Introduction 1 the Concentric Circles of Democratization

Notes

Introduction 1. System I is more intuitive and automatic than System II, which is more effortful and calculating. See Kahneman (2013). The analogy drawn here is with the conception of democratization, and not the ways in which analysis was undertaken to arrive at this conception. Explaining democratization through elections, parties, civil society and culture is much more frequent, intuitive and straightforward than accounting for it in terms of policy making. The term policy making covers all policy phases—design, debate, implementation, evaluation and monitoring. 2. Scholars dissatisfied with the limitations imposed by a procedurally minimalist understanding of democratization have come up with “expanded procedural minimums” which, in addition to elections and certain basic rights, cover factors such as the effective power to rule for elected governments. For more, see Collier and Levitsky (1996). Neither “expanded procedural” definitions nor “maximalist” explanations of democracy, which cover socioeconomic in addition to political rights, have accounted for policies pertinent to democratization, nor have they attempted to draw out the substantive minimums of a democracy.

1 The Concentric Circles of Democratization: Teasing Out the Common Drivers 1. Cosmopolitan, universal or global ethics are defined as “a systematic reflective inquiry into the nature, content, justification and application of a global ethic,” itself defined as a “claim about universal and transnational responsibilities, or a set of values and norms universally accepted; or widely shared by people from all over the world.” See Dower (2005: 26). 2. Many scholars differentiate between persistence and consolidation drawing boundaries between stability and legitimacy. Often, the argu- ments for differentiating between the two center on the quality of democracies. See Rose and Shin (2001). 140 Notes

3. In the second volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty, first published in 1976, Hayek called the idea of social justice a “mirage.” See Hayek (1982). 4. Such a shift in Lasswell’s thinking on democracy is remarkable. His earlier work—extending back to his dissertation in 1926—viewed democracy as the ability of the rational political elite along with the scientists to manipulate the irrational masses through symbols and myths. See Lasswell (1926). 5. Rostow’s (1964) model of Stages of Growth complemented Lipset’s political analysis. It enumerated the steps through which economies must go in order to grow, also based on Western countries’ experiences. 6. Other modernization theorists who have explored and posited strong relations between economic development, modernization and democratization are Cutright (1963), Neubauer (1967), Needler (1968), Winham (1970), Coulter (1975), Bollen (1979), Muller (1995), Londregan and Poole (1996) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997). 7. For more on Easton, see Miller (1971). 8. For more, see Coppedge et al. (2008). 9. Some scholars referred to a third type as a theoretical tool to study the relationship between state and organized groups in liberal democracies. For more, see Williamson (1985). 10. Bell (1973) divided the modernization phase into the first industrialization and the second post-industrialization phases. The first period was linked with bureaucratization, centralization, rationalization and secularization. The second period was associated with creativity, self- expression and choice, also dubbed as postmodernism. 11. Munck and Leff (1997) categorized Chile as reform from below, Huntington (1991) as transformation, and Schmitter and Karl (1991) somewhere between imposition and a pact. Other cases bear similar dif- ficulties of categorization, such as Argentina, Greece, Peru and Zambia. 12. Stradiotto and Guo (2010) demonstrated that the opposition-led cooperative pacts result in higher average levels of democracy in the post- transitional phase compared to other transitional modes, and that they have the greatest survival rate within ten years of transition. Nilsson (2012) found that negotiated settlements following civil war are more conducive to democratization than truces or military victories. 13. O’Donnell (1992) made an additional distinction between the first transition starting with the end of the authoritarian regime and the establishment of a democratic government through elections; and the second transition, equated with democratic consolidation or the effective func- tioning of a democratic regime. Later, O’Donnell (1993) also distinguished between a democratic regime and a democratic state. A democratic state was a democratic regime or a consolidated democracy that, in addition, included guarantees vis-à-vis citizen rights to fair and equal protection in their social and economic relationships. Notes 141

14. Terry Karl coined the term “fallacy of electoralism” to refer to the inad- equacy of equating democratization with elections alone (Karl 2000, Carothers 2002, Diamond 2002). Committing the fallacy was about adopting an excessively minimalist definition of democracy in which accountability, the broadest meaning of representative democracy according to Schmitter (2004: 47), was relegated to elections. The fallacy instigated numerous and broader definitions and measurements of democracies and democratization (Schmitter and Karl 1991, Munck and Verkuilen 2002). It also led to the distinction between an electoral and a liberal democracy. The latter refused considering systems with enclaves of authoritarianism as democratic even though the overall system was based on fair, free and competitive elections, legitimate constitutions and effective multiparties. It required extended legal and political rights for citizens, and strengthened horizontal accountability among governing institutions (R. A. Dahl et al., The Democracy Sourcebook, Boston: The MIT Press, 2003. Available at http://downloads.pavroz. ru/files/democracysourcebook.pdf ). 15. For a definition of horizontal accountability, see Chapter 3. 16. Multiparty democracies and proportional representation were associated with more democratic but less pragmatic systems of democracy based on mutual consultation and a legislature with a ministerial vote of no confidence. Two-party democracies and the Westminster system of representation were associated with less democratic but more pragmatic systems of democracy based on turnover of power through periodic elections and a legislature without the ministerial vote of no confidence. Parliamentary systems of governance associated with the first model and the presidential systems associated with the second were not the only two categories analyzed by the democratization scholars. Many different combinations lay in between parliamentarian and presidential regimes, including hybrid semi-presidential regimes where both the President and the Parliament are directly elected by the people, hence the question of dual legitimacy and its associated implications on democratization. For more, see Shugart (2005) and Sedelius and Berglund (2012). 17. Human capital refers to the norms and values held by individuals con- stituted by formal education and/or organizational skills. For more, see Becker (1993). Cultural capital includes the full range of a society’s symbolic resources, from the norms and values that individuals bring to or encounter in interactions with others to the religious, philosophical, artistic, and scientific understandings that frame and interpret reality. For more, see Bourdieu (1990). 18. Three major shifts detectable in the civil society-democratization literature of the decade were: (i) internationalization of civil society—move from a nation-based civil society to globally active civil society; (ii) gender- sensitive civil society—increased emphasis on women’s role in civil 142 Notes

