OVER the HILLS and FAR AWAY: The MARS Task Force, the Ultimate Model for Long Range Penetration Warfare

By Troy J. Sacquety

Vol. 5 No. 4 1 One of the great military engineering projects, the Ledo Road bypassed the Japanese controlled part of the Burma Road, to permit the delivery of supplies to besieged China.

he China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) is almost forgotten Chinese Army had to have desperately needed supplies Tin WWII history. However, the Theater—especially to constitute a viable threat. operations in Burma—is still very relevant for ARSOF. Although the effort was insufficient, the air bridge from The several special operations legacy units that served India to Kunming, China supplied vital resources until there provided lessons that remain current. Because the Ledo Road was complete. Japanese fighter aircraft of the difficult operating environment all U.S. ground based at Myitkyina, Burma were a major threat for Allied combat forces slated for Burma were uniquely organized cargo planes flying the “Hump” route. This forced the and specifically mission-oriented. Two of these units, the unarmed aircraft to fly a longer and more dangerous Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Detachment 101 and course. Clearing higher passes in the Himalayas and the the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), more commonly additional distance meant that aircraft carried less cargo. known as Merrill’s Marauders, have received considerable To secure the trace of the Ledo Road and make the Hump recognition for their accomplishments. However, another flights more effective, Myitkyina had to be taken from the Army special operations legacy unit, the 5332nd Brigade Japanese. It was for this reason that the U.S. Army formed (Provisional), known as the MARS Task Force, has not. the GALAHAD Force [nicknamed Merrill’s Marauders This article “introduces” that unit to Veritas readers with a after their commander Brigadier General (BG) Franklin brief overview of its organizational structure, subordinate D. Merrill], the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). units, and campaign history. But, why were Long Range The 3,000-man Marauders started their penetration Penetration Groups (LRPG) needed in Burma? campaign in February 1944 and by late May, secured Myitkyina’s airfield. Three grueling months in the A Unique Mission Burmese jungle, numerous sharp engagements, and From the outset, Burma presented a challenge for disease—typhus, malaria, and dysentery—considerably the United States Army. The British were in charge reduced the strength of the LRPG. They were not strong of operations in the country because it was their enough to capture the city of Myitkyina by themselves and former colony. In north Burma, the U.S.-led Northern the attached Chinese units did not help. Even though the Combat Area Command (NCAC) had a small force of Marauders were already spent, they remained Lieutenant mostly Chinese troops. These were nominally under General (LTG) Joseph W. Stilwell’s only American ground American control. Burma was one of the most difficult combat force in NCAC. Politically, he could not withdraw geographical environments in WWII and a lack of the unit to rest and refit. As American replacements resources plagued operations. NCAC had to clear the arrived in theater, LTG Stilwell committed them, and area so that it could build a bypass—the Ledo Road— others hastily scraped together from in-theater personnel from Ledo, India to the portion of the Burma Road not to the siege of Myitkyina. controlled by the Japanese. Otherwise, all supplies Replacements, often poorly trained for the mission, into China had to arrive by air. Secondly, the Allies were derisively dubbed “New GALAHAD” by the wanted to keep the bulk of the Japanese ground forces dwindling veterans, even as they changed the image of engaged in mainland Asia because the main advance the Marauders. But, they kept an American presence against Tokyo was across the Pacific islands. To keep on the battlefield. The new arrivals quickly became the bulk of the Japanese Army fixed, the Nationalist combat veterans as the Allied noose was tightened

China-Burma-India MARS Task Force Merrill’s Marauders Chindit Patch SSI Patch Patch

