Hutchinson Island Plant Units 1 and 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 9

AUXILIARYSYSTEMS

Section Title ~Pa e

9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING 9.1-1

9.1.1 NEW FUEL STORAGE 9.1-1

9.1.1.1 Desi n Bases 9.1-1

9.1.1.2 S stem Descri tion 9.1-1

9.1.1.3 S stem Evaluation 9.1-2

9.1.'2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE 9.1-2

9.1.2.1 Desi n Bases 9.1-2

9.1.2.2 S stem Descri tion 9.1-3

9.1.2.3 S stem Evaluation 9.1-5

9.1.2.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.1-7

9.1.2.5 Instrumentation A lications 9.1-7

9.1.3 FUEL POOL SYSTEM 9.1-9

9.1.3.1 9. 1-9.

9.1.3.2 S stem Descri tion 9.1-9

9'1.3.3 Com onent Descri tion 9.1-11

9.1.3.4 S stem Evaluation 9.1-15 Testin and Ins ection 9.1-16 9.1.3.5'.1'.3.6 Instrumentation A lication 9 '-17

9.1.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM 9.1-19 9.1.4.1 9.1-19

9.1.4.2 S stem Descri tion 9 '-19

9.1.4.3 S stem Evaluation 9.1-28 9.1.4.4 Tests And Ins ections 9. 1-32 Section Title ~Pa e

9.2 WATER SYSTEMS 9.2-1

9.2.1 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.2-1

9.2.1.1 Desi n Bases 9.2-1

9.2.1.2 S stem Descri tion 9.2-1

9.2.1.3 S stem Evaluation 9.2-4

9.2.1.3.1 Performance Requirements and Capabilities 9.2-4 9.2.1.3.2 Single Failure Analysis 9.2-4 9.2.1.3.3 Service Environment 9.2-4

9.2.1.3.4 Natural Phenomena 9.2-7

9.2.1.4 Testin and Ins ections 9.2-8

9.2.1.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.2-8

9.2.2 COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM 9.2-11 9.2.2.1 9.2-11

9.2.2.2 S stem Descri tion 9.2-11

9.2.2.3 S stem Evaluation 9.2-13

9.2.2.3.1 Performance Requirements and Capabilities 9.2-13 9.2.2.3.2 Single Failure Analysis 9.2-13 9.2.2.3.3 Service Environment 9.2-18

9.2.2.3.4 Natural Phenomena 9.2-18

9.2.2.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.2-21

e 9.2.2.5 Instrumentation Application , 9.2-21

9.2.3 CIRCULATING WATER'YSTEMS 9.2-27 9.2.3.1 Desi n Bases 9.2-27

9.2.'3.2 S stem Descri tion 9.2-27

9.2.3.3 S stem Evaluation 9.2-28 9.2.3.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.2-31 Section Title ~Pa e

9.2.3.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.2-31

9.2.4 TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.2-33

9.2.4.1 Desi n Bases 9.2-33

9.2.4.2 S stem Descri tion 9.2-33

9.2.4.3 S stem Evaluation 9.2-34 9.2.4.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.2-34

9.2.4.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.2-34

9.2.5 MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM 9.2-42 9.2.5.1 Desi n Bases 9.2-42

9.2.5.2 S stem Descri tion 9.2-42

9.2.5.3 S stem Evaluation 9.2-42 9.2.5.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.2-45

9.2.5.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.2-45

9.2e6 POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEMS 9.2-47

9.2.7 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK 9.2-49 9.2.7.1 9.2-49

9.2.7.2 S stem Descri tion 9.2-49

9.2.7.3 S stem Evaluation 9.2-50

9.2e8 CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITIES 9.2-51 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES 9.3-1

9.3.1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM 9.3-1 9.3.1.1 9.3-1

9.3.1.2 S stem Descri tion 9.3-1

9.3.'1.3 S stem Evaluation 9;3 2 9.3.1.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.3-5 9.3.1.5 Instrument A lication 9.3-5 Section Title ~Pa e

9.3.2 SAMPLING SYSTEM 9. 3-8 9.3.2.1 9.3-8

9.3.2.2 S stem Descri tion 9.3-8 9.3.2.2.1 Sampling 9.3-8

9.3.2.2.2 Component Description 9.3-13

9.3.2.3 S stem Evaluation 9.3-14 9.3.2.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.3-15

9.3.2.5 Instrument A lication 9.3-15

9.3.3 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM 9.3-17 9.3.3.1 Desi n Bases 9.3-17

9.3.3.2 S stem Descri tion 9.3-17

9.3.3.3 S stem Evaluation 9.3-19 9.3.3.4 Instrumentation Application 9.3-19

9;3.4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM 9.3-20 9.3.4.1 Desi n Bases 9.3-20 I 9.3.4.2 S stem Descri tion 9.3-21 9.3.4.2.1 Normal Operation 9.3-21 9.3.4.2.2 Components 9.3-28 9.3.4.2.3 Plant Start-up 9.3-44 9.3.4.2.4 Normal Operation 9.3-44a 9.3.4.2.5 Plant Shutdown 9.3-44a

9.3.4.3 S stem Evaluation 9.3-45 9.3.4.3.1 Performance Requirements and Capabilities 9.3-45 9.3;4.3. 2 Single Failure Analysis 9.3-46 9.3.4.3.3 Testing and Inspection 9.3-46 9.3.4.3.4 Natural Phenomena 9.3-52

9-iv Section Title ~Pa e

9.3.4.4 Instrument A lication 9.3-52

9.3.5 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM 9.3-56

9.3.5.1 Desi n Bases 9.3-56

9.3.5.2 S stem Descri tion 9.3-56 9.3.5.2.1 Normal Operation 9.3-56 9.3.5.2.2 Plant Shutdown 9.3-56 9.3.5.2.3 Plant Start-up 9.3-58 9.3.5.2.4 Refueling 9.3-58

9.3.5.2.5 Emergency Operation 9.3-58

9.3.5.3 S stem Evaluation 9.3-60 9.3.5.3.1 Performance Requirements and Capabilities 9.3-60 9.3.5.3.2 Single Failure Analysis 9.3-61

9.3.5.3.3 Testing and Inspection 9.3-62

9.3.5.3.4 Natural Phenomena 9.3-62

9.3.5.4 Instrument A lication 9.3-62

9 ' AIR CONDITIONING HEATING COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS 9.4-1

9.4.1 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION 9.4-1 9.4.1.1 9.4-1

9.4.1.2 S stem Descri tion 9.4-1

9.4.1.3 S stem Evaluation 9 ~ 4-4

9.4.1.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.4-5

9.4.1.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.4-5

9.4.2 REACTOR AUXILIARYBUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEMS 9.4-7 9.4.2.1 9.4-7 9.4.2.2 9.4-7 9.4.2.2.1 Reactor Auxiliary Building Main Ventilation System 9.4-7 9-v Section Title ~Pa e 9.4.2.2.2 Reactor Auxiliary Building Electrical Equipment and Battery Room Ventilation System 9.4-11 9.4.2.2.3 Reactor Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous Ventilation Systems 9.4-11

9.4.2.3 S stem Evaluation 9.4-12

9.4.2.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.4-12

9.4.2.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.4-13

9.4.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM 9,4-18 9.4.3.1 9.4-18

9.4.3.2 S stem Descri tion 9.4-18

9.4.3.3 S stem Evaluation 9.4-21

9.4.3.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.4-21

9.4.3.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.4-22

9.4.4 RADWASTE AREA VENTILATION .9.4-23

9.4.5 TURBINE BUILDXNG VENTILATION 9.4-23

9.4.6 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION 9,4-23

9.4.7 DIESEL GENERATOR BUXLDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4-26

9.4.8 CONTAINMENT VESSEL VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4-27

9.4.8.1 Reactor Cavit Coolin S stem 9.4-27

9.4.8.2 Reactor Su ort Coolin S stem 9;4-29

9.4.8.3 Testing and Inspection 9.4-29

9.5 OTHER AUXILIARYSYSTEMS 9.5-1

9.5.1" FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 9.5-1 9.5.1.1 9.5-1

9.5.1.2 S stem Descri tion 9.5-1

9.5.1.3 S stem Evaluation 9.5-2

9.5.1.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.5-5 Section Title ~Pa e

9.5.1.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.5-5

9.5.2 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 9.5-7 9.5.2.1 9.5-7

9.5.2.2 S stem Descri tion 9.5-7 9.5.2.2.1 Intraplant Communications 9.5-7 9.5.2.2.2 External Communications 9.5-7

9.5.2.3 S stem Evaluation 9.5-8 9.5.2.4 Testing and Inspection 9.5-8

9.5.3 LIGHTING SYSTEMS 9.5-9

9.5.4 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM 9.5-9 9.5.4.1 9.5-9

9.5.4.2 S stem Descri tion 9.5-10

9.5.4.3 S stem Evaluation 9.5-12 9.5.4.4 Testin and Ins ection 9.5-12

9.5.4.5 Instrumentation A lication 9.5-12

9-vii LIST OF TABLES

Table Title ~Pa e

9.1-1 Fuel Pool System Process Flow Data 9.1-10

9.1-2 Fuel Pool Water Chemistry 9.1-11

9.1-3 Design Data for Fuel Pool System Components 9.1-12

9.1-4 Fuel Pool System Instrumentation 9.1-18

9.1-5 Single Failure Mode Analysis of Fuel Handling Equipment 9.1-30

9.2-1 Design Data for Intake Cooling Water System 9.2-2

9.2-2 Single Failure Analysis Intake Cooling Water System 9.2-5 9.2-3 Intake Cooling Water System Instrumentation Applica- tion 9.2-9

9.2-4 Design Data for Component Cooling System Components 9.2-14

9.2-5 Operating Flow Rates and Calculated Heat Loads All Auxiliary Equipment Cooled by the Component Cooling System 9.2-17

9. 2-6 Single Failure Analysis — Component Cooling System 9.2-19 9.2-7 Component Cooling System Instrumentation Application 9.2-23

9.2-8 Design Data for Circulating Water System Components 9.2-29 9.2-9 Circulating Water System Instrumentation Application 9.2-32

9.2-10 Design Data for Turbine Cooling Water System Compo- nents 9.2-35

9.2-11 Turbine Plant Components Operating Flow Rates and Calculated Heat Loads e 9.2-37 9.2-12 Turbine Cooling Water System Instrumentation Application 9.2-38

9.2-13 Design Data for Makeup Water System Components 9.2-43 9.2-14 Makeup Water System Instrumentation Application 9.2-46

9.2-15 Design Data for Potable and Sanitary Water System Components 9.2-48

9.2-16 Design Data for Condensate Storage Tank 9.2-51

9-viii e Table Title ~Pa 9.3-3 9.3-1 Design Data for Compressed Air System Components 9.3-7 9.3-2 Compressed Air System Instrument Application 9.3-9 9.3.3 Sampling System Flow Rates 9.3-10 9.3-4 Design Data for Sample System Components 9.3-16 9.3-5 Sampling System Instrumentation 9.3-18 9.3-6 Drains Routed to Drain Tanks

9.3-8 Reactor Coolant and Reactor Makeup Water Chemistry 9.3-23 9.3-9 Design Transients, - Regenerative and Letdown Heat Exchangers 9.3-24

9.3-10 Chemical and Volume Control System Parameters 9.3-26

9.3-11 Chemical and Volume Control System Process Flow Data 9.3-30 9.3-12 Regenerative Heat Exchanger Design Data 9.3-34

9.3-13 Letdown Heat Exchanger Design Data 9.3-35 9.3-14 Purification Filters Design Data 9.3-36 9.3-15 Purification and Deborating Ion Exchangers Design Data 9.3-36

9.3-16 Volume Control Tank Design Data 9.3-37

9.3-17 Charging Pumps Design Data 9.3-38

9.3-18 Boric Acid Makeup Tanks Design Data 9.3-38 9.3-19 Boric Acid Batching Tank Design Data 9.3-39

9.3-20 Boric Acid Makeup Pumps Design Data 9.3-39 9.3-21 Chemical Addition Tank Design Data 9.3-40

9.3-22 Metering Pump Design Data 9.3-40 9.3-23 Process Radiation Monitor Design Data 9.3-41 9.3-24 Boronometer Design Data 9.3-41

9.3-25 Single Failure Analysis — Chemical and Volume Control System 9.3-41,.

9-ix Table Title ~Pa e

9.3-26 Chemical and Volume Control System Instrument Application 9.3-53

9.3-27 Shutdown Cooling System Design Data 9.3-57

9.3-28 Shutdown Heat Exchanger Design Data 9.3-57

9.3-29 Shutdown Cooling System Instrument Application 9.3-63

9.4-1 Design Data for Control Room Ventilation System Components 9.4-2

9.4-2 Control Room Ventilation System Instrumentation Application 9.4-6 9.4-3 Design Data for Reactor Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Components 9.4-8

9.4-4 Auxiliary Building Ventilation Systems Instrumentation Application 9.4-14

9.4-5 Auxiliary Building Components with SIAS, Interlocks or Manual Controls 9.4-16

9.4-6 Design Data for ECCS Area Ventilation System Components '9.4-19

9.4-7 Design Data for Turbine Building Heating and Ventilation System Components 9.4-24

9.4-8 Design Data for Reactor Support Cooling System and Reactor Cavity Cooling System 9.4-28

9.5-1 Design Data for Fire Protection System Components 9.5-3

9.5-2 Fire Protection System Instrumentation Application 9.5-6

9.5-3 Design Data for Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System 9.5-11

9.5-4 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Instrumentation Application 9.5-13

9-x LIST OF FIGURES

~P1 ure Title

9.1-1 New Fuel Storage Racks

9.1-2 Spent Fuel Racks

9.1-3 Fuel Pool System P&I Diagram

9.1-4 Fission Product Decay Heat Curve

9.1-5 Dose Rate Axially From Top of Spent Fuel Assembly in Water

9.1-6 Dose Rate From Side — A Single Spent Fuel Assembly in Water 9.1-7 Reactor Refueling Arrangement

9.1-8 Upper Guide Structure Lifting Rig Assembly 9.1-9 Refueling Machine

9.1-10 CEA Change Mechanism

9.1-11 Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Rig 9.1-12 Core Support Barrel Lifting Rig 9.1-13 Surveillance Capsule Retrieval Tool 9.1-14 Refueling Pool Seal

9.2-1A Intake and Circulating Water System

9.2-1B Plan View of Intake and Discharge Canals

9.2-1C Profile of Intake and Discharge Canals — Sheet 1

9.2-1D Profile of Intake and Discharge Canals — Sheet 2

9.2-1E Profile of Intake and'ischarge Canals — Sheet 3

9.2-2 Component Cooling Water P & I Diagram

9.2-3 Detail of Y Outfall for Circulating Water Discharge

9.2-4 Turbine Cooling 'Water P & I Diagram

9.2-5 Flow Diagram — Firewater, Domestic and Makeup Systems

9.3-'1 Service and Instrument Air P & I Diagram

9.3-2 Sampling System P & I Diagram

9.3-3 Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Schematic

9-xi Title

9.3-4 Chemical and Volume Control System P & I Diagram

9.3-5 Chemical and Volume Control System P & I Diagram

9.3-6 Shutdown Cooling System Flow Schematic

9.4-1 HVAC — Air Flow Diagram

9.4-2 HVAC P & I Diagram

9.4-3 HVAC P & I Diagram

9.5-1 Flow Diagram Miscellaneous Systems Sh.2

9 '-2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil P & I Diagram

9-xii CHAPTER 9.

AUXILIARYSYSTEMS

The auxiliary systems discussed in this section are those supporting systems which are required to ensure the safe operation, protection or servicing of the major unit systems and, principally, the reactor coolant system. In some cases the dependable operation of several systems is required to fulfillthe above requirements and, additionally, certain systems are required to operate under emergency conditions. The extent of the information provided for each system is commensurate with the relative contribution of, or reliance placed upon the system in relation to the overall plant safety.

The majority of the active components within these systems are located outside of the containment. Those systems with connecting piping or duct work between the containment and the, reactor auxiliary building are equipped with containment isolation valves as described in Section 6.2.4.

9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING

NEW FUEL STORAGE 9.1.1.1

The new fuel storage rack is designed to: a) store 100 fuel assemblies provide sufficient spacing between the fuel assemblies t'o maintain a subcritical array during flooding with nonborated water c) maintain a subcritical array under all design loadings, including the design basis earthquake d) preclude the possibility of a fuel assembly being placed between the new fuel cavities e) maintain a subcriticality of at least 5 percent for the similtaneous occurrence of design bases (b) and (c).

9.1.1.2 S stem Descri tion

The location of the new fuel storage rack is illustrated in the fuel handling building general arrangement drawings, Figures 1.2-18 and 1.2-19. The new fuel storage rack is shown on Figure 9.1-1.

The method of transferring new fuel into the fuel handling building and placing it into the new fuel storage racks is discussed in Section 9.1.3.

9.1-1 New fuel is stored dry at a floor elevation of 48 feet with the top of the rack at an elevation of 62 feet. Since the maximum flood wave runup is 21.8 feet the racks are not expected to be covered with water under normal or flood conditions; nevertheless, the array of fuel assemblies remains subcritical while flooded with nonborated water.

The new fuel storage racks consist of 100 square cavities fixed together in a large array. The size of the cavities (1'9" x 1'9") is sufficient to hold one fuel assembly in a vertical position. Each cavity has a hinged plate cover.

The supporting structure is designed to limit deflections so that subcriticality is maintained under all anticipated loadings. The clearance between structural framing members is small enough to prevent the wedging of a fuel assembly between adjacent, cavities.

The new fuel is subjected to a maximum ambient temperature of 110F. There is not sufficient room in the new fuel racks to store all the fuel assemblies for the initial loading of the core. The remaining assemblies are stored dry in the spent fuel racks under this circumstance. Section 9.1.2.3 discusses the design of the spent fuel racks.

9.1.1.3 S stem Evaluation

The new fuel in the storage racks is subcritical by at least 5 percent under the assumption of flooding with nonborated water and 3.7 weight percent enriched uranium.

The new fuel storage racks are designed in accordance with the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings and meets ANSI Standard N18.2 Paragraph 5.7.4.1.

Lateral loads exerted on the rack support structure are resisted by a vertical bracing system which transmits these forces to the concrete floor or through horizontal members into the concrete walls via anchor bolts. Lateral movement of the rack with any number of fuel assemblies is prevented by these supports for all anticipated loadings.

9.1.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE

9.1.2.1 Desi n Bases

The fuel pool is designed to provide safe storage for l-l/3 cores of spent fuel assemblies, control element assemblies, new fuel during initial core loading and spent fuel shipping cask. The system design includes interlocks, travel limits and other protective devices to minimize the probability of either mishandling or of equipment malfunction that could result in inadvertent damage to a fuel 0

9.1-2 assembly and potential fission product release. Criticality is pre- cluded by spacing of the fuel assemblies which ensures a subcritical array assuming the pool water is unborated. The pool, however, will always contain boric acid at the refueling concentration of >1720 ppm.

The fuel handling building exterior walls, floors and interior partitions are designed to provide plant personnel with the necessary radiation shielding and to protect the equipment from the effects of adverse atmospheric conditions including winds, temperature, missiles and corrosive environment.

9.1.2.2 S stem Descri tion The fuel handling building general arrangement showing the location of the spent fuel storage facilities is given in Figure 1.2-18 and 1.2-19. The fuel handling building consists of cast-in-place concrete exterior walls with interior walls which are of reinforced concrete construction. It is completely isolated from all other structures. The floors and roof are of beam and girder construction supported by columns. The fuel pool portion of the fuel handling building including the walls and roof directly above the pool is designed to withstand, without penetration, the impact of high velocity external missiles that might occur during the passage of a tornado. The design missiles are discussed in Section 3.5. Details of the structural design and analysis are given in Section 3.8. The fuel handling building also houses the fuel handling building heating and ventilating equipment, the fuel pool heat exchanger, the fuel pool filter, the fuel pool pumps, and the fuel pool purification pump. In addition, the fuel handling building provides space for the storage of new fuel (refer to Section 9.1.1), a decontamination area for the spent fuel cask, and a miscellaneous equipment area. As noted above, the fuel pool is located outside the containment in the fuel handling building. It is designed for the underwater storage of 304 spent fuel assemblies (l-l/3 cores), the spent fuel shipping cask and the fuel handling tools. Control element assemblies removed from the core are stored within the fuel assemblies. The pool is lined with stainless steel ASTM Specification A167, Type 304, which is the material for all of the stainless steel components in the fuel pool. This material resists the corrosive effect of boric acid in the fuel pool water.

A leakage detection system is included which consists of a network of stainless steel angles seal welded to the outside of the pool liner walls and floor. In the event that one of the liner plate weld seams develops a leak, the liquid enters the monitor channel system and flows to one of a number of collection points at the base of the pool. The flow is restricted in such a way that it is possible to determine the location at which the leak originated, and steps may be taken to repair it.

9.1-3 The fuel pool contains water with >1720 ppm of boron and has the capacity to store one and one-third cores. The capacity of one and one-third cores enables handling the removal of one full core during that period of time when one-third of a core is stored in the fuel pool following a refueling. When in storage racks, the fuel assemblies are spatially distributed so as to preclude criticality in the event of complete accidental dilution of the fuel pool water. The fuel pool water is borated to refueling concentration to assure that mixing of the fuel pool water and refueling cavity water cannot dilute the refueling cavity boron concentration.

Spent fuel assemblies are placed in stainless steel storage racks consisting of vertical cells (modules) grouped in parallel rows with a center-to-center distance of 1.6 ft. The modules are fabricated from welded steel racks. This design permits inspection or replacement of the racks without draining the pool since the modules are removed individually.

The rack assembly is designed to withstand all anticipated loadings, including a dropped fuel assembly on the top. Structural deformations of the racks are limited to preclude any possibility of criticality. The structural design precludes the possibility of a fuel assembly being placed in the spaces between the fuel cavities.

Fuel pool racks are open construction to permit convective cooling of the fuel assemblies. Spent fuel decay heat is removed by the fuel pool system described in Section 9.1.3.

The spent fuel racks are shown on Figure 9.1-2.

Boron concentration in the fuel pool is >1720 ppm which is adequate to preclude criticality even with fuel assemblies adjacent to each other and without CEA's. However, no credit is taken for the boron in the water in establishing the safe geometry of the storage racks.

The fuel enrichment selected for determination of the safe geometry is 3.7 percent. This is substantially higher than the enrichment for the initial and future cores. In the analysis to determine allowable edge- to-edge spacing, infinite arrays of fuel assemblies are analyzed with PDQ-5< ), using appropriate terms to account for axial leakage. Standard two-group beginning-of-life constants for fuel assemblies with the maximum enrichment and a temperature of 68 F are used. No boron is assumed to be present in the water. Fast constants for the water between assemblies are generated with the FORM computer program(2) assuming pure water, while thermal constants for the water are obtained using Maxwellian cross sections. The enrichments used in the analysis, provide allowance for future possible changes in the maximum enrichment of the fuel.

9.1-4 The stainless steel structure which supports each individual fuel assembly further reduces keff for any thickness of water slab. The structural basis for this container has been outlined above. No credit is taken for this reduction in keff . The geometry criteria is thus conservative. The spent fuel shipping cask is located in the cask handling area of the pool. The cask is designed such that spent fuel assemblies can be placed in the cask while still maintaining the minimum water level above the fuel assemblies. The cask cover is then placed on the cask and the unit is transferred to the cask washdown (see Figure 1.2-18) area by the cask handling crane.

9.1.2.3 S stem Evaluation

The modules making up the spent fuel storage racks are grouped in parallel rows with a center-to-center distance of 1.6 ft. This distance maintains a maximum keff of <0.95 assuming flooding with nonborated water and maximum lateral movement of the assemblies. The storage rack is supported to prevent significant lateral rack movement with any number of fuel assemblies in it under all anticipated loadings including the design basis earthquake. Lateral movement of the fuel assemblies results from the clearance between the assembly and the rack. The above value of keff reflects con- sideration of both these types of lateral movement. The fuel pool is also protected against other occurrences that could theoretically result in a critical assembly. The physical design of the racks prevents inadvertently placing a fuel assembly between the outermost module and the pool wall. Adequate clearance is provided between. the top of the CEA in the fuel assembly and the top of the rack to preclude criticality in the event a fuel assembly is dropped and lands in the horizontal position on the top. Rack design also assures adequate convection cooling of a fuel assembly lying horizontally across the top of the racks.

The spent fuel storage racks are designed in accordance with the AISC Specifications except that the normal working stress is limited to 18,000 psi. In the fuel pool, interlocks prevent movement into the walls while limit switches prevent the spent fuel handling machine from raising the fuel above a height where less than 10.5 ft separates the surface of the water from the top of the active fuel length. Under these conditions and when not refueling, the direct dose rate at the pool surface is less than

9. 1-5 2 mrem/hr. This number is calculated using the most active fuel assembly two days after shutdown. If the interlock should fail and if there were no operator action, the fuel handling machine could not raise the assembly above a 9 ft water-to-active-fuel-length height because of the geometry of its design. Under the conditions described above, the dose rate at the surface of the water above the assembly would be 7 mrem/hr. The grappling tool on the spent fuel handling machine is designed so that a fuel assembly cannot be released accidently. The assembly could not be dropped from greater than a height of 9 ft active length below the water. The shielding provided in the fuel handling building is discussed in Section 12.1.2.4. A dividing wall to the top of the spent fuel racks separates the cask storage area of the pool from the spent fuel storage area. The wall prevents the water level from uncovering the spent fuel assemblies even if a dropped fuel cask causes damage to the pool or pool liner in the cask handling area.

The fuel pool meets those portions of Safety Guide 13 which apply to the fuel pool (13.C.1, 2, 4, 5, 7) with the except.ion of 13.C.4. The fuel handling building is not a controlled leakage facility. Doses from a refueling accident are kept within the limits defined by 10CFR100 without a controlled leakage building as discussed further in Section 9.4.6. The assumptions, evaluation and results of the refueling accident analysis are given in Section 15.4.6. Articles one, two, five and seven are met in the following ways: a) The spent fuel storage facility is seismic Class I. b) The spent fuel storage facility is designed against hurricane or tornado winds and missiles generated by the winds from s'ignificantly affecting the integrity of the pool. Missiles generated by hurricane or tornado winds are prevented. The fuel handling building is designed in accordance with the ACI Standard Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, ACI 318-63 Part IVB, Ultimate Strength Design. Details of the structural design and analysis of the fuel handling building are given in Section 3.8. c) All cranes capable of carrying heavy loads cannot move in the area of the fuel pool. The cask handling crane is restrained from tipping over due to an accident, wind loading, or an'arthquake. Th'e fuel pool is designed to withstand dropping of a fuel assembly from the highest elevation that it can be lifted by .the spent fuel handling machine.

The spent fuel cask is handled by a 105 ton capacity fuel handling crane which runs on rails supported on a structural steel frame above the roof of the building. The trolley and end trucks of the fuel handling crane have lugs which prevent the crane from lifting off the rails in the event of a design basis earthquake.

9.1-6 The fuel cask handling crane cannot approach any area above where spent fuel is stored because of the geometrical design of the crane runway, the physical design of the building, and travel limit switch interlock circuitry. Reliable and frequently tested (refer to Section 9.2.5) monitoring equipment will provide local and control room alarm of high radiation and low fuel pool water level. The fuel pool cooling system instrumentation is discussed in Section 9.1.3.3.10. 9.1.2.4 Testin and Ins ection

The welded steel spent fuel and new fuel storage racks are liquid penetrant tested for structural adequacy and alignment is periodically checked prior to handling fuel assemblies by operation of all systems by the use of a dummy fuel bundle which has the same weight, center of gravity, exterior size and end geometry as a fuel assembly.

9.1.2.5 Instrumentation A lications

Temperature, water level, and radiation monitoring and alarm instrumentation are provided in the control room and locally to verify that the decay heat from the spent fuel assemblies is being removed. Means are provided to control entry of personnel and to account for the flow of tools in and out of the area. Table 11.2-3 gives the location of the area radiation monitoring in the fuel handling building. The radiation alarms give indication of high, high-high, and radiation alarms.

9.1-7 REFERENCES FOR SECTION 9.1

PDQ-5 Program for the Solution of the Two-dimensional Neutron Diffusion — Depletion Problem, Cadwell, W.R., et al., WAPD-TM-477 January 1965.

2. FORM — A Fourier Transform Fast Spectrum Code for the IBM-7090, McGoff, D.J., NAA-SR-Memo 5766, September 1967.

9.1-8 9.1.3 FUEL POOL SYSTEM 9.1.3.1

The fuel pool system is designed to:

a) provide radiation shielded storage of 304 spent fuel assemblies to limit personnel dose rates to less than 2'.5 mrem/hr

b) remove decay heat from the spent fuel stored in the pool assuming the spent fuel assemblies to have undergone infinite irradiation and maintain pool water temperature to less than 150F. c) maintain purity and optical clarity of the fuel pool water

maintain purity of the water in the refueling cavity and in the refueling water tank e) maintain the water level a minimum of 9 ft above the top of the fuel during fuel handling and storage operations.

9.1.3.2 S stem Descri tion

The P 6 I diagram of the fuel pool system is shown in Figure 9.1-3. The system process flow data is shown in Table 9.1-1. The cooling portion of the fuel pool system is a closed loop system consisting of two full capacity pumps for normal duty and one full capacity heat exchanger. The fuel pool water is drawn from the fuel pool near the surface and is circulated by the fuel pool pumps through the fuel pool heat exchanger where heat is re)ected to the component cooling system. From the outlet of the fuel pool heat exchanger, the cooled fuel pool water is returned to t'e bottom of the fuel pool via a distribution header at the opposite end of the pool from the intake.

The fuel pool is designed to limit the fuel pool temperature to 150F with one and one-third cores in the pool assuming one full core is placed in the fuel pool seven days after reactor shutdown plus one-third of a core that has been stored in the pool for ninety days. Figure 9.1-4 shows the fission product decay heat curve. During normal operating conditions with one-third of a core in the pool seven days after reactor shutdown, the system maintains a maximum fuel pool temperature of 120F. For this condition, the initial heat load is 9.4 x 10 Btu/hr. For both conditions the design component cooling water inlet temperature is 100F. The clarity and purity of the water in the fuel pool, refueling cavity, and refueling water tank are'maintained by the purification portion of the fuel pool system. The purification loop consists of the fuel pool purification pump, ion exchanger, filter, strainers and surface skimmers. Most of the purification flow is drawn from the bottom of the fuel pool, while a small fraction is drawn through the surface skimmers to remove surface debris. A basket strainer is provided in the purification line to the

9.1-9 TABLE 9.1-1

FUEL POOL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA (Refer to Figure 9.1-3 for location of data points)

1. Normal Fuel Pool Coolin FPS Location Flow, gpm 1500 1500 1500 Pressure, psig 26 24 Temperature, F 120 120 108

2. Maximum Fuel Pool Coolin FPS Location Flow, gpm 3000 3000 3000 Pressure, psig 32 25 Temperature, F 150 150 129

3. Purification FPS Location 4a 4b Flow, gpm 150 150 150 150 Pressure, psig 40 35 20 Temperature, F 120 120 120 120

4. Skimmin 0 erations

FPS Location 4a 5 6

Flow, gpm 142-150 0-8 , 150 150 150 Pressure, psig 40 35 20 Temperature, F 120 120 120 120 120, NOTES: The pressure drop across the filters, strainers, and ion exchangers will vary with loading. The pressure losses are typical. pump suction to remove any relatively large particulate matter. The fuel pool water is circulated by the pump through a filter, which removes particulates larger than 5 micron size, and through an ion exchanger to remove ionic material. Connections to the refueling water tank and refueling water cavity are provided for purification. Fuel pool water chemistry is given in Table 9.1-2 below.

