had recently moved on to other assignments.

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According to the Army Leadership Development Strategy, 2013, “The Army wants NCOs who are competent and effective in, a broader set experience; these broadening experiences improve individual NCO’s skill sets.” NCOs who successfully completed any of the various broadening assignments, reaped benefits from the broadening experience. Sergeant Major of the Army Daily during the 2015 AUSA Convention set the enlisted instructor selection standard, “NCO’s must “OWN” NCOPD-S. Send the “Best” to instruct.” Decision authority would only assign the highest quality Soldiers as instructors. Upon completion of an instructor assignment at the NCO Academy, you will return to the Operational Force as highly skilled facilitator, expert instructor, a most competent and more experienced NCO and better prepared for your next leadership challenge. If you were a SSG or SFC who met AR 614-200 and were able to meet TR 600- 21 prerequisites, believed that you had the talent necessary to succeed and thrive as an SGL or SSGL and had served a minimum of two years as a chief or team leader for ALC and two years as Platoon Sergeants for SLC, you should consider serving as an instructor at the USAFCOEFS, United States Army Noncommissioned Officer Academy.

Basic Leader Course The Basic Leader Course (BLC) was a branch-immaterial course that provided an opportunity for soldiers to acquire the leader skills, knowledge, and experience needed to lead team-level size units. It was the foundation for further training and development. Scope of tasks/competencies addressed in BLC provided both the team and squad-level perspective, where appropriate, and built upon experience gained in previous training and operational assignments.

Advanced Leader Course The Advanced Leader Course (ALC) was a branch-specific course that provided soldiers selected for promotion to staff sergeant with an opportunity to enhance leadership, technical skill, tactical expertise, and experience needed to lead squad-size units. Training built on experience gained in previous training and operational assignments. Branch schools and selected reserve components institutions (RTCI) conducted this course in a live-in learning environment.

Senior Leader Course The Senior Leader Course (SLC) was a branch-specific course that provided an opportunity for soldiers selected for promotion to sergeant first class to acquire the leader, technical, and tactical skills, knowledge, and experience needed to lead platoon- size units. Training built on experience gained in previous training and operational assignments. Branch schools and selected RCTI conduct this course in a live-in learning environment. Content for the SLC included materials required for success at both the platoon and company level. The scope of tasks/competencies addressed in SLC provided both the platoon and company level perspective, where appropriate, and built upon experience gained in previous training and operational assignments.

Master Leader Course

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The Master Leader Course (MLC), once fully implemented, would be a branch- immaterial course that provided an opportunity for soldiers selected for promotion to master sergeant to acquire the leader skills required for success at both troop and staff assignments throughout the defense establishment. Areas of study included public speaking, other services capabilities, mission command, understanding and applying military decision-making process, decisive action, organizational management, interagency capabilities, and multinational considerations. TRADOC would deliver this course in in a distributed learning and resident school environment. Currently the USAFCOEFS, was not one of the locations that the MLC will be taught.

FUNCTIONAL COURSES

Precision Fires Courses In 2016 the 428th Field Artillery Brigade provided certified training for the Target Mensuration Only (TMO) course that taught students how to locate a target precisely on the earth, the Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) course that taught students how to estimate the collateral damage from conventional weapons and precision, unguided, and cluster munitions, and the Weaponeering Course (WPN) course that taught students the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or non-lethal weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target through three venues.27

Joint Fires Observer Course In September 2015 the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee accredited the Army’s two-phase approach to Joint Fires Officer (JFO) certification and qualification. In 2016 the Field Artillery School conducted phase one training in the Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Military Occupational Specialty 13F, Fire Support Specialist course, and a functional course. In phase one students received qualification training. The operational command provided phase two training. Commanders determined through talent management who would be positioned in JFO billets, conducted the qualification test to determine proficiency, and write a designation letter designating the individual as a JFO.28 ______27Memorandum for Administrative Contract Review Board, subj: Contract Requirement Validation, Functional Requirement Review Board, 19 Apr 16, Doc II-9; Briefing, subj: Officer and Warrant Officer Training, 29 Aug 16, Doc II-10; ATRRS Catalog, Precision Fires Collateral Damage Estimation, 7 Nov 16, Doc II-11; ATRRS Catalog, Precision Fires Weaponeering Certification, 7 Nov 16, Doc II-12; ATRRS Catalog, Precision Fires Target Mensuration Only Certification, 7 Nov 17, I-13. See 2014 USAFAS AH for background on the development of the precision fires program. 28Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SIGACT, 11 Sep 14, Doc II-56, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SIGACT, 14 Aug 14, Doc II-57, 2014 USAFAS AH; ATRRS course 2E-“SIL7/250-ASIL, 1 Dec 15, Doc II-22, 2015 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Craig Newman, Dep to Cmdt, 9 Dec 15, Doc II-23, 2015 USAFAS AH; “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Jun/Jul 15, p. 3, Doc II-

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Special Technical Operations Course Based on lessons learned from past and current operations, the Army acknowledged a need for an enduring capability for Special Technical Operations (STO) training to train Army personnel how to use special access programs (SAP) that controlled access to emerging Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities, information, technologies, and operations so that combatant commanders could use SAP in their planning processes and mission execution.29

Master Gunner’s Course In 2016 the Master Gunner’s program was the Army’s only training program designed to educate senior noncommissioned officers on the necessary skills to apply advanced understanding, troubleshooting, and leader development of the Fires system of systems. The Master Gunner’s Course of 80 hours was an Additional Skill Identifier A7 producing course. The course had three modules that were progressively sequenced and focused on current and future Field Artillery weapons, training management, artillery tables, crew served weapons assigned to field artillery units, maintenance management, targeting systems, weapons and ammunition ballistics, and mission command, and assessing and developing a unit certification program so that the individual could serve effectively as an advisor to the commander/command sergeant major and staff on all Field Artillery systems to include training, certification, limitations, and capabilities. In 2016 the Field Artillery School added a fire support training module to provide division artillery and field artillery brigade commanders with fire support master gunners who were trained to integrate, execute, and sustain joint fire support training and the fire support certification program and would serve as primary joint fires subject matter experts to the fire support coordinator.30 During the year, the School conducted a detailed analysis that led to an eight- week Master Gunner Course being developed. It would consist of two-week common core and a five-week Military Occupational Specialty specific tracks and culminate with a one-week capstone event.31

______24, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Army Joint Fires Observer Program, 27 Apr 16, Doc II-14; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, p. 16, Doc II-15; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 26-27, Doc II- 3. 29ATRRS Course Catalog, 9 Nov 16, Doc II-15; Information Paper, subj: Course 2E-F280/250-F69, 28 Nov 16, Doc II-16. 30ATRRS Course Catalog, Field Artillery Master Gunner Course, FY 2015, Doc II-17; “Farewell from the 51st Chief of the Field Artillery,” RedLeg Update, May-Jun 16, pp. 3-6, Doc II-18; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, pp. 18-19, Doc II-19; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 30-31, Doc II-3; Briefing, subj: Proposed Course Growth, Dec 16, Doc II-20. 31U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, pp. 30-31, Doc II-3.

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Command and General Staff Fires Refresher To mitigate the Fires experience gap of new Field Artillery majors, the Fires Center of Excellence provided a one-week fires emersion course prior to the start of the Command and General Staff College course taught at Fort Leavenworth. This course consolidated numerous fires topics and included senior subject matter facilitation. Topics included five requirements for accurate fires, targeting, overview of airspace coordination, training strategies, to name just a few.32

Field Artillery Weapons Maintenance Course This course was an additional skill identifier U6 producing course. It covered shop safety, maintenance publications, Army maintenance management system, maintenance of firing components, fire control equipment, and subsystems of the M119A2 and M777A1 towed howitzers.33

Bradley Fire Support Vehicle Operator Course During 2016, the Field Artillery School started transforming the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle Operator Course from a vehicle-driven/main-gun focused course for Advanced Individual Training graduates to a Fire Support Vehicle Operators Course to train all 13F staff sergeants and Field Artillery second lieutenants in the mission equipment package to address a chronic gap in fire support vehicle training. This critical restructure would address a chronic gap in fire support vehicle training and give 13F30 staff sergeants and Field Artillery second lieutenants a better training opportunity to learn to operate the fire support vehicle’s mission equipment package.34

ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

During 2016, the Field Artillery School conducted seven advanced individual training (AIT) courses as a part of its initial military training mission to train Soldiers to be skill level one qualified in Field Artillery core competencies and to provide the operational Army with combat ready Field Artillery Soldiers, including females that were being integrated into Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) 13M (Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember, 13R (Firefinder Radar Operator), and 13P (Multiple Launch Rocket System Automated Tactical Data System Specialist). The courses also included MOSs 13B (Cannon Crewmember) that had its first female trainee in January 2016, 13D (Fire Control Systems Specialist), 13F (Fire Support Specialist), 13R (Firefinder Radar Operator), and 13T (Field Artillery Meteorological/Survey Crewmember) that was scheduled for deletion in Fiscal Year 2017. The courses provided ______32U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 32, Doc II-3. 33Information Paper, subj: U6 Field Artillery Weapons Maintenance Course, 9 Nov 16, Doc II-21. 34COL Stephen J. Maranian, “The United States Field Artillery Vision,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 16, pp. 7-9, Doc II-22; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Extract), Oct 16, p. 20, Doc II-23.

37 hands-on and field training and battle drills to give the graduates the capability of contributing to their new unit of assignment, while the 13F AIT students received training on precision devices so that they could provide accurate targeting. The School also finalized the program of instruction for the 13P/13D merger to form 13J, Fire Control Specialist.35

WARRANT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

131A Mission Command/Sensor As the Field Artillery branch continued to modernize, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 131A Field Artillery Targeting Technician started undergoing a modernization in 2016. The Field Artillery planned to transition the MOS from a radar technician to a targeting technician by 2017. This transition would enable warrant officers to facilitate better the targeting process and fire support planning to deliver accurate and timely fires in support of the maneuver commander’s scheme of maneuver. Warrant officers would use the modernized Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System as the central fires mission command tool to improve integration of organic and joint targeting sensors. This effort was intended to solve a significant technical capability gap that continued to grow with the rapidly increasing numbers and complexities of Army and Joint Interagency Multinational (JIM) targeting sensors and Mission Command systems.36

Warrant Officer Basic Course During 2016, the Field Artillery School conducted three, 30-week Warrant Officer Basic Courses (WOBC) for 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers that trained the best noncommissioned officers from Military Occupational Specialties 13 (Field Artillery) and 11C (Indirect Fire Infantryman). The course focused on common core subjects, command and control, target acquisition, targeting, precision fires, and the military decision making process and had a capstone training event. All WOBC students received certification in precision fires to include Target Mensuration Only, Weaponeering, and Collateral Damage Estimation and received training to serve as a targeting officer/target analysis, counterfire officer, and a target acquisition platoon leader.37

Warrant Officer Advance Course

______35Briefing, subj: Advanced Individual Training, 16 Mar 15, Doc II-35, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Cornerstone Brigade, 29 Aug 16, Doc II-24. 36“131A Mission Command/Sensor (System Integrator),” Redleg Update, Sep-Oct 16, pp. 5-6, Doc II-25. 37Briefing, subj: BOLC, CCC, and WOES Overview, 13 Jul 16, Doc II-26; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA Commandant Program Review and Discussion, 2 Feb 17, Doc II-26a.

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During 2016, the Field Artillery School taught a 12-week Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC). The course focused on common core subjects, and targeting/precision fires, held a capstone event of 72 hours, and prepared graduates to serve as a brigade, division, and corps targeting officer.38

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Basic Officer Leader Course B Through the BOLC B program of instruction, the Field Artillery School produced Field Artillery second lieutenants who were trained in warrior tasks and warrior battle drills. During Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, the School conducted eight BOLC B classes of 94 days each. The course provided newly commissioned second lieutenants with general knowledge of the Field Artillery with specific skills and in-depth knowledge in fire support, observed fire, fire direction, tactical communications, leadership, and platoon operations. The course prepared them to become platoon leaders, company level fire support officers, joint fires observers, and fire direction officers. Fire support training focused on 80/10/10 targeting standard (80 percent precision target location methods, 10 percent degraded methods, and 10 percent manual/unaided methods). The course also included Joint Fires Observer qualification training so that every graduate was qualified as a Joint Fires Observer. The operational unit certified School graduates as Joint Fires Observers through a comprehensive practical exercise.39 The course fully supported Army Learning Model 2015 initiatives. It used Blackboard and interactive multimedia instruction to facilitate technology-delivered self- paced learning and peer-to-peer interactions. The course also interjected cutting edge precision technology to enable greater understanding of gunnery theory, precision targeting and to build the precision mindset in the employment of fires. The course also included hands on training on light/towed artillery systems, mechanized artillery systems, and Multiple Launch Rocket System, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System.40 ______38Briefing, subj: BOLC, CCC, and WOES Overview, 13 Jul 16. 39Briefing, subj: BOLC, CCC, and WOES Overview, 13 Jul 16, Doc II-27; Briefing, subj: The Army Joint Fires Observer Program, 27 Apr 16, Doc II-28; Briefing, subj: The Cornerstone Brigade, 29 Aug 16, Doc II-29; Individual Training Plan for AOC 13A Field Artillery Officer, 22 Jul 16, pp. 4-5, Doc II-30; Memorandum thru Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, for CG, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, subj: Justification for Increased Instructor Contact Hours to Support the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course-B, 11 Apr 14, Doc II-31; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Office of the Commandant, Fort Sill, Ok, subj: Programs of Instruction for 2-6-c20B, FA Basic Officer Leaders Course-Branch 2-6-C20 Resident, 6 Aug 14, Doc II-32; COL Stephen Maranian, “State of the Field Artillery 2016,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 17, pp. 5-6, Doc II- 33. 40Individual Training Plan for AOC 13 A Field Artillery Officer, 22 Jul 16, pp. 4- 5, Doc II-34.

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Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course In Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) conducted six Field Artillery Captain Career Course (FACCC) classes of 24 weeks each in a small group format of 12-16 students. The training program comprised of three major blocks of instruction: common core, staff ride to the Battle of Washita near Cheyenne, Oklahoma, gunnery, and field artillery technical and tactical block. During the Common Core phase, students were introduced to Army Doctrine 2015, underwent extensive practical applications utilizing the military decision making process, applied critical thinking to numerous tactical and non-tactical practical applications, and conducted a staff exercise. During the technical and tactical block (also called integration block), students reviewed the tactical and technical skills of automated and manual gunnery as well as automated command and control systems, conducted fire support planning, and had familiarization training on Joint Fires Observer operations, among other subjects. Also, the School integrated Target Mensuration Only into FACCC to enable graduates to manage and use mensuration tools, such as the Precision Strike Suite- Special Operations Forces, at the appropriate echelon to employ precision munitions at the brigade combat team and battalion task force levels.41 Ultimately, the course provided challenging instruction to prepare students for the next phase of their Army career. Students had to demonstrate their ability to think critically within Unified Land Operations, to possess the ability to provide adaptive and flexible leadership, to conduct problem solving, to conduct Field Artillery operations planning, to synchronize Fire Support assets with maneuver, and to demonstrate mastery of battery level operations. The course taught students how to think and not what to think and leveraged technology and interactive multimedia instruction products and simulations to enhance training.42 During 2016, a major revision of the FACCC was underway. The School started working towards having all FACCC students do their fire support and mission planning on the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System.43

Fires Pre-Command Course In 2016 the two-phased Field Artillery Pre-command Course (PCC) prepared battalion and brigade level commanders and their command sergeant majors for their command assignment. The first phase focused on Fires leader competencies and command training requirements while the second centered on branch specific ______41Briefing, subj: BOLC, CCC, and WOES Overview, 13 Jul 16, Doc II-35. 42Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Captains Career Course, undated, Doc II-; Individual Training Plan for AOC 13A, Field Artillery Officer, 22 Jul May 16, p. 5, Doc II-34; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA Commandant Program Review and Discusson, 2 Feb 17, Doc II-26a. 43COL Stephen J. Maranian, “The United States Field Artillery Vision,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 16, pp. 7-9, Doc II-36.

40 information. PCC provided battalion and brigade command designees with the latest available information on training management, logistics, maintenance management, tactics, general functional operations theory, command perceptions, professional subjects, and operational readiness theory. The course also prepared selectees for command by providing a common understanding of doctrine and new and refresher training in selected functions and duties. Attendance was mandatory for all centrally selected battalion and brigade commanders and available to command sergeant majors.44

Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component In 2016 the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component (FACCC-RC) consisted of four phases for Field Artillery officers in the Reserve Component who were unable to attend the resident course and was designed around the 13-month model. Once the student started the course, the individual should complete it in 13 months. Phase one (online, self-paced with instructor access) was asynchronous and centered on common core subjects, such as leadership and mission command. Students had five or more months to finish the online modules. Completion was a prerequisite for moving into phase two. Phase two was a two-week resident session at Fort Sill that also focused on common core subjects. Successful completion of this phase served as a prerequisite to taking phase three. Phase three then followed. This asynchronous phase was Field Artillery specific. Successful completion of this five or more month online phase permitted students to move into phase four that was the second two-week session at Fort Sill and that was also Field Artillery specific.45

Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Fires Orientation Course In 2016 the Field Artillery School conducted a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Commander’s Orientation Course to mitigate the fires experience gap of new BCT commanders. Following the Forces Command Commanding General’s guidance, the School piloted this course twice during the year and planned to conduct it three times in Fiscal Year 2017. Attendees included infantry, armor, Stryker, and aviation, and division artillery commanders from active and National Guard components. The course provided a comprehensive understanding of the five requirements for accurate fire, increased understanding of how to train the Fires Warfighting Function to employ and deliver fires effectively, and helped commanders understand the principle of conducting targeting and fire integration to achieve lethal and non-lethal effects on the enemy effectively. The course also discussed the role of the fire support coordinator, the role of the force field artillery headquarters, the role of the division artillery, and the role of the BCT commander and incorporated critical training and commander’s guidance for Fires, fire support coordinating measure/airspace control measure use, and the roles, functions, and ______44Individual Training Plan for AOC 13A Field Artillery Officer, 22 Jul 16, p. 6, Doc II-37. 45Briefing, subj: The Cornerstone Brigade, 29 Aug 16, Doc II-38; Individual Training Plan for AOC 13A Field Artillery Officer, 22 Jul 16, p. 5, Doc II-39; Briefing (Extract), subj: Officer and Warrant Officer Training, 30 Jan 17, Doc II-40.

41 important of fire support element’s integration with the Air Defense Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element or most commonly known as the ADAM/BAE cell.46

JOINT OPERATIONAL FIRES AND EFFECTS COURSE

In 2013 the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) designed and delivered the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC) in a fiscally unconstrained environment. Although the course proved to be a successful and popular, significant financial constraint imposed through sequestration led to a detailed review of expenditures across all training programs. This clearly showed that FCoE could no longer resource expensive JOFEC training to the same level that had been possible in 2012. Because constrained costs meant cutting some training and because the Field Artillery School Commandant ranked JOFEC below the Joint Fires Observer course and precision fires courses, the FCoE cancelled the course. The last iteration of JOFEC was delivered at Fort Sill in June 2013.47 In 2016 the Field Artillery School announced that JOFEC would be funded in 2017 and that three pilot courses would be run. Created because combatant commanders repeatedly requested the course to fill a leader education gap, the new JOFEC would provide students with a baseline knowledge of joint services fires capabilities and doctrine and joint targeting process to allow them to function at an operational level and execute the targeting process to create lethal and non-lethal effects and would train soldiers and leaders working in the division and higher fire cells or battlefield coordination detachments.48

______46FA Cmdt SITREP, 22 Apr-5 May 16, Doc II-40a; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery, 10 Mar 16, Doc II-41; Briefing, subj: Fires, 15 Apr 16, Doc II-42; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy (Draft), Oct 16, pp. 20-21, Doc II-43; U.S. Army Field Artillery 2017 Training Strategy, Nov 16, p. 32, Doc II-3; COL Stephen Maranian, “State of the Field Artillery 2016,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 17, pp. 5-6, Doc II-44. 47Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-105, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JOFEC Cancellation Background Info, 17 Mar 14, Doc II-106, 2013 USAFAS AH. 48“Update on Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course,” Redleg Update, Sep- Oct 16, p. 9, Doc II-45, DOTD SITREP, 21 Feb 17, Doc II-45a; DOTD SITREP, 10 Jan 17, Doc II-45b.

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CHAPTER THREE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION

During the 2016, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School worked in cooperation with the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate to make the Field Artillery more lethal, deployable, mobile, and responsive to meet the current and future operational environment and to be a vital part of the joint forces team. This involved participating in force design and doctrine updates, testing new concepts, and introducing new fire support systems.

FORCE DESIGN AND DOCTRINE

Concept Development Division, Capability Development and Integration Directorate Based on General Donn Starry’s (the second commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) idea that concepts drive technology, a small group of dedicated Soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and contractors in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) Capability Development and Integration Directorate’s (CDID) Concepts Development Division (CDD) worked to envision required Fires forces and capabilities in the year 2025 and beyond. Organized into three distinct branches (Force Development Branch, Concept Development Branch, and Operational Environment Branch), CDD focused on concepts in support of Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery, force development, and the operational environment. Like its predecessors, CDD set foundational changes to meet the Army’s pace of capability needs required to win in the far future.1

Expansion of Cross Domain Fires. During 2016, the Fires Concept Development Branch, Concepts Development Division, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate continued to lead the way in innovative thinking with the development of two new Operational and Organizational (O&O) Concepts. The branch developed one for the Army’s operational level with a Fires headquarters designated as an Operational Fires Command (OFC). It had the authorization to synchronize, to coordinate, and to manage all fires to counter near peer hybrid warfare by integrating Army, joint, inter-organizational, and Multinational (JIM) capabilities to deliver cross-domain fires at echelons above brigade (EAB) in a multi- domain battle (MDB) at both the tactical and operational level of war as needed. The second O&O was the Strategic Fires Command (SFC) which would conduct strategic- level joint targeting, delivering strategic-level lethal and nonlethal cross-domain effects, ______1Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1.

43 and defending critical assets from air and missile attack in a multi-domain battle at both the Theater and Operational level of war.2 Also in 2016 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-4: The U.S. Army Functional Concepts for Fires 2020 – 2040, was refined and evolved to support the Army’s emerging concept of Multi-Domain Battle. The Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) #17 – (Integrate Fires) explained how to coordinate and integrate Army, JIM fires and to conduct targeting to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of action across the range of military operations, while AWFC #18 – (Deliver Fires) outlined how to deliver Fires to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of action across the range of military operations. They were merged into AWFC #17/18 – (Employ Cross Domain Fires) that outlined how to employ cross domain fires to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of action across the range of military operations.3 In 2016 the Army employed Army Warfighting Challenges to focus prioritized efforts on first-order enduring military challenges and to lead force development. As the Army explained, solutions to first-order enduring problems would improve combat effectiveness of the current and future force by providing a conceptual foundation, assessing requirements, identifying capabilities, developing solutions, and implementing them.4 During these initial stages of concept development for the Force of 2025 beyond and Cross Domain Fires, the Concepts branch participated in numerous Army and Joint wargames and experiments which included Unified Challenge (UC), Unified Quest (UQ), Army Warfighter Assessment (AWA), Network Integration Exercise (NIE), Russian New Generation War Study, Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment, F2025 O&O BCT SIMEX, Cyber Quest, Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), Bold Quest, How the Army Fights (HTAF) II, Nimble Fires, and Support Area Security Wargame (SASWAR). These wargames and experiments were also contained in the Campaign of Learning (CoL) which helped to clarify CDD’s continued running estimates and conceptual documents designed to drive future capability development. They also provided insights to the Fires O&O Concepts and AWFC 17/18 and supported the development of interim solution strategies by addressing the Fires Center of Excellence current gaps and learning demands.5 In October 2016 the Army explained the importance of cross domain fires that was a key part of its Warfghting Challenge 17/18. Pioneered by the Army Capabilities Integration Center at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), this concept emphasized employing artillery, naval, attack aircraft, and air defense fires combined with nonlethal effects to support the scheme of maneuver across the domains ______2Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1. 3Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1. 4Information Paper, subj: Army Warfighting Challenges, 1 Feb 17, Doc III-1a. 5Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1.

44 of land, air, space, and cyberspace). The Army, the Field Artillery, and the Fires (Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery) community needed to deliver surface-to-surface fires, surface-to-air fires, and shore-to-ship fires to defeat current and emerging threats, such as the widespread use of unmanned aircraft systems and cruise missiles. Specifically, the Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment of 2016 demonstrated the ability of directed energy systems to engage and destroy unmanned aircraft systems.6 Concurrent with the requirement to defend against unmanned aircraft systems, threat indirect fire systems out-ranged the Army’s indirect fire systems. This limited the Army’s ability to engage and defeat target. As a result, the Field Artillery required enhanced long-range precision capabilities to replace the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with its range of 400 plus miles to accomplish what the Russians were doing with long-range guided munitions that had the ability to shoot down U.S. aircraft or sink U.S. ships well out to sea.7 Rather than developing a totally new missile system or buying one on the global market, the Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, announced 28 October 2016 the Department of Defense’s intention to upgrade ATACMS to strike moving targets on land and sea. After two years of pressure from Congress and vague promises by the Pentagon and after disbanding the Coastal Artillery in 1950, the Army planned to be back in the business of killing ships from land-based batteries that unlike a ship could not be sunk. This would give the Army a big new role in countering Russian aggression in the Baltic and Black Seas or defending allies such as the Philippines against China. Equally important, upgrading ATACMS would give the Army cross domain fires capabilities and start moving the concept of cross domain fires from theory to reality. However, such a capability meant fitting ATACMS with a guidance system developed for a different weapon that would permit hitting a moving sea- or land-based target because the missile’s guidance system was designed to engage a stationary target.8 In the meantime, the Fires Center of Excellence started developing cross domain fires by taking it from concept to doctrine reality. Essentially, the center had to think beyond fires for the Army for fires in a joint, interagency, and multi-national environment so that friendly forces had the ability to deliver cannon, rocket, and missiles fires against land, air, maritime, space, and cyber targets with the capacity to overmatch enemy capabilities. As the Field Artillery conceded in 2016, cross domain fires was in its infancy with years to go before becoming a reality.9

______6Information Paper, subj: Army Warfighting Challenges 17/18, 6 Apr 17, Doc III-1b. 7Information Paper, subj: Warfighting Challenges, 17/18, 6 Apr 17; Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, 4 Oct 16, https//www.defense.gov; Cpt Joshua Urness, “Milley Addresses Attendees of AUSA Meeting,” Fires Bulletin, AUSA Special Issue 2016, p. 4, Doc III-3; Army Warfighting Challenges, 2 Dec 16, Doc III-4; Army Warfighting Challenges, 12 Oct 16, Doc III-5. 8 “Fires Forward,” Nov 16, Doc III-6. 9Army Warfighting Challenges, 12 Oct 16.

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Force Structure Design and Total Army Analysis. The Army continued to operate in an environment of budgetary uncertainty in 2016 but remained optimistic about future resourcing which might stimulate growth. However, Army strategy still required force restructuring to achieve an Active Component (AC) end strength of 450,000. Total Army Analysis (TAA) 19-23 key force initiatives retained eleven Combat Aviation brigades (CAB) and resourced three Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). The Army’s focus beyond the CAB and SFAB initiatives was on marginal adjustment to provide the best possible total force. While balancing the force, capabilities were both reduced and grown to achieve a balance mix across components.10 TAA 19-23 created 10 AC and five Army National Guard (ARNG) Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT), 13 AC and 19 ARNG Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), and seven AC and two ARNG Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT). This increased the number of ABCTs by one and reduced the number of IBCTs by one thus maintaining 56 brigade combat teams. There were no changes to the number of Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) Field Artillery (FA) units. The only Air Defense Artillery (ADA) impact was the loss of its’ remaining JLENS battery.11 In addition, the Army created two Infantry and one Armor SFABs. The Security Force Assistance Brigades would take the lead for the Army’s conventional force for advice and assist missions in support of combatant commander (COCOM) and/or senior leader priorities. The brigade would meet COCOM theater security cooperation requirements, would be able to regenerate combat power and transform into a full brigade combat team (BCT), and consequently would relieve current active component (AC) BCTs of these advice and assist and security missions, providing Army senior leaders with additional flexibility to prosecute other priorities. The SFAB design was comprised of a Headquarter and Headquarter Company, Brigade Engineer Battalion, Cavalry Squadron, Combined Arms Battalion (x2), Field Artillery Battalion and Brigade Support Battalion.12 Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery force structure successes came in the Army’s approval of two Force Design Updates (FDU). First, the Field Artillery EAB 155 self-propelled 3x6 Cannon FDU took the current 3x4 design to a 3x6 design increasing the number of cannons to 18 per battalion which addressed the degradation of lethality within the EAB force. Second, the Air Defense Artillery Army Air Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) FDU reorganized the organization to efficiently and effectively provide mission command and strategic level planning and integration of Joint AMD capabilities to meet Army and Joint Commanders operational requirements.13 ______10Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1. 11Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1. 12Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1. 13Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-

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The Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) force development initiatives for future TAA are the FA EAB 155 towed cannon 3x6, EAB Multiple Launch Rocket System 3x9, EAB High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 3x9 and Air Defense Artillery Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) Increment 2-Intercept FDUs.14

The Operational Environment Branch. In 2016 the Operational Environment (OE) Branch continued to provide support across the entire Fires Center of Excellence, broadly focusing its efforts on informing the development community and testing doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities domains, policy (DOTMLPF-P) capability solutions. Highlights included Intelligence Home on Home sessions and “deep-dive” analysis in support of simulations and testing the AN/MPQ-65 Radar and electronic counter-counter measures analysis. The OE successfully hosted a Threat Home-on-Home session at Fort Sill, inviting intelligence community experts to discuss Fires-specific issues such as electronic warfare, ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles in conjunction with the Fires Community. These events ensured capability developers have relevant and timely information to perform their functions. The branch also conducted an initial “deep-dive” analysis of adversarial threats within the European Army Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility in support of PATRIOT simulations that included providing threat system performances of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and piloted and unmanned aerial vehicles for future tests at the Battle Lab. The branch also supported operational testing of the PATRIOT radar and prepared for operational testing of the Integrated Air and Missile Defense System. These operational tests validated the threats that these systems would address. OE also conducted an armor penetration analysis of threat tanks, self-propelled artillery, and armored vehicles in an effort to better understand adversarial protection efforts that directly supported future munitions development within the Field Artillery community. OE assisted the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capabilities Manager for Brigade Combat Team Fires in resolving issues with the DoD Inspector General’s Office review of the PEO Ground Based Systems Production Plans. OE provided threat and intelligence support to the High Velocity Projectile Feasibility Study including creating realistic threat databases and computer simulations. OE, representing Army G-2, briefed the Threat Summary for the Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munition Acquisition Review Board to the Army G- 8. Throughout the year, the OE Branch supported Fires Center of Excellence initiatives by providing intelligence expertise.15

Fires Doctrine On 23 August 2011 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and ______1. 14Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1. 15Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1.

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Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Robert W. Cone, issued Doctrine 2015 guidance. He wanted to reduce their length and number and leverage emerging technology to make them more collaborative and accessible. Once completed, Doctrine 2015 would give the Army well-defined enduring principles, tactics, and standard procedures. The transition to Doctrine 2015 required all doctrine publications to be reviewed and separated into new categories. Even though resources would be constrained, General Cone added, TRADOC had to produce quality doctrine by its best and brightest. He concluded, “In summary, we need to make the development and implementation of Doctrine 2015 a priority. We must seize the initiative we now enjoy as we reflect on this decade of war our Army has fought. We have too many hard earned lessons, and we must capitalize on the talent we have across our force to ensure the next fight we find our Army in we can win upon arrival.”16 In his guidance General Cone established key priorities. First, he wanted Army Doctrine Publications (ADP) and Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) to be completed by August 2012. Second, he directed field manuals (FM) to be finished by December 2013. Third, he wanted technique publications to be written by December 2015. To accomplish these goals, service schools, such as the Field Artillery School, could increase their manning levels commensurate with the workload and fill the positions with the best qualified personnel who would be competitive for battalion command and beyond and had recent operational experience, subject matter expertise, and a fundamental understanding of Army concepts.17 Besides increasing the number of people required to write the publications, the Field Artillery School started writing its ADP, ADRP, FMs, and Army Techniques Publications (ATP) during 2011. On 6 January 2012 the School submitted the initial draft of ADP 3-09 that explained the fundamental principles of fire support and the initial draft of ADRP 3-09 that provided detailed information on fire support fundamentals to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and initiated work on FM 3-09, Field Artillery Operations, that would focus on fire support tactics and procedures.18 In August 2012 the Army published and distributed ADP 3-09 and ADRP 3-09, both written by a team from Forces Command (FORCSOM), the Air Defense, and the Field Artillery. A Department of Army publication, an ADP contained the fundamental principles that guided military forces’ actions and expressed them so that Army forces could seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. ADP 3-09 incorporated air and missile defense and electronic attack in the Army fires warfighting function, included fires from ______16Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, 23 Aug 11, Doc III-6, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12, Doc III-7, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Doctrine Update, 13 Mar 17, Doc III-6a. 17Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, 23 Aug 11; Interview, Dastrup with Bo Bielinski, FA Supervisor, Doc Div, DOTD, 15 Feb 12, Doc III-8, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12. 18Interview, Dastrup with Bielinski, 15 Feb 12; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Doctrine Update, 20 Jan 12, Doc III-9, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12; Briefing, subj: Doctrine Update, 13 Mar 17, Doc III-6a.