2 Veritas around Myitkyina. Even so, by the time the city fell in early August, the Marauders (old and new GALAHAD) were combat-ineffective. The remainder, still fit, became the core for the newly activated 475th Infantry Regiment (Long Range Penetration, Special). NCAC created the 3,100-man unit on 5 August 1944 at Myitkyina and relocated it to nearby Camp Robert W. Landis for combat training on the banks of the Irrawaddy River ten miles north of Myitkyina.1 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William L. Osborne, a former Marauder and veteran of the 1941-42 Philippines campaign, took command of the regiment, a part of the lineage of the 75th Ranger Regiment.2 The 475th Infantry was just one of the major components that made up the second LRPG created specifically for service in Burma, the MARS Task Force. The MARS Task Force NCAC activated the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional), the MARS Task Force, on 26 July 1944 under the command of BG Thomas A. Arms.3 After a motor vehicle accident, he was replaced by BG John P. The MARS Task Force trained at Camp Robert W. Landis before 4 Willey on 31 October 1944. The second component setting out on combat operations in late 1944. for the 5332nd, the 124th Cavalry Regiment (Special), a federalized Texas National Guard unit of 2,700 men, arrived at Ramgarh, India in late August 1944. As one of the last horse cavalry units, the 124th was formed in 1929 and saw extensive service patrolling the Texas- Mexico Border and maintaining order in the Texas oilfields. After Executive Order No. 8594 federalized the unit on 18 November 1940, it moved to Fort Bliss, TX. The 124th continued to patrol the Mexican Border Brigadier General John until April 1944 (Mexico did not declare war on the P. Willey commanded Axis Powers until May 1942). The U.S. Army sent the MARS Task Force in the field. the unit to Fort Riley, KS, and ordered it to dismount. Mules replaced horses because only they had the mobility needed for Burma.5 Despite being cavalry without horses, the unit retained “squadrons” instead of battalions and “troops” instead of companies. After the fall of Myitkyina, the unit moved to Camp Landis, Burma to join elements of the 475th Infantry.6 The 1st Chinese Regiment (Separate), commanded by Colonel Lin Kuan-hsiang, was to be the third combat component of the MARS Task Force. Like the 124th Cavalry, it had been schooled in LRPG tactics at the Ramgarh Training Center.7 Although assigned on paper to the MARS Task Force, in reality, it was the NCAC reserve and never fought with the 5332nd.8 Thus, the MARS Task Force organized as a brigade with two combat teams. However, unlike the 5307th, the 5332nd was made self-suffic ient w it h attac hed suppor t i ng u n its. The largest of these were two mule pack field artillery battalions (FAB) of approximately 460 men each; the 612th and 613th FAB (Pack). They were a natural choice for MARS and among the few artillery formations The 124th Cavalry was a Texas National Guard unit in Federal designed from the start to be part of an Army Special Service. Although replacements thinned the ranks, a large Operations unit. (Article continues on page 6) percentage of the men were Texans.

Vol. 5 No. 4 3 GALAHAD and the MARS Task Force: Two Vastly Different LRPGs for Burma

The U.S. Army modeled GALAHAD, the 5307th With no organic artillery the Marauders were Composite Unit (Provisional), after a British LRPG outgunned by the Japanese until aircraft dropped dubbed the “Chindits.” In mid-1942 British Major two 75mm M1 pack howitzers to the 2nd Battalion. General Orde C. Wingate formed the Chindits to Improvised crews, made up of Marauders who had operate deep within Japanese held-territory. The served with the 98th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack) on British followed the first Chindit operation in early New Guinea, manned the guns. The two howitzers 1943 with a second in 1944 that coincided with helped counter the Japanese artillery at Nhpum Ga, NCAC’s push for Myitkyina. It was in that push and provided much needed artillery support during that Merrill’s Marauders got “bloodied” in combat. the two month siege of Myitkyina. Originally conceived to serve as the American Another shortcoming was the Marauders’ lack component of MG Wingate’s Chindit command, of coordination with the local guerrillas. Kachin the 5307th organized along British lines; three light tribesmen organized and armed by Detachment 101 of battalions, each subdivided into two color-designated the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were a significant combat teams.1 Like the Chindits, the entire force combat force in the Marauder area of operations. ranged well ahead of Allied lines and received Although BG Merrill knew about Detachment 101, he resupply by airdrop alone. Entering the field as did not capitalize on their talents.2 It would be the an independent unit, however, the Marauders’ acting commander, Colonel Charles N. Hunter, who organization proved unsatisfactory and the first praised the Kachins and credited them with “saving American LRPG encountered a steep learning curve. over two-thirds of Merrill’s forces.” They warned The absence of artillery and the lack of coordination the unsuspecting American force of the Japanese with local guerrillas were most noteworthy. Both counterattack that created the siege of Nphum Ga. became necessities when the Japanese surrounded Afterwards, the Kachins became an integral part of the the 2nd Battalion at Nhpum Ga in April 1944. Marauders.3 Other problems plagued the Marauders.

