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OVER the HILLS and FAR AWAY: The MARS Task Force, the Ultimate Model for Long Range Penetration Warfare By Troy J. Sacquety Vol. 5 No. 4 1 One of the great military engineering projects, the Ledo Road bypassed the Japanese controlled part of the Burma Road, to permit the delivery of supplies to besieged China. he China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) is almost forgotten Chinese Army had to have desperately needed supplies Tin WWII history. However, the Theater—especially to constitute a viable threat. operations in Burma—is still very relevant for ARSOF. Although the effort was insufficient, the air bridge from The several special operations legacy units that served India to Kunming, China supplied vital resources until there provided lessons that remain current. Because the Ledo Road was complete. Japanese fighter aircraft of the difficult operating environment all U.S. ground based at Myitkyina, Burma were a major threat for Allied combat forces slated for Burma were uniquely organized cargo planes flying the “Hump” route. This forced the and specifically mission-oriented. Two of these units, the unarmed aircraft to fly a longer and more dangerous Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Detachment 101 and course. Clearing higher passes in the Himalayas and the the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), more commonly additional distance meant that aircraft carried less cargo. known as Merrill’s Marauders, have received considerable To secure the trace of the Ledo Road and make the Hump recognition for their accomplishments. However, another flights more effective, Myitkyina had to be taken from the Army special operations legacy unit, the 5332nd Brigade Japanese. It was for this reason that the U.S. Army formed (Provisional), known as the MARS Task Force, has not. the GALAHAD Force [nicknamed Merrill’s Marauders This article “introduces” that unit to Veritas readers with a after their commander Brigadier General (BG) Franklin brief overview of its organizational structure, subordinate D. Merrill], the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). units, and campaign history. But, why were Long Range The 3,000-man Marauders started their penetration Penetration Groups (LRPG) needed in Burma? campaign in February 1944 and by late May, secured Myitkyina’s airfield. Three grueling months in the A Unique Mission Burmese jungle, numerous sharp engagements, and From the outset, Burma presented a challenge for disease—typhus, malaria, and dysentery—considerably the United States Army. The British were in charge reduced the strength of the LRPG. They were not strong of operations in the country because it was their enough to capture the city of Myitkyina by themselves and former colony. In north Burma, the U.S.-led Northern the attached Chinese units did not help. Even though the Combat Area Command (NCAC) had a small force of Marauders were already spent, they remained Lieutenant mostly Chinese troops. These were nominally under General (LTG) Joseph W. Stilwell’s only American ground American control. Burma was one of the most difficult combat force in NCAC. Politically, he could not withdraw geographical environments in WWII and a lack of the unit to rest and refit. As American replacements resources plagued operations. NCAC had to clear the arrived in theater, LTG Stilwell committed them, and area so that it could build a bypass—the Ledo Road— others hastily scraped together from in-theater personnel from Ledo, India to the portion of the Burma Road not to the siege of Myitkyina. controlled by the Japanese. Otherwise, all supplies Replacements, often poorly trained for the mission, into China had to arrive by air. Secondly, the Allies were derisively dubbed “New GALAHAD” by the wanted to keep the bulk of the Japanese ground forces dwindling veterans, even as they changed the image of engaged in mainland Asia because the main advance the Marauders. But, they kept an American presence against Tokyo was across the Pacific islands. To keep on the battlefield. The new arrivals quickly became the bulk of the Japanese Army fixed, the Nationalist combat veterans as the Allied noose was tightened China-Burma-India MARS Task Force Merrill’s Marauders Chindit Patch SSI Patch Patch 2 Veritas around Myitkyina. Even so, by the time the city fell in early August, the Marauders (old and new GALAHAD) were combat-ineffective. The remainder, still fit, became the core for the newly activated 475th Infantry Regiment (Long Range Penetration, Special). NCAC created the 3,100-man unit on 5 August 1944 at Myitkyina and relocated it to nearby Camp Robert W. Landis for combat training on the banks of the Irrawaddy River ten miles north of Myitkyina.1 Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William L. Osborne, a former Marauder and veteran of the 1941-42 Philippines campaign, took command of the regiment, a part