TABLE 9.1-2 FUEL POOL WATER CHEMISTRY

pH (77F) 4.5 to 10.6 Boric Acid, Maximum, wt % 1.5 Ammonia, Maximum*, ppm 50 Lithium, Maximum*, ppm 2.5 Dissolved Air, Maximum Saturated Chloride, Maximum, ppm 0.15 Fluoride, Maximum, ppm 0.1

*Concentrations do not occur simultaneously

Maximum dose rates from a spent fuel assembly as a function of the water height above the top of the active fuel is shown in Figure 9.1-5 and for horizontal water distances in Figure 9.1-6 for various decay times. Long term operation, infinite irradiation, is assumed for the dose rate calcula- tion. An axial power distribution with maximum power at the top and bottom of the fuel was used for the axial dose rate calculations while an axial peak of 1.50 was used for the radial (side) dose rate calculations for shielding requirement as described in Section 12.1. Additionally, both cases 'assumed a maximum radial fuel assembly peaking factor of 1.38. The decay times are not representative of any particular point in the refueling cycle and are only given to show the dose r'ate variation with time. Other decay times between 2 days and 60 days can be obtained by interpolation between the existing points.

The fuel pool system is manually controlled from a local control panel. High fuel pool temperature, high and low fuel pool water level, and a low fuel pool pump discharge pressure alarms are annunciated in the control room. Makeup to the fuel pool is provided from the refueling water tank. Overflow protection is provided by transferring the fuel pool water on high level alarm to the refueling water tank via the purification pumps. Spent resins from the fuel pool ion exchanger are sluiced to the waste management system as described in Section 11.5.2. Local sample connections are provided on the influent and effluent of the fuel pool purification filter and the fuel pool ion exchanger effluent for verifying purification performance.

9.1.3.3 Com onent Descri tion All piping, valves, instruments, and components except the fuel pool ion exchanger are located in the fuel handling building. The fuel pool ion exchanger is located in the reactor auxiliary building with the CVCS and waste management system ion exchangers. Design data for the major components are indicated in Table 9.1-3.

9.1-11 TABLE 9.1-3 DESIGN DATA FOR FUEL POOL SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Heat Exchan ers

Quantity 1 Type Shell and Tube Tube Side Fluid Fuel Pool Water Design Temperature, F 250 Design Pressure, psig 75 Normal Operating Conditions Flow, gpm 1500 Inlet Temperature, F 120 Outlet Temperature, F 107.5 Materials ASTM-SA-240, Type 304 Code ASME III, Class C Shell Side Fluid Component Cooling Water Design Temperature, F 250 Design Pressure, psig 150 Normal Operating Conditions Flow, gpm 3560 Inlet Temperature, F 100 Outlet Temperature, F 105.3 Materials Carbon Steel Code ASME III, Class C

Quantity 1 V Type 'ixed Bed, Disposable Design Pressure, psig 200 Design„Temperature, F 250 Normal Operating Temperature, F 120 Vessel Volume, ft3 55 Resin Volume, ft3 (useful) 32 Code ASME III, Class C Normal Flow Rate, gpm 150 Materials ASTM-SA-240,,Type 304

3. ~Pum s Fuel Pool Coolin Fuel Pool Purification

Quantity 2 1 Type ,Centrifugal Centrifugal Design Pressure, psig 75 150 Design Temperature, F 250 250 Normal Operating Conditions Flow, each, gpm 1500 150 Head, ft 70 165 Fluid Temperature, F 120 120

9.1-12 TABLE 9.1-3 DESIGN DATA FOR FUEL POOL SYSTEM COMPONENTS (Cont) Seal Type Mechanical Mechanical Horsepower 40 15 Material ASTM A-351 ASTM A-351 Gr CF-8M Gr CF-8M 4. Filters

Quantity 1 Type of Elements Replaceable Cartridge Retention of 5 micron particles 98% Design Pressure, psig 100 Design Temperature, F 200 Design Flow, gpm 150 Material ASTM-SA-240, Type 304 Code ASME VIII 5. Strainers Fuel Pool Fuel Pool Ion Purification Pump ~Exchan er Suction Quantity 1 1 Type Basket Wye Design Flow, gpm 150 150 Design Pressure, psig 100 100 Design Temperature, F 200 200 Screen Size 1/8" perforated 100 U.S. Mesh Body Material ASTM A-351 ASTM A-351 6. Fuel Transfer Valve

Type Gate Size, in 36 Design Pressure, psig 75 Normal Operating Differential Pressure 34'-6" 20 Design Temperature, F 150 Normal Operating Temperature, F 140 Materials ASTM-A-351 CF-8M Design Integrated Dose, Rads 1 x 107 Allowable Seat Leakage, cc/hr 72

9. 1-13 Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger

The fuel pool heat exchanger is a horizontal shell and tube design with a two-pass tube side. A slight pitch, 3'bove the horizontal, is provided for complete draining of the heat exchanger. The component cooling water circulates through the shell side, and pool water circulates through the tube side. Fuel Pool Purification Filter The fuel pool purification filter is located upstream of the fuel pool ion exchanger to remove any particulates in the pool water. The filter retains 98 percent of the particulates larger than 5 micron in size at a flow of 150 gpm. Due to the possible buildup of high activity in the filter, the unit has been designed and installed to provide for removal of the contaminated element assembly with remotely operated handling equipment. The filter drains to the drain collection header in the waste management system.

Fuel Pool Ion Exchanger

The ion exchanger removes ionic matter from the water. Mixed bed resin is used with the anion resin converted to the borate form and the cation resin in the hydrogen form. The units are provided with all connections required to replace resins by sluicing. The ion exchanger contains a flow distributor on the inlet to prevent channeling of the resin bed and a resin retention element on the discharge to preclude discharge of resin with the effluent.

Fuel Pool Purification Pump Suction Strainer

The fuel pool purification pump suction strainer prevents any . relatively large particulates from entering the purification pump. The strainer has a drain connection allowing local draining. Fuel Pool Ion Exchanger Strainer

The wye strainer removes particles larger than 149 microns from the purification flow. Blowdown is directed to the spent resin tank in the waste management system.

; Fuel Pool Pumps

There are two fuel pool pumps installed for parallel operation. Under normal operating conditions one pump is operational. The pumps are provided with mechanical seals. To increase seal life and reduce maintenance, the seals are cooled by circulating a portion of the pump discharge flow to the seals which returns to the pump suction. The seals are provided with leakoff vent and drain connections.

9.1-14 Fuel Pool Purification Pump

The fuel pool purification pump is used for purification and skimming operations. Mechanical seals minimize shaft leakage. To increase seal life and reduce maintenance, the seals are cooled by circulating a portion of the pump discharge flow to the seals which returns to the pump suction. The seals are provided with leakoff vent and drain connections. The internal wetted surfaces of the pump are stainless steel.

Piping 6 Valves

All the piping used in the fuel pool system is stainless steel with welded connections throughout, except for flanged connections at the suction and discharge of the pumps. All the valves in the fuel pool system are stainless steel, 150-pound class. All valves are manually operated diaphragm type.

S stem Evaluation

Cooling System

With one-third of a core in the fuel pool, one fuel pool pump and the fuel pool heat exchanger are in service. With one and one-third cores in the fuel pool, two fuel pool pumps and the heat exchanger are in service. The system is manually controlled and the operation monitored locally. A pressure switch on the fuel pool pump discharge header annunciates low header pressure in the control room. The fuel pool temperature high alarm and the fuel pool water level switch high and low level alarms are annunciated in the control room. In the event the fuel pool pump breakers are opened, an alarm is annunciated in the control room. The component cooling water flow to the fuel pool heat exchanger is initially ad)usted to the required flow. Further adjustments of the component cooling water is not required. The component cooling water discharge line has a flow indicator. High and low component cooling water flow alarms are annunciated in the control room.

The fuel pool piping is arranged so that the pool cannot be inadvertently drained to uncover the fuel. All fuel pool piping is arranged to prevent gravity draining the fuel pool. To prevent syphoning of the fuel pool, the fuel pool cooling discharge and purification suction lines have 1/2" and 1/4" holes respectively 1 foot below the normal water level. The only means of draining the pool below these siphon breaker holes is through an open line in the cooling loop while operating the pool cooling pumps. In such an event the fuel pool water level can be reduced by only 6 feet since the pump suction connection enters near the top of the pool. Adequate shielding and cooling are still provided with the water level at this point. The temperature and level alarms would warn the operator of such an event.

9.1-15 In the case of loss of component cooling water with one and one-third cores stored in the pool under the design conditions of one full core in the pool seven days after shutdown and one-third core in the pool for ninety days after shutdown the temperature would rise from 150F to boiling in 4.8 hours. With one-third of a core in the pool seven days after shutdown it would take 27.6 hours for the pool temperature to rise from 120F to boiling. These values are based on the fuel pool containing 2.8 x 10 pounds of water with one-third core and 2.45 x 10 pounds with one and one-third cores in the fuel pool. If the pool reaches the boiling point (212F) the maximum makeup rate to the fuel pool required to compensate for loss due to boiling is approximately 66 gpm. This makeup rate is within the supply capacity from the refueling water tank. The makeup rate is based on the heat load from one and one- third cores in the pool (32 x 10 Btu/hr). In the unlikely event that makeup was unavailable for 12 hours and the spent fuel pool temperature was 212F, the pool water level would only decrease approximately 5 feet. As a result the fuel would still be covered by approximately 19 feet of water.

b) Purification System

The purification loop is normally run on an intermittent basis when required by the fuel pool water conditions. It is possible to operate with either the ion exchanger or filter bypassed. Local samples permit analysis of ion exchanger and filter efficiencies. A diaphragm valve in the skimmer suction line is throttled to maintain flow balance between t'e skimmer and normal purification flow. Spent filters and ion exchanger resins are removed to the waste management system described in Section 11.5 for eventual disposal. 9.1.3.5 Testin and Ins ection Each component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the system. Demineralized water is used to flush the entire system. Instru- ments are calibrated and alarm functions are checked for operability and set points during preoperational testing. The system will be operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability.

Prior to transferring spent fuel to the pool, the system will be tested to verify satisfactory flow characteristics through the equipment, to demonstrate satisfactory performance of pumps and instruments, to check for leak tightness of piping and equipment, and to verify proper operation of controls. Also, the overall cooling capability will be checked during initial refueling by analyzing pool temperature versus quantity of fuel transferred into the pool and comparing with expected performance. The active components of the system are in either continuous or intermittent use during normal plant operation; thus no additional periodic tests are required. Data will be taken and periodic visual inspections and preventative

9.1-16 maintenance will be conducted, as necessary. This periodic inspection will also confirm heat transfer capabilities, purification efficiency, and component differential pressures.

9.1.3.6 Instrumentation A lication

Instrumentation is provided to monitor fuel pool temperature and water level together with significant temperature and pressures around the cooling and purification loops. Alarms annunciated in the control room are provided for fuel pool water level, fuel pool temperature and fuel pool pump discharge pressure. A tabulation of instrument channels is included in Table 9.1-4.

9.1-17 TABLE 9.1-4 FUEL POOL SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

1 Indication Alarm Normal System Parameter Contr 1 Operating Inst. & Location Local Room High Low Rec. Control Function Inst. Range Range Accuracy

Heat exchanger inlet * 0-200F. +10F

Heat 'exchanger outlet * 0-200F +10F temp.

Fuel pool temp.

Fuel pool pump 0-60 psig 40 psig +0.3psi discharge press.

Purification pump 0-30 psig 5-18 psig +0.2 psi 0 suction press. I * CO Purification pump 0-100 psig 50 psig +0.5 psi discharge press.

Ion exchanger 0-30 psi 2-10 psi 0.2 psi differential press.

Filter differential * 0-30 psi 1-15 psi 0.2 psi pressure Fuel pool water level

1 All alarms and recorders are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. 9.1.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM 9.1.4.1

The fuel handling system is designed to:

a) safely handle and store fuel assemblies and control element assemblies

b) safely remove, replace and store reactor internals

c) by means of interlocks, travel limiting devices and other protective devices, minimize the probability of malfunction or operator initiated actions that could cause fuel damage, and potential fission product release or reduction of shielding water coverage d) conduct all spent fuel transfer and storage operations under water to limit radiation dose levels to less than 2.5 mr/hr at the pool surface e) operate in water with the chemistry listed in Table 9.1-2 operate dry for the initial core loading g) remain in a safe condition in the event of loss of power h) withstand containment internal design leak rate test pressure without loss of function

remove and install a fuel assembly at each operating location at the most adverse combined tolerance condition for the equipment, core internals and fuel assemblies

withstand the loadings induced by the design base earthquake

9.1.4.2 S stem Descri tion

The fuel handling system is an integrated system of equipment, tools and procedures for refueling the reactor. The system is designed for safe handling and storage of fuel assemblies from receipt of new fuel to shipping of spent fuel. The arrangement of the fuel handling area is shown in Figure 9.1-7.

The equipment is normally used at 12-month intervals for a period of approximately 3 weeks during which time it must operate continuously without maintenance or service.

9.1-19 a) New Fuel Handling

New fuel assemblies are delivered to the site in containers approved by the U.S. Department of Transportation. New fuel assemblies are removed from the shipping containers and placed in the new fuel storage racks using the new fuel handling tool attached to the 5-ton fuel transfer hoist. New CEA's are inserted into the guide tubes of the fuel assemblies while the new fuel is in the storage rack. During reactor refueling operations the new fuel is removed (with CEA's inserted if stored with the fuel) from the new fuel storage racks and transferred to the new fuel elevator. The new fuel elevator lowers the fuel assembly into the refueling cavity where the spent fuel handling machine transfers the fuel assembly to the fuel pool upending mechanism. Interlocks prevent the spent fuel handling machine from lowering the fuel assembly unless the upender is in the vertical position. After a new fuel assembly has been placed in the upending mechanism, a spent fuel assembly is removed from the other position of the fuel carrier and transferred to a designated position in the spent fuel storage racks. b) Spent Fuel Handling The spent fuel handling equipment is designed to handle the spent fuel underwater from the time it leaves the reactor until it is placed in a cask for shipment from the site., Underwater transfer of spent fuel provides a transparent radiation shield, as well as the cooling medium for removal of decay heat. Boric acid is added to the water to ensure subcritical conditions during refueling. The major components of the system are the refueling machine, the CEA change mechanism, the fuel transfer equipment and the spent fuel handling machine. The refueling machine moves fuel assemblies into and out of the core and between the core and the transfer equipment. The CEA change mechanism moves CEA's from one fuel assembly to another. The fuel transfer equipment tilts fuel assemblies from the vertical position to the horizontal, shuttles them through the containment wall to the fuel handling building fuel pool and returns them to the vertical position. The spent fuel handling machine handles fuel between the transfer equipment and the fuel storage racks in the fuel pool. Special tools and lifting rigs are also used for disassembly of reactor components and are included in the refueling system.

Prior to refueling, the plant is shut down, the water level lowered and reactor coolant is established at refueling temperature. During the cooldown, preparations are begun for the refueling operation.

9.1-20 Refueling operations are initiated with the removal of the missile shield from over the reactor. The control element drive mechanisms are disengaged from their drive shaft extensions by deenergizing the CEDM electromagnetic coils, and both mechanism and in-core instrument cabling disconnected in preparation for head removal. The stud tensioners are used to remove the preload of the vessel head studs. Plugs are installed to protect the empty stud holes and two alignment pins are installed in the vessel flange for subsequent operations. The CEDM cooling shroud is disconnected from the duct work and the vessel vent line removed. The reactor vessel flange is sealed to the bottom of the pool using the refueling cavity seal to prevent"water from entering the lower portion of the vessel cavity. A lifting frame is then installed on the head assembly and, by means of the containment building polar crane, the head is removed to its storage location.

The flange on the transfer tube is removed and, after the refueling cavity is filled the fuel transfer valve is opened to establish a common water level preparatory to refueling.

Using the refueling machine walkway as a work platform, the mechanism drive shaft extensions are disconnected from the CEA's by means of a tool hung from the polar crane. The extension shafts are then locked in place for subsequent removal with the vessel upper guide structure. The upper guide structure lift rig (Figure 9;1-8) is installed and the in-core instrumentation is withdrawn into the upper guide structure and logked in place.

Provision is made in the refueling cavity for the temporary storage of the upper guide structure. After this is removed from the vessel, the refueling machine hoist mechanism is positioned at the desired location over the core. Alignment of the hoist to the top of the fuel assembly is accomplished through the use of a digital readout system and is monitored by closed circuit television. After the fuel hoist is lowered, minor adjustments can be made to properly position the hoist if misalignment is indicated on the monitor. The operator then energizes the actuator assembly which rotates the grapple at the bottom of the hoist and locks thy fuel assembly to the hoist. The hoist motor is started and the fuel assembly withdrawn into the fuel hoist box assembly so that the fuel is protected during transportation to the upending machine. The grapple is designed to preclude inadvertent disengagement as the 'fuel assembly is lifted vertically. from the core. When the fuel assembly has been withdrawn out of the grapple zone, positive locking between the grapple and the fuel assembly is established so that uncoupling is prevented even in the event of inadvertent initiation of an uncoupling signal to the assembly. After removal from the core, the spent fuel assembly is moved underwater to the transfer area of the pool. The spent fuel assembly is lowered into the transfer carriage of the upending machine. in the refueling cavity. If the fuel assembly contains a control element assembly, the CEA change mechanism transfers the CEA to a new fuel assembly which will hav'e been brought into the transfer area from the storage area.

9.1-21 The new fuel assembly is removed from the carriage and moved to the reactor as the upending machine rotates the spent assembly to the horizontal position after which a cable drive transports the carriage on tracks through the transfer tube.

Once received in the fuel pool, another upending machine returns the transfer carrier to the vertical position. The spent fuel handling machine transfers a new fuel assembly to the carrier, removes the spent fuel assembly from the transfer carrier and transports it to the spent fuel rack. The new fuel assembly is carried through the transfer tube to the refueling cavity where the refueling machine picks it up and places it in its proper position in the core. The refueling machine is also used to rearrange fuel within the core in accordance with the fuel management program.

Neutron sources described in Chapter 4 are transferred between fuel assemblies at the upender position via a tool manipulated from the refueling machine. Capsules containing serveillance samples are similiarly removed from the reactor vessel using a tool manipulated from the refueling machine which then transports them to the upender station for insertion into a dummy fuel bundle. The transfer carrier transports the dummy assembly with the surveillance capsules to spent fuel storage area for eventual disassembly and disposition.

Dry sipping of fuel assemblies can be conducted, if required, during normal fuel handling operations. A portable control console is installed on the refueling machine with connections to a nitrogen gas supply, the fuel hoist, and the waste management system. Fuel is raised into the hoist box in the normal manner and the water displaced by applying a pressurized gas at the top of the sealed hoist box. When the box is allowed to refill, this gas is passed through a scintillation counter and the gas discharged to the containment vent header. The console contains the necessary controls for gas flow and for recording of gas activity levels. Once the hoist box is reflooded, fuel is discharged in the normal manner. At the completion of the refueling operation, the fuel transfer valve is closed. The upper guide structure is reinserted in the vessel and the in-core instrumentation placed in position. The drive shaft extensions are reconnected to the CEA's. The water in the refueling cavity is lowered to the level of the vessel flange using one of the low pressure safety injection pumps. Draining of the refueling cavity is completed using the reactor drain pumps.

The head is simultaneously lowered with the water level to the vessel flange until the drive shaft extensions are engaged by the control element drive mechanisms. Lowering of the head is then continued until it is seated. Then the head is bolted down, and the transfer tube closure flange installed. The refueling cavity seal between the reactor vessel flange and the vessel cavity wall is removed. CEDM and in-core instrument cabling is reconnected. The ducting is reconnected to the CEDM cooling shroud,=the vessel vent piping installed, and the missile shield 'placed in position.

After a period of 5 to 6 months for reduction of decay heat and radioactivity level, the spent fuel'handling machine transfers the assemblies from the spent fuel racks to the spent fuel cask located in the northeast corner of the pool. The spent fuel cask is placed in the spent fuel cask laydown area by the overhead 105-ton crane. After the cask is loaded with spent fuel assemblies, the head is fastened to the cask for transport to the decontamination area.

9.1-22 In the decontamination area the cask is cleaned to remove surface contamination. After the cask surface contamination is reduced to a safe level the crane loads the spent fuel cask onto the shipping vehicle for transport to the reprocessing plant. c) Component Description Refueling Machine

The reactor refueling machine is shown in Figure 9.1-9. The refueling machine is a traveling bridge and trolley which is located above the refueling cavity and rides on rails set in the concrete on each side of the pool. Motors on the bridge and trolley accurately position the machine over each fuel assembly location within the reactor core or fuel transfer carrier. The hoist assembly contains an air operated grappling device which, when rotated by the actuator mechanism, engages the fuel assembly to be removed. The hoist assembly and grappling device are raised and lowered by a cable attached to the hoist winch. After the fuel assembly has been raised into the refueling machine, the refueling machine transports the fuel assembly to its designated location.

The controls for the refueling machine are mounted on a console which is located on the refueling machine trolley. Coordinate location of the bridge and trolley is indicated at the console by digital readout devices which are driven by encoders coupled to the guide rails through rack and pinion gears.

During withdrawal or insertion of either a fuel assembly, or a fuel assembly with a control element inserted, the load on the hoist cable is monitored at the console to ensure that movement is not being restricted. Limits are such that damage to the assembly is prevented. Positive locking between the grapple and the assembly is provided by the engagement of the grapple actuator arm in axial cnannels running the length of the fuel hoist assembly. Therefore, it is not possible to uncouple even with the inadvertent initiation of an uncoupling signal to the actuator assembly. The drives for both the bridge and trolley provide close control for accurate positioning, and brakes are provided to maintain the position once achieved. Interlocks are installed so that movement of the refueling machine is not possible when the hoist is withdrawing or inserting an assembly. After operation of the hoist, a console- mounted bypass button must be pressed to allow movement of the bridge or trolley.

9.1-23 For operations in the core, the bottom of the hoist assembly is equipped with a spreading device to move the surrounding fuel assemblies to their normal core spacing to ensure clearance for fuel assemblies being installed or removed. An anticollision device at the bottom of the mast assembly prevents damage should the mast be inadvertently driven into an obstruction, and a positive mechanical up-stop is provided to prevent the fuel from being lifted above the minimum safe water cover depth. A system of pointers and scales serves as a backup for the remote repositioning readout equipment. Manually operated handwheels are provided for bridge, trolley and winch motions in the event of a power loss. Manual operation of the grappling device is also possible in the event that air pressure is lost. 2) Upending Machine

Two upending machines are provided, one in the containment refueling cavity and the other in the fuel pool. Each consists of a structural steel support base from which is pivoted an upending straddle frame which engages the two-pocket fuel carrier. Mhen the carriage with its fuel carrier is in position within the upending frame, the pivots for the Euel carrier and the upending frame are coincident. Hydraulic cylinders, attached to both the upending frame and the support base, rotate the fuel carrier between the vertical and horizontal positions as required by the fuel transfer procedure. Hach hydraulic cylinder can perform the upending operation and can be isolated in the event of its failure. A long tool is also provided to allow manual rotation of the fuel carrier in the event that both cylinders fail or hydraulic power is lost. Fuel Transfer Tube, Valve and Carriage A fuel transfer tube extending through the containment wall connects the refueling cavity with the fuel pool as shown in Figure 9.1-7. During reactor operation, the transfer tube is closed by means of a blind flange on the containment end of the transfer tube. Prior to filling the refueling cavity, the flange is removed. After a common water level is reached between the refueling cavity and the fuel pool, the fuel transfer valve is opened. The procedure is reversed aEter refueling is completed.

The 36-inch diameter transfer tube is contained in a 48-inch diameter pipe which is sealed to the containment. The two concentric tubes are sealed to each other at both ends by welding rings and bellows-type expansion joints. The transfer tube valve is flange connected to the fuel pool end of transfer tube. The valve is supported in such a manner to allow for horizontal movement along the centerline of the transfer tube. The manual gear operator for the valve is designed to allow for movement of the valve due to thermal expansions and still permit operation. The valve is designed for operation from the operating floor. Description of the transfer tube valve is given in Table 9.1-3.

9.1-24 A transfer carriage conveys the fuel assemblies between the refueling cavity and the fuel pool, moving them through the fuel transfer tube on a transfer carriage. Large wheels support the carriage and allow it to roll on tracks within the transfer tube. Track sections at both ends of the transfer tube are supported from the pool floor and permit the carriage to be properly positioned at the upending mechanisms. The carriage is pulled by stainless steel cables connected to the carriage and through sheaves to its driving winch mounted on the operating floor. A two-pocket fuel carrier is mounted on the carriage and is pivoted for tilting by the upending -machines. The load on the transfer cables is displayed at the master control console. An overload will interrupt the transfer operation. Manual override of the overload cutout allows completion of the transfer. The supports for the replaceable rails on which the transfer carriage rides are welded to the 36-inch diameter transfer tube.

CEA Change Mechanism

The CEA change mechanism is shown in Figure 9.1-9. The mechanism that inserts CEA's into and removes CEA's from fuel assemblies is mounted on rails adjacent to the containment side upender and consists of a structural frame, a translation drive, and a grapple hoist. The mechanism can be moved to either of two operating positions above the upender cavities or a third parking position which permits access of the refueling machine to the upender positions. At the bottom of the h'oist section an alignment device centers the fuel assembly to the grapple centerline and a finger guide maintains the pattern of the five control rod fingers when the CEA is withdrawn. A rotary grapple engages the CEA for lifting. The grapple rides in a vertical channel section so that inadvertent release of the CEA is not possible. Grapple load is monitored and position readout is provided for both hoisting and translation drives. The operator's control station is located at the edge of the refueling cavity where all operations can be monitored. Interlocks are provided to ensure that translation cannot occur during hoisting, and vice versa. The equipment, including all moving parts, may be lifted off the rail for maintenance or repair. Fuel Handling Tools

Two fuel handling tools are used to move fuel assemblies in the fuel pool area. A short tool is provided for dry transfer of new fuel, and a long tool is provided for underwater handling of both spent and new fuel in the fuel pool. The tools are operated manually from the walkway on the spent fuel handling machine.

Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Rig

The reactor vessel head lifting rig is shown in Figure 9.1-11. This lifting rig is composed of a removable three-part lifting frame and a three-part column assembly which is attached to the reactor vessel closure head. The column assembly supports three hoists used for handling the reactor vessel stud tensioners.

.9.1-25 Reactor Internals Handling Equipment

Two lifting rigs are used to remove either the upper guide structure or the core support barrel from the reactor vessel and to raise and lower the in-core instrumentation support plate assembly.

The upper guide structure lifting rig is shown in Figure 9.1-8 This lifting rig consists of a delta spreader beam which supports three columns providing attachment points to the upper guide structure. Attachment to the upper guide structure is accomplished manually from the working platform by means of lifting bolt torque tools. The integral in-core instrumentation hoist connects to an adaptor which is manually attached to the in-core instrumentation structure by utilizing an adaptor torque tool. The in-core instrumentation is then lifted by the polar crane auxiliary hook. The upper clevis assembly, which is common to this and the core support barrel lifting rig, is installed prior to lifting of the structure by the crane hook. Correct positioning is assured by attached bushings which mate to the reactor vessel guide pins. The core support barrel lifting rig, shown in Figure 9.1-12, is used to withdraw the core barrel from the vessel for inspection purposes. The upper clevis assembly is a tripod-shaped structure connecting the lifting rig to the containment crane lifting hook. The lifting rig includes a spreader beam providing three attachment points which are threaded to the core support barrel flange. This is done manually from the refueling machine bridge by means of the lifting bolt torque tool. Correct positioning of the lifting rig is assured by guide bushings which mate to the reactor vessel guide pins. Stud Tensioners Three hydraulically operated stud tensioners are used to apply and remove the preload on the reactor vessel head closure studs. These tensioners are suspended from pneumatic hoists which are attached to the head lift rig. The tensioner assemblies, when placed over the studs, rest upon the reactor vessel head flange. An internal socket is attached to the stud by engagement with the stud upper threads and when hydraulic pressure is applied to the stud tensioner pistons, the studs are elongated a predetermined amount. After the closure nuts are seated, the hydraulic pressure is released which results in the preload necessary to maintain the seal between the reactor vessel and the reactor vessel head.

A portable pumping unit mounted on a two-wheel truck is the source of hydraulic power. Two air operated pumps connected in parallel produce the hydraulic pressure which is routed by hose to the tensioner pistons. The control panel contains an air gauge indicating the regulated air pressure and an air valve for operating the pump. A hydraulic gauge showing the pump pressure is .also provided as is the hydraulic release valve.

9, 126 9) Surveillance Capsule Retrieval Tool

A retrieval tool is used during the refueling shutdown for manual removal of the irradiated capsule assemblies of the reactor vessel materials surveillance program described in Section 5.4.4. The surveillance capsule retrieval tool is shown in Figure 9.1-13. The tool is operated from a position on the carriage walkway of the refueling machine. Access to the capsule assembly is achieved by inserting the tool through 3-inch diameter retrieval holes in the core support barrel flange provided at each capsule assembly radial location. A female acme thread at the end of the retrieval tool is mated to the surveillance capsule lock assembly (Figure 5.4-3) by turning the retrieval tool handle. A compressed spring in the lock assembly exerts a high frictional force at the retrieval tool-lock assembly interface to prevent disengagement during retrieval.

The overall length of the tool is 45.5 feet. The tool consists of two parts to facilitate storage. The upper portion is a 2-inch diameter tube and handle. The lower portion of the tool is also a 2-inch tube with a 1-inch outer diameter at the connector end. A 3/4-inch diameter hole in the upper end of the tool permits the polar crane to assist with the retrieval procedure and prevents inadvertent dropping of the tool. The tool is made of aluminum and has a dry weight of 40 pounds.

10) CEA Uncoupling Tool

This tool is approximately 17 feet long and consists'basically of two concentric tubes with a conical lead-in at the end to facilitate engagement with the CEDM extension shafts. When installed, pins attached to the outer tube are engaged with the extension shaft outside diameter and the pins carried by the inner tube are inserted in the inner operating rod of the extension shaft. The inner tube of the tool is then lifted and rotated relative to the outer tube which compresses a spring allowing the gripper to release, thus separating the extension shaft from the CEA. The extension shaft is then handled by the tool. Underwater Television

A high resolution closed circuit television system is provided to monitor the fuel handling operations inside the containment. The camera is mounted on the refueling machine mast so that the fuel assembly can be sighted prior to and during grappling and removal from the core. The system may be used to initially align the refueling machine position indication system with the actual core location of the 'fuel assemblies. A portable monitor is provided at the refueling machine control console. The camera, if required for remote surveillance or inspection, can be removed from its mount on the mast and handled separately. 12) Dry Sipping Equipment

A dry sipping system is provided to test irradiated fuel assemblies for cladding defects. This system consists of both permanently ,9.1-27 mounted components on the refueling machine and a portable control console that is set onto the refueling machine trolley when a dry sipping test is to be performed. The refueling machine fuel hoist box is modified to allow plugging of the recirculation holes and hose connections are added so that pressurized nitrogen gas can replace the cooling water within the hoist box. This gas is vented through a scintillation counter after the soak period has been completed. Temperature detectors are also installed to indicate the temperature of the gas surrounding the suspect fuel assembly. The gas is vented to the gas collection header.