4 Veritas Drastic rates of death and incapacitation from disease (Separate) ever joined the unit, the MARS Task Force were unanticipated. Mobile medical facilities would would have been the size of a light division. Using the have helped as would have additional veterinary care lessons learned from the Marauders, the MARS Task for their mules. The lessons of the Marauders were Force was designed to be the model of an ideal LRPG integrated into the MARS Task Force structure. The for Burma, with artillery, support, and medical facilities unit “was able to profit by the experience of Wingate’s integral to all maneuver elements. Raiders [Chindits] and Merrill’s Marauders in Burma jungle operations.”4 Endnotes 1 Merrill’s Marauders (Washington D.C: Military Intelligence Division, U.S. nd As the second LRPG created for Burma, the 5332 War Department, 1945), 12-13; Charlton Ogburn, Jr., The Marauders (New Brigade (Provisional) did not resemble the Marauders, York: Harper, 1959), 15. even though it was a successor unit. MARS addressed in 2 For more on the OSS Detachment 101 role in the Myitkyina Campaign, see “A Special Forces Model: Detachment 101 in the Myitkyina Campaign duplicate the deficiencies in GALAHAD’s organization. Part I” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History 4 (1): 30-47 Both regimental combat teams had organic field (2008); and “A Special Forces Model: Detachment 101 in the Myitkyina Campaign Part II” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations History 4 ( 3 ) : artillery, medical, and quartermaster units, and three 38-53 (2008). platoons of Kachins detailed from the OSS to serve 3 “KNOTHEAD GROUP,” [March-May 1944], F 48, B 38, E 190, RG 226, as an intelligence and reconnaissance force.5 The National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD; Anonymous, Merrill’s Marauders (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of headquarters controlled veterinary, additional medical, Military History, 1990), 96-97. and a small element capable of interrogating Japanese 4 LTC Ralph E. Baird, “Narrative History – 5332d Brigade (Prov), copies prisoners and translating captured documents. These provided by the USAJFKSWCS Archive and the Mr. Randy Colvin were not the only differences. collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. 5 John Randolph, MARSmen in Burma (Columbia, MO: University of Size wise, the MARS Task Force, of nearly 7,000 Missouri-Columbia, 1990), 33-40. th men was twice as big as the 5307 Composite Unit 6 Numerical breakdown of the MARS Task Force, provided by the Mr. Randall (Provisional) of 3,000 men.6 Had the 1st Chinese Regiment Colvin collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Vol. 5 No. 4 5 Activated at Camp Gruber, OK, on 17 December 1943 and filled by personnel from nine different U.S. Army posts, the 612th Field Artillery (Pack) trained at Camp Carson, CO, before it shipped out for Bombay, India.9 There, on 26 August 1944, one of the artillerymen commented on the crowded waterfront and wrote, “If all of India is like this I know I am not going to like it.”10 He did not have much time to find out. Elements of the 612th reached Camp Landis on 19 September, but the rest trickled in through early November. On 12 November LTC Severn T. Wallis assumed command a nd t he 612 th was attac hed to t he 475 th Infantry Regiment shortly afterwards.11 The 613th FA had also been activated at Camp Gruber, OK on the same date, under the command of LTC James An M1 75 mm pack howitzer with its 613th FAB crew. F. Donovan. 12 With personnel from Fort Bragg, NC, and Camp Carson, CO, the 613th trained at Camp Carson before following its sister unit across the Pacific. It arrived in India on 23 November and six days later was engaged in jungle training at Camp Landis, Burma and attached to the 124th Cavalry.13 The organization of the 612th and 613th FABs was identical. Each battalion had four batteries; A, B, C, and Headquarters and Service (H/S). The firing batteries, A, B, and C, had four 75 mm pack howitzers each. A single firing battery supported a battalion in the th475 or a squadron in the 124th. The firing batteries had a Detail and Service Section and four Gun Sections, led by a Sergeant. Corporals served as gunners and there were five Private First Class cannoneers in each howitzer crew. Cannoneers had specific jobs: the #1 man assisted the The Field Artillery received its ammunition in clover-arranged Gunner with elevation and fired the howitzer (pulled the tubes of three, that were packed three to a mule. Each gun lanyard); #2 man loaded and unloaded the gun, #3 and had at least a basic load of twenty-seven rounds at all times. #4 men set the fuse and proper charge for range, and #5 1st Section, C Battery, 612th Field Artillery fires at Japanese positions near the Burma Road, 19 January 1945. Standing at left is SGT George Hasse, while (L to R) PFCs John Elliot and Stan Eddy kneel at the gun trail.

