1 MICHAEL J. STRUMWASSER (SBN 58413) BEVERLY GROSSMAN PALMER (SBN 234004) 2 RACHEL A. DEUTSCH (SBN 275826) STRUMWASSER & WOOCHER LLP 3 10940 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2000 Los Angeles, California 90024 4 Telephone: (310) 576-1233 Facsimile: (310) 319-0156 5 E-mail: [email protected]

6 HARVEY ROSENFIELD (SBN 123082) PAMELA PRESSLEY (SBN 180362) 7 LAURA ANTONINI (SBN 271658) CONSUMER WATCHDOG 8 2701 Ocean Park Boulevard, Suite 112 Santa Monica, California 90405 9 Telephone: (310) 392-0522 Facsimile; (310) 392-8874 10 E-mail: [email protected]

11 Attorneys for Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles, Southern California Federation of 12 Scientists, Committee to Bridge the Gap, and Consumer Watchdog

13

14 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

15 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

16 ) Case No.: 34-2013-80001589 PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL ) 17 RESPONSIBILITY-LOS ANGELES, a non- ) REPLY DECLARATION OF ARNOLD profit corporation; SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ) 18 FEDERATION OF SCIENTISTS, a non-profit ) GUNDERSEN IN SUPPORT OF corporation; COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE ) PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR 19 GAP, a non-profit corporation; and CONSUMER ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WATCHDOG, a non-profit corporation ) 20 ) Petitioners, ) 21 v. ) ) 22 DEPARTMENT OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES ) CONTROL; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ) 23 HEALTH; and DOES 1 to 100 ) ) 24 Respondents. ) ) 25 ) THE BOEING COMPANY, a corporation; ROES ) 26 1 to 100 ) ) 27 ) Real Party In Interest. ) 28

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER REPLY DECLARATION OF GUNDERSEN ISO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

1 I, Arnold Gundersen, declare and state as follows: 2 1. I make this Reply Declaration In Support of Petitioners: Physicians for Social 3 Responsibility – Los Angeles, Southern California Federation of Scientists, Committee to Bridge the 4 Gap, and Consumer Watchdog’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. I have personal knowledge of the statements herein, and if called upon to do so, could and would testify competently thereto. My 5 Curriculum Vitae is attached as Exhibit A to my prior Declaration submitted in this matter. 6 2. I submit this Reply Declaration in part to respond to the attacks by Real Party in Interest 7 the Boeing Company (“Boeing”) on my qualifications to testify regarding the topics addressed in my 8 prior declaration and on the foundation for the opinions I expressed in that declaration. Boeing 9 misrepresents my educational and professional background as well as my qualifications to testify as 10 expert on matters related to decommissioning of nuclear sites and facilities. I also identify and discuss 11 the substantive errors in the testimony submitted by Boeing and by the Respondent Department of 12 Public Health (“DPH”). 13 3. As stated in my prior Declaration, I have more than forty years of professional 14 experience in the field of nuclear engineering and the decommissioning of nuclear sites. Throughout 15 that period, I have been professionally employed on matters related to the nuclear industry with a focus 16 on the regulatory and scientific framework governing safety at operating and decommissioned nuclear 17 facilities. I have a Master of Engineering degree in Nuclear Engineering (ME NE) from the Rensselaer 18 Polytechnic Institute. I was also licensed to serve as a Licensed Reactor Operator by the US Atomic 19 Energy Commission. During the past forty years, I have provided expert consulting services to private, state, and federal entities, testified before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other state 20 and federal agencies, and served on state Commissions and Panels charged with the oversight or review 21 of projects. 22 4. I worked for more than 10 years for Nuclear Energy Services, as a Senior Vice President 23 and as a member of the Radiation Safety Committee. The NRC licensed Nuclear Energy Services to 24 perform decommissioning services, and the NRC required that the Radiation Safety Committee oversee 25 all licensed activities. In the course of my work for Nuclear Energy Services, I oversaw teams of 26 workers conducting decommissioning of major nuclear sites, including the Shippingport 27 plant in Pennsylvania. In this capacity, I was responsible for developing decommissioning plans, 28 writing and presenting decommissioning cost estimate testimony to various Public Service Commissions