The portable control console contains the sequencing mechanism which first surrounds the fuel assembly with nitrogen and then ports the gas to the integral scintillation counter. Strip chart recorders record the dose rate and also the nitrogen temperature surrounding the fuel assembly and a pressure gauge displays the depth of the water interface in the hoist box. A tank and float valve prevents flow of contaminated water through the console and a high temperature alarm automatically initiates venting which replaces the gas surrounding the fuel assembly with cooling water.

13) Hydraulic Power Package

The hydraulic power package provides the motive force for raising and lowering the upender with the fuel carrier. It consists of a stand containing a motor coupled to a hydraulic pump, a sump reservoir, valves and the necessary hoses to connect the power package to the hydraulic cylinders on the upender. The valves can be lined up to actuate either or both upenders. The hydraulic fluid may be either borated or nonborated water.

14) Refueling Pool Seal A watertight seal (Figure 9.1-4) is provided for installation between the reactor vessel flange and the floor of the refueling cavity. The seal is installed for the refueling operation. Provisions are made to test the seal after installation and before flooding the refueling cavity. Leak rate is monitored during refueling to assure that no sudden change in water level will occur. 9.1.4.3 System Evaluation a) The single failure mode analysis of the fuel handling equipment is shown in Table 9.1-5. b) The analysis presented in Section 15.4.3 assumes damage to the entire group of fuel rods in an assembly as a basis for the fuel handling accident. The exclusion boundary doses resulting from a fuel handling accident're within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100. c) Reliability of the fuel handling equipment and the associated instrumentation and controls, is assured through the implementation of preoperational tests and routines. Prior to any fuel loading, the I 9.1-28 equipment is cycled through its operations using a dummy fuel bundle specifically for this purpose. In addition, the following special features of the equipment assure safe and reliable operation:

Grapples and mechanical latches which carry fuel assemblies or CEA's are mechanically interlocked against accidental opening.

2) Equipment has suitable locking devices or restraints to prevent parts, fasteners, or limit switch actuators from becoming loose. In those cases where a loosened part or fastener can drop into, or is not separated by a barrier from, or whose rotary motion will propel it into the water of the refueling cavity or fuel pool, these parts and fasteners are lockwired or otherwise positively. captured.

3) The refueling machine is capable of removing and installing a fuel assembly at each operating location at the most adverse combined tolerance condition fo" the equipment, core internals and fuel assemblies. 4) Positive mechanical stops prevent the fuel from being lifted above the minimum safe water cover depth and will not cause damage or distortion to the fuel or the fuel handling equipment when engaged at full operating hoist speed.

5) The hoist is provided with a load measuring device with a visual display of the load and interlocks to interrupt hoisting if the load increases by more than 10 percent and interrupt lowering if the load decreases by more than 10 percent. 6) The stresses under the combined deadweight, live, and operating basis earthquake loads do not exceed the allowable stress of the material per AISC requirements. The equipment can withstand the loading induced by the design base earthquake vertical and horizontal loadings which are considered as acting simultaneously in con)unction with normal loads without exceeding minimum material yield stresses as specified by AISC. Where required, keepers are provided to preclude derailment of equipment under seismic loading.

7) Gamma radiation levels in the containment and fuel storage areas are continuously monitored. These monitors provide an audible alarm at the initiating detector indicating an unsafe condition. Continuous monitoring of the count rate provides immediate indication of an abnormal core flux level in the control room and in the containment.

8) There is direct communication between the control room and the refueling machine console during fuel handling operations. This provision allows the control room operator to inform the refueling machine operator of any impending unsafe condition detected from the control room during fuel movement.

9.1-29 TABLE 9.1-5

SINGLE FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS OF FUEL HANDLING E UIPMENT Component Detrimental Effect Identification Failure Mode On S stem Corrective Action Remarks

R. M. Fuel Hoist Electrical Overload None Continue refueling, Use visual presentation of weight system Trip fails repair on non- load on meter. Complete system interferring basis Max. stall torque of motor fails as above will not damage bundle.

Fuel Carrier Wheels lock in Transfer change Switch to 5 hp mode Load sufficient to move fuel transfer tube completed carrier with all wheels locked Hydraulic Power Line to cylinder None Valve off defective Upender has two cylinders, supply for upender on upender ruptures line each of which is capable of Loss of hydraulic Process can continue Upend manually raising upender power on slower basis Use tool provided

Brake on R.M. Does not provide Continue, repair on fuel hoist required brake load None non-interferring Redundant brake system provided basis C) Fuel Carrier Cable parts Delays refueling Move fuel carrier to Cable safe position with Remove fuel prior to repair manual tool R. M. Hoist Motor Power Failure Operation can be Repair Hoist using manual hand-wheel completed

Bridge Drive Motor Power Failure Operation can be Repair Drive using manual hand-wheel completed

Electronic Position Power Failure None Repair non-inter- Indexing can be accomplished Indication ferring basis by back-up scale and pointer

Fuel Carrier Po- Electrical Failure None Repair non-inter- Winch motor stalls on over- sition Sensing ferring basis load System

Refueling Machine Loss of air None Repair Continue, using manual mode pressure TABLE 9.1-5 (Cont.) SINGLE FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS OF FUEL HANDLING E UIPMENT

Component Detrimental Effect Identification Failure Mode On S stem Corrective Action Remarks Refueling Machine Electrical Failure None Repair non-inter- Not mandatory for fuel handlin 1V Camera ferring basis

Refueling Machine Electrical Failure None Repair non-inter- Redundant mechanical counter Electronic .Hoist ferring basis provided position indication manual CEA Change mechanism Electrical and air None Repair Continue, using failure operator 9) The fuel transfer tube is large enough to provide natural circulation cooling of a fuel assembly in the unlikely event that the transfer carriage should be stopped in the tube. The operator for the fuel transfer tube valve extends from the valve to the operating elevation. Travel stops in the fuel handling equipment limit the travel to restrict withdrawal of the spent fuel assemblies. This limitation, together with water level control, results in the maintenance of a minimum water cover of 9 feet over the active portion of the fuel assembly resulting in a radiation level of 2.5 mr/hr or less at the surface of the water. The depth of water surrounding the fuel transfer canal, transfer tube and spent fuel storage pool is maintained to limit the maximum continuous radiation levels in working areas to 2.5 mr/hr. 10) The arrangement of the fuel handling building has been designed such that the spent fuel cask can not traverse over spent fuel.

11) Miscellaneous design features include —backup hand operation of hoist and traverse drives in the event of power failure, a dual wound transfer system motor to permit applying an increased pull on transfer carrier in the event it becomes stuck, a viewing port in the refueling machine trolley deck to provide visual access to the reactor for the operator, electronic and visual indication of the refueling machine position over the core, a protective shroud into which the fuel assembly is drawn by the refueling machine, transfer system upender manual operation by a special tool in the event that the hydraulic system becomes inoperative, and removal of the transfer system components from the refueling cavity for servicing without draining the water from the pool.

9.1.4.4 . Tests And Ins ections

The entire fuel handling system is tested using a dummy fuel bundle before the system is put into operation. The following specific tests are performed on the individual equipment in addition to the above test. The spent fuel cask crane cables are periodically load tested. Hooks and grapples which are designed to support fuel assemblies are tested at 125 percent of rated load. After 'the 125 percent load test, they are subjected to liquid penetrant inspection. After installation, the cranes are thoroughly field tested using a dummy fuel bundle. During manufacture of the fuel handling equipment at the vendor's plant, various in-process inspections and checks are required including certification of materials and heat treating and liquid penetrant or magnetic particle inspection of welds loaded in excess of 10,000 psi. Following completion of manufacture, compliance with design and specification requirements is determined by assembling and testing the equipment in the vendor's shop. Utilizing a dummy fuel bundle and a dummy CEA, each having the same weight, center of gravity, exterior size and end geometry as an actual fuel assembly, all equipment is run through several complete operational cycles. In addition, the equipment is checked for its ability to perform under the maximum limits of load, fuel mislocation and misalignment. All traversing mechanisms are

9.1-32 tested for speed and positioning accuracy. All hoisting equipment is tested for vertical functions and controls, rotation, and load misalignment. Hoisting equipment is tested to 125 percent of maximum working load. Set points are determined and adjusted and the adjustment limits are verified. Interlock function and backup systems operations are checked. Those functions having manual operation capability are exercised manually. During these tests the various operating parameters such as motor speed, voltage, and current, hydraulic system pressures, and load measuring accuracy and set points are recorded. At the completion of these tests the equipment is checked for cleanliness and the locking of fasteners by lock- wire or other means is verified.

When installed in the plant, the equipment is again tested and the results compared to the results of tests performed at the vendor's plant. Any changes in adjustment and condition which may have ensued from transit to the site are noted. Plant testing permits determination of characteristics which are unique to the actual site installation and therefore cannot be duplicated in the vendor's shop test. Each component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the system. Prior to equipment operation recommended maintenance, including any necessary adjustments and calibrations, is performed. Pre-operational tests also include checks of all control circuits including interlocks, safety, and alarm functions.

Fuel Cask Handlin Crane Load Testin

Both main and auxiliary hooks will be tested to 125 percent of rated capacity. The crane manufacturer will furnish copies of certified mill test and mechanical test reports covering hooks and hoist ropes.

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FIGURE 9.1-14 9. 2 WATER SYSTEMS

9.2.1 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The intake cooling water system is designed to:

a) provide a heat sink for the component cooling and turbine cooling water systems under normal operating and shutdown conditions

b) provide a heat sink for the component cooling system under safe shutdown or LOCA conditions, assuming a single active component failure c) withstand design basis earthquake loads, tornado loads or maximum flood levels without loss of safety function d) permit periodic inspection and testing of equipment to assure system integrity and capability

9.2.1.2 S stem Descri tion

The intake cooling water system is shown in Figure 9.2-1A through 1E. The system consists of three pumps and associated piping and valves. The system removes heat from the component cooling heat exchangers and the turbine cooling heat exchangers and discharges it to the condenser discharge canal. Intake cooling water from the intake structure flows through basket strainers located at the inlets of the component cooling and turbine cooling heat exchangers, passes through the tube side of the exchangers, and flows to the discharge canal.

The intake cooling water system is divided into two redundant supply header systems designated A and B. Both header systems, each aligned with an intake cooling water pump, supply normal plant operating and shutdown requirements. However, during accident conditions, one pump and header is adequate to supply the required cooling water to one component cooling heat exchanger. The turbine cooling water heat exchangers are supplied by nonessential headers which are automatically isolated on SIAS by valves I-MV 21-2 and 21-3. In the event that either pump 1A or 1B fails, intake cooling pump. 1S may be aligned with either header A or B by positioning of the pump discharge header cross connect valve.

Both the intake and circulating water pumps require lubricating water. Lubricating water flow to the intake and circulating water pumps is initiated using the domestic water system. After the intake cooling water pumps have started they are used to supply lubricating water for themselves and for the circulating water pumps.

System design data are presented in Table 9.2.1. A description of the intake and discharge structures is given in Section 9.2.3.

4 9,2-1 I TABLE 9.2-1

DESIGN DATA FOR INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM

Intake Coolin Pum s

Type Single stage,, vertical Quantity

Capacity, each, gpm 14,500

Head, feet 130

Design temperature, F 95 (max) -40 (min) Material

Case Type 316 SS

Impeller Type 316 SS

Shaft Type 316 SS

Motor 600 hp, 4000 v, 3 phase, 60 hz 900 rpm, with 1.15 Service Factor

Motor enclosure WP II

2. Lube Water Re uirements

Flow, gpm 20

Pressure, psig 10

3. Codes NEMA, Standards of the Hydraulic Institute ASME Section VIII, ASTM, and ANSI, Nuclear Pump & Valve Code Class III

4. Dischar e Pi in

Material (above ground)

14 inch and larger 3/8 inch wall carbon steel pipe with 1/8 inch cement lining or cast iron

3 inch to 12 inch Std wall carbon steel pipe with 1/8 inch cement lining

2< inch and under Aluminum Brass

9,2-2 TABLE 9.2-1 (Cont'd)

DESIGN DATA FOR INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM

5. Connections

Cement Lined Steel

2 inches and smaller Screwed

2~< inches and Flanged larger Cast Iron

2 inches and smaller Flanged

24 inches and Flanged larger

6. System design pressure, psig 100

7. System design temperature, F 125

8. Valves

2< inch and smaller Bronze — screwed 3 inch and larger Carbon steel — rubber lined. Flanged and/or wafer.

9. Code ANSI — B31.7, Class III — and B31.1

9. 2-3 9. 2 ~ 1.3 S stem Evaluation

9.2.1.3.1 Performance Requirements and Capabilities The intake cooling water system is designed to supply sufficient cooling water to the component cooling heat exchangers to fulfill emergency requirements in the event of the design basis LOCA. Each essential header, with one intake cooling water pump operating, fulfills the requirements of one component cooling heat exchanger during normal, shutdown, and LOCA conditions.

The intake cooling water system is sized to ensure adequate heat removal with a design seawater temperature of 95F at plant rated power. 9.2.1.3.2 Single Failure Analysis

Only one intake cooling water pump and one essential header are required to remove the post-accident heat load from one component cooling heat exchanger. Each component cooling heat exchanger is capable of post-accident heat removal duty (Section 9.2.2.3.1). Two redundant full capacity essential headers and three full capacity pumps are provided, one pump and one header for each component cooling heat exchanger to assure adequate cooling capability if one system fails. The third pump can be connected to either heat exchanger. Electrical power for each header system is supplied from a separate emergency power bus such that no single electrical failure can prevent operation of both header systems.

The redundant essential headers are isolated from each other during emergency conditions by two valves (I-SB-21-7) in the tie line connecting the headers. Each essential header is isolated from the nonessential portion of the system by a valve which closes automatically on SIAS. Each header isolation valve receives a signal from a separate SIAS channel, hence, no single failure can cause both valves to remain open. A single failure analysis of the intake cooling water system is presented in Table 9.2-2. 9.2.1.3.3 Service Environment

The intake cooling water pumps and valves are located outdoors and are designed to operate under the following environmental conditions: ambient temperature from 30F to 120F, 100 percent humidity, salt laden atmosphere, torrential rains and hurricane winds. Section 9.2.1.3.4 describes other potential environmental conditions.

A chlorine solution will be fed into the sea water ahead of the intake structure for 15 minutes every other day to control slime formation. The solution enters the circulating water and intake cooling water system in regulated quantities such that the residual chlorine at the condenser outlet will be nominally 1 ppm and no greater than 14 ppm at any time. The pumps in the intake cooling water system have cathodic protection against corrosion and the system is protected by sacrificial anodes located in the turbine and component cooling water heat exchangers.

9. 2-4 TABLE 9. 2-2

SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS — INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM

Component Identification Method of and Quantity — Failuie Mode Effect on System Detection Monitor Remarks Off-site power Lost ICW pumps trip and automa- Various loss-of- CRI One ICW pump & header is tically restart on emer- power alarms adequate to supply the gency diesel generator required cooling water power. to one component cooling HX. ICW pump suction Clogged Loss of suction for one Pump header dis- CRI Operator may start stand- (3) full capacity ICW pump. charge low pres- by pump & realign header Operator must stop pump. sure alarm cross-connect valves I-SB-21-7 (if necessary), to maintain desired flow. ICW pump (3) Fails Loss of one full capacity Pump header dis- CRI Operator may start stand- ICW pump. charge low pres- by pump & realign header sure alarm cross-connect valves I-SB-21-7 (if necessary), to maintain desired flow. ICW pump Ruptures Loss of one discharge Pump discharge CRI One ICW pump & header is discharge header header. Operator must iso- header low pres- adequate to supply the re- (2) late ruptured header by sure alarm quired cooling water to realigning cross-connect one component cooling HX. valves I-SB-21-7 (if necessary), and ICW pump(s) to maintain desired flow. ICW pump lube Valve I-SB-21-1 Loss of lube water to ICW Pump lube water CRI water line (1) inadvertantly pumps. Alternate lube water line low pressure closed, line cross-connect valves alarms can be opened to maintain lube water flow. Turbine cooling Valve fails to One ICW pump & header will Component cooling CRI One ICW pump & header is water HX isolation close upon SIAS service both one component HX tubeside outlet adequate to the re- I-MV-21-2&3 supply valves cooling HX & one turbine flow & temperature quired cooling water to (2) cooling HX. indications one component cooling HX. TABLE 9.2-2 (Cont'd)

Component Identification Method of and Quantity Failure Mode Effect on System Detection Monitor Remarks

Component cooling Inlet strainer Significant reduction of Strainer high dif- CRI One ICW pump & header is water HK (2) clogged flow to component cooling ferential pressure adequate to supply the re- HX. Operator must stop alarm & HX outlet quired cooling water to ICW pump. low flow alarm one component cooling HX. Strainer by-pass line or cross-connect valves I-SB-21-3 from alternate cooling water supply line may be opened downstream ainer. Air operated Lose air supply Fail open valve — no in- Temperature & CRI temperature contro terruption of cooling water flow(1) indication valves'-TCV-14-4A&B (2) Fails to open One component cooling HX Temperature & CRI One ICW pump & header is lost. flow( ) indication adequate to supply the required cooling water to one corn onent coolin HX. Diesel generator One fails to Loss of one ICW pump & Various loss-of- CRI One ICW pump & header is set (2) start header. power alarms adequate to supply the required cooling water to one component cooling HX.

ICW — Intake cooling water CRI — Control room indication HX —Heat exchanger SIAS — Safety injection actuation signal (1) —Local indication only The intake cooling system is designed to withstand the corrosive effect of the sea water circulated. The materials used in the system are compatible with each other. A brief description of the recirculation operation proposed for limiting marine growth can be found in Section 9.2.3.3. A full description of the proposal can be found in the July 6, 1972 Amendment to the Environ- mental Report.

9.2.1.3.4 Natural Phenomena The essential components of the intake cooling water system, i.e., those supplying cooling water to the component cooling heat exchangers, are designed and installed as seismic Class I equipment. That portion of the system supplying cooling water to the turbine cooling water system is non-seismic Class I downstream of the isolation valves. The seismic Class I and non-seismic Class I portions of the system are automatically isolated from each other on SIAS. The intake cooling pumps are located on the intake structure which is designed as seismic Class I. All underground piping is located in seismic Class I fillareas. Seismic qualification of system components has been demonstrated by manufacturer calculations based on the design basis earthquake accelerations. Discussion of seismic qualification of equipment is given in Section 3.7.5.

The equipment of the intake cooling water system is located outdoors. Accordingly, the essential portions of the system are designed to withstand design basis tornado winds of 360 mph. The intake cooling. water pumps are 12 ft apart, which allows sufficient separation to prevent all three pumps from being damaged by a single missile. The pumps, heat exchangers and exposed outdoor piping and valves are designed to withstand design basis tornado winds of 360 mph. Protection is provided from missiles by imposing the following spatial separation criteria on redundant components located outdoors:

a) Minimum separation for piping up to a height of 25 ft above yard grade is controlled by the dimensions of an airborne car weighing 4000 lb, 18 ft long, 7 ft wide, travelling at 50 mph; for piping at elevation higher than 25 ft above yard grade, minimum separation is controlled by a 2 in. by 4 in. timber, 10 'ft long, travelling at 360 mph. b) Underground piping minimum separation is 8.7 ft, dictated by tornado missiles. A minimum of 6 ft earth or equivalent concrete cover is provided for protection from the airborne car.

To ensure pump operation under flood conditions, the pump motors are installed above the maximum calculated flood level of +22.8 feet mean low water (MLW). The pump suction columns require 4 ft of minimum submergence to deliver the design capacity of the pumps. This requirement is met under the minimum water level conditions associated with the maximum probable hurricane postulated for the site as discussed in Section 2.4.11.3.

9.2-7 9.2.1.4 Testin and Ins ections

The manufacturer of the intake cooling water pumps shop tests each unit over the complete range of hydraulic performance including runout conditions. Shop hydrostatic tests on the pump casings are made at 150 percent of the maximum operating pressure. All fluid boundary castings and forgings are nondestructive tested in accordance with ASME Draft Nuclar Pump and Valve Code, Code Class III. Prior to installation in the system, each component is inspected and cleaned. The system is flushed with water before being put into normal operation. Preoperational testing consists of calibrating the instruments, testing the automatic controls for actuation at the prescribed set points, and checking the operability and limits of alarm functions.

The intake cooling water system is in service during normal plant operation. System performance is monitored and data is taken periodically to confirm heat transfer capabilities.

The intake cooling water pumps are rotated in service periodically so that their continued availability for emergency conditions is ensured.

9.2.1.5 Instrumentation A lication

Table 9.2-3 lists the parameters measured by the intake cooling water system instrumentation.. All heat exchangers and pumps are'monitored locally as well as in the control room. In every case where safety related equipment is involved more than one parameter is measured to assure design performance of the equipment.

The intake cooling water pumps can be started or stopped either locally or from the control room. The pumps receive a start signal upon SIAS.

The logic and instrumentation for this system is discussed in Section 7.4.1.9. All valves in the system are manually operated with three exceptions. The turbine cooling water system is automatically valved off of the intake cooling water on receipt of an SIAS. This operation can also be initiated with a local hand switch. The second automatic valve in the system is the butterfly valve (one in each header) at the outlet of the component cooling water heat exchanger. This valve automatically controls outlet water flow from the exchanger. It is modulated opened and closed according to the outlet water temperature of the shell side of the component cooling water heat exchanger. The third valve is located at the outlet of the turbine cooling water heat exchangers. This valve is temperature controlled from the shell outlet side of the heat exchanger and controls intake cooling water flow.

9. 2-8 TABLE 9.2-3

INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm Instru- Normal Control (1) ment Operating Instrument System Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy Intake Coolin Water: 1) Intake canal temperature 30-130F 95F (max) + 3.0% 2) Pump discharge pressure 0-100 psig 50 psig + 0.5% 3) Lubricating water flow .upstream of pump 0-25gpm 10-20gpm + 1.0% 4) Lubricating water Upon startup 0-100 psig 10-15 psig + 0.5% pressure upstream of pump controls make- (min) up water flow via PCV-21-26 5) Lubricating water strainer differential pressure upstream of pump 0-3 2 psi + 0.5%

psi'-100 6) Pump discharge=header psig 50 psig + 1.0% pressure (2) Turbine Coolin Water HX Tube Side 1) Inlet strainer differential pressure 0-3 psi 2 psi + 0.5X 2) Inlet water temperature 0-100 psig 30-40 psig + 0.5% 3) Inlet water pressure '-200F 95F + 1.0X 4) Outlet water pressure 0-100 psig 17.5-27.5 + 0.5% psig 5) Outlet water temperature * Local 103.5F Local 0-200F + 1.0%

Control room Control Room 30-130F + 3.0% 6) Outlet water flow 0-10,500gpm 6250 gpm + 1.0% TABLE 9.2-3

INTAKE COOLING 'WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Instru- Normal Control (1) ment Operating Instrument System Parameter 6 Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy

C onent Coolin Water (3) HX Tube Side

1) Inlet strainer differential pressure 0-3 psi 2 psi ~ 0.5% 2) Inlet water pressure 0-100 psig 25-30 psig + 0.5% 3) Inlet water temperature 0-200F 95P + 1.5% 4) Outlet water pressure 0-100 psig 13.5-18.5 + 0.5% psig 5) Outlet water temperature 0-200P 130F(max) + 1.0% 6) Outlet water flow 0-20000 8250-16,500 + 1.5% gpm gpm

Dischar e Canal Water Tem erature 50-130P 50-120P + 1.0%

(1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated.

(2) - Turgine cooling water HX'hell side instrumentation is included in Table 9.2-12. (3) Component cooling water HX shell side instrumentation is included in Table 9.2-7. W e 9.2.2 COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM

9.2.2.1 Desi n Bases The component cooling system is designed to: a) provide a heat sink for auxiliary systems under normal operating and shutdown conditions b) provide an intermediate barrier between the reactor coolant and the intake cooling water systems c) provide a heat sink for safety related components associated with reactor decay heat removal for safe shutdown or LOCA conditions, assuming a single failure d) withstand design basis earthquake loads, tornado loads or maximum flood levels without loss of safety function e) permit periodic inspection and testing of components to assure system integrity and capability

9.2.2.2 S stem Descri tion

The component cooling system is a closed loop cooling water system that utilizes demineralized water (buffered with Calgon and sodium dichromate, a corrosion inhibitor) to cool various components as shown schematically in Figure 9.2-2. The component cooling system consists of two heat exchangers, three pumps, one surge tank, a chemical addition tank, and associated piping, valves and instrumentation. The component cooling system is arranged as two redundant essential supply header systems (designated A and B) each with a pump and heat exchanger and the capability to supply. the minimum safety feature requirements during plant shutdown or LOCA conditions. The nonessential supply header (designated N) which is connected to both essential headers during normal operation is automatically isolated from both by valve closure on a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) . During normal operation, the nonessential header supplies cooling water to the following components: fuel pool heat exchanger, sample heat exchangers, boric acid concentrators, waste concentrator, waste gas compressors, letdown heat exchanger, control element drive mechanism air coolers and the reactor coolant pump motors.

The A and B headers serve the following components:

Header A Header B

Shutdown heat exchanger lA Shutdown heat exchanger 1B

Containment fan cooler lA Containment fan cooler 1C

Containment fan cooler 1B Containment fan cooler 1D

9. 2-11 Low pressure safety injec tion Low pressure safety injection pump lA pump 1B

High pressure safety injection High pressure safety injection pump 1A pump 1B

Containment spray pump lA Containment. spray pump 1B

High pressure safety injection pump 1C is normally supplied by either header A or header B, depending on the alignment of the manual cross connect valves.

The A and B header systems are isolated from each other during accident conditions. Pump 1A serves header A and Pump 1B serves header B. Pump 1S may be aligned with either header A or B by means of the cross connection valving on the suction and discharge sides of the pumps.

Both the A and the B supply header systems pump demineralized cooling water through the shell side of their respective component cooling heat exchangers, through the components being cooled and back to their respective pumps. The surge tank is connected to the suction side of the pumps and is designed to accommodate volumetric thermal expansion and contraction in the system and to maintain a static pressure head at each pump suction. Demineralized makeup water is added to the surge tank through an automatic level control system by the condensate pump discharge. Provisions are also made to supply makeup from the fire protection system. Although both essential headers share the surge tank, a baffle divides the lower portion of the tank into two separate compartments, each associated with one of the two essential headers. The cylindrical tank is ll ft long and is mounted horizontally. It has a 5.5 ft diameter with a baffle height of 2.5 ft. Makeup water is added when the level falls below 36 inches and a low level alarm is initiated in the control room at 29 inches. Makeup water is stopped at a surge tank level of 48 inches and a high level alarm is initiated in the control room at 54 inches. Level indication on the tank is provided on each side of the baffle. There is also a level gauge mounted on each side of the tank for local indication of tank level. Leakage of reactor coolant into the component cooling water system can be detected by an increasing level in the surge tank. A 1 gpm leak into the tank causes a high level alarm in 8 hours (based on an initial tank level of,40 inches in the 66 in. high tank) . Section 5.2.4 gives a description of leak detection by surge tank level and by radiation in the component cooling water system. Any overflow or drainage from the component cooling surge tank is collected by the auxiliary building drain system and routed to the chemical drain tank. The material in this tank is treated by the waste management system as described in Section 11.2.3.2.

9.2-12 A chemical additive tank in the system permits addition of the proper corrosion inhibitor. Sodium 'dichromate is added to maintain a concentration of 200-300 ppm. A radiation monitor is provided in each of the redundant headers on the outlet side of the heat exchangers. Should the activity in the system rise above 4 x 10 4 p Ci/cc, a high radiation alarm is actuated in the control room and the atmospheric vent valve of the surge tank is automatically closed. The system then operates unvented with relief to the waste mangement system for overpressure protection.

The valves used in the component cooling system are carbon steel and although the cooling water is not radioactive, welded construction is used, where possible, to minimize the possibility of leakage. Self- actuated spring-loaded relief valves are provided for overpressure protection on the shutdown, sample, and letdown heat exchanger inlets as well as on the inlets to the containment cooling units and waste gas compressors. All component cooling cooling system piping is carbon steel.

Design data for component cooling system components are tabulated in Table 9.2-4.

9.2.2.3 S stem Evaluation

9.2.2.3.1 Performance Requirements and Capabilities

The component cooling system is capable of providing sufficient cooling capacity to cool reactor coolant system and auxiliary systems components with two pumps and one heat exchanger in operation, although, during normal operation, flow is estabilished through both heat exchangers. Two pumps and two heat exchangers are used during normal plant shutdown; however, if only one heat exchanger is available, the cooldown rate is decreased but plant safety is not jeopardized. Table 9.2-5 lists operating flow rates and calculated heat loads for all the auxiliary equipment cooled by the component cooling system.

Safety related equipment cooling requirements are met following a postulated LOCA with only one pump and one heat exchanger operating, 'even though both essential header systems are available.

The component cooling pumps are connected to separate emergency electrical busesi'(see Figure 8.2-3) which can be energized by the diesel generators. The A and B pumps are connected to the respective A or B emergency bus counterparts and the third pump is connected to the AB bus which is manually connected to either the A or B diesel generator bus. 9.2.2.3.2 Single Failure Analys'is

The component cooling system is arranged into two redundant and independent essential supply systems, each with a pump and heat exchanger and the capability to supply the minimum complement of safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of LOCA conditions.

9. 2-13 TABLE 9.2-4

DESIGN DATA FOR COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Com onent Coolin Pum s

Type Centrifugal, horizontal split, double suction pumps Quantity

Capacity, each, gpm 8500

Head, feet 177 to 182

Design pressure, psi 150

Design temperature, F 185 Material

Case ASTM A-216-Gr-WCB steel

Impeller ASTM A-216-Gr-WCB steel

Shaft SAE 4140 stainless steel

Motor 450 hp, 4000 V, 60 hz, 3 phase, 1800 rpm

Enclosure WP II

Codes Motor: NEMA, Pump: Standards of the Hydraulic Institute; ASME Sections VIII and IX Draft Nuclear Pump 6 Valve Code Class III

2. Com onent Coolin Mater Heat Exchan ers

Type Horizontal, counterflow, straight tubes rolled into tubesheets Quantity

Flow, lb/hr Shell side Tube side Normal 5.55x10 6 8.50xlO 6 Shutdown 6 6 (Max) 7.35x10 8.50x10 6 Design duty, each, Btu/hr 55.0 x 10 (normal) 165.0 x 106 (3.5 hrs after shutdown)

9.2-14 TABLE 9.2-4 (Cont'd)

6 65.0 x 10 (27.5 hrs after shutdown) 118.0 x 106 (Maximum long term cooling following a LOCA) Heat transfer area, each, ft2 18,250

Design pressure, psig Shell side: 150; Tube side: 90

Design temperature, F Shell side: 185; Tube side: 150 Material

Shell Carbon steel ASTM A 515, Gr 70

Tubes Aluminum Brass SB illAlloy //687

Tubes Sheets Aluminum Bronze ASTM B-171 Type D

Codes ASME Section VIII, TEMA Class R ASME Section III Class I

Type Horizontal Quantity„

Design pressure, psig 100

Design temperature, F 150

Volume, gallons 2000 Material

Shell ASTM A-283 Gr C steel

Dished head ASTM A-283 Gr C steel

Baffle ASTM A-283 Gr C steel

Code ASME Section III, Class I Chemical Addition Tank

Type Vertical Quantity

9.2-15

TABLE 9.2-4 (Cont'd)

Design pressure, psig 150

Design temperature, F 200

Volume, gal 50 Material Carbon steel

Code ASME Section VIII

5 Pi in Fittin s and Valves Piping material Carbon steel, ASTM A 106 Gr B Seamless

Design pressure, psig 150

Design temperature, F 200 Construction:

2-1/2" and larger Butt welded except at flanged connections

2" and smaller Socket welded or screwed except at flanged connections Valves:

2-1/2" and larger

Gate and globe Carbon steel, butt weld ends NSI 150 psi

Check and butterfly Carbon steel, flanged, ANSI 150 psi

2" and smaller Carbon steel, socket weld ends, ANSI 150 to 600 psi

Codes B31.1 and ANSI B31.7, Class III 'NSIPenetration Piping is designed fabricated to ANSI B31.7 Class I 6 II

Draft Nuclear Pump & Valve Code Class I, II 6 III as applicable

9.2-16 TABLE 9.2-5

OPERATING FLOW RATES AND CALCULATED HEAT LOADS FOR ALL AUXILIARYE UIPMENT COOLED BY THE COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM

Heat Load/Unit Flow/Unit E ui ment Descri tion

S'eactor coolant pump motor oil cooler 6 seal jacket cooler 0.66 115

Reactor coolant pump motor air cooler 0.82 175 Shutdown heat exchanger 130( ) 4850( ) 29 4850

Letdown heat exchanger 20.5( ) 1275 2.61 150

CEA magnetic drives 2.23 200

Fuel pool heat exchanger 32 3560

High pressure safety injection pumps negligible 10

Low pressure safety injection pumps negligible 10

Containment spray pumps negligible 10

Boric acid evaporator condensate cooler 11.5 775

Waste evaporator condensate cooler 1.15 115 Waste gas compressor aftercooler jacket negligible 1.0

Containment fan cooler 60"'.75 1200 1200

Sample heat exchanger 0.52 35 6 (1) The maximum heat load of 130 x 10 Btu/hr occurs 3 1/2 hours after shutdown and reduces gradually to 29 x 106 Btu/hr after 27 1/2 hours after shutdown. During refueling operations the heat load on the heat exchanger is expected to be 29 x 106 Btu/hr per shutdown heat exchanger. 6 (2) Maximum heat load of 20.5 x 10 Btu/hr occurs during load change only. Normal steady power heat load is only 2.61 x 10 Btu/hr. However to accommodate the load changes without increase in temperature 1275 gpm has been considered with a heat load of 20.5 x 106 Btu/hr. 6 (3) Normal containment heat load is 2.25 x 10 Btu/hr with a maximum of 240 x 106 Btu/hr occurring during accident conditions.