48 other services, and provided fires doctrine that would enable the development of interoperable, networked, and integrated systems that would be capable of executing multiple missions throughout unified action. ADRP 3-09, meanwhile, served as a doctrinal manual for commanders, leaders, and staffs of the fires warfighting function and furnished a detailed explanation of all doctrinal principles in support of offensive and defensive tasks. As of the end of 2015, the manuals were current after going through revisions.19 In the meantime, the School completed a draft of ADRP 3-09.90, Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Operations and Fire Support for the Division in February 2015. The ADRP explained the DIVARTY’s three primary tasks of the fires warfighting function for the division. The tasks included deliver fires, integrate all forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires, and conduct targeting. The DIVARTY accomplished these tasks by coordinating, integrating, synchronizing, and employing fires within the operational process to achieve the division commander’s objectives. At the end of 2015, the School anticipated changes in the FM based upon revisions with ADP 3-09 and ADRP 3-09 and ATPs for targeting, target acquisition, and cannon battery. The next year, the School completed ATP 3-09.42, Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team, ATP 3-09.02, Field Artillery Survey, and ATP 3-09.81, Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery.20

Five Requirements for Accurate Fires As the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley explained in February 2014, a thorough examination by the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) and the Field Artillery School amended the five requirements for predicted fire to the five requirements for accurate fire. Through much of the 20th ______19“Update on Doctrine,” Redleg Update, Aug 12, p. 2, Doc III-4, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing, undated, Doc II-5, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc III-6, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works,” Redleg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-7, 2012 USAFAS AH; ADRP 3-09 (Extract), Fires, Aug 12, Preface, Doc III-16, 2013 USAFAS AH; ADP 3-09 (Extract), Fires, Introduction, Doc III-17, 2013 USAFAS AH; “DIVARTY Update,” Redleg Update, Oct 14, p. 4, Doc III-12, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), Field Artillery Pre-command Course FSCOORD Seminars, 17 Aug 14, Doc III-13, 2014 USAFAS AH; BG William A. Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 15, www.Army.mil, Doc III-2, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: FM 3-09, 18 Dec 15, Doc III-3, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: ADP 3-09, ADRP 3-09, and ADRP 3-09.90, 18 Dec 15, Doc III-4, 2015 USAFAS AH. 20ATP 3-09.90, Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Operations and Fire Support for the Division (Draft, Extract) 20 Feb 15, Doc III-5, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Fires Forward,” Mar 15, Doc III-6, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: FM 3-09, 18 Dec 15; Email, subj: ADP 3-09, ADRP 3-09, and ADRP 3-09.90, 18 Dec 15; Briefing, subj: Doctrine Update, 13 Mar 17, Doc III-6a.

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Century, the five requirements for predicted fire provided the foundation of field artillery gunnery. Prior to World War One, the Field Artillery relied upon observed fire to engage a target. The battery commander identified the target and brought his battery’s fire to bear on the target. However, this method precluded massing fires for echelons above the battery. Recognizing this deficiency, the Germans developed predicted fire techniques during World War One. Accurate predicted fire required accurate target location, accurate firing unit location, accurate weapon and ammunition information, accurate meteorological information, and accurate computational procedures. By implementing these procedures field artillery units up to army echelon had the capability of providing massed, surprise predicted fires without adjustment to give a distinct tactical advantage. Recognizing the importance of massed, surprised fires produced by predicted fire, the Americans borrowed the German method following the war and employed it through the remaining years of the 20th Century.21 During the first years of the 21st Century, the FCoE and the Field Artillery School questioned the validity of the five requirements for accurate predicted fire in light of the Global Position System (GPS), digitized field artillery systems, and near-precision and precision munitions. Technology allowed the Field Artillery to be precise in all aspects of the five requirements for predicted fires. As General Bentley pointed out on 6 May 2014, automated systems and near-precision and precision munitions permitted modifying the term of the five requirements for accurate predicted fire to the five requirements for accurate fire. Technology allowed the Field Artillery to be precise. It did not have to predict where a near-precision or precision munition would hit whereas for the previous 100 years the branch had to predict the impact points of ballistic munitions. In 2015 and 2016 the Field Artillery School continued emphasizing the five requirements for accurate fire in Precommand Courses for field artillery battalion and brigade commanders and Precommand Courses for Brigade Combat Team commanders to ensure everyone was familiar with the change and to reaffirm the Field Artillery’s goal of achieving accurate, first-round fire for effect through the five requirements for accurate fire.22

Targeting Standards for Accurate Targeting Raising target location standards accompanied the five requirements for accurate ______21BG Christopher F. Bentley, “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Feb 14, p. 1, Doc III-17, 2014 USAFAS AH; CPT Brock Lennon, “Fire Requirements of Accurate Fire for the 21st Century,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 14, pp. 51, 58, Doc III-18, 2014 USAFAS AH. 22Lennon, “The Five Requirements for Accurate Fires in the 21st Century,” pp. 3- 4; Lennon, “Fire Requirements for Accurate Fire for the 21st Century,” pp. 51, 58; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery: 2025 and Beyond, 6 May 14, Doc III-19, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery, May 15, Doc III-7, 2015 USAFAS AH; BG William A. Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 15, www.army.mil/firesbulletin, Doc III-8, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Five Requirements for Accurate Fire, 26 Apr 16, Doc III-2.

50 fire. As the Field Artillery School explained in the fall of 2014, precision targeting was “non-negotiable.”23 With this as the vision, the School created ratio of 80:10:10. Taking advantage of the Fire Support Sensor System, the Forward Observer System, the Palm Forward Entry Device/Pocket-size Entry Device, the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2H, and systems scheduled for fielding in the near future, the School determined that forward observers had to acquire an accurate grid 80 percent of the time. This meant achieving a Category I (six meter target location error) and a Category II (15 meter target location error) or a precision grid 80 percent of the time, achieving a Category IV (50 meter target location error) 10 percent of the time, and achieving a Category V/VI (200 meter target location error) 10 percent of the time. The School continued, “This 80:10:10 ratio defines for us as professional Artillerymen the term accurate in the first requirement for accurate Fires. It also defines for us, as a profession of arms, how we train, certify and deliver accurate target locations in support of strategic, operational and tactical Fires.”24 These standards were integrated into training and taught throughout the Field Artillery in 2015 and 2016.25

Fires Command: Division Artillery and Corps Field Artillery Brigade At the beginning of the 21st Century, the Army introduced the modular brigade combat team (BCT) and the functional fires brigade to provide the capability of delivering responsive fires to maneuver commanders, placed fires battalions within the BCT, and furnished fires brigades to support BCTs, divisions, corps, or joint task forces. This eliminated senior Field Artillery command headquarters at the division and corps levels for the integration of fires and training and readiness oversight and left the force with an inadequate number of force Field Artillery headquarters to support divisions and corps. Specifically, six (going to seven) active component Fires Brigades supported 14 divisions and corps headquarters as well as the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. The modular organization assumed that the BCTs could provide sufficient training, readiness, and administrative oversight to their organic fires battalions and that a small number of fires brigades could function as a Force Field Artillery headquarters for divisions, corps, or joint task forces. Operational experience during the first years of the 21st Century demonstrated the assumptions to be invalid.26 ______23 “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for the BCT and Division,” Fires Bulletin online edition, Nov-Dec 14, Doc III-20, 2014 USAFAS AH. 24Ibid; Also see Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery2025 and Beyond, 6 May 14, Doc III-21, 2014 USAFAS AH. 25Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery, May 15, Doc III-9, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 16 Mar 15, Doc III-10, 2015 USAFAS AH; BG William A. Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Jan-Feb 15, www.army.mil/firesbulletin, Doc III-11, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Modernizing Field Artillery Instruction, 9 Mar 15, Doc III-12, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Five Requirements for Accurate Fire, 26 Apr 16, Doc III-2. 26LTC Sean Bateman and MAJ Steven Hady, “King of Battle Once Again: An Organizational Design to Effectively Integrate Fires in Support of Tactical, Operational

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As the Army projected returning to combined arms operations and executing regionally aligned force missions, the modular design created several capability gaps. The echelon above brigade mission command Field Artillery force structure and organizational design did not sufficiently meet the combatant commander requirements as part of the Joint Force. It lacked the ability to integrate and synchronize fires effectively at the division and the corps in support of unified land operations. The organization also lacked the ability to provide training and readiness oversight to Fires battalions in the BCTs and could not provide consistent fire support certifications and leader development. Soon after becoming the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Major General James M. McDonald, submitted a force design update to the Army in December 2012 to re-establish Field Artillery command headquarters in echelons above brigade at division and corps levels.27 The proposal established a division artillery (DIVARTY) without organic firing units for each active component division. A DIVARTY would be assigned to each active component division, would be stationed with the division, and would coordinate, integrate, and synchronize fires to achieve the division commander’s objectives, while the DIVARTY commander would serve as the Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) for the division. Moreover, the DIVARTY could be tailored with a variety of fires battalions (rocket and cannon), unmanned aerial systems, and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (CRAM)/indirect fire protection capability units, could integrate and deliver fires, and would furnish mission command for training management and certification of BCT fires battalions and fires cell.28 Also, the proposal provided for a Field Artillery brigade to be assigned to each active component corps and one with the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea. While the Field Artillery brigade would coordinate, integrate, and synchronize fires, would provide long- range precision fires to the corps, and would give the corps/U.S. Eighth Army commander a headquarters that could plan, prepare, execute, and assess fires in support ______and Strategic Force,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 23-25, Doc III-7, 2013 USAFAS AH; Shirley Dismuke, “The 2013 State of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 13, pp. 14-15, Doc III-8, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14, Doc III-9, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup History, 28 Mar 14, Doc III-10, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14, Doc III-11, 2013 USAFAS AH. 27Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of Fires,” pp. 14-15; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup’s History, 28 Mar 14; Interview, Dastrup with James McClary, Concepts Development Division, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, 18 Mar 14, Doc III-12, 2013 USAFAS AH. 28Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of Fires,” pp. 14-15; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup’s History, 28 Mar 14.

52 of operations, and would provide the capability for counterstrike throughout the corps area of operations, the Field Artillery brigade commander would serve as the FSCOORD for the corps. In addition, the corps Field Artillery brigade would train and certify its subordinate Field Artillery battalions and allocate them to the division as required to provide reinforcing fires.29 In October 2013 the Army approved the echelon above brigade force design update. It created 10 DIVARTYS that would be assigned to the 10 active component divisions and retained four active component Fires Brigades that would be assigned to each corps and the Eighth Army. Later, the Army authorized redesignating fires battalions in the BCT and echelons above BCTs as Field Artillery battalions. To standardize naming convention within Field Artillery units, General McDonald also changed the Fires Brigade to the Field Artillery brigade.30 FCoE’s force design update also modified the existing Field Artillery brigade in the Army National Guard with the same organizational design as the active component. The existing Army National Guard Field Artillery brigades would provide flexibility to the Total Army and would perform the same functions as the active component Field Artillery brigades. However, they would be aligned with Army National Guard divisions for training affiliation, would be capable of serving as a DIVARTY to support Army National Guard divisions during deployment, or would provide reinforcing and counterfire capability to active component corps and joint task forces. The primary function of the brigade included coordination, integration, synchronization, employment of fires, and long-range precision fires to the corps through strike operations. The number and mix of Field Artillery battalions assigned to the brigade would vary depending on mission and number and type of divisions assigned to the corps.31 In 2014 the Army started standing up the DIVARTY with last one scheduled for standing up in 2016. During the last part of the year, the Army converted the 212th Field Artillery Brigade to the 1st Armored Division Artillery that became operational in 2014 and the 42nd Field Artillery Brigade to the 3rd Infantry Division Artillery and activated the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery, the 101st Air Assault Division Artillery, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, 2nd Infantry Division Artillery, and 3rd Infantry Division Artillery. U.S. Army Forces (FORSCOM) noted that the Army’s decision to implement Field Artillery brigades and DIVARTYs would provide the Field Artillery with the ______29Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14. 30Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Memorandum for CG, TRADOC, subj: Renaming all Fires Battalions and Fires Brigades, 3 Jan 14, Doc III-13, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atchs, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14, Doc III-13a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Army Staffing Form, 19 Sep 13, Doc III-14, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 2 Apr 14, Doc III-15, 2013 USAFAS AH. 31Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 2 Apr 14; “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for the BCT and Division,” Redleg Update, Apr 14, pp. 3-6, Doc III- 22, 2014 USAFAS AH.

53 capabilities of planning, synchronizing, and coordinating strategic, operational, and tactical fires in support of the unified land commander and provide mission command for the training and readiness of attached Field Artillery units. This action would effectively reverse 12 years of continuing atrophy in Field Artillery skills and erosion of leader and professional development within the fires warfighting. As the DIVARTY commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, Colonel John O’Grady, pointed, the return of division artillery reflected the Army’s commitment to strengthen core skills. By the end of 2015, all 10 active component DIVARTYS had been stood up. Adding to this, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General William A. Turner, noted early in 2016 that the DIVARTYS were operating exceedingly well in Warfighters, at the Combat Training Centers, and on deployments around the globe and that the field artillery brigades were also performing well. For example, the 210th Field Artillery Brigade continued its mission in 2016 to deter North Korean aggression and maintain peace on the Korean peninsula.32

Electric Fires and Electric Fires Range After several years of construction, Fort Sill used its electric fires range, although it was not completely finished, for the first time in 2016. The range permitted developers to observe and examine directed energy weapons, electric weapons, and electric fires that were emerging, revolutionary technologies in a live-fire event besides evaluating the technology through modeling and simulation. Demonstrating electric fires capabilities would showcase their tailorable and scalable effects and the increased speed of engagement (speed of light), among other things.33 In April 2016 the Fires Battle Laboratory in the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate in the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill conducted the 2016 Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment at the range. This experiment explored the challenges associated with the ability to detect, identify, and ______32FORSCOM Implementation Order 9 Apr 14, Doc III-23, 2014 USAFAS AH; “Division Artillery Returns to the Army,” Redleg Update, Aug 14, pp. 3-4, Doc III-24, 2014 USAFAS AH; White Paper, subj: Field Artillery Brigade and Division Artillery, 1 May 14, Doc III-25, 2014 USAFAS AH; “Guns of Glory to return to Fort Campbell,” www.us.army.mil, Doc III-26, 2014 USAFAS AH; “Artillery Forces Restructure at Fort Stewart with Return of Division Artillery,” www.us.army.mil, Doc III-27, 2014 USAFAS AH; “Col Christopher S. Moretti Assumes Command of 82nd Airborne Division Artillery,” www.us.army.mil, Doc III-28, 2014 USAFAS AH; Corey Dickstein, “Marne Thunder DIVARTY Returns to 3ID,” Redleg Update, Nov 14, p. 3, Doc III-29, 2014 USAFAS AH; BG William A. Turner, “Field Artillery 2016, Beyond,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 16, pp. 9-14, Doc III-13, 2015 USAFAS AH; BG William A. Turner, “Farewell from the 51st Chief of the Field Artillery,” Redleg Update, May-Jun 16, pp. 3-6, Doc III- 7. 332015 USAFAS AH, pp. 52-54; News Release, Electric fires Range Approved for Use at Fort Sill, 17 Jun 15, Doc III-15, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Electric fires v1 Doc, 9 Mar 16, Doc III-16, 2015 USAFAS AH.

54 defeat threat unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and focused on four experimental objectives designed to enhance counter-UAS capabilities at the tactical edge (Air Ground Integration, Counter UAS (C-UAS), Sensor Management, and Precision Fires). The low, slow, small UASs attracted attention because they had the potential to conduct reconnaissance and to deliver nuclear, biological, chemical, or conventional weapons.34 Specifically, the experiment demonstrated Army’s directed energy technology using the High Energy Laser Mobile Test Truck (HEMTT) to acquire, track, engage, and destroy air and ground targets in a simulated tactical environment. The truck, an initiative pursued by the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command, consisted of a truck-mounted laser weapon test platform designed to track incoming enemy UASs, rockets, artillery, and mortars and to shoot them down. As presently configured the truck had a 10-kilowatt high energy laser and subsystems. During the Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment the HEMTT shot down 15 Group 1 UAS targets. Future plans for the HEMTT included a 50 or 100 kilowatt high energy laser.35 The experiment proved to be invaluable. It provided critical insights about future Fires Air Defense Artillery (ADA)/Field Artillery (FA) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions to Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfC) 17 and 18 and identified several actions and recommendations for the Fires Center of Excellence and Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) that would be assessed during MFIX 2017. These capabilities included multi-mission directed energy with onboard radar, short range air defense, execution of simultaneous live artillery missions and counter-UAS operations, and exploration of more precision targeting assets.36 ______34Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- ; Shane Sandstrom, “Fort Sill High-Tech Range Assessment Approved,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 16, pp. 30-31, Doc III-8; Cpt Jeffrey Jarimillo, “The Tactical Edge of Fires: Maneuver Fires Integration Experiment,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 16, pp. 34-38, Doc III- 9; Fact Sheet, subj: High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator, 28 Dec 16, Doc III-10; Army Missile and Space Defense Command Information Paper, subj: HEL TVD, Jan 17, Doc III-11; Monthly Report, Electric Fires, 1-31 Jan 16, Doc III-12; Monthly Report, Electric Fires, 1-31 Mar 16, Doc III-13; Jeff Crawley, “Electric Fires Seminar Focuses on Future Battlefields,” www.army.mil/article/143949, Doc III-14; “Fires Forward,” May 16, Doc III-15; C. Todd Lopez, “Army Tests High Energy Laser in Exercise,” www.army.mil/article/168047, 17 May 16, Doc III-16. 35Shane Sandstrom, “Fort Sill High-Tech Range Assessment Approved,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 16, pp. 30-31, Doc III-8; Jarimillo, “The Tactical Edge of Fires: Maneuver Fires Integration Experiment,” pp. 34-38; Fact Sheet, subj: High Energy Laser Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator, 28 Dec 16, Doc III-10; Monthly Report, Electric Fires, 1- 31 Jan 16; Monthly Report, Electric Fires, 1-31 Mar 16; “Fires Forward,” May 16, Doc III-15; C. Todd Lopez, “Army Tests High Energy Laser in Exercise,” www.army.mil/article/168047, 17 May 16, Doc III-16. 36Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1.

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TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM-FIRES

Excalibur Extended-Range Guided Projectile Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without sacrificing accuracy and to satisfy its requirement for precise, all-weather, day/night, fire-and-forget lethal fires up to and beyond the current range of conventional 155-mm. artillery, the U.S. Army explored adopting the XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile. As initially planned in 1995 and outlined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of 22 February 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and-forget projectile with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and inertial measurement unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended ranges (50 kilometers) to shape the close battle and to improve survivability and would permit the munition to detonate within six meters of the target. The projectile’s modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) for area targets, the Sense-and-Destroy- Armor Munition (SADARM) for counterfire against self-propelled artillery or armor, or the Unitary munition, a high-explosive, single warhead, for precision targets – soft or hard. Upon fielding, Excalibur would furnish the Field Artillery with improved fire support; would be compatible with all digitized 155-mm. howitzers, such as the M109A6 (Paladin) Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer (XM777) under development, and the Crusader Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer under development; would reduce fratricide; and would be fielded with DPICM in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, with SADARM in FY 2007, and Unitary in FY 2010.37 Several years into development, critical issues altered the direction of the Excalibur program. Insufficient funding and the termination of the SADARM program early in 2000 prompted the Army to limit Excalibur’s initial development to DPICM. However, the fear of duds and collateral damage, the need for precision, and the Transformation of the Army process that was underway, especially the creation of the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), caused a shift in priorities. In December 2000 the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, signed a decision paper recommending switching Excalibur’s initial development to the Unitary munition. Concurring with General Stricklin, the Program Manager for Excalibur subsequently deferred work on the DPICM warhead in January 2001 because it caused collateral damage by scattering sometimes unexploded bomblets. The Program Manager made the Unitary the primary warhead because it produced low collateral damage. This caused the Unitary warhead to become more important after being a low priority for years.38 In the meantime, another development influenced the Excalibur program. In 1999 Congress started pulling money from the Excalibur program to fund the Trajectory ______372004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 74-75; Briefing, subj: Excalibur Increment 1b Full Rate Production ASARC Brief, 25 Jun 14, Doc III-47, 2014 USAFAS AH. 382000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79.

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Correctable Munition (TCM), a howitzer-launched 155-mm. artillery projectile being developed by Bofors Defense of Sweden. Using GPS and an inertial measurement unit, Bofors TCM would carry three different warheads, including Unitary, would provide a significant increase in accuracy with first-round hit capabilities, and would extend the Field Artillery’s digitized cannon range from 27 to 35 kilometers with the XM777 and the Paladin and 50 plus kilometers with the Crusader. Equally important, TCM would significantly improve warfighting capability and give the Army and the Field Artillery a second long-range, precision-guided munition.39 Raytheon’s technical problems with the Excalibur airframe or projectile and the inability to afford both TCM and Excalibur soon forced the Army to explore various developmental options. First, the Army could drop the TCM program and fund Excalibur, but this was a high-risk solution because Excalibur’s airframe was untested whereas TCM’s had been tested and had already demonstrated reliability. Second, the Army could drop Excalibur and fund TCM. This alternative involved abandoning a contract with an American company and would be politically troublesome. Third, the Army could merge the programs and take the best from each. After serious consideration the Army Acquisition Executive decided in November 2001 to merge the two developmental programs that essentially paralleled each other. A merger would deliver a low-risk program that would take advantage of the complementary strengths of each. While Bofors would be the subcontractor and had years of experience with projectile design, Raytheon would be the prime contractor. Raytheon also possessed extensive experience with guidance electronics and software development.40 The merger, however, was not free. Before the merger, Excalibur had unfunded requirements. The merger added more unfunded requirements. In view of the importance of developing the projectile, the United States and Sweden signed a memorandum of agreement on 11 December 2002 for the cooperative development of Excalibur with the Sweden providing $57 million.41 Meanwhile, Excalibur development passed key milestones. On 26 February 2002 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, approved a new block approach to field Excalibur Block I to the Crusader in FY 2008 and Blocks II and III which would build on Block I to the Paladin and the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer later. When the Office of the Secretary of Defense terminated the Crusader on 8 May 2002, the Army restructured the program to focus developing Excalibur for the Future Combat System (FCS) Cannon of the Objective Force with fielding in FY 2008.42 Prompted by the requirement to get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible in view of the Global War on Terrorism, the Office of the Secretary of Defense subsequently tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur to develop a plan to accelerate

______392001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 402001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 57. 412001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 57-58. 422002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS ) ACH, p. 49.

57 fielding by employing “spiral development.”43 This approach would deliver sequential, increasing capability over time until the ORD threshold and objective requirements were met. On 28 August 2002 the Army Acquisition Executive attended a review that detailed the program to deliver the Unitary Excalibur in three versions, called spirals, and subsequently approved it. The first version (Block/Increment I) would be the least capable and would be fielded to the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer in FY 2006. Block/Increment II with more capabilities would be fielded to the FCS Cannon in FY 2008. Block/Increment III would meet the original ORD requirements and would be fielded in FY 2010 or 2011. The revised ORD signed by the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Major General Michael D. Maples, on 20 August 2002 and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments, Major General Alan W. Thrasher, on 12 February 2003 and verbally approved by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army on 23 April 2003 reflected the changes brought by spiral development. Over a year later on 16 September 2004, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army signed the ORD because its key performance parameters were essential for the contemporary operational environment with its urgent requirement for precision fires.44 Meanwhile, development moved forward. On 23 July 2003 BAE Systems completed the first firing trials of its M777E1 (formerly XM777) with the Excalibur at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The trials evaluated seven XM982 instrumented ballistic test projectiles fired at three different temperatures using the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) to characterize the ballistic environment and to assess the projectile’s physical compatibility with the M777E1. A few weeks later in August 2003, the U.S. government awarded United Defense Industries subsidiary, Bofors Defense, the contract for the system development and demonstration phase of the Excalibur program. Later in October 2003, the Army and Sweden officially opened the Excalibur Joint Program Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, to improve developmental efficiency. One year later in September 2004, the Guided Series 3b Tests validated the airframe and guidance system design.45 An urgent needs statement for the Excalibur endorsed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in August 2004 created the requirement to accelerate fielding the munition even more than initially planned. In response to the urgent need statement, the Field Artillery School presented its case for a formal acceleration of the munition’s development to the Army Resource and Requirements Board which would vet the requirement and decide the fate of accelerating development. Although the product of the accelerated program would not be the objective round identified in the officially approved ORD of September 2004, it would meet the urgent needs statement and create a parallel development program for Excalibur. The urgent ______43Email with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 12 Feb 03, Doc III-37, 2002 USAFACFS ACH. 442002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 62. 452003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63.

58 needs statement required splitting Block/Increment I into two parts. While Increment Ia- 1 would provide the theater forces with an immediate need capability and have less capability, Increment Ia-2 would be the objective program outlined in the 2004 ORD. Increment Ia-2 would continue development, would have improved reliability, and improved countermeasures, and would be fielded to M777A2 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer and Paladin units.46 In March 2005 the Army Resource and Requirements Board validated the urgent needs statement of August 2004. To accelerate the fielding of Excalibur to get it to Iraq by the second quarter of FY 2006, the Army condensed the testing schedule, allowing little room for program slippage or delays, and reduced the capabilities. Updated Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) software would accompany Excalibur.47 Subsequently, the contractor held test firings at the Yuma Proving Ground. On 1 September 2005 the contractor fired two urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 projectiles from a Paladin using MACS. Both rounds deployed their canards, acquired the GPS signal, and completed their pre-programmed navigational maneuvers. Subsequently on 15 September 2005, the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 demonstrated its accuracy by hitting within seven meters of the target to bring the program a step closer to filling the urgent requirement to put the projectile in the hands of 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armor Division.48 More testing took place in 2006 and early 2007. Tests conducted in March-July 2006 fired 22 rounds while the Limited User Test of February 2007 demonstrated the munition’s reliability and lethality when 23 out of 25 rounds hit within an average six meters of the target. In fact, the Limited User Test indicated that the munition actually surpassed the requirements outlined by the ORD and had better effects than anticipated to permit fielding the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 to U.S. ground forces in Iraq in May-July 2007. The Limited User Test results also permitted moving the munition into low-rate initial production. Subsequently, in the Customer Test conducted by I Battery, 11th Marine Regiment at Yuma Proving Ground with the M777A2, the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 successfully demonstrated its accuracy when four out of four rounds had an average miss distance of 10 meters, allowing material release to the M777A2. Meanwhile, the Army approved the Capability Production Document for the Excalibur Ia-2 and began testing in 2008.49 ______462004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 63-64; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 52-53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 50-51; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 69; COL (Ret) Donald C. DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger Brigade Combat Team Fires: The One-Stop-Shop for All Things Cannon,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 35-39, Doc III- 32, 2013 USAFAS AH. 472005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51. 482005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56. 492006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; Briefing, subj: Precision Strike Association Excalibur Overview, undated, Doc III-48, 2014 USAFAS AH.

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The urgent need/requirement Excalibur Ia-1 quickly demonstrated its value in combat. Following new equipment training on 5 May 2007, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted the first operational firing of the munition at a well-known insurgent safe house in Baghdad. Elements from the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment to destroy the safe house with one Excalibur round. At the end of 2007, American operational units had fired the urgent requirement Excalibur Ia-1 in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), while Canadian forces had fired the munition in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. In February 2008 American forces also began firing Excalibur Ia-1 in OEF as units equipped with the M777A2 deployed to Afghanistan. Through late 2010, Army and Marine field artillery units had fired 370 urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 projectiles in OIF and OEF.50 Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School participated in developing Excalibur Ia-2 and Ib. Representing the baseline program outlined in the ORD of 2004, Excalibur Ia-2 would have increased range, improved reliability, improved countermeasures (anti-jam capabilities), and went through an initial operational test in January 2010. At that time Excalibur Ia-2 demonstrated high reliability with charges three and four but was less reliable at charge five and had an increased range over Excalibur Ia-1’s range of 24 kilometers by over 13 kilometers. It received full material release in April 2011. Fielding began in August 2011 to complement the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 that completed its fielding and production run in 2012. The Army concluded fielding Excalibur Ia-2 in 2012 with the production line being shut down in April 2014 and meanwhile awarded Raytheon the contract to produce Excalibur Ib and scheduled testing for 2012 and fielding in FY 2014.51 ______502007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 70; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-33, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO, Doc III-33, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, Doc III-34, 2013 USAFAS AH; Selection Acquisition Report (Extract), 21 May 13, p. 4, Doc III-49, 2014 USAFAS AH. 512009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM BCT- Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III-39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, Excalibur XM 982 Precision Engagement Projectiles, undated, Doc III-14a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 10, Doc III- 15, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” pp. 35-39; Briefing, subj: Precision Strike Association Excalibur Overview, 2012, Doc III-35, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22

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However, technical difficulties set back the demonstration of the Raytheon and Alliant Tech Systems designs of Excalibur Ib from March 2010 until August 2010. Raytheon won the shoot off the contract for Excalibur Ib; and the Army awarded the company the contract in August 2010 to continue engineering and manufacturing development. The munition achieved ORD requirements during testing and provided more range, increased reliability, and lower cost than the Excalibur Ia-2 that was a major system objective. A critical design review in April 2011 revealed that the fins were being destroyed upon firing the projectile. As a result, the Army decided in February 2012 to use the Ia-2’s base assembly as opposed to the Ib’s base assembly. This approach would lower the developmental risk and use a base that had demonstrated reliability. Subsequently, testing in October 2012 validated the Excalibur Ib and led to a Milestone C Decision review in December 2012 by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology and the Army Acquisition Executive to move the munition into low-rate initial production in 2013. Excalibur Ib successfully passed the initial operational test and evaluation in February 2014 at the Yuma Proving Ground. Although funding constraints reduced the number to be produced from 6,264 to 5,666, the Army Acquisition Executive approved Excalibur Ib in June 2014 for full material release and type classified it. Type classification meant that the munition was safe for soldier to use, that it met operational requirements, and that it could be logistically supported. Full rate production followed in 2015 with production to be completed in 2017.52 ______Feb 13, (material used is not FOUO); Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13; Interview, Dastrup with Mark Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 25 Feb 14, Doc III-36, 2013 USAFAS AH; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract) 21 May 13, p. 4; Briefing, subj: Precision Strike Association Excalibur Overview, undated; Picatinny Arsenal Information Paper, subj: Army Completes Excalibur 1a-2 Production, Transitions to 1b, 14 Apr 14, Doc III-50, 2014 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mark W. Belcher and Steven W. Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 18 Feb 15, Doc III-51, 2014 USAFAS AH; DOTE Report (Extract), subj: Excalibur Increment 1b M982E1, FY 2014, Doc III-52, 2014 USAFAS AH. 522009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM BCT- Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions Systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III-39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for TCM Cannon, COL Michael Hartig, 6 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 12 Feb 13; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: Raytheon’s Excalibur Ib Demonstrates Accuracy during Flight Tests, 24 Oct 12, Doc III-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval of the

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Crucial developments with Excalibur Ib arose in 2015. In August 2015 the Program Manager for Excalibur recommended upgrading the projectile software and hardware to continue operational relevancy and to counter future and emerging threats. Subsequently in December 2015, the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army accepted the proposals and added his own. He directed the Army to look at the threat of peer-to-peer because of Russian combat actions in the Ukraine where the Russians employed anti-jam capabilities, to examine the costs associated with the Program Manager’s upgrades, and to determine the cost to the contractor to extend the full-rate production through FY 2022.53 During 2016, US Army forces supporting the Iraqi army in Operation Inherent Resolve fired 214 operational Excalibur rounds and experienced anomalies when firing Excalibur. This prompted the Product Manager to deploy a team in August to investigate the unit’s concerns. Based on observations, the team concluded that the Enhanced Portable Inductive Artillery Fuze Setter (EPIAFS) and Platform Integration Kits (PIKs) were not fully operational and that incorrect software on the howitzers and fouling in the barrel contributed to the reliability issues. Once corrected, the reliability significantly increased with no further issues noted from units since. During an Ammunition Stockpile Reliability Inspection, inspectors meanwhile discovered cracks in the warheads of Ia-2 and Ib Excalibur projectiles that led to a System Safety Risk Assessment being issued in July 2016 that restricted firing of all increments to Modularity Artillery Charge System (MACS) 3 and 4 charges. Based on operational necessity, an amendment was issued in September 2016 that delegated ______Precision Engagement Projectile, Excalibur Ib Capability Production Document, 18 Dec 12, Doc III-18, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Ammunition, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for Low Rate Initial Production of Increment Ib Excalibur M982E1, 13 Dec 12, Doc III-19, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur, PGK, and Future Cannon Munition Suite 2012, 26 Feb 13, Doc III-20, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: US Army Awards Raytheon $54 million for Excalibur Ib, 10 Sep 13, Doc III-37, 2013 USAFAS AH; “Raytheon Completes Excalibur IB Projectile’s Qualification Flight Testing,” www.army- technology.com, 21 Oct 13, Doc III-38, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur and Munitions Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 28 Feb 14, Doc III-39, 2013 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Belcher, 25 Feb 14; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: Excalibur Ib Enters Full Rate Production and Receives $52 million award, 31 Jul 14, Doc III-53, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Excalibur Increment 1b Full Rate Production ASARC Brief, 25 Jun 14, 2014 USAFAS AH; US Army Acquisition Support Center Information Paper, subj: Excalibur XM 982, M982, and M982A1 Precision Guided Extended Range Projectile, 6 Jan 16, Doc III-17, 2015 USAFAS AJ; Interview, Dastrup with Mark W. Belcher and Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 21 Jan 16, Doc III-18, 2015 USAFAS AH; “TRADOC Capabilities Manager Brigade Combat Teams,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 16, pp. 15-20, Doc III-19, 2015 USAFAS AH. 53Interview, Dastrup with Belcher and Worth, 21 Jan 16; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT Fires History, 10 Mar 16, Doc III-20, 2015 USAFAS History.