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1 and ensuring that all corporate decommissioning activities would protect public health and safety. I 2 regularly oversaw radiation monitoring and thus understand what methods and techniques are required 3 to accurately calculate the radioactivity in the context of a widely contaminated site. Also in this 4 capacity, I was an invited chapter author of the very first DOE Decommissioning Handbook, written in 1982. 5 5. I have had my testimony on nuclear safety issues accepted in both adjudicatory and 6 judicial proceedings. The following matters drawn from my curriculum vitae represent instances in 7 which I presented expert testimony in adversarial and administrative settings regarding nuclear 8 engineering, safety, and radiological contamination issues: 9  Blue Castle Holdings, State of Utah 7th District Court (September 2013) as an expert witness 10 on a proposed new nuclear power plant 11

12  Fermi 3 Nuclear Power Plant, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), U.S. Nuclear 13 Regulatory Commission (May 30, 2013) expert reports admitted 14 15  Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Pickering Hearings (April 30, 2013) – written report 16 and oral testimony as an expert witness 17 18  San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, U.S. Nuclear 19 Regulatory Commission (January 2013) – written testimony as an expert witness

20  Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, New York State Department of Environmental 21 Conservation (November 2011) – written and oral testimony as an expert witness 22

23  North Anna 3 Nuclear Power Plant, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, U.S. Nuclear 24 Regulatory Commission (October 2010) – written testimony as an expert witness 25

26  Vogtle 3 and 4 Nuclear Power Plant, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, U.S. Nuclear 27 Regulatory Commission (August 2010) – written testimony as an expert witness 28

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1  Bellefonte Nuclear Power Plant, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, U.S. Nuclear 2 Regulatory Commission (2009) written testimony as an expert witness 3 4  Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (April 2008) –written testimony and oral testimony as an expert witness 5

6  Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, State of Vermont Supreme Court, (March 2006) 7 written testimony as an expert witness 8

9  Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, State of Vermont Environmental Court, (April 2007) 10 written testimony and deposition as an expert witness 11

12  Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant, New York State Department of Environmental 13 Conservation (November 2011) – written and oral testimony as an expert witness subjected 14 to cross examination 15 16  Levy County 1 and 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Florida Public Service Commission, (September 17 2009) (Progress Energy questioned credentials under cross examination and in deposition, 18 testimony accepted by FL Public Service Commission) – written and oral testimony as an 19 expert witness

20  Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, State of Vermont Public Service Board, (2003-2004) 21 written and oral testimony as an expert witness; testimony admitted into evidence, twice 22 resulting in sanctions against the Defendant Entergy (parent corporation to Vermont Yankee) 23

24  Penn Central (NRC licensee Nuclear Energy Services), United States Nuclear Regulatory 25 Commission Inspector General 26 o Testimony led to two NRC Inspector General reports and two Congressional 27 Hearings about corruption within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 28

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1 o Publicly recognized by NRC Chairman Ivan Selin, in May 1993, before U.S. Senate 2 Government Oversight Committee chaired by Senator John Glenn. 3 4  Three Mile Island Litigation (TMI) (1994-1997) – written and deposition testimony as an expert witness. 5

6 6. My expert testimony was accepted in every proceeding noted in my curriculum vitae, 7 except in the Finestone matter referenced by Boeing. In the Finestone personal injury tort litigation, I 8 was asked to perform a forensic analysis identifying the likely source of a specific release of radiation 9 that was alleged to have caused specific illnesses in two children. By contrast, the Boeing matter 10 involves questions whether a nuclear site is being decommissioned, and its nuclear wastes disposed, in 11 an appropriate manner. My testimony in the Finestone matter was thus categorically different from the 12 nature of testimony I now offer in the Boeing matter. 13 7. Boeing’s assertion that I have not been employed in the nuclear industry since 1990 is 14 factually incorrect. From 1990 to 2005, I provided nuclear safety consultation services to private, state, 15 and federal agencies under the auspices of my own company, Gundersen Management Analysts and 16 later Fairewinds. Since 2005, I have served as the Chief Engineer at Fairewinds Associates, Inc., a 17 company that provides expert nuclear consulting services to private, state, and federal entities regarding 18 the decommissioning of nuclear sites, among other areas of expertise. 19 8. In 1990, after two decades of work as an engineering and decommissioning expert for nuclear energy producers and consultants, I discovered license violations in my role as a member of the 20 Radiation Safety Committee at Nuclear Energy Services and was fired when I reported these violations 21 to the firm’s President. I then submitted sworn testimony to federal investigators regarding these 22 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license violations at Nuclear Energy Services. My testimony 23 before the United States Inspector General led to official findings of license violations and, not 24 surprisingly, to the loss of my employment within the nuclear industry. As reflected in the transcript of 25 the May 6, 1993 hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Chairman of the 26 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Ivan Selin, commended my testimony to Committee Chairman 27 Senator John Glenn, observing that “everything Mr. Gundersen said was absolutely right; he performed 28 quite a service.” Despite, or perhaps because of, my truthful testimony, I have not been employed since