9.2-17 Automatic valves isolate the nonessential header from the two essential headers in the event of an accident. Upon occurence of a LOCA, the valves connect1ng each essential header to the nonessential header (at the two cross connect points) also close automatically on SIAS there by isolating the essential headers from each other. Each of the two valves at a cross connection receives a signal from a separate SIAS channel so that no single failure can cause both valves to remain open. If one essential header should fail, the remaining redundant essential header assures availability of at least one set of equipment and piping for accident service.

The cooling water surge tank is common to both essential headers but is partitioned to provide independence. Consequently, there is no single failure that could prevent the component cooling system from performing its safety function. 'he single failure analysis is presented in Table 9.2-6. 9.2.2.3.3 Service Environment

The component cooling system pumps, heat exchangers and portions of the piping and valves are located outdoors. These components are designed to operate under the following environmental conditions: ambient air temperature from 30 F to 120 F, 100 percent humidity, salt laden atmosphere, torrential rains and hurricane winds. Section 9.2.2.3.4 describes other potent1al environmental conditions resulting from extreme natural phenomena. Other system components are located within the reactor auxiliary building and are designed for the normal ambient expected 1n the building. No system active components are located in areas of high radioactivity. Except for seism1c Class I pip1ng serving the containment fan coolers, there are no essential components located within the containment vessel. Containment post-accident environment will not affect operation of the component cooling system.

9.2.2.3.4 Natural Phenomena

All components of the component cooling system including cooling water pumps, heat exchangers and piping which are essential for safe shutdown or to mitigate the effects of a LOCA are, designed and installed as seismic Class I equipment. The nonessential portions of the system are not seismic Class I and are isolated automatically from the seismic Class I portions upon SIAS. The isolation valves are seismic Class I.

The pumps and heat exchangers are located outdoors on a seismic Class I foundation. Seismic Qualification of system components has been demonstrated by manufacturer calculations and is discussed in Section 3.7.5.

9.2-18 Table 9.2-6

SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS — COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM

Component Identification Method of and Quantity Failure Mode . Effect on System Detection onitor .Remarks

Off-site power Lost CCS pumps trip and automa Various loss-of CRI One CCS pump & one CCS tically restart on emergency power'larms HX are adequate to cool diesel generator power. reactor coolant system & auxiliary systems in an emergency. CCS pump suction Valve I-SB-14 Loss of suction for one CCS CCS HX outlet CRI Operator may start stand- line (3) inadvertently pump. Operator must stop high temperature by pump & realign header closed pump. alarm cross-connect valves I-MV-14-1 or 2 (if nec- cessary) to maintain desired flow. CCS pump (3) Fails Loss of one full capacity CCS HX outlet high CRI Operator may start stand- CCS pump. temperature alarm by pump & realign header cross-connect valves I-MV-14-1 or 2 (if nec- cessary) to maintain desired flow. CCS HX outlet Valve I-SB-14-lA Loss of one essential sup- CCS HX outlet low CRI Two CCS pumps & one HX Line (2) or 1C inadvert- ply header system. pressure & low are adequate to cool ently closed flow alarms reactor coolant system & auxiliary systems during normal operation. Operator may realign cross-connect valves 1-MV-14-1 or 2 with two CCS pumps to maintain desired flow. Essential headers Ruptures Loss of essential CCS Various loss of CRI One CCS pump & one CCS HX A & B (2) supply system. flow & low pressur are adequate to cool re- alarms actor coolant system & auxiliary systems in an emergency. TABLE 9.2-6 (Cont'd)

Component Identification Method of and Quality Failure Mode Effect on System Detection Monitor Remarks

Nonessential supply Loses air supply Fail closed valves — flow Valve position CRI Safety related equipment header main isola- discontinued through non- indicating lights cooling requirements are tion valve (pneu- essential supply header N. available from two redun- matic) (4) Essential supply headers A dant & independent supply I-HCV-14-SA/B & B isolated from each other. systems A & B. I-HCV-14-9/10 Valve fails to Remaining valves will ef- Valve position CRI Safety related equipment close upon SIAS fectively isolate nones- indicating lights cooling requirements are sential supply header N. available from two redundant & independent supply systems A & B. CCS surge tank air Loses air supply Fail closed valve — tempor- CCS surge tank low CRI Bypass valve V-14-430 must operated level ary loss of makeup water level alarm be opened and makeup re- control valve to surge tank. gulated manually to main- LCV-14-1 tain desired water level. Fails to open Temporary loss of makeup CCS surge tank low CRI Bypass valve V-14-430 must water to surge tank. level alarm be opened and makeup. regulated manually to maintain desired water level. CCS surge tank Loss of makeup Temporary loss of makeup CCS surge tank CRI Valve V-15-610 can be (1) water from water to surge tank. low level alarm opened to supply required condensate pumps makeup water from the fire protection system. Diesel generator Fails to'tart Loss of one essential CCS Various loss-of CRI Safety related equipment set (2) supply system power alarms cooling requirements will be met with one CCS pump & one HX operating in an emergency. Standby pump may be manually connected to available generator bus.

CCS — Component cooling system CRI — Control room indication HX — Heat exchanger SIAS — Safety injection actuation signal The spatial separation criteria for component cooling water equipment is the same as discussed in Section 9.2.1.3.4. Indoor components such as the surge tank and portions of the piping and valves are protected from tornado winds and missiles since they are housed within the reactor auxiliary building.

Component cooling system equipment susceptible to flood damage is protected to 22 ft above mean low water (MLW) which is greater than the calculated maximum flood elevation attainable as discussed in Section 2.4.

9.2.2.4 Testin and Ins ection

Hydrostatic tests to 150 percent of design pressure are performed on the heat exchangers. Performance tests to demonstrate design requirements are conducted and heat transfer characteristics are verified. Eddy current tests of all tubes are performed in accordance with ASTM B-ll, Paragraph 10, for entire tube cross sections. All pressure containing welds a'e checked by radiographic examination.

Hydrostatic test to 150 percent of maximum operating head is performed on each pump casing. Performance tests are performed on each pump in accordance with the latest design code standards to establish pump characteristics. Nondestructive testing is performed on welds, forgings and castings in accordance with the requirements of ASME B31.7 and the Draft Nuclear Pump and Valve Code, Code Class III. The component cooling system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and mechanically operability. Pumps are tested'to demonstrate head and capacity. All automatic and manual sequences and control functions are tested to ensure design operability. See Section 14.1.1.1 for a discussion of plant preoperational tests. The component cooling system is in service during normal plant operation and system performance is monitored and'ata taken periodically to confirm heat transfer capabilities.

9.2.2.5 Instrumentation A lication

Table 9.2-7 gives a functional listing of component cooling water instrumentation.

The pumps and heat exchangers have diverse parameters measured to confirm the correct operation of the equipment involved. The monitoring of flow, temperature and pressure at the points indicated in Table 9.2-7 and Figure 9.2-2 provides the control room the information for operating the essential and normal header systems.

9.2-21 The valves in the component cooling water system allow: a) isolation of the nonessential (N) header from the A and B headers on SIAS b) routing of component cooling water through the shutdown heat exchangers on SIAS c) isolation of the reactor coolant pumps and control and drive coolers on SIAS d) routing of component cooling water surge tank ventilation to the waste management system upon a high component cooling water radiation signal e) controlling the level in the component cooling water surge tank f) directing of discharge of the 1S component cooling water pump to either the A or B header and g) controlling of flow to the containment cooling units

The component cooling water pumps can be started and stopped both locally and from the control room. The pumps receive a start signal on SIAS. The logic and instrumentation is discussed in Section 7.4.1.8.

9.2-22 TABLE 9.2-7

COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm Normal Contro Instrument- Operating Instrument S stem Parameter 6 Location Local Room Hi h Low Recordin Control Function Ran e Ran e Accurac

Com onent Coolin Water (2) HX Shell Side 1) Inlet temperature. 0-200F 110F + 1.0% 2) Outlet temperature Modulates tempera- 0-200F 100F + 1.0% ture controlled butterfly valve on tube side of HX discharge 3) Outlet pressure 0-150psig 80 psig + 0.5% 4) Outlet flow 0-15,000 5600- + 1.0% gpm 11200 gpm (3) -6 -6 5) Outlet radiation On high radiation, 10 ci/cc 10 Ci/cc closes component to to Cs137 in cooling water 10 2ci/cc a 2mR per source tank vent hr field of valve and routes 1.25 mev the water vapor background through the waste radiation management system

(4) Shutdown HX Shell Side:. 1) Outlet temperature 0-200F 150F + 1.0% + 2) Outlet flow 0-6000gpm 4850 gpm 1.5%

Fuel Pool HX: 1) Outlet temperature 0-200F 110-120F + 1.0% + 2) Outlet flow 0-3800 gpm 1600- 1.5% 3560 gpm TABLE 9.2-7 (Cont'd)

COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm Normal Control Instrument Operating Instrument S stem Parameter & Location Local Room Hi h Low Recordin Control Function Ran e Ran e Accurac Containment Coolin Unit: 1) Outlet temperature 0-600F 102F + 3.0% 2) Outlet flow 0-1500 gpm 1200 gpm + 3.0% Control Element Drive Mechanism Air Cooler: 1) Outlet temperature 0-600F 115F + 3.0% 2) Outlet flow 0-250 gpm 200 gpm + 3.0%

Reactor Coolant Pum Coolin Water Outlet'low Com onent Coolin Water ~Snn e Tank 1) Level Controls valving Sight glass 36-48" make-up flow into tanks via LCV 14-1 2) Integrated make-up flow

Hi h Pressure Safet In ection Pum Coolin Water 1) Outlet temperature 0-200F 95F +1.0%

2) Outlet flow Rotometer 10 gpm

Containment S ra Pum s

1) Outlet temperature 0-200F 95F + 1.0% 2) Outlet flow Rotometer 10 gpm TABLE 9.2-7 (cont'd)

COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm Normal Contr'ol (1) Instrument Operating Instrument S stem Parameter & Location Local Room Hi h Low Recordin Control Function Ran e Ran e Accurac

Low Pressure Safet Pum In ection Pum

1) Outlet temperature 0-200F 95F + 1.0% 2) Outlet flow Rotometer 10 gpm Boric Acid Concentrator

1) Outlet flow 0-1000 gpm 775 gpm + 2.0% 2) Outlet temperature Rotometer 115 gpm

Waste Concentrator Coolin Water 1) Outlet temperature 0-200F 120F + 0.5% 2) Outlet flow Rotometer 115 gpm

Waste Gas Com ressors

1) Outlet temperature 0-200F 100F + 1.0% 2) Outlet flow Rotometer lgpm

Com onent Coolin Water 0-150psig 100psig 0.5% Pum Dischar e Pressure TABLE 9.2-7 (Cont'd)

COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm Normal Contro (1) Instrument Operating Instrument S stem Parameter & Location Local Room Hi h Low Recordin Control Function Ran e Ran e Accurac

Letdown HX:

1) Outlet temperature 0-600F 135F (Max) + 3.0% 2) Outlet flow 0-1500 gpm 150 gpm + 1.0%

(1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated (2) Component cooling water HX tube side instrumentation is contained in Table 9.2-3 (3) Local radiation recorder (4) Shutdown HX tube side instrumentation is contained in Table 6.2-11 HX — Heat Exchanger 9.2. 3 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEMS 9.2.3.1 Desi n Bases the The circulating water system is designed to provide a heat sink for main condenser under normal operating and shutdown conditions. The system serves no safety function since it is not required to achieve safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA.

9.2.3.2 S stem Descri tion

The circulating water system is shown schematically on Figure 9.2-1A. The general plan and profile'f the system is shown on Figures 9.2-1B through 9.2-1E.

The circulating water system consists of two intake pipes which connect the Atlantic Ocean to the intake canal, an intake structure, four cir- " culating water pumps, a discharge canal and discharge pipe.

The intake cooling water will be taken from the ocean through two 10.5 ft ID reinforced concrete pipes, 1200 feet offshore. The intake pipes are buried at the (-18) ft mean low water (MLW) contour to prevent interference with natural littoral processes. Each pipe has a "velocity cap" to minimize fish entrapment. There is about 8 feet of water above each cap and the velocity of intake water is less than 1 ft/sec.

The intake pipes are located approximately 2300 ft south of the discharge pipe. They are buried from the intake points for a distance of about 1600 ft beneath the ocean bottom and under the beach, terminating in a 'canal on the west side of the sand dunes. After passing through the inlet pipes at about 6 fps, the circulating water is conveyed in the canal about 900 ft to State Road AlA and passes under a bridge. After passing under the bridge the water is then conveyed in a canal at about 0.3 to 0.5 fps for approximately 4000 ft to the plant intake structure. This reinforced concrete structure consists of four bays. The water in each bay passes through trash racks and traveling screens which remove debris from the water before it reaches the circulating water and other pumps. The approach velocity to each bay is less than 1 fps. The circulating water pumps discharge into four buried conduits to the condenser.

I The water leaving the condenser, at a temperature rise of about 21 F for normal full load operation, flows from the discharge water boxes to the seal well. From the seal well, the discharged condenser cooling water is transported approximately 500 ft in a buried pipeline and then about 580 ft in a canal to State Road A1A. The water is conveyed under the road bridge. Once past AIA, the cooling water, travels about 1155 ft in a canal to a discharge structure, located on the western side of the sand dune. From the canal discharge structure, the cooling water discharge is carried about 1425 ft in a 12 ft diameter pipeline buried under the beach and under the ocean. The pipeline terminates at a depth of (-18) ft MLW and at a distance of about 1200 ft from shore.

9 .2-27 The outlet of the 12 ft diameter discharge pipe is split into a Y-type high velocity jet discharge (see Figure 9.2-3) designed to limit the circulating water surface temperature to 5 F above ambient. Based on the design power heat dissipation of 6.1 x 10 Btu/hr for the unit the isotherm areas from the discharge are:

a) 2 F — 150 acres

b) 3 F — 25 acres

c) 5 F — 1/4 acre

Both ports in the "Y" are 7.5 ft in diameter and result in a horizontal discharge of about 13 fps. A short sloping trench will be excavated from the inverts of the ports, daylighting at the natural ocean bottom. The trench is lined to prevent scour from the get discharge. System design data are presented in Table 9.2-8.

9.2.3.3 S stem Evaluation

The four circulating water pumps are each sized to provide 25 percent of the cooling water flow for the turbine condenser. The pumps are sized for the maximum condenser heat load and provide sufficient head (40 ft) to overcome system frictional losses. The dimensions of the intake bays are designed to give a low velocity profile through the traveling screens and to provide sufficient submergence for the pump required NPSH. The circulating water, screen wash, and intake pumps are arranged in each bay to eliminate the adverse effects of vortices, and to provide flow path and suction velocities to each pump. Three of the four bays contain intake cooling ~ater pumps and two bays contain screen wash pumps. The pumps are located at different elevations in the bays. The suction for the intake cooling water pumps is at the -18.5 ft level followed by the suction for the circulating cooling water pumps at el. -16.0 ft and finally by the screen wash pumps at el. -5.5 ft. The intake and discharge piping are separated by 2300 ft of ocean to prevent recirculation of heated water.

A chlorine solution will be fed into the sea ahead of the intake structure for approximately 2 hours each week in order to control slime formation. The solution in the circulating and intake cooling water systems is added in regulated quantities so that the residual chlorine at the condenser outlet will be nominally 1 ppm and no greater than 14 ppm.

A program for controlling marine growth in the intake structure has been developed whereby discharge water is heated to 122-125 F and diverted into each of the intake pipelines for approximately 4 hours once each month. Sluice gates are provided. to permit routing of water directl from the discharge canal to the intake canal. The principal constraints designed for in the defouling program are:

9.2-28 TABLE 9.2-8

DESIGN DATA FOR CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Circulatin Water Pum s

Type Single stage, vertical removable element, mixed flow Quantity

Capacity, each, gpm 121,000

Head, feet 40 Material

Case 2 percent Ni-Cast Iron, ASTM-A-48 C130

Impeller ASTM A-296 CF8M

Shaft ASTM A-276 Type 316 SS

Motor Constant speed, 1500 hp, 4000V, 60hz, 3 phase, 360 rpm, with 1.15 Service Factor

Enclosure WP II

Codes N&$., Standards of the Hydraulic Institute, A&fE Section VIII. 2. Travelin Water Screens

Type Vertical, through-flow Quantity Screen velocity, ft/min 10.0, 5.4, 3.2, 2.5 Material

Screen Copper Frame Steel, hot dipped galvanized

3. Screen Wash Pum s

Type Five stage, vertical, turbine, wet pit Quantity

9.2-29 TABLE 9.2-8 cont'd)

Capacity, each, gpm 1060

Head, feet 250 Material

Case 2 percent Ni cast iron

Impeller Type 316 SS

Shaft Type 316 SS

Motor 100 hp, 460 v, 3 phase, 60 hz, 1760 rpm

Enclosure TEFC

Codes NElfA, Standards of the Hydraulic Institute, ASME Section VIII.

4. Pi in Fittin s and Valves

Pressure, psig 50

Temperature, F 125 Pipe material*

Below ground Concrete Above ground Cast iron, rubber lined Valves

3 inches and above Cast iron, flanged

2< inches and below Bronze, screwed and/or flanged

Code ANSI B31-1

+All pipes 3 inches and above

9. 2-30 1) limiting the temperature of the water discharged to the ocean to no greater than that discharged during normal plant operation

2) limiting the velocity of the water drawn into the intake pipeline to 1 ft/sec

3) limiting the rise in the intake canal so as not to adversely affect marine life The recirculation operation is under strict administrative control and is sub)ect to refinement after test operation. Further details of the recirculation operation are discussed in the July 6, 1972 amendment to the Hutchinson Island Environmental Report.

9.2.3.4 Testin and Ins ection

Prior to installation in the system, each component is inspected and cleaned. Preoperational testing consists of calibrating the instruments, testing the automatic controls for actuation at the proper set points, and checking the operability and limits of alarm functions. Automatic actuation of system components is tested periodically to confirm operability. The circulating water system is in service during normal plant operation. System performance is monitored and data is taken periodically to confirm heat transfer characteristics.

9.2.3.5 Instrumentation A lication

The circulating water system is continuously monitored by measuring the condenser inlet and outlet temperature and the effluent chlorine content.

Table 9.2-9 lists the system parameters that are measured and Figure 9.2-1A shows the system instrumentation. Diverse parameters (discharge pressure and temperature, and suction pressure) are measured on the circulating water pumps to establish that they are operating correctly. The circulating water pumps can be started from either the control. room or locally at the pumps. A pump start permissive circuit prevents starting unless:

1) there is bearing lubricating water flow, and 2) the valve in the discharge line is opened at least 10 percent. 3) the valves at the water box are full open

9.2-31 TABLE 9.2-9

CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication .Alarm -Instru- Normal Control (1) ment Operating Instrument System Parameter 6 Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy

Circulatin Water Pum s 1) Discharge pressure 0-50 psig 16.4 psig +0.5% 2) Lubricating water flow 0-12 gpm 20 gpm +1.0% 3) Lubricating water pressure Pump start per- 30 psig missive 4) Seal water pressure 0-100 psig 30 psig +0.5%

Dischar e Valve Position Pump start. permissive for .minimum opening Condenser 1) Inlet temperature 30-130F 95F +3.0% (one leg on each condenser) 2) Discharge temperature 30-130F 119F +3.0% 3) Chlorine residual 0-10 ppm +1.0%

(1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. 9.2.4 TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM

9.2.4.1 Desi Bases

The turbine cooling ~ater system is designed to provide a heat sink for power cycle equipment during normal operation and normal shutdown. The system serves no safety function since it is not required to achieve safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA. It is completely independent of, and has no connection with the component cooling system.

9.2.4.2 S stem Descri tion

The turbine cooling system is a closed loop system which uses demineralized water buffered with sodium dichromate to remove'heat from the turbine and other components in the power cycle (See Figure 9,2-4).

The water is circulated by two turbine cooling water pumps. and the heat removed is transferred to the intake cooling water system through the two turbine cooling water heat exchangers. Turbine cooling water circulates through the shell side of the heat exchangers. A surge tank open to the atmosphere is connected to the turbine cooling water system. The tank level is automatically controlled (by level switches and a level control valve)'and makeup is from the main condensate system. Control room alarm is initiated on both high and low water level. Sodium dichromate is used as a corrosion inhibitor in the turbine cooling water system. The concentration of inhibitor is not critical (usually about 200-300 ppm) and is not automatically regulated. The turbine cooling water chemistry is measured periodically and an inhibitor added when needed from t'e chemical additive tank located above the surge tank water level.

The turbine plant components cooled by the turbine cooling water system include: a) Turbine lube oil coolers b) Turbine electro-hydraulic fluid coolers c) 'ydrogen seal oil coolers d) Isolated phase bus air coolers e) Hydrogen coolers Exciter air cooling units g) Heater drain pumps seal and stuffing box coolers h) Feedwater pump oil coole'rs

Condensate pump motor bearing coolers

9.2-33 Instrument and service air compressor jackets, aftercoolers, and instrument air dryer cooler

k) Sample coolers, secondary system Components (a), (c), (e) and (f) listed above are provided with automatic temperature control valves in the cooler outlet piping.

System component design data are presented in Table 9.2-10.

9.2.4.3 S stem Evaluation

Each of the two pumps and heat exchangers in the turbine cooling system is designed to provide 60 percent of total system capacity. Table 9.2-11 lists operating flow rates and calculated heat loads for the turbine plant components cooled by the turbine water system. The turbine cooling water system is supplied with makeup through the condensate system and also through a double valved connection to the domestic service water system. Flow through the turbine cooling water heat exchangers is monitored downstream by a local flow meter.

Turbine cooling water is not needed to shut down the turbine.

9.2.4.4 Testin and Ins ection

The turbine cooling water system is in service during normal plant operation. System performance is monitored and data taken periodically to confirm mechanical, hydraulic, and heat transfer characteristics.

9.2.4.5 Instrumentation A lication Table 9.2-12 lists the parameters measured to monitor the turbine 'cooling water system.

The turbine cooling water pumps can be started and stopped either locally or from the control room.

There are a number of temperature controlled valves in the system which control flow through the: a) turbine lube oil coolers b) hydrogen seal oil unit coolers (air side cooler) c) hydrogen seal oil unit (hydrogen side cooler) d) hydrogen coolers e) exciter cooling air units

9.2-34 TABLE 9.2-10

DESIGN DATA FOR TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Turbine Coolin Water Heat Exchan ers

Type Horizontal, straight tube, single pass

Quantity 6 Design duty, each, Btu/hr 26.5 x 10 2 Heat transfer area, each, ft 8400 Design pressure, psig 150 shell side, 90 tube side

Design temperature, F 150 shell side, 150 tube side Material

Shell ASTM A-515 Gr 70

Tubes Aluminum Brass SB111 Alloy //687

Tube Sheet Aluminum Bronze ASTM B171-Type D

Codes TEMA, Class C, ASTM Section VIII & Section IX

2. Turbine Coolin Water Pum s

Type Horizontal Centrifugal Quantity

Capacity, each, gpm 5100

Head, feet 152 Material

Case Cast Iron Impeller Bronze Shaft Steel

Motor 250 hp, 4000 v, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 1180 rpm

9.2-35 TABLE 9.2-10 (cont'd) Enclosure WP-II

Codes NEMA, Standards oE Hydraulic Institute, ASME VIII

3. Turbine Coolin Water Sur e Tank

Type Horizontal Quantity

Design pressure Atmospheric

Design temperature, F 125

Volume, gallons 1000

Material ASTM A-283 Gr C

Code ASME Section VIII 4. Chemical Additive Tank

Type Vertical Quantity

Design pressure, psig 150

Design temperature, F 200

Volume, gallons 50

Material Carbon steel

Code ASME Section VIII

9.2-36 TABLE 9.2-11

TURBINE PLANT COMPONENTS OPERATING FLOW RATES AND CALCULATED HEAT LOADS

Flow/Unit Heat Load/Unit Com onent Descri tion ~('m) (Btu x 106

Turbine lube oil coolers 2900 gpm 7.5 Turbine E-H fluid coolers 40 Negligible

Hydrogen seal oil units 100 0 '6 Isolated phase bus air coolers 62.5 Negligible

Hydrogen coolers 4500 40.0

Exciter air cooler units 200 1.09

Heater drain pumps seal & stuffing box coolers 20 Negligible

Feedwater pumps oil coolers 20 Negligible

Condensate pumps motor bearing coolers 10 Negligible

Instrument air compressor 20

Station air compressor 15 1.0

Air dryer 10

Sample cooler, secondary system 100 Negligible

9.2-37 TABLE 9.2-12

TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATIONS Indication Normal Control (1) Instrument Operating Instrument System Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Punction Range Range Accuracy Turbine Coolin Water Pum 1) Suction pressure 0-60 psig 10-15 psig +0.5% 2) Outlet pressure 0-150 psig 70-75 psig +0.5% Turbine Coolin Water HX Shellside (2) 1) Outlet temperature Controls intake 0-200F 95P +1.0% cooling water flow through tube side of HX by means of temperature control valves TCV-13-2A,2B 2) Outlet header pressure 0-200 psig 70 psig +1.0% Turbine Electro-H draulic Fluid Coolers- 1) Outlet flow Rotometer 40gpm 2) Outlet temperature 0-200F 100P +1.0% Turbine Lube Oil Coolers 1) Outlet temperature 0-200P 110P +1.0% 1) Inlet header flow 0-3500 2900gpm +2.0% gpm H dro en Seal Oil Unit Cooler 1) Air side coolers a) Inlet flow 0-300gpm 260gpm +2.0% b) Outlet temperature 0-200P 110F +1.0% 0 TABLE 9.2-12 (Cont'd)

TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATIONS (1) Indication Alarm Normal Control (1) Instrument Operating Instrument System Parameter 6 Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy 2) Hydrogen side coolers

a) -Inlet flow 0-120 gpm 100 gpm +2.0% b) Outlet temperature 0-200P 106F +1.0% H dro en Coolers

1) Inlet header flow 0-5500 gpm 4500 gpm +2.0% 2) Outlet temperature 0-200P 120F +1.0% Exciter Cooler Air Units

1) Inlet header flow 0-250 gpm 200 gpm +2.0% 2) Inlet header pressure 0-150 psig 50 psig +0.5% 3) Outboard exciter cooler 0-200F lllP +1.0% outlet temperature 4) Inboard exciter cooler 0-200P lllF +1. 0% outlet temperature Isolated Phase Bus Air Coolers 1) Inlet header flow 0-75 gpm 63 gpm + l. 0% 2) Outlet temperature 0-200F 100F + l. 0% Instrument Air Com ressor 1) Cooling water jacket a) Outlet temperature 0-200P 120F + l. 0% b) Outlet flow Rotometer 10 gpm 2) Aftercooler a) Outlet temperature 0-200F 140F + l. 0% b) Outlet flow Rotometer 10 gpm TABLE 9.2-12 (Cont')

TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm'1) Normal Control (l) Instrument Operating Instrument System Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy Instrument D er Cooler a) Outlet temperature 0-200F 140F +1.0% b) Outlet flow Rotometer 10 gpm Station Air Com ressor 1) Cooling water jacket a) Outlet. temperature 0-200F 120F + l. 0% b) Outlet flow Rotometer 15 gpm 2) Aftercooler

a) Outlet temperature * 0-200F 140F +1.0%

b) Outlet flow Rotometer 10 gpm Condensate Pum s & Motor ~Coolio 1) Motor outlet a) temperature 0-200F 110F +1.0% b) flow Rotometer 10 gpm 2) Stuffing Box Outlet a) temperature 0-200F 110F +1.0% b) flow Rotometer 10 gpm Feedwater Pum s Oil Coolers

1) Outlet flow Rotometer 20 gpm TABLE 9.2-12 (Cont'd)

TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION (1) Indication Alarm Normal Control (1) Instrument Operating Instrument S stem Parameter 6 Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy 2) Outlet temperature 0-200F 110F + l. 0% Heater Drain Pum s 1) Seal cooler outlet

a) temperature 0-200F 110F +1.0% b) flow Rotometer 10 gpm 2) Stuffing Box Outlet

a) temperature 0-200F 110F +1.0%

b) flow Rotometer 10 gpm Turbine Coolin Water Sur e Tank 1) Level Regulate flow to Sight Center- tank from conden- glass line of sate pump by means tank of level control valve LCV-13-1 2) Integrated makeup (gal)

(1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. (2) Turbine cooline HX tube side instrumentation is contained in Table 9.2-3. HX — Heat exchanger 9.2.5 MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM

9.2.5.1 Desi n Bases

The function of the makeup water system is to supply treated, demineralized water of the required quality for makeup use to various systems of the plant, including the reactor coolant system and the condensate and feedwater system. The makeup water system serves no safety function, since it is not required to achieve safe shutdown or mitigate the consequences of a LOCA.

9.2.5.2 S stem Descri tion

At the plant site, water from the city of Fort Pierce is stored in two 500,000 gal city water storage tanks. Water from these tanks i' supplied to the fire protection system, domestic water system and the makeup water system. The makeup water system is shown schematically on Figure 9.2-5 and equipment design parameters given in Table 9.2-13.

Water for the makeup system is pumped by two city water transfer pumps through the water treatment system which consists of sand pressure filters, organic scavengers, cation demineralizers, anion demineralizers and mixed bed demineralizers. The demineralized water then flows to the condensate storage tank (Section 9.2.8) for use in the condensate and feedwater system.