62 decision authority to commanders to fire Excalibur with MACS 5 using prescribed safety mitigation actions. This led to the issuing Notice of Ammunition Restriction (NAR) 16- 0304 through 16-0308 on 10 August 2016 (amended 2 February 20 17 by NARs 17-0084 and 0085); and Ammunition Information Notice (AIN) 001-17 and Operational Safety of Use Message (SOUM) 17-001 on 4 October 2017. Stockpile screening for warhead cracks was delayed due ineffective and inconsistent X-ray imaging resolution. An approved X-ray screening process was finally developed by the program manager and was initiated at McAllister Army Ammunition Plant on 17 October 2016. Screening continued with priority going to rounds required for other crack testing, followed by foreign military sales contractual requirements.54

Precision Guidance Kit Although the U.S. Army had been working to introduce precision munitions since the early 1990s, the effort led to a limited number and types, such as the Sense-and- Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM). Interestingly, combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlighted the need for precision munitions to mitigate collateral damage and improve accuracy. Prompted by the Americans’ restrictive rules of engagement for attacking targets to minimize collateral damage, American adversaries modified their tactics. By dispersing their forces and often occupying positions in or near populated areas, enemy forces limited the Americans’ ability to engage targets. This tactic caused the Army to increase its dependence upon precision munitions.55 As a result, the Army initiated a search for a less expensive precision munition than SADARM. On 20 November 2003 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) to head a working group of representatives from the military and industry to conduct the Precision Effects Study to determine the current or near-current precision engagement solutions and to select those that would yield the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets within 24 to 36 months.56 Various proposals emerged. Among many including the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3), the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition developed by GD/Denel of South Africa, the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR), and the course-correcting fuse (CCF), renamed Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) in 2005, offered much promise. Based upon analysis of the proposed solutions during the first part of 2004, USAFACFS concluded that PGK would vastly improve the accuracy of 105-mm. and 155-mm. ______54Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1; Jen Judson, “Small Cracks in Excalibur Artillery Rounds Prompt Closer Look by the Army,” Defense News, 15 Nov 16, Doc III-17. 552004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 58; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH. 56Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH.

63 projectiles and drive down the logistical tail by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement and ammunition resupply requirements. Through spiral development PGK could be fielded by Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 with the first increment and by FY 2010 with the second increment that would be the full-performance fuse.57 In 2005 USAFACFS explained that PGK, a low-cost, fuse-size module, intended to replace a standard fuse on current and future non-guided 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles, would significantly improve accuracy by using the Global Position System (GPS) to provide location during flight and to make trajectory corrections and would reduce the amount of ammunition required for a mission. PGK would transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile.” Late in the year, USAFACFS completed the capabilities development document which noted that the PGK would leverage U.S. Navy Guidance Integrated Fuse Technology Demonstration Program work, forwarded the document through the chain of command for staffing with approval coming on 22 January 2007, and announced that fielding was projected for 2009.58 As of late 2006, the Army planned to field PGK in three increments. Increment I would consist of a fuse-like kit that would contain GPS guidance, power supply, control surfaces, electronic circuitry, and the fuse function modes of point-detonating and proximity, would give the projectile a circular error probable of 50 meters or less, and would address the urgent needs of current operations in the Global War on Terrorism with fielding in FY 2010. Increment II would minimize GPS interference and jamming, would improve delivery accuracy to 30 meters, would add delay and GPS time-fuse functions, would address the entire 155-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants, and would be fielded in FY 2013. Increment III would add the 105-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants and would be fielded in FY 2014.59 In the meantime, developmental efforts moved forward. On 20 December 2005 the Program Executive Officer Ammunition approved PGK Increment I. Subsequently, the Army Requirements Oversight Council approved the PGK requirement and sent it to joint staffing with the Department of the Army approving the Capability Development Document in January 2007 which established the requirement for PGK. Charged with developing the kit, the Project Manager Combat Ammunition Systems meanwhile solicited industry for possible Increment I designs that could provide a near-term solution, awarded two six-month technology contracts, one to BAE Systems and one to Alliant Techsystems, for PGK development, and scheduled a shoot off at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in March-April 2007. The winner would receive the contract for development of Increment I with an accuracy of 50 meters circular error probable. Alliant Techsystems won the shoot off. Eighteen Alliant Techsystems rounds impacted ______572004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 58-59. 582005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 52. 592006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 57-58; Briefing, subj: TCM Cannon, 2 Nov 09, Doc III-38, 2009 USAFAS AH; Capability Development Document for the PGK (Extract), 11 Jul 12, Executive Summary, Doc III-23, 2012 USAFAS AH.

64 within 30 meters of the target. Based on this, the Program Executive Officer Ammunition approved and signed the Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum on 4 May 2007 to permit PGK to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of acquisition. Subsequently, Project Manager Combat Ammunition Systems awarded Alliant Techsystems an 18-month SDD contract on 18 May 2007 to develop PGK Increment I for 155-mm. high-explosive shell and to test it in 2009. However, technical difficulties pushed PGK Increment I testing back into 2010 and delayed PGK Increment II development.60 In August 2010 testing to move PGK Increment I into the next phase of development did not go well. In response, the Program Manager Combat Ammunitions Systems put together a team to review the test and to determine the causes of the failures. A few months later, the team’s findings indicated that design problems had led to the failures and recommended terminating the program or letting it slip so that fielding would be later than initially planned. In December 2010 the Army Systems Acquisition Review Board approved a plan by the Program Manager Combat Ammunition Systems to restructure the engineering and manufacturing development program to allow the program to slip 25 months in order to make minor design changes and to field PGK Increment I in 2014 rather than 2011. Subsequently on 21 January 2011, the Army Acquisition Executive authorized moving forward with the restructured plan for PGK Increment I and directed the Program Manager Combat Ammunitions System to provide PGK Increment I acquisition program baseline for approval within 120 days. The Army Acquisition Executive approved the acquisition program baseline restructure on 16 July 2011 for continued development.61 Concurrently, the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, Fires Center of Excellence, developed, staffed, and received Army approval to place M777A2 155-mm. howitzer into the force structure of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Field Artillery battalions alongside the M199A2 105-mm. howitzer. This change enabled the IBCT to have precision and near-precision cannon artillery fire support using Excalibur and PGK without having to move forward with development of a 105-mm.

______602006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 58; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-44, 2009 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: IBCT Organic Cannon Precision Strike Capability, 12 Jan 2011, Doc III-18, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: PGK, undated, Doc III-37, 2011 USAFAS AH. 61Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant TCM BCT-Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-34, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer for Ammunition, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit Increment I, 21 Jan 11, Doc III-38, 2011 USAFAS AH; “Update on the Precision Guidance Kit,” Redleg Update, 6-13 May 13, p. 4, Doc III-41, 2013 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, “PGK Arrives in Afghanistan Ahead of Fighting Season,” Redleg Update, 6-13 May 13, p. 4, Doc III-41, 2013 USAFAS AH.

65 near precision PGK.62 Meanwhile, the Department of the Army G-3 directed an urgent material release on 17 May 2011 for PGK. This would accelerate fielding of PGK Increment I with reduced reliability to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan based upon successful testing in August 2011. Subsequently, the contractor conducted a PGK Increment I guided flight test in August-September 2011 where it collected sufficient data for entrance into the engineering, manufacturing, and development phase as well as considering the accelerated fielding to OEF. In March 2012 the Army approved accelerated fielding of PGK to OEF in 2013. This gave PGK two tracks – the program of record fuse and the urgent material release program fuse. Following successful testing, fielding the urgent material release PGK began in March 2013. The Army sent these PGKs to deployed M777 and M109 units in Afghanistan where they reported achieving near-precision target effects with PGK fuses mated to conventional 155-mm. projectiles.63 As the Army fielded the urgent material release PGK (NA28), it continued development of the program-of-record PGK (NA29) in 2013-2014. The Program Executive Officer for Ammunition conducted a Milestone C review in March 2013 and approved moving into Low-rate Initial Production (LRIP). However, the NA29 failed article testing in December 2013. The failure was attributed to poor production controls in place at the production facility in Rocket City, West Virginia. Because of this, the production effort was pulled back to the engineering facility in Plymouth, Minnesota, using the same production procedures used to produce the test articles. This prompted the Army to conduct a limited user’s test in February 2014. Unfortunately, the Army lacked sufficient numbers of NA29, causing NA28 fuses to be used during the limited user’s test. Despite this, the program-of-record PGK (NA29) went through a successful initial operational test and evaluation (IOTE) in May 2015 that indicated that the fuse was operational effective, accurate, operationally suitable, and survivable. This permitted moving the NA29 fuse into full-rate production and adding anti-jamming capabilities

______62Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT Fires History, 10 Mar 16, Doc III-20, 2015 USAFAS AH. 63Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army, subj: Acceleration and Urgent Materiel Release for XM 1156 Precision Guidance Kit, 17 May 11, Doc III-39, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: PGK, 2012, Doc III-24, 2012 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, Picatinny Arsenal, “Fort Bliss soldiers First to Fire Army’s New Near-precision Artillery Rounds,” www.army.mil, Doc III-25, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval of Capability Development Document in lieu of Capabilities Production Document for the Precision Guidance Kit, 11 Jul 12, Doc III-26, 2012 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: PGK, 2013, Doc III-54, 2014 USAFAS AH; CPT Cal A. Thomas and SFC Jonathan S. Delong, “Regaining our Luster: How Fort Sill Institutional Training is Improving to meet Requirements for the 21st Century Field Artillery NCO,” Redleg Update, Aug 14, pp. 5-9, Doc III-55, 2014 USAFAS AH.

66 added to the fuse by 2020.64 In 2016 PGK made further progress. During the year, operational units fired 471 PGKs in theater. In May 2016 the NA29 PGK began Full Rate Production with the Option 2 buy awarded in July 2016. Resurgence of near- and peer-threats led to plans to accelerate modernization efforts.65 New equipment training was conducted for nine Army battalions, the Fires Center of Excellence Marine Corps Detachment and the Canadian and Australian armies. Based on the findings from the Excalibur inspection team, issues with Enhanced Portable Inductive Artillery Fuze Setter (EPIAFS) reliability continued to surface. Investigation determined that the setter coils were being burned out that could not be detected by the embedded built in test (BIT). This led to the development of a plan to build and field a small, hand-portable PGM simulator to allow units to routinely test the EPIAFS.66

Cannon-Delivered Area Effect Munition In order to mitigate high-risk gaps that would be caused with the 1 January 2019 implementation of the 2008 Department of Defense policy on cluster munitions, the Army adopted the Joint Cannon-Delivered Area Effect Munition (C-DAEM) Initial Capabilities Document on 20 October 2016. In a follow-on briefing a month later, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and Army Oversight Council approved a bridging strategy to “get something in the bunkers” before 1 January 2019 and the fielding of the actual C-DAEM munition. This bridging strategy directed pursuing purchase of the Swedish BONUS Sensor Fused Munition, accelerating development of the XM1128 HE projectile with Lithographic Fragmentation Technology (LFT), and assessment of the IMI Systems’ M999 projectile.67

M777 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer ______64DOTE Information Paper, subj: PGK, 2013; Operational Test and Evaluation Director, Reasons Behind Program Delays, 2014 Update (Extract), 25 Aug 14, Doc III- 56, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA DOTMLPF Synchronization, 2 Jul 14, Doc III-57, 2014 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mark W. Belcher and Steven W. Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 18 Feb 15, Doc III-58, 2014 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Major General Clark W. LeMasters, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/4, U.S. Army Materiel Command, subj: Full Materiel Release for Fuse, Multi-portion: Precision Guidance Kit, M1156 (NA29), 21 Dec 15, Doc III-19a, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT Fires History, 10 Mar 16, Doc III-20, 2015 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: Precision Guidance Kit, Fiscal Year 2015, Doc III-21, 2015 USAFAS AH; TCM BCT Fires Quarterly Newsletter, 31 Jan 16, Doc III-18. 65Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1. 66Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1. 67Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 1.

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When the United States shifted its national defense priorities from forward- deployed forces in Europe to force projection from the continental United States (CONUS) at the end of the Cold War early in the 1990s, lightweight weapons attracted the Army’s interest more than before. Lightweight weapons offered greater strategic and tactical deployability than heavier weapons. In view of the emergence of a new world order and the need for strategically deployable equipment, the Army completed an Operational and Organizational Plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer to replace the aging M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer. Prompted by the urgent need to replace the M101 towed 105-mm. howitzer and the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the Marine Corps concurrently planned to field a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer as a replacement. With the recognition that they required a new towed lightweight 155-mm. howitzer, the Army and the Marine Corps wrote a Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) in 1995 to develop a joint lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer (LW155) and later formed the Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office in 1998 to direct the developmental program. Although Joint Program Management Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, managed the overall program, the Marine Corps had the lead in the acquisition of the LW155, also called the XM777. Pressed to obtain the LW155 as soon as feasible, the Marine Corps opted to field one without digital enhancements/capabilities and to add them later, while the Army chose introducing a digitized LW155 that would take longer to field.68 After several years of developmental work, the contractor delivered the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) prototype XM777s. Unveiled at Picatinny Arsenal in June 2000, the first EMD prototype XM777 held out great promise. The howitzer’s reduced size and weight permitted towing by the same prime mover used to tow the M198 and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 aircraft for strategic deployability. Additionally, the howitzer could be emplaced in three minutes or less, could fire faster than the M198, could be displaced in two minutes or less, and had a range of 30 kilometers. By the end of 2001, the Marines had a total of six XM777 EMD howitzers undergoing tests.69 Unfortunately, none of the six EMD howitzers met the “production representative” requirements for an operational test to be conducted in 2002 by the Army and Marine Corps.70 This caused the Marine Corps to restructure the program by adding an operational assessment test or a limited user’s test in 2002. If the EMD howitzers passed the test, the contractor could start low-rate initial production with the goal of performing an operational test in 2004 to determine if full production would be permitted.71 In 2002 the XM777 underwent testing as scheduled. Following extreme cold ______682003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 82; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 105-08; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64. 692002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65. 702002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 712000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65.

68 weather testing in Alaska in January 2002 where the howitzer demonstrated its ability to function in extremely cold weather conditions, the Army and the Marine Corps conducted an operational assessment test from 13 May 2002 to 15 June 2002 at Twenty- Nine Palms, California; Camp Pendleton, California; and the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base, California; to determine if the howitzer met the specific requirements outlined in the JORD of 1995. The test included live fire of approximately 4,000 rounds, towing, and embarkation. Although the howitzer failed to meet the displacement time, reliability, and maximum rate of fire requirements and demonstrated minor equipment problems, it achieved its key operational requirements and later passed the accuracy requirement in a separate accuracy test in August 2002 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Along with the successful air load test at the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, California, in June 2002, the operational assessment and the accuracy test indicated that the XM777 program was making satisfactory progress.72 Based upon the accuracy test and especially the operational assessment test of May-June 2002, the Navy held a Milestone C decision meeting on 8 November 2002. Although the key performance parameters of displacement, maximum rate of fire, and reliability were not met and would be addressed in full-rate production exit criteria, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition approved moving the XM777 into the low-rate initial production of 94 howitzers to be delivered in 2004-2005 for testing. This decision granted the Marine Corps permission to move forward with development.73 More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package that was scheduled to be added to the Army’s LW155 distinguished the Army’s howitzer from the M198. As the Army explained, TAD would give the howitzer onboard advanced capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers, such as the Paladin M109A6 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer and the futuristic Crusader 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer under development, and would eliminate the need for external survey, aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as self-locating and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easy-to-read electronic sights, digital communications, and improved direct fire sight, would also make the Army version of the LW155 superior to the M198. Additionally, TAD would be compatible with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS). In light of this, the Army released a request for proposal to industry on 10 February 2000 for TAD. After analyzing six proposals, the Army awarded a contract to General Dynamics Armament Systems of Burlington, Vermont, on 15 September 2000 to engineer, manufacture, and develop TAD for operational testing by 2003. To distinguish the Army’s LW155 with TAD from the Marine Corps’ basic LW155, the Joint Program Office designated the Army’s LW155 as the XM777E1 and made the Army the lead agency. With the emergence of the XM777E1, two LW155 programs coexisted – the XM777 (M777) with onboard conventional optical fire control capabilities for the Marine Corps and the XM777E1

______722002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 732002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 65-66; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84.

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(M777E1) with digital fire control capabilities for the Army.74 Fielding the M777 with conventional optical fire control began in 2005. On 19 January 2005 at Fort Sill, the Marine Corps conducted their first M777 live fire and received 55 of the planned 94 M777s. These howitzers were fielded to the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines at Twenty Nine Palms and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines at Camp Pendleton. On 19 December 2005 Colonel John M. Sullivan, Jr., the Commander of the 11th Marine Regiment, certified that the Marine Corps had achieved their initial operational capability with the M777.75 Work on the software for the TAD and hardware meanwhile progressed. In September-October 2006, the Army carried out a successful first article testing of the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)-equipped M777A1 howitzer (TAD equipped) at the Yuma Proving Ground. Together, the successful software testing and the successful first article testing led to full material release of the M777A1 with TAD automated fire control capabilities on 12 January 2007 by Major General William M. Lenaer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Tank Command Life Cycle Management Command.76 Shortly afterwards, the Army initiated testing and fielding the M777A2 that would have software upgrades to fire the Excalibur precision munition and other upgrades. In June 2007 I Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment successfully fired the first Excalibur from the M777A2 (TAD equipped and Excalibur capable). This led to full material release for the M777A2 system by the Army on 3 July 2007 and by the U.S. Marine Corps on 7 September 2007; and fielding began in July 2007 and continued into 2010. At same time the Army upgraded the M777 to a M777A2 and upgraded all M777A1s to M777A2s.77 Other crucial developments concurrently occurred. C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur precision munition in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan from the M777A2 on 13 January 2008; and later the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur from the howitzer in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on 26 April 2008.78 Subsequently to these operational firings, emerging force structure issues influenced M777A2 fielding decisions. In August 2009 the Army decided to convert the ______742000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 752005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67. 762006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 66. 772007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 68-69; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 87-88; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to 2010 Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); M777 155-mm. Ultra lightweight Field Howitzer, United Kingdom, www.army-technology.com, 30 Jan 14, Doc III-45, 2014 USAFAS AH. 782008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 87; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 USAFAS AH.

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1st Brigade, 1st Armor Division, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to Stryker Combat Brigade Teams (SBCTs) in 2011 and 2012 respectively to shift focus towards the middle of the spectrum of conflict. This action would require equipping the SBCTs with M777A2s and associated equipment and furnishing new equipment training. Additionally, the Army forced a 10 percent manpower reduction across all branches and proponencies; and the Field Artillery community decided to take this hit in all field artillery organizations except for brigade combat teams. The biggest “hit” on structure required the echelons above brigade cannon battalions to convert from a 3x6 (three batteries of six howitzers each for a total of 18 howitzers) to a 3x4 (three batteries of four howitzers each for a total of 12 howitzers) force structure. In 2010 the Army decided to phase the conversion over a period of five years through 2015. Through the first part of 2014, the Army and Marine Corps fielded over 800 M777A2s. For the Army the M777A2 served as general support artillery in the Infantry Brigade Combat Team and direct support artillery in the SBCT and as the sole howitzer for the Marine Corps.79 During 2015 the Army updated the M777A2. On 9 December 2015 the Army installed two M776 chrome tubes on two 1st Battalion, 78th Field Artillery Regiment howitzers. This was in line with the M109A6 M284A2 chrome tube efforts. The chrome tubes would add longer tube life as compared to the steel tubes, would reduce spiral wear, would produce less variation in muzzle velocity over time, and would increase accuracy of projectile impacts over time. This effort would serve to evaluate the possibility of converting all M777A2 howitzers to chrome-lined tubes in the future for better reliability and maintainability.80 In the meantime, the Army installed Digital Fire Control Software version 4.1.2 on Fort Sill M777A2 howitzers and competed the Modularity Artillery Charge System (MACS) mitigation AINO24-16 (Ammunition Information Notice) guidance for M777A2 howitzer sections. Software version 4.1.2 improved crew controls and displays, location and navigation, fire support deployment commands, gun tube laying aids, digital ______792009 USAFAS AH, p. 89; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Scott Veach, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-21, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11; Briefing, subj: M777A2 Future Initiatives Demo, 8 Feb 12, Doc III-43, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Rafael Acevedo, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-44, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13, Doc III-31, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-32, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Picatinny Arsenal Information Paper, subj: Artillery systems, undated, Doc III-59, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Advanced Planning Brief to Industry, 1 May 12, Doc III-60, 2014 USAFAS AH. 80Email, subj: Comments to Dr. Dastrup, 4 Feb 16, Doc III-22, 2015 USAFAS AH.

71 communications, fire mission processing, ammunition and inventory management, integration of the Muzzle Velocity Sensor System output, and built-in test. Because of the hardened residue build-up that prevented proper periodic borescope inspections and the inability to inspect the bore surfaces beneath the residue, AINO24-16 outlined M232A1-5H firing restrictions. It restricted gun crews from firing M203A1 Charge-85 and M232A1 Charge 5H unless the howitzer had a full bore chrome plated cannon and MACS mitigation initiatives.81 Also, the program manager for the M777A2 conducted a metallurgical test on a howitzer that had cracked cradles from the Anniston Army Depot in October 2015. Results showed that the crack came from a weld to fill threaded purged holes used during the cradle manufacturing process. The program manager determined that there was no significant operational impact to the M777A2 fleet and that no safety issue existed while repairs were initiated on those affected systems.82 With the Army fleet nearing an average life of seven years and the last Army delivery having taken place in January 2014, 2016 was a year of sustainment for the M777A2. Work continued on the breach and primer feed mechanism MACS Mitigation Initiative (MMI), spiral wear, cradle cracks, wheel hub cracks (Ground Precautionary Action 16-009), hydraulic power assist kit (HYPAK), cables, and electronic component obsolescence. Under ARDEC’s Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) initiative, a 52 caliber cannon was mounted on a M777A2 for proof of concept. Although feasible, additional efforts continued to evaluate other armament requirements to support a cannon tube larger than 39 caliber.83 In 2016 the Army began work on a longer, modified M777A2 tube. Called the Extended Range Cannon Artillery, the initiative by the Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC) would double the M777A2’s range from approximately 30 miles to 70 miles without detracting from mobility requirements. This increased range would enable the howitzer to hit targets before they could reach them and give operational overmatch so that the warfighter would not have to worry about coming under fire before they could return fire.84 On 30 November 2016 after several years of negotiation, India signed a letter of agreement with the US government to buy 145 M777 howitzers. This provided an opportunity to leverage new production efforts to support further sustainment of Army

______81Email, subj: Comments to Dr. Dastrup, 4 Feb 16. 82Email, subj: Comments to Dr. Dastrup, 4 Feb 16; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 83Fires Forward, Mar 16, Doc III-19; Lauren Poindexter, “Picatinny Engineers Seek to Double the Range of Modified Howitzer,” Picatinny Arsenal Public Affairs, 17 Mar 16, Doc III-20; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 84Fires Forward, Mar 16; Lauren Poindexter, “Picatinny Engineers Seek to Double the Range of Modified Howitzer,” 17 Mar 16; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17.

72 and Marine Corps fleet.85

M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer Largely through the efforts of personnel at , North Carolina, the 82nd Airborne Division obtained funding in 1998 for the Light Artillery System Improvement Program (LASIP) to provide some needed changes to the M119 towed 105-mm. howitzer to make it more maintainable and more operationally suitable. The Army initiated the LASIP program in 1998 with Block I improvements that included a cold weather recuperator, trail lifting handles, off-the-shelf brakes, and other enhancements. First applied in 2002, Block II upgrades consisted of a redesigned elevation gearbox, a new rammer/extractor tool, an improved buffer, an improved buffer/recuperator connection, a roll bar, and a new fire control system that used LEDs as a light source and not radioactive tritium. Because of the aggregate differences produced by LASIP Block I and II modifications from the original M119A1 that was typed classified in 1985 and was towed by a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the Army designated modifications as the M119A2 with type classification coming on 15 February 2005.86 With the creation of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) with their organic fires battalion beginning in 2002, the Army required more towed 105-mm. howitzers than in the inventory. This led to a decision by a general officer steering committee (GOSC) in June 2004 to rebuild and refit old M102 towed 105-mm. howitzers. Pressured by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the GOSC reevaluated the decision in August 2004 and ordered production of new M119A2 howitzers to fill the shortages. Shortly afterwards, the Army National Guard decided to replace their M102 howitzers with the M119A2 to have a pure M119A2 fleet.87 Based upon successful testing, the Army granted new production full materiel release for the M119A2 on 10 June 2008 and began fielding. Because of modularity conversions and aging M102 howitzer fleets, the Army National Guard agreed to accept initial half-battalion fieldings for 2008 and 2009, allowing Guard battalions to field their new equipment sooner.88 Fielding M119A2 howitzers continued into 2011. By the end of 2010, 20 active component IBCTs and 18 of the 20 Army National Guard IBCTs had been fully fielded with M119A2s. One year later, the Army completed fielding the M119A2s. Twenty active component brigade combat teams and 20 Army National Guard brigade combat ______85Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17. 862000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 115-16; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 66. 872005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 69. 882008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 89-90; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 90-91.

73 teams had M119A2s.89 Meanwhile, a critical issue arose with the M119A2 in 2006. With the fielding of the digitized M777A1 towed 155-mm. howitzer and the phasing out of the M102 towed 105-mm. howitzer, the M109A5 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, and the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the M119A2 would be the only howitzer in the Army’s inventory without digital capabilities; and this would exacerbate the capability gap between the IBCTs and Heavy Stryker Brigade Combat Team because the latter would have digitized howitzers. The lack of digital capabilities with the M119A2 would also prevent the howitzer from using near-precision munitions and the Precision Guidance Kit that would convert dumb munitions into near-precision munitions. The lack of precision in turn would lead to less accuracy, would make dispersed operations more difficult to perform, and would decrease the survivability of the IBCT. Influenced by these reasons, the Field Artillery School, TRADOC, and the Army G-8 (Programming and Materiel Integration) developed the requirement for digitizing the M119A2 along the lines of the M777A1. Based upon the Material Change Package (MCP) signed on 15 June 2007, the Field Artillery School and the Army developed a strategy for digitizing the M119A2. One year later in January 2008, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) and Fort Sill approved digitizing the M119A2 to give it the same capabilities of self-locating, self- orienting, and digital communications as the M777A1 and M109A6 (Paladin) self- propelled 155-mm. howitzer.90 Over the next two years, digitizing the M119A2 moved forward. Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Commanding General of the FCoE, Kevin M. Fahey, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, and the Army G-8 met on 24 January 2008 with the Program Manager for LW155. They agreed on the requirements, directed work to begin digitizing the M119A2 through a series of block upgrades, and recommended maximizing the use of digitization components common to the IBCT where they would be fielded. At a subsequent meeting on 2 October 2008, they defined functionality for the blocks – Block One (aiming, pointing, and basic digital communications to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System), Block Two (ammunition management and deployment commands), and Block Three (on-board ballistic computation and integrated muzzle velocity management) and noted that the lack of off-the-shelf hardware ______89Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-49, 2011 USAFAS AH; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 91; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-25, 2009 USAFAS AH; SIGACTS, LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09, Doc III-26, 2009 USAFAS AH; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 11 Dec 10, Doc III-27, 2009 USAFAS AH. 902006 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 67-68; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 70; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 90; Information Paper, subj: M119A2, 27 Oct 10, Doc III-50, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Digitized M119A2 Information Paper/Airdrop Certification, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-51, 2011 USAFAS AH; Joseph Lipinski, “Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” Army AL&T, Jul-Sep 10, pp. 21-24, Doc III-32a, 2012 USAFAS AH.

74 had caused the initial operational capability date to slip from FY 2011 to FY 2012.91 Meanwhile, the Army conducted a preliminary design review on 10 June 2008 and another one in December 2008, while the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment participated in Early User Assessments of the M119A2 digitization design concept in September 2008 and November 2008. The exchange between soldiers and engineers brought increased attention to digitizing the weapon and understanding operational considerations to the engineers. Subsequently, on 30 June 2009, the program manager for the M119A2 released a request for proposal to industry for an inertial navigation device for the M119A2. Bid sample testing began in August 2009 and ended with a Global Positioning System (GPS) inertial navigation unit contract awarded to Honeywell Inc., Clearwater, Florida, in March 2010.92 Digitizing the M119A2 continued in 2012-2013. In March 2012 a new howitzer production line was completed. The production line was originally scheduled to be completed in August 2011, but delays and contractor issues caused the program to miss the original date and to be finished in March 2012. Between July 2012 and September 2012, the Program Office conducted a Follow-on Test and Evaluation on the digitized M119A2 (M119A3) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, using soldiers from B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Sill. Taking place over a nine-week period, testing included the Fires Directorate (FTD), Program Manager-Towed Artillery Systems (PM- TAS), and TRADOC Capabilities Manager-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (TCM-IBCT) and consisted of three 96-hour vignettes in which B Battery fired over 12,000 rounds. Testing went well. On 20 December 2012 the Program Executive Officer Brigadier General John McGuiness signed the Milestone C type classification standard for the M119A2 as the digitized M119A3 with full material release coming in March 2013. Fielding of the M119A3 began in 2013 when the 3rd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 1st Battalion, 78th Field Artillery Regiment, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill; received their howitzers as part of a six-year fielding plan that would create a fleet of 528 M119A3s by Fiscal Year 2018. The M119A3s would provide increased lethality and strategic deployment, improved survivability with decreased emplacement and displacement time, self-locating, and pointing accuracy ______912008 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS LW 155 and M119, 20 Nov 10, Doc III-28, 2010 USAFAS AH. 922008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 20 Nov 10; Email with atch, subj: M119 Input to 2010 Annual History, 7 Mar 11, Doc III-29, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Gives Quicker Firepower,” Army News Service, undated, Doc III-52, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atchs, subj: Digitized M119A2 Information Paper, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-53, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: M119 Tow 105 2011, 9 Mar 12, Doc III-54, 2011 USAFAS AH; Lipinski, “Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” pp. 21-24.