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1 1990 by that segment of the nuclear industry representing energy producers and companies such as 2 Boeing. I nonetheless remain active in providing consulting services regarding nuclear safety matters, 3 as I have been regularly employed for decades by both private and governmental agencies to provide 4 analysis and opinion based upon my professional expertise and training in the decommissioning of nuclear sites and other nuclear safety issues. Boeing asserts that I was licensed to operate only a “small” 5 . In fact, I was a licensed reactor operator between 1971 and 1973 for a research facility 6 that used bomb grade (93%) uranium and which contained sufficient material to produce five atomic 7 bombs. Notably, the reactors at the SSFL site were also research reactors. I was also one of 20 Atomic 8 Energy Commission Fellows nationwide in 1972 while operating the reactor. 9 9. I have taken numerous courses in the nuclear field, including, contrary to Boeing’s 10 assertion, coursework in radiation biology. I do not, however, provide testimony in this matter 11 regarding the causation of any particular biological injuries already occasioned by exposure to nuclear 12 radiation at the SSFL site. Indeed, neither I nor the plaintiffs in this case have been permitted to access 13 the SSFL site to gather data regarding possible exposures at that site. 14 10. I have instead offered testimony regarding the risks and dangers associated with 15 decommissioning of the SSFL site, testimony that lies at the core of my expertise. The general 16 foundation for my testimony on matters related to decommissioning of nuclear sites is the expertise 17 gained through my education and years of professional experience conducting and overseeing major 18 decommissioning projects. This expertise has been recognized by the numerous adjudicatory bodies, 19 including courts, administrative law judges, and administrative tribunals that have accepted my testimony on these matters. 20 11. The specific foundation of my testimony regarding Boeing’s planned decommission of 21 the SSFL site further lies in the documents created by Boeing and government agencies regarding the 22 radiation present at the site, as compiled in the Hirsch Report that is Exhibit B to my original 23 Declaration. Based upon my review of the publicly available documentation surrounding the 24 decommissioning plans and preliminary decommissioning activities at the SSFL site, including the 25 radiation data culled by Boeing itself as posted on the EPA website, I have opined that the demolition of 26 buildings at the site, the transportation of demolished materials to facilities not designed or licensed for 27 low-level radioactive waste fails to follow accepted procedures and thereby poses unacceptable risks. 28 The foundation for these conclusions are the vast body of widely-accepted scientific knowledge