Water required for reactor coolant system makeup flows from the mixed bed demineralizer outlet to a vacuum degasifier. From the degasifier, the water is pumped by two degasifier water pumps to the primary water storage tank. The water is maintained degasified by use of a diaphragm. Water from this tank is supplied as makeup to the chemical volume and control system by means of two primary water pumps. The chemical volume and control system maintains reactor coolant system inventory by charging primary makeup water to the reactor coolant system. The primary water pumps also supply makeup water to the waste management system.

9.2.5.3 S stem Evaluation

The makeup water system serves no safety function. Each of the two city water transfer pumps, the two degasifier water pumps and the two primary water pumps are 100 percent capacity. The various components of the water treatment system also have redundant capabilities, namely four sand pressure filters, two 100 percent capacity organic scavengers, two 100 percent capacity cation demineralizers, three 100 percent capacity anion demineralizers and two 100 percent capacity mixed bed demineralizers.

Adequate volume of water is always stored in the condensate storage tank to ensure availability of water for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

9.2-<2 TABLE 9.2-13

DESIGN DATA FOR MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Water Treatment S stem Pressure Filters Quantity Diameter, feet

Pressure, psig 100 Filtering media Sand Organic Scavengers Quantity Diameter, feet 6.5

Pressure, psig 100 Cation Demineralizer Quantity Diameter, feet

Pressure, psig 100 Anion Demineralizer

Quantity Diameter, feet

Pressure, psig 100 l Mixed Bed Demineralizer Quantity Diameter, feet 6.5

Pressure, psig 100

9.2-43 TABLE 9.2-13 (cont'd)

Vacuum De asifier Quantity

Flow rate, gpm 200

Pressure, inches of vacuum Hg 30

De asifier Water Pum s

Flow rate, gpm 200 Quantity

TDH, feet 110

Cit Water Transfer Pum s

Flow rate, gpm 750

Primer Water Store e Tank Quantity

Capacity, gallons 150,000 Material Carbon steel, Tarset epoxy lined Design pressure Atmospheric

Code AWWA — D 100

Primer Water Pum Quantity

Capacity, each, gpm 300 Type Horizontal centrifugal

Head, feet 250 Material Stainless steel

9. 2-44 9.2.5.4 Testin and Ins ection

Each component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the system. 'he system is operated and tested initially to ensure its proper operation, instruments have been calibrated, and automatic controls have been tested for actuation at the proper set points.

9.2.5.5 Instrumentation A lication

The instrumentation in the makeup water system is listed in Table 9.2-14. The instrumentation monitors and controls the water level of the primary water tank and monitors operation of the primary water pump. The primary water pump can be started by hand switch in the control room or by local pushbutton. The standby primary water'ump is automatically started on low pump discharge header pressure.

The flow of water into the primary water tank is controlled by a level control valve in the intake header to the tank. The pressurizer quench tank makeup header is isolated on a CIS signal (see Table 6.2-1 for data on isolation valves) by valve'losure. Isolation can also be accomplished by local hand switch closure of the valve.

9.2-45 TABLE 9.2-14

MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

(1). Indication 'Alarm Normal Control (1) nstrument Operating Instrument System Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range- Accuracy Prima Water (2) Tank Level * Control operation 0-30 ft. Full make- of valve connecting up — 4 ft. +1.0% degasifier water pump discharge to primary water tank

Primar Water Pum 1) Discharge header pressure Start standby pri- 0-100 mary pump on low psig 110 psig +1.0% pressure 2) Discharge pressure 0-200 psig 110 psig +0.5%

1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. 2) Alarms in both control room and water treatment panel. 9 2 POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEMS

The potable and sanitary water system is shown on Figure 9.2-5 and system design data are given on Table 9.2-15. The potable and sanitary water system serve no safety function since they are not required to achieve safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA.

The potable and sanitary water required for plant use is taken directly from the water supply for the city of Fort Pierce and stored in the two 500,000 gallon city water storage tanks. It is distributed throughout the plant without any additional water treatment. The system is pressurized with a hydropneumatic tank and' set of pumps which assure that minimum pressure is available to supply water. It is designed to meet the drinking and miscellaneous requirements of the full complement of the plant staff. All plant sanitary water is routed to septic tanks. All sanitary water used at the plant is potable. The system is tested and cleaned before being'ut into operation.

9.2-47 TABLE 9.2-15

DESIGN DATA FOR POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. H dro neumatic Tank

Material Carbon steel

Capacity, gallons 4000 (approximate) Length, ft-in 19-5

Diameter, ft-in 6 — 0

Design pressure, psig 200

Design temp, F 150

Code ASME Section VIII

2. Domestic Water Pum

Type Horizontal centrifugal

Number

Capacity, gpm 350

Discharge Pressure, psig 125 Material:

Discharge Head Ductile iron Impeller Cast iron

Motor 50 HP/460 Volts/3 Phase/60 hz

Codes Motor: NEMA

Pump: Standards of the Hydraulic Institute

9.2-48 9.2.7 ULTIMATE HEAT. SINK 9.2.7.1

The ultimate heat sink has sufficient cooling water capacity to dissipate reactor decay heat during normal and emergency shutdown conditions. Specifically, the ultimate heat sink can: a) provide sufficient cooling water for more than 30 days to permit and maintain safe shutdown, or to permit control of a LOCA b) withstand the effects of the design basis earthquake (DBE), tornado, or flooding effects without loss of safety function, assuming a single failure of a man-made structural feature.

9.2.7.2 S stem Descri tion

Two water sources comprise the ultimate heat sink for the plant, the Atlantic Ocean and Big Mud Creek/Indian River. The retaining structures associated with the latter source are designed to seismic Class I requirements. The retaining structure and conduits associated with the Atlantic Ocean are not designed to function after a design basis earthquake; however, they can withstand all other severe natural phenomena associated with the site. The stability of the intake canal slopes is discussed in Section 2.5.5. The primary source of cooling water for dissipating reactor decay heat during normal or emergency shutdown is the Atlantic Ocean via the circulating water system intake, described in Sections 9.2.3 and 3.8.1. Two 10.5 ft I.D. reinforced concrete pipes take ocean water from about 1200 ft off shore. The pipes are buried at the -18 ft MLW contour. The preferred source of cooling water for dissipating reactor heat following a LOCA is also the Atlantic Ocean source. However, if the LOCA were accompanied by the DBE, the possibility would exist for the.int'ake canal to become impassable due to failure of nonseismic Class I structures. Consequently, a second source,

designed to withstand the DBE, is connected to the intake structure for use's a backup. This source is Big Mud Creek which is a natural body of water extending easterly from the Indian River just north of the plant site. The Indian River is connected to the Atlantic Ocean by two inlets, one at" Fort Pierce to the north and one at St. Lucie to the south. The Intercoastal Waterway, with a 12 foot deep channel, runs north-south in the Indian River. A 60 ft wide by 20 ft deep (-20 ft MLW) channel has been dredged fromythe Intercoastal Waterway into Big Mud Creek. The creek itself is dredged to a minimum elevation of -40 ft MLW with a minimum 250 ft width.

The intake structure is connected to Big Mud Creek by two 48 inch diameter conduits with a centerline elevation of -6 feet MLW and are supported on piles extending to elevation -60 ft. Each pipe is sized to pass the water required for normal and emergency shutdown operations, approximately 14,500 gpm. During power operation, the conduits are sealed by a float operated valve which prevents flow from Big Mud Creek into the intake structure. When the ~ater level in the canal falls below -6 ft'MLW, the float operator opens the valve.

9.2-49 Each set of piles, pipe cradle and pipe for the secondary source are designed as a single structure for seismic earthquake loads with the soi1 liquefied from elevation -60 ft. to elevation 0 ft. The liquefied soil is treated as a 90 lb/ft3 liquid. The structure and piles have a horizontal loading of 1/10th of the liquefied. soil pressure applied to the structure. The 1/10th factor is a static load factor and corresponds to the DBE acceleration of O.lg. The soil is above ground water level and acts as'ead load on the structure. The soil above the structure to elevation +18 feet is considered as supported by the structures and lateral loadings equivalent to 1/10 of the dead weight of the soil are applied to the structure in combination with the liquefied soil conditions.

9.2.7.3 S stem Evaluation

The ultimate heat sink concept for the plant complies completely with the Regulatory Position of AEC Safety Guide 27.

To provide a high level of assurance that cooling water is available for dissipation of decay heat following reactor shutdown or after an accident, two cooling water sources are connected to the plant intake structure. The primary heat sink is provided by the Atlantic Ocean as described in Section 9.2.3; the secondary heat sink is provided by Big Mud Creek. Each water source is capable of performing the safety functions required of the ultimate heat sink. The intake structure and the adjacent soils for the first 60 feet in front of the intake bays are seismic Class I.

The system connecting Big Mud Creek to the intake structure consists of two independent emergency cooling ~ater pipes. Each pipe is designed to provide sufficient cooling water to achieve safe plant shutdown or mitigate the consequences of a LOCA in the event of loss of cooling water from the primary source. The pipes are designed to remain operable during and following a DBE or tornado. The two conduits are completely redundant and are separated sufficiently that loss of one pipe does not induce failure of its redundant counterpart or compromise the ability of the sink to accomplish its safety function. There is sufficient water between the Ft. Pierce and St. Lucie inlets from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian River to allow the required ultimat'e heat sink functions for much more than 30 days. The ultimate heat sink is capable of withstanding each of the most severe natural phenomena expected at the site concurrent with a single failure of a man made structural feature without loss of cooling capability. The intake canal by itself can supply the required quantity of emergency cooling water for at least 20 hours after occurrence of the most severe natural phenomena (liquefaction) and a single failure of a man-made structure.

9.2-50 9.2.8 CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITIES

The condensate storage sys'em is schematically shown in Figure 10,1-2. The condensate storage system consists of a 250,000 gallon condensate storage tank which serves as a source of feedwater for the auxiliary feedwater system. The tank also serves as a source of makeup water for condenser hotwell and return for excess hotwell water under normal operations. Approximately 110,000 gallons of water are required for cooldown of the unit to 320 F, the temperature needed to start operation of the shutdown cooling system. Alarms are sounded in the control room and at the water treatment panel on low and high level. A low-low level is alarmed in the control room to prevent overheating of the auxiliary feedwater pumps should the condensate level drop to minimum pump suction requirements. The low level alarm is initiated at a tank volume of 125,000 gallons and the low-low level alarm at 5,000 gallons. Refer to Section 10.4.7 for further discussion of the auxiliary feedwater system emergency condensate requirements.

The condensate water is expected to contain insignificant radioactivity; therefore, no provision has been made to measure radioactivity release from this source. Periodic grab samples are taken and analyzed to ensure that there is no activity buildup in the tank. The tank is designed as seismic Class I and is enclosed in a concrete missile barrier. A discussion of the seismic requirements for the condensate system piping is given in Section 9.4-6. Design data for the condensate storage tank is given in Table 9.2-16. TABLE 9.2-16

DESIGN DATA FOR CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK Capacity, gallons 250,000 ' Operating pressure Atmospheric

Operating temperature, F 30-120 Design pressure Atmospheric

Design temperature, F 125

Material Epoxy lined carbon steel Seismic design Class I

Code AWWA-D100

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FLORIDA POWER 6 LIGHT COMPANY HUTCHINSON ISLAND PLANT

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9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES

9.3.1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM

The compressed air system consisting of the instrument and service air systems is designed to provide a reliable supply of dry, oil-free air for pneumatic instruments and controls, and pneumatically operated valves and the necessary service air for normal plant operation and maintenance. The system serves no safety function since it is not required to achieve safe shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA.

The design of the system is based on an instrument air requirement of 155 scfm and a service air requirement of 500 scfm.

9.3.1.2 S stem Descri tion

The compressed air system is shown schematically in Figure 9.3-1 and equipment design parameters are given in Table 9.3-1. The instrument air system incorporates two full capacity nonlubricated compressors, each having a separate inlet filter, aftercooler and moisture separator. The instrument air compressors dischax'ge to a single header connected to an air receiver and air dryer and filter assembly. The compressed air header is divided into branch lines supplying the containment, intake structure, service building, water treatment area, turbine building, tank storage areas, fuel handling building and reactor auxiliary building. The various air-operated valves and pneumatic instruments and controls are supplied from the header.

Normal operation requires one instrument air compressor to maintain air receiver pressure between 90-100 psig, with the other compressor starting automatically if the instrument air receiver pressure falls below 85 psig. The service air system consists of one 100.percent capacity service air compressor, with inlet filter, an aftercooler and moisture separator, air re'ceiver and distribution piping. The receiver outlet header is divided into branch lines supplying service air to the containment area, intake structure, fuel handling building, reactor auxiliary building, service building, water treatment area and storage tank areas. Service air is used for the operation of pneumatic tools and equipment used for plant maintenance.

Normal operation requires the service air compressor to maintain service air receiver pressure between 90-100 psig. Cross connect capability exists between the instrument air and service air systems. The cross connect consists of a flexible coupling used to reduce noise and vibrations associated with the reciprocating action of the compressors.

9.3-1 9.3.1.3 S stem Evaluation

The power supply for the compressor motors is from the normal power distribution system. If a loss of offsite power occurs, the buses can be manually connected to the emergency diesel generators.

Instrument air system redundancy is provided by the two instrument,air compressor units plus the cross connect capability to the service air system. A total loss of system is highly unlikely during normal operation.

9. 3-2 TABLE 9.3-1 DESIGN DATA FOR COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Instrument Air S stem

Air Com ressor

Type Horizontal, non-lubricated reciprocating, double acting single stage Quantity 2 I Design capacity, scfm 162 Discharge pressure, psig 100 Motor 40 hp, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 460 v Enclosure Totally enclosed fan cooled Code ASME Section VIII, NEMA Intake Filter Silencer

Type Dry type, Air Maze Quantity 2 Base size, inches 6

Aftercooler and Moisture Se arator

Type Shell and tube Quantity 2 Code TEMA Class C. ASME Section VIII Air Receiver

Type Ver tical' Quantity Design pressure, psig 125 Design Temperature, F 125 Actual volume, ft 96 Code ASME Section VIII Prefilters

Type Baffles 6 Vanes Quantity 2 Capacity, scfm 385 Filtration 100% removal of all entrained particulate 10 microns in size and larger

~AAr Dr er

Type Electrically Heated Desiccant Activated alumina desiccant Quantity 1 Capacity, scfm 155 Outlet moisture content with saturated air inlet -40F dew point at 100 psig

9.3-3 TABLE 9.3-1 (cont'd)

Afterfilters

Type . Cartridge Quantity 6 Capacity, scfm, each 30 Filtration 100% removal of all particulates over 0.9 microns

Pi in and Valves

Valves 150 lb ANSI for 2-1/2" and larger. 600 lb ANSI for 2" and smaller. Piping Seamless ASTM A-106, Grade B (2-1/2" thru 6") Code ANSI B31.1.0 (ANSI B31.7— penetration piping)

2. Service Air S stem

Air Com ressor

Type Horizontal, reciprocating, two stage Quantity 1 Design Capacity, scfm 518 Discharge pressure, psig 100 Motor 125 hp, 3 phase, 60 Hz, 460 v Enclosure Totally enclosed fan cooled Code ASME Section VIII, NEMA- Intake Filter Silencer

Type Dry Type Quantity 1.

Aftercooler and Moisture Se arator

Type Shell and tube Quantity 1 Code TEMA Class C, ASME Section VIII Air Receiver

Type Vertical Quantity 1 Design pressure, ~sig 125 Actual volume, ft 151 Code ASME Section VIII

9.3-4 TABLE 9.3-1 (cont'd)

Pi in and Valvin

Valves 150 psi ANSI for 2-1/2" and larger, 600 psi ANSI for 2" and smaller Piping Seamless ASTM A-106, Grade B (2-1/2" thru 6") Code ANSI B31.1.0 (ANSI B31.7— penetration piping) All safety related air-operated valves are designed to fail in the position required to perform their safety function in the event a loss of air supply occurs. The single exception to this rule applies to the containment vacuum relief valves which perform both a containment isolation function and vacuum relief function. These valves fail closed on loss of air. They are provided with accumulators to assure a reliable source of air in the event of loss of instrument air. The accumulator and 'piping for operation of the valves are designated as Seismic Class I. A check valve is provided at the interface with the instrument air system. See Section 3.8.2.1.11 for further discussion of these valves. Other containment isolation valve positions on power failure are indicated in Table 6.2-1., All safety related instruments and controls are non-pneumatic except for (1) the air operated temperature control valve used to regulate intake water flow to the component cooling heat exchangers and (2) the electropneumatic transducers used to regulate auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators. Temperature controlling transducers cause the control valves to fail fully open on loss of air supply.

Complete loss of instrument or service air during full power operation or under accident conditions in no way reduces the ability of the reactor protective system or the engineered safety features and their supporting systems to safely shut down the reactor or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

9.3.1.4 Testin and Ins ection The systems are inspected and cleaned prior to service. Instruments are calibrated during testing and automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper set points. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during plant operational testing. The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity, and mechanical operability. The compressed air system is in service during normal plant operation. System performance will therefore be checked by the performance of the components utilizing instrument or service air.

9.3.1.5 Instrument A lication

Table 9.3-2 lists the parameters used to monitor compressed air system operation.

9.3-5 The station and instrument air compressors are automatically started and stopped to maintain the air receiver pressure within the range of 90-100 psig. The compressors can also be started manually by local push button.

The operation of automatic valves in the compressed air system is discussed in Section 9.3.1.3.

9. 3-6 TABLE 9.3-2

COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM INSTRUMENT APPLICATION

Indication Alarm Instru- Normal Control ment (1) Operating Instrument System Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording ontrol Function Range Range Accuracy

Instrument Air Com ressor 1) Discharge temperature 50-500F 425F + 1.0% 2) Discharge pressure 0-200psig 100-105psig + 0.5% Instrument Aftercooler 1) Discharge temperature 0-200F 115F + 1.0% 2) Discharge pressure 0-200psig 100 psig + 0.5% 3) Separator level Sight glass Instrument Receiver Pressure ) Controls in- 0-200psig 100psig +0. 5% strument air compressor operation 2) Second compressor cut-in. at 85 psig;cut-out at 95 psig Instrument Prefilter 1) Inlet pressure 0-150psig 100psig + 2.0% 2) Outlet pressure 0-150psig 98-100psig + 2.0% Instrument D er 1) Inlet pressure 0-150psig 98-100psig + 2.0% 2) Inlet temperature 0-200F 115F + 2.0% 3) Outlet temperature 0-200F 100F + 2.0%

(1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. TABLE 9.3-2 (Cont'd)

COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM INSTRUMENT APPLICATION

Indication Instru- Normal Control ment Operating Instrument — (1) System Parameter & Location Local- -Room = High Low- Recording Control Function Range . Range A'ccuracy

4) Outlet pressure Local 95 psig Local 0-200psig + 0.5% Control Control Room 0-150 Room psig + 3.0% Afterfilter Packa e Outlet Pressure 0-200psig 80-100psig + 0.5% Station Air Com ressor 1) Outlet pressure 0-200psig 100psig + 0.5% 2) Outlet temperature 50-500F 425F + 1.0% Station Aftercooler 1) Outlet pressure 0-200psig 100psig + 0.5% 2) Outlet temperature 0-200F 125F + 1.0% Station Air Receiver Pressure Controls 0-200psig 100psig + 0.5% station air compressor Dischar e Air Header Pressure 0-150psig 100psig + 1.5%

(1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. 9.3.2 SAMPLING SYSTEM

9.3.2.1 Desi n Bases

The sampling system provides the means to obtain samples from the reactor coolant and auxiliary systems during plant startup, power operation and plant shutdown for chemical and radiochemical laboratory analysis. The results of analyses performed on these samples form the basis for regulating the boron concentration, monitoring the fuel integrity, evaluating the ion exchanger and filter performance, specifying chemical additions and maintaining the proper hydrogen concentration in the reactor.

9.3.2.2 " S stem Descri tion

P The piping and instrumentation diagram for the sampling system is shown in Figure 9.3-2. Tables 9.3-3 and 9.3-4 list the sample flow rates and system design data, respectively. Typical analyses performed on the reactor coolant and auxiliary systems include tests for boron concentra'tion, fission and corrosion product activity levels and concentration, dissolved gas and corrosion product concentrations, chloride concentration, coolant pH and conductivity levels. Typically the samples are collected on a periodic basis. The sampling room, located at floor elevation 19.5 ft in the reactor auxiliary building, uses instrumentation to monitor the temperature and pressure of each of the samples.

The sample sink, which is located within the sampling hood, has a raised edge to contain any spilled liquid. To minimize the possibility of spillage all samples are either collected in plastic containers or in a sample vessel. The sink is provided with a hood equipped with a fan exhausting to the plant vent.

In order to assure that a representative sample is obtained, the sampling lines are purged prior to withdrawing the sample. The pressure and flow rate of each of the purge flows is locally indicated. The duration of the purge will be sufficient to'urn over a minimum of two sample line volumes.

The sample volume varies according to the type of analysis to be performed. For instance, the hot leg sample may be collected in the sample vessel which has a volume of 1000 cc. From this sample, the amounts of 02, H2 and dissolved fission gases may be determined. The hot leg sample may also be collected at the sample sink where the sample volume required for a boron or chloride concentration analysis would be approximately 250 ml while a crud concentration analysis sample volume could be as large as 5 liters. 9.3.2.2.1 Sampling The sampling points have been selected to obtain all the required chemical and radiological information necessary for monitoring and regulating plant chemistry. Separate transfer lines from the various sampling points to the

9.3-8 TABLE 9.3-3

SAMPLING SYSTEM FLOW RATES

Nominal flow rates at standard conditions, gpm

Pressurizer Steam Space 0.5

Pressurizer Surge Line 1.0

Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg 1.0

Shutdown Cooling Suction Line 1.0

High-Pressure Safety In)ection Pump 1.0 Miniflow Line

CVCS Purification Filter 1A Inlet 1.0

CVCS Purification Filter 1A Outlet 1.0

CVCS Purification Filter 1B Outlet 1.0

CVCS Purification Ion Exchanger Series Flow Line 1;0

Steam Generator Blowdown Line 1.0

9. 3-9 TABLE 9.3-4

DESIGN DATA FOR SAMPLE SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Sam le Heat Exchan er

Quantity 4 (Identical units) Type Shell and Tube, Vertical Tube Side (Sampling) Fluid Reactor Coolant Design Pressure, psig 6000 Pressure Drop, psi 55 8 250 lbs/hr Material Ni Ci Fe Shell Side (Cooling Water) Fluid Component Cooling Water Design Pressure, psig 375 Pressure Drop, psi 3 8 3 gpm Material Ni Ci Fe

Sam le Vessel

Quantity 2 Internal Volume, cc 1000 Design Pressure, psig 2485 Design Temperature, F 250 Normal Operating Pressure, psig 2235 Normal Operating Temperature, F 120 Material Stainless Steel'(316) Fluid Reactor Coolant Relief Valves a. Relief Valve in Hot Leg Sample Line (V-5109) Set Pressure, psig . 75 Accumulation, 10 Backpressure Buildup, psi 35 Superimposed Backpressure, psi 25 Capacity, gpm for water 9 100F 8.0 Normal Fluid Temperature, F 120 Maximum Fluid Temperature, F 250 b'. Relief Valve in Pressurizer Steam Sample Line (V-5124) Set Pressure, psig 75 Accumulation, 10 Backpressure Buildup, psi 35 Superimposed Buildup, psi 25 Capacity, gpm for water 8 100F 8.0 Normal Fluid Temperature, F 120 Maximum Fluid Temperature, F 250 Hood Fan

Type Centrifugal Motor Horsepower, hp 1/4 Fan Speed, rpm 1725 Flow Rate, scfm 515

9.3-10 sample sink or sample vessel are provided to allow for simultaneous sampling. Specific samples and sampling points and criteria used in designing the sample lines are described below: a) Reactor Coolant System Samples

Reactor coolant system samples are taken from hot le'g loop 1A, the pressurizer surge line and the pressurizer steam space.

Hot Le Sam le — The hot leg is sampled to check reactor coolant chemistry and radioactivity. The hot leg sample tubing is arranged to include a delay coil so that the overall transient time from the loop to the containment wall is sufiicient to permit the decay of short lived radionuclides. In particular, a delay time of at least 90 seconds inside the containment is allowed for N-16 because of its high energy gamma emission. This delay time is selected to allow normal access to the sampling room.

The two types of samples which may be collected from the hot leg of the reactor coolant system are (1) a high pressure, low temperature sample collected in a sample vessel and used for determining the amounts of 02, N2, He, H2 and fission gases, and (2) a low pressure, low temperature sample collected at the sampling sink and used for determining the chloride and boron concentration.

A high pressure (<2235 psig) and high temperature (~600F) sample from the hot leg of the reactor coolant system is routed to the sampling system where it is cooled to 120F or less in a sample heat exchanger and then may be reduced in pressure by a throttling valve (V-5107) to approximately 25 psig. The flow rate for the sample is approximately 1.0 gpm.

Before sampling, a purge flow is established by bypassing the sample vessel to assure that a representative sample is obtained. A portion of the flow is then either drawn to t'e sample sink where a sample is collected or the flow is diverted to the sample vessel where a high pressure sample is isolated and collected.

2) Pressurizer Sur e Line Sam le — This sample is taken at the sample sink to check the boron concentration in the pressurizer surge line. A high pressure, low temperature sample is not required because the boron concentration analysis is normally the only test to be performed.

The high pressure (~ 2235 psig), high temperature (~ 650F) sample from the pressurizer surge line is routed to the sampling room where it is cooled to 120F or less in a sample heat exchanger and then reduced in pressure across a throttling valve (V-5111) to approximately 25 psig. The flow rate is approximately 1.0 gpm. The sample normally flows through a purge line to the volume control tank or to the waste management system flash tank (if the volume control tank is not available) until sufficient volume has passes to permit the collection of a representative sample. A

9.3-11 portion of the flow is drawn via the grab sample valve (V-5139) and a sample is collected. The purge flow is normally directed to the volume control tank in the chemical and volume control system to minimize waste generation. The pressure and flow rate to the volume control tank is locally indicated.

3) Pressurizer Steam S ace Sam le - This sample is taken to give a representative sample of fission products and noncondensable gases in the pressu'rizer steam space. A high pressure, low temperature sample can be collected in a sample vessel or a low pressure, low temperature sample can be collected in the sample sink as described above. The sample flow rate is 0.5 gpm.

Grab samples can also be obtained with the sample vessels disconnected by using the sample vessel bypass lines (V-5106) or (V-5120). The sample vessel bypass lines are used during the initial portion of the sample line purging operation to minimize sample vessel contamination. b) Safety Injection System Samples

The safety injection system sample is taken to check the boron concentration of the water during the recirculation period following a LOCA. The pressure in the high pressure safety injection pump miniflow line varies from 120 psig to 200 psig depending on the operation of the safety injection pumps. The temperature in this line has a maximum value of 300F. The flow rate to the sampling system is approximately 1.0 gpm.

At the sample room, the flow is routed through a sample heat exchanger where the temperature is reduced to about 120F and through a throttling valve (V-5128) where the pressure is reduced to approximately 25 psig. After the sampling lines are purged, a sample is collected at the sample sink. c) Shutdown Cooling System Samples

The shutdown cooling suction line sample allows verification of the reactor coolant boron concentration prior to and during shutdown cooling. The pressure at the shutdown cooling sample point can be as high as 300 psig and the temperature can be as high as 350F. The maximum flow rate to the sampling room is approximately 1.0 gpm. At the sampling room, the temperature and pressure (V-5128) are reduced to about 120F and 25 psig, respectively. After the sample lines have been purged, a sample is collected at the sample sink. d) Chemical and Volume Control System Samples

Sample points for the chemical and volume control system are located at purification filter 1A inlet and outlet, at the outlet of purification filter 1B (outlet of the ion exchangers) and in the purification ion exchanger series flow line. The samples at the

9.3-12 purification filter lA inlet and outlet provide a means to determine the particulate activity decontamination factor (DF) for crud activity of the filter. The purification filter 1A inlet sample (letdown flow) can also be a backup to the hot leg sample. The sample at the outlet of purification filter 1B together with the ion exchanger inlet sample (same as the purification filter 1A outlet sample) gives a decontamination factor of soluble activity for the ion exchanger unit, and the combined ion exchanger and filter 1B DF ofr particulate activity. The purification ion exchanger series flow line sample together with the samples from the inlet and outlet of the ion exchangers gives the decontamination factor for each ion exchanger if two ion exchangers are being operated in series.

The samples from the chemical and volume control system are at a temperature of 120F and a pressure of approximately 25 psig. Since these are the approximate operating conditions of'he sampling system at the sampling room, no further reduction in temperature or pressure is required. The flow rate to the sampling zoom is approximately 1 gpm. After the sample lines have been purged a sample is collected at the sample sink. Purging can be to the flash tank rather than to the volume control tank to obtain an adequate flow rate due to the low differential head available. e) Steam Generator Blowdown System Samples

The samples taken from the steam generator blowdown system are used to continuously monitor the steam generator conductivity, pH, and radiation levels. A low pressure, low temperature sample can also be taken at the sample sink in order to monitor steam generator chemistry.

Steam generator blowdown samples are taken from the blowdown line of each steam generator. These high pressure (~ 885 psig), high temperature (~ 550F) samples are individually routed to the sample heat exchangers and cooled to approximately 120F. The pressure of the samples is then reduced to about 25 psig by a throttling valve. The sample flow rates are approximately 1.0 gpm.

Each sample is containuously monitored for conductivity and pH. Grab samples can be obtained at the sample sink. These sample lines are containuously monitored for radiation. All continuous discharges are directed to the steam generator blowdown tank for disposal or processing.

9.3.2.2.2 Component Description

The major components of the sampling system are described below. The sample sink, work area and sampling lines are constructed of stainless steel to minimize any potential corrosion problems. a ~ Sample Heat Exchangers The sample heat exchangers are tube-in-shell, vertical counter flow type. Sample fluid enters the tube side at the top of the heat

9.3-13 exchanger and the cooled samples are taken from the bottom. Component cooling water, which must be flowing before the sample fluid is introduced into the heat exchanger, enters the shell side at the bottom of the sample heat exchanger and exists at the top. b) Sample Vessel

The sample vessels are located inside the sample hood over the sample sink. Each vessel consists of a 1000 cc stainless steel sampling cylinder with isolation valves and quick disconnect couplings. The sample vessel allows the operator to collect a high pressure, low temperature liquid or gas sample from which dissolved gases and fission gas activities can be determined. c) Sample Sink and Hood The sample sink is located within the sample hood. All grab samples are obtained within the sample hood and over the sample sink. A demineralized ~ater line is routed to the sink for flushing purposes. The sample sink drains to the chemical drain tank. The sink perimeter has a raised edge to contain spilled liquid. The entrance to the sample hood is shaped so that the air drawn into the hood by the hood fan will enter in a smooth, uniform and unbroken pattern, thereby minimizing the possibility of local airborne activity outside the hood. d) Sample Delay Line

A delay line, consisting of 150 feet of tubing, is of sufficient length to keep the reactor coolant sample flow inside the containment for a sufficient period of time to allow for the decay of radionuclides, particularly nigrogen-16. This delay line permits normal access to the sample room.