society activism; and (iii) policy-driven civil society activism—policies that support or hamper the positive impact of civil society on democratization. In all three focus areas, linkages with democratization were increasingly couched in historical and comparative perspectives. 19. R. O. Keohane et al., “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism.” Inter national Organization 63 (Winter 2009): 1–31. Available at https:// www.princeton.edu/~rkeohane/publications/DEMfinal.pdf 20. R. Dominguez, “Diffusion of EU Norms in Latin America: The Cases of Mexico, Venezuela and Honduras,” Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman paper series 10, 1 (February 2010), Miami: Florida European Center. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/15000/1/DominguezEU_LatinAm NormDiffFeb10Edi.pdf 21. F. Decker and J. Sonnicksen, The Direct Election of the Commission President: A Presidentialist Approach to Democratizing the European Union, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2009. Available at http://www.zei.uni-bonn.de/dateien/discussion-paper/dp_c192_ Decker_Sonnicksen.pdf 22. In terms of the unique circumstances of conflict and post-crisis cases, Miller (2012) argued, based on his analysis of 167 countries from 1875 to 2004, that development leads to authoritarianism because it reduces the likelihood of violent leader removal. For Miller, economic development would lead to democratization only if a violent turnover preceded the first democratic elections. In contrast, Fortna and Huang (2012) maintained that peacekeeping in conflict and post-conflict cases does not affect democratization; economic development does. 23. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) defined economic crisis as an annual growth rate of less than five percent of GDP/capita in any of the pre- ceding five years (65). 24. During economic crises, the private sector, instead of supporting the incumbent regime, cooperates with the lower and middle income groups who protest against the economic grievances. The military also stops supporting the incumbent regime in the face of budget cuts. 25. P. Y. Lipscy, “Democracy and Financial Crisis,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, Stanford University, California, November 12, 2011. Available at http://www. stanford.edu/~plipscy/democracycrisis.pdf 26. Albertus and Menaldo (2012) found that the coercive capacity of the authoritarian regime is negatively associated with the likelihood of democratic transitions and the level of subsequent democracy. 27. The use of historical and state–society interaction perspectives were also used to re-examine successful cases of democratization found in the non-Western world. Haddad (2010), for instance, in his analysis of cultural democratization in Japan, demonstrated how traditional institutions changed and adopted to the new circumstances rather than being overhauled and replaced. Notes 143

28. J. Granato, “Cultural Values, Stable Democracy and Economic Development: A Reply.” American Journal of Political Science 40, 3 (August 1996): 680–696. Available at http://www.class.uh.edu/ hcpp/jimgranato/CulturalValuesStableDemocracyAndEconomic Development.pdf 29. R. V. Jackman and R. Miller, “A Renaissance of Political Culture?” University of Nebraska-Lincoln Political Science Publications 50, 1996. Available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1050&context=poliscifacpub 30. M. Helbling, “Nationalism and Democracy: Competing or Complementary Logics?” Living Reviews in Democracy 1, (2009): 1–14. Available at http://democracy.livingreviews.org/index.php/lrd/article/ view/lrd-2009-7 31. Religious endowment to charity with all profit or products going to the poor or other good purposes.

2 The Transparency Triangle: Differentiating Inputs, Outputs and Outcomes 1. This would not apply to the instances when the ruling party perceives its likely loss in the upcoming elections, and thus, supports transparency as a strategy to weaken the winning party. Transparency is also used as a strategy to weaken the political party expected to win the upcoming elections in presidential systems as in South Korea’s Sunset provisions, which allow a government to undo the policies of the previous government. For more, see Baum and Bawn (2011). 2. For more on the process and the convention, see European Com mission (1998). 3. Confidentiality pressure by national governments who have a monopoly over the information requested by the international organizations has been used to curtail transparency (Keohane 2005). 4. Open Budget Index operationalizes a transparent budget as the presence of a legal and administrative framework, publicly available fiscal information depending on the various stages of the budget cycle, data quality standards, strength of budget oversight institutions such as the legislature and supreme audit institutions, and opportunities for public engagement in budget processes. For more, see Luna-Reyes and Chun (2012). 5. Several scholars have found a robust and negative association between extractive industries and transparency. See McFerson (2010), Williams (2011), Norman (2012). 6. Although some scholars have drawn distinctions between “openness” and “transparency,” often pointing at the latter as encompassing the 144 Notes