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1 regarding the potential for release of radioactive contamination from structures into the environment 2 during demolition and disposal, as well as the widely-accepted scientific knowledge regarding the 3 hazards posed to human health by exposure to radioactive materials. These subjects are core elements 4 in the training of experts in the decommissioning of nuclear sites. During the past six decades, these fields of scientific knowledge have given rise to regulatory standards (including minimum safeguards 5 and best practices) governing the decommissioning of nuclear sites both in the United States and in 6 other countries that have developed nuclear technologies. As a trained expert in the decommissioning 7 of nuclear sites and as a member of the Radiation Safety Committee of a company licensed to perform 8 the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, I am intimately familiar with those fields of accumulated 9 scientific knowledge. 10 12. As described in detail below, it is in fact Boeing that posits new science regarding the 11 decommissioning of nuclear sites, presumably in an effort to circumvent the established rules and costs 12 associated with the safe decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Boeing’s plans for decommissioning the 13 SSFL site are wholly inconsistent with the widely accepted minimum safeguards to protect human 14 health from exposure to radioactive isotopes. The testimony Boeing offers to support its plans runs 15 directly against the stream of widely accepted scientific knowledge regarding the engineering and 16 demolition of buildings and equipment, the safe disposal and containment of nuclear materials, and the 17 risks associated with human exposure to radiation. 18 13. In the paragraphs that follow, I identify and respond to the substantive errors in the 19 Declarations submitted by Boeing and Respondent Department of Public Health (“DPH”). First, I identify a few fundamental errors. 20 14. A pervasive error in all of the declarations is the testimony that once premises have been 21 released from a license pursuant to the criteria in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.86 or related DPH tables that 22 the resultant premises may be demolished and the debris disposed outside of a licensed low-level 23 radioactive waste (LLRW) facility even if the material is demonstrably contaminated, with detectable 24 activity levels above natural background radiation. This premise is false. It is widely known throughout 25 the nuclear safety field that in 1992, the United States Congress legislatively overturned the NRC’s 26 efforts to permit materials with levels of radioactivity NRC purported to be “below regulatory concern” 27 (BRC) to be disposed of in sites other than licensed LLRW disposal facilities. Since that Congressional 28 action, the NRC has not attempted to institute any BRC policy. I am familiar with the regulations

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1 governing disposal of radioactive materials. There is no amount of radioactivity above background that 2 is deemed to not be radioactive waste and required to be disposed of in a licensed LLRW site. See, e.g., 3 10 CFR §§61.3 and 61.55. The former requires all radioactive waste to be disposed of in a licensed site 4 (unless an exemption request has been granted under 10 CFR § 61.6, which has not happened here). The latter establishes the categories of LLRW. 10 CFR § 61.55 sets upper limits for the categories, i.e., 5 if more than a certain concentration the waste is not Class A but Class B or C, but there is no lower limit 6 for Class A LLRW. It is understood in the field of nuclear decommissioning that any material 7 contaminated above background must be disposed in a licensed low-level radioactive waste facility. 8 15. Similarly, I am aware from my experience in the decommissioning field that California 9 has not adopted a BRC standard for waste disposal. Indeed, it has by statute required at minimum 10 compliance with 10 CFR § 61. It is well known in the field that any wastes with radioactivity above 11 background must be disposed of in a licensed LLRW site. Accordingly, the statement that 12 decommissioning and termination from license equates to a below regulatory concern authorization to 13 dispose of materials containing radioactivity above natural background levels is simply incorrect. 14 16. Similarly, the Boeing and DPH declarants inappropriately refer to radiation standards 15 irrelevant to whether contaminated material can go to other than a licensed disposal site. They refer, for 16 example, to a 25 millirem/yr limit in NRC’s decommissioning rules for how much exposure is permitted 17 to remain at a former nuclear site once a license is terminated (10 CFR Subpart E). I am familiar with 18 that rule, and understand that this rule does not permit radioactive waste to be shipped from the site and 19 disposed of offsite in other than licensed LLRW sites. Other standards cited by the Respondents’ declarants, such as the 100 millirem/yr NRC limit for all collective exposures at the site boundary from 20 an operating nuclear reactor are contradicted by other standards that apply to public exposure to 21 radiation, such as EPA’s more protective fuel cycle rule (25 mrem dose limit; 40 CFR § 190.10), its 22 drinking water standard (4 mrem dose limit; 40 CFR § 141.66), and its CERCLA cleanup standards 23 (0.016 to 1.6 mrem/yr dose limit equivalent to the 10-4 to 10-6 cancer risk; 40 CFR§ 300.430 24 (e)(2)(i)(A)(2)). However none of these standards permits the disposal of radioactive material in an 25 unlicensed radioactive waste facility. 26 17. The Boeing and DPH declarants also inappropriately compare purported doses from the 27 release of these contaminated materials to the levels of radiation that humans cannot avoid receiving 28 from background sources of radiation, including the radon component of background, implying thereby