9.3.2.3 S stem Evaluation

The sampling system is designed to provide a means of obtaining samples from the reactor coolant and auxiliary systems for chemical and radiochemical laboratory analysis. Safety features are provided to protect plant personnel and to prevent the spread of contamination from the sampling room when samples are being collected. The system is designed to limit radioactivity releases below the 10 CFR 20 limits under normal and failure conditions. The temperature and pressure of the various samples are reduced to minimize the possibility of local airborne activity. Instrumentation is provided in the sampling room to monitor the temperature and pressure of the samples before they are collected. Samples are normally taken only when the hood fan is operating. The sampling room ventilation system provides a backup means of maintaining the low airborne activity levels. The sample lines penetrating the containment are each equipped with two pneumatically operated isolation valves which close on actuation of the containment isolation signal (CIS). The containment isolation valves in the letdown line also close on CIS thereby stopping, flow from the

9.3-14 chemical and volume control system to the sampling system. The containment isolation valves are also designed to fail closed on loss of air supply. Remote control of these valves is provided to isolate any line failure which might occur outside of the containment. Should any of the remotely operated valves in the sampling system fail to close after a sample has been taken, backup manual valves in the sampling room may be closed. The sample system tubing components and valves are capable of operating at source pressure (~ 2485 psig) and temperature (650F) up to and including the grab sample valves. The sample sink drains to the chemical drain tank. Any leakage from the grab sample valves in the sample sink drains to this tank. The work area around the sink provides adequate space for sample collection and storage. The sink perimeter has a raised edge to contain spilled liquid.

The throttling valves in the sampling system have a limited flow coefficient (C ) range. This range is based on the flow required and the differential head available under all operating conditions. This limits the sample flow rate to the required value and prevents excessively high flow.

9.3.2.4 Testin and Ins ection

The system is inspected and cleaned prior to service. Demineralized water is used,to flush each part of the system. The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow rate, thermal capacity and mechanical operability. Instruments are calibrated during plant hot functional testing. The set points of the relief valves are also checked at this time.

During plant startup the sampling system is hydrostatically tested by opening the valves that connect the reactor coolant system to the sampling s'stem and observing the pressures and temperatures as the heatup continues.

9. 3. 2. 5 Instrument A lication Table 9.3-5 lists the parameters used to monitor the sampling system operation.

9. 3-15 TABLE 9.3-5 SAMPLING SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

System Parameter Indication Alarml. Inst. Normal Inst. n - & Location Control Function Range Operating Accuracy Local Room High'' Low Rec; Ran e Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature 0-400 F 120 F +20 F

Sample Vessel Inlet 0-3000 2250 + 15 Pressure psig psig psig

Sample Vessel Outlet 0-100 0-60 + 0.5 Pressure psig psig psig

Sample Flow 0-3 GPM 0.7 GPM + 0.1 GPM

All alarms and recorders are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. 9.3.3 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM

The equipment and floor drainage system is designed to collect leakage or spillage from equipment located in the containment, reactor auxiliary and fuel handling buildings.

9.3.3.2 S stem Descri tion

The equipment drains inside the containment are routed to the reactor drain tank and the floor drains to the reactor cavity sump. In both cases, the collected drainage is then routed to the waste management system for either reuse storage in the primary water tank or discharged to the discharge canal after sampling depending upon the quality of the water. There are four drain tanks in the reactor auxiliary building: two laundry drain tanks, one chemical drain tank and one equipment drain tank. Table 9.3-6 lists the drains which are routed to each tank.

The ECCS room sumps collect floor and equipment drains from floor el -0.5 ft from some of the drains in adjoining areas. The sumps have automatic level controls for transfer of liquid waste to the equipment drain tank.

The chemical drain sump collects water from the floor drains surrounding the chemical drain tank and pump. This liquid is transferred to the chemical drain tank by the sump pump. Laundry wastes from the service and reactor auxiliary buildings which are not potentially radioactive are routed to the on-site septic tank facility. The laundry drain sump collects potentially radioactive laundry waste from the floor drains in the laundry equipment cavity. The liquid is automatically transferred to the laundry drain tanks by the sump pump. The water in the laundry drain tank is sampled and if activity levels are low, the water is filtered and discharged into the circulating water discharge header. The water in the discharge header (which is made up of laundry, waste condensate and boric acid condensate water) is monitored for radiation. The flow to the circulating water discharge canal is stopped by valve (FCV-6627X, FCV-6627Y) 'closure on high radiation alarm.

The header valve can also be closed from the control room. The chemical and equipment drain tank water is pumped through a filter to the waste concentrator. The water in the drain tanks is sampled at its respective tank pump discharge prior to release. Storm, floor and equipment drains that are not potentially radioactive are routed to a settling basin.

9.3-17 TABLE 9.3-6

DRAINS ROUTED TO DRAIN TANKS

E ui ment Drain Tanks Miscellaneous valve leakoffs Miscellaneous pump leakoffs CVCS equipment drains Safety injection system drains Fuel pool drains Waste management system drains Blowdown tank CVCS ion exchangers Waste management system ion exchangers Fuel pool ion exchangers Preconcentrator ion exchangers Boric Acid condensate ion exchangers Laundr Drain Tank

Hot showers Hot sinks Laundry pumps Laundry drain sump pump Laundry sump

Chemical Drain Tanks

Sample sink Component cooling drains Decontamination room drains Chemical laboratory drains Cask decontamination area drains Fuel handling building sump pump Chemical drain sump pump

9.3-18 9.3.3.3 S stem Evaluation

Floor drains within the reactor auxiliary building are embedded so that leakage from the lines is contained within the building. Equipment and floor drains containing potentially radioactive fluids are made of stainless steel. Non-radioactive drains are galvanized steel above ground and cast iron below ground.

The radiological consequences of effluents from the equipment and floor drainage system are discussed in Chapter ll. A table of sources and volumes of waste are given in Table 11.2-1.

9.3.3.4 Instrumentation A lication The parameters used in equipment and floor drainage system is given in the Waste Management System Instrument Application

9.3-19 9. 3.4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

9.3.4.1 Desi n Bases

The chemical and volume control system is designed to: a) maintain the chemistry and purity of the reactor coolant within the limits specified in Table 9.3-8

b) maintain the required volume of water in the reactor coolant system by compensating for coolant contraction or expansion due to plant step load changes of +10 percent of full power and ramp changes of +5 percent of full power per minute between 15 and 100 percent power and for reactor coolant losses or additions

c) accept out-flow from the reactor coolant system when the reactor coolant is heated at the administrative rate of 75F/hr and to provide the required makeup when the reactor coolant is cooled at the administrative rate of 75F/hr using two charging pumps

d) accommodate the reactor coolant system water inventory change for a full-to-zero power decrease with no makeup system operation and with the volume control tank initially at the normal operating level band

e) inject concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system upon a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) control the boron concentration in the reactor coolant system to obtain optimum control element assembly (CEA) positioning to compensate for reactivity changes associated with large changes in reactor coolant temperature, core burnup, and xenon concentration variations, and to provide shutdown margin for maintenance and refueling operations

g) inject boron in sufficient quantity to counteract the maximum reactivity increase due to cooldown at 75F/hr and xenon decay using one charging pump

h) automatically divert the letdown flow to the waste management system (WMS) when the volume control tank is at the highest permissible level

provide continuous on-line measurement of reactor coolant boron concentration and radioactivity due to fission and corrosion products

assure that the radioactivity due to corrosion and fission products in the reactor coolant system does not exceed Technical Specification limits for an assumed 1 percent failed fuel condition k) provide auxiliary pressurizer spray for operator control of the reactor coolant system pressure during the final stages of shutdown and to allow for the cooling of the pressurizer

9.3-20 collect the controlled bleedoff from the reactor coolant pump seals m) provide a means for functionally testing the check valves which isolate the safety injection system from the reactor coolant system n) leak test the reactor coolant system o) withstand the environmental conditions as presented in Section 3.11 p) withstand the expected transients given in Table 9.3-9 without any adverse effects.

9.3.4.2 S stem Descry tion 9.3.4.2.1 Normal Operation

The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) is shown on the simplified diagram, Figure 9.3-3, and on the piping and instrumentation drawings, Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5. The system parameters are given in Table 9.3-10.

The normal flow path of reactor coolant through the system is indicated by the heavy lines in Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5.

Normal operation includes hot standby operation and power generation when the reactor coolant system is at normal operating pressure and temperature.

Coolant flow from the cold leg in Loop 1Bl of the reactor coolant system passes through the tube side of the regenerative heat exchanger for an initial temperature reduction. The cooled fluid is reduced to the operating pressure of the letdown heat exchanger by one of two letdown control valves (LCV2110P, LCV2110Q). The final reduction to the operating temperature and pressure of the purification system is made by the letdown heat exchanger and one of two letdown backpressure valves (PCV2201P, PCV2201Q). The flow then passes through a prefilter, one of three ion exchangers, a strainer, another filter, an afterfilter, and is sprayed into the volume control tank.

The'charging pumps take suction from the volume control tank and pump the coolant into the reactor coolant system. One charging pump is normally in operation and one letdown control valve is controlled to maintain an exact balance between letdown flow rate plus reactor coolant pump bleedoff flow rate and charging flow rate. The charging flow passes through the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger for recovery of heat from "the letdown flow before being returned to the reactor coolant system. A makeup system provides for changes in reactor coolant boron concentration and for reactor coolant chemistry control. Concentrated boric acid solution, prepared in an electrically heated batching tank, is stored in two boric acid makeup tanks. Two boric acid makeup pumps are used to transfer the concentrated boric acid for mixing with reactor makeup water in a predetermined ratio to produce the desired boron concentration. The controlled boric acid solution is then directed into the volume control tank. A chemical addition tank and metering pump are used to transfer chemical additives to the suction of the charging pumps. Boric acid recovered from t'e waste management system (WMS) boric acid concentrator is returned to the boric acid makeup tanks. The volume of water in the reactor coolant. system is automatically controlled by water level instrumentation mounted on the pressurizer. The pressurizer 9.3-21 level set point is programmed to vary as a function of reactor power in order to minimize the transfer of fluid between the reactor coolant system and the chemical and volume control system during power changes. This linear rela- tionship is shown in Figure 5.5-4. Reactor power is determined by the reactor coolant average temperature across a steam generator. A level error signal is obtained by comparing the programmed level set point with the measured pressurizer water level. Water level control is achieved by automatic control of the constant speed charging pumps and one letdown control valve in accordance with the pressurizer level control program shown in Figure 5.5-5. One letdown control valve is normally controlled by the pressurizer level control program to obtain a letdown flow equal to the charging flow produced by one charging pump minus the total reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff flow. Large changes in pressurizer water level due to power changes or abnormal operations result in automatic operation of one or both of the standby charging pumps and/or modulation of one letdown control valve. The rate of letdown flow is controlled by the letdown control valve which is positioned by the pressurizer level control signal. An automatic system maintains the water level in the volume control tank. The letdown flow is automatically diverted to the waste management system when the highest permissible water level is reached in the volume control tank. The makeup system is normally set to the automatic mode of operation, and a volume control tank low level signal causes a preset solution of concentrated boric acid and reactor makeup water to be introduced into the volume control tank. A low-low level signal automatically closes the outlet valve on the volume control tank and switches the charging pump suction to the refueling water tank.

The boronometer supplements normal chemical analysis and utilizes'the neutron absorptionometry technique to continuously monitor the concentration of the boron-10 isotope in the reactor coolant as sampled from the letdown line. A neutron source is positioned in the center of a cylindrical pressure vessel. Four neutron detectors located concentrically around the outer edge of the pressure vessel produce pulses whose rate varies inversely with the B-10 concentration. The pulse rate signal is integrated to improve statistical, accuracy and passed to a signal generator which produces a signal proportional to boron concentration. This signal is scaled and applied to a front panel meter located in the control room. A portion of the response time of the boronometer is due to the time it takes for coolant to be transported from the reactor coolant system to the instrument. With a letdown rate of 40 gpm, and a flow rate of 1.0 gpm through the process radiation monitor and the boronometer, a response time of about four minutes exists from the reactor coolant system to the boronometer. The time constant of the mixing process within the boronometer is about 15 minutes with a 0.5 gpm flow rate. With an added response time of less than one minute for the instrument electronics, the total system will require about twenty minutes to reach equilibrium following a step change in boron concentration. This system response time is adequate considering the relatively slow rate of boron concentration change in the reactor coolant.

The- accuracy of the boronometer is +25 ppm of the actual boron concentration over the total range of 0 — 2150 ppm. Measured repeatability will be better than +10 ppm throughout the range of expected variations in power supply voltage and environmental conditions. Tests run on a prototype unit in the C-E test facility have verified the accuracy limits specified above.

9.3-22 TABLE 9.3-8 REACTOR COOLANT AND REACTOR MAKEUP WATER CHEMISTRY

Variable Reactor Coolant Reactor Makeu Water During Passivation 0 erational Total solids (ex- cluding Additives), ppm max. 0.5 0.5 0.5 pH at 77F 10.0-10.4 4.5-10.2 6.0-8.0

Chloride, ppm Cl max. 0.15 0.15 0.15

Fluoride, ppm P max+ 0.10 0.10 0.10

Hydrogen as H , scc/kg 0(1) 10-50

Dissolved 02, ppm max. 0.1 0.1 "Deaerated 7 Lithium as Li , ppm 0.1-0.5 Boron as boric acid (3) ppm 0 0-2150

Hydrazine, ppm 30-50

pmhos/cm (5) <2010'4'onductivity, <2

Carbon dioxide (77F) Deaerated

Nitrogen overpressure is used in the CVCS volume control tank during passivation operations to exclude oxygen.

(2) At temperature below 150F, no upper limit on dissolved 02 is specified. (3) Boric acid to be added to the reactor coolant system prior to fuel loading. Following the boric acid addition, hydrazine and ammonia concentrations are reduced to maintain a reactor coolant conductivity of less than 20 pmhos/cm. (4) After preconditioning, hydrazine is added only during subcritical heatup at l-l/2 times the measured oxygen concentration.

(5) Depends on the concentrations of N2H4 and NH3 in the coolant.

9.3-23 TABLE 9.3-9 DESIGN TRANSIENTS Regenerative and Letdown Heat Exchangers

Variation Level Letdown Flow Charging Transient Cycles in 40 Years Initial — Final Rate Initial — Final Flow (GPM) (GPM) RCS Plant Startup 500 70F — 532F 75F/hr 56 — 150 44 Atmos. — 2250 psia in 8.6 hrs 150 — 40 in 3 hrs

Step Power Change 2000 90% — 100% 40 — 90 90 — 40 in 40 min

Step Power Change 2000 100% — 90% — 40 73'3 44 — 30 (88 briefly) in 20 min

Ramp Power Change 15000 15% — 100% 5%/min 40 — 121 44 in 17 min 121 — 40 in 17 min

Ramp Power Change 15000 100% — 15% -5%/min 40 — 30 44-88-132; 30 —40 132-88-44 in 27 min in 20 min

Turbine Trip 400 100% — 0% 40 —30 44-88-132; 30 —40 132-88-44 in 35 min in 15 min

Loss of Lbad 40 100% — 0% 40 —30 44-88-132; 30 - 40 132-88-44 in 35 min in 15 min

Loss of Flow 40 100% — 0% 40 — 30 44-88-132; 30 —40 132-88-44 in 35 min in 15 min TABLE 9.3-9 (Cont.)

~ Variation Level Letdown Flow Charging Transient C cles in 40 Years Initial — Final Rate Initial — Final Flow Loss of 40-30-0 44-132 Secondary Pressure in 12 sec Maximum 1000 40-84-128; 44-88-132; Purification 128-84-40 132-88-44

Low-Low Volume 80 Charging Flow 40 44 Control Tank Tempo Response 120F — 40F in 10 sec

Loss of Charging 100 40 — 0 44-0 0 — 40 0-44

' ~ Loss of Letdown 50 40 — 0 44 0-128-40 25 min after restart

Short Term 400 40 — 0 44-0 Isolation- 0 -40 0-44 Regen. Ht. Exch.

Long Term 800 R.H. Exch. 40 — 0 44-0 Isolation- Temp. 0 — 40 0-44 Regen. Ht. Exch. ? 125F

Plant Cooldown 500 RCS 30 —100 132 532F — 70F in ll hrs 2250 psia-Atmos. 100 —30 132-44 (rapidly) TABLE 9.3-10 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PARAMETERS

Normal letdown and purification flow, gpm 40 Normal charging'flow, gpm 44 Reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff, 4 pumps, gpm Normal letdown temperature from reactor coolant system, F 550 Normal charging temperature to reactor coolant system loop, F 395 Ion exchanger operating temperature, F 120

The boronometer electronics are constructed of modern solid state components in a design utilizing printed circuits. This type of construction has proved to be highly reliable in operation.

The chemistry and purity of the reactor coolant are controlled to ensure the following: a) The plant is accessible for maintenance and operation without excessive radiation exposure to the operating personnel b) Long term operation of the plant is achieved without excessive fouling of heat transfer surfaces c) The corrosion rate of the materials in contact with the reactor coolant is kept at a minimum.

Chemistry control of the reactor coolant consists of removal of oxygen by hydrazine scavenging during startup and reduction of oxygen concentration during power operation by maintaining excess hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant. A chemical addition tank and metering pump are used to transfer hydrazine to the suction side of the charging pumps for injection into the reactor coolant system, while hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant system is controlled by maintaining a hydrogen overpressure in the volume control tank.

During the preoperational test period, 30 to 50 ppm hydrazine is maintained in the reactor coolant whenever the reactor coolant temperature is below 150F. This is done to prevent halide-induced corrosion attack of stainless steel surfaces. which can occur in the presence of significant quantities of dissolved oxygen. During heatup, any dissolved oxygen is scavenged by hydrazine thus eliminating one necessary ingredient for halide-induced corrosion. Elimination of oxygen on heatup also minimizes the potential for general corrosion. At higher temperatures, the hydrazine decomposes, not necessarily completely, producing ammonia and a high pH which aids in ~the development of passive oxide films on reactor coolant system surfaces that minimize corrosion product release. The corrosion rates of Ni-Cr-Fe Alloy-600 and 300 series stainless steels decrease with time when exposed to prescribed reactor coolant chemistry conditions which rates approach low steady state values within approximately 200 days.

By the end of the preoperational test period, any fluorides or chlorides are removed from the system and concentrations in the coolant are maintained at low levels by reactor coolant purification and demineralized makeup water 9.3-26 addition. High hydrazine concentration is not required to inhibit halide- induced corrosion, but hydrazine, added at 1.5 times the oxygen concentration, is still used during heatup to.scavenge oxygen. This assures complete removal of oxygen on heatup while minimizing ammonia and nitrogen generation when hot and at"power. When at power, oxygen is controlled to a very low concentration by maintaining excess dissolved hydrogen in the coolant. The excess hydrogen forces the water decomposition/synthesis reaction in the reactor core to water rather than hydrogen and oxygen. Any oxygen in the makeup water is also removed by this process.

Since operating with a basic pH control agent results in lower general corrosion release rates from the reactor coolant system materials, and because the alkali metal lithium is generated in significant quantities by the core neutron flux through the reaction B10(n,u)Li7> lithium is selected as the pH control agent. The production rate of lithium from this reaction is approximately 100 ppb per day at the beginning of core life and decreases with core lifetime in proportion to the decrease in boron concentration. However, even though lithium is the choice for pH control, there exists a threshold for accelerated attack on zircaloy at approximately 35 ppm lithium and therefore, the lithium concentration limits are specified as 0 to 0.5 ppm to provide a wide margin between the upper operating limit and the threshold for attack in the event any concentrating phenomena exist. Early in core life lithium production is the greatest and periodic removal by ion exchange is required to control the concentration below the upper limit. Late in core life lithium additions may be necessary if lithium concentration is to be held near the upper limit, but this is not considered essential as indicated by the lower lithium concentration limit of zero. Lithium is removed along with cesium by intermittent operation on'n ion exchanger while a second ion exchanger is operated continuously for the removal of fission and corrosion products. The resin beds remove soluble nuclides by the ion exchange mechanism. Insoluble particles are removed by the impingement of these particles on the surface of the resin beads. A cartridge type prefilter, located upstream of the ion exchangers, removes insoluble articles. A strainer downstream of the ion exchangers protects against the gross release of resin to the coolant in the event of an ion exchanger retention element failure.

The boron concentration is contr'oiled to obtain optimum CEA positioning to compensate for reactivity changes associated with changes in coolant temperature, core burnup, xenon concentration variations and,to provide shutdown margin for maintenance and refueling operations or emergencies. The normal method of adjusting boron concentration is by the technique of feed and bleed. To change concentration, the makeup system supplies either reactor makeup water or concentrated boric acid to the volume control tank, and the letdown stream is diverted to the waste management system. Toward the end of a core cycle, the quantities of waste produced due to feed and bleed operations become excessive due to the low boron concentration and the deborating ion exchanger is used to reduce the reactor coolant system boron concentration. The deboration ion exchanger uses an anion resin which is converted to a borate form as boron is removed from the bleed stream.

Two boric acid makeup tanks and two boric acid pumps supply boric acid to the reactor coolant system via the volume control tank and charging pumps. There are four modes of makeup system operation. In, the dilute mode, a preset

9 '-27 quantity of reactor makeup water is added into the volume control tank at a preset rate. In the borate mode, a preset quantity of concentrated boric acid is introduced at a preset rate. In the manual mode, the flow rates of the reactor makeup water and the concentrated boric acid are preset manually to give any boric acid solution between zero and concentrated boric acid. This latter mode is primarily used for makeup and filling the safety injection tanks and the refueling water tank. In the automatic mode, a preset boric acid solution is automatically mixed and introduced into the volume control tank upon demand from the volume control tank level program. The preset solution concentration is adjusted periodically by the operator to match the boric acid concentration being maintained in the reactor coolant system.

The location numbers on the chemical and volume control system P6ID, Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5, indicate the process flow reference points in the system. Table 9.3-11 is a tabulation of the process flow data for the three modes of purification loop operation and six modes of makeup system operation using these numbers as reference points. Basically, a letdown flow of 40 gpm is normal purification operation, a letdown flow of 84 gpm is intermediate puri-. fication operation and a letdown flow of 128 gpm is maximum purification operation. Typical operating conditions are given for the various makeup system operating modes.

9.3.4.2.2 Components

The major components of the CVCS are described below: a) Re enerative heat exchan er- The regenerative heat exchanger located in the containment above floor elevation 16.0 feet conserves reactor coolant system thermal energy by transferring heat from the letdown stream to the charging stream. The heat exchanger is designed to maintain a letdown outlet temperature below 450F under all normal operating conditions. The design characteristics of the regenerative heat exchanger are given in Table 9.3-12. b) Letdown heat exchan er- The letdown heat exchanger located in the auxiliary building on floor elevation 19.5 feet uses component cooling ~ater to cool the letdown flow from the outlet temperature of the regenerative heat exchanger to a temperature compatible with long term operation of the purification system ion exchangers. The unit is sized to 'cool the maximum letdown flow rate from the maximum outlet temperature of the regenerative heat exchanger (450F). To prevent possible damage to the heat exchanger by excessive component cooling water flow the flow control valves are preset to limit the flow to 1500 GPM maximum. The cooling water flow rate is indicated and alarmed on high flow in the control room. The design characteristics of the letdown heat exchanger are given in Table 9.3-13. c) Purification filters— Purification filter lA located in the auxiliary building on floor elevation 19.5 feet removes insoluble particulates from the reactor coolant prior to entering the ion exchanger.(5) Purification Filter 1B downstream of the ion exchangers and strainer, is the same as Filter 1A and.serves to retain any resin fines that may be released from the ion exchangers. The unit is designed to pass the maximum letdown flow without exceeding the allowable differential pressure across

9.3-28 the filter cartridge in the maximum fouled condition. Due to the buildup of high activity levels during normal operation,'he unit is designed for remote removal of the contaminated cartridge assembly. The design characteristics of the filters are given in Table 9.3-14.

Purification and deboratin ion exchan ers- The two mixed bed purification ion exchangers are each sized for the maximum letdown flow rate. One purification ion exchanger is used intermittently to control the lithium and cesium concentration in the reactor coolant system and the other for normal constant operation. The units contain both anion and cation resins in a 3/1 ratio and both ion exchangers are provided with all connections required to replace and mix the resins by liquid and air sluicing. The deborating ion exchanger is identical to the purification ion exchangers in size and construction and is sized to contain sufficient anion resin to control the reactor coolant system boron concentration from 30 ppm to the end of core cycle. The design characteristics of the ion exchangers are given in Table 9.3-15. The three ion exchangers are located in auxiliary building on floor elevation 19.5 feet. 'he

9.3-29 TABLE 9.3-11

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA

CVCS NORMAL PURIFICATION OPERATION One Charging Pump in Operation

CVCS Location: 1 '2 4 5 6 7 7a- 7b

Flow, gpm 40 40 40 40 40 39 1 1/2 1/2 40 40 Press., psig 2110 2090 465 460 25 22 25 24 24 21 20 Temp., F 550 262 262 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 '20

CVCS INTERMEDIATE PURIFICATION OPERATION Two Charging Pumps in Operation ' CVCS Location 1 2 3 4 5 7 7a 7b

Flow, gpm 84 84 84 84 84 83 1 1/2 1/2 84 84 Press., psig 2075 2005 475 460 43 40 43 42 42 38 35 Tempep F 550 334 334 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120

CVCS MAXIMUMPURIFICATION OPERATION Three Charging Pumps in Operation

CVCS Location: 1 2 4 5 6 7 7a 7b

Flow, gpm 128 128 128 128 128 127 1 3/4 3/4 128 128 Press., psig 1995 1785 495 460, 75 68 75 74 74 64 57 Temp, F 550 375 375 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120

NOTES: The pressure drop across the purification prefilter, afterfilter, and ion exchanger varies with loading. The pressure drops shown are typical. The pressure in the volume control tank varies and affects the pressures at locations 5 through 11 and 14a through 14g proportionally. CVCS location numbers are shown on Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5. TABLE 9.3-11 (Cont.)

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA

CVCS NORMAL PURIFICATION OPERATION One Charging Pump in Operation

CVCS Location: 10 10a 10b 10c ll 12 13 14 14e 14f 14g (a,b,c,d)

Flow gpm 40 40 40 44 44 44 44 1 0 4 Press., psig 19 18 15 15 15 2235 2225 100 100 100 16 Temp, F 120 120 120 120 120 120 395 120 120 120 120

CVCS INTERMEDIATE PURIFICATION OPERATION Two Charging Pumps in Operation

CVCS Location: 10 10a 10b 10c ll 12 13 14 14e 14f 14g (a,b,c,d)

Flow, gpm 84 84 84 88 88 88 88 1 0 4 , 4 Press., psig 33 30 15 15 15 2280 2255 100 100 100 16 Temp., F 120 120 120 120 120 120 340 120 120 120 120

CVCS MAXIMUMPURIFICATION OPERATION Three Charging Pumps in Operation

CVCS Location: 10 10a 10b 10c 11 12 13 14 14e 14f 14g (a,b,c,d)

Flow, gpm 128 128 128 132 132 132 1 0 4 press., psig 54 47 15 15 2385 2335 100 100 100 16 Temp~s F 120 120 120 120 120 120 310 120 120 120 120

NOTES The pressure drop across the purification prefilter, afterfilter, and ion exchanger varies with loading. The pressure drops shown are typical. The pressure in the volume control tank varies and affects the pressures at locations 5 through ll and 14a through 14g proportionally. CVCS location numbers are shown on Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5. TABLE 9.3-11 (Cont) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOH DATA

CVCS MAKEUP — SYSTEM OPERATION AUTOMATIC MODE Blended Boric Acid Concentration= 925 ppm

CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 - 22 23 24 25 26 27 =-28 29 30 31 32

Flow, gpm 174 174 10 10 0 10 140 140 150 0 0 0 164 154 10 10 0 0 Press., psig 7 91 91 86 15 20 140 20 20 12 91 15 91 91 91 20 7 7 Temp F p 140 140 140 140 160 140 60 60 65 70 160 160 140 140 140 140 160 160

CVCS MAKEJP SYSTEM OPERATION — BORATE MODE Three Charging Pumps Operating

CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30. 31 32

Flow, gpm 180 180 16 I 16 0 16 0 0 16 0 0 0 164 154 10 10 0 0 7 Press., psig 90 90 76 15 20 165 20 , 20 12 90 15 90 90 90 20 7 7 Temp,~ F 140 140 140 140 160 140 60 60 140 70 140 160 140 140 140 140 160 160

CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION — DILUTE MODE Three Charging Pumps Operating

CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Flow, gpm 160 160 0 0 0 0 128 128 128 0 0 0 160 150 10 10 0 0 Press., psig 7 88 88 88 15 20 142 20 20 12 88 15 88 88 88 20 7 7 Temp., F 140 140 160 160 160 160 60 60 60 70 160 160 140 140 140 140 160 160

NOTES: The date shown for the various modes of operation is typical. The pressure in the isolated piping of the CVCS makeup system will normally be 0 psig but may range as high as 140 psig before the relief valve lifts. CVCS location numbers are shown on Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5. TABLE 9.3-11 (Cont.)