75 within one mil. By 2016 eight composite battalions of M777s and M119s had been upgraded to the M119A3.93 As effective as the howitzer was in combat, issues with its recoil system created reliability, maintainability, and manufacturing problems based upon reports from Afghanistan. One of the main problems involved the buffer that absorbed the recoil when the weapon was fired and the hydropneumatic recuperator that returned the tube back to its original firing position. Because they were tied together and jointly operated by fluid, the seals leaked frequently. To resolve the problem U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC) reconstituted the recoil system. ARDEC disconnected the buffer and recuperator so that they functioned as separate systems rather than one and reduced the gas pressures to reduce leaks and other problems. The upgraded buffer, upgrades recuperator, and suspension lockout system would allow the howitzer to fire top charges at all quadrants.94

M109A7 Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer In the fall of 2007, the U.S. Army and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a public-private partnership to develop and sustain the Army’s M109 Family of Vehicles (FOV) – the M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer (Paladin), the M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (FAASV), and the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle (POCV) – through the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) and later in May 2008 signed a contract to design and develop the PIM M109 system of vehicles. The Army separately approved the capabilities ______93Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13, Doc III-33, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-34, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Historical M119A2, 14 Feb 13, Doc III- 34a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Provides Quicker Firepower,” www.army.mil, Doc III-35, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on the Digitized M119A3 Program,” Redleg Update, Mar 13, Doc III-36, 2012 USAFAS AH; COL (Ret) Donald C. DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires: The One-Stop-Shop for All Things Cannon,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 35-39, Doc III-46, 2013 USAFAS AH; “Fort Bragg First to Receive upgraded M119 Howitzers,” Army Material Command, 6 May 13, Doc III-47, 2013 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CPT Dusty Gray, TCM BCT-Fires, 27 Feb 14, Doc III-48, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA DOTMLPF Synchronization, 2 Jul 14, Doc III-61, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: M119A3 Production and Fielding, 7 Oct 14, Doc III-62, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: M119A3 Integration at Picatinny, 7 Oct 14, Doc III-63, 2014 USAFAS AH; “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 16, pp. 15-20, Doc III-; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III- 94Cassandra Mainiero, “Picatinny Engineers Modify M119A3 Howitzer to make It Safer, Simpler, More Reliable,” Picatinney Arsenal Public Affairs, 21 Jun 16, Doc III- 21; TCM Fires Quarterly Newsletter, 1 Apr 16, Doc III-22; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1.

76 production document for the POCV, started the process of incorporating it into the M109 FOV capabilities production document to rebaseline the FOV with all three platforms, and initiated testing in 2008.95 The Army intended PIM to improve readiness, to avoid component obsolescence, and to increase sustainability of the M109 platforms to mitigate size, weight, and power gaps required to support Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) through 2037. Operationally, PIM upgrades would make the howitzer faster, more maneuverable, more sustainable, and more lethal and would reduce the logistics footprint and operation and support costs. To achieve these objectives, PIM would leverage commonality with Future Combat System’s Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and HBCT’s Bradley fighting vehicle. The PIM would use the Bradley’s engine and transmission and new track/suspension and incorporate select technologies from the NLOS-C including but not limited to the automated projectile rammer and modern electric-gun drive systems to replace the current hydraulic operations (elevation and azimuth drives) that were designed in the early 1960s. Once delivered to the field, the PIM M109 FOV would give the HBCT upgraded capabilities including more maneuverability, a higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and improved delivery of accurate and timely fires.96 The M109 FOV successfully completed the Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews, among other milestones, in 2008. Upon successful completion of these milestones, the M109 was postured to begin prototype testing in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. Successful completion of prototype testing would positively impact the Milestone C decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2010. Upon completion of this decision, the program would move forward into low-rate initial production (LRIP) to produce a limited number of the vehicles.97 In 2009 key developments took place. In January 2009 the program manager approached the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development and Engineering Center about approving the capabilities documents, but the center did not approve it. However, the cancellation of the NLOS-C in April 2009 by the Secretary of Defense caused PIM to become the Army’s number one modernization effort and led to the approval of the capabilities production document on 9 August 2009 that scheduled a Milestone C decision in 2011. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) stripped the POCV from PIM and tied it to a command and control vehicle to replace the M113, the M577, and the M1068 vehicles. In August 2009 the Army awarded BAE the contract to produce seven PIM vehicles – five self-propelled howitzers and two carrier ammunition tracked (CAT) vehicles. Five months later on 20 ______952007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 91. 96Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,” www.army.mil/article, 6 Sep 11, Doc III-55, 2012 USAFAS AH; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 93-94. 972008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 92; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 94.

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January 2010, the company unveiled its first M109 PIM prototype.98 Later in 2010, Lieutenant General Michael M. Vane, the Director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, TRADOC, made a significant change to the PIM. He increased force protection and survivability, but the changes were not added to the capabilities production document. This created confusion with the program since some government agencies and some contractors did not have the changes and consequently increased the cost of PIM.99 PIM costs generated concern. In March 2010 the Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of the Staff of the Army received a PIM cost briefing that was based upon contractor estimates so that they could determine how many PIMs could be purchased. The briefing indicated an aggressive acquisition schedule, causing them to request acquisition changes, because they believed that the schedule was too aggressive and created a high-risk program. Subsequently, the Army Acquisition Executive adopted the low-risk schedule rather than the moderate-risk schedule or the low- to moderate-risk schedule alternatives. The low-risk schedule slowed down the program, included all test events, slipped the Milestone C decision where the Army had to decide about going into LRIP or not from 2011 to 2013, and established full-rate production in 2017.100 Using the contractor estimates that had been briefed in March 2010, the Army G- 3 subsequently determined in April 2010 how many PIM sets (howitzers and ammunition and resupply vehicles) that the Army could purchase. At that time the G-3 opted to buy 440 sets that was a reduction from the previous number of 718. This would modernize about one half of the M109 fleet in the active and reserve components. Shortly after in May 2010, the Army realized that the cost of the 440 sets was based upon contractor estimates and not the actual cost of the PIM set. Purchasing the PIM would cost considerably more, forcing the Army and the Field Artillery to rejustify PIM program continually.101 In October 2010 rising costs influenced the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to question if the program was justifiable and why the costs had changed so frequently during the year. To answer the questions the Army held a cost briefing on 17 November 2010 because the costs had risen from $3.6 million per set to $5.4 million to $9.4 million. The last cost turned PIM into an acquisition category one. This meant that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would now make the decision about PIM’s future and all major program decisions and not the Army. Because the $9.4 million was considered too expensive, the Office of the Secretary of Defense chose to replace all M109 Paladins with ______982009 USAFAS AH, pp. 94-95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with MAJ Jeffrey R. White, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-30, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12, Doc III-56, 2011 USAFAS AH. 99Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 100Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 101Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12.

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PIM. This would reduce the cost to $7.2 million per set. Subsequently in May 2011, the Army decided to field 580 PIMs to have a pure PIM fleet.102 Meanwhile, the Army conducted a two-part de-scoping effort using the Army Oversight Council (AROC) in January-February 2011 to review the status and requirements of the program in the face of rising costs and funding shortfalls. The AROC approved the capability production document with revisions and a classified annex E. The AROC reduced the reliability requirement to permit flexibility with the testing schedule and acceptance of PIM and added Office of the Secretary of Defense directed force protection and survivability requirements with add-on armor kits for operational flexibility that would permit the commander to choose the right configuration for the mission.103 Several months after the AROC in June 2011, the Army began developmental testing at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, for firing and automotive performance testing at the Aberdeen Test Center, Maryland. Test events were designed to achieve system requirements. Successful test results permitted development and testing to continue that laid the groundwork for a Milestone C decision in June 2013 and award of a low-rate initial production contract.104 Shortly afterwards, the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC) approved the requirements listed in the M109 FOV capability production document on 16 December 2011 as an acquisition category ID program. Concerns continued about the increasing costs and government risk generated by a poor contract structure choice. Following the JROC, a Defense Acquisition Board in December 2011 approved a modification to the contract from a cost plus fixed-fee type to a cost plus incentive-fee type. This would reduce overall costs and incentivize the contractor with additional money to deliver a quality product on time. The new contract modification also extended ______102Briefing, subj: Update for Secretary of Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, 14 Mar 12, Doc III-57, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PIM AROC Update, 4 Feb 11, Doc III-58, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM BCT Fires, 13 Mar 12, Doc III-59, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, subj: M109 Family of Vehicles Army Acquisition Objective, 24 May 11, Doc III-60, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Information Paper, subj: How the PIM Supports Army Concepts, 19 Nov 10, Doc III-31, 2010 USAFAS AH. 103Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM BCT-Fires, 13 Mar 12; Email, subj: PIM AROC Update, 3 Feb 11, Doc III-62, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Paladin PIM AROC, 21 Jan 11, Doc III-63, 2011 USAFAS AH. 104Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12; Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 13 Mar 12; Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center Information Paper, subj: Army Developing New Self- Propelled Howitzer,” live.usaac.info, 27 Oct 11, Doc III-64, 2011 USAFAS AH; Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,” www.army.mil/article, 1 Sep 11, Doc III-65, 2011 USAFAS AH.

79 the period of performance for developmental testing through 2015.105 Subsequently, the Army conducted several key events in 2012. From May to November 2012, it held a logistics demonstration. During the demonstration, soldiers performed field level operations and maintenance to demonstrate the PIM’s suitability for maintenance in the field and the requirement to update procedures in the draft technical manuals. Running from October to November 2012, the limited users test gave soldiers the first opportunity to employ PIM in an operational environment. Following individual and collective training, soldiers from the 4-27th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, ran two 72-hour scenarios with PIM and CAT, firing 1,255 rounds and driving 882 miles. The soldiers demonstrated PIM’s ability to deliver accurate and timely fires in an operational environment. The limited user test helped prove how soldiers would be able to operate the system and provided additional data showing that the system could continue development testing and move into low-rate initial production in 2013.106 More good news followed in 2013. At site coordination meeting with BAE concerning the Elgin PIM production facility the Product Manager, Self-propelled Howitzer System reaffirmed the significance of PIM and the suitability of the facility. Later in 2013, Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems announced that PIM had passed a major hurdle when it received Milestone C approval from the Defense Acquisition Executive on 18 October 2013.107 This allowed PIM to move into low-rate ______105Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 13 Mar 12; Email, subj: EXSUM CCM, 9 Jan 12, Doc III-66, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: DRM EXSUM, 5 Dec 11, Doc III-67, 2011 USAFAS AH; CPD, 21 Dec 11, Doc III-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 106Interview, Dastrup with CPT Dusty Gray, TCM BCT Fires, 8 Feb 13, Doc III- 37, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15 Jan 13, Doc III- 38, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on the Paladin Integrated Management Program,” Redleg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-39, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PIM Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-39a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup Article, 9 Apr 13, Doc III-39b, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-49, 2013 USAFAS AH. 107Interview, Dastrup with CPT Dusty Gray, TCM BCT Fires, 8 Feb 13, Doc III- 37, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15 Jan 13, Doc III- 38, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on the Paladin Integrated Management Program,” Redleg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-39, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PIM Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-39a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup Article, 9 Apr 13, Doc III-39b, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-49, 2013 USAFAS AH. PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Army’s Paladin Integrated Management Program Reaches Successful Milestone C Decision, 24 Oct 13, Doc III-50, 2013 USAFAS AH; “Paladin Hybridizes for Future Fleet,” Army News, 18 Nov 13, Doc III-51, 2013 USAFAS AH; Fires Forward, Nov 13, Doc III-52, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: M109 FOV Historical Record EXUM Compilation, 6 Mar 14,

80 initial production in 2014 with full-rate production scheduled for 2017 with first unit equipped in FY 2017. While the system’s cannon remained the same as the M109A6, the PIM would have a new chassis, engine, transmission, suspension system, and steering system upon fielding.108 Before the PIM moved into full-rate production, the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill conducted the first PIM firing on 1 May 2014. This was the first time that the howitzer had been fired outside of an Army test center. Witnessed by the Commanding General of FCoE, the local media, and members of the Field Artillery community and manned by the 4-27th Field Artillery, the M109 PIM successfully fired one round.109 In January 2015 the Army accepted delivery of the first M109A7 at the BAE assembly plant in Elgin, Oklahoma. The M109A7 replaced the M109A6, commonly called the Paladin, and incorporated enhanced capabilities such as a brand new chassis, engine, transmission, suspension, and steering system that were common to the Bradley fighting vehicle. The M109A7 would provide the Armored Brigade Combat Team with highly responsive indirect fire system with the ability of keep pace with the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle.110 ______Doc III-53, 2013 USAFAS AH; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), subj: Paladin Integrated Management, 16 Apr 14, Doc III-64, 2013 USAFAS AH; BAE Information Paper, subj: M109A7, undated, Doc III-65, 2014 USAFAS AH; Sam Tricoma, PEO Ground Combat Systems Public Affairs, “Army Inducts Self-propelled Howitzer into Low-rate Initial Production,” 19 May 14, Doc III-66, 2014 USAFAS AH; PEO Ground Combat System Information Paper, subj: Army’s Paladin Integrated Management Program Reaches Successful Milestone, 21 Oct 13, Doc III-67, 2014 USAFAS AH. 108PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Army’s Paladin Integrated Management Program Reaches Successful Milestone C Decision, 24 Oct 13, Doc III-50, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13; “Paladin Hybridizes for Future Fleet,” Army News, 18 Nov 13, Doc III-51, 2013 USAFAS AH; Fires Forward, Nov 13, Doc III-52, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: M109 FOV Historical Record EXUM Compilation, 6 Mar 14, Doc III-53, 2013 USAFAS AH; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), subj: Paladin Integrated Management, 16 Apr 14; BAE Information Paper, subj: M109A7, undated, Doc III-67a, 2014 USAFAS AH; Sam Tricoma, PEO Ground Combat Systems Public Affairs, “Army Inducts Self-propelled Howitzer into Low-rate Initial Production,” 19 May 14; PEO Ground Combat System Information Paper, subj: Army’s Paladin Integrated Management Program Reaches Successful Milestone, 21 Oct 13. 109Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Marvin Millar, TCM BCT Fires, 24 Feb 15, Doc III-68, 2014 USAFAS AH; “Fires Forward” Apr 15, Doc III-26, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email with atchs, subj: PIM Roll-Out Ceremony Articles, 26 Jan 16, Doc III-27, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Test Schedule for PIM, 26 Jan 16, Doc III-28, 2015 USAFAS AH. 110“Fires Forward” Apr 15; Email with atchs, subj: PIM Roll-Out Ceremony Articles, 26 Jan 16; Email, subj: Test Schedule for PIM, 26 Jan 16, Doc III-. Email with

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Following this, the Army tested the howitzer. Live firing of three rounds took place at Fort Sill as a part of the government acceptance testing, while repair and maintenance was conducted at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The Army conducted electronic and cold weather at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and the Cold Region Training Center, Alaska, respectively.111 Planning activities also transpired during 2015. The Army planned to employ the M109 FoV (M109A7 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer and the Carrier Ammunition Track resupply vehicle) as part of a Field Artillery battalion in the Armored Brigade Combat Team and the Field Artillery Brigade as well as any brigade combat team and to field up to 557 sets of the M109 FoV. While planning for logistics demonstration that was scheduled for January 2016 took place in December 2015, planning for the collective training portion of the initial operational test occupied TRADOC Capabilities Manager (TCM) BCT Fires during most of the year. The TCM also updated documents to include the operational mode summary/mission profile and the initial operational test doctrinal and organizational support package.112 During 2016, the Army continued testing PIM family of vehicles. The IOTE began with a pilot test 24-28 September 2016. Based on the results of this exercise, the Army Operational Test Command (OTC) reworked the schedule to build in a second unit training period 4-6 October 2016 and a pilot test 2 11-14 October 2016. The actual IOTE began with the first 72-hour vignette on 20-23 October 2016. During this vignette, several soldiers reported feeling ill, most likely attributed to noxious fumes entering the cab during firing. Citing this and reliability and training issues seen during the pilot and record tests, the Army Evaluation Center (AEC) ended the test, even though insufficient data had been collected.113 While the main focus was preparing for and completing the IOTE, the Army anticipated fielding of the M109A7 and M992A3. A New Material Introductory Briefing (NMIB) was conducted with 1-7 Field Artillery Regiment (the planned First Unit Equipped) at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 7 and 8 September 2016, as well as NMIBs for Fires Center of Excellence and the Sustainment Center of Excellence. Based on the events during the IOTE, fielding’s were suspended until further notice.114 Throughout the course of the year, two changes to the Capabilities Production ______atchs, subj: PIM Roll-Out Ceremony Articles, 26 Jan 16; Email, subj: Test Schedule for PIM, 26 Jan 16. 111Email, subj: Test Schedule for PIM, 26 Jan 16. 112Email, subj: Test Schedule for PIM, 26 Jan 16; Email, subj: PIM, Corrosion, and Chrome Tube Portion of 2015 USAFAS Annual History, 29 Jan 16, Doc III-29, 2015 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: M109 Family of Vehicles, Paladin Integrated Management, Fiscal Year 2015. 113Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1;DOTE FY 2016 Report, M109A7 Family of Vehicles, Paladin Integrated Management, Dec 16, pp. 167-68, Doc III-23. 114Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17.

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Document (CPD) were pursued. First, to increase the objective value to the Range Key Performance Parameter (KPP) and second, to clarify the Rate of Fire KPP as well as changing the rate of Fire to a Key System Attribute (KSA). Both changes were approved by JROCM 150-16 dated 6 December 2016. Additionally, the program was subject to two Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General audits in areas regarding automatic fire control system (AFES), proposed CPD changes and underbelly protection.115

Chrome Tube In 2015 the Army decided to replace the existing M284 steel tube that was prone to corrosion and pitting with a M284A2 chrome tube. Currently, the M284 tube had a chrome plated chamber and bare steel throughout the rifled tube. Chrome was a heavy and hard metal that would provide thermal and wear protection from hot propellants and projectiles by lessening propellant residual and spiral wear and produce less variation in muzzle velocity to extend the life of the tube. The Army planned to extend chrome plating throughout the entire bore of the cannon tube for extended wear life and to start production of the chrome tube in the fall of 2015.116 Fielding the new M284A2 chrome tubes began in June 2016 as part of refit of Army National Guard M109A6s, with five battalions completed by the end of the year. M109A7 low-rate initial production (LRIP) howitzers and future production howitzers were scheduled to be equipped with the M284A2.117

Next Generation Survey/Location Azimuth Determining System Through the first years of the 21st Century, nearly all combat and combat support elements relied heavily upon the Global Positioning System (GPS) for self-locating, navigation, and targeting. Many of those that relied upon GPS also maintained Inertial Navigation System (INS) capabilities as a backup or as a primary means with GPS updates. However, in the absence of GPS, the INS required initial survey support to retain acceptable levels of accuracy.118 As of 2015, the Field Artillery depended upon the Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System-GPS (IPADS-G). IPADS-G was heavy, vehicle mounted, and crew-operated INS/GPS. Because of the system’s complexity, employment ______115Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17; DOTE Report FY 2016, M109A7 Family of Vehicles, Paladin Integrated Management, Dec 16, pp. 167-68. 116Briefing, subj: 155mm M284A2 Cannon Chrome Tube, 13 Jul 15, Doc III-34, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: G-4 M109/M284 Update 30 Jun, 1 Jul 15, Doc III-35, 2015 USAFAS AH. 117Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 118Capability Development Document for Location Azimuth Determining System, Increment 1 (Extract), 13 Apr 15, Executive Summary, Doc III-36, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email with atchs, subj: Future Survey, 9 Feb 16, Doc III-37, 2015 USAFAS AH.

83 depended upon school-trained Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13T Field Artillery Surveyor/Meteorological Crewmember soldiers. However, Army force reductions prompted the elimination of MOS 13T by Fiscal Year (FY) 2018. At that time Army survey support capability organic to the Field Artillery would be comprised of the IPADS-G that was becoming obsolete, making it a candidate for replacement, which would require nonexistent trained crews or another MOS to operate the system.119 Understanding these circumstances and the requirement to be more expeditionary capable, the Field Artillery School moved to find a replacement for IPADS-G. In 2015 the School envisioned three-prong plan. It could maintain IPADS-G capability by upgrading the software. It could replace IPADS-G with the Next Generation Survey/Location Azimuth Determining System (LADS) and could develop a long-term solution. The three-pronged effort would reduce risk with loss of MOS 13T and would provide improved support to the operational force. The mitigation efforts for loss of the 13T MOS included designating MOS 13R as primary operator of IPADS-G by incorporating training into the Senior Leader Course (SLC) and deploying a Military Training Team (MTT) to conduct system training of two weeks at 27 installations in Fiscal Years 2017-2018.120 In 2015 the Field Artillery School worked to replace IPADS-G with the Next Generation Survey/LADS. To meet expeditionary requirements the system would be lightweight and MOS and vehicle agnostic. It would not depend upon a dedicated vehicle as IPADS-G was, would provide advanced, simplified, and intuitive capabilities so that maintenance and operation could be performed by the existing force structure with no requirement for formally trained survey personnel or Field Artillery soldiers with an Additional Skill Identifier training. Also, the LADS would support the precise location and locational direction orientation for cannon and missile systems, radars, mortars, unmanned aerial vehicles, observers, sensors, and rotary-winged aircraft under GPS- denied conditions or during periods of support platform GPS/INS failure.121 In 2016 the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) hosted an Army Armament, Research Development and Engineering Center demonstration of a LADS prototype. The system was lightweight and MOS and vehicle agnostic and displayed the same accuracy as IPADS-G. LADS would not be dependent upon a dedicated vehicle.122

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER FIRES CELL ______119Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT Fires History, 10 Mar 16, Doc III-20, 2015 USAFAS. 120Email with atchs, subj: Future Survey, 9 Feb 16; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT Fires History, 10 Mar 16. 121Capability Development Document, Increment 1 (Extract), 13 Apr 15, Executive Summary; Email, subj: Future Survey, 17 Feb 16, Doc III-38, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT Fires History, 10 Mar 16. 122Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1.

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Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble During the first years of the 21st Century, the advent of Global Positioning System (GPS) aided munitions, such as the 155-mm. Excalibur, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary, and the 120-mm. Precision Guided Mortar, outpaced the dismounted forward observer’s organic ability to locate targets in a timely and accurate manner. Weight, power, consumption rates, cabling difficulties, and the lack of simultaneous voice and digital transmission means prevented the dismounted forward observer at company and below from exploiting precision munitions. Although Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) could refine grid coordinates for precision strikes, it generally resided at levels above the dismounted forward observer and was therefore unavailable. As a result, the dismounted forward observer did not have the ability to employ precision munitions because he could not provide precise target location. As one Field Artilleryman indicated, the munitions would fly precisely to the assigned coordinates, but they would be incorrect.123 With this in mind, the Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager (TCM) Fires Cell at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, launched an initiative to revolutionize the dismounted forward observer’s capabilities with the Precision Fires Warrior (PFW) Ensemble that addressed the Fires Center of Excellence’s number one capability gap – the inability of the dismounted forward observer to locate ground targets rapidly with better than 10- meter accuracy in all conditions without target mensuration to prevent engagement with precision indirect fire systems.124 Conceived in June 2012 from the NETT Warrior Kit, the Precision Fires Warrior ensemble included a collection of technology that would be worn by the Soldier on the Integrated Outer Tactical Vest and promised to give the dismounted forward observer the capability of exact target location for precision munitions to engage. The heart of the ensemble was the Forward Observer Software (FOS) application located on a ruggedized commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smart phone called the End User Device (EUD) that also ran the Nett Warrior software program and often called Nett Warrior EDU. While running the FOS software, the EUD would be able to display a digital map depicting the selected situational awareness and fire support measures on its five-inch screen. To locate targets precisely, the dismounted precise warrior would employ the hand-held Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) that would be capable of night observation, target location, and designation and that was under development. Until then, the discounted forward observer would utilize the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2H ______123Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-45, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; MAJ Alex Mora and Scott McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 13, pp. 40-41, Doc III-56, 2013 USAFAS AH. 124Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41.

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(LLDR-2H).125 The Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble would give the dismounted forward observer the capability of employing all of the available precision munitions and ability to locate a target for precision munitions without mensuration. As planned in 2012-2013, the Army would field the ensemble initially to the Fire Supporters in the Infantry Brigade Combat Team followed by the Armored Brigade Combat Team and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. Throughout 2013 and into 2014, the ensemble was refined with fielding moved from 2015 to 2017 to accommodate technological modifications.126 Software formed the heart of the system. In 2015 the software was changed from FOS software to the Science and Technology effort called Maneuver and Fires Integrated Application. The Army signed a contract that transitioned the Maneuver and Fires Integrated Application to the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED) software. Because the original program name included the word “device” and the new program is software only, the name was changed to “Precision Fires-Dismount.” This software was being developed by Aviation and Missile Research and Development Command, a government agency and would be fielded by Program Management Office Fire Support Command and Control. The next planned increment of this software application would be called “Precision Fires- Mounted” and would replace FOS software currently used on the three Fire Support Vehicle variants.127

Bradley Fire Support Vehicle In 2015 the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) fielded as a replacement to the M981 Fire Support Vehicle (FISTV) served as the Field Artillery’s fire support vehicle for the heavy forces, such as the heavy brigade combat team. Late in the 1970s, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) working group, Close Support Study Group (CSSG) II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver forces. Besides ______125Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41; Scott McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in Precision Targeting,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 26-28, Doc III-57, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-58, 2013 USAFAS AH. 126Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41; McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in Precision Targeting,” pp. 26-28; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14; BG Christopher F. Bentley, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 14, pp. 9-12, Doc III-74, 2014 USAFAS AH. 127Email with atch, subj: TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell, 11 Mar 16, Doc III-39, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1.

86 reaffirming the necessity of the Fire Support Team (FIST) that had been created in the mid-1970s to integrate fire support with the maneuver arms at the company level, the group recommended fielding a mobile fire support vehicle for reliable, secure communications.128 After funding had become available early in the 1990s and after the maneuver arms had received their Bradley fighting vehicles, equipping the Field Artillery with the BFIST became a reality. As of 1995-1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned two models of BFIST (the M7 and M7A1) with each being a type-classified system. The M7 BFIST would integrate a fire support mission package onto a modified Bradley A2 ODS chassis. The M7A1 would be more advanced and use a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis with the fire support mission package.129 After several years of developmental work, the project manager modified the acquisition strategy for the M7A1 in 1999 by initiating an engineering change proposal to the M7 BFIST to develop it into the M3A3 BFIST and halted work on the M7A1. The M3A3 BFIST (A3 BFIST) would be based on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis, would incorporate the M7 fire support mission package, and would be fielded beginning in 2004 to counterattack units, such as the digitized 4th Infantry Division. Thus, the M7 BFIST that was a variant of the M2A2 Bradley ODS and the A3 BFIST existed as official Army programs to adapt the Bradley fighting vehicle to fire support missions.130 In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 the Program Manager acquired funds to retrofit A3 BFISTs with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) as the main target location system for under armor targeting and designation. The FS3 Sensor would provide the A3 BFIST with the most accurate and greatest range sensor available, would allow the fire support team to detect, identify, and designate targets for precision munitions at greater ranges while remaining buttoned up (protected by the vehicle’s armor), and would give the A3 BFIST the same FSC3 capability as the Stryker fire support platform and the M1200 Armored Knight. The critical design was approved on 18 June 2008; and an integrated development test with soldiers was completed in February 2010. The first unit equipped with the FS3 was in 2011.131 ______1282000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 138-39; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2015 USAFAS. 1292000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 140-43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94. 1302001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 94-95; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 20, pp. 343-50. 1312004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 126-27; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 131; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26, Doc III-32, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-33, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 30, Doc

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Meanwhile, the Army awarded BAE a contract in 2010 to upgrade Bradley M2, M3, and M7 BFIST to the M2A2 ODS-Situational Awareness (SA) configuration. This program would bring the M7 BFIST capabilities close to those of the A3 BFIST by integrating the latest digitized electronics to provide optimal situational awareness, network connectivity, and enhanced communications hardware, including the FSC3 sensor that would give the M7 the ability to observe for precision munitions. The 81st Brigade Combat Team of the Washington Army National Guard received their fire support team version of the Bradley ODS-SA in October 2010. As the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems explained in 2013, the modernization effort would fully digitize the entire force when the last Bradley ODS SA vehicles were fielded. As of 2015, the Army was fielding the Bradley ODS SA to the Army National Guard and active Army.132 In 2015 work began to place the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) onboard the National Guard variant of the BFIST, the M7 BFIST SA. The addition of the FS3 capability set effectively increased the ability of the M7 BFIST SA to match the detection, recognition, and identification ranges to that of the active components A3 BFIST with the FS3 while at the same time providing an under armor designation capability for use with laser guided munitions.133 In Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 and early FY 2017, target locating capability improvements were designed and tested during developmental testing of both the A3 and BFIST SA variants. Hardware and software modifications associated with the targeting accuracy locating capabilities of the A3 BFIST and BFIST SA were introduced to the fire support platforms. This change in capability set effectively reduced the target location error (TLE) by greater than 50 percent across all ranges while also providing visual TLE values to the user.134 ______III-69; FCOS CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27, Doc III-70, 2011 USAFAS AH; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338, Doc III-71, 2011 USAFAS AH. 1322009 USAFAS AH, pp. 131-32; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 10; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 30; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338; BAE Information Paper, 13 Aug 12, Doc III-50, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL Scott Patton, Dir, TCM Fires Cell, and Gordon Wehri, TCM Fires Cell, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-51, 2012 USAFAS AH; PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, Doc III- 70, 2013 USAFAS AH; Army, Oct 13, pp. 322-24, Doc III-71, 2013 USAFAS AH; PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, Doc III-76, 2014 USAFAS AH; BAE Information paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 System Upgrade, 2015, Doc III-40, 2015 USAFAS AH; BAE Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley A2 ODS-SA, 2015, Doc III-41, 2015 USAFAS AH. 133Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 134Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17.

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In 2014 Program Management Armored Fighting Vehicles (PM AFV) meanwhile began an engineering development under Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) 2 for the conceptualized A4 BFIST. ECP2 would regain the loss of required capabilities that had occurred over time due to the weight increase associated with heavier armor and incorporate new technology that has evolved since the inception of the A3 BFIST.135

Knight Vehicle The Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) employed the M981 fire support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 had been designed for armored and mechanized forces and presented a unique signature in forces that used the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) as their scout vehicles. In response to this discrepancy, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Document of April 1997, written by the Field Artillery School, to leverage fire support vehicle technology for heavy and light forces. In the revised Operational Requirements Document the Field Artillery School retained the Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) Vehicle for the heavy forces and recommended developing a vehicle with BFIST mission capabilities for the COLT by integrating the fire support mission equipment package onto a HMMWV chassis, known as the Striker. This would provide the COLT with unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. Also, the Striker would be less noticeable because it would present a common signature with other HMMWVs, would save Bradley assets for fire support teams, and would lower operating costs for the COLT. Based upon its performance in the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment of March 1997, the Striker vehicle, as well as the Striker concept that furnished six Striker vehicles to each heavy maneuver brigade, was adopted by the U.S. Army and was approved as a Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 May 1997 for rapid development.136 Over the next several years, several critical developments with Striker occurred. Early in 1999, the Army type classified the system as the M707 Striker (mounted on the M1025 HMMWV) and conducted a successful air-drop test to demonstrate its ability to be dropped from an aircraft. Also, the contractor built three prototypes that went through successful developmental and operational testing in 2000 by the 4th Infantry Division that would be the first unit equipped. The following year, the Army fielded Striker to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Field Artillery School, and Army National Guard ______135Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-77, 2014 USAFAS AH; BAE Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley A2 ODS SA, 2015; BAE Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 System Upgrade, 2015; Bill Good, PEO Ground Combat Systems Public Affairs, “Bradley ECPs to Upgrade Vehicle Across the Board,” www.army.mil, Doc III-42, 2015 USAFAS AH; Sandra I. Erwin, “Army Begins Massive Makeover of Combat Vehicle Fleet,” www.nationaldefensemagazine, Doc III-43, 2015 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17. 1362000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 144.