former, the terms have often been used synonymously. For more, see Heald (2006). 7. Available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/48825133.pdf 8. Heald (2006) also differentiated between Transparency Inwards, when citizens could see inside the operations of government, and Transparency Outwards, when subordinates in the government could see outside the government. 9. Required transparency clauses included the investigation of closed sessions, and the optional transparency policies comprised the introduction of codes of conduct, registry of lobbyists and the creation of the office for an auditor general and an integrity commissioner. The munic- ipalities that adopted more than the minimum requirements were often the larger ones that already had policies similar to the voluntary transparency policies suggested by the central government. 10. Wikileaks is an international online non-profit organization that publishes classified information leaked by whistleblowers in public and private institutions. It published confidential information on the Afghan and Iraq wars, and the Guantanomo Bay detention camp from 2010 to 2011. For more, see Margetts (2011). 11. Internal and external transparency divide has also been attributed to the nature of the power holders in ensuring and regulating transparency. External transparency control has been attributed to sociopolitical actors such as elected politicians, civil society and the judiciary. Internal transparency control, in turn, has been associated with internal organizational workings, office heads and auditors. See Moore (2004). 12. FOIA/Ls have often been sponsored by the government agencies themselves, often by diverting agency funds from other projects. FOI offices tend to be understaffed, underfunded and backlogged. In the United States, the 20 days of maximum response provision period is rarely respected by government agencies, and some agencies, such as the State Department, CIA and the FBI, may take much longer to respond. 13. Openness and secrecy are the two halves of one whole in this sense (Cohen 2010: 6) and they are both useful in different issue matters and in different degrees. 14. FOIA/Ls have seldom been consistently implemented across different administrations, let alone different countries. With each change of administration in the United States, a new stand on freedom of information was announced by the Attorney-general of the incoming government. Even though during the Clinton administration, government agencies had to prove harm to justify withholding information, during the second Bush administration, it was acceptable to retain information based on legal justification. As for the differences across countries, some FOIA/Ls as in Zimbabwe and Belarus, might read more like secrecy acts rather than right-to-know clauses. See C. Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Rulemaking Process, Notes 145

Penn.: University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2008. Available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/transparencyReport.pdf. 15. Performance.gov was launched in 2011 to make government agencies’ performance plans, reports and annual programs available to civil society. Congressional reports, and testimonies on agencies’ performance are available online but not searchable or comparable. 16. Wikileaks transparency is not an entirely positive phenomenon in itself or for democratization. Depending on the nature of the information that is leaked, serious security and privacy concerns may arise and jeop- ardize the overall freedoms and democracy, including transparency. 17. Regime type and transparency were found to be correlated even after controlling for GDP/capita, IMF participation, country-fixed effects and time trends. For more, see Hollyer et al. (2011). 18. P. Birkinshaw, “Transparency as a Human Right,” in Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? edited by C. Hood and D. Heald, London: British Academy Publications Online: February 2012. Available at http://www.britishacademypublications.com/view/10.5871/bacad/ 9780197263839.001.0001/bacad-9780197263839-chapter-3 19. S. Aftergood, “Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works,” Yale Law and Policy Review 27, 399 (2009): 399–416. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/aftergood.pdf 20. Transparency in elections concerns clear rules for citizen participation, all statutory instruments and ways to deal with electoral malpractice, such as underage registration, vote and polling station results doctor- ing, and impersonation; and political parties laws. See Debrah (2011). 21. Alt et al. (2002) find that in the United States the individual (fiscal) popularity of policy-makers might be what is making them more transparent, and not necessarily the fact that they were socialized in democratic systems. 22. Although not causally determinant, level of democracy and freedom of press were found to be permissive factors for the emergence, development and spread of transparency. 23. For more, see Hood (2011). 24. De Fine Licht (2011) found that transparent decision-making procedures weaken general trust in public health care. 25. Politics is understood as how conflicting and competing demands are converted into decisions, and policy refers to actions carried out in order for decisions to be perceived as binding in the production of outcomes. 26. Peter Eigen, a manager at the World Bank, became increasingly dis- tressed by the bank’s failure to address corruption in its loan-giving to nations, and founded in 1993 with a few of his colleagues, Transparency International (TI), which examines the effects and consequences of corruption across countries (Holzner and Holzner 2006: 188–189). TI publishes its latest audit, annual report, governance process, code of conduct and ethics policy on its website www.transparency.org. 146 Notes

3 The Accountability Cube: Moving from Dichotomy to Continuity 1. This chapter uses parts based on the draft version of the previously online published work “Accountability in Public Service Delivery” by Peride K. Blind at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ documents/un-dpadm/unpan046363.pdf and the unpublished Con ference Paper “Linking Civil Society with Democratic Governance through the MDGs” presented by Peride K. Blind at the World Civic Forum. Seoul, May 2009. 2. The term accountability does not have a clear equivalent in French, Portuguese, Spanish or Japanese where “responsibility” is the closest term semantically (Dubnick 2002, Harlow 2002). In French, the term “rendre les comptes” is relatively new, and has arisen in response to the need to find a better equivalent to the originally Anglo-Norman term of “accountability.” For more, see Gordon (2006). Vielajus (2010), for instance, prefers to use the term “redevabilité,” for it involves a larger sense of giving accounts than does the term “rendition” or “reddition de comptes” (6). In Spanish, accountability is often translated as “control” or “fiscalización,” and the literal translation of “rendición de cuentas” only approximates but does not equal “accountability” (IFAI 2004: 11). The notion of accountability assumes that an actor is responsible for producing certain outcomes, and is then accountable through oversight to ensure that those responsibilities are met. In this understanding, bureaucrats are responsible to the public but accountable to their superiors and the elected officials. For more, see Boven (2007b) and Blair (2000). In accountability, there is also the notion of answerability. In other words, willingness to be responsible and responsive is not suffi- cient; also important is the actual procedural phase of control where answers must be provided (Schedler 1999). 3. Although the focus of Lloyd (2008) is on global accountability, his hardware versus software distinction applies to any organization. Global accountability has been used to denote the accountability practices in the international organizations, including the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), Inter national Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and international organizations such as the United Nations, and its various entities. For more, see the Global Accountability Reports produced by One World Trust. Global accountability has also been used to denote the new norms of international accountability beyond the territoriality of sovereign states, and emanating from the globalization of production, investment and trade patterns (Mason 2005). A specific focus on global accountability is outside the scope of this chapter. Notes 147