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1 that background must be safe and that anything below background must be safe. As an expert in 2 decommissioning and nuclear safety, I am aware that it is the official judgment of EPA and the National 3 Academy of Sciences (NAS) that there is no safe level of radiation, i.e., no threshold below which there 4 is no risk, and that background produces large numbers of cancers. I attach as Exhibit A to this Reply Declaration a true and correct copy of the Executive Summary of United States Environmental 5 Protection Agency (USEPA) publication Radiogenic Cancer Risk Models and Projections for the U.S. 6 Population, EPA 402-R-11-001, April 2011, which states that exposure to natural background radiation, 7 excluding radon, produces a risk of cancer of 0.87 percent. (See p. 2.) I attach as Exhibit B to this 8 Reply Declaration a true and correct copy of Public Summary of the National Academy of Science’s 9 Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation VII (“BIER VII Phase 2”) by the 10 National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academies Press, 2006, 11 which predicts that “approximately one individual per hundred would be expected to develop cancer 12 from a lifetime (70-year) exposure to low ) LET, natural background radiation (excluding radon and 13 other high-LET radiation).” (p. 8.) Radon, discussed by Boeing witness Dr. Christopher Whipple, is 14 totally irrelevant to the potential harm caused by exposure to the manmade radioactive isotopes at the 15 SSFL site. 16 18. At paragraph 35 of his Declaration, Dr. Whipple cites to a proposal by the Health Physics 17 Society, an advocacy organization for radiation officers that frequently pushes for relaxing regulations 18 on their industry. I am aware that these proposed levels for clearance of contaminated solid materials 19 have not been adopted as regulations by federal or California regulators. Likewise, Dr. Whipple’s refers to a document issued for comment by the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose charter is the 20 promotion of nuclear power. That document, not even final, also suggests clearance for disposal of 21 contaminated materials. But it too has not been accepted by federal or state regulators. 22 19. Those two papers, however, show the very wide range of estimates of potential dose 23 from levels such as found in Reg. Guide 1.86, extending over six orders of magnitude (i.e., differing by 24 factors of up to a million.) Contrary to Dr. Whipple’s assertion, the papers did not choose the most 25 conservative values for their recommended clearance values. Thus, Dr. Whipple’s claim that Reg. 26 Guide 1.86 levels would produce doses of only a few millirem per year are not even supported by the 27 proposals cited. Indeed, the USEPA has estimated that doses as high as 45 millirem per year, just for a 28 reoccupation scenario for a worker (i.e., 8 hours a day, 250 days per year). Attached to this Reply

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1 Declaration as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of a December 8, 2000 letter to Mr. Dan Hirsch from 2 Larry Bowerman of USEPA Region XI, enclosing slides that show the range of dose estimated prepared 3 by USEPA’s contractor Tetra Tech if a SSFL structure were released from a license under “surface 4 activity levels,” which were the proposed release limits for the facility (as shown in other Tetra Tech reports included in Boeing’s demolition notices, these limits were the Reg. Guide 1.86 limits). The 5 document shows a dose as high as 45 mrem/year for thorium, which would be the equivalent of more 6 than 20 chest X-rays a year, year after year, for decades. (A posterior-anterior chest X-ray produces 7 approximately 2 millirem exposure.) 8 20. It is critical to observe that the Boeing and DPH declarations do not dispute the findings 9 in my prior Declaration or the Hirsch Report included as Exhibit B which show that there is radioactive 10 contamination in the debris in question, and that because of problems with the measurements, the 11 contamination could be far greater than the levels reported. The Declaration and Report explained that 12 Boeing used detection levels so high that it couldn’t reliably “see” contamination at the limits it 13 established to clear the site. The Declaration and Report explained that Boeing used significantly 14 inflated background values and then subtracted them from the measurements, resulting in net readings 15 far lower than the real values. The Declaration and Report showed that Boeing’s background values 16 kept changing, and were far higher than the EPA contractor’s values. And the Declaration and Report 17 concluded that nonetheless, many of Boeing’s readings exceeded even the release limits Boeing was 18 using. 19 21. Instead of acknowledging that the measurements exceeded Boeing’s limits, the Boeing and DPH declarants compare Boeing’s measurements to far higher limits (sometimes 50 times higher) 20 that were not in fact the Boeing limits. In my experience decommissioning sites, I am aware that these 21 higher limits are not appropriate to use, where, as here, the sampling at a site does not measure for 22 specific radionuclides. In that case, it is necessary to assume that more dangerous isotopes, like 23 plutonium-239, may be present, and use the more protective standards. That is in fact what Boeing 24 chose to do in its release criteria tables; its own measurements showed numerous exceedances of those 25 limits as set forth in the Hirsch Report. 26 22. The witnesses for Respondents and Boeing present misleading testimony and exhibits 27 regarding the applicability of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.86 to the disposal of demolished building 28 components containing reactive material. Both DPH witness Robert Greger and Boeing witness Dr.