6 Veritas Unlike Merrill’s Marauders, each regiment in the MARS Task Force and the 5332nd Brigade Headquarters had attached mobile medical units. The 44th Portable Surgical Hospital seen above supported the 475th Infantry Regiment. man adjusted the direction of fire by moving the trail of nineteen dogs were attached to the 124th and sixteen the howitzer to the correct compass azimuth. Ten other men and dogs to the 475th.18 Each regiment had a mobile privates served as mule drivers that packed/unloaded medical facility assigned to take care of the sick and the guns and ammunition.14 Muleskinner Corporal wounded while deep in Japanese territory. The Task Phillip Sparn, C Battery, 613th FAB, recalled that “we took Force headquarters controlled veterinary and other care of that mule better than we did ourselves.”15 medical units, as well as photographers and Nisei In addition to artillery, a host of smaller units translators. Civil Affairs tasks, such as paying cash for were attached. Critical to the 5332nd were the Army war damaged crops, were handled by Captain Terrance Quartermaster Mule Teams. By providing additional Carroll, a British officer from NCAC headquarters.19 The pack support beyond those mules supporting each regiment and FAB, the Quartermaster units increased the quantity of supplies that the MARS Task Force carried, allowing it to conduct independent operations longer. Initially, mules were a novelty to many of the soldiers, although that quickly changed. One muleskinner, SGT Ernie Mutch, said “When it comes to eatin’ and sleeping with ‘em, I lose my affection damn fast.”16 Despite some dissatisfaction associated with the mules, they proved invaluable in Burma. The MARS brigade-wide standard of one mule leader per animal meant that the mule trains moved very efficiently, if a bit unwieldy and slowly. The 3,000 mules in the 5332th—all shipped from the United States—made the Task Force largely self-sufficient.17 Smaller units had specific functions. Each regiment had a section of “war dogs.” Twenty enlisted men and The MARS Task Force had sections of “war dogs” After the USAAF dropped supplies to the MARS Task Force, assigned to both the 475th Infantry Regiment and the soldiers then had to repack the material onto the mules. the 124th Cavalry Regiment. Special harnesses helped distribute the loads on the mule’s back to prevent injury and fatigue.

Private First Class James L. Miller, L Company, 3rd Battalion, 475th Infantry, rests with his mule prior to climbing a steep grade on 10 February 1945. Carrying the majority of the unit’s supplies, mules were critical to MARS Task Force operations.

Vol. 5 No. 4 7 Civil Affairs officer British Captain Terence Carroll, assigned Japanese-American Nisei assisted the MARS Task Force by to NCAC, pays local villagers for war damage caused by the translating captured documents or interrogating prisoners. MARS Task Force. Although assigned to the command group, they served in each of the two regiments. only outside support came from the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) 10th Air Force. Since the Japanese lost air superiority over Burma after Myitkyina, this enabled the 10th Army Air Force MARS Task Force to exploit its SSI LRPG capabilities to the utmost. NCAC supplied the MARSmen by air dropping food and ammunition by parachute every three days.20 In addition to aerial resupply, the USAAF also evacuated the sick and wounded of MARS. The unit would not simply leave their casualties behind as the British had in their 1943 Chindit operation. Light liaison aircraft like the Stinson L-1 Vigilant and the Stinson L-5 Sentinel performed medical evacuations. Although small and limited to one or two Once a place was found on which to land a light plane, wounded wounded at a time, their ability to take off and land on and sick soldiers were evacuated by air to hospitals in the rear. short improvised runways made them ideal. Sick and injured had only to stay in the field until a suitable landing site was found. A critical support element for MARS came MARSmen had to reduce obstacles on potential landing strips from the indigenous population. while on the march so that wounded or sick soldiers could be evacuated. Here, local roofing material followed by earth, was used to cover a trench.

8 Veritas Casualty evacuation by air was not foolproof as shown by this wreckage of an L-5 near Namhkam, Burma on 20 January 1945. Uneven and improvised landing fields claimed many aircraft.

Although the majority of wounded were evacuated safely once airborne, not all were. Four men had to be rescued from this overloaded L-1.

Route of the MARS Task Force in Burma, December 1944-March 1945.

Although not assigned or attached, three platoons of OSS Detachment 101-led Kachin tribesmen acted as intelligence and reconnaissance scouts for each regiment. Originally created for intelligence collection and sabotage in Japanese-controlled Burma, Detachment 101 expanded its Detachment 101 capability to conduct guerrilla warfare. Patch With recruits primarily from the Kachin tribes of north Burma, the OSS had a distinct advantage over the Japanese and ambushes were invariably deadly. In addition, the unit supplied tactical intelligence to the The Kachin tribesmen of OSS Detachment 101 (Jingpaw USAAF for bombing missions. The Kachins scouted at Rangers) provided valuable service to the MARS Task Force. least a day ahead of the MARS main body. In doing so, They scouted ahead of the main body, identifying drop zones they located Japanese troop concentrations, drop zones, and warning of enemy forces. and medical evacuation strips.

Vol. 5 No. 4 9 When elements of the MARS Task Force left Camp Landis, the initial marches were “shake downs.” During these stretches, the soldiers shed excess equipment and learned to carry only the bare minimum.