4. Boven (2007b), on the other hand, opts for the hardware approach of accountability dubbing the software as non-falsifiable. For more on falsi- fiability and concept boundaries, see Popper (1959) and Sartori (1970). 5. This prescriptive dichotomy is paralleled by a methodological one where Boven (2010) refers to “virtue” as the dependent variable, and the “mechanism” as the independent variable. 6. Broadly, good governance describes an open, efficient, effective and legitimate way of conducting public affairs and managing public resources. Good governance accomplishes these goals in a manner essentially free of corruption, and with due regard to rule of law. For many, good governance is synonymous with democratic and effective governance because it is participatory, transparent and accountable. See UNDP (1997a, b). For others, good governance and democratic governance have diverged in the past decade due mainly to the crises triggered by globalization. For such a perspective, see Bang (2008). 7. The more direct link between “accountability as virtue” and “trust in government” is through the link of a “trust culture.” A trust culture is where citizens feel that they have a more or less equal and potential chance of making a difference in decision making. For a discussion on trust culture, see Sztompka (1999). For a comprehensive analysis of trust in government and linkages to good governance and accountability, see Blind (2006, 2010). 8. Briefly, “Old Public Management” focuses on hierarchical, rule- oriented and centralized bureaucracies while the “New Public Management” favors an entrepreneurial, performance-driven and decentralized public administration. For more, see Riccucci (2002). 9. Some innovative tools in this shift have included the minimization of several conventional formal oversight mechanisms, such as audits, inspections and performance league tables and the adoption of intelli- gent commissions by different government agencies and/or third parties, all with extensive citizen engagement and with an eye to engaging the most deprived. 10. Some scholars make a distinction between bureaucratic and political accountability on the grounds that the former concerns accountability to superiors, and the latter accountability to the constituents. For instance, LaFrance shows that, in the case of law enforcement against drunk-driving, the police in the United States display accountability both to the chain of command and the external anti-alcohol lobbies (C. LaFrance, “The Drunk Trap: Bureaucratic versus Political Account ability in Local Law Enforcement Management,” Law Enforcement Executive Forum 9, 5 (September 2009): 73–87. Available at http:// www.academia.edu/366899/The_Drunk_Trap_Bureaucratic_vs_ Political_Accountability_in_Local_Law_Enforcement_Management). 148 Notes

Most scholars agree that political and bureaucratic accountability converge on several grounds. Page (2010), for instance, demonstrated that in the case of Sweden, Germany, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the European Union, political accountability in the form of “ministerial responsibility” dominated and shaped administrative and other forms of accountability, including the legal/judicial and social variants. 11. Boven (2007b) distinguishes among types of accountability based on the nature of the accountability forum, the organizational form of the actor, the nature of the issue of accountability at hand and the nature of the obligation (461). 12. H. F. Ladd, “School Policies and the Black-White Test Score Gap,” Working Papers Series SAN08-03, Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy at Duke University, March 2008. Available at http://research. sanford.duke.edu/papers/SAN08-03.pdf 13. Some scholars are satisfied with the accountability weight carried by elections in democratization. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010), for instance, find that devoid of free and fair elections, the impact of information and transparency through education and media is flimsy. Halim (2008) cor- roborates a similar finding in the developing world. 14. Decreetism is rule-making by decree often involving the bypassing of the legislative branch by the executive. It is often associated with the personalization and concentration of power in the executive and the weakening of legislatures. See O’Donnell (1994). 15. World Bank. “State-Society Synergy for Accountability: Lessons for the World Bank.” World Bank Working Paper No. 30. Washington DC: World Bank, 2004. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTPCENG/214578-1116499844371/20524131/297010PAPER0 State1society0synergy.pdf 16. J. Ferejohn, “Accountability in a Global Context,” Conference paper presented at the Normative and Empirical Evaluation of Global Governance Conference, Niehaus Center for Globalization and Gover nance, Princeton University, February 2006. Available at http://www. princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/normative/papers/Session1_ Ferejohn.pdf 17. Boven (2007b) finds that, with the transfer of power from the ministers to the heads of agencies, public administrators become more directly accountable to the public than to their political bosses. The decrease in political accountability has thus been paralleled by the increase in legal and social accountability, this further attesting to the higher conver- gence between accountability types. 18. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) make the “police patrol” versus the “fire alarm” analogy, the first one referring to rigorous performance targets from above, and the second, to openings of public administration to social pressures from below. Notes 149

19. Goetz, A. M. “Community of Practice on Social Accountability Launch.” World Bank ESSD. Lecture Series: “Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for All.” Washington DC: World Bank, November 2003. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPCENG/ 1143374-1116506116408/20542842/AMG+speech+for+COPSA,+ November+2003.pdf 20. Other scholars have taken a more empirical perspective attempting to discern the different social accountability tools and functions in different environments. See D. Orlansky and N. Chucho, “Gobernanza, Instituciones y Desarrollo: Exploraciones del caso de Argentina en el contexto regional, 1996–2008,” Ponto de Vista 4 (April 2010): 1–22. Available at http://webiigg.sociales.uba.ar/sepure/Publicaciones/Ponto_ de_vista_01abril2010%207.pdf 21. For an analytical analysis of the degree of state support per a given social accountability mechanism (SAM), see Blair (2011). 22. Sarker and Mostafa (2010) are other scholars who affirm that civic engagement processes in enforcing public accountability still stay as piecemeal efforts. 23. With respect to the social accountability tool of citizen councils, some have questioned their autonomy since they tend to be government- funded (Ackerman 2005). Based on his case study of Argentina, Salvochea (2007) distinguishes, for instance, between involving NGOs in such exer- cises of social accountability where they act as watchdogs over the implementation of public policies, which he finds valuable, and those social accountability functions where they (NGOs) administer public funds, which he advises against for being amenable to patron-client dealings. 24. Within-state accountability to superiors is categorized as vertical or horizontal by different scholars depending on their emphasis on either the “internal/interagency,” hence horizontal, or the “hierarchical,” hence vertical nature of the relationship. 25. For Boven (2007a), these newer forms of accountability, such as the establishment of ombudsmen, auditors and independent inspectors, are examples of diagonal, and not horizontal accountability because they do not fit within the traditional top-down, principal–agent relationships. 26. Schmitter calls the specific type of accountability linkages between officials and civil society as “oblique accountability” (P. C. Schmitter, Political Accountability in “Real-Existing” Democracies: Meaning and Mechanisms. Firenze: European University Institute mimeo, January 2007. Available at http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/ SPS/Profiles/Schmitter/PCSPoliticalAccountabilityJan07.pdf 27. The still-developing social accountability literature has often referred to civil society, and more specifically non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as social accountability agents. There is, however, a growing literature on the internal accountability of NGOs, and the accountability of their interaction with state. For more, see Harsh (2010). 150 Notes