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1 Macolm Knapp rely upon statements in NUREG-1757, taken entirely out of context and omitting more 2 relevant discussion in NUREG-1757. Indeed, Dr. Knapp contents that “a true and correct copy of” 3 NUREG-1757 is attached to his declaration; however Exhibit C to Dr. Knapp’s declaration contains 4 only an extremely brief excerpt of NUREG-1757. The included excerpt, and the passages quoted in Mr. Greger’s declaration, at paragraph 8, are misleading. NUREG-1757 contains specific instructions for 5 handling volumetric contamination, such as in concrete building materials, and these instructions do not 6 reference Regulatory Guide 1.86 levels. Indeed, the very next section of NUREG-1757 after the 7 sections excerpted by Dr. Knapp and Mr. Greger, section 15.11.1.2, provides that “[i]n the case of 8 volumetrically contaminated materials, NRC staff has not provided guidance like that found in Reg 9 Guide 1.86 for surface contamination.” A true and correct copy of NUREG-1757 section 15.11.1.2 is 10 attached as Exhibit D to this Reply Declaration. Section 15.11.1.2 states plainly that the limits in 11 Regulatory Guide 1.86 are not intended to apply to the release of volumetrically contaminated materials. 12 Indeed, NUREG-1757 explains that in the case of reactor licenses, like those applicable to SSFL, 13 “materials can be released if no licensed radioactive material above natural background levels is 14 detected, provided the radiation survey used a detection level that is consistent with the lower limit of 15 detection values used to evaluate environmental samples.” (emphasis added) These statements are 16 consistent with my earlier testimony that materials containing radioactive contamination above 17 background levels may not be disposed in facilities without a license for low-level radioactive waste. 18 23. DPH witness Robert Greger testifies that “not all radiation above background is 19 hazardous enough to require that the radioactive materials resulting in the radiation be disposed in a licensed low-level radioactive waste facility.” (paragraph 3.) Mr. Greger also testifies that “the 20 nationally and internationally recognized standard for the acceptable dose of ionizing radiation to 21 members of the public . . . is 100 mrem per year from all combined non-background radiation sources.” 22 (paragraph 7.) This is untrue. First, the 100 mrem dose is not limited to a single source of 23 contamination like SSFL, but rather from all sources encountered over the course of a year. Second, as 24 set forth in my Declaration, a linear-no-threshold standard applies to the risk from exposure to radiation. 25 BIER VII, included in Exhibit B, explains why the expert scientists who drafted the report adopted the 26 linear-no-threshold approach to conclude that there is no dose of radiation below which there is not an 27 increased risk of cancer or other physical impact on human health. (See Exhibit B, pp. 9-10.) The 28 document explains that while the risk of harm is lower at low doses, there is still a risk of harm at any