With these elements assigned and attached, the MARS Task Force was combat-ready after a relatively short training period. The 475th Infantry began moving south into Japanese-controlled Burma in late November 1944. The 124th Cavalry followed them out of Camp Landis in mid-December. On these early marches soldiers shed excess equipment and learned to carry only what was needed to live in the field, though special things were occasionally hidden in a mule load. The MARS Task Force campaign consisted of three phases: first, the march from Camp Landis to the first combat at Tonkwa; second, the mission to cut the Burma Road; and third, the movement to serve as instructors in the Chinese Combat Command. Private Charles H. Pelsor, E Company, 2nd Battalion, 475th Infantry, fires a Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) at Japanese MARS Enters the Field near Tonkwa on 15 December 1944. The march south from Camp Landis on 17 November ended at Tonkwa for the 475th, supported by the 612th F A B . They had been ordered by NCAC to help the Chinese envelop Tonkwa. From 12 to 24 December, the 612th FAB assisted the 475th by firing approximately 2500 shells on enemy positions.21 The 475th was first “bloodied” at Tonkwa. Private First Class Richard W. Hale, who experienced a banzai charge, said, “The [Japanese] made a mistake by preceding their attack with a ten-minute artillery barrage, so we were more than ready for them . . . The charging Japanese ran into a firestorm of .30 caliber bullets. I do not know how many of the 220 Japanese dead at Tonkwa we killed that night, but they broke off that action and never tried it again against our portion of the perimeter.”22 After helping to weaken the Japanese hold on Tonkwa, the Chinese 50th Division managed to occupy the town during the British drive in Central Burma. This forced the enemy to retreat south, ceding the area to the Allies.23 After Tonkwa, the MARS Task Force was ordered to intercept retreating Japanese forces Corporal Tony S. Damiano shows Private Joseph P. Knoapack by cutting the Burma Road near Nampakka, Burma, close Christmas stockings he received in a package from home, 20 to where the Ledo Road intersected it. It was also the site December 1944, Tonkwa, Burma. of a large enemy ammunition dump. For Phase Two, the

10 Veritas 475th joined the 124th, which had left Camp Landis on 16 December 1944 headed for Nampakka. Cutting the Burma Road deep in enemy-held territory was critical for several reasons. First, it hindered Japanese lines of communication to their forces north of the block, forcing the enemy to retreat, freeing all convoys traveling the now completed Ledo Road from Japanese interference. Second, NCAC hoped to goad reluctant Chinese forces into action by placing an American force deep inside Japanese territory—an attempt to embarrass them into resuming the offensive. Third, securing the area lessened the Japanese threat to the rear of British forces in the west who were driving south into Central Burma. During the Second Phase, the MARS Task Force validated its mission as a long This photograph shows the terrain that the MARS Task Force traversed in order to reach range penetration unit. the Burma Road. It took a whole day for a single battalion to pass any given point. All resupply came by air because the route of march traversed some of the most difficult terrain in the world. The official U.S. Army history stated, “The men would peer ahead and look out across

Because they were plentiful, MARSmen used parachutes to make life as comfortable as possible. This soldier uses a silk parachute as a foxhole liner.

Once the MARS Task Force entered enemy territory, its only link for outside assistance was by radio.

Vol. 5 No. 4 11 MARSmen cross the swollen Shweli River on 2 March 1945. Soon If a mule lost its footing and went over the side of the trail, the after, heavy rains threatened to sweep the “bridge” away. Mules unfortunate muleskinner was duty-bound to retrieve the animal were unpacked and led across one at a time while the men carried if it were still alive, or to salvage the load if not. the supplies. the valleys to where lay row on row of hills, like the waves of a frozen sea.”24 Marching up the steep mountains and back down into the valleys was so exhausting that at times one or two minutes of climbing was followed by five minutes of rest. One particularly hard day the Task Force only managed to march three and a half miles.25 Trails were so narrow and precipitous that fully-loaded mules occasionally toppled over the side. When that occurred, MARSmen climbed down to collect the lost supplies, and bring the mule back to the column if it was alive, or to shoot it on the spot if it was too injured to do so. Fortunately, few mules were lost. The intermittent rain plagued the 124th and its attached units because they were following the 475th column. Trails became mud slides. At the Shweli River, the trail down was so steep and muddy that it was nicknamed the “Shweli Slide” because once you started down it “there was no stopping until we hit the bottom,” recalled John Randolph, who chronicled the campaign in MARSmen in Burma.26 “We crossed some of the roughest country in the world, and after seventeen days of marching, we arrived at the Burma Road,” wrote one 612th FAB soldier in his diary.27 Still, they managed to surprise the Japanese 4th Regiment on 17 January 1945. Then, in a scene reminiscent of the Battle of Gettysburg during the American Civil War some eighty years before, both sides rushed to secure the high ground. Unbeknownst to the MARS Task Force, the Japanese had nearly 11,500 men in the area (the entire 56th Division, the 168th and 4th Regiments, and the regimental- sized Yamakazi Detachment).28 Outside combat

When on the march, the MARS Task Force columns stretched for several miles. Because the trails were often narrow, the 7,000 men and 3,000 mules had to travel single-file.