89 units in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. In addition, the Army fielded the Striker to the 82nd Airborne Division in 2002 and to additional active component units and Army National Guard units in 2003-2004. To avoid confusion with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, meanwhile, the Army renamed the Striker the Knight in 2002.137 In December 2005 the Program Manager Office determined that the M1025 version of the HMMWV and its planned replacement, the M1114, would no longer be able to support the Knight program. Due to armor increases, either vehicle with the Mission Equipment Package (MEP) would no longer be safe to operate because the increased vehicle weight would create excessive operating restrictions. In January 2006 Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill submitted a letter to the Program Manager Fire Support Systems agreeing with him about the weight and urged finding a suitable replacement. Subsequently on 17 April 2006, Headquarters Department of the Army G-3/5/7 validated Third Army’s operational needs statement to provide the 10th Mountain Division with five Knight systems on a more survivable platform than the existing one. These two concerns prompted the Product Manager Fire Support Systems to initiate an effort to change the platform of the M707 Knight system from the M1114 HMMWV to the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle (ASV).138 Subsequently, the Army purchased eight M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) and designated them as the M1200 Armored Knight for employment by the COLT. Production began late in 2007 with a Limited User Test completed in September 2007. In October 2007 the 10th Mountain Division received five M1200 Armored Knights. The 101st Division received its first four M1200 vehicles in November 2007 with regular fielding beginning in February 2008 and continuing into 2013 with production ending in the first quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2013. Through the end of FY 2013, the Army had fielded M1200 Armored Knights to COLTS in armored brigade combat teams, infantry brigade combat teams, Stryker brigade combat teams, and battlefield surveillance brigades, and fire support teams in infantry combat teams.139 In October 2013, meanwhile, the Armored Knight M1200 entered sustainment. Force structuring designated the elimination of the COLT requirement at the company level, replaced it with the Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadron requirement, and moved the Armored Knight into this role.140 ______1372000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96. 1382005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 128. 1392008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 128; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, pp. 338-40, Doc III-72, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: M1200 Armored Knight, 11 Mar 13, Doc III-52, 2012 USAFAS AH; Army, Oct 13, p. 324, Doc III-72, 2013 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Armored Knight, undated, Doc III- 73, 2013 USAFAS AH. 140Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-74, 2014 USAFAS AH, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells

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Subsequently, the Army began working Armored Knight M1200 obsolescence issues in January 2014. Recognizing the obsolescence of the Knight’s targeting station control panel and mission processing unit, the Army decided to replace it with the Mounted Family of Computer Systems over the next several years to improve planning, monitoring, and executing missions. In addition, efforts by the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, drove the need for netted sensor capability to facilitate the RSTA role to provide target handoff capability for joint munitions precision targeting. Communications improvements, in the meantime, involved upgrading the beyond-line-of sight capability with the replacement of SINCGARS communications suite with the maneuver network vehicular radio communications suite, while platform discussions recognized the Knight platform had met its essential useful life cycle and proposed replacing it with the joint light tactical vehicle. This caused TRADOC Capabilities Manager (TCM) Fires Cell at Fort Sill to begin work on finding an adequate replacement vehicle for the Armored Knight M1200 that would provide the requisite force protection to the fire supporter while maintaining the same or better targeting capabilities of the current system.141 During recent overseas operations, the Army determined that the level of armor protection on the ASV chassis would not adequately support Forward Operational Base operations. In many cases, commanders left their M1200 Armored Knights at home station in the continental United States because of the lack of armor protection. In Fiscal Year 2016 the Army G4 considered abandoning the ASV chassis for the Military Police and Armored Knight and started conducting studies to replace it at the early date as possible.142

Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder Early in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (GVLLD) to lase targets for location and precision munitions. The system weighed 107 pounds, reduced the mobility of light fire support team, did not meet its needs, and was not man-portable. In response to this situation and the lack of a man- portable system to designate targets, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School wrote an Operational Requirements Document for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR). Approved by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in February 1994, the LLDR would replace the GVLLD. Although the LLDR remained unfunded for several years, the School still pursued acquisition. Combining technological advances in position/navigation (Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System), thermal sights, and laser development, the LLDR would be a lightweight, ______History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2014 USAFAS AH. 141Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Army Advances Standardized Tactical Computer,” www.army.mil/article/109748, 27 Aug 14, Doc III-75, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15. 142Email with atch, subj: TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell Updated, 11 Mar 16, Doc III-39, 2015 USAFAS AH.

91 compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted or mounted operations. Besides determining range, azimuth, and vertical angle, the modular LLDR would permit the light forces to perform fire support functions quickly and accurately on a fast-paced, less dense, and more lethal battlefield and would offer the best alternative to the GVLLD, while its modular design would permit tailoring to meet the mission. In its target location configuration the LLDR weighed about 20 pounds and had the ability of locating targets accurately out to 10 kilometers and seeing the battlefield with a near, all-weather capability at shorter ranges. An integrated thermal night-sight would provide continuous day/night operations and the ability to see through obscurants, such as fog and smoke. If needed, the LLDR could be configured with a separate laser designator module to designate moving and stationary targets for precision munitions. This configuration would increase the system’s weight to 35 pounds. Equally important, the LLDR could be used in training environments because of its eye-safe rangefinder.143 Although LLDR passed its initial operational test and evaluation in 2001, testing revealed some deficiencies. This caused the Army to develop a corrective action plan; and LLDR program proceeded to Milestone III where the Army decided to move into it low-rate initial production (LRIP). The 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to receive the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) and LRIP production models; but the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon caused the Army to shift fielding priorities. Instead, the Special Operations Command was fielded with the EMD models, while the 82nd Airborne Division and the Interim Brigade Combat Team, later renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, shared 66 LRIP models. In 2002 the Army fielded 15 test LLDRs to the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, started developing plans to reduce the system’s weight even more, and anticipated a full-rate production decision in 2003 and fielding in 2004.144 In December 2003 the Army made the LLDR full-rate production decision with contract negotiations continuing into 2004 and shifted fielding priorities at the same time. LRIP fielding priority shifted from the 82nd Airborne Division to the 25th Infantry Division. Just as the 25th Infantry Division was deploying to Iraq in January 2004, it received 21 LLDRs. Subsequently in September 2004, the 3rd Infantry Division’s combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) received 20 LLDRs in conjunction with M707 Knight fieldings. Later in October 2004, the Army fielded two LLDRs to the Field Artillery School for training and decided to field the LLDR to units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), making it the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to receive the system.145 In November 2005 the Army Requirements and Review Board approved ______1432000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 145-46. 1442001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 110. 1452004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99.

92 accelerating LLDR production and increased funding in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 Program Objective Memorandum. The production rates would go from three LLDRs per month, doubling every six months until a full-rate production of 40 per month would be achieved. This funding stream would complete LLDR fielding by FY 2013 to the total force. In fact, the Army completed fielding LLDR, also called LLDR-1, in 2011.146 Meanwhile in October 2006, the Program Manager for LLDR initiated a two-year performance improvement and weight reduction effort and designated the effort as the LLDR-2. Product improvements included improved day-and-night imaging performance, solid-state laser designator module that would provide higher reliability, and a five-pound overall weight reduction to the system. Fielding began in FY 2011 to units supporting OEF.147 Meanwhile on 21 September 2010, the Army G-3 acknowledged the LLDR’s need for better accuracy to support current and future precision munitions. As a result, the Army began development on the LLDR-2H, initiated testing in 2010, and awarded a contract to retrofit the LLDR-1 and the LLDR-2 that used the digital magnetic compass and laser to determine target locations and had the capability to laser designate as the high-accuracy LLDR-2H. The new LLDR-2H incorporated the High Accuracy Azimuth Device that would not be subject to the magnetic interference issues that had plagued existing target locator systems. The device had three cameras (one day camera and two night cameras) that could map the location of the sun and stars and could compare them to its GPS location to determine very accurate direction and angular deviation to permit the soldier to call for fire with precision munitions. Current funding supported fielding four brigade combat teams per year. Initial fielding began in 2014, but software problems halted fielding after only two units had been fielded. Fielding resumed in FY 2015 with 250 systems fielded by the end of the year.148 In FY 2015 and FY 2016 the LLDR-2H performed well as a part time precision targeting device but did not meet the complete requirement for full time precision ______1462005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED- 1, 2012, Doc III-74, 2011 USAFAS AH. 1472008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), ACH, p. 131; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III- 99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012, 2012 USAFAS AH. 148Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-53, 2012 USAFAS AH; PEO Soldier Information Paper, subj: LLDR, 12 Dec 12, Doc III-76, 2013 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-77, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-77a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2014 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: LLDR 3, 30 Sep 16, Doc III-24.

93 targeting. The Army required a 24/7 target location systems that could precisely locate targets at longer ranges than the Joint Effects Targeting System could provide. LLDR-3 would provide 24/7 precision targeting through a combination of celestial and the integration of the precision azimuth vertical angle modules. In FY 2016 the integration of the Position and Vertical Angle Module and electronic upgrade was approved for the development of the LLDR-3 that was planned for fielding in FY 2021. The LLDR3 was scheduled to undergo full and open contract award expanding the capabilities and providing a technology refresh of obsolete electronics in the previous three LLDR variants. The Army anticipated contract award to be in FY 2018.149

Joint Effects Targeting System In June 2004 the Army/Marine Corps Board (AMCB) directed the services to develop a common laser-targeting device requirement. In response, the Army began developing the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS). JETS would consist of a Target Location Designation System (TLDS) and a Target Effects Coordination System (TECS). Combined, they would enable the dismounted observer (forward observer, joint target attack controller, special operations forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets and control all available effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack aviation, and naval gunfire) and to designate stationary targets out to five kilometers and moving targets out to three kilometers. TECS would provide Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA) and communications interface with effects providers. On 19 September 2005 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the initial capabilities documents (ICD).150 In October 2006 the Department of Defense designated the Army as the lead component for JETS. The Army made Program Executive Office Soldier the material developer to assist the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in the development of the capabilities documents and supporting analysis documentation. Work on the capabilities development document began with an analysis of alternatives being conducted in 2007-2008. The Capabilities Development Document for TLDS was released for worldwide staffing in January 2009, while the Army worked to produce the TECS capability development document.151 ______149Email with atch, subj: TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell Update, 11 Mar 16, Doc III-39, 2015 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Lightweight Laser Designator and Rangefinder, 30 Sep 16; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 1502004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 97; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-78, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2014 USAFAS AH; Capabilities Development Document for Joint Effects Targeting System (Extract), Executive Summary, 17 Jan 13, Doc III-78, 2014 USAFAS AH. 1512008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 130; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26; Email with atch, subj:

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In July 2010 a meeting held at the Pentagon with milestone decision authority led to a successful milestone a decision for the JETS TLDS. This moved JETS from the material solution analysis phase into the technology development phase where technology demonstrator prototypes would be developed. Two years later in 2012, the Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, awarded the contract to design, develop, fabricate, test, and deliver prototypes for engineering and manufacturing the system with fielding scheduled for 2016. In 2012 the Army approved Capabilities Production Document for Pocket-size Forward Entry Device Increment II software as a replacement to the JETS TECS concept.152 In February 2013 JETS successfully reached a Milestone B decision that allowed the program to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the program. The Army selected two vendors to continue the program and awarded contracts in March 2013. Technical and budget challenges caused Milestone C scheduled for the second quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 with Initial Operational Test and Evaluation rescheduled for the last of FY 2017. At first, initial fielding was scheduled for the second quarter of FY 2018, but the loss of procurement funding in 2015 caused it to be slipped from six to nine months.153 In the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2016, the Army conducted the developmental testing vendors’ systems at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Information from the tests along with proposals would be used to evaluate and select a single vendor for the JETS system production contract. On 22 September 2016 the Army awarded the contract to DRS Network and Imaging Systems, Melbourne, Florida, to produce JETS with a limited user test scheduled for April 2017 and an initial operation test and evaluation in February 2018 with initial operational capability in 2018.154

______TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 152Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System, 12 Jun 12, Doc III-54, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System Target Location Designation System, undated, Doc III-55, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-56, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15. 153Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA DOTMLPF, 27 May 15, Doc III-44, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA DOTMLPF, Dec 15, Doc III-45, 2015 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System Production, 31 Oct 16, Doc III-25. 154Email with atch, subj: TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell Update, 11 Mar 16, Doc III-39, 2015 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Targeting, undated, Doc III-26; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1.

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Profiler In 1995 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School started work on replacing the existing Meteorological Measuring Set (MMS). The MMS produced meteorological (MET) messages by obtaining data from radiosonde instrumentation carried aloft by balloons and sent back to a ground-based receiver. Given the current state of operational numerical weather prediction systems, the single local balloon-borne radiosonde technology used by MMS was antiquated and limited in capability. The MMS MET messages provided only limited range and carried high operational and support costs. To address these shortcomings, an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Target Area Meteorological Measuring System (TAMMS) was generated and signed on 15 October 1996 by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This ORD, later renamed MMS-Profiler, required a system to provide a modernized, real-time meteorological capability over an extended battle space out to 500 kilometers. The system would provide vital target area meteorological information from a mesoscale model and associated software that acquired information from weather satellites and other meteorological sensors for use in the employment of smart weapons to ensure proper munitions selection and optimal aiming. The Profiler would also furnish field artillery forces with current or expected weather conditions along the projectile trajectory and within the target area. In 2000 the Army issued a contract for Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) of the Profiler system. The initial program schedule called for operational testing in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 and low-rate initial production (LRIP) of nine systems to begin in the third quarter of FY 2003. Production of 83 systems was originally scheduled to begin in the first quarter of FY 2005, and the first unit equipment would be equipped in the second quarter of FY 2005.155 Progress with the program moved forward but with modifications. The Army changed the acquisition strategy to incorporate a system functional demonstration during the second quarter of FY 2003. In 2004 the program received a Milestone C decision after the completion of a successful developmental test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and went through an operational test at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Following these tests, LRIP began. Subsequently, the Army granted an urgent material release and fielded Profiler to the 3rd Infantry Division in December 2004. The Profiler program began full-rate production (FRP) in April 2006 after the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare had granted approval. In 2007 Program Manager (PM) Target Identification and Meteorological Systems (TIMS) accepted an initial five FRP Profiler systems. The first of these systems was fielded in March 2007 under an urgent material release until the full material release could be attained. In December of 2007 the Army approved full material release and fielded the MMS-Profiler, also known as MMS- ______1552005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 86-87; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 92; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-53, 2013 USAFAS AH; Brandon J. Pollachek, Program Executive Office Intelligence Electronic Warfare, and Sensors, “Balloon Removal Earns Value Engineering Achievement Award,” 18 May 10, Doc III-79, 2014 USAFAS AH.

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Profiler I, from 2008 through 2010.156 Meanwhile, Fort Sill began developmental work on the Block II Profiler system (AN/TMQ-42B). Block II would reduce the system’s footprint, leverage technology and software advancements to achieve improved accuracy and to eliminate the balloon and radiosonde subsystem. In August 2008 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, approved eliminating the use of the balloon and the radiosonde and to depend entirely on weather satellites because obtaining meteorological data was no longer dependent upon a balloon- borne radiosonde and was no longer based upon the modeling of the atmosphere. With the elimination of the balloon and radiosonde came some logistical savings. The Army was able to reduce the size of the Profiler crew from six to two and the number of vehicles from three to one. Equally important, the Army achieved all Block II requirements (eliminating the balloon and radiosonde) in Block I that completed fielding in November 2011.157 The next step in the evolution of the Profiler system involved moving to the Block III configuration that the Army authorized in September 2010. Block III Profiler (Computer Meteorological Data-Profiler) further reduced the footprint by limiting the equipment to a laptop computer and the number of soldiers from two to zero, and was embedded in the tactical operations center via a local area network and integrated within the Fire Support Command and Control software. Upon fielding in 2013-2014, Block III provided meteorological data to target acquisition radars, cannons, rockets, missiles, and mortars to improve first round hits, to conserve ammunition, to achieve surprise, and to

______1562007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10, Doc III-102, 2010 USAFCOEFS ACH; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p.p. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 123-24; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-36, 2010 USAFAS AH. 1572001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 127-29; Information Paper, subj: MMS-PI, 28 Jan 09; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler, 2010, Doc III-37, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10, Doc III-38, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: MMS-P I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-39, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-40, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27, Doc III-78, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Field Artillery, 21 Sep 11, Doc III- 79, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-56, 2012 USAFAS AH; Pollachek, “Balloon Removal Earns Value Engineering Achievement Award;” Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, Army Capabilities Integration Center, with atchs, subj: Approval of the Operational Requirements Documents for the Meteorological Measuring Set, 16 Nov 11, Doc III-80, 2014 USAFAS AH.

97 reduce the chances of fratricide.158 In 2014 the Army began work on the Profiler Virtual Module (PVM) AN/GMK-2 which would be the successor to the Computer, Meteorological Data – Profiler (CMD- Profiler). It would remove the need for the laptop computer by modifying CMD-Profiler software for execution in a Common Operating Environment (COE) compliant Virtual Machine (VM). The fifth generation Mesoscale Model (MM5) would be replaced by the Weather Research Forecast (WRF) model. PVM would utilize multiple types of GRIB1 and GRIB2 weather data including Unified Model (UM) and Global Forecast System (GFS). The PVM would use one kilometer (objective), 1.6 km (threshold) grids in place of the four kilometer grids for improved accuracy. The PVM processes would be optimized to allow for changes in the weather model.159

Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications Systems Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. In 1996 the Army began fielding the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) as version 96. Over the next two decades, the Army updated the system with subsequent releases reflecting the spiral development strategy. Almost 20 years later in 2016, AFATDS served as the Field Artillery’s primary fire support and mission command system. It processed, analyzed, and exchanged combat information and furnished fully automated support for planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing fires and effects. It supported mortars, field artillery cannons, rockets, and missiles, close air support, attack aviation, and naval surface fire support systems and was integrated with 80 different battlefield systems from Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force, and German, French, Turkish, and Italian fire support command and control systems.160 ______158Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27; RDT&E Project Justification (Extract), Feb 11, Doc III-80, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, MMS-P/Computer Meteorological Data- Profiler, undated, Doc III-57, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, PEO IEW&S, 18 May 10, Doc III-58, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-59, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: MMS-P/Computer Meteorological Data-Profiler, undated, Doc III-80, 2013 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj; ARL Scientists Assist the Army and Marine to Retain Artillery MET Capability, 18 Apr 13, Doc III-80a, 2013 USAFAS AH. 159Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2014 USAFAS AH; RDT&E Project Justification (Extract) Apr 13, Doc III-46; LTC Michael Parodi and Brandon Pollachek, Project Executive Office, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors, “The Other Snowball Effect,” 26 Nov 13, www.army.mil, Doc III- 47; Kathryn Bailey, Project Manager Mission Command, Army Acquisition Support Center, “Profiler Meteorological Systems Aligns with Army’s Fire Support,” 22 Jun 15, www.asc.army.mil, Doc III-48; The Federal Plan for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, FY2015, (Extract), Doc III-49. 160RDT&E Budget Justification, Mar 14, Doc III-81, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Gets Dramatic Upgrade,” Redleg

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In June 2011 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the AFATDS Increment 2 Capability Development Document as version 7.0, version 7.1, and version 7.2. AFATDS Increment 2 was marked as Version 7.0 with expected initial fielding in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. Increment 2 would be capable of using the fully array of tactical, operational, and strategic communications available within the theater of operations to support the needs of the maneuver and fire commanders.161 The Fires Command and Control (C2) Migration strategy meanwhile would have all field artillery command and control systems under AFATDS around 2019-2025. This would include the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED), Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (Centaur), Forward Observer System, and Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS) that was a command and control system tool.162 Handheld Command and Control Systems. To improve mobility for the Field Artillery, the Army adopted hand-held devices to augment AFATDS and to ensure that the entire force had common command and control systems that would improve the ______Update, Sep-Oct 16, pp. 6-7, Doc III-27. 161USMC Systems Information Paper, subj: AFATDS I and II, undated; “AFATDS Version for U.S. Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25 Jul 12, Doc III-62, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-78, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Fire Support Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13; BG Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” Redleg Update, 12-13 Dec 13, pp. 1-3-5, Doc III-82, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-77a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Army RDT&E Budget Item Justification, Mar 14; Notte, “Fire Support Command and Control Team’s Continued Quest for Optimal Joint Fires,” pp. 40-43; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: JADOCS, 2014; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2014 USAFAS AH; RDT&E Project Justification (Extract), Mar 14, Doc III-50, 2015 USAFAS AH; “Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Gets Dramatic Upgrade,” Redleg Update, Sep-Oct 16, pp. 6-7. 162USMC Systems Information Paper, subj: AFATDS I and II, undated; “AFATDS Version for U.S. Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25 Jul 12, Doc III-62, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-78, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Fire Support Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13; BG Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” Redleg Update, 12-13 Dec 13, pp. 1-3-5, Doc III-82, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-77a, 2013 USAFAS AH; Army RDT&E Budget Item Justification, Mar 14; Notte, “Fire Support Command and Control Team’s Continued Quest for Optimal Joint Fires,” pp. 40-43; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: JADOCS, 2014; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2014 USAFAS AH; RDT&E Project Justification (Extract), Mar 14, Doc III-50, 2015 USAFAS AH.

99 capabilities of early-entry forces. In 2015 the Field Artillery employed the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED) and the Centaur.163 A lightweight, portable, low-power Rugged Personal Digital Assistant designed for the dismounted forward observer and hand-held, the PFED with an integrated Global Positioning System capability utilized a laser range finder and a precision fire imagery application to generate a grid coordinate and to send it to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). The forward observer also used PFED to compose, edit, transmit, receive, store, and display messages, process data, and monitor status and employed it in the conduct, planning, and execution of fire support missions. With the Precision Fire Imagery software PFED gave the dismounted observer the capability to mensurate the target and provide a precision grid in the call for fire.164 In June 2012 the Army approved Capability Production Document for PFED Increment II. PFED Increment II was a software application that would operate on common Army handheld devices used by forward observers and fire support teams to transmit and receive fire support messages over standard military line-of-sight, high frequency, and satellite communication radios. It would provide a dynamic, dismounted capability for executing a call for fire and would provide precision coordinates for precision munitions and non-precision munitions. It would allow the forward observer and fire support team to achieve the desired effects while reducing collateral damage and ammunition expenditures. It would also feature a full motion video capability for situational awareness. PFED Increment II software application would operate on the NETT Warrior end user device (currently the Samsung Note 2). PFED Increment II would transition the Maneuver, Aviation, Fires Integrated Application Science and Technology developed by the Aviation and Maneuver Research, Development, and Engineering Command (AMRDEC) would transmit and receive fire support messages over standard military line of sight, high frequency, and satellite communications, would add new capabilities, such as Precision Strike Suite for target refinement and the Joint Effects Targeting System, and could operate in GPS denied environment. In January 2014 Heidi Shyu, the Army Acquisition Executive, approved the Materiel Development Decision (MDD) for entry into the acquisition management system at the Technology Development phase as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) III Program.165 ______1632002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105; PEO Command, Control, Communications-Tactical Information Paper, subj: Family of Products, Doc III-84, 2014 USAFAS AH. 164Kathryn Bailey, “Handheld Fires App Lightens the Load for Forward Observers,” 20 Dec 13, www.army.mil/article/117413, Doc III-83, 2013 USAFAS AH. 165Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2014 USAFAS AH; Capability Production Document for Pocket-Sized Forward Entry Device (Extract), Executive Summary, 6 Sep 12, Doc III-85, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: PFED Increment II Milestone B Decision Review, 22 Apr 15, Doc III-86, 2014 USAFAS AH; Program Executive Office Command and Control, Information Paper, subj: Fire Support Command and Control, 13 Aug 15, Doc III-51, 2015 USAFAS

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During 2015, Field Artillerymen also used the Centaur. Centaur was a ruggedize personal digital assistant that computed a technical firing solution for cannon units. Centaur provided the flexibility to conduct technical fire control as a critical piece for fire mission processing with a range of inputs from very few to several complex criteria with a highly detailed specification. It was also a backup system, an independent check system, and a safety system. Centaur was designed to provide a temporary and limited technical fire direction capability for cannon artillery units and United States Marine Corps (USMC) Expeditionary fire support system mortar units. Centaur performed some specialty functions found in no other system, such as, creating surface danger zones, automating Safety-T and executive officer’s minimum quadrant elevation computation with the safety data used in mission processing. Centaur was highly accurate and was subjected to the same comprehensive ballistic testing and standards as AFATDS. It was certified safe for firing in the same manner as AFATDS.166

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE- DIVISION

Radar Strategy In 2014 the Field Artillery had five target acquisition radars – AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37, AN/TPQ-48, AN/TPQ-49, and AN/TPQ-53 – in its inventory and a modernization plan for each. However, the Field Artillery required a strategy to guide radar acquisition in an era of constrained resources that would reduce the number of radars and that would provide a way forward to accomplish the Fires core mission of detecting, tracking, classifying, and identifying aerial objects, including manned and unmanned aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, cannon artillery projectiles, and mortar projectiles. In the near term (Fiscal Years 2015-2019) the Army’s fires radar strategy would merge the Lightweight Counter Mortar Radars (AN/TPQ-48 and AN/TPQ-49) that were not programs of record and field the program of record AN/TPQ- 50. The AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 would be retired, leaving the AN/TPQ-53 that the Army started fielding in the 3rd quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. The Q-53 and Q-50 would provide the Field Artillery force with 360-degree target acquisition capability, improved range, improved mobility, and decreased maintenance requirements over the Q- 36 and Q-37.167

AN/TPQ-53 Radar ______AH; Briefing, subj: PFED Increment II Update to the FA Commandant, 15 May 15, Doc III-52, 2015 USAFAS AH. 166Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 15, Doc III-75, 2014 USAFAS AH. 167Daryl Youngman, “Fires Radar Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 45- 47, Doc III-84, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13, Doc III-85, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 16.

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In September 2010 a production capabilities document outlined the requirement for a radar system of record with capabilities comparable to the QRC EQ-36 radar and initiated the program of record QRC EQ-36 as the AN/TPQ-53 in September 2011. Mounted on a five-ton truck, the Q-53 would also reduce operational and support costs than the QRC EQ-36 radar, would have a minimum range of 500 meters and a maximum range of 60 kilometers, could be emplaced in five minutes, displaced in two minutes, would be equipped with an auto-leveling system, could be operated by a crew of four, and would be linked by digital tactical radios to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Digital System (AFATDS) for mission processing. Once these Q-53 radars had been fielded, the Army planned to retrofit the QRC EQ-36 radars to make them Q-53 radars. In 2011 the Army outlined fielding the Q-53 to the brigade combat teams and fires brigades and intended to replace the Q-36 and Q-37 radars with the Q-53.168 Three years later, the Army conducted the initial operational test and evaluation of the Q-53 in April-May 2014 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Emerging results at the end of 2014 found the Q-53 to be operational suitable but not operational effective. The radar was operational suitable because it was available to complete its mission 99 percent of the time; whereas the Army required the radar to be operationally available 95 percent of the time. However, the Q-53 did not meet the Army’s reliability requirement. Ten system aborts occurred during 1,152 hours of testing. This amounted to system abort every 115 hours. The Army required no more than one abort every 185 hours. Based upon these deficiencies, the Army planned to reevaluate the radar in FY 2015 to determine the status of the corrective measures.169 ______168Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, undated, Doc III-75, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 12, III-73 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-69, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III- 70, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, Mar 13, III-68a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-43; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Fire Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-89, 2013 USAFAS AH; Kris Osborn, “Army Fields Next- Generation Radar,” 17 Oct 12, www.army.mil/article, Doc III-89, 2014 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TPQ-53 Radar System, 10 Dec 14, Doc III- 90, 2014 USAFAS AH; DOTE Report (Extract), FY 2014, pp. 137-38, Doc III-91, 2014 USAFAS AH; DOTE Report (Extract), FY 2011, pp. 77-78, Doc III-92, 2014 USAFAS AH. 169DOTE Report (Extract), FY 2014, pp. 137-38; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 16.

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In 2015 the Army conducted additional testing. In January and February 2015 the 82nd Division Artillery and 18th Field Artillery Brigade conducted a capstone exercise at Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona, with the AN/TPQ-53 in preparation for the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (iteration 2) (IOTE2) at Yuma Proving Grounds in May and June 2015. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOTE) test assessment report rated the AN/TPQ-53 as effective, suitable and survivable with a concern over volley fired mortar munitions. The radar demonstrated difficulties in detecting volley- fired mortars. Volley-fired mortars was a common technique employed by a variety of threat nations. Later in October 2015, the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) issued its test report and material release statement. ATEC supported the full- rate production and conditional material release of the AN/TPQ-53 Counter Target Acquisition Radar Set and a full material release when the following conditions were met: improved mean time between system aborts and operational availability, development of a mature product support package with digital interactive technical manuals, cold weather testing to ensure that the system would remain operational at -25 degrees, updated provisioning data reflective of fielded configurations, updated training material in accordance with AR 350-1. A get well plan has been developed and fielding followed. On 5 April 2016 CECOM approved a Conditional Material Release. Shortly afterwards on 8 June 2016 the 210th Field Artillery Brigade and the 2nd Division Artillery received the new Q-53 Radar under the Conditional Material Release. During the rest of 2016, the Army fielded 43 systems to Forces Command and deployed units. Operation Atlantic Resolve saw the Q-53 deploy to with 4th Infantry Division.170 Joint Urgent Needs Statement 0558 meanwhile created an opportunity to further develop the Q-53 radar into a Multi-Mission Sensor. Program Manager Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortars has been performing enhanced product development to facilitate the Q-53 expanded mission set of counterfire and the air surveillance mission at the brigade combat team and below level. This capability is scheduled to deploy in FY2019.171 The Army anticipated a conditional material release in the 3rd quarter of Fiscal Year 2016 with fielding to begin thereafter and planned to field the radar to target acquisition platoons in brigade combat teams, target acquisition batteries and field artillery brigades and division artillery headquarters to replace the legacy AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars.

AN/TPQ-50 Radar ______170TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 16, pp. 15-20, Doc III-55; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 16; Fact Sheet, subj: Q-53 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar System, Fiscal Year 2015, Doc III-56, 2015 USAFAS AH. 171Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1; Lockheed Martin Informatio Paper, subj: Passed the Test: Q-53 Radar Demonstrates Counter UAS Capability, 27 Jun 16, Doc III-28.

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Over the past several years, the Army worked to introduce the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR). Originally called the man-portable countermortar radar, the LCMR emerged from requirements identified late in the 1990s by the Special Operations Forces. Because the existing AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars lacked the ability to scan 360 degrees and the mobility and agility to accompany light and early entry forces, Special Operations Forces had a critical need for a lightweight countermortar radar with the capability of scanning 360 degrees to detect the location of short-range mortars rapidly and accurately. This led to the development of the Quick Response Capability (QRC) LCMR (AN/TPQ-48) that was specially designed to support the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a maximum range of 7,000 meters and a minimum range of 1,000 meters, the LCMR had the ability to search 360 degrees and to detect and track mortar fire. Such capabilities would permit responsive counterfire to destroy fleeting improvised shooters including those in urban area.172 The Army awarded a contract to Syracuse Research Corporation to develop and produce the radar. Requirements documentation was written and approved. Syracuse Research Corporation adopted the Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) requirements as a baseline and planned to utilize a spiral development strategy using increments/versions to achieve the full capability needed for fielding. An operational needs statement (ONS) further defined the requirements. Accuracy and range would increase for each spiral while maintaining the mobility and transportability of the original LCMR concept.173 In 2004 the Army started fielding the QRC Q-48 to Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a range of five kilometers and a target location error of 100 plus meters, the radar met the immediate needs of deployed forces of the United States Special Operations Command, while future spirals would satisfy the capability gaps identified in the operational and organizational concept of 2004. Fielded in 2005-2006, Increment II/Version II (QRC AN/TPQ-49) provided more rugged hardware and better software and supported the counter rocket, artillery and mortar (CRAM) system of

______1722004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 99; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 100; Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010, Doc III-52, 2010 USAFAS AH; Scott R. Gourley, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army Magazine, Apr 02, Doc III-53, 2010 USAFAS AH; Navy Lt.j.g. Jason Calandruccio, Defense Contract Management Agency, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, www.dcma.mil, Winter 02, Doc III-54, 2010 USAFAS AH; AN/TPQ-48 was the initial designation of the LCMR as noted in Scott R. Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” Army, Feb 11, pp. 63-66, Doc III- 102, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH. 1732006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 94; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 122; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH.