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1 dose. My testimony relies upon the conclusions in BIER VII that there is always a risk of harm from 2 exposure to radiation and thus that in decommissioning and demolishing a contaminated site one must 3 endeavor to avoid any increased dose of radiation to the public. Finally, the 100 mrem standard for 4 exposures at an operating licensed reactor site has nothing to do with allowing disposal of LLRW in an offsite unlicensed facility. 5 24. Mr. Greger’s testimony regarding dose in paragraph 5 of his declaration is misleading. 6 Boeing’s measurements are not provided in millirems, which is the dose measurement discussed by Mr. 7 Greger. Boeing’s measurements are provided in disintegrations per minute. The level of energy in a 8 particular isotope is highly relevant in determining its biological effect, and this is not captured by 9 Boeing’s measurements of disintegrations per minute. There are three types of radiation present at 10 SSFL and each has a different Relative Biological Effectiveness, because there are varied energy levels 11 of the emitted particles and a further distinction must be made if the radiation is internally absorbed or 12 from an external source. For instance, an external alpha particle will not penetrate the skin, but an 13 internal alpha particle will create cellular damage. 14 25. Mr. Greger’s testimony regarding the Boeing measurements contained in Appendices C, 15 D, and E of the Hirsch Report is also erroneous. Mr. Greger testifies in his paragraph 9 that my 16 Declaration incorrectly stated that Boeing’s data showed instances where samples measured exceeded 17 the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.86 levels, claiming that the measurements do not exceed the stated 18 “Maximum” level on the charts. Mr. Greger misunderstands the standard for the use of “Average” and 19 “Maximum” levels as set forth in both Regulatory Guide 1.86 and in Boeing’s limits. Table 1 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.86 (attached as Exhibit 3 to the Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice) contains 20 the applicable limits, and explains in footnotes (c) and (d) the permissible use of average and maximum 21 values. (See Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 3, p. 1.86-5.) Footnote (c) explains that 22 average values are to be averaged over one square meter only; footnote (d) explains that radioactivity at 23 the maximum value is permitted only where the contamination is demonstrated to occur on only 100 24 square centimeters. Boeing’s data contains no indication that there were multiple readings over a square 25 meter, or that the readings over 100 dpm (the “Average” limit) were confined to a specific 100 square 26 centimeter area. There is no basis in the data for one to conclude that any high reading is a small 27 hotspot of less than 100 square centimeters. Therefore, values in excess of the 100 dpm limit are 28 considered to be in excess of Regulatory Guide 1.86 limits. Indeed, Boeing in its table identifying the

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1 standards it used for demolition and disposal sets a limit of 100 dpm for alpha radiation, and its 2 measurement table cite 100 dpm as the standard against which to compare those measurements. 3 Boeing’s own data shows that it is violating the standard it claims that it applied. 4 26. Mr. Greger concedes that one measurement exceeds even the 300 dpm maximum limit, and attempts to explain away this high value in an erroneous manner. Mr. Greger’s explanation is 5 erroneous. There is no basis in Boeing’s data to conclude what radionuclide caused the high reading, 6 and no additional sampling was conducted. Moreover, one cannot average the value of this sample with 7 the remainder of the debris upon demolishing the building, as Regulatory Guide 1.86 explains that 8 values may be averaged only over a single square meter. 9 27. The testimony by Boeing witness Dr. Malcolm Knapp is likewise flawed in several 10 critical respects. In addition to the fundamental error discussed above of confusing release from a 11 nuclear license with the ability to dispose of waste containing materials with man-made radioactivity 12 above natural background levels in a facility without a license for low-level radioactive waste, Dr. 13 Knapp makes several specific errors that should not be overlooked by this court. Dr. Knapp asserts in 14 paragraph 55 that “the radiological building at SSFL have been surveyed appropriately and repeatedly 15 for both surface and volumetric contamination.” The testimony references three different surveys of one 16 Boeing building, including a survey analyzing soil samples, and one looking for gamma emitters in solid 17 samples. This testimony does not demonstrate that Boeing has sampled appropriately for volumetric 18 contamination at this or any other radiological building. Soil samples are unrelated to volumetric 19 contamination in structures. The referenced Tetra Tech survey of solid samples for gamma emitters would be unlikely to detect plutonium, for example, which is an alpha emitter; indeed, Tetra Tech noted 20 that in its survey of the plutonium building it would not be able to detect plutonium that had been 21 painted over. Sampling for volumetric contamination requires taking a significant number of volumetric 22 samples from meaningful locations within a facility where contamination is most likely to be located. 23 Floors are more likely to be contaminated than ceilings, for instance. Dr. Knapp does not provide a 24 comprehensive sample of volumetric locations from which to draw his conclusion that sampling was 25 indeed appropriate. The reports show that there were in fact very few such samples, and for many 26 structures, none at all. My experience from decommissioning cleanups is that volumetric contamination 27 is most always present. 28

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