12 Veritas assistance for MARS came from American airpower. Fortunately, the Japanese were intent on withdrawing their forces south to fight the British at Mandalay. Putting a noose on the Burma Road was a serious problem. The MARS Task Force secured elevated positions looking down on the Burma Road, but, the Japanese managed to keep the Americans from cutting the roadbed. The Americans could only block the road temporarily with artillery fire and occasional ambushes. Fierce Japanese opposition limited maneuver. It became a knockdown fight for control of the heights overlooking the road, with the MARS Task Force also forced to protect the rear area drop and evacuation zones. On 17 January, the 475th had captured its first positions. This permitted the 612th Field Artillery to interdict enemy traffic with its pack howitzers, forcing the Japanese Soldiers of the 475th Infantry attempt to capture Loi-Kang hill units to use the road only at night. By the next day, the on 17 January 1945. Stubborn Japanese resistance prevented Japanese had recovered. From positions overlooking the their success until much later. Americans, observers called in larger caliber artillery to reach the drop zones. It took several days before pack howitzers firing at maximum range and the USAAF reduced the threat. Blockage of the Burma Road was having an effect. On 21 January, MARS Task Force patrols encountered the Chinese 114th Regiment, which had begun to push south. For the next week, the MARS Task Force patrolled on the west side of the road and tried to interdict Japanese traffic with artillery fire. With their forces in full retreat along the Burma Road and adjacent trails, the Japanese goal became to prevent the Task Force and nearby Chinese from cutting off their escape. Both regiments of the 5332nd were hard pressed. The 2nd Battalion, 475th Infantry struggled to seize Loi-Kang hill and the village on top. It took two battalions to push the enemy off the hill. The 124th Cavalry faced similar obstacles. An observer from the 612th FAB calls in artillery on Japanese (Article continues on page 15) positions along the Burma Road, 19 January 1945.

Directed by MARS Task Force observers, the USAAF bombs Japanese positions near the Burma Road. The road is seen The MARS Task Force’s positions overlooking the Burma in the middle foreground. Road forced the Japanese to use it only at night. Then, the Americans placed machine-gun and artillery fire on the road to harass the enemy and prevent them from using the road in the dark.

Vol. 5 No. 4 13 1LT Jack L. Knight First Lieutenant (1LT) Jack L. and intrepidity were responsible Knight was the Commander of F for the successful elimination of Troop, 2nd Squadron, 124th Cavalry most of the [Japanese] positions Regiment. On 2 February 1945, 1LT and served as an inspiration to the Knight received orders to attack the officers and men of his troop.”31 right side of a Japanese-held ridge When 1LT Knight was killed, north of Loi-Kang.29 The intent Second Lieutenant (2 LT) Leo C. was to gain a closer ridge from Tynan, his artillery observer from which the 124th could more easily the 613th FAB, took command of F interdict Japanese traffic retreating Troop when he discerned that all down the Burma Road. The attack other officers were wounded or was fierce; all officers in F Troop dead. For his gallantry during the were either killed or wounded.30 attack, 2LT Tynan was awarded 1LT Knight’s heroic actions were the Silver Star.32 particularly valorous, based on his COL William L. Osborne, the 124th Medal of Honor citation. Cavalry commander, commented: “On 2 February 1945, near Loi- “In over four years of combat Kang, Burma, First Lieutenant Jack I have seen many officers fight Llewellyn Knight, 124th Cavalry and die for their country, but the Regiment, MARS Task Force, led actions of Lieutenant Knight in his cavalry troop against heavy leading his troop against a strong concentrations of enemy mortar, artillery, and small enemy will always remain as the finest example of arms fire. After taking the troop’s objective and while American courage, valor, and leadership of any officer I making preparations for a defense, he discovered a nest have had under my command. It is officers of Lieutenant of Japanese pillboxes and foxholes to the right front. Knight’s caliber, and troops that follow that kind of Preceding his men by at least 10 feet, he immediately leadership, who are winning the war—not colonels led an attack. Single-handedly, he knocked out two and generals.”33 The British head of the South East enemy pillboxes and killed the occupants of several Asia Command—which oversaw NCAC in theater— foxholes. While attempting to knock out a third Lord Louis Mountbatten, proclaimed on 18 February pillbox, he was struck and blinded by an enemy 1945 that the hill that F troop had captured would be grenade. Although unable to see, he rallied his troops declared “Knight’s Hill.”34 1LT Knight from Garner, and continued forward in the assault on the remaining TX, was the only ground combat soldier to receive the pillboxes. Before the task was completed, he fell Medal of Honor in the CBI. He was also the only soldier mortally wounded. First Lieutenant Knight’s gallantry from an ARSOF legacy unit to do so in WWII.