104 systems.174 In 2008 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Program Office Sensors at Fort Sill wrote and staffed a capabilities document for the program of record LCMR. Syracuse Research Corporation received the contract to produce LCMR (AN/TPQ-50) or Increment III/Version III to serve in conjunction with the AN/TPQ-53 radar to track artillery and rockets and friendly fire without having to switch modes.175 After a successful initial operational test and evaluation early in February and March 2012 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, the Army started fielding the Q-50 in the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 with the 101st Airborne Division receiving the first radars. As of 2014, two Q-50 programs existed: the QRC and the program of record, Q-50 that was mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) to give a lightweight and highly mobile radar for early entry operations. Through the end of 2015, the Army had fielded 155 Q-50 systems to the operational Army and 10 systems for training purposes to the 428th Field Artillery Brigade in the Field Artillery School, removed the Q-48 form service in 2015, and transferred the Q-49 to United States Marine Corps starting. During the 2015, the Army continued to procure and field the Q-50 to the operational force.176 ______1742004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11, Doc III-55, 2010 USAFAS AH; Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” pp. 63-66; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-75, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-76, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III- 70, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH. 175Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-104, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH. 176FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-104, 2011 USAFAS AH; PM Radars Information Paper, subj: LCMR, undated, Doc III-105, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army Equipment, undated, Doc III-77, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, PM Radars, 16 Jan 13, Doc III-78, 2012 USAFAS AH; Presolicitation Synopsis for LCMR, 15 May 12, Doc III-79, 2012 USAFAS AH; DAC for ARNG SITREP, Apr 12, Doc III-80, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-81, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-73, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-82, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-43, Doc III-92, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-93, 2013 USAFAS AH; Kris Osborn, “Army Fields Next-Generation Radar,”

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Multiple Launch Rocket System Munitions. Improvement efforts with the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in 2014 focused on enhancing the munitions to give them better range and precision. Although MLRS performed well during Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in 1991, its rockets and their submunitions raised serious concerns. During the war, many Iraqi field artillery assets out-ranged their coalition counterparts, including the MLRS M26 Dual-Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) rocket. Also, the high dud rate of the M26 rocket’s submunitions raised apprehensions about the safety of soldiers passing through impact areas. Together, the proliferation of rocket systems with greater ranges than MLRS M26 and its unacceptable dud rate led to the requirement for an extended- range (ER) MLRS rocket (M26A2) with a range of 45 kilometers and a lower submunition dud rate that would serve as an interim measure until a Guided MLRS (GMLRS) rocket could be developed. A 45-kilometer range would increase the commander’s ability to influence the battlefield at depth and to fire across boundaries and simultaneously would improve the survivability of launcher crews. However, the Field Artillery required greater accuracy to accompany the increased range.177 After the Army started production of the ER-MLRS M26A2 rocket in limited quantities to meet the range requirements identified in ODS, it turned its efforts to the GMLRS rocket that was already under development and that could be fired from the M270A1 MLRS Launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) also under development. Unlike the accuracy of the traditional free- flight MLRS M26 or M26A2 rocket that degraded as the range to the target increased, the guided rocket’s Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation system would provide consistent, improved accuracy from a minimum range of 15 kilometers to a maximum of 60-70 kilometers, depending upon warhead weight and type of propellant, to attack area and point targets. The GMLRS rocket would also enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, would reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and would give the MLRS an additional 15 plus kilometer range beyond the ER-MLRS. Such a range would permit hitting more targets and make the MLRS launcher more survivable because it could be positioned farther from the target. Given the need for the rocket, the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin Vought Systems in November 1998 for a four-year, five-nation (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort. Based upon successful testing, low-rate initial production would begin in 2002 with the first unit ______www.army.mil/article, Doc III-89, 2014 USAFAS AH; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: TPQ-53 Radar System, 10 Dec 14, Doc III-90, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA DPTMLPF, Dec 15, Doc III-57; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 16. 1772000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44, Doc III-92, 2013 USAFAS AH.

106 equipped in 2004. Technical problems, however, arose in 2000, causing the program to slip with the initial operational capability being moved to 2006.178 As planned, engineering developmental testing (EDT) for GMLRS took place. In May 2002 the contractor completed the last of the six EDT tests for 2001-2002. During the last one, a rocket flew more than 70 kilometers to the target area and dispensed its submunitions. Major test objectives included the successful launch of the rocket from the launcher, nominal motor performance, tail fin deployment and spin rate evaluation, and navigation performance. In all aspects the GMLRS rocket satisfied its EDT objectives to permit moving to the next stage of testing.179 Production qualification test (PQT) at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, followed shortly after EDT. Over a period of six months beginning in June 2002 and ending in November 2002, the contractor conducted five PQT flights that ranged between 15-70 kilometers to demonstrate accuracy and performance maturity. Although some technical problems still existed, the flights verified the rocket’s maturity and accuracy and led to the decision on 7 March 2003 to enter into low-rate initial production (LRIP) for GMLRS with the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions M30 rocket. Later on 3 November 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) at the Joint Staff approved fielding GMLRS. Upon fielding that began in 2003, GMLRS M30 rocket enhanced the Army’s and Marine corps’ ability to conduct precision strikes, reduced the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and extended the range of MLRS 15 kilometers beyond that of ER-MLRS, but the rocket was not be well suited for target engagements in heavy snow or forested, urban, complex, or restrictive terrain. Debris caused by the warhead skins, nose cone, and rocket motor damage could cause collateral damage.180 Subsequent to the JROC decision, additional testing occurred. During September 2004 and October 2004, the Army and contractor conducted operational testing. They fired more than 24 GMLRS rockets from MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS M142 launchers. Testing demonstrated that the rocket met all requirements; and the GMLRS with DPICM was type classified and went into full-rate production in 2005. Because of restrictions imposed by the Department of Defense Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians implemented in 2008, GMLRS M30, later designated as GMLRS Increment I, the Army stopped procuring the munition.181 Concurrently, the Army explored the possibility of adding another MLRS rocket, ______1782000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 117-19; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-93; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 71-72; Memorandum with atch, subj: Annual History, 10 Apr 13, Doc III-63a, 2012 USAFAS AH. 1792002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73. 1802002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 73; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 1812004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40- 44.

107 later designated as GMLRS Increment II (Unitary). Looking at Kosovo in 1999, the need to reduce damage to civilian property and the loss of civilian lives during combat operations and to deliver organic fires in all types of terrain and weather, the Army required a more accurate MLRS rocket with a high-explosive Unitary warhead and investigated the possibility of acquiring it. Equipped with the Guided DPICM MLRS motor, the Unitary rocket would have a fuse with the capabilities of a proximity fuse, a point-detonating fuse, or a delay fuse capability, depending upon the target area. The proximity fuse would provide a large burst over the target area. The point-detonating fuse would reduce the size of the burst and collateral damage because of the ground burst, while the time-delay fuse would permit the rocket to penetrate certain types of structures or targets and then detonate the rocket.182 Even before operational testing could be done on the GMLRS Unitary, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and also Commander of the U.S. Army III Corps, sent the Army an operational needs statement on 28 March 2004 for the rocket. After the Army denied the request on 13 September 2004, General Metz forwarded an urgent needs statement for the rocket to the Army on 12 October 2004. His forces required a precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive MLRS munition to integrate into joint fires in an urban environment, to attack high pay-off targets, and to provide large area coverage at the same time; and the initial GMLRS Unitary met those requirements.183 On 6 January 2005 the Army validated General Metz’s request and accelerated work on the GMLRS Increment II (Unitary) to provide it sooner than planned and subdivided it into IIa and IIb. In May 2005 the contractor, Lockheed Martin, delivered 72 Increment IIa rockets with the point detonating and delay dual-mode fuses to the Army. Meanwhile, Congress directed the Army to field 496 GMLRS Increment IIa Unitary rockets with 486 of them going to the field. The rest would be used for further development and testing.184 Combat operations corroborated the GMLRS Increment IIa (Unitary) development. On 9 and 10 September 2005, B Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment fired a six-rocket mission at an insurgent safe house in a heavy urban environment at 53 kilometers and destroyed it, killing insurgents in the process, and shot another two-round mission in the same area, killing more insurgents in the process. One day later, A Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment shot six rockets at a bridge and destroyed it. In all instances, collateral damage to surrounding buildings was almost non-existent according to participants. By 23 December 2008, field artillery units in Iraq and Afghanistan had fired over 1,000 GMLRS Unitary IIa rockets. The following year of ______1822000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 95-96; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 73; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 1832004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. 1842005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95.

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2009, American and British field artillery units shot approximately 1,500. Of these, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps engaged the enemy with 830 Increment IIa rockets and employed them in pre-planned missions against precisely located targets in urban or counterinsurgency operations where collateral damage was of concern. The GMLRS Increment IIa rockets with point detonating and delay fuse capabilities requested by General Metz performed well and generated a paradigm shift that permitted using MLRS rockets in close proximity (200 meters or less) to friendly forces whereas the previous practice had a minimum of 2,000 meters as the safe distance from friendly forces. Even though it went out of production and was the only GMLRS munition, GMLRS Unitary Increment IIa continued to be used in theater in 2012 and 2013.185 Work on the objective GMLRS Unitary IIb rocket (the objective rocket) with software upgrades, new trajectory shaping modes, and the third (proximity) mode of the tri-mode fuse meanwhile moved forward. Phase two engineering developing testing and production qualification testing of 2007 demonstrated the maturity of the GMLRS Unitary IIb rocket. This permitted moving to Milestone C decision for low-rate production and operational testing of the objective rocket. Successful completion of operational testing resulted in full-rate production decision and fielding of the tri-mode fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay) rocket configuration. Over 3,000 GMLRS Unitary Increment IIbs were employed in OIF and OEF through mid-2014.186 In 2012-2013 the Army meanwhile commenced developing the next-generation GMLRS designated as GMLRS Increment IV. To mitigate the eventual loss of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with its Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) cluster munitions that were banned by the cluster munitions convention with a proven missile, the Army wanted to adopt the GMLRS Unitary Increment IV, designated as the ______1852006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 71; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM RAMS, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 History, 29 Mar 12, Doc III-81, 2011 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 1862006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 95-96; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: HIMARS Takes the High Ground, 5 Jan 10, Doc III-89, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-64, 2012 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-94, 2013 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44; DOD Select Acquisition Report (Extract), 16 Apr 14, p, 6, Doc III-93, 2014 USAFAS AH.

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Long Range Precision Fires Munition in October 2013. It would have a 250-300 kilometer range, a warhead with a tri-mode fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay), and effectiveness to achieve required target effects, among other requirements. The Army completed the updated Increment IV capabilities development document for worldwide staffing in 2013.187 Throughout 2016 U.S. military forces employed over 2,000 GMLRS-Unitary rockets employed in the Central Command combat operations in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. Targets were located/mensurated point targets in congested/complex urban targets, targets in areas where collateral damage was of concern, and area targets in the absence of other munitions options.188 In the meantime, the Army Contracting Command-Redstone (ACC-R) awarded contracts for an insensitive munition compliant propulsion system (rocket motor and ignition safety device) to both Orbital ATK and Aerojet Rocketdyne in March 2016 with a 22-month period of performance. In May 2016, the PFRMS Project Office awarded an Industrial Engineering Services (IES) Contract Task order to Lockheed Martin for the integration and qualification of this system in anticipation of an FY 2018 production cut- in. 189 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead. Over the years, cluster munitions generated controversy. Armies first used them in World War II, and at least 21 countries have employed them since. For example, the United States used them in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, the Soviets utilized them in Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s, while the British employed them in the Falkland Islands in the 1980s. Subsequently, the United States dropped cluster bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21st Century. Basically, cluster munitions dispensed large numbers of submunitions from a carrier shell over an extended area. The submunitions generally lacked self-destruct capability and had the potential of remaining hazardous for decades.190 Frustrated with attempts to prohibit or restrict the use of cluster munitions, a group of nations led by Norway reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions. In December 2008, 94 countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions that prohibited ______187Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-64, 2012 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44; Speaker Notes for Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-95, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fire Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-96, 2013 USAFAS AH. 188Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 189PEO M&S FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 16; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17. 190Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 Dec 09, pp. 1-2, Doc III-31, 2010 USAFAS AH.

110 their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. The United States, Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not participate in the talks that led to the agreement or sign the convention. By December 2009 103 states had signed the convention.191 Meanwhile, the United States resisted banning cluster munitions. In May 2008 prior to the signing of Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Political-Military Affairs, Stephen Mull, said that United States relied upon cluster munitions as an important part of its defense strategy and preferred pursuing technological fixes to ensure that the munition would not be viable once a conflict was over. Moreover, if cluster munitions were eliminated, more money would be spent on new weapon systems, ammunition, and logistical resources. The United States further stated that most militaries would increase their employment of massed field artillery and rockets barrages which would increase the destruction of key infrastructure if cluster munitions were banned.192 On 19 June 2008 the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a new policy on cluster munitions although it still recognized them as legitimate weapons with clear military utility and did not support the convention. Acknowledging the unintended harm that unexploded cluster munitions could cause to civilians and civilian infrastructure and the worldwide opposition to the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) which was a cluster munition, the DoD replaced its previous policy with a new one. As soon as possible but no later than one year from 9 July 2008, the military and combatant commands would begin removing all cluster munitions that exceeded operational planning requirements or for which there would be no operational planning requirements from the active inventory All excess cluster munitions would be demilitarized as soon as practicable. After 2018 United States military departments and combatant commands could only employ cluster munitions that would not result in more than one percent unexploded ordnance. Until then, the employment of cluster munitions that exceeded the one percent threshold had to be approved by the combatant commander. Prior to 2018, DoD could seek to transfer cluster munitions that did not exceed the one percent threshold to a foreign government if that government agreed not to use them. The old policy required the military to design and procure cluster munitions with a 99 percent reliability rate but did address the use and removal of current munitions.193 Because the dud rate for GMLRS DPICM did not meet DoD and international agreements on the reduction of dud munitions, the Army pressed forward to develop an alternative to engage area and inaccurately located targets, recognizing the need to ______191Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 3-4. 192Ibid. 193Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, 19 Jun 08, Doc III-32, 2010 USAFAS AH; DOD News Release, Cluster Munitions Policy Released, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-33, 2010 USAFAS AH; Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to Reduce Collateral Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH.

111 minimize collateral effects in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Although the Army acknowledged the need for such munitions and noted that unitary munitions did not provide the same capability and effects, the DoD officially announced a moratorium on the production and use of DPICM on 18 June 2008 that would leave more than one percent duds after arming and subsequently approved an effort on 22 October 2008 to develop a viable alternative to GMLRS DPICM with an initial operational capability in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. Subsequently, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, announced the Army’s desire to transition to an alternative warhead capability as soon as technologically and programmatically feasible. Later, the Army announced its intention to procure GMLRS Unitary rockets in-lieu of the future planned DPICM procurement and to develop a GMLRS Alternative Warhead that was designated as GMLRS Increment III with fielding scheduled for FY 2015.194 Work on the alternative warhead moved forward over the next several years. During the 2009, the Army contracted with three vendors to produce a warhead that was equal or greater than DPICM in destructive capabilities. The Army wanted each to produce four prototypes for testing and planned to enter engineering, manufacturing, and developing. In August-October 2010 the three vendors successfully fired their prototypes (warhead designs). Based upon this, the Project Office conducted a three-part system preliminary design review of each alternative warhead in January 2011. Six months later in July 2011, the Army Missile Command Source Selection Authority completed evaluating the three competing alternative warhead designs and selected Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor to develop the alternative warhead with Alliant Tech Systems (ATK) as a subcontractor to the Lockheed Martin that would do the actual development. Subsequently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the GMLRS Alternative Warhead (GMLRS Increment III) capability development document and validated the key performance parameters for the system on 8 November 2011. Later on 19 November 2012, the Army approved engineering and manufacturing development to begin on the warhead.195 ______1942007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 96; Briefing (Extract), subj: Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets Program Review, 24 Apr 07, Doc III-82, 2011 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44, III-92, 2013 USAFAS AH. 195Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, Doc III-83, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires, Rockets and Missiles, 21 Apr 11, Doc III-85, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, subj: GMLRS Alternative Warhead Analysis of Alternatives, 9 Feb 10, Doc III- 41, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM Fires Brigade, 15

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In 2013-2014 work continued on GMLRS Alternative Warhead (GMLRS Increment III). Flight testing held in May 2013 and engineering and developmental testing conducted between April 2013 and September 2013 paved the way for production qualification testing. Production qualification testing carried out between October 2013 and April 2014 confirmed the missile’s compliance with the Army requirements. The test consisted of five missions employing M270A1 and M142 launchers and 17 GMLRS Alternative Warhead rockets that were fired at short, medium, and long ranges (16.8, 37.4, and 65.7 kilometers). Successful pre-production qualification testing In February 2014 permitted moving into developmental testing and operational testing (DT/OT). In July 2014 soldiers from the 214th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, performed a test at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. They fired three tactical missions and demonstrated that the munition was accurate and reliable.196 Subsequently, the Army conducted the Initial Operational Test (IOT) during the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2015. The GMLRS AW rocket performed as required in the requirements document with a 99 percent reliability. The pre-flight predictions called for six rockets to engage targets at 16 kilometers and 34 kilometers respectively with associated Target Location Errors (TLE). Even though the GMLRS AW rocket met all of the requirements listed in the Capabilities Development Document (CDD), it failed to meet the Fractional Damage (FD) in an operational setting. In response, the Directorate ______Feb 11, Doc III-42, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G- 3/5/7, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for GMLRS Alternative Warhead to Initiate Analysis of Alternatives, 7 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: GMLRS-U Fire, undated, Doc III-44, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: GMLRS-AW Analysis of Alternatives Study Directive, 26 Apr 10, Doc III-45, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65, 2012 USAFAS AH; ATK Information Paper, subj: ATK Selected to Develop Alternative Warhead for Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, 20 Feb 12, Doc III-94, 2014 USAFAS AH; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 16 Apr 14, p. 6, Doc III-58, 2015 USAFAS AH. 196Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-43; Briefing, subj: Fires Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-97, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-98, 2013 USAFAS AH; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin Conducts Second Successful Production Qualification Flight Test of GMLRS Alternative Warhead, 3 Feb 14, Doc III- 99, 2013 USAFAS AH; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin GMLRS Alternative Warhead Logs Successful Flight-Test Series, Shifts to Next Testing Phase, 16 Apr 14, Doc III-95, 2014 USAFAS AH; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin Completes Successful Operational Flight Tests of GMLRS Alternative Warhead, 28 Jul 14, Doc III-96, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Launcher and Munitions System Overview, undated, Doc III-97, 2014 USAFAS AH; DOTE FY 2014 Report on Army Programs (Extract), Doc III-98, 2014 USAFAS AH; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract) 16 Apr 14, p. 6.

113 of Test and Evaluation (DOTE) recommended changes to the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and to refire those two missions. The Army revised the TTP to address procedures and conducted a two-mission mission for 19-22 May 2015 where it verified the revised TTP. Meanwhile on 8 April 2015, the Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) was conducted with the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) who approved Milestone C and full-rate rate production Subsequently, the Directorate of Test and Evaluation issued a classified report detailing the results of the follow-on testing and indicated that the GMLRS AW contained no submunitions that would cause unintended harm to civilians and infrastructures associated with DPICM, was operational effective, was accurate, was operationally suitable, and was survivable.197 Subsequently, the Army demonstrated the munition and employed it in combat. In November 2016 the Precision Fires Project Office executed a GMLRS-AW demonstration live fire at Udairi Range in Kuwait with B Battery, 3-157th Colorado Army National Guard. The 12-rocket live fire successfully highlighted GMLRS-AW effects on simulated targets and demonstrated the application of the revised GMLRS-AW TTP. Later, Army units received the Initial Operational Capability GMLRS-AW in 4th Quarter of FY 2016 with the first rockets being employed in combat in December 2016.198 As work went forward with GMLRS AW III, the Army initiated an effort to develop GMLRS AW IV in 2010. Known as the GMLRS AW with extended range of 100 or more kilometers, GMLRS AW IV underwent a designation change in 2013 to Long Range Precision Fires.199 Launcher. After the fielding the M270A1 launcher began in 2002, the Army upgraded it over the next decade. During 2005, 13 launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, received the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU). The IWIU was required for firing Guided MLRS munitions, both Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) and Unitary. Meanwhile, the Army completed other significant M270A1 modification projects. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) after action reviews and lessons learned expressed a need for a mount for the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) that was the primary weapon for the M270A1’s launcher chief. Lengthy road marches and traveling down unimproved roads presented a challenge for the launcher chief to maintain control and stability of his SAW while standing in the hatch as the vehicle was moving. By the end of 2007, all M270A1 units were equipped with this machine gun mount.200 ______197Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History, 8 May 15, Doc III-87, 2014 USAFAS AH; “TRADOC Capabilities Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 16, pp. 15-20, Doc III-59, 2015 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System-Alternative Warhead M30E1, Fiscal Year 2015, Doc III-60, 2015 USAFAS AH. 198Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 16, Doc III-1. 199Information Paper, subj: Long Range Precision Fires, 13 Sep 16, Doc III-29. 2002005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77.

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Because the current ventilation system in the launcher cab did not meet Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) requirements for a crew during firing and silent watch operations in all weather and because multiple radios and electronic equipment in the cab generated heat, the Army meanwhile had to find a way to improve conditions in the cab. In 2005 the Army installed the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) to control adverse climate conditions and to permit the maximum use of radios and computer systems and the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) to reduce maintenance time and cost while providing the capability for silent watch operations. The ECU was an 18,000 BTU unit that could reduce the temperature inside the cab when it was subjected to extreme heat environments like those found in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The APU was a diesel generator designed to provide a source of electricity and to permit the launcher to remain powered while in the hide area with the main engine shut off; and.201 With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army meanwhile initiated development of the Modular Launcher Communication System (MLCS) for MLRS and HIMARS in 2006 to permit long-range communications between the fire direction center and the launchers. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time- sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means of receiving and transmitting long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2007.202 MLCS addressed a communications capability gap in MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS M142 launchers. In the near-term the Army planned to use the Harris 150 High Frequency Radio to satisfy long-range communications requirements. For the long- term (2011-2017) the Army foresaw migrating both launchers to the Joint Tactical Radio System when it became available and integrating limited tactical fire control, among other capability improvements. The Army outlined using Blue Force Tracker for situational awareness that would be an on-board asset. The Blue Force Tracker would give the commander the ability to share encrypted tactical information using a satellite terminal and global position system and permit better command and control by allowing commanders to send and receive orders, map routes and provide locations of objectives. Additional situational awareness would be met with the acquisition of the Driver’s Vision Enhancement for both launchers that would provide the driver with the capability to drive ______2012005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 77-78. 2022007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 104.

115 in reduced visibility with the use of forward looking infrared sensor and display control module.203 In 2014 the Army continued the modernization effort above, commonly known as the “Big Three Modifications,” and three other modernization efforts. Because the original M270 launcher was designed to be employed behind front line troops by utilizing the extended reach of the rockets and missiles, the cab had minimal armor to protect the launcher crew. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that the threat had changed, requiring greater protection. The first modernization effort, the Improved Armored Cab (IAC) that had its origins in 2008 when the Army directed improving the M270’s cab with requirements approved for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), would provide increased protection for the crew against mines, improvised explosive devices, fragmentation from enemy artillery, and direct attack from small arms upon completion. The second modernization effort, the Fire Control System Upgrade, would upgrade the obsolete Fire Control System and would provide fire control system software and hardware commonality between the M142 and M270A1 by taking advantage of the latest technology and better processors that would enhance mission processing and make the Fire Control System more user friendly. These two modernization efforts would significantly increase soldier survivability and combat electronic and hardware obsolescence. The third modernization effort centered on the Crew Chief Restraint System to preclude the crew chief/commander from being ejected from the cab during an accident or rollover. These modernization efforts would make the M270A1 more modern, survivable, and sustainable; and fielding would begin in 2016.204 ______2032007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 101; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 104; Email, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc III-86, 2011 USAFAS AH; MAJ David Dykema, CW3 Matt MacKenzie, and CPT Justin Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and Launchers,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 14, pp. 5- 8, Doc III-99, 2014 USAFAS AH. 204Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launchers, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-100, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: PFRMS Launcher and Munitions System Overview, 2012, Doc III-101, 2013 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44, Doc III-102, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews, 2012; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-103, 2013 USAFAS AH; MAJ Matt Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives Upgrades for Future,” www.theredstonerocket.com/tech, 17 Jul 13, Doc III-104, 2013 USAFAS AH; Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and Launchers,” pp. 5-8; Project Manager Precision Fires, Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems, Mar 15, Doc III- 100, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History, 8 May 15, Doc III-87, 2014 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery Launcher Project Office, FY 2016 Historical Summary, Doc III-30.

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In 2014 IAC production qualification testing underwent threat survivability testing and demonstrated that it protected the crew against specified threats. Live fire testing with GMLRS and ATACMS had been conducted as of second quarter of FY 2015 with 100 percent success rate. As of the second quarter of FY 2015, the IAC was still undergoing automotive testing and was scheduled for the Program Managers Enhanced Field Exercise in May 2015 where it would be determined if the IAC degraded mobility and lethality of the M270A1.205 The IAC underwent a series of live fire test events at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in 2015. The test program included automotive, survivability, live fire and climate testing which validated the robustness of the design by executing 80 fire and reload missions and more than 1,000 miles of road testing. In June 2015 crews participated in the Product Manager’s Extended Field Exercise (EFEX) that consisted of two weeks of operational exercises. Each day, two launchers executed 16 fire missions per launcher. Twenty-three pods of Reduced Range Practice Rockets (RRPR) were fired. The IAC modification had no adverse impact on firing or mission timelines. Full-Up System Level (FUSL) testing of the new armor material provided favorable results on system survivability. The tests evaluated crew protection from shell fragments, small arms fire, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Fire Control System-Update (FCS-U) effort completed Critical Design Review in November 2014, conducted several software demonstrations, developed hardware prototypes, and completed three of the six Software V8.0 Engineering Releases prior to qualification testing. During the year, the Redstone Arsenal Software Engineering Directorate continued integration of V8.0 Software with the prototype hardware prior to qualification testing. Based upon this testing, the Directorate of Testing and Evaluation’s preliminary analysis of September 2015 indicated that the IAC protected the crew from specified threat.206 As explained in the Fires Bulletin of January-February 2016, the IAC would support current and future operations and provide greater protections against mines, improvised explosive devices, enemy artillery fragmentation and direct attack from small arms. It furnished increased crew protection on par with the High Mobility Army Rocket System (HIMARS) cab, protected the crew from improvised explosive devices (IED), artillery fragmentation rounds and small arms fire, and provided more crew/equipment space with a larger cab.207 The Army released the IAC production contract Request for Proposal (RFP) released in 4QFY16 and anticipated an award in the fourth quarter of FY 2017. The IAC ______205Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History, 8 May 15, Doc III-87, 2014 USAFAS AH; DOTE FY 2015 Report, p. 131, Doc III-31. 206Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 16, Doc III-53; Fact Sheet, subj: M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System Improved Armored Cab, Fiscal Year 2015, Doc III-61, 2015 USAFAS AH. 207“TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 16, pp. 15-22, Doc III-62, 2015 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Program Executive Office, Precision Fires, Rockets and Missile Systems, undated, Doc III-63, 2015 USAFAS AH.

117 program has awarded Work Directives to BAE Systems through TACOM to complete logistics products required for fielding. The Army awarded the FCS-U development contract to Lockheed in the fourth quarter of FY 2016, and the product office received the first FCS-U production qualification units in October 2016. This hardware was being integrated with the Software Version 8 to maximize capability of hardware and software. Additionally, the launcher overhaul program continued to execute according to schedule - - overhauling M270A1s at Red River Army Depot (RRAD) and completing Vehicle Operational Life Extension Program (VOLEP) repairs on 16 M270A1s. All of these efforts improved soldier effectiveness and safety, as well as ensure launcher viability in the future.208 Meanwhile, the Big Three Modifications provided Soldiers with three hardware upgrades that enhanced the operation of the launcher’s mission on the battlefield. The Driver’s Vision Enhancement provided the ability to conduct day and night operations and the ability to maneuver in smoke, fog, dust, or other battlefield obscurants, while the Blue Force Tracker furnished greater situational awareness through a small screen that provided the locations of friendly units and other battlefield intelligence. The long-range communications allowed units to receive voice and digital fire missions from thousands of miles away, reduced physical/electronic footprint by expand reach, and provided tactical flexibility when positioning launchers.209

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System In 2016 the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 launcher provided the Army with a critical precision deep fires capability for light and early entry forces, furnished field artillery medium and long-range rocket and long-range missile fires as part of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fleet of launchers, and satisfied digitization requirements by interfacing with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). A wheeled, indirect fire, rocket/missile system capable of firing all rockets and missiles in the current and future MLRS family of munitions, HIMARS originated in the 1990s. On 26 October 1990 the operational and organizational plan for HIMARS established an urgent need for a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, indirect fire, long-range, rocket/missile system that could operate semi-autonomously and achieve the range, accuracy, and lethality required to support combat operations effectively. The plan stated that the light divisions and early entry forces did not have the organic assets to perform battle tasks on a worldwide basis effectively. While corps-level assets could furnish supporting fires with 155-mm. howitzers and MLRS M270 launchers, these systems’ lack of strategic deployability could limit or even preclude their introduction into the theater in time to influence the battle. In comparison, a HIMARS unit would require less lift than an equivalent MLRS ______208PEO M&S FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 16; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 209“TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 15-20; Briefing, subj: Program Executive Office, Precision Fires, Rockets and Missile Systems, undated.

118 unit and expand airlift capacity by extending airlift platforms to include C-130 aircraft. Use of C-130 aircraft would also expand tactical mobility once forces arrived in the area of operations. Examination also revealed that doctrinal changes alone would not correct the identified shortfalls of not having a rapidly deployable launcher system to support light forces. Organizational changes of field artillery units also would not address the basic problems associated with worldwide deployment.210 Analysis by the Field Artillery School also supported HIMARS development. In December 1991 the school conducted an in-house Legal Mix VII analysis to determine the preferred composition for the Field Artillery to meet worldwide requirements in the future. The analysis concluded that HIMARS would provide a much-needed, lethal punch for the light forces and would be as mobile as the supported force. The wheeled chassis and C-130 deployability would provide unique means for rapid intra-theater employment. The effectiveness comparisons of equal airlift alternatives for M198 155- mm. towed howitzer, the MLRS M270 launcher, and the HIMARS launcher revealed that the HIMARS was approximately 20 percent more effective than the MLRS alternative and approximately 70 percent more effective than the M198 alternative.211 In view of this, the Department of the Army approved the HIMARS operational requirements document (ORD) on 3 December 1992, outlining the requirement for two battalions with three being desired. However, the Army failed to fund development because the payoff of fielding only two battalions was not deemed worth the cost of a new start.212 In 1997 an emerging force structure study at the Field Artillery School called for two field artillery brigades of two HIMARS battalions and one towed cannon battalion each to support one light division. The study confirmed that adding a rocket/missile system to the light corps artillery force structure would increase lethality against high- payoff targets, field artillery, and other special targets. The analysis also highlighted an increase in field artillery survivability when HIMARS was integrated into the light force field artillery structure. In view of this evidence, the Army decided to fund HIMARS.213 Subsequently, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI), a joint effort sponsored by the U.S. Army Missile Command and the Dismounted Battle Space Battle Laboratory, conducted an advanced concepts technology demonstration (ACTD) in 1998 using new target acquisition systems, “shooters,” and command and control systems at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that would be C-130 deployable and would be used by the first-to-fight forces. Among the systems to be tested were four HIMARS prototypes. In August 1998 following the ACTD, the RFPI reviewed the contributions of HIMARS as a lightweight MLRS system. RFPI’s assessment cited the advantage of increased firepower for early entry forces, less time spent on the firing point versus the M270 ______2102002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 77-78; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 102; Field Artillery Launcher Project Officer, FY 2016 Historical Summary, Doc III-30. 2112002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 212Ibid. 213Ibid.