of the lineage of the 75th Ranger Regiment.2 The 475th Infantry was just one of the major components that made up the second LRPG created specifically for service in Burma, the MARS Task Force. The MARS Task Force NCAC activated the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional), the MARS Task Force, on 26 July 1944 under the command of BG Thomas A. Arms.3 After a motor vehicle accident, he was replaced by BG John P. The MARS Task Force trained at Camp Robert W. Landis before 4 Willey on 31 October 1944. The second component setting out on combat operations in late 1944. for the 5332nd, the 124th Cavalry Regiment (Special), a federalized Texas National Guard unit of 2,700 men, arrived at Ramgarh, India in late August 1944. As one of the last horse cavalry units, the 124th was formed in 1929 and saw extensive service patrolling the Texas- Mexico Border and maintaining order in the Texas oilfields. After Executive Order No. 8594 federalized the unit on 18 November 1940, it moved to Fort Bliss, TX. The 124th continued to patrol the Mexican Border Brigadier General John until April 1944 (Mexico did not declare war on the P. Willey commanded Axis Powers until May 1942). The U.S. Army sent the MARS Task Force in the field. the unit to Fort Riley, KS, and ordered it to dismount. Mules replaced horses because only they had the mobility needed for Burma.5 Despite being cavalry without horses, the unit retained “squadrons” instead of battalions and “troops” instead of companies. After the fall of Myitkyina, the unit moved to Camp Landis, Burma to join elements of the 475th Infantry.6 The 1st Chinese Regiment (Separate), commanded by Colonel Lin Kuan-hsiang, was to be the third combat component of the MARS Task Force. Like the 124th Cavalry, it had been schooled in LRPG tactics at the Ramgarh Training Center.7 Although assigned on paper to the MARS Task Force, in reality, it was the NCAC reserve and never fought with the 5332nd.8 Thus, the MARS Task Force organized as a brigade with two combat teams. However, unlike the 5307th, the 5332nd was made self-suffic ient w it h attac hed suppor t i ng u n its. The largest of these were two mule pack field artillery battalions (FAB) of approximately 460 men each; the 612th and 613th FAB (Pack). They were a natural choice for MARS and among the few artillery formations The 124th Cavalry was a Texas National Guard unit in Federal designed from the start to be part of an Army Special Service. Although replacements thinned the ranks, a large Operations unit. (Article continues on page 6) percentage of the men were Texans. Vol. 5 No. 4 3 GALAHAD and the MARS Task Force: Two Vastly Different LRPGs for Burma The U.S. Army modeled GALAHAD, the 5307th With no organic artillery the Marauders were Composite Unit (Provisional), after a British LRPG outgunned by the Japanese until aircraft dropped dubbed the “Chindits.” In mid-1942 British Major two 75mm M1 pack howitzers to the 2nd Battalion. General Orde C. Wingate formed the Chindits to Improvised crews, made up of Marauders who had operate deep within Japanese held-territory. The served with the 98th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack) on British followed the first Chindit operation in early New Guinea, manned the guns. The two howitzers 1943 with a second in 1944 that coincided with helped counter the Japanese artillery at Nhpum Ga, NCAC’s push for Myitkyina. It was in that push and provided much needed artillery support during that Merrill’s Marauders got “bloodied” in combat. the two month siege of Myitkyina. Originally conceived to serve as the American Another shortcoming was the Marauders’ lack component of MG Wingate’s Chindit command, of coordination with the local guerrillas. Kachin the 5307th organized along British lines; three light tribesmen organized and armed by Detachment 101 of battalions, each subdivided into two color-designated the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) were a significant combat teams.1 Like the Chindits, the entire force combat force in the Marauder area of operations. ranged well ahead of Allied lines and received Although BG Merrill knew about Detachment 101, he resupply by airdrop alone. Entering the field as did not capitalize on their talents.2 It would be the an independent unit, however, the Marauders’ acting commander, Colonel Charles N. Hunter, who organization proved unsatisfactory and the first praised the Kachins and credited them with “saving American LRPG encountered a steep learning curve. over two-thirds of Merrill’s forces.” They warned The absence of artillery and the lack of coordination the unsuspecting American force of the Japanese with local guerrillas were most noteworthy. Both counterattack that created the siege of Nphum Ga. became necessities when the Japanese surrounded Afterwards, the Kachins became an integral part of the the 2nd Battalion at Nhpum Ga in April 1944.

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