28. Some scholars use a reverse terminology. They refer to internal accountability mechanisms as vertical due to their command-and-control nature, and external accountability as horizontal due to the decentralized nature of the accountability mechanisms at the societal level. Boven (2005) is an example. 29. According to Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006) social accountability is a relatively new mechanism of vertical accountability. 30. The repeatedly cited cases of vertical accountability success are Brazil/ Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting (1989), Mexico’s citizen-run Federal Electoral Institute (1990) and India’s Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan Movement (1990) in Rajasthan. Since these experiences date back to the 1990s, there is an urgent need to research and document more recent, and potentially, more innovative examples of vertical social accountability across the world. 31. According to Stapenhurs and O’Brien, diagonal accountability occurs when active citizens and civil society groups work with elected repre- sentatives to enhance the representativeness of the parliaments (R. Stapenhurst and M. O’Brien, “Accountability in Governance,” World Bank Governance Papers, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORAND GOVERNANCE/Resources/AccountabilityGovernance.pdf). 32. For a perspective on “New Citizen Engagement” in postmodernism, see Chiou (2000). 33. A basic Google search on “citizen oversight committees,” for instance, mostly gives out examples from the educational, health and policing sectors from advanced industrialized countries, and notably the United States. One then would wish that new research tackles diagonal accountability in the developing world. 34. New volumes by Claasen and Lardiés (2011) and O’dugbemi and Lee (2011) are positive steps toward this goal. However, for the most part, they stay as descriptive accounts. 35. E. J. Hernández, “Reinterpretando la rendición de cuentas o accountability: Diez propuestas para la mejora de la calidad democrática y la eficacia de las políticas públicas en España.” Working Paper 145/2009, Spain: Fundación alternativas, 2009. Available at http://www.acade mia. edu/3518617/Reinterpretando_la_rendicion_de_cuentas_o_accountability_ diez_propuestas_para_la_mejora_de_la_calidad_democratica_y_la_eficacia_ de_las_politicas_publicas_en_Espana 36. The term “good” governance continues to be controversial and is omitted by many scholars and policy-makers for its unclear and subjective tone and implications. Many equate it with “democratic” governance, and use it as such. Others make a difference between “good” and “democratic” without necessarily opposing one to another. For more, see Bellina et al. (2009). Notes 151

37. POAS makes all principal officials accountable, including the Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary, Secretary for Justice and heads of government agencies, political appointees chosen by the Chief Executive rather than politically neutral career civil servants. Under the new system, all agency heads become Ministers, members of the Executive Council, a refashioned cabinet. They report directly to the Chief Executive instead of the Chief Secretary or the Financial Secretary. 38. Citizens’ stated confidence in their own ability to evaluate a policy proposal substantially affects their willingness to reward or punish a representative for their votes on that policy. Gerber et al. (2011) find that any gap between citizen preferences and policy often reflect citizen def- erence to “expert” legislators rather than a lack of representativeness. 39. The Westminster system provides various actors with a great potential of increasing their autonomy over others due to the high levels of flexibility. Accordingly, the executive, and particularly the Prime Minister, are able to establish and formulate constitutional traditions (Kumarasingham 2013). 40. Greater media attention, the rise of new controversial cross-cutting issues and the changing cultural attitudes toward higher accountability expectations in Australia may have been at the root of accountability problematic there, not the declining parliamentary and ministerial standards of accountability (Dowding and Lewis 2012). 41. Bridoux and Gerbel (2012) differentiated between a flexible democracy promotion discourse and an inflexible and uncompromising anti-corruption discourse, which together might lead to contradictory policies and processes. They underline that both corruption control and democratization must focus on the ownership and the sustainability of reforms. 42. For more on good enough governance, see Grindle (2007). 43. DDC or Direction du développement et de la coopération (2007), for instance, enumerates five principles of good governance including accountability, transparency, non-discrimination, participation and effi cacy (5). These very same terms are also used in defining the term accountability. Accountability, for instance, presupposes transparency because without the latter, accountability will not transpire. Also, accountability breeds transparency and participation (Hernandez 2009, see this chapter, note 35 for details). 44. Council on Foundations and the European Foundation Centre (2007) enumerates seven defining features of accountability in international philanthropy: integrity, empathy, respect, sensitivity, justice, cooperation and collaboration and efficacy. 45. L. Beck et al., The Enabling Environment for Social Accountability in Mongolia, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007. Available at http:// www.sasanet.org/curriculum_final/downlaods/EV/Case%20Studies/ EE%20CS3.pdf 152 Notes