119 launcher’s time, and the ease of the training transition from the M270 to the HIMARS.214 Over one year later on 19 October 1999, the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments approved an updated HIMARS operational requirements document in light of the RFPI ACTD. The updated document permitted HIMARS to enter into the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase of acquisition and also identified the requirement for 16 HIMARS battalions – two in the active force and 14 in the Army National Guard.215 After five years of development and testing, the Army fielded HIMARS beginning in 2005 and carried it on for several years.216 As fielding began, the Department of the Army approved an urgent need statement of 20 October 2005 by the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg and XVIII Airborne Corps for increased crew protection for the HIMARS by armoring the launcher cab. Even with the armor, the cab still had to meet C-130 transportability requirements while achieving STANAG level II armor requirements. Developed in 2005-2006 to meet an operational need statement from the XVIII Airborne Corps, the near-term armor solution involved using a modified design of the Low Signature Armored Cab (LSAC) developed for use with the family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) and using “bolt on” or “appliqué” armor which would be applied after the launcher had been transported by C-130. This modified cab design was designated the Low-Signature Armored Cab-HIMARS (LSAC-H). The appliqué armor consisted of 43 pieces of armor that could be installed on the cab in less than two hours and removed in less than one hour. A removable machine gun mount was also developed because of after action reviews and lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).217 To reduce production sustainment costs and to provide even greater crew protection, the Army initiated work on the Increased Crew Protection (ICP) cab late in 2006. During 2007, the ICP cab went through a series of tests including a live-fire test and evaluation and road shock and vibration testing. The cab would incorporate enhancements suggested in the test phase of the LSAC-H with production beginning in 2010. The ICP cab would protect the crew from ballistic attack, mine blast, foreign object debris, and fumes from the rocket launch and would be retrofitted to HIMARS M142 launchers without armored cabs and HIMARS M142 launchers with LSAC-H capabilities.218 Testing continued into 2008. In July 2008 the Army and the contractor completed ______2142002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97. 2152002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 2162005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 84; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 106-07; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launchers, 10 Feb 14, Doc III- 105, 2013 USAFAS AH. 2172005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 110-11. 2182005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111.

120 the final test that consisted of an extended field exercise to evaluate the operational effectiveness and suitability of the ICP cab configured HIMARS to ensure that the system met performance standards identified in the HIMARS operational requirements document and system specifications prior to production and fielding. Test results indicated that the ICP cab configured HIMARS met the critical operational criteria and demonstrated that the launcher’s ability to conduct shoot-and-scoot tactics to make it survivable in a hostile threat environment. As a result in 2009, the Army awarded BAE Systems the contract for 64 ICP cab up-armor kits. Retrofitting all HIMARS M142 launchers with ICP cab was completed in 2012 along with the universal fire control system to mitigate obsolescence of critical fire control components.219 With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army meanwhile initiated acquisition action for development of the modular launcher communication system (MLCS) for HIMARS and MLRS in 2006. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, situation awareness, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio to the launcher. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time-sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test in 2007 utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, another test in 2008, and one in 2009.220 Concurrently, TCM Rockets and Missiles (RAMS) which was rechartered as part of TCM Fires Brigade in 2010 and which was responsible for the capability development and user requirements for the Fires Brigade sought to improve command and control and address a capability gap with the integration of prototype long-range high frequency and satellite communications kits and outlined plans to improve battle space awareness by integrating blue force tracking into the HIMARS M142 launcher. In 2011 the Army implemented the Hot Panel capability for the HIMARS. This capability allowed the ______2192008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 108; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launcher, 10 Feb 14; MAJ David Dykema, CW3 Matt MacKenzie, and CPT Justin Teague, “Advances in Precision Fires and Launchers,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 14, pp. 5-8, Doc III-99, 2014 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fire Bulletin, Mar-Apr 14, pp. 40-44, Doc III-101, 2014 USAFAS AH. 2202006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 111-12; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44.

121 launcher software to receive positional updates while in flight aboard a C-130 or C-17 aircraft to give the HIMARS a true roll off and fire capability allowing for greater flexibility in projecting the force on the battlefield. Further efforts in implementing long- range communications led to the AN/PRC 150 being fielded to the 5-3rd Field Artillery Regiment and the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment. As explained in 2014, this radio gave true beyond-line-of-sight communications capability. Plans were also underway for the installation of the Blue Force Tracker to give commanders an on-board asset to share encrypted tactical location information using a satellite terminal and global positioning systems and drivers vision enhancement. The Blue Force Tracker would also permit better command and control by allowing commanders to send and receive orders, map routes, and provide locations of objectives throughout the force. Additional situational awareness would be met by the acquisition of the Driver’s Vision Enhancement that would provide the driver with the capability to drive in reduced visibility with the use of forward looking infrared sensor and display control module. The Army completed fielding the driver’s vision enhancer, the blue force tracker, and long-range communication, often called the “Big 3 Mods,” to the HIMARS fleet and Multiple Launcher Rocket System fleet.221 In 2015 the “Big 3 Mods” provided Soldiers with three hardware upgrades that enhanced the operation of the launcher’s mission on the battlefield. The Driver’s Vision Enhancement furnished the ability to conduct night and day operations and the ability to maneuver in smoke, fog, dust, or other battlefield obscurants; and the Blue Force Tracker gave the crew greater situational awareness through a small screen that identified the locations of friendly units and other battlefield intelligence. Long-range communications permitted voice and digital communications over thousands of miles.222 ______2212007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 101, 109; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 104, 112; Email, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc III-86, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 28, Doc III-87, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 25; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc III-88, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44, Doc III-105, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews, 2012, Doc III-101, 2013 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-106, 2013 USAFAS AH; Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives Upgrades for Future,” Doc III-104, 2013 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launcher, 10 Feb 14; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 11, Doc III-107, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: PFRMS Launcher and Munitions System Overview, 2012; Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advanced of Precision Fires and Launchers,” pp. 5-8, Doc III-97; Program Executive Office, Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, Mar 15, Doc III-100, 2014 USAFAS AH. 222“TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin,

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Also, Total Army Analysis 16-20 Force Design Update (FDU) authorized 3-312st Field Artillery Regiment, 18th Field Artillery Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to convert from an M777 155-mm. towed howitzer unit to an M142 HIMARS unit in early Fiscal Year 2015. This latest conversion brought the active duty launcher totals to six battalions of M270A1 and five battalions of M142 HIMARS.223 Also, the Field Artillery Launcher (FAL) Project Office began development of government-owned software to support the system in the sustainment phase of the acquisition life cycle. Version 8 software would provide improved user interfaces and operational capability to the platform. HIMARS successfully completed the Version 8 Software User and Prognostics/Diagnostics Demonstrations in August 2015. The data received from these demonstrations would support the HIMARS Version 8 SW Material Release.224 The final development of Software Version 8 continued in 2016 which was a software developed and owned by the government. Software Version 8 provided improved user interfaces and operational capability to the platform. Fielding of SW V8 was scheduled for 2017. In FY 2016, the launcher overhaul program inducted the 1st HIMARS launcher into the Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) Overhaul Program and the Vehicle Operational Life Extension Program (VOLEP) completed repairs on 16 M142s. 225 On 22 June, the FAL team completed successful live firing of the HIMARS Maritime Precision Strike System capability aboard a Navy test vessel. All of these efforts improve soldier effectiveness and safety, as well as ensure launcher viability in the future. This is evident by the HIMARS system surpassing one million operational hours in 2016. 226

Army Tactical Missile System In 2016 the Army had four variants of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) – the ATACMS I, ATACMS Ia, ATACMS Quick Reaction Unitary, and ATACMS Unitary (T2K) – that possessed long-range, all-weather capabilities and provided the joint task force and corps commander with precision engagement throughout the depths of the battlefield. The ATACMS I (range of 35-165 kilometers) and Ia (range of 70 to 300 kilometers) were semi-ballistic missiles with Anti- Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) cluster munitions. While they were employed extensively early in the major combat portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), ATACM I and Ia did not comply with the 2008 Department of Defense Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians that precluded using them after 2018 and ______Jan-Feb 16, pp. 15-20, Doc III-64. 223Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 16, Doc III-53, 2015 USAFAS AH. 224Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 16. 225PEO M&S FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 16; Email with atch, subj: CDID, FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 226PEO M&S FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 16.

123 forced employing ATACMS Quick Reaction Unitary (M48/M57) that had been used with great effectiveness in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. ATACMS Quick Reaction Unitary had the precision to attack high-payoff targets at extended ranges as well as troops in contact with minimal collateral damage employing the Global Positioning System for accuracy. With a range of 70 to 270 kilometers, ATACMS Quick Reaction Unitary could deliver single 500-pound high-explosive warhead up to 270 kilometers. Block I and Block Ia were scheduled to be removed from the inventory by 2019 as a result of the cluster munitions policy.227 As of early 2014 the Army had service life extensions in place for ATACMS I, ATACMS Ia, and ATACMS Unitary. By refurbishing or replacing propulsion and navigation systems and replacing the non-compliant anti-personnel/anti-material warheads (ATACMS I and Ia) with the Unitary, a high-explosive, single warhead, the service life extension program would provide time to complete analysis and development of a successor to ATACMS. In 2015 the ATACMS service life extension program remained under review by the Army to determine if the Army should service life extension additional missiles to fill the gap until the Long-Range Precision Fires system reached a full rate production decision.228 Department of Defense issued Resource Management Decision (RMD) 700A1 directed the Army to modify a limited number of ATACMS APAM missiles into a configuration using a Cluster Munition Policy compliant alternate warhead. This modification would convert ATACMS M39/M39A1 APAM missiles into ATACMS Unitary (M57) missiles utilizing the Warhead Delivery Unit (WDU)-18 policy compliant warhead and reset missile service life to 10 years.229 ______227Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, Doc III-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 118; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Dep Dir, 10 Feb 11, Doc III-47, 2010 USAFAS AH. See 2010 USAFAS AH for history of ATACMS from the early 1990s to 2009, pp. 105- 10; Federal Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, Doc III-108, 2013 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-109, 2013 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, Doc III-110, 2013 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile System Product Office Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 9 Dec 14, Doc III-102, 2014 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Rockets and Missiles, Update for AUSA 2013, Fall 2013, Doc III-103, 2014 USAFAS AH; Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, Doc III-32. 228Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager – Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 14, pp. 40-44, Doc III-104, 2014 USAFAS AH; Charles Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 14, pp. 22-23, Doc III-105, 2014 USAFAS AH; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires,” 16 May 14, Doc III-106, 2014 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB- D History Document, 9 Mar 16, Doc III-53, 2015 USAFAS AH. 229PEO M&S FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 16; Email with atch, subj:

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Upon moving their production facility from Horizon City, Texas, to Camden, Arkansas, Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control-Camden (LMMFC-C) successfully completed their pre-operational site survey with Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) in May 2016. This production facility would be responsible for ATACMS Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) production and any/all future ATACMS builds and leverages synergies gained with the GMLRS production line.230 LMMFC built and delivered the first three ATACMS SLEP missiles to White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in support of System Qualification Test (SQT). SQT was used to validate SLEP modifications made to ATACMS including the reuse of M39 Block I components, new navigation and guidance computer and characterization of a proximity sensor for Height of Burst (HOB) capability all leading to a production decision early in 2017.231

Long Range Precision Fires Strategy Two critical factors led to the loss of the Army Tactical Missile System with its long-range capability. First, the funding issues in 2007 caused the Army to terminate production of the missile. Second, the Department of Defense’s policy on cluster munitions and unintended harm to civilians of 19 June 2008 eliminated employment of about 50 percent of the ATACMS inventory that included the ATACMS I and Ia that had anti-personnel/anti-material cluster munitions warheads. As a result of these decisions, the inventory of ATACMS I and Ia approached the end of their useful shelf life in the second decade of the 21st Century. This prompted the Department of Defense to direct the Army to apply a service life extension program. By refurbishing or replacing propulsion and navigation systems and replacing the non-compliant anti-personnel/anti- material warheads (ATACMS I and Ia) with the ATACMS Unitary, the service life extension program provided time to complete analysis and development of a successor to ATACMs.232 Understanding that the service life extension program did not satisfy long-term precision fires requirements, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Needs Analysis that was approved on 27 September 2013 noted the imperative of developing a long-range missile. Without the ATACMS the Army lacked the capability to engage targets out to 499 kilometers and to destroy strategic targets. Although several viable options existed to eliminate the capability gap, ranging ______CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1; Program Executive Officer Missiles and Space, FY 2016 Historical Summary, Doc III-32. 230PEO M&S FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 16; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc III-1. 231PEO M&S FY 2015 Historical Summary, 25 October 16; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 16. 232Charles Hutchinson, “Long-Range Precision Fires Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 14, pp. 22-23, Doc III-105, 2015 USAFAS AH; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires,” 16 May 14, Doc III-106, 2015 USAFAS.

125 from joint assets to restarting the ATACMS program, the Fires Center of Excellence believed that a new start was the most cost effective alternative for fielding a missile with long-range capability and designed block strategy to develop a missile in a timely and affordable manner. In 2013 the Army concurred with developing a new missile; and work on a new missile began.233 As of 2015-2016, the first block or increment would service targets from 70 to 300 kilometers and would have two missiles per missile pod. This would not require any modifications to the current ATACMS launcher or pod, would permit fielding the missile in 2022 shortly after the moratorium on cluster munitions established the Department of Defense in 2018 and after the end of the ATACMS’s shelf life. Initial capabilities would include 24/7 all-weather precision area and time sensitive capability to destroy tactical or strategic targets.234 The second increment or block would take advantage of emerging technologies to engage targets beyond 300 kilometers. This range would most likely come from improved motor, lightweight airframe, and propulsion technologies.235

______233Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” pp. 22-23; Information Paper, subj: Long Range Precision Fires, 13 Sep 16, Doc III-33. 234Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” pp. 22-23; MAJ David Dykema, CW3 Matt MacKenzie, and CPT Justin Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and Launchers,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 14, pp. 55-58, Doc III-107, 2014 USAFAS AH; Fires Division, Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Capabilities Development of Long-Range Precision Fires.” 235Hutchinson, “Long Range Precision Fires Strategy,” pp. 22-23; Dykema, MacKenzie, and Teague, “Advances of Precision Fires and Launchers,” pp. 55-58.

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CHAPTER FOUR FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY

INTRODUCTION

In 1992 Fort Sill became an active participant in the Army’s new Battle Laboratory (Battle Lab) program. Designed to prepare the Army better for warfighting in the post-Cold War era, the Battle Lab program took root in six of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) key service schools to coordinate ideas about technology and warfighting in future battlefield effectiveness. At Fort Sill the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory (now called the Fires Battle Laboratory [FBL]) was created to fulfill one of the six major components in the program. The FBL concept represented a significant break with Cold War era threat driven decision making. As General Frederick M. Franks, the former TRADOC commander, explained it, the FBL focused on tailoring post-Cold War Army force projections into the 21st Century. In seeking to increase battlefield effectiveness by optimizing combinations between technology and warfighting, the FBL envisioned giving the Army a technological edge on future battlefields as well as streamlining the technological modernization process. Before any concept or equipment was tested in the field, the Battle Labs tested them through computer simulations and virtual prototyping. General Franks established the first of six battle labs in early April 1992 at the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with the remaining five selected by the end of the month. The six were: (1) Early Entry Battle Lab at TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia, (2) Mounted Battle Space Laboratory, Fort Knox, Kentucky, (3) Dismounted Battle Space Battle Laboratory, Fort Benning, Georgia, (4) Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, (5) Battle Command Leavenworth, Kansas, and (6) Combat Service Support, Fort Lee, Virginia. Fort Sill’s Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab began operating on August 1992 with a mission to identify depth and simultaneous needs and then initiate action to resolve these needs using analysis, simulation, experimentation, evaluation, and integration of materiel and non-materiel solutions. The FBL was the first to identify a need to develop an interface that translated simulations messages into tactical messages to stimulate Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for training. This led to the development of the Enhanced Protocol Interface Unit that enabled field artillery staffs to train in a “free play” simulated environment on a large scale. This first step into “doing the impossible” provided immeasurable benefits to the Army and Department of Defense. The Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) was leading simulations development on many fronts and was on the cutting edge of providing enhanced training capabilities. The FBL continued to provide support to Forces Command (FORSCOM) units, TRADOC schools,

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Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID), and other Battle Labs experiments.1

THE FIRES BATTLE LAB MISSION

The Fires Battle Laboratory mission used live, virtual and/or constructive simulations to gain insights, impacts, and recommended changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), based on inputs from Soldiers and their leaders, as well as emerging technologies and materiel initiatives to support current and future forces.

FIRES BATTLE LAB CHARTER

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command chartered the Battle Lab to provide the means to develop, refine, and integrate future operational capabilities and architectures in support of Joint and Army concepts and to focus on developing and refining tactical and some operational concepts for the Future Force. The Battle Lab integrated DOTMLPF imperatives to support the task and purpose of mission concepts and employed experimentation/war gaming and analysis, utilizing modeling and simulation to produce the underpinnings for concepts and requirements validation.

EXPERIMENTS AND WARGAMING DIVISION

EW Branch’s primary mission is to design, develop, execute, analyze, and report out on all FCoE and FBL experiments in support of ARCICs annual experimentation plan. This is done to support the Joint and Army’s Warfighter Functional Concept Development process and FcoE Combat and Material Development processes. This requires internal and external planning, coordination, and synchronization of each experiment with the Joint community of practice using a model-test-model process designed to evaluate critical issues and feasibility as part of an outcome based focus.

MODELING AND SIMULATION DIVISION

Fires Battle Lab’s Modeling and Simulation Division provided modeling and simulation support to TRADOC Battle Labs within the construct of Battle Lab Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE) to support Transformation Experimentation and Concept Development. M&S Division also supported Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) analysis with FireSim XXI development, and FCOE soldier training and leader development courses with simulation

______1Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17, Doc IV-. All of chapter 4 comes from Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 17.

128 supported exercises. In addition, M&S Division provided M&S support and expertise to M&S exercises and M&S developments for throughout the Department of Defense.

EXPERIMENTS AND WARGAMING DIVISION

Unified Challenge 16.1 GAMEXp 14 - 25 Mar 2016

Event Description: UC 16.1 was a turn-based, multi-sided, fully adjudicated experiment integrating Operational and Organizational (O&O) concept developers into a two vignette, four-day turn addressing a base case (Army 2020) and an advanced case (Force 2025 and Beyond). Vignette 1 was a phase II (seize the initiative, entry operations) and Vignette 2 was a phase III (dominate, major combat operations) construct.

Event Results: FCOE explored multiple S&T enablers and organizational design changes to include DIVARTY, Fires Brigade, Air Defense (AD) Brigade, and the Area Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC). 1. The Integrated Fire Control Network (IFCN) and the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) provide the AD with a common centralized fire control and mission command network. 2. The addition of IBCS/IFCN equipped assets allows the AD brigade to gain the capability to conduct identification (ID) / engagement authorization (EA) operations. 3. The Field Artillery lacks the ability to conduct long range targeting and battle damage assessment (BDA). 4. The division lacks clearly defined authorities to mass all artillery fires (unity of effort). 5. The DIVARTY lacks sufficient self-sustainment capabilities to provide large caliber Class V, Class III, recovery/maintenance, and medical support. 6. BCTs currently lack a tactical AD capability with a focus on defeating enemy unmanned aerial system (UAS) and rotary wing (RW) assets.

Event POCs: Dr. Myers, 580 442-2930, email address [email protected] or Mr. Anthony Evans, 580 442-3139, email address [email protected]

Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment (MFIX) 2016 04 - 22 April 2016 Event Description: The TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Science, Technology, Research and Accelerated Capabilities Division (STRACD) sponsored MFIX 16. The FCOE conducted the experiment focused on four experimental objectives designed to enhance C-UAS capabilities at the tactical edge. The objectives were Air Ground Integration, Counter UAS (C-UAS), Sensor Management, and Precision Fires.

Event Results: (U) The experiment was well supported by TRADOC Centers of

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Excellence, the Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), various program Executive Offices, Space and Mission Defense Command, and multiple industry partners. 1. The purpose of the experiment was to develop, evaluate and expand integrated concepts and material capabilities in order to inform how Fires enhances tactical operations below the Brigade Combat team, retain current advantages over adversaries, and accelerate investments on contested future capabilities in support of Force 2025 Maneuvers and beyond. Additionally the Joint Test and Evaluation, Joint Fiber Laser Mission Engagement (J-FLaME) executed their Test 2 as part of MFIX 16. The purpose of the J-FLaME mission was to address TTPs for all Joint forces for ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, and air-to-ground 2. The experiment provided insights about future Fires Air Defense Artillery (ADA)/Field Artillery (FA) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions to Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfC) 17 and 18. 3. The personnel support requirements for MFIX 2016 were provided by Soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, and 1st Cavalry Division, as well as the FCoE and the United States Marine Corps. The Soldiers and Marines operating at the company level conducted their missions using either the USMC C-UAS Mobile Integrated Capability (CMIC) vehicle equipment suite or the Joint Forcible Entry C-UAS Kit (JFECK). These Soldiers and Marines responded to a Battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) manned by Officers from the 2nd Division and the 1st Armored Division except in the cases where they were operating in an unsupported role. The FCoE provided the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) support to the Battalion (BN) Fire Support Element (FSE) and Brigade Air Defense and Airspace Management (ADAM) Cell. 4. The experiment identified several actions and recommendations for the FCOE and Army Capabilities Integration Center ARCIC that will be assessed during MFIX 2017. These capabilities included: multi-mission directed energy with onboard radar, short range air defense, execution of simultaneous live artillery missions and counter-UAS operations, and exploration of more precision targeting assets. These desired capabilities were codified in the MFIX 2017 Request for Information distributed to industry and government organizations.

POC: FBL – Michael K Smith, 580 442-2927, email address: [email protected]

Integrated Air Missile Defense Limited Objective Experiment 20 - 30 Jun 2016

Event Description: The Fires Center of Excellence (FCOE) Commanding General and the ADA Commandant directed the Fires Battle LAB (FBL) to conduct two assessments during FY16. The first mission was to support Army Operational Concept development and Fires Functional Concept Development for the Army Air Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) and the Air Defense Artillery Brigade (ADA BDE). The second

130 mission was to focus on F2025 Force Design initiatives associated with the introduction of the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) system of systems (SoS) initiatives. Both missions were successfully completed during the first ever Theater wide multi-unit and system experiment. This two-weeklong hybrid seminar wargame and a supporting computer assisted force on force simulations experiment (SIMEX) was executed 20-30 June 2016.

Event Results: Experiment produce six insights and these are: 1. All insights supported the critical learning requirements pertaining to Army Warfighting Functional Challenges 17 Integrate Fires / 18 Deliver Fires, learning objectives, and CNA gap assessment requirements for extremely high risk and high risk gaps in near, mid, and far term have been identified as current and sufficient for the FY15-16 FCOE CNA databases. 2. In an Integrated Battle Command System/Integrated Fire Control Network (IBCS/IFCN) - enabled force Engagement Operations Centers (EOC) can and should be delegated ID and Engagement Authorities when task saturation precludes centralized management. Recommendations: Implement the following; Joint and Army doctrine are sufficient to allow decentralized ID and Engagement (D). No change to current or planned staff organizations is required (O). Direct that Institutional and organizational events occur annually as part of a soldier and unit certification process (T). Continued Learning needed. Target discrimination needs to be a priority in future sensors (M). 3. IFCN architecture may introduce CYBER/EW vulnerabilities. Recommendations: Implement the following; IBCS planning tool should include CYBER/EW considerations (M, L). Implement hardening for critical networks against EW attacks (M). 4. Defense design for EOCs must balance efficiency and depth. Recommendations: Implement the following: The functions, roles, missions, and tasks for EOC need to clarified and specified for each echelon from brigade to platoon) (D). EOC certification, institutional and unit training must account for varied roles and missions (T). Develop training and certification programs that ensure leader and soldier development for Soldiers, non-commissioned officers, warrants, and officers have requisite skills to support functions and missions based on their section tasks at each echelon (T, L, P). 5. Interoperability with Joint and Multinational forces will remain a challenge in and IBCS-enabled force. Recommendations: Continued Learning needed. Develop a cross- domain solution to allow multinational partner access to information (M, Pol). Develop Joint interface for sharing engagement solutions (M). 6. Force protection and security are inadequate against near peer threat. Recommendations: Implement the following: Develop doctrine that supports survivability moves by individual system (D). Provide units counter EW attack systems through organic or supporting relationships (O). Modify existing equipment to enhance displacement and emplacement capability (M). Provide units radar spoofing and decoy devices (M). Develop ability for IBCS to pair Army launchers with Joint sensors (M).

Event POC: Dr. Myers, 580 442-2930, email address [email protected] or Mr. Anthony Evans, 580 442-3139, email address [email protected]

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Unified Challenge 16.2 GAMEXp 31 Jul - 12 Aug 2016

Event Description: UC 16.2 was a turn-based, multi-sided, fully adjudicated experiment integrating Operational and Organizational (O&O) concept developers into a two vignette, four-day turn addressing a base case (Army 2020) and an advanced case (Force 2025 and Beyond). Vignette 1 was a phase II (seize the initiative, entry operations) and Vignette 2 was a phase III (dominate, major combat operations) construct

Event Results: Fires formed two assessment groups, Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery, which examined the Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver (AFC-MM) and four O&Os (DIVARTY, FA BDE, AAMDC, and ADA BDE O&Os). 1. Division Artillery and FA Brigade (EAB Fires Command) provide key capabilities (SEAD, shaping, counter-fire and massing) enabling Mission Command, cross-domain maneuver, Integrated Security Operations and semi-independently operations. Solutions to high priority gaps are Update 3-09.90 (DIVARTY) to include tenets of AFC-MM, explore the capacity of the EAB Fires Cell with an emphasis on supporting shaping and counter-fire in support of multiple semi-independent BCTs, include DIVARTY counter- fire Cell in CTC rotations and an annual division targeting exercise incorporating all elements (including COMPO 2 & 3 Soldiers) . The most effective way to provide fires in accordance with the AFC-MM to maintain cannon Fires units organic to BCTs with ERCA, while reemphasizing the Reinforcing and General Support/Reinforcing missions for DIVARTY and FA Brigades. Continue to experiment with AFC-MM with the EAB fires capabilities conducting Reinforcing and General Support/Reinforcing missions. 2. BCTs lack the capacity to comprehensively manage BCT airspace in order to support identification and engagement authorities (IDA/EA) for tactical aerial threats. Solution’s to high priority gaps are: Update methods of control/engagements to allow the BCT limited IDA/EA within their AO, augment ADAM/BAE cells with airspace and fire control personnel, more emphasis placed on training of ADAM/BAE at home station with ADAM/BAE certifications, implementation of the IFCN/IBCS, requirement of more trained certified fire control personnel; develop a tactical airspace control MOS. For the BCTs to be able to fully conduct dynamic airspace clearance, they must be able to control airspace users and must hold IDA/EA for relevant air tracks in their AO. Provide the BCTs with the capability to manage airspace within their AO during future experimentation. 3. The BCT lacks the capability to defend itself from tactical aerial threats. Solutions to high priority gaps are: Push ID Authority/Engagement Authority for air threats in the BCT’s airspace to the BCT, expand the use of procedural ID methods and airspace control, field a platoon or battery of organic air defense shooters at the BCT, Reinvigorate passive air defense training and CAFAD (combined arms for air defense) training at all echelons, develop a mobile, protected tactical air defense system that employs an organic sensor and a mix of shooters, develop MANPADS capabilities for the maneuver force, revive SHORAD personnel – a mix of maneuver and air defense

132 competencies located at the BCT. The implementation of all air defense capabilities at the tactical echelons greatly increases the ability of BCTs to operate semi-independently and main non-contiguous operations. Continue to work with MCoE to develop the tactical AD protection asset within the BCTs and continue to experiment with this capability during future events. 4. Cross-Domain capabilities are essential to offset threat overmatch. Solutions to high priority gaps are: Revise Fires and Targeting doctrine to account for and employ capabilities in all domains, organizational structure must account for MDAT capabilities at appropriate levels, organizations must be structured to integrate seamlessly through targeting, appropriate systems must be developed and integrated to conduct attacks in all domains, multi-domain capabilities ranging from strategic to tactical must be integrated and synchronized at appropriate echelons, networks must have sufficient capacity and reliability to handle the increased flow from the use and synchronization of MDAT, and the appropriate military specialties in sufficient numbers with the correct training. Multi- domain efforts (EW, cyber, Close Air Support, shore to ship) need to be continued or evolved, but the key is in providing more robust and comprehensive synchronization and coordination capabilities.

Event POCs: Dr. Myers, 580 442-2930, email address [email protected] or Mr. Anthony Evans, 580 442-3139, email address [email protected]

MODELING AND SIMULATION

The Fires Battle Lab Models and Simulations Team was selected as the Army’s Models and Simulation Team of the year for the Fires Experimentation Campaign 2016. The theme for the year was “Modeling and Simulation, Enabling Readiness of our Army – the Right Capabilities, Training, and Analysis. There were 21 nominations. This award is hosted by the Army’s Models and Simulations Office. This award represents the teams 4th award in 6 years.

Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment (AEWE) Spiral 16 03 JAN - 20 FEB 2016

Event Description: The Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment, was conducted by the Maneuver Battle Lab. AEWE is TRADOC’s annual, live, force-on-force prototype experiment. Government and private vendors tested their unclassified technologies by putting them into the hands of soldiers, trained them to use it, and sent them through a series of missions. Simulated platoons were used to fight a battalion level fight, without tasking more live platoons than needed to test the new equipment. The Fires Battle Lab supported AEWE 16 by simulating Fires capability and radar acquisitions using FireSimXXI during pilot and case missions (11 missions in total); ensuring proper sequencing and execution of all fire mission processing. FireSimXXI was integrated with ExCIS and AFATDS to provide a means for the battalion TOC to push fire missions to the simulation from voice or digital call for fires. FireSimXXI also integrated with

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OneSAF to support the simulated platoons throughout the experiment.

Event Results: Successful experiment for the development community to get credible feedback from the end-user (the soldiers). Event POC: FBL POC - Matt McLaughlin, 580 442-5919, email address [email protected].

MFIX 2016 4 April 2016

Event Description: The Fires Battle Lab hosted the Maneuver and Fires Integration Experiment (MFIX) 2016 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma from 4-22 April 2016. The battle lab conducted the experiment focused on four experimental objectives designed to enhance C-UAS capabilities at the tactical edge. The objectives were Air Ground Integration, Counter UAS (C-UAS), Sensor Management, and Precision Fires. The experiment was well supported by TRADOC Centers of Excellence, the Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), various program Executive Offices, Space and Mission Defense Command, and multiple industry partners. The purpose of the experiment was to develop, evaluate and expand integrated concepts and material capabilities in order to inform how Fires enhances tactical operations below the Brigade Combat team, retain current advantages over adversaries, and accelerate investments on contested future capabilities in support of Force 2025 Maneuvers and beyond. Additionally the Joint Test and Evaluation, Joint Fiber Laser Mission Engagement (J-FLaME) executed their Test 2 as part of MFIX 16. The purpose of the J-FLaME mission was to address TTPs for all Joint forces for ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, and air-to-ground laser weapon engagements. Event Results: The experiment provided insights about future Fires Air Defense Artillery (ADA)/Field Artillery (FA) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Policy (DOTMLPF-P) solutions to Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfC) 17 and 18.The experiment identified several actions and recommendations for the FCOE and Army Capabilities Integration Center ARCIC that will be assessed during MFIX 2017. These capabilities included: multi-mission directed energy with onboard radar, short range air defense, execution of simultaneous live artillery missions and counter-UAS operations, and exploration of more precision targeting assets. These desired capabilities were codified in the MFIX 2017 Request for Information distributed to industry and government organizations. Event POC: FBL POC - MAJ Thomas E. Veld, [email protected], 442-3649

Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability-Entity Resolution Federation (JLCCTC-ERF) v5.6 Validation and MRT Several Integration Events throughout 2015 and 2016 leading up to the Validation Exercise in Sep 16. Event Description: Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability- Entity Resolution Federation (JLCCTC-ERF) Validation & Maintenance Release Test

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Event

Event Results: During integration events, FireSim (fs7.2.5.6) successfully passed all tests with ExCIS and AFATDS while supporting the overall ERF federation operations integrating with JCATS, JDLM, MUSE, AARS POC: FBL – Ms. Kay Bowen, 580 442-3629, email address: [email protected]

AIDE III (Actionable Infrared Detected Events) Several planning throughout 2015 and 2016 leading up to the live runs through March 2016

Event Description: Test of Actionable infrared event data through a network established to replicate a Field Artillery Brigade HQ AFATDs and the associated units. This is the third in the series of experiments to explore the use of this asset.