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA

CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION — MANUAL MODE Blended Boric Acid Concentration = 2300 ppm

CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Flow, gpm 174 174 10 10 0 10 50 50 60 0 0 0 164 154 10 10 0 0 Press., 7 . psig 91 91 86 15 20 155 20 20 12 91 15 91 91 91 20 7 7 Temp F ~ 140 140 140 3.40 160 140 60 60 75 70 160 160 140 140 140 140 160 160

CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM — OPERATION EMERGENCY BORATION (SIAS) Via boric acid makeup pump and one pump is operating Three charging pumps operating Two boric acid makeup pumps operating CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Flow, gpm 142 142 132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 132 132 10 0 10 10 Press., 0 0 psig 7 97 97 97 97 15 165 15 15 12 97 92 97 97 97 20 7 7 F Temp., 140 140 140 160 160 160 60 60 160 70 140 140 140 160 140 140 160 160

I CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION — EMERGENCY BORATION (SIAS) Via Gravity Feed

CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 . 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Flow, gpm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 66 66 Press., 7 psig 7 7 7 5 15 165 15 15 12 7 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 Temp., F 160 160 160 160 160 160 60 60 160 70 160 160 160 160 160 160 140 140

CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION — SHUTDOWN BORATION

CVCS Location: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Flow, gpm 180 180 16 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 16 16 164 154 10 10 0 0 7 Press., psig 90 90 90 90 15 165 15 15 12 90 89 90 90 90 90 7 7 Temp F p 140 140 140 160 160 160 60 60 160 70 140 140 140 140 140 140 160 160 NOTES The data shown for the various modes of operation is typical. The pressure in the isolated piping of the CVCS makeup system will normally be 0 psig but may range as high as 140 psig before the thermal relief valves lift. CVCS location numbers are shown on Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5. TABLE 9.3-12 REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER DESIGN DATA

1) Desi n Parameters

Quantity 1 Type Shell and Tube, Vertical Code ASME Section III Class C, Terna-R Tube side- letdown Fluid Reactor Coolant, 1 wt % Boric Acid Maximum Design pressure, psig 2485 Design temperature, F 650 Materials Stainless Steel, Type 304 Pressure loss at 128 gpm, psi 99 Normal flow, gpm 40 Design flow, gpm 128 Shell Side- Charging Fluid Reactor Coolant, 12 wt % Boric Acid Maximum Design pressure, psig 3025 Design temperature, F„ 650 Materials Shell ASME SA-182, F 304 Tubes ASME SA-213, TP 304 Baffles ASME SA-240, TP 304 Tube Sheet ASME SA-182, F 304 Channel ASME SA-312, TP 304 Pressure loss at 132 gpm, psi 45 Normal flow, gpm 44 Design flow, gpm 132

2) 0 eratin Parameters

Minimum Letdown/ Maximum Letdown/ Maximum Letdown/ Tube Side —Letdown Normal Maximum Char in Maximum Char in Minimum Char in

Flow — gpm 8 120F 40 30 128 128 Inlet Temp. — F 550 550 550 550 Outlet Temp. — F 262" 165 375 450 Shell Side — Charging

Flow — gpm 8 120F 44 132 132 44 Inlet Temp. — F 120 120 120 120 Outlet Temp. —F 395 212 310 452

9.3-34 TABLE 9.3-13 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER DESIGN DATA

1) Desi n Parameters

Quantity 1 Type Shell and Tube Horizontal Tube side- letdown Code TEMA-R And ASME Section III, Class C Fluid Reactor Coolant, 1 wt % Boric Acid Maximum Design pressure, psig 650 Design temperature, F 550 Pressure loss at 128 gpm psi 50 Normal flow, gpm 40 Design, 128

gpm'aterials Shell ASME SA-53 Carbon Steel Tubes ASME SA-213, Type 304 Cover ASME SA-3.06 Gr B, Carbon Steel Tubesheet ASME SA-182, F 304 Channel ASME SA-240, Type 304 Shell Side- cooling water Code TEMA-R and ASME Section VIII Fluid Component Cooling Water Design pressure, psig 150 Design Temperature, F 250 Materials Carbon Steel Normal flow, gpm 157 Design flow, gpm 1200

2) 0 cretin Parameters

Minimum Letdown/ Maximum Letdown/ Maximum Letdown/ Tube Side- Letdown Normal Maximum Char in Maximum Char in Minimum Char in

Flow — gpm 8120F 40 30 128 218 Inlet Temp, F 262 165 375 450 Outlet Temp, F 120 120 128 128 Shell Side (Cooling Watei)

Flow — gpm 8120F 157 21 1200 1200 Inlet Temp, F 95 65 95 95 Outlet Temp, F 131 130 121 130

9.3-35 TABLE 9. 3-14 PURIFICATION FILTERS DESIGN DATA

Quantity 2 Type elements Wound (Tag 1A and 1B) Cartridges Retention for 2 micron and larger particles, % by wt 95 Normal operating temperature, F 120'00 Design pressure, psig Maximum allowable pressure loss clean,;psi 8 128 gpm Maximum allowable pressure Loss, loaded, psi at 128 gpm 35 Design temperature, F 250 Design flow, gpm 128 Normal flow, gpm 40 Code ASME III, 1968 Edition through Winter 1969 Addenda Class C Materials, wetted SA-240 Type 304 Stainless Steel Fluid, wt % boric acid, maximum 1

TABLE 9.3-15 PURIFICATION AND DEBORATING ION EXCHANGERS DESIGN DATA

Quantity 2 purification, 1 deborating Type Flushable Design pressure, psig 200 Design tern'perature, F 250 Normal operating temperature, F 120 Resin volume, ft each (total) 36. 2 Resin volume, ft each (useful) 32.0 Normal flow, gpm 40 Maximum flow, gpm 128 Code for vessel ASME ll III, 1968 Edition, Winter 1969 Addenda, Class C Retention screen size 80 U. S. Mesh Material. Stainless Steel, SA-240, Type 304 Fluid, wt % boric acid, maximum 1 Resin type Cation/anion mixed bed for purification, anion bed for deborating

9.3-36 Volume Control Tank—

The volume control tank, located in the reactor auxiliary building on floor elevation 19.5 ft, accumulates letdown water from the reactor coolant system to maintain the desired hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant, and to provide a reservoir of reactor coolant for the charging pumps. The tank is sized to store sufficient liquid volume below the normal operating band to allow a swing from full power to zero power without makeup to the volume control tank and such that sufficient useful volume is above the normal operating band to permit the accumulation of approximately 500 gallons of water during dilution operations. The accumulated water is normally sufficient to pr'ovide normal plant leakage makeup between dilution operations. The tank is provided with hydrogen and nitrogen gas supplies and a vent to the waste management system to enable venting of hydrogen, nitrogen and fission gases. The volume control tank is initially purged with nitrogen and a hydrogen overpressure is established. The design characteristics of the volume control tank are given in Table 9.3-16.

TABLE 9.3-16 VOLUME CONTROL TANK DESIGN DATA

Quantity 1 Type Vertical, Cylindrical Internal volume, gallons 4700 Design pressure, internal, psig 75 Design pressure, external, psig 15 Design Temperature, F 250 Normal operating pressure, psig 15 Normal operating temperature, F 120 Normal spray flow, gpm 40 Blanket gas — during plant operation Hydrogen Code ASME III, Class C Fluid, wt % boric acid, maximum 12 Material ASME SA-240 Type 304

N The charging pumps, located in the reactor auxiliary building on floor elevation -0.50 ft, take suction from the volume control tank on the floor level above and return the purification flow to the reactor coolant system during plant steady state operations. Normally one pump is running to balance the letdown purification flow rate plus the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff flow rate. The second and third pumps are automatically started or stopped as pressurizer level decreases or increases due to plant load transients. The pumps are positive displacement type with an integral leakage collection system. Vent, drain and flushing connections are provided to minimize radiation levels during maintenance operations. The pressure containing portions of the pump and internals are austenitic stainless steel materials for compatibility with boric acid. The pump design characteristics are given in Table 9.3-17.

9.3-37 TABLE 9.3-17 CHARGING Pl&6'S DESIGN DATA

Quantity 3 Type Positive Displacement, Triplex Design pressure, psig 2735 .Design temperature, F 250 Capacity, gpm 44 Normal discharge pressure, psig 2300 Normal suction piessure, psig 15 to 20 Normal temperature of pumped fluid, F 120 NPSH required, psia 9.0 Driver rating, hp 100 Materials in contact with pumped fluid SA-182, F 316 Fluid, wt % boric acid, maximum 12 l Boric Acid Makeu Tanks— / Two boric acid makeup tanks, located between reactor auxiliary building floor levels —.50 ft and 19.5 ft, provide a source of boric acid solution (7.9 weight percent minimum) for injection into the reactor coolant system.I Each tank is insulated and has redundant strap-on electrical heaters. Each tank is capable of storing boric acid in concentrations up to 12 weight percent. Each tank contains sufficient boric acid below the normal makeup band to bring the plant to a cold 5 percent Ap subcritical shutdown condition. The total volume of both tanks is sufficient to bring the reactor coolant system to refueling concentration, >1720 ppm boron, before initiation of a cooldown for refueling. The tanks have a combined volume to provide for the complete recovery of the boric acid in the reactor coolant at beginning of life as concentrated 7.9 weight percent boric acid. The design characteristics of the tanks are given in Table 9.3-18.

TABLE 9.3-18 BORIC ACID MAKEUP TANKS DESIGN DATA

Quantity 2 Volume, gal each 11,200 Design pressure, psig 15 Design temperature, F 200 Normal operating temperature, F 160 Type heater 6 Electrical Strap-on Heaters, 2.25 kw Total each (2 banks of 3 each) Fluid, wt % boric acid, maximum 8.25 Material ASME SA-240 Type 304 Code ASME III, Class C Boric Acid Batchin Tank—

I The boric acid batching tank, located on reactor auxiliary building floor level 43.0 ft, and above the boric acid makeup tanks, is used for the preparation of concentrated boric acid which is batch gravity drained to the makeup tanks. The tank is designed to permit handling of up to 12

9.3-38 we'ight percent boric acid. The tank is heated and insulated and supplies demineralized water for mixing the boric acid solution. Sampling provisions, mixer, temperature controller and electric immersion heaters are an integral part of the hatching system. The design characteristics of the tanks are given in Table 9.3-19.

TABLE 9.3-19 BORIC ACID BATCHING TANK DESIGN DATA

Quantity 1 Internal volume, gal 550 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, F 200 Normal operating temperature, F 160 Type heater Electrical Immersion Number of heaters 3, Heater capacity, kw each 15 Fluid, wt % boric acid maximum 12 Material ASME SA-240 Type 304 Code None

Boric Acid Makeu Pum s—

fI The boric acid makeup pumps, located in the auxiliary building on the floor at elevation -0.5 feet, take suction from the overhead boric acid makeup tanks and provide boric acid to the makeup subsystem and to the charging pump suction header. The capacity of each pump is greater than the combined capacity of all three charging pumps.. The boric acid makeup pumps are also used to recirculate makeup tank contents, to pump from one makeup tank to the other, and to supply makeup to the refueling water tank. The pumps are single stage centrifugal pumps with mechanical seals and liquid and vapor leakage collection connections. The pumps are heat traced and insulated. The design characteristics of the pumps are given in Table 9.3-20.

TABLE 9.3-20 BORIC ACID MAKEUP PUMPS DESIGN DATA

Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal, Horizontal Design pressure, psig 150 Design temperature, F 250 Design head, ft 225 Design flow, gpm 142 Normal operating temperature, F 150 NPSH required, ft 8 Motor horsepower 25 Motor voltage/phase/Hz 440/3/60 Fluid, wt % boric acid, maximum 12 Material in contact with liquid Austenitic Stainless Steel Code Draft ASME Code for Pumps and I Valves for Nuclear Power, November 1968, Class 2

9. 3-39 Chemical Addition Tank and Meterin Pum

The chemical addition tank and metering pump, both located on reactor auxiliary building floor elevation-19.5 ft, provide a means to inject chemicals into the charging pump suction header. Reactor makeup water is supplied for chemical dilution and flushing operations. The design characteristics of the tank are given in Table 9.3-21. The tank size and pump capacity are based on the maximum service requirement of hydrazine injection for oxygen scavenging on plant startup. The design characteristics of the metering pump are given in Table 9.3-22.

TABLE 9.3-21 CHEMICAL ADDITION TANK DESIGN DATA

Quantity 1 Internal volume, gals 12 Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature, F 250 Normal operating temperature Ambient Materials Austenitic Stainless Steel Code None

TABLE 9.3-22 METERING PUMP DESIGN DATA

Quantity 1 Type Piston-diaphragm Design pressure, psi 150 Design Temperature, F 150 Design flow, gph 0-40 Normal discharge pressure, psig 15.0 Fluid Hydrazine (N H ) or Lithium Hydroxide Horsepower 1/2 Diaphragm material Teflon Code None Process Radiation Monitor (R-2202) The process radiation monitor described in Section 11.4, is in the 1/2 inch line bypassing purification filter 1A, provides a continuous recording in the control room of reactor coolant gross gamma radiation and specific fission product gamma activity. A high alarm indicates an increase in coolant activity above the setpoint within 5 minutes of the event. The design characteristics of the pressure boundary of the monitor are given in Table 9.3-23.

9 '-40 TABLE 9.3-23 PROCESS RADIATION MONITOR DESIGN DATA

Quantity 1 Type Gamma scintillation Design pressure, psig 200 Design temperature, F 250 Normal operating temperature, F 120 Normal flow rate, gpm 0.5 Measurement range, pCi/cc, I-135 10 to 10 Code ASME III, Class C Boronometer (A-2203)

The boronometer, described in Section 7.5.14 is in a 1/2 inch pipe line in parallel with the process radiation monitor, and provides a continuous recording in the control room of reactor coolant boron concentration. Periodically adjusted high and low alarms warn the operator of deviations beyond the alarm set point. The principal of 'operation is neutron absorption. i'he unit is provided with shielding as required to limit external radiation level from its PuBe source to a low value. All portions of the unit that contact reactor coolant are constructed of austenitic stainless steel. The design characteristics of the boronometer pressure boundary are given in Table 9.3-24.

TABLE 9.3-24 BORONOMETER DESIGN DATA

Quantity 1 Vessel design temperature, F 250 Vessel design pressure, psig 200 Normal operating temperature, F 120 Normal flow rate, gpm 0.5 Range of measurement, boron, ppm 0-2150 Accuracy, ppm +25 Code for vessel ASME III, Class C, 1968 Edition through Winter 1969 Addenda Size, inlet and outlet, in 1/2 flanged Relief Valves

To "assure safe operation of the CVCS overpressure protection is provided by relief valves throughout the system. The following is a description of the relief valves in the system. 1) Intermediate ressure letdown relief valve V-2345 The relief valve downstream of the letdown control valves protects the intermediate pressure letdown piping and letdown heat exchanger from overpressure. The .valve capacity is equal to the capacity of one letdown control valve in the wide open position during normal operation. The other letdown control valve must be closed and isolated before plant pressure exceeds 1500 psig as required by Technical Specification 16.3.2. The relief valve set 9.3-41 pressure is equal to the design pressure (650 psig) of the intermediate pressure letdown piping and letdown heat exchanger. Low- ressure letdown relief valve V-2354

The relief valve downstream of the letdown backpressure control valves protects the low pressure piping, purification filters, ion exchangers and letdown strainer from overpressure. The valve capacity is equal to capacity of intermediate pressure letdown relief valve V-2345. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure (200 psig) of the low pressure piping and components.

Char in um dischar e relief valves U-2324 U-2325 U-2326

The relief valves on the discharge side of the charging pumps are sized to pass the maximum rated flow of the associated pump with maximum backpressure without exceeding the maximum rated total head for the pump assembly. The valves are set to open when the discharge pressure exceeds the reactor coolant system design pressure (2485) by 10 percent.

Char in um suction relief valves V-2315 V-2318 V-2321

The relief valves on the suction side of the charging pumps are sized to pass the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate that would occur if the pump were operated with the suction and discharge isolation valves closed. The set pressure is less than design pressure of charging pump suction piping. Char in line thermal relief valve V-2435 The relief valve on the charging line downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger is sized to relieve the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate that would occur if hot letdown flow continued after charging flow was stopped by closing the charging line distribution valves. The valve is a spring-loaded check valve. Volume control tank relief valve V-2115 The relief valve on the volume control tank is sized to pass a liquid flow rate equal to the sum of the following flow rates: the maximum operating flow rate from the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff line; the maximum letdown flow rate possible without actuating the high flow alarm on the letdown flow indicator; the design purge flow rate of the sampling system; and the maximum flow rate that the boric acid makeup system can produce with relief pressure in the volume control tank. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the volume control tank.

Reactor makeu water relief valve V-2185

The relief valve on the reactor makeup water line is sized to pass the maximum capacity of the reactor makeup water pumps with the volume control tank pressure at its design value. The set pressure is less than the volume control tank design pressure

9.3-42 (75 psig) to ensure that the valve will open before the volume control tank relief valve opens.

8) Volume control tank as su 1 relief valve V-2105

The relief valve is sized to exceed the combined maximum capacity of the nitrogen and hydrogen gas regulators. The set pressure is lower than the volume control tank design pressure.

9) Reactor coolant um controlled bleedoff header relief valve V-2199

The relief valve at the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff header allows the controlled bleedoff flow to continue to the quench tank in the event that a valve in the line to the volume control tank is closed and does not serve an overpressure protection function. The valve is sized to pass the flow rate required to assure closure of one excess flow check valve in the event of failure of the seals in one reactor coolant pump plus the normal bleedoff from the other reactor coolant pumps. The maximum relief valve opening pressure is less than the controlled bleedoff high-high pressure alarm. 10) Heat traced i in thermal relief valves Relief valves are provided for those portions of the boric acid system that are heat traced and which can be individually isolated. The set pressure is equal to or less than the design pressure of the system piping. Each valve is sized to relieve the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate that could occur if maximum duplicate heat tracing power were inadvertently applied to the isolated line. Pi in and valves—

The piping of the chemical and volume control system is austenitic stainless steel. The cooling water side of the letdown heat exchanger is carbon steel. All piping is in accordance with the code for pr'essure piping of the USA Standard, USASI-B31.1, or B31.7, as applicable.

All valves except the diaphragm type have backseats to limit stem leakage when in the open position. Diaphragm-type valves are used to prevent radioactive gas leakage from the volume control tank and also for resin sluicing operations for the ion exchangers. Manually operated valves for radioactive service with nominal sizes larger than two inches are provided with a double-packed stem and intermediate lantern ring with a leakoff connection. All actuator operated valves for liquid service have stem leakoffs. Electrical Heaters—

Electrical heat tracing is installed in duplicate on all piping, valves, pumps and other line-mounted components that may potentially contain concentrated boric acid solution for a significant period of time. The heat tracing is designed to prevent precipitation of boric acid due to cooling. The portions of the system that are heat traced are indicated on the piping and instrumentation diagrams, Figures 9.3-4 and 9.3-5. 9.3-43 The heat tracing is designed to maintain the fluid temperature of the traced components at 160+5F with insulation designed as described below. This criterion assures that the boric acid will be at least 25F above the saturation temperature for 12 weight percent boric acid solution.

Two independent full capacity strap-on-type heater banks are installed on each boric acid makeup tank. The heaters are sized to compensate for heat loss through the tank insulation to the surroundings when the tank is filled to its maximum operating level with boric acid at its maximum temperature. Each heater bank is operated by an independent controller. The batching tank is provided with corrosion resistant electrical immersion heaters. The heaters are sized to supply sufficient heat in 6 hours to increase the temperature of 500 gallons of 12 weight percent boric solution from 40F to 160F including the heat of solution required to dis'solve the boric acid granules. The boric acid is not added to the tank until the demineralized water temperature exceeds the final saturation temperat re by at least 20F.

p) Thermal Insulation Thermal insulation protects personnel from contact with high temperature piping, valves, and components. Equipment and sections of the system that are insulated are the regenerative heat exchanger, the charging and auxiliary spray lines downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger and the letdown line from the reactor coolant loop to the letdown heat exchanger. Thermal insulation on these sections is designed to limit the insulation surface temperature to 140F based on ambient temperature of 80F and the maximum expected piping and component temperature. Electrically heat traced piping, valves, pumps, and other components are insulated to limit the insulation surface temperature to 120F based on an ambient temperature of 80F and a component temperature of 160F. Thermal insulation on the batching tank is designed to limit heat losses to 15.0 Btu/hr-ft2 based on a tank temperature of 160F and an ambient temperature of 70F. Thermal insulation with ion chloride content that does not cause chloride stress corrosion or that contains a chloride stress corrosion inhibitor is used on all stainless steel surfaces and on any insulated surfaces adjacent to stainless steel surfaces where moisture from that insulation could reach the stainless steel. 9.3.4.2.3 Plant Startup

Plant startup is the series of operations which bring the plant from a cold shutdown condition to a hot standby condition at normal operating pressure and zero power temperature with the reactor critical at a low power level. The charging pumps and letdown backpressure valves are used during initial phases of reactor coolant system heatup to maintain the reactor coolant system pressure until the pressurizer steam bubble is established. One charging pump will normally operate during plant startup to cool the letdown fluid to maintain design pressure and temperature limits in the letdown portion of the system.,

9,3 44 During the heatup, the pressurizer water level is controlled manually using the backpressure control valves and the letdown control valves. The letdown flow is automatically diverted to the waste management system when the high level limit is reached in the volume control tank.

The reactor coolant system boron concentration may be reduced during heatup in accordance with shutdown margin limitations. The shutdown group of control rods must be in the fully withdrawn position before any dilution of reactor coolant system boron concentration is started. The makeup controller is operated in the dilute mode to inject a predetermined amount of reactor makeup water at a preset rate. Compliance with the shutdown margin limitations is verified by sample analysis and boronometer ndication. Technical Specification 16.3.2 has been set to define those conditions of the CVCS necessary to assure safe reactor operation and shutdown.

9.3.4.2.4 Normal Operation

Normal operation includes hot standby operation and power generation when the reactor coolant system is at normal operating pressure and temperature.

9.3.4.2.5 Plant Shutdown

Plant shutdown is accomplished by a series of operations which bring the reactor plant from a hot standby condition at normal operating pressure and zero power temperature to a cold shutdown for maintenance or refueling.

Prior to plant cooldown, the gas space of the volume control tank is vented to the flash tank to reduce dissolved hydrogen concentration and fission gas activity. The purification rate may be increased to accelerate the degasification, ion exchange and filtration processes. Addition of chemicals is not normally required during plant shutdown. The boron concentration in the reactor coolant is increased to the cold shutdown value prior to the cooldown of the plant. This is done to assure sufficient shutdown margin throughout the cooldown period. However, the. shutdown group of CEA's is not inserted into the core until t'e cooldown is completed and the correct boron concentration in the reactor coolant is verified by sample analysis.

During the cooldown, the charging pumps, letdown control valves, and letdown backpressure valves are used to adjust and maintain the pressurizer water level. High charging flow results in a low level in the volume control tank which initiates automatic makeup at the selected shutdown boron concentration. Xf the shutdown is for refueling, which requires a higher boron concentration than the cold shutdown value, the suction of the charging pumps is connected to the refueling water tanks during plant cooldown. This is required because the automatic blending line from the boron system cannot supply the refueling boron concentration at maximum charging flow. All or a portion of the charging flow may be used for auxiliary spray to cool the pressurizer if the reactor coolant system pressure is below that allowable for reactor coolant pump operation.

9.3-44a 9.3.4.3 ) S stem Evaluation

9.3.4.3.1 „ Performance Requirements and Capabilities

The normal amount of boric acid stored solution in either of the boric acid makeup tanks is sufficient to bring the plant to a 5 percent Ap subcritical cold shutdown condition at any time during plant life. The refueling water tank is a redundant source of borated water.

The charging pumps are used to inject concentrated boric acid into the reactor coolant system. With one pump normally in operation, the other charging pumps are automatically started by the pressurizer level control or by the safety in)ection actuation signal (SIAS). The safety injection actuation signal, also causes the charging pump suction to be switched from the volume control tank to the boric acid pump discharge. Should the pumped boric acid supply be unavailable, the charging pumps are also lined up for gravity feed from the boric acid makeup tanks..- Should the charging line inside the reactor containment building be inoperative for any reason, the line may be isolated outside of the reactor containment, and the charging flow may be injected via the safety injection system. The malfunction or failure of one active component does not reduce .the ability to borate the reactor coolant system since an alternate flow path is always available for emergency boration.

If the letdown temperature exceeds the, maximum operating temperature of the resin in the ion exchangers (140F) the flow will automatically bypass the ion exchangers, the process radiation monitor, and the boronometer.

The charging pumps, boric acid makeup pumps, boric acid makeup tank heaters and'll related automatic control valves are connected to'n emergency bus should the normal power supply system fail. There are two emergency diesel generator sets available for this service and the components are aligned to the diesels as designated below:

~tom anent Diesel A Diesel B

Charging Pump No. 1A and seal system Charging Pump No. 1B and seal system X Charging Pump No. 1C and seal system swing bus Boric acid makeup pump No. 1A X Boric acid makeup pump No. 1B X

Boric acid gravity feed valve V-2508 . X Boric acid gravity feed valve V-2509 X Boric acid makeup tank No. 1A heater No. 1 X Boric acid makeup tank No. 1A heater No. 2 Boric acid makeup tank No. 1B heater No. 1 Boric acid makeup tank No. 1B heater No. 2 X Heat tracing system No. 1A X Heat tracing system No. 1B Boric acid makeup pump supply valve V-2514 Volume control tank discharge valve V-2501 X Letdown stop valve V-2515 X Letdown stop valve V-2516 Controlled bleedoff stop valve V-2505 Boric acid recirculation valve V-2510 X Boric acid reci'rculation valve V-2511 X Boric acid makeup stop valve V-2512

9.3-45 The boric acid solution is stored in heated and insulated tanks, and is piped in heat-traced and insulated lines to preclude precipitation of the boric acid. Two independent and redundant heating systems are provided for the boric acid tanks and p'iping. Automatic temperature controls and independent alarm circuits are included in the heating system.

The heat tracing is appropriately sectionalized taking into account system redundancy requirements and components that may be removed from the system for maintenance. Each heat tracing section has a duplicate full capacity set of heater elements and controls. An independent alarm system is provided with temperature sensors appropriately spaced within each section to detect a malfunction of the operating heat tracing anywhere within that section. Each sensor is annunciated separately on a local panel. A malfunction anywhere in the heat tracing annunciates an alarm in the control room. In the event of a malfunction, switchover to the redundant heat tracing for the affected section is done manually. The separate alarm system provides annunciation at the control room in the event of loss of electric power to the heat tracing. Frequently used, manually operated valves located in high radiation or inaccessible areas are provided with extension stem handwheels terminating in low radiation and accessible control areas. Manually operated valves are provided with locking provisions if unauthorized operation of the valve is considered a potential hazard to plant operation or personnel safety.

Leakage can be detected by the gamma sensitive area radiation monitors which are located in strategic areas throughout the plant. The gamma flux level seen by each detector is indicated, annunciated and recorded in the control room. Any significant leakage from the CVCS annunciates one of these alarms.

The chemical and volume control system can also monitor the total reactor coolant system water inventory. With no leakage in the reactor coolant system the level in the volume control tank remains constant during steady state plant operation. Therefore, a decreasing level in the volume control tank alerts the operator to a possible leak. A more detailed discussion of leakage detection systems is presented in Section 5.2.4. 9.3.4.3.2 Single Failure Analysis

Shown in Table 9.3-25 is a single failure analysis for the chemical and volume control system. At least one failure is postulated for each major component, Additionally, various line breaks throughout the system are also considered. In each case the possible cause of such a failure is presented as well as the local effects, detection methods and compensating provision. 9.3.4.3.3 Testing and Inspections

Each" component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation in the system. Demineralized water is used to flush the system. Instruments are recalibrated during startup testing. Automatic controls are tested 'for actuation at the proper set points. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during preoperational testing. The safety valve settings are checked.

9.3-46 TABLE 9.3-25

SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS — CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

Inherent Component/ Symptoms and Method of Compensating No. Location Failure Mode Cause Local Effects Detection Provision(s)

Regenerative Decrease in Excessive High temperature High temperature (1) Hot flow will auto- Heat Exchanger ability fouling or in letdown line alarm from TIC-2221 matically bypass IX's, (RHX) Transfer heat crud PRM and boronometer deposition (2) TIC-2221 will shut valve V-2515 and stop letdown flow

Regenerative Shell to tube Corrosion Eventual out of spec. Isolate letdown Safe plant shutdown not Heat Exchanger leakage and/or manu- boron concentration and measure flow on affected. Charging via (RHX) facturing Abnormally high borono- FIA-2212 while charg- SIS filling pressurizer, defect meter reading during ing. Perform only letdown via reactor boration and low during shutdown coolant pumps reading during dilution Also heat exchanger temperature disparities Letdown Heat Decrease in Excessive High temperature High temperature Hot flow will automatically Exchanger (LHX) ability to fouling or in letdown line alarm and indication bypass IX's transfer heat crud or abnormally high from TIC-2224 and deposition cooling water flow rate high temperature reading from TIC-2223

Letdown Heat Cross Leakage Corrosion Radioactivity will Activity monitor in Safe plant shutdown Exchanger (LHX) and/or manu- be transferred to CCS will sound alarm not affected facturing CCS defect

Line, between Rupture Faulty weld High temperature High temperature TIC-2221 will shut valve TIC-2221 and in letdown line alarm from TIC-2221 V-2515 and stop letdown LCV-2110P (out- and low pressure flow side containment) alarm from PA-2201 Line, between Rupture Faulty weld Loss of pressure Low pressure alarm TIC-2221 will close LHX and in letdown line from PA-2201 and :letdown stop valve TIC-2224 high temp. alarm V'-2515 TIC-2221 Abbreviations of components listed at end of table TABLE 9.3-25 SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS — CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

Inherent Component( Symptoms and Method of Compensating No. Location Failure Mode Cause Local Effects Detection Provision(s) -"

Purification Clogs Contamination High differential AP sensor, PDI-2202 Bypass line will facilitate Filter pressure across filter will actuate alarm cartridge replacement Purification Cartridge Excessive Contamination of IX's, None for small Bypass line will facilitate Filter rupture differential PRM and breaks, for larger cartridge replacement pressure boronometer breaks the reading of PDI-2202 will be lower than normal Also periodic sampling for activity buildup

~6 Radiation Fails to detect Electrical May allow a Laboratory analysis Backup by sampling system I Monitor high levels of malfunction buildup of of coolant sample and local samples CO radiation contamination

Radiation False indica- Electrical Laboratory analysis Backup by sampling system Monitor tion of high malfunction of coolant sample and local samples level of radiation

Boronometer False alarm for Electrical Alarm, and no Laboratory analysis Backup sampling system high or low malfunction abnormal control of coolant sample concentration rod positions

Purification Fails to remove Resin Buildup in RCS Alarm from PRM and Bypass ion exchangers Ion Exchanger contamination exhausted activity laboratory sample during replacement of resin analysis TABLE 9.3-25

SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS — CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Inherent Component/ Symptoms and Method of Compensating No. Location Failure Mode Cause Local Effects Detection Provision(s)

Deborating Fails to remove Resin Unable to maintain High boronometer Bypass and replace resin Ion Exchanger boron from exhaustion power at end of core reading, coolant in ion exchanger coolant cycle sample, and decreasing power

10 Charging Fails to Seal failure, High letdown Low level in Low level in pressurizer Pumps provide suffi- electrical temp at TIC-2221, pressurizer, low will start second and third cient flow to malfunction, and low charging flow flow alarm at pump pump RCS or low NPSH rate at FIA-2212, and outlet (FIA-2212) low pressurizer liquid level

Line, Makeup Rupture Faulty weld Possible loss of Low VCT level alarm, VCT level controller LC-2227 to Volume makeup, activity possible annunciation will close VCT discharge Control Tank release from VCT, of area radiation valve and open valve to (VCT) VCT low pressure monitors, VCT low refueling water tank pressure alarm 12 Boric Acid Fails off Electrical Precipitation, TIC-2213 will indi- Sufficient reserve in Batching Tank malfunction inability to mix cate low temperature makeup tanks is available Heater and boric acid until malfunction is Controller is corrected

Boric Acid Fails on Electrical Overheating of TIC-2213 will indi- Isolate and repair, Batching Tank malfunction boric acid in cate high temperature sufficient reserve in Heater and batching tank makeup tanks Controller

13 Boric Acid Fails to Electrical Unable to batch Visual Isolate and repair, Batching Tank start malfunction boric acid solution sufficient reserve in Mixer makeup tanks 14 Boric Acid Faulty weld Loss of boric acid Level indication Redundant standby tank Makeup tank or connection and alarm 15 Line, Discharge Leak Faulty weld Loss of boric acid Level indication and Redundant standby tank Boric Acid or connection alarm Makeup Tank TABLE 9.3-25

SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS — CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

Inherent Component/ Symptoms and Method of Compensating No. Location Failure Mode Cause Local Effects Detection Provision(s)

16 Boric Acid Fails to Electrical Loss of flow Pump discharge Redundant standby pump, Makeup Pump start malfunction pressure low alarm gravity feed or use or shaft break refueling water tank

17 Line, Boric Rupture Faulty weld Loss of boric acid Pump discharge Redundant standby Aci'd Pump pressure low alarm pump, and boric acid from Discharge refueling water tank.