4 The Corruption Pentagon: Linking Causes, Controls and Consequences 1. See United Nations, A/RES/51/191 (1996) and United Nations, A/RES/51/59 (1997) respectively. 2. For more, see Europa (2007). 3. OECD (2008) defines corruption as any activity that involves the offer (active) and the acceptance (passive) of illicit financial or other benefits to a public official in order to incite him/her to violate his/herofficial duties. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Corruption: A Glossary of International Standards in Criminal Law. Paris, 2008. Available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ anti-bribery/41194428.pdf 4. L. Wren-Lewis, “Do Infrastructure Reforms Reduce the Effect of Corruption? Theory and Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean,” ECORE Discussion Paper 73, United Kingdom/Belgium: International Association for Research and Teaching, July 2011. Available at http://www.ecore.be/DPs/dp_1315293840.pdf 5. F. Fukuyama, “Democracy and Corruption.” American Interest, California (October 5, 2012). Available at http://blogs.the-american- interest.com/fukuyama/2012/10/05/democracy-and-corruption/ 6. T. Lovseth, “Corruption and Alienation,” Paper presented at the ECPR joint sessions. Grenoble, April 2001. Available at http://www.essex. ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/grenoble 7. C. Kenny, “Measuring and Reducing the Impact of Corruption in Infrastructure,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 4099 (December 2006): 1–42. Available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/ WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/12/14/000016406_200612 14120802/Rendered/PDF/wps4099.pdf 8. F-J. Urra, Assessing Corruption: An Analytical Review of Corruption Measurement and its Problems: Perception, Error and Utility, Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2007. Available at http:// unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/ unpan028792.pdf 9. National integrity systems have been in existence for over a decade, and are used to map the integrity of countries across the world. They can be defined generally as institutions, laws, procedures, practices and attitudes that encourage and support integrity in governance (Head et al. 2008, Pope 2000, Sampford 2005). More specifically, they include the legislative, executive and the judicial branches of government, public sector and law enforcement agencies, political parties and electoral management bodies, watchdog agencies and civil society, ombudsman, audit institutions, anti-corruption agencies and the media. Notes 153

10. A. Gentlemen, “Letter from India: Thin Ray of Light Shines on Dark Ocean of Graft,” The New York Times (January 7, 2008). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/17/world/asia/17iht-letter. 3.9294097.html?_r=2& 11. Even pork-barreling, which might be an essential tool of compromise and balancing different political interests, might be considered corrupt since it is a method of give and take in the parliament. 12. Dahlstrom et al. (2012) found, for instance, that reforms of meritocratic bureaucratic recruitment reduce public sector corruption even when controlling for a large set of alternative explanations, including public employees’ competitive salaries, career stability or internal promotion. Others find that meritocratic recruitment does not change corruption nor does education; leadership and good politicians do (Nyblade and Reed 2008). 13. For such an account, see the case of the Slovak Republic by Pawelke (2010), the case of Georgia by Kukhianidze (2009), the case of Bulgaria by Popova (2012). 14. Asthana (2012) finds that awareness of human rights reduces incidence of bribery. 15. Investigations, trials and convictions can be weapons in political strug- gles; visible trends may thus say more about contention among factions than about actual corruption. Indeed, perceptions of a country or city may be made worse by serious reforms, as allegations and convictions dominate the news and public discussion. The government needs to gain more public confidence before anti-corruption reforms can strengthen good governance. For more on this stand, see Oyamada (2005) and Johnston (2010). Conversely, anti-corruption reforms and institutions could also decrease the experience of corruption, and hence the perception of it. 16. UNODCCP (2002) differentiates between an anti-corruption agency, which is a standing body established to implement and administer prevention and enforcement elements of a national strategy, and an anti- corruption committee or commission, that are intended to develop, launch, implement and monitor the anti-corruption strategy itself. The mandate of an anti-corruption committee or commission could thus call for the establishment of an independent anti-corruption agency and any other necessary entities, the development of legislation, the development of appropriate action plan(s), taking measures to inform the public and foster broad-based support of the national strategy. For more, see Tool 9—National Anti-Corruption Commissions, Committees and Similar in UNODCCP (2002). 17. While the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission has been largely inef- fectual, the more autonomous Economic and Financial Crimes 154 Notes

Commission in Nigeria has had a measure of success in fighting corruption. For more, see Lawson (2009). 18. S. N. Parnini, “Governance Reforms and Anti-Corruption Commission in Bangladesh,” Romanian Journal of Political Science 11, 1 (Summer 2011). Available at http://www.sar.org.ro/polsci/?p=587 19. A judiciary is institutionally insulated from the other branches of government when four conditions are met: (i) Constitution contains guarantees of judicial autonomy and independence; (ii) Judges have life tenure guarantees; (iii) Judiciary is in control of judicial careers— appointment, promotion, discipline, transfers and, if necessary, dismissal of individual judges; and (iv) Judiciary drafts and controls its own budget. For more, see Jain (2001). 20. It is also possible, however, that the institutional insulation of the judiciary contributes to the collusion of a corrupt judiciary with an equally corrupt political elite in an otherwise procedurally democratic setting, as in Bulgaria (Popova 2012). 21. For more on the objectives of public sector auditing, see Lima Decla ration of Guidelines on Auditing adopted in Lima, Peru in October 1997 (INTOSAI 1997). 22. E. Nino, “Access to Public Information and Citizen Participation in Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI): Guide to Good Practice,” World Bank Institute Governance Working Paper Series, Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 2010. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/ Resources/213798-1259011531325/6598384-1268250334206/ Citizen_Participation_SAI.pdf 23. Local integrity systems consist of all the institutions, policies, practices and instruments meant to contribute to the integrity of a given munici- pality. For more, see Hubert and Six (2012). 24. For an example of regional transfer of anti-corruption initiatives, see Barcham (2009). 25. The premise of routine activity theory is that crime is relatively unaf- fected by social causes such as poverty, inequality and unemployment because it can be committed by anyone who has the opportunity to do so. The routine activity theory thus examines the factors that render a particular target attractive. For more, see Cohen and Felson 1979. 26. Mohtadi and Roe (2003) assume that democracy increases both the flow of information available to rent-seekers and their access to government officials. Better information about where rents lie and greater access to corruptible government officials increase the returns to rent- seeking. This, in turn, encourages competitive entry into rent-seeking increasing the ongoing rate for bribes, and corruption (451). 27. The direct ways to fight political corruption include: (i) political competition, symbolized by free and fair elections in a democracy, by posing a credible threat to the incumbents of losing office in the Notes 155

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accountability surfaces, soft 3, 84 bureaucratic 88, 89, 91–93 as responsibility 1, 3, 84–85, conventional 91, 147 95–96, 103–104, cube 83–85, 86, 104, 133 109, 124, 130, 134, -democratization linkages 143, 146 98, 104 longitudinal 84–86, dimensions 95–96, 104 descriptive 84–86, 88–93, market-based 88–89, 92–93, 96, 104 97–99 economic 84 operational 84–86, 93–96, 104 ex-ante/ex-post 84–86, diagonal 94–95, 97, 95–98, 104 149–150 formal/informal 89, 91–105 external/internal 84, 89–90, forms 93, 105, 150 continuous 84–89, 92–98, horizontal/vertical 24, 84, 100, 104–105, 133 86, 93–96, 104, dichotomous, see under 113–116, 121, 125, continuous 141, 149, 150 institutional 84, 88–89, internal, see under external 91–93, 105 reflexive/transversal 94–95; institutions see also diagonal Auditor general 125, transversal, see under reflexive; 127, 144 see also diagonal Supreme Audit General 125, vertical, see under horizontal 127, 129, 143 political 89–90, 94, Ombudsman 70, 94, 147–148 128, 153 prescriptive 84–89, 93–96, hybrid 92, 141 104, 147 legal/judicial 88–91, 93, as honesty 87 118, 148 as performance 85, 87, 89, surfaces, hard 3, 84 95, 98 as answerability 1, 3, 6, as process-oriented 87, 96 83–84, 89, 96, 104, 131, as results-driven 87 134, 146 social 88–96, 105, 148–150 204 Index anti-corruption bureaucratic, see under institutions administrative corruption; agencies 125, 127, 132 compare with bureaucratic code of conduct 114, accountability 117, 146 classical 110, 117, 118, 131, committees 153 133; compare with modern mechanisms corruption formal/informal 108–109, control 111, 114–116, 118, 120, ex-post 109, 114, 118, 127, 126, 128, 131–132, 132–134 134, 147 definitions authoritarianism, bureaucratic behavioral 110, 112–114; see 16–19 also under institutional institutional 110, 112–114 citizen functional 110–112 advisory board 89, 92, 128 social 110–112; see also council 92, 149 under functional engagement 29, 83, 91, 92, -democratization linkages 103, 124, 143, 147, 149, 130–131 155, compare with dimensions participation need-greed 120–124 oversight 128–129, 143; see seed-feed 118–120 also public oversight wield 124–130 civil society 1, 4, 10, 19, 24, 27, formal 108–109, 114–118, 28–35, 43–44, 47–48, 58, 120, 128, 131–132, 134, see 61–62, 70–72, 75, 88–89, also under legal corruption 91, 93, 96, 99, 101, 105, forms 124–129, 134, 139, 141, 142, bribery 58, 109, 114, 119, 144, 145, 149, 150, 153 121–123, 131, 153, 164 as civic community 28–30 cheating 121, 124 as public space 28–30 clientelism 24, 26, 101, as voluntary association 28–30 120–123, 129, 131, 149 corporatism 16, 18–19, 30 embezzlement 112, authoritarian 19 121–123 neo-corporatism 19 extortion 121–123, 131 societal 19 favoritism 119, 131 state 19, 30 graft 109, 121–123 corruption influence peddling 121–123 administrative 108, 118, 121, kickback 121–123 123–124, 127, 129–134; logrolling 121–123 compare with political looting 121–123 corruption; see also petty money-laundering corruption 71, 121–123, 126 Index 205