Event Results: Previous events have validated the possibility of OPIR events for integration into the FIRES operating picture. Resulting data led to draft Tactics, techniques and Procedures for both current and future applications. Event POC: FBL – MAJ Matt Starsnic, 580 442-4645, email address: [email protected]

Agile Fires IX Jun – Aug 2016

Event Description: Joint distributed exercise executed locally from the Rocket and Missile Smart Lab in building 3040. FireSim XXI replaced the C-RAM Distributed System of Systems Simulation (CDS3) as the simulation driver for Fires. Additionally, FireSim XXI provided stimulation for the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) allowing a more accurate representation of end-to-end mission execution. FBL provided software, scenario/data, and integration support. FireSim XXI enhancements included revision of the Munition Entity State model and a translation tools to turn Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems (PFRMS) Project Office (PO) rocket and missile trajectories into a useable FireSim format.

Event Results: The use of FireSim XXI in the exercise enhanced the event and lead to a desire additional participation in future Agile Fires and Advanced Concepts Event (ACE) events. Collaboration with the smart lab also lead to a requirement for a more robust aiming algorithm for FireSim XXI. Event POC: FBL – Bill Green, 580 442-6780, email address: [email protected]

Hyper Velocity Projectile (HVP) Analysis support Jan – Mar 2016

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Event Description: The HVP study looked at the potential for a munition fired from a howitzer to intercept aircraft. The Naval Surface Warfare Center provided use cases and performance data while FBL provided the scenario and the FireSim XXI model. Enhancements were required to allow a traditional artillery platform to connect to an Air Defense network and fire munitions capable of air engagements. Replication of the munition required a new endgame as well. The Battle Lab Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE) engineering team provided tools to allow the reuse of scenario products from the FY15 Simulation Experiment and retrieve positioning and movement information from event loggers.

Event Results: The output data from the event was used in a utility study for HVP. Enhancements will continue to be used for experimentation. Event POC: FBL – Bill Green, 580 442-6780, email address: [email protected]

Starbase OK November 2016 - Continuous

Event Description: STARBASE Youth Program is a nonresidential American military educational program for students (grades K-12) that provides them with real- world applications of math and science. It was created in 1991 through a grant from the Kellogg Foundation. The FBL in conjunction with the Mission Simulation Center / Monti Hall, instructed students in the use of Simulations, the reality spectrum and also demonstrated Simulations used by the military.

Event Results: The use of Simulations and the need for Science and mathematics skill sets required to create Simulations was emphasized to students. 100 to 150 students visited the locations over three days and were provided a briefing and demonstration which showed the application of Science and mathematics. A short explanation of the inner working and usefulness of simulations was presented. Annually this program will train over 1000 students from the local area. Event POC: FBL – MAJ Matt Starsnic, 580 442-4645, email address: [email protected]

Integrated Air Missile Defense (IAMD) Experiment Nov 2015 – June 2016

Event Description: IAMD sought to examine the Organization and Operational construction of Army Air Defense forces within a Joint and Coalition environment defending US and Host nation facilities from a near peer competitor.

Event Results: Simulation enabled discussion and examination of four separate organizations modified from the current Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). This enabled Subject Matter Expert (SME) discussion and selection of possible reorganization options of Patriot and other Air Defense capabilities in both garrison and

136 deployed constructs. Event POC: FBL – MAJ Matt Starsnic, 580 442-4645, email address: [email protected]

Annual Army Model and Simulation (M&S) Capability Portfolio Review (CPR) Forum 23 – 25 Feb 2016

Event Description: The purpose of the US Army’s Model and Simulation forum was to bring together Army operators, LVCG/M&S experts, and testers/experimentalists from across the six Army communities to work analysis and determine resolutions to the M&S CPR Gaps identified during the M&S CPR

Event Results: (U) Army Model and Simulation (M&S) Capability Portfolio Review (CPR) Forum, 23-25 FEB 16. Army M&S community representatives were asked to refine M&S CPR Gaps identified during the 2015 M&S CPR and provide an out brief by community lead to AMSO on the closing day of the M&S Gap forum. AMSO has been directed to work an implementation plan and provide the way ahead at the next M&S GOSC 23 March 16. Analysis, Experimentation, Intelligence, Cyber and Networking, Testing, and Training were represented at the Forum. Members from these communities refined and discussed Fires M&S gaps during sessions on 25 and 26 February. Immediate benefit to Fires representation within training, analysis, and experimentation is the effort to address coalition participation in FCoE events through the addition of a coalition network presence (Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network - CFBLNet) to Fort Sill. AMSO is also working the feasibility of an enterprise cross domain solution in order to facilitate the many community need for multi- classification level architectures. Event POC: FBL – Chesley B. Montague, 580 442-5647, email address: [email protected]

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GLOSSARY

AAR, After Action Review ABCS, Army Battlefield Command System ABCT, Armor Brigade Combat Team ABOLC, Armored Basic Officer Leader’s Course AC, Active Component/Assistant Commandant ACAT, Acquisition Category ACCC, Aviation Captain’s Career Course ACR, Armored Cavalry Regiment ACT, Acquisition Category ACTD, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ADA, Air Defense Artillery ADP, Army Doctrine Publication ADRP, Army Doctrine Reference Publication AESA, Army Enterprise Area Standards AFATDS, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System AIB, Army Instructor Badge AIT, Advanced Individual Training AFWC, Army Warfighting Challenges AKO, Army Knowledge Online ALC, Advanced Leader Course, Army Learning Concept ALM, Army Learning Model AMCB, Army/Marine Corps Board AMCS, Army Mission Command Systems AMRDEC, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center AOC, Army Operating Concept AOT, Assignment-Oriented Course AOEWC, Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course APAM, Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material APMI, Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative APU, Auxiliary Power Unit ARDEC, Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center ARNG, Army National Guard ARCIC, Army Capabilities Integration Center AROC, Army Oversight Council ARSTRAT, Army Strategic Command ASARC, Army System Acquisition Review Council ASCA, Artillery Systems Cooperative Activity ASI, Additional Skill Identifier ASV, Armored Security Vehicle ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile System ATEC, Army Test and Evaluation Command AVCATT, Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer AVN, Aviation

138

AWFC, Army Warfighting Challenge BATES, Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System BCD, Battle Coordination Detachment BCS, Battery Computer System BCT, Brigade Combat Team BFIST, Bradley Fire Support Vehicle BFSA. Blue Force Situational Awareness BIT, Built in Test BLC, Basic Leader Course BNCOC, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course BOLC, Basic Officer Leader’s Course C2, Command and Control C3I, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence C4I, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence C4ISR, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CAB, Combat Aviation Brigade CAC, Combat Arms Center CAS, Close Air Support CASCOM, Combined Arms Support Command CAT, Carrier Ammunition Tracked CATT, Combined Arms Tactical Trainer CBRNE, Chemical, Biological, radiological, and Nuclear Explosive CCA, Close Combat Attack CCC, Captains Career Course CCF, Course-correcting Fuse CCoE, Cyber Center of Excellence CCTT, Close Combat Tactical Trainer CDAEM, Cannon Delivered Area Effect Munition CDD, Capability Development Document CDE, Collateral Damage Estimate CDID, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command CFFT, Call for Fire Trainer CFLCC, Coalition Forces Land Component Command CG, Commanding General CGSC, Command and General Staff College CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force CMF, Career Management Field COCOM, Combatant Commander COE, Center of Excellence/Common Operating Environment COLT, Combat Observation Lasing Team CONOPS, Concept of Operations CONUS, Continental United States COP, Common Operating Picture

139

COTS, Commercial off the Shelf CPD, Capabilities Production Document CPOF, Command Posts of the Future CRADA, Cooperative Research and Development Agreement C-RAM, Counter- Mortars CSM, Command Sergeant Major CTS, Combat Training Squadron C-UAS, Counter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle DA, Department of the Army DAC, ARNG, Department of the Army, Army National Guard DAC, Deputy Assistant Commandant/Department of the Army Civilian DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DCG, Deputy Commanding General DFCS, Digital Flight Control System DGCAR, Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule DIVARTY, Division Artillery DoD, Department of Defense DOTD, Directorate of Training and Doctrine DOTMLPF, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities DOTMLPF-P, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy DPICM, Dual-Improved Conventional Munition DPW, Directorate of Public Works DSABL, Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory DTED, Digital Elevation and Terrain Data DT/OT, Developmental Testing/Operational Testing EAB, Echelons Above Brigade ECU, Environmental Control Unit EDT, Engineering Developmental Testing EFX, Extended Field Exercise EMD, Engineering and Manufacturing Development EPIAS, Enhanced Portable Inductive Artillery Fuze Setter ER, Extended Range ERCA, Extended Range Cannon Artillery EUCOM, European Army Command EUD, End User Device EW, Electronic Warfare EWTGLANT, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group-Atlantic FA, Field Artillery FAASV, Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle FAB, Field Artillery Brigade FA BOLC, Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course FAC, Forward Airborne Controller FACCC, Field Artillery Captains Career Course

140

FACCC-RC, Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component FAL, Field Artillery Launcher FAPO, Field Artillery Proponency Office FAS, Field Artillery School FAST-21, Task Force Future Army Schools 21 FBL, Fires Battle Lab FCoE, Fires Center of Excellence FCPT, Fire Control Panel Trainer FDC, Fire Direction Center FDU, Force Design Update FDS, Fire Direction System FIA, Fires Integrated Application FIST, Fire Support Team FISTV, Fire Support Vehicle FM, Field Manual FMTV, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles FOF, Force on Force FORSCOM, U.S. Army Forces Command FOS, Forward Observer System FRP, Full-rate Production FS3, Fire Support Sensor System FSC, Fire Support Center FSC3, Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications FSCATT, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer FSCATT-T, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer-Towed FSCOORD, Fire Support Coordinator FSCU, Fire System Control Update FSO, Fire Support Officer FTD, Fires Directorate FY, Fiscal Year GO, General Officer GOSC, General Officer Steering Committee GPS, Global Positioning System GVLLD, Ground/Vehicular Laser Location Designator HBCT, Heavy Brigade Combat Team HCT, Howitzer Crew Trainer HEMETT, High Energy Laser Mobile Test Truck HIMARS, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System HMMWV, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HQ, Headquarters HQDA, Headquarters, Department of the Army HTAF, How the Army Fights HTU, Handheld Terminal Unit HVAC, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning HYPAK, Hydraulic Power Assist Kit

141

IAC, Improved Armor Cab IBCT, Infantry Brigade Combat Team I/ABOLC, Infantry/Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course IBCT, Infantry Brigade Combat Team ICD, Initial Capabilities Document ICP, Increased Crew Protection IDRP, Individual Development and Recognition Program IED, Improvised Explosive Device IET, Initial Entry Training IFCS, Improved Fire Control System ILMS, Improved Launcher Mechanical System IMILES, Instrumented Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System IOTE, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation IPADS, Improved Position and Azimuth System IWIU, Improved Weapon Interface Unit JACI, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate JADOCS, Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System JAGIC, Joint Air Ground Integration Center JCAS, Joint Close Air Support JCATS, Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation JCM, Joint Conflict Model JCTST, Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation Trainer JDAM, Joint Direct Attack Munition JETS, Joint Effects Targeting System JFETS, Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System JFO, Joint Fires Observer JFT, Joint Task Force JIM, Joint Interagency Multinational JNN, Joint Network Node JOFEC, Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course JORD, Joint Operational Requirements Document JROC, Joint Requirement Oversight Council JTAC, Joint Terminal Attack Controller LADS, Location Azimuth Determining System LASIP, Light Artillery System Improvement Program LCMR, Lightweight Countermortar Radar LCT, Longbow Crew Trainer LDM, Laser Designator Module LED, Light Emitting Diode LLDR, Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder LOE, Lines of Effort LRIP, Low-rate Initial Production LSAC, Low Signature Armored Cab LSAC-H, Low Signature Armored Cab HIMARS LRAS3, Long-range Advanced Scout Surveillance System

142

MACS, Modular Artillery Charge System MANPRINT, Manpower Personnel Integration MCCC, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MCoE, Maneuver Center of Excellence MCP, Material Change Package MCWS, Mission Command Workstation MDB, Multi-Domain Battle MDMP, Military Decision Making Process MEP, Mission Equipment Package MET, Meteorological MFIX, Maneuver and Fires Experiment MIFX, Maneuver and Fires Exercise Experiment MLC, Master Leader Course MLCS, Modular Launcher Communication System MLRS, Multiple Launch Rocket System MMS, Meteorological Measuring Set MOCS, Military Occupational Classification and Structure MOS, Military Occupational Specialty MOUT, Maneuver Operations in Urban Terrain MRAP, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle MTOE, Modified Tables of Equipment MTT, Mobile Training Team NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO, Noncommissioned Officer NCOA, Noncommissioned Officer Academy NCOES, Noncommissioned Officer Education System NIMA, National Imagery and Mapping Agency NIPR, Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router NIPRNET, Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network NLOS-C, Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon NVIG, Night Vision Image Generator O&O, Organizational and Operational OBT&E, Outcomes Based Training and Education OCONUS, Outside Continental United States OCS, Officer Candidate School OE, Operational Environment OEF, Operation Enduring Freedom OES, Officer Education System OFC, Operational Fires Command OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom OPFOR, Opposing Force ORD, Operational Requirements Document PADS, Position and Azimuth Determining System PCC, Precommand Career Course PDFCS, Paladin Digital Fire Control System

143

PEO STRI, Program Executive Officer for Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation PEO, Program Executive Officer PERSCOM, Personnel Command PFC, Precision Fires Course PFED, Pocket-size Forward Entry Device PFW, Precision Fires Warrior PGK, Precision Guidance Kit PIM, Paladin Integrated Management PLDC, Primary Leadership Development Course PM, Program Manager PME, Professional Military Education PM SPHS, Program Manager Self-Propelled Howitzer System PMAD, Personnel Management and Authorization Document PME, Professional Military Education PM TAS, Program Manager Towed Artillery Systems POCV, Paladin Operations Center Vehicle POI, Program of Instruction POM, Program Objective Memorandum POV, Privately Owned Vehicle PQT, Production Qualification Test PSS-SOF, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Force QAO, Quality Assurance Office QRC, Quick Response Capability RAMS, Rockets and Missiles RCTI, Reserve Component Training Institute ROTC, Reserve Officer Training Corps RSTA, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition RTI, Regional Training Institute SA, Situational Awareness SADARM, Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition SAP, Special Access Programs SAW, Squad Automatic Weapon SBCT, Stryker Brigade Combat Team SDD, System Development and Demonstration SSD, Structured Self-Development SSG, Staff Sergeant SFC, Sergeant First Class/Strategic Fires Command SGI, Small Group Instruction SGL, Small Group Leader SHARP, Sexual Harassment and Rape Prevention Program SINCGARS, Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System SIPR, Secure Internet Protocol Router SIPRNET, Secret Internet Protocol Router Network SIR, Sistema Informatico di Reggimento SLC, Senior Leader Course

144

SMC, Sergeant Major Course SMDC, Space and Missile Defense Command SME, Subject Matter Expert/Simulated Military Equipment SOCOM, Special Operations Command SRC, Standard Requirement Code STEP, Select, Train, Educate, and Promote STO, Special Technical Operations STX, Staff Exercise STRATCOM, Strategic Communications Office SVT, Soldier Virtual Trainer TACFIRE, Tactical Fire Direction System TAD, Towed Artillery Digitization TADSS, Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations TAMMS, Target Area Meteorological Measuring System TASS, Total Army School System/The Army School System TATS, The Army Training System TATS-C, The Army Training System Courseware TBOC, Training Brain Operations Center TCM, Trajectory Correctable Munition/TRADOC Capabilities Manager/Target Coordinate Mensuration TCM IBCT, TRADOC Capabilities Manager Infantry Brigade Combat Team TDA, Tables of Distribution and Allowances TDY, Temporary Duty TECS, Target Effects Coordination System THAADS, Theater High Altitude Air Defense TIMS, Target Identification and Meteorological System TLDS, Target Location Designation System TLE, Target Location Error TLM, Target Location Module TMO, Target Mensuration Only TOE, Table of Organization and Equipment TRAC, TRADOC Analysis Center TRADOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TSM, TRADOC System Manager TSP, Training Support Package TTP, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures TWV, Tactical Wheeled Vehicle TWVRMO, Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management Office USAADAS, U. S. Army Air Defense Artillery School USACGSC, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College USAFAS, U.S. Army Field Artillery School USAFCOE, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence USAFCOEFS, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill USARIEM, U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Science USASOC, U.S. Army Special Operations Command

145

USMA, U.S. Military Academy USMC, U.S. Marine Corps VBS, Virtual Battlefield System VBS2, Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2 VBS3, Virtual Battle Space 3 VCSA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army VOLEP, Vehicle Operational Life Extension Program VTC, Video Teleconference WITA, Women in the Army WLC, Warrior Leadership Course WOAC, Warrant Officer Advance Course WOBC, Warrant Officer Basic Course WOES, Warrant Officer Education System WOIB, Warrant Officer Instruction Branch WPN, Weaponeering ZUP, Zero Velocity Updates

146

APPENDIX ONE STUDENT PRODUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016

428th Field Artillery Brigade Course Initial Inputs Graduates FACCC 305 255 FACCC-RC DL 164 116 FACCC-RC ADT 128 126 BOLC B 927 878 WOAC 51 50 WOBC 106 105 NCOA 1,676 1,609 USMC 1,559 1,388 Functional *1,483 1,353 Ordnance **108 *53 Other Courses (AIT) 5,066 4,853 Total 11,573 10,786

*Functional courses that fell under the 428th FAB included the Joint Fires Officer, Precision Fires TMO, Precision Fires Weaponeering, Precision Fires CDE, STO, FA Master Gunner, and BFIST Operator.

**Because of the length of the courses, most inputs do not graduate in the same year as they start.

Source: Email with atch, subj: Appendix One 2016, 14 Feb 17, Doc I-29; Email with atch, subj: 428FAB Student Production Figures for Annual History, 15 Feb 17, Doc I-30.

147

APPENDIX TWO KEY FCoE AND USAFAS PERSONNEL

Commanding General, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill MG John G. Rossi, 3 Jun 2014-Aug 2016 MG Brian J. Mckiernan, Aug 2016-present USAFAS Commandant and Chief of Field Artillery BG William A. Turner, 23 Jul 2014-3 Jun 2016 BG Stephen J. Maranian, 3 Jun 2016-present USAFAS Assistant Commandant U.S. Army Field Artillery School COL Michael J. Dvoracek, Jun 2014-Jul 2015 COL Heyward G. Hutson, Jul 2015-present Commander, 428th Field Artillery Regiment COL John P. Delaney, 29 May 2014-16 Jun 2016 COL Joe D. Bookard, 16 Jun 2016-present

148

APPENDIX THREE FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANTS

CPT Dan T. Moore, 19 Jul 1911-l5 Sep 1914 LTC Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., l5 Sep 19l4-26 Jun 1916 School was closed 9 July 1916-2 July 1917. COL William J. Snow, 27 Jul 1917-26 Sep 1917 BG Adrian S. Fleming, 26 Sep l9l7-11 May 1918 BG Laurin L. Lawson, 11 May 1918-18 Dec 1918 BG Dennis H. Currie, 24 Dec 1918-l0 Jun 1919 BG Edward T. Donnely, 30 Jun 1919-9 Jul 1919 MG Ernest Hinds, 25 Oct 1919-l Jul 1923 MG George LeR. Irwin, l Jul 1923-l Apr 1928 BG Dwight E. Aultman, 6 Apr 1928-l2 Dec 1929 BG William Cruikshank, 8 Feb 1930-3l Jul 1934 MG Henry W. Butner, l7 Sep 1934-10 May 1936 BG Augustine McIntyre, 29 Jun 1936-31 Jul 1940 BG Donald C. Cubbison, l Aug 1940-22 Dec 1940 BG George R. Allin, 20 Jan 1941-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-11 Jan 1944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan 1944-30 Oct 1944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct 1944-30 Aug 1945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug 1945-4 Jun 1946 MG Clift Andrus, 18 Jun 1946-9 Apr 1949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 1 Jun 1949-3l Mar 1950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr 1950-l6 Nov 1953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan 1954-28 May 1954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul 1954-23 Feb 1956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, 15 Feb 1959-6 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, 1 Apr 1964-15 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-31 May 1973 MG David E. Ott, 1 Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-21 Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 MG Eugene S. Korpal, 4 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999

149

MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007 MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 Jun 2009 BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 Jun 2009-1 Oct 2010 BG Thomas S. Vandal, 10 Dec 2010-30 Sep 2011 BG Brian J. McKiernan, Jan 2012-Apr 2013 BG Christopher F. Bentley, Jun 2013-6 Jun 2014 BG William A. Turner, 23 Jul 2014-3 Jun 2016 BG Stephen J. Maranian, 3 Jun 2016-present

150

APPENDIX FOUR CHIEFS OF FIELD ARTILLERY

*MG William J. Snow, 10 Feb 1918-19 Dec 1927 *MG Fred T. Austin, 20 Dec 1927-15 Feb 1930 *MG Harry G. Bishop, 10 Mar 1930-9 Mar 1934 *MG Upton Birnie, Jr., 10 Mar 1934-24 Mar 1938 *MG Robert M. Danford, 26 Mar 1938-9 Mar 1942 BG George R. Allin, 9 Mar 1942-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-11 Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, 12 Jan 1944-30 Oct 1944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct 1944-30 Aug 1945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug 1945-4 Jun 1946 MG Clift Andrus, 20 Jun 1946-15 Apr 1949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 9 Apr 1949-31 Mar 1950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr 1950-16 Nov 1953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan 1954-28 May 1954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul 1954-23 Feb 1956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, 15 Feb 1959-25 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 1961-31 Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-15 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-31 May 1973 MG David E. Ott, 1 Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-21 Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 *MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 *MG Eugene S. Korpal, 3 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 *MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 *MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 *MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 *MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 *MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999 *MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 *MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 *MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 *MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007 *MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 Jun 2009 *BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 June 2009-1 Oct 2010 *BG Thomas S. Vandal, 20 Dec 2010-30 Sep 2011 *BG Brian J. McKiernan, Jan 2012-Apr 2013 *BG Christopher F. Bentley, Jun 2013-6 Jun 2014 *BG William A. Turner, 23 Jul 2014-3 Jun 2016

151

*BG Stephen J. Maranian, 3 Jun 2016-present

Individuals with an asterisk by their name were officially recognized by the Department of War or Department of the Army as the Chief of Field Artillery. The War Department created the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery on 15 February 1918 to supervise the Field Artillery during World War One. On 9 March 1942 the War Department abolished the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery as part of a World War Two reorganization and placed the Field Artillery under the Army Ground Forces. When the War Department dissolved the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery on 9 March 1942, General Allin who was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School became the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery. He served as the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School until 31 June 1942. In 1983 the Department of the Army reestablished the Chief of Field Artillery to oversee the development of Field Artillery tactics, doctrine, organization, equipment, and training. Although the War Department and later the Department of the Army did not recognize an official Chief of Field Artillery from 1942 through 1983, the Commandants of the Field Artillery School considered themselves to be the Chief of Field Artillery. See TRADOC Annual Command History for 1 Oct 82-30 Sep 83, pp. 57, 308. Note: The article, “Three Chiefs,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1931, p. 115, lists Snow’s date of tenure as Chief of Field Artillery as 10 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. USAFAS’s records list 15 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. The same article lists Austin’s tenure as 22 December 1927 to 15 December 1930. USAFAS’s records list 20 December 1927 to 15 February 1930.

152

APPENDIX FIVE ASSISTANT COMMANDANTS

COL Oliver L. Spaulding, 24 Nov 1917-3 May 1918 LTC William Bryden, 4 May 1918-25 Oct 1918 COL Rine E. De R. Hoyle, 26 Oct 1918-25 May 1919 MAJ John W. Kilbreth, 24 Jun 1919-14 Nov 1919 MAJ Augustine McIntyre, 15 Nov 1919-28 Jul 1920 COL Henry W. Butner, 28 Jul 1920-30 Jun 1924 COL Daniel W. Hand, 22 Jul 1924-25 Jun 1925 LTC William P. Ennis, 26 Jul 1925-22 Jul 1929 LTC Lesley P. McNair, 23 July 1929-30 Jun 1933 COL Charles S. Blakely, 28 Jun 1933-15 Jun 1937 COL Donald C. Cubbison, 1 Aug 1937-30 Jun 1938 COL Maxwell Murray, 15 Aug 1938-12 Nov 1938 BG LeRoy P. Collins, 12 Dec 1938-17 Feb 1941 COL Mert Proctor, 17 Mar 1941-25 Jun 1941 COL James A. Lester, 4 Jul 1941-20 Feb 1942 COL Theodore L. Futch, 21 Feb 1942-2 Sep 1942 COL Lawrence B. Bixby, 7 Nov 1942-28 Nov 1943 COL Dinar B. Gjelsteen, 1 Dec 1943-3 Oct 1944 COL Thomas P. DeShazo, 16 Oct 1944-10 Oct 1947 BG Stanley R. Mickelsen, 1 Sep 1947-1 Oct 1949 BG William H. Colbern, 9 Jan 1950-1 Feb 1952 BG James F. Brittingham, 19 Mar 1952-31 Jul 1953 BG Thomas W. Watlington, 1 Aug 1953-31 Jul 1955 MG John E. Theimer, 1 Aug 1955-8 Jul 1956 BG Paul A. Gavan, 9 Jul 1956-29 Aug 1957 BG Philip C. Wehle, 30 Aug 1957-26 Apr 1959 BG Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., 23 Jul 1959-31 Jul 1962 BG James W. Totten, 1 Aug 1962-7 May 1964 BG Charles P. Brown, 15 Jun 1964-15 Jun 1965 BG John S. Hughes, 1 Jul 1965-21 May 1967 BG John J. Kenney, 22 May 1967-14 Jul 1968 BG Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., 15 Jul 1968-30 Jun 1972 BG Robert J. Koch, 1 Aug 1972-11 Jul 1974 BG Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., 15 Jul 1974-16 Jul 1975 BG Albert B. Akers, 17 Jul 1975-13 Jan 1978 BG Edward A. Dinges, 10 Aug 1978-27 Jun 1980 BG Robert C. Forman, 1 Jul 1980-8 Mar 1981 BG Donald Eckelbarger, 2 Mar 1981-29 Apr 1983 BG Thomas J.P. Jones, 29 Apr 1983-16 Jul 1984 BG Raphael J. Hallada, 1 Aug 1984-1 Apr 1986 BG Jerry C. Harrison, 29 May 1986-13 Jul 1987 BG Fred F. Marty, 13 Jul 1987-24 Aug 1989

153

BG John C. Ellerson, 24 Aug 1989-13 Aug 1990 COL Marshall R. McCree, 14 Aug 1990-14 Apr 1991 BG Tommy R. Franks, 17 Apr 1991-8 Jul 1992 BG David L. Benton III, 8 Jul 1992-1 May 1994 BG Leo J. Baxter, 24 May 1994-25 Sep 1995 BG William J. Lennox, Jr., 1 Dec 1995-13 Jun 1997 BG Toney Stricklin, 14 Jun 1997-17 Apr 1998 BG Lawrence R. Adair, 18 Apr 1998-13 Aug 1999 BG William F. Engel, 1 Oct 1999-11 Oct 2001 BG David C. Ralston, 11 Oct 2001-27 Apr 2003 BG James A. Cerrone, 4 Aug 2003-23 Aug 2004 BG Mark A. Graham, 24 Aug 2004-25 Jul 2005 BG James M. McDonald, 25 Jul 2005-22 May 2006 COL Jeffrey W. Yaeger, 22 May 2006-25 Sep 2006 COL Albert Johnson, Jr., 25 Sep 2006-27 Aug 2007 COL (P) Richard C. Longo, 27 Aug 2007-8 Sep 2008 BG Ross E. Ridge, 8 Sep 2008-4 Jun 2009 COL Matt Merrick, 19 Aug 2009-Jul 2011 COL Richard M. Cabrey, Sep 2011-4 Apr 2012 COL Martin D. Clausen, 9 Jul 2012-5 Jun 2014 COL Michael J. Dvoracek, Jun 2014-Jul 2015 COL Heyward G. Hutson, Jul 2015-present

154

APPENDIX SIX COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF USAFAS SINCE 1991

CSM Joseph J. McFadden, Jan 1991-Aug 1995 CSM Gary R. Green, Sep 1995-Aug 1998 CSM Perry L. Roberts, Aug 1998-Jun 2000 CSM Ricky Hatcher, Jul 2000-Mar 2002 CSM Dennis M. King, May 2002-May 2004 CSM Armando Ramirez, Jul 2004-Jul 2006 CSM Gary J. Bronson, Aug 2006-Aug 2008 CSM Daniel R. Willey, Jul 2009-Aug 2011 CSM Sam K. Young, Aug 2011-Sep 2013 CSM Daniel S. Moriarty, Sep 2013-Aug 2015 CSM Robert G. Lehtonen, Aug 2015-present

155

APPENDIX SEVEN COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF THE NONCOMMISSSION OFFICER ACADEMY

CSM Clifford L. Lewis, Mar 1973-Sep 1974 CSM Ralph Pitcher, Aug 1974-Jun 1975 CSM Coyle C. Bohn, Jul 1975-Apr 1976 CSM Tommy Morgan, Apr 1976-May 1977 CSM Nick Mastrovito, May 1977-Jun 1978 CSM James Kennedy, Jun 1978-May 1980 CSM George Phillips, Aug 1980-May 1983 CSM Pat Fowler, May 1983-Nov 1984 CSM John A. Pierce, Nov 1984-Jan 1986 CSM Kenneth E. Mills, Jan 1986-Aug 1988 CSM Jerry M. Laws, Aug 1988-Feb 1990 CSM William J. Kermode, Feb 1990-Jun 1991 CSM Mal Causby, Jun 1991-Oct 1991 CSM Harold F. Shrewsberry, Oct 1991-Oct 1993 CSM Karl L. Purdy, Oct 1993-May 1995 CSM Jerry L. Wood, May 1995-Oct 1997 CSM Gene Odom, Oct 1997-Jun 1999 CSM Rickey Hatcher, Jun 1999-Jun 2000 CSM Joseph Stanley, Jun 2000-Dec 2001 CSM Carl B. McPherson, Jan 2002-Jan 2004 CSM Allie R. Ousley, Jan 2004-May 2006 CSM Robert L. White , May 2006-Jul 2007 CSM Dean J. Keveles, Nov 2007-Jun 2011 CSM Bryan A. Pinkney, Jun 2011-Apr 2014 CSM Philip Brunwald, Aug 2014-present

156

APPENDIX EIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANT’S OFFICE CHART, FISCAL YEAR 2016

Source: Email with atch, subj: USAFAS Org Chart FY 16, 13 Jan 16, Doc I-42, 2015 USAFAS AH.

157

APPENDIX NINE LIST OF DOCUMENTS

See Footnotes

158

INDEX OF KEY NAMES

B

Beatty, PFC Katherine, 5, 21 Bentley, BG Christopher F., 49, 50

C

Carter, Secretary of Defense Ash, 20, 45 Cone, GEN Robert W., 48

F Fahey, Kevin M., 74

G Gruber, Edmund L., 8

H

Hamilton, Alexander, 8 Halverson, LTG David D., 12

K

Knox, Henry, 8

L

Lewis, CSM Clifford L., 31

M

Maple, MG Michael D., 58 Maranian, BG Stephen J., 1, 2 McDonald, MG James M., 13, 52, 53 McKiernan, MG Brian J., 15 Metz, LTG Thomas F., 108 Milley, GEN Mark A., 11, 20

O

Obama, President Barack, 12 Odierno, GEN Raymond, 18

159

O’Grady, COL John, 54

R

Rossi, MG John G., 10, 13, 14

S

Shinseki, GEN Eric K., 57 Stricklin, MG Toney, 56 Sullivan, COL John M., Jr., 70

T

Thrasher, MG Alan W., 58 Thurman, LTG James D., 112 Turner, BG William A., 5, 54

V

Vane, LTC Michael M., 78 Vangjel, MG Peter M., 74, 97

W

Wilson, CW5 Robert D., 4

160