18 Line, Gravity Rupture Faulty weld Loss of boric acid Boric acid makeup Alternate flow path of feed to charging tank level indication boric acid available pump suction and alarm from refueling water tank

19 Heat Tracing Fails off Electrical Decrease in Any malfunction of Redundant standby malfunction temperature in heat heat tracing annun- heat tracing and controls traced sections ciates an alarm in the control room

20 Volume Control Rupture Faulty weld Loss of liquid and Pressure and level Charging pump suction will Tank (VCT) radioactive gases indication and alarms automatically be supplied on VCT, and radiation by refueling water tank on alarm in auxiliary low level in VCT building

21 Line, Discharge Rupture Faulty weld Loss of coolant, Pressure and level VCT discharge valve will of VCT radioactive gases indications and close on low VCT level and and liquids released alarms in VCT charging pump suction will and low VCT pressure switch to refueling water tank

22 Line, Refueling Rupture Faulty weld Loss 'of RWT contents Level alarm in RWT Ability to borate the RCS Water Tank with contents of makeup to CVCS tanks not affected. Isolation valve at tank TABLE 9.3-25

SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS — CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM

Inherent Component/ Symptoms and Method of Compensating No. Location Failur'e Mode Cause. Local Effects = Detection -Provision(s)

23 Line, Charging Rupture Faulty weld Loss of pressure, Low pressure alarm Isolate, charge through Pump Discharge Loss of coolant (PIA-2212) and HPSI header low flow alarm (FIA-2212)

24 Line, VCT to Rupture Faulty weld Loss, of charging VCT low pressure Trip charging pump, charging pump capability, loss of alarm, low charging place plant in blackout coolant and radioactive pressure alarm and condition and perform gases low flow alarm emergency shutdown using SIS ~ABBREVIATIONS

RHX- Regenerative heat exchanger LHX- Letdown heat exchanger IX—Ion exchanger PRM- Process radiation monitor SIS- Safety infection system CCS- Component cooling system RCS- Reactor coolant system VCT- Volume control tank RMT- Refueling-water tank The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and mechanical operability. Pumps are tested at the.vendor's plant to demonstrate head and capacity. Prior to preoperational testing, the components of the chemical and volume control system are tested for op'erability. The components and subsystems checked include the following: a) operation of all automatic and remote controlled valves

b) boric acid makeup pumps

c) nitrogen and hydrogen pressurization systems

d) charging pump operational check

e) check of miscellaneous valve functions, alarms and interlocks

instrumentation on the boric acid makeup tanks, volume control tank and boric acid batching tank

g) installation of all valves for proper flow direction. II The system is tested for integrated operation during preoperational testing. Any defects in operation that could affect plant safety are corrected before full loadings. As part of normal plant operation, tests and inspections, data tabulation and instrument .calibrations are made to evaluate the condition and performance of the chemical and volume control system equipment. Data is taken periodically during normal plant operation to confirm heat transfer capabilities and purification efficiency.

The charging pumps permit leak testing of the reactor coolant system during plant startup operations and connections are provided to install a hydrostatic test pump in parallel with the charging pumps.

A charging pump is periodically used to check the operability and leak tightness of the check valves which isolate the reactor coolant from the safety injection system.

9.3.4.3.4 Natural Phenomena

The chemical and volume control system components are located in the reactor auxiliary building and the containment and, therefore, would not be subject to the natural phenomena described in Chapter 3 other than seismic which is discussed in Section 3.7. The reactor auxiliary building arrangement showing the chemical and volume control system components is shown in Figures 1.2-12 through 1.2-17.

9.3.4.4 Instrument A lication

Table 9.3-26 lists the parameters used to monitor the chemical and volume control system.

9.3-52

TABLE 9.3-26 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM INSTRUMENT APPLICATION

Indication . Alarm Normal System Parameter Contr Operating Inst. and Location Local Room High Low Rec.l Control Function Inst. Range Range Accuracy

'B;A. Makeup Tank Temp. * * Heaters 50-200F . 140-160F +1.0%-

B.A. Batching Tank Temp. Heaters 50-200F 140-160F +1.0%

Letdown Temp. After Regen Hx Letdown Flow 100-600F 263F +2.5F

Letdown Temp After Letdown Hx Component Cooling 50-200F 120F +0. 8F Water

Letdown Temp. Process Radiation and 50-200F 120F +0.8F Boronometer Isolation Valve, Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve.

Volume Control Tank Tempo 0-200F 120F +1.0F

Regen. Hx Shell Temp. 0-600F 395F +3.0F

Letdown Pressure Backpressure Control 0-600psig 460psig +3.6psig Valves Purif. Filter 0-40psid 1-30psid +0.2psid Ion Exchanger 0-40psid 1-15psid +0.2psid

Letdown Strainer 0-40psid 1-4psid +0.2psid

B.A. Pump Discharge Press. 0-160psig 55-110psig +0.8psig

All alarms and recorders are in the control room unless otherwise indicated.

TABLE 9.3-26 (Cont.) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM INSTRUMENT APPLICATION

Indication Alarml Normal System Parameter Contr Operating Inst.- and Location Local Room Hi h Low Rec.l Control Function Inst. Ran e Ran e Accurac B.A. Strainer 0-20psid 0.25-5.0 O.lpsid psid Charging Pump Header 0-3000psig 2300psig +15psig Press

RCP Bleedoff Header 0-300psig 100psig +1.5psig Press

Charging Pump Suction Charging Pump Permis- 0-150psia 15psia +0.8psia Press sive

Volume Control Tank 0-75psig 15psig +0.4psia Press

Charging Pump Seal 0-30psig 5.5-6.0 Lube Press psig

B.A. Makeup Tank 0-100% 53 96% +0.5%

Volume Control Tank Level Replenishment, 0-100% 72-85.6% +0.5% Level Bypass to MMS, Tank I'solation

Chg. Pump Lube Oil 50% Level

Chg. Pump Sump Tank 0-100% 87.5% Level

Letdown Flow 0-140 gpm 40gpm +7. 0gpm

Boron 6 Process Rad. Flow * 0.2-3.0gpm 1.0gpm +O.lgpm

Boron Flow * VCT Level, Boron. Conc. 0-30gpm 0-16gpm +3.0gpm 1 All alarms and recorders are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. TABLE 9.3-26 (Cont.) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM INSTRUMENT APPLICATION

Indication Alarml Normal System Parameter Contr Operating Inst. and Location Local Room High Low Rec. Control Function Inst. Range Range Accuracy

Boron Conc. Maint. 0-999,999 +1.0% gal. Demineralized Water * VCT Level, Boron Conc. 0-150gpm 0-150gpm +7.5gpm Flow

Maintenance Boron 0-999,999 +1.0% Conc. Maint. gal.

Charging Flow 0-150gpm 44gpm +75gpm

Chg. Pump Lube Oil Flow

Boron Concentration 0-2050ppm Variable +25ppm 6 Process Radiation 10-10 10pCi/cc +50% pCi/cc

1 All alarms and recorders are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. 9.3.5 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

The shutdown cooling system is designed to: a) . reduce the temperature of the reactor coolant from 300 F to refueling water temperature and maintain this temperature during refueling assuming a single active failure b) remove post-LOCA decay heat during the recirculation mode of safety injection system operation to preclude containment pressure and temperature from exceeding their design values assuming a single failure I r c) control reactor 'coolant temperature during the early stages of plant start-up d) withstand design basis earthquake loads without loss of function e) withstand the post-LOCA short and long term environmental and corrosion conditions without loss of function.

9.3.5.2 S stem Descri 'tion

The shutdown cooling system is shown schematically in Figure 9.3-6. System component design, data are given in Table 9.3-27 and the shutdown heat exchanger design data me given in Table 9.3-28. The safety injection pump design data are given in Table 6.1-3. System instrumentation util'ization is described in Section 7.4.1.3. The shutdown cooling system uses portions of the reactor coolant system, safety infection system and the containment spray system in accomplishing its design functions. 9.3.5.2.1 Normal Operation

During normal power operation, there are no components of the system in operation. 9.3.5.2.2 Plant Shutdown Plant shutdown is the series of operations which bring the reactor .from a hot standby condition of 2235 psig and 532F to a cold shutdown condition of zero psig and 135F. Cooldown from hot standby to.300F. is accomplished through the steam dump and bypass system in conjunction with either the feedwater or auxiliary feedwater system as discussed in Chapter, 10.

Shutdown cooling is initiated when the reactor coolant system conditions dr'op below the design pressure and temperature of the shutdown cooling equipment., At this time the system is aligned for shutdown cooling. In the shutdown cooling mode, reactor coolant is circulated using the low pressure safety in)ection pumps. The flow path from the pump discharge runs through motor-operated valve V-3658 and manual valve V-3452 (normally locked closed) and manual valve V-3453 (normally

9.3-56 TABLE 9.3-27

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM DESIGN DATA

Code — piping Code for Pressure Piping, USAF - valves B31.1, 1967 draft ASME Code for Pumps and Valves for Nuclear Power, November 1968

Shutdown Cooling System Approximately 3.5 hours after Start-up reactor shutdown or trip Design Pressure, psig 500 i Design Temperature, F 350

Reactor Coolant System Cool- 75F/hr down Rate;(Atl initiation of Shutdown Cooling)

I Refueling Temperature, F 135

Material — Piping and Valves Austenitic Stainless Steel Nominal Shutdown Cooling 6000 (Total) Flow, gpm

TABLE 9.3-28

SHUTDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER DESIGN DATA

Shutdown Cooling Mode

Tube Side 'low, Million lb/hr 1.5 Inlet Temperature F 135 Outlet Temperature F 116.3 Shell Sidei Flow, Million lb/hr 2.41 Design Temperature, F l Inlet Temperature, F 100 Design Pressure, psig Obtlet Temperature, F 111.6

II

9. 3-57 Piping and valves are provided in the chemical and volume control system such that during shutdown cooling a portion of the flow can be bypassed from the outlet of the shutdown heat exchangers through the letdown portion of the chemical and volume control system and returned to the suction line of the low pressure safety injection pumps. Flow through stream provides and ion exchange of the thisI bypass filtration reactor coolant via the purification filter and ion exchanger and boronometer providesl monitoringl of boron level using the 9.3.5.2.3 Plant Start-Up

The shutdown cooling function is used during the early stages of plant start-up to control reactor coolant temperature. Heat generated by reactor coolant pumps and by core decay heat is removed as required by the shutdown cooling system. Prior to commencing plant heatup the interconnections the are and the I to reactor coolant system isolated safety injection system is aligned for emergency operation. The four isolation, valves in the shutdown cooling suction lines are closed. 9.3.5.2.4 Refueling

The transfer of refueling water from the refueling water tank to the reactor cavity may be accomplished using the safety injection system at the start of refueling. The reactor vessel head is removed and the high pressure safety injection pumps are started. These pumps take water from the refueling water tank and inject it into the reactor coolant loops through the normal flow paths. The low pressure safety injection pumps or the containment spray pumps 'may also be used'for this operation. At the end of refueling operations, refueling water is returned from the reactor cavity through the reactor coolant system and safety injection system to the refueling water tank. A connection is provided from the shutdown cooling heat exchanger discharge to the refueling water tank for this purpose. The low pressure safety injection pumps are used for the transfer operation.

9.3.5.2.5 Emergency Operation

The shutdown cooling system heat exchangers are used during the recirculation phase of safety injection system operation following a LOCA. Heat removed from the containment sump .water through the I is shutdown cooling heat exchangers means the containment I by of spray pumps. During normal plant operation the containment spray pumps are alignedI to flow through the shutdown I cooling heat exchangers. In the shutdown cooling mode of operation isolation valves act to separate the heat exchangers from the containment spray system. The cooling system also provides the capability'f diverting a portion of the cooled water from the containment spray system to the suction of the high pressure safety injection pumps for injection of cooler water into the core. For further discussion refer to Sections 6.2 and 6.3.

9.3-58 locked open); through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers; through manual valves V-3456 and V-3457 (normally locked open) and air- operated valve HCV-3657 (normally locked closed); to the low pressure safety injection header; and enters the reactor coolant system through the four safety injection nozzles. The circulating fluid flows through the core and is returned from the reactor coolant system to the low pressure safety injection pump suction through two shutdown cooling lines. One shutdown cooling line is located in each reactor vessel hot leg pipe. In returning to the pumps, the fluid passes through normally locked closed motor-operated isolation valves V-3651 and V-3652 in the line from loop 1B and motor-operated valves V-3480 and V-3481 in the line from loop 1A. The isolation valves'in the suction lines are interlocked to prevent inadvertent opening and to automatically close whenever the reactor coolant system pressure exceeds the design pressure of the shutdown cooling system. Both valves in each of the suction lines are independently controlled by separate instrumentation channels. The interlock on these valves is further described in Section 7.6.1.1.

The component cooling system is the heat sink to which the reactor coolant residual heat is rejected. Each shutdown heat exchanger receives cooling water to its shell side from a separate component cooling'system essential header. The shutdown heat,exchangers are sized to establish refueling water temperature (135F) with the design component cooling water temperature (100F) 27-1/2 hours after shutdown following an assumed infinite period of reactor operation.

The minimize thermal shock on the low pressure safety injection pumps, shutdown heat exchangers and piping, a low flow is established by opening warmup valves V-3400 and 'V-3484. The low pressure safety injection pumps are then warmed to reactor coolant temperature by crack- ing open one low pressure injection valve. The shutdown cooling heat exchangers are warmed by slowly opening valve HCV-3657. When the shutdown cooling heat exchangers are warmed up the remaining three low pressure injection valves are opened. The initial cooldown rate is maintained at 75F per hour or less. The cooldown rate is controlled by adjusting the flow 'rate through the heat .exchangers with the throttle valve on the discharge of heat exchangers. The shutdown cooling flow indicator-controller (FIC-3306) maintains a constant total shutdown cooling flow rate to the core by adjusting the heat exchanger bypass flow to compensate for changes in flow rate through the heat exchangers. During initial cooldown the temperature differences for heat transfer are large, thus only a portion of the total shutdown flow is diverted through the heat exchangers. As cooldown proceeds the temperature differences become less and the flow rate through the heat exchangers is increased. The flow is increased periodically until the system reaches refueling temperature. At this time full shutdown cooling flow is, through the heat exchangers. Shutdown cooling is continued through the entire period of plant shutdown to maintain a r'efueling water temperature of 135F or less.

9.3-59 9. 3.5. 3 S s tern Evalua tion

9.3.5.3.1 Performance Requirements and Capabilities

When the reactor coolant system pressure falls below 1700 psig the SIAS is manually blocked. The SIAS is automatically unblocked any time the reactor coolant system pressure rises above 1700 psig. When reactor coolant pressure falls below 400 psig the safety injection tank isolation valves are closed. Prior to placing the system in operation the boron concentration is verified at various sample points in the safety injection system. Should the concentration be too low, recirculation to the refueling water tank is used to bring it to refueling conditions. System components with design pressure and temperature less than 'the reactor coolant system design limits are provided with overpressure protection devices and redundant isolation means. System discharge from overpressure protection devices is collected in closed systems. Pressure relief valves are„provided to protect sections of piping from pressure increases due to the thermal expansion of the contained water and inadvertant cross connections with other pressure sources. The relief valves are shown in Figure 9.3-6.

Control valves are equipped with two sets of packing and intermediate leakoff connections that discharge to the waste management system. Manual valves have backseats to limit:stem leakage when in the open position. Manual isolation valves are provided to isolate equipment for maintenance. Throttle valves are- provided for remote fnanual control of heat exchanger tube side flow. Check valves prevent shutdown cooling reverse flow through the low pressure safety in)ection pumps.

Leakage within the emergency core cooling system equipment room described in Section 6.2.2 normally drains to the room sump. From there it is pumped to the waste management system. Should a gross gasket failure or equipment failure occur which cannot be directly isolated, the spillage flows to the room sump. The sump pumps in each room will handle leakage for short periods of 'time. If leakages are greater than pump capacity or if gaseous radiation releases are greater than liquid waste system capabilities, the room is isolated. Room isolation is accomplished by stopping the pumps in that room and closing the sump isolation valve. If a tube-to-shell leak develops in the shutdown heat exchanger, the water level in the component cooling system surge- tank gives a high level alarm as described in Section 9.2.2. If the in-flow completely fills the surge tank, the excess flow is discharged to the waste management system.

The shutdown cooling system components are designed to operate in the environment to which they would be exposed following a LOCA. Refer to Section 3;ll. To ensure long term performance of the shutdown cooling system without degradation due to corrosion, only materials

9.3-60 compatible with the pumped fluid are used. The possibility of chloride- induced stress corrosion of austenitic stainless steel is minimized by use of insulation material with low soluble chloride content. During long term operation chloride stress corrosion due to recirculation of the containment sump water is minimized since the shutdown cooling system is not highly stressed. 9.3.5.3.2 Single Failure Analysis

The failure of any single active or passive component in the shutdown cooling system during recirculation following a LOCA will not result in a loss of cooling capability. Sufficient isolation capabilities, interconnections and redundancy of components are provided to ensure adequate reactor core cooling. This is further discussed in Section 6.3.

The single failure of, an active component during shutdown cooling operation will not result in a loss of cooling capability. The reactor coolant system can be brought to refueling temperature using one low pressure safety injection pump and one shutdown heat exchanger, but the cooldown process would be considerably longer than the speci-„ fied 27-1/2 hours time period. To control the rate of reactor coolant system cooldown, reactor coolant is bypassed around the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. This allows maintaining a constant total shutdown cooling flow to the core. Loss of the automatic control function will not reduce the shutdown cooling system cooling capability. The automatic flow control facilitates cooldown, but its function may be duplicated by- operator action. The flow may be controlled by manual operation using the low pressure safety injection pump discharge pressure (utilizing the certified pump characteristic performance curve) as an indication of system flow rate. A single failure of passive component during shutdown cooling will result in the interruption of the cooldown but will not result in a loss of core cooling. Should a portion of the shutdown cooling system piping outside of the containment sustain a failure during cooldown from 300F, the shutdown cooling system can be isolated while core heat is removed 'by the main steam and feedwater systems. The'ecay reactor coolant system is then maintained in this partial cooldown condition (approximately 300F) while repairs are affected on the shutdown cooling system. A failure of a shutdown cooling suction line will not interrup cooldown, since the second suction line will permit continued cooldown at a reduced rate.

Continued core cooling in the event of a passive failure, occurring after the reactor vessel head has been removed, is prov'ided by manual alignment and initiation of the safety injection system. The safety injection tank isolation valves and high pressure safety injection control valves are opened, the high pressure safety injection pumps are started and the shutdown cooling system is isolated. The containment cooling system is used to remove core decay heat. These actions, initiated from the control room, will ensure the continuation of core cooling.

9.3-61 9.3.5.3.3 Testing and Inspection Preoperational tests are conducted to verify proper operation of the shutdown cooling system. The preoperational tests include calibration of instrumentation, testing of the automatic flow control, verification of adequate shutdown cooling flow and verification of the operability of all associated valves.

To ensure availability of the shutdown cooling system, components of the system are periodically tested. As described in Section 6.3.4, the low pressure safety injection pumps, air and motor operated valves, instrumentation and check valves associated with the safety injection system are tested on a quarterly basis. 'These system and component tests together with shutdown cooling heat exchanger thermal performance data taken during refueling are sufficient to demonstrate the operability of the shutdown cooling system.

9.3.5.3.4 Natural Phenomena

Since the shutdown cooling system is essential for a safe shutdown of the reactor, it is a seismic Class I component and designed to remain functional in the event of a design basis earthquake. Components of the system are located within the, reactor auxiliary building or the containment and therefore would not be subject to natural perturbations other than seismism.

9.3.5.4 Instrument A lication

Table 9.3-29 lists the parameters used to monitor the shutdown cooling system.

9.3-62 ,TABLE 9.3-29

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM INSTRUMENT APPLICATION

Indication Alarm1 Normal Sys tern Parameter on Inst. Operating r 1 Inst. and Location Local Room High-. Low Rec. Control'Function Range Range Accuracy

Heat Exchanger Inlet 0-400F Variable +8.0F Temperature

Heat Exchanger Outlet 0-400F Variable +8.0F Temperature

Shutdown Cooling Return 0-400F Variable +8.0F Temperature

Heat Exchanger Inlet 0-500psi 300psig +2a5psig Pressure

Shutdown Cooling Return Heat Exchanger 0-8000 Variable +40 Flow Bypass Valve

Heat Exchanger Flow Heat Exchanger 0-100 Variable +0.5 Bypass Valve

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9.4.1 CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION

The- control room ventilation syst: em is designed to: a) limit control room doses due to airborne activity to within GDC 19 limits I b) maintain the ambient temperature required for personnel comfort "during normal conditions

1 c) permit personnel occupancy and proper functioning'f instrumentation and control during all normal and LOCA conditions assuming a single active failure d) withstand design basis earthquake loads without loss of function.

9.4.1.2 S stem Descri tion

The control room ventilation system flow diagram is shown on Figure 9.4-1 and the P & I diagram is shown on Figure 9.4-2. System design data is given in Table 9.4-1.

The control room is air conditioned by two redundant 100 percent capacity units. Figure 9.4-1 shows 3 units, HVA-3C being reserved for the addition of a second plant. One unit is normally'running with the second unit in a standby status available for manual actuation in the event of a failure of the operating unit. The normal operating- conditions in the control room are those recommended by ASHRAE for comfort air conditioning. The control room temperature reaches a maximum of 113F in the unlikely event that both units fail and no outside air makeup is -available. This temperature is based on full equipment load, emergency lighting, eight control room personnel and 93F ambient conditions outside. The analysis assumed a temperature of 110F in the adjacent heating and ventilating room and 104F in the electrical equipment room below. Solar heat gain into the control room was also considered. Under t'e conditions described above, the maximum temperature'n the control room is reached in 54 min 'after loss of cooling. The contiol room ventilation system consists of split system air conditioners (i.e., -an indoor and outdoor section), a ducted air intake and air distribution system, and a filter train with HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers with two redundant booster centrifugal fans. The indoor section is located at elevation 43 ft and includes a cabinet type centrifugal fan, a direct expansion refrigerant cooling coil, heating. coil and filters. The outdoor section is a single assembly which includes a refrigerant condensing coil and fans, and refrigerant compressors. The indoor section is seismic Class I while the outdoor section is not.

9.4-1 TABLE 9.4-1

DESIGN DATA FOR CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Air Conditioners (HVA-3A,B,C)

Qu'antity 2; 1 running, 1 standby Type split system, direct expansion with air cooled condensers Air flow, each, cfm 7500, Fan static pressure, in. wg 1. 25 Outside intake air flow, cfm 750

2. Booster Fans (HVE-13 A,B) Quantity per bank Type Centrifugal Material Steel Air flow, cfm 2000 Fan static pressure, in. wg. 3.5 Fan performance, each Capacity, cfm 2000 ,Static pressure, in. wg. 4

3. Motors Quantity Type Electric, 2 HP Insulation Class B, powerhouse Enclosure & ventilation Open, drip-proof

4. HEPA Filters (HVE-13) Quantity per bank Air,flow, cfm 2000

'4 Cell size, in. wide x 24 high x 114 deep Cell arrangement 1 wide x 2 high mounted on structural frame Max. resistance, clean, in. wg. 3.0 Efficiency, percent 99.97 percent when tested with 0.3 micron DOP

9.4-2 0 TABLE 9.4-1 (Cont'd)

Material Glass asbestos paper separated by aluminum inserts, supported on cadmium plated steel frame

Code UL-586, Class 1

5. Charcoal Adsorbers (HVE-13)

Quantity per bank Air flow, cfm 2000 Cell size, in. 24 wide x 8 high x 30 deep Cell arrangement 1 wide x 6 high mounted on structural cradle frame Max. air resistance, in. wg. 1.15 Efficiency, percent 99.9 minimum of iodine with 5 percent in the form of methyl iodide (CH3I), when operating at 70 percent relative humidity and 150 F Loading capacity 6000'gm of stable iodine and 360 gm of radioactive iodine including 30 gm of CH3T. Adsorber material Activated coconut shell charcoal Enclosure Stainless steel type 304L ASTM Gaskets Neoprene ASTM D1056 Grade SCE-43 Frame Steel ASTM — A36 6. Ducts Material Galvanized steel

9.4-3 Control room air is drawn into the indoor air handling section through a return air duct system and roughing filters, and is either heated or cooled as required. Conditioned air is directed back to the control room through a supply air duct system. Outside air makeup is effected through either of two outside air intakes located in the north and south walls of the reactor auxiliary building. One air conditioner unit is normally in operation with the selected intake damper open.

On receipt of a containment isolation signal (CIS), the booster fans are automatically started and the charcoal filter train dampers are opened. Outside air intake is isolated by the redundant dampers (FCV-14-,-15,-16, -17) located in the outside air makeup ducts. The control room air is re- circulated through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Air flow through the units is monitored and loss of flow conditions is annunciated. Position of air intake isolation valves, fan inlet dampers and filter inlet damper is indicated in the control room.

As long as the outside air intakes are open the control room is maintained at a slightly positive pressure. After the outside air intake dampers are closed by a CIS, the pressure differential is reduced. The operator can select which outside air intake to open by observing the two radiation monitors located in each air intake duct.

Should a loss of off-site power occur the air conditioner units can be powered by the emergency diesel generator sets. The engineered safety features and reactor protective system instrumentation and controls contained within the control room are specified to remain operable over a temperature range of 40 to 140 F and a humidity range of 40 to 95 percent. The vendor is required to submit test data verifying this fact.

The control room radiation monitor is a Geiger-MUller counter with a range of 0.1 to 1000 mR/hr which audibly alarms any exposure above 0.5 mR/hr. The operator can manually open the charcoal filter train dampers and start the booster fans in any instance where such action might be necessary and no CIS signal has been received. The system is not designed to detect airborne containments other than radiation.

9.4.1.3 S stem Evaluation

Control room ventilation system components essential to safety are designed and installed in accordance with seismic Class I requirements. The control room air conditioning outdoor section is not seismic Class I. Purchase specifications require manufacturers to submit type test or calculational data to verify the capability of the equipment to function during and following a design basis earthquake. Refer to Section 3.7.5 for a discussion of seismic qualification.

9.4-4 Only one booster fan and HEPA filter are required for ventilation and filtration of the control room air under post-accident conditions. Electrical power for each booster fan, damper and outside air intake isolation valve is supplied from a separate emergency power bus to prevent a single electrical failure from disabling both units.

9.4,1.4, Testin And Ins ection

Preoperational tests are performed on the system to ensure meeting performance and design basis requirements. All automatic and manual sequences are tested to ensure proper operation. Manufacturers tests include:

a) pressure testing HEPA filter casings at 30 in. wg vacuum for distortion

b) pressure testing casings at 2 psig for leaks c) performing filtration tests to verify filter design performance for filtration, air flow capacity, air flow resistance, moisture and overpressure resistance and shock and vibration d) verifying charcoal adsorber design efficency

9.4.1.5 Instrumentation A lication Table 9.4-2 lists the measured parameters for monitoring the performance of the control room ventilation system.

The air conditioners, centrifugal fans and outside air intake dampers are controlled by remote manual operation in the control room. The outside air intake dampers can also be opened or closed by manual operation.

9,4-S TABLE 9.4-2

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

1) Indication Alarm nstru- Normal Control (1) ent Operating Instrument S stem Parameter 6 Location Local Room Hi h Low Recordin Control Function an e Ran e Accurac Control Room

1) Temperature Start air conditioner at 75F 75F Booster Fan

1) Inlet" damper position

2) Outlet flow 2000 cfm Indoor Unit I

1) Outlet flow 7500 cfm Outside Air Intake Position

HEPA Filter Dam er Position

(1) All alarms and recordings are in control room unless otherwise indicated. 9.4.2 REACTOR AUXILIARYBUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEMS

9.4.2.1 Desi Bases

The reactor auxiliary building ventilation systems are designed to:

a) provide ventilation to permit proper functioning of equipment during normal operation

b) provide air flow from areas of low potential radioactivity to areas of higher potential radioactivity c), provide an air supply for cooling of safety related equipment assuming a single active failure

d) withstand design basis earthquake loads without loss of its cooling function of safety related equipment

The reactor auxiliary building ventilation systems consist of the. main ventilation and various auxiliary systems which are shown on Figure 9.4-1. The main system ventilates equipment areas such as pump rooms, the waste management system processing and storage areas, chemical and volume control system equipment rooms, and all potentially contaminated areas. The main ventilation system exhausts through the plant vent.

The electrical switchgear rooms and the battery rooms are served'y the electrical equipment room ventilation system.'ersonnel areas such as locker rooms, offices, the machine shop, and laboratory are served by various miscellaneous ventilation systems. Laboratory areas are exhausted by the main reactor auxiliary building exhaust system. The reactor auxiliary building ventilation air flow is shown in Figure 9.4-1. The system P&I diagrams are shown on Figures 9.4-2 and 9.4-3.

9.4.2.2.1 Reactor Auxiliary Building Main'entilation System

The system consists of an air supply subsystem and an air exhaust air system (HVE-10A,B). Air supply is effected through wall louvers, roughing filters, steam heating coils, two 100 percent capacity centrifugal fans (HVS-4A,B) and duct distribution systems. Component data are given in Table 9.4-3. The air supply system provides the cooling requirements for the low and high pressure safety injection pumps and the containment spray pumps, and is designed as seismic Class I. Upon loss of normal power, the system is automatically connected to the on-site emergency diesel generator sets. Main supply fan HVS-4A is powered from bus 1A-2 and fan HVS-4B from bus 1B-2.

The air exhaust system includes a 100 percent capacity bank of prefilters and HEPA filters, two 100 percent capacity exhaust fans (HVE-10A,B) and duct exhaust system. The exhaust system serves no safety function. Under accident conditions the engineered safety features pump rooms are exhausted by the ECCS area ventilation system described in Section 9.4.3.

9,4-7 0 TABLE 9;4-3

DESIGN DATA FOR REACTOR AUXILIARYBUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Reactor Auxiliar Buildin Main Su 1 S stem (HVS-4A & B)

Number of fans installed 2 Number of fans normally operating 1 Fan capacity, each, cfm 69,015 Fan static pressure, in. wg 3 Fan motor HP 60 No. of filters 72

2. Reactor Auxiliar Buildin Main Exhaust S stem (HVE-10A & B)

Number of fans installed 2 Number of fans normally operating 1 Fan capacity, cfm 70,600 Fan static pressure, in. wg 6 Fan motor HP 125 No. of prefilters 72 No. of HEPA filters 72

3. Electrical E ui ment and Batter Room Ventilation Su 1 S stem (HVS-5A & B)

Number of fans installed 2 Number of fans normally operating 2 Fan capacity, each, cfm 26,000 Fan static pressure, in. wg 1.5 Fan motor HP 15 No. of filters 48

4. Electrical E ui ment Room Exhaust S stem

Number of fans installed a) Room 1A (RV-3 & 4) b) Room 1B (HVE-ll & 12) c) Room 1A/B (HVE-18 & 19) Number of fans normally operating a) Room lA b) Room 1B c) Room 1A/B Fan capacity, cfm each a) Room lA 8,500 b) Room 1B 16,500 c) Room lA/B 10,000

9.4-8 TABLE 9.4-3(Continued)

Fan static pressure, in. wg a) Room lA 0.25 b) Room 1B 0.25 c) Room lA/B 0.25

Fan motor, HP a) Room 1A 1.5 b) Room 1B 2 c) Room 1A/B 1.5

No. of prefilters None

5. Batter Room Exhaust S stem (data given is identical for both rooms)(RV-1 & 2)

Number of fans installed 1 Number of fans normally operating 1 Fan capacity, cfm 1,000 Fan static pressure, in. wg 0.25 Fan motor, HP 0.166 No. of prefilters None

6. Locker Area and Machine Sho Ventilation Su 1 S stem (HVS-3)

Number of fans installed 1 Number of fans normally operating 1 Fan capacity, cfm 10,225 Exhaust static pressure, in. wg 1.25 Fan motor, HP 5 No. of filters None

7. Locker Area Exhaust S stem (HVE-4)

Number of fans installed 1 Number of fans normally operating 1 Fan capacity, cfm 1,850 Fan static pressure, in. wg 0.5 Fan,motor, HP 0.5 N'o. of filters None

8. Machine Sho Area Exhaust s stem (HVE-5)

Number of fans installed 1 Number of fans normally operating 1 Fan capacity, cfm 7,000 Fan static pressure, in. wg 3.5 Fan motor, HP 7.5 No. of prefilters 6 No. