Politics and the Double-Edged Place of Belief
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POLITICS AND THE DOUBLE-EDGED PLACE OF BELIEF by JUSTIN JAMES PINKERMAN (Under the Direction of Alexander Kaufman) ABSTRACT Hannah Arendt and Ralph Waldo Emerson both express alarm at the way social conformity imperils individuality and debases politics. Yet, they respond to the threat by explicating contradictory notions of political association. Arendt argues for political cooperation rooted in mutual promises whereas Emerson warns against pledging oneself to a common cause. In this paper, I argue that Emerson and Arendtʼs opposing accounts of reason underlie their divergent ideals of political association. Arendt regards the lone individual as unable to reason properly, and she stresses the importance of common sense in making political judgments. Conversely, Emerson considers the solitary person able to ascertain knowledge reliably and perceives formal association as corrupting. I contend that Emerson, by incorporating belief into his theory of knowledge, better equips the individual to resist political cooption than does Arendt. However, I also insist that belief only benefits politics when used to justify resistance and not coercion. INDEX WORDS: Hannah Arendt, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Politics, Belief, Individuality, Society, Political association, Nonconformity, Opinion, Truth, Political judgment, Common sense POLITICS AND THE DOUBLE-EDGED PLACE OF BELIEF by JUSTIN JAMES PINKERMAN B.S., Oral Roberts University, 2004 B.A., Oral Roberts University, 2004 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS ATHENS, GEORGIA 2012 © 2012 Justin James Pinkerman All Rights Reserved POLITICS AND THE DOUBLE-EDGED PLACE OF BELIEF by JUSTIN JAMES PINKERMAN Major Professor: Alexander Kaufman Committee: O. Bradley Bassler Robert Grafstein Electronic Version Approved: Maureen Grasso Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2012 DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my father and mother, Arlo and Anita Pinkerman, whose constant love and encouragement have been a source of inspiration throughout my life. Also, this thesis is dedicated to my wife, Rossana Pinkerman, whose kindness and care have strengthened me greatly during my graduate studies. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to express his profound gratitude to the Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia for their many forms of support. This thesis has benefited greatly from the comments and advice of Dr. Elizabeth Brient, Dr. O. Bradley Bassler, Dr. Robert Grafstein, and Dr. Alexander Kaufman. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ v CHAPTER 1 INDIVIDUALITY AND POLITICAL ASSOCIATION .......................................... 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 The Threat to Individuality .......................................................................... 4 Political Association: Hannah Arendt ........................................................ 13 Political Association: Ralph Waldo Emerson ............................................ 15 2 REASON AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT ....................................................... 22 Reason as a Political Good ...................................................................... 22 The Relationship of Thought and Belief .................................................... 24 The Starting Point of Thought ................................................................... 27 Transcendent Truth: Articulable or Ineffable? ........................................... 28 Reason: Fallible or Infallible? .................................................................... 31 Transcendent Truth: Unknowable or Uncontainable? .............................. 32 Reality ....................................................................................................... 34 Common Sense ........................................................................................ 35 Facts ......................................................................................................... 36 Opinion ..................................................................................................... 37 vi Purification of Opinion ............................................................................... 41 Political Judgment ..................................................................................... 44 3 THE POLITICAL PROMISE AND PERIL OF BELIEF .................................... 46 The Double-Edged Place of Belief in Politics ........................................... 46 The Political Value of Belief ...................................................................... 47 The Transcendent in Arendtʼs Political Theory ......................................... 50 The Political Peril of Belief ........................................................................ 55 Coercive Truth Claims and Political Movements ...................................... 58 BIBILIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 61 vii CHAPTER 1 INDIVIDUALITY AND POLITICAL ASSOCIATION Introduction In their writings, Hannah Arendt and Ralph Waldo Emerson potently articulate the challenge modern society poses to individuality and the peril of anonymity darkening the horizon of every newborn life. Both perceive a creeping social conformism overtaking the public space requisite for individuals to sound their identity. Each also bemoans societyʼs incessant intrusion into the private sanctuary where every global habitant must retreat to make sense of the world. Acutely sensitive to the threat of self-loss in the modern condition, Arendt and Emerson both embark on projects to preserve selfhood. Emerson intimates, and Arendt spells out, a conception of politics urging nonconformity and dignifying human uniqueness. Both present a mode of political life in which humanity can reassert itself against pressures of standardization. Yet despite remarkably similar concerns and parallel goals, Arendt and Emerson present conflicting theories of political association. Arendt advances an affirmative theory of politics that emphasizes plurality, is based on mutual pledges, and establishes a stable public sphere in which men can express their uniqueness through action. Contrarily, Emerson suspects political cooperation of bringing individuals into false relations with one another, and he advocates reducing the role of politics in modern life. 1 By taking part in politics, he believes one is nearly certain to be coopted into a social movement and divested of uniqueness. Thus, Emerson counsels uncompromising self- reliance, eschews covenant-making, and argues for a rather dissociated polis in which citizens have fluid relationships and join together only inadvertently and temporarily. Given their comparable motivations, how do Arendt and Emerson arrive at contradictory conclusions regarding the place of politics? In this paper, I assert that their conflicting accounts of the faculty of reason lead them to opposite notions of political association. In particular, I contrast how the two perceive the human capacity to apprehend truth. Arendt regards truth, both transcendent and worldly, as utterly unknowable to the lone individual.1 She places the human condition of plurality at the foundation of her political theory, and she bases reality on commonly sensed worldly appearances. Meanwhile, Emerson perceives transcendent truth to be intelligible to the solitary mind, even if uncontainable by it, and he insistently stipulates that one can only ascertain truth firsthand. This leads him to endorse absolute self-trust of oneʼs intuitions and to prioritize expansion of oneʼs capacity to receive truth. He views responsible and truth-responsive self-government, with its indirect influence on the public realm, to hold the most political promise. Conversely, he considers cooperative political ventures to be corruptive in that they dissuade individuals from living in accordance with their uniquely intuited apprehension of truth. What are we to make of the pairʼs oppositional explanations of human reason, and the political implications thereof? I contend that their antagonistic views stem from 1 In this paper, I use the word “transcendent” to mean “independent of the world.” In her writings, Hannah 2 alternate conceptions of the relationship between thought and belief.2 I argue that by supplementing the activity of reflective thinking with belief one becomes more resistant to political cooption. Accordingly, I contend that Emersonʼs incorporation of belief into the faculty of reason enables him to fashion a more robust nonconformity than Arendt. Furthermore, I assert that Hannah Arendt, despite her avowal that transcendent truth undermines politics, nonetheless draws upon it in expounding her theory of action. In so doing, she unwittingly connects belief to political freedom. Though I theorize a beneficial role for belief in politics, I do not deny the potential danger of transcendent truth claims in the public realm. Having witnessed the horrors of totalitarian regimes, Hannah Arendt is especially attuned to the danger of affording so- called higher laws a dominant place in politics. She argues that fixed standards of natural law, when translated into positive law by a political body, pose no danger to politics.