MARSmen snipe at Japanese positions near the Burma Road. MARSmen move into an assembly area on 18 January 1945 The Mars Task Force was issued “light-gathering” night scopes before launching another attack on the Japanese. called “sniperscopes” and “snooperscopes” to improve night marksmanship.

14 Veritas The Japanese hold was finally broken on 9 February. One MARSman later said, “They really gave us the works, but we were better.”35 The MARS Task Force lost 115 killed in action and 938 wounded, but the unit had validated LRPG operations.36 Unfortunately, this battle was to be its last. Events in north Burma rapidly turned in NCAC’s favor. With the upper reaches of the Burma Road in Allied hands, the Japanese could no longer hold north of Lashio. The rapid advance of NCAC’s Chinese divisions after the British breakthrough forced the Japanese to withdraw even further south. Isolated Japanese elements A 4.2 inch mortar crew fires on Japanese positions. Like the concentrated in the eastern Shan States. NCAC tasked OSS 75 mm pack howitzers, the 4.2 inch mortars were mule-packed. Detachment 101 to harass these forces and prevent them from escaping to reinforce enemy units in Thailand.37 With no combat mission remaining for the MARS Task Force in Burma, the unit was ordered to China to advise and train the Nationalist Chinese Army; its third phase of activity. From March to May 1945, elements of the MARS Task Force were flown to China, but the mules were transported overland in seven groups. In two of the groups, the mules caught surra, an insect-born parasitic blood disease. They, and those in another group that ran out of water during the trip, were destroyed. Some 2,000 mules were turned over to the Chinese Army pack artillery units and 1,000 were lost en route.38 In China, most troops served as training cadre in the Chinese Combat Command. Each component had specific training responsibilities, for instance the Field (Article continues on page 17) To prevent the Japanese from recovering their stranded vehicles during the night, patrols used explosive charges After blowing a large crater in the Burma Road on to destroy the enemy equipment. 19 January 1945, a MARS Task Force patrol returns in daylight to inspect the night’s “catch” of two tankettes and a truck.

Vol. 5 No. 4 15 On 17 January 1945, the MARS Task Force surprised the enemy by marching deep into their territory and attacking the Burma Road. This map shows the positions of the two opposing forces on 19 January 1945. The surprised Japanese quickly recovered and fiercely defended the hills to the east of the road, preventing the MARS Task Force from cutting it. The best the MARS Task Force could do was interdict it with artillery fire and occasional patrols. There was a stalemate for two weeks until the Japanese retreated under pressure from Chinese forces in the north. This was the last combat mission of the LRPG.

After attacking the Burma Road, the MARSmen were ordered south but the rapid Chinese advance ended further combat for the force.

16 Veritas Artillery soldiers trained the Chinese on 75 mm and 105 mm howitzers. It was a mission for which they had not Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of trained, but fortunately, it did not last long. On 11 June Nebraska–Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from 1945 the MARS Task Force was disbanded, and on 1 July Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC 1945 both the 475th Infantry and 124th Cavalry and their History Office staff he worked several years for the Central attached units followed suit. Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Although technically not a Ranger unit, the MARS Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special Task Force is part of the lineage of the U.S. Army Ranger operations during World War II, and Special Operations Regiment, validating several operational concepts.39 The units in Vietnam. MARS model of an LRPG in Burma, proved how vital attached artillery and indigenous units were. It also Endnotes reinforced the Marauder and OSS proven use of air 1 Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI evacuation for wounded and sick soldiers and that mules (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1999), 94. still had a role in an age of mechanized combat. With 2 COL Osborne fell ill after his campaigning with the Marauders and was replaced by COL Ernest F. Easterbrook. He later returned to the MARS Task these central concepts the MARS Task Force had the Force in early January 1945 to replace COL Thomas J. Heavey as commander combat power to drive deep into enemy-occupied territory of the 124th Cavalry. to break the Japanese hold on the northern stretches of 3 Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, 90. the Burma Road. Yet, the MARS Task Force remains 4 Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, 95. somewhat forgotten. This article is a primer on the 5 John Randolph, Marsmen in Burma (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, Columbia, 1990), 5, 11-15. organization and service of that LRPG. Future articles 6 Robert W. Landis was the first member of Merrill’s Marauders to be killed will explore the special training and combat operations in action. of the MARS Task Force in depth. 7 Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, 90. 8 LTC Ralph E. Baird, “Narrative History – 5332d Brigade (Prov),” copies Thank you to the MARS Task Force Mountain Artillery provided by the USAJFKSWCS Archives and the Mr. Randy Colvin collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Association for helping with this article, in particular, Mr. 9 MARS Task Force Artillery Association, “History of the 612th Field Artillery Randall Colvin and LTC (ret) Willard B. Woodruff. Thanks go Battalion (PK), Copy in the USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, as well to my colleagues Earl J. Moniz and Ms. Laura Goddard NC. It was filled out with officers and enlisted men from Camp Carson, CO, Fort Sill, OK, Camp Butner, NC, Fort Bragg, NC, Fort Meade, MD, Camp for acquiring and preparing the photographs for publication. Shelby, MS, Fort Sheridan, IL, Fort Riley, KS, and Camp Roberts, CA. 10 Hiram Vance Boone, “S.S. Cyrus W. Field,” copy provided by Mr. Randall Colvin, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. 11 Randy Colvin, “The Saga of Two GIs,” copy provided to the USASOC History Office, the Mr. Randy Colvin collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. 12 “Some Highlights in the Unit History of the 613th FA Bn,” copy provided by Mr. Randall Colvin, the Mr. Randy Colvin collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. 13 “From the Official Log of the 613th F.A. Battalion (PACK),” copy provided by Mr. Randall Colvin, the Mr. Randy Colvin collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. 14 Randy Colvin, “Mountain Artillery Assn 612th & 613th Field Artillery Battalion (PK), September 1998, copy provided to the USASOC History Office, the Mr. Randy Colvin collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. 15 Phillip Sparn, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 3 September 2009, Washington D.C, notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Chinese Training Command Patch

The MARS Task Force patch became the The USAAF started flying the men of MARS to China in March model for the 75th Ranger Regiment 1945 to serve as trainers in the Chinese Combat Command. Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI).

Vol. 5 No. 4 17 16 SGT John McDowell, “Mules, Vets of Burma, China Bound,” CBI Roundup, 29 MAJ George B. Jordan, “The Operations of 2d Squadron, 124th Cavalry 9 August 1945, copy provided to the USASOC History Office by Mr. Randy Regiment Special in the Battle of Knight’s Hill, 29 January -2 February 1945 Colvin, the Mr. Randy Colvin collection, USASOC History Office Classified (Personal Experience of a Squadron Commander),” Advanced Infantry Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Officers Course Paper, 1948-1949, Fort Benning, GA, copy in the USASOC 17 Baird, “Narrative History – 5332d Brigade (Prov).” History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. th 18 Randolph, Marsmen in Burma, 37. 30 Jordan, “The Operations of 2d Squadron, 124 Cavalry Regiment Special in the Battle of Knight’s Hill.” 19 Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, 214. 31 Charles Briscoe, “Lieutenant Jack L. Knight; MARS Task Force MOH 20 George W. Patrick, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 23 April 2008, Fort Winner,” Special Warfare, February 2004, 38-41. Bragg, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. For more on air resupply in Burma, see “Wings Over Burma: Air 32 Bill Knight, Knight’s Hill: The Story of a Family in War (Victoria, BC, Canada: Support in the Burma Campaign,” Veritas: Journal of Army Special Operations Trafford, 2004), 273. History 4 (2): 16-29 (2008). 33 “Jack L. Knight Medal of Honor Winner,” The Burman News, December 2005, 21 “Combat History of the 612th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack) North and 2-3. Central Burma Campaigns 18 November, 1944-18 April, 1945,” [May 1945], 34 Jordan, “The Operations of 2d Squadron, 124th Cavalry Regiment Special in copy in the USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. the Battle of Knight’s Hill.” 22 Richard W. Hale, “The MARS Task Force in Burma: A Personal Memoir,” 35 Delong, “C BTRY 612th.” http://www.americanveteranscenter.org/?page_id=1654, accessed 27 October 36 Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, 213. 2009. 37 OSS Detachment 101 received a Presidential Unit Citation for its role in this 23 Baird, “Narrative History – 5332d Brigade (Prov).” final campaign. 24 Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, 187. 38 Randall Colvin, “The Move of Mules from Burma to China, 1945,” Copy 25 Baird, “Narrative History – 5332d Brigade (Prov).” provided by Mr. Randall Colvin, the Mr. Randy Colvin collection, USASOC 26 Randolph, Marsmen in Burma, 120. History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; SGT John McDowell, “Mules, Vets of Burma, China Bound,” India-Burma Theater Roundup, 9 August 1945. 27 John R. Delong, “C BTRY 612th,” Copy provided by Randall Colvin, the th Mr. Randy Colvin collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort 39 “Special Troops Battalion 75 Ranger Regiment Lineage,” http://www. Bragg, NC. history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/lineages/branches/inf/0075ra-sptpsbn. htm, accessed 23 September 2009. 28 Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, 190.

18 Veritas