neopatrimonialism 108, prevention 121–123 ex-ante 109, 114, 118, 127, nepotism 47, 119, 132–134 121–123, 131 structural 109–110, 119–120, patronage, see under 126, 131 clientelism quid pro quo 121 data state-capture 63, 121–123 disclosure 51, 57, 59, 61, trading of favors 121–123 67–68 grand 118, 123–127, dissemination 51, 57, 61, 62 133–134; compare with open 53, 63, 65–71, 74, petty corruption; see also 79, 143 political corruption security 60, 64, 67–71, 145 informal, see under formal decentralization 17, 25–26, 30, corruption 120, 147, 150 legal 108–109, 114–118, 120, decreetism 90, 148 128, 131–132, 134; see also democracy under formal corruption electoral 8, 11, 25, 43, 49, 65, modern 118, 120–121, 74, 79, 136, 141 132–133; compare with genesis of 10–20 classical corruption growth of 20–26 pentagon, parameters networked 12 feed 3, 108–109, 117–120 parliamentarian 25, 31, 103, 141 greed 3, 108–109, 117, presidential 24–25, 101, 115, 120–124 141, 143 need 3, 108–109, 117, procedural 1, 4, 8–10, 37, 45, 120–124 49, 72, 74, 80, 83, 97, 101, seed 3, 108–109, 117–120 106, 134–137, 139 wield 3, 108–109, 118, substantive 1, 2, 4, 49, 72, 74, 124–130, 132 78–80, 96–97, 101, 106, performance-perceptions 133–137 understandings 110, democratic 114–117 aid 34–35, 77, 105, 113 petty 118–119, 123, 127, breakdown 8–9, 20–22, 37–39, 133–134, compare with 42, 49, 119, 135 grand corruption; see also consolidation 6–9, 21–28, 31, administrative corruption 33–42, 45, 48–49, 53, 74, political 108, 110, 118, 101–103, 105, 130, 132, 120, 121, 123–125, 127, 135, 136, 139, 140 130–134, 154, compare diffusion 33–34 with administrative functionalism corruption; see also grand quality 7–9, 37–39, 48, 49, 52, corruption 108, 132, 133, 135, 139 206 Index democratic—continued globalization 12, 15, 27, 33, 64, transition 6–9, 16, 20–28, 40–45, 78, 146, 147 48–49, 52, 53, 102, 105, governance 4, 23, 28, 32–34, 38, 130, 132, 134, 135, 140, 142 49, 59–60, 62, 68–70, 76–78, democratization 80–81, 93, 96, 99–103, 105, concentric circles 2, 5, 6, 10, 112, 114, 116, 123–127, 129, 11, 47–49 136, 141, 152, 155 inner circles 12, 20–23 good 52, 53, 55, 63, 67, 72, middle circles 15, 23–26 73, 76, 77–80, 83, 86, 99, outer circles 10–15 103–104, 108, 113, 116, definitions 130–131, 147, 150, 151, 153 process-led 7–8 democratic 2, 10, 31, 72, 94, scope-led 7–8 99, 134, 147; see also good stage-led 9 governance degree-led 9 local 26, 97, 110 demonstration effects 33, 78; see also snowballing human capital 29, 63, 141 development human rights 7, 28, 31–32, 46–47, dependent 15 66, 73, 77, 91, 93, 99–100, human 38 103, 105, 114, 123, 153 economic 6, 10, 13–16, 18, 20, 27, 33–34, 37–39, 42, immigration 42 45, 47–49, 78, 97, 111, incrementalism 16–17, 31 115, 140, 142 information 6, 18, 42, 51–79, sustainable 91 83, 94–103, 109, 127–131, capacity 19, 24, 41, 48, 55, 62, 133–134, 143–145, 148, 154 97, 101, 126 compare with data access to 56, 57, 59, 64, 66, economic 121, 125, 131 growth 44, 45, 55, 111, commissioner 70, 144 120, 136 communication technologies inequality 36, 37, 39–40, 46, 136 (ICTs) 65, 79, 81, 105 crises 37, 40–42, 55–56, 142 freedom of 53, 54, 56, 57, 61, 63, reforms 37, 40–42 64, 66, 68–69, 103, 105, 144 rights 7, 37, 43, 71, 78, 79, 139 right to 52, 66, 72, 125, 144 ethics 89, 123, 131, 137, 146 usage 59, 65 cosmopolitan 6, 49, 119, 139 innovation 29, 36, 63, 67, 90, ethnicity 25, 35, 44–45, 97, 101 95, 101, 147, 150 internet 65, 79, 126; see also freedom information, communication of expression 17, 46, 54, 61, technologies (ICTs) 73, 80, 101, 124 of information, see under labor unions 23–25; see also trade information unions 31 of media 61–62, 93–94, liberalization 6, 14, 17, 23, 28, 30, 101–102, 109, 128 35, 43–47, 71, 100, 140, 141 Index 207 military 18, 28, 30, 34–35, 44, service 37, 54, 76–77, 140, 142 87–90, 94, 97–99, 102, modernization 13–16, 20, 28, 37, 103, 105, 108 42, 78, 111, 140 space 28–30, 47 education 13, 38, 98, 126, 141, 148, 150, 153 religion 44–47, 120 industrialization 13, 15, 20, Catholicism 46–47 37, 39, 140 Confucianism 47 literacy 13, 15, 24, 116 Islam 46–47 middle-class 13, 15 Protestantism 46, 120 urbanization 13 resource-curse 9, 42, 76, 116, 121 rule of law 9, 11, 13, 24, 76, 77, nationalism 20, 44–46 90, 108, 114, 124, 126, 129, neoliberalism 12, 41, 112 131–132, 147 oikeiosis, see under democratization secrecy 53–58, 67–71, 75, 80, 112, 144; see also privacy participation 13–18, 26, 29, 30, snowballing 33; see also 33, 37, 46, 49, 57–58, 67, 71, democratization; 73, 76, 89, 91–97, 100–105, demonstration effects 134, 145, 151 social movements 10, 15, 24, compare with citizen 27–31 engagement state 7, 8–10, 15–19, 27–32, polyarchy 7, 16–17 37, 44, 48, 51, 66, 92–94, post-conflict 32, 83, 99, 105, 101–102, 116, 126–127, 134, 134, 142 140, 146 privacy 63–64, 66, 68–70, capacity 48, 97, 126, 128 80, 145; see also secrecy capture 121–123 public society, relations 6, 14, 19, administration 1–2, 49, 23, 46, 48, 76, 92–94, 119, 51–52, 81, 83, 87–89, 97, 120–121, 129, 140, 99, 108, 123–127, 130–131, 142, 149 147, 148 stateness 45 engagement, see under citizen engagement transparency management 60, 77, 86, 88, -democratization linkages 2, 91, 147, 153 73, 79 oversight 58, 93, 94, 128, triangle 51–83, 78, 133 129, 150 inputs 52–57 regulation 59, 61, 69, 71, outputs 57–70 84–84, 89, 90–92, 120, outcomes 70–81 124, 129 types 60 sector 26, 52, 70, 77, 88, 91, agent-controlled 65 99, 103, 152–154 budget 60–61 208 Index transparency—continued social 63 bottom-up 53, 62 top-down, see under bottom-up downward 62 upward, see under downward external, see under internal voluntary 63–64, 79, 144 institutional 64 trust 16, 28–29, 41, 47–49, intentional 53, 65–67 53, 55, 57, 68, 71, 73, 75, internal 64, 144 86, 112, 116, 120, 122, involuntary, see under voluntary 145–147 mandatory 53, 63, 68, 77 truth commission 32, 72, 100 nominal 53, 65 operational 60, 62, 64–66 whistleblowing 64–65, 79, 125, policy-level 53, 64 131, 144–146 public 55, 63 Wikileak 53, 64, 68, 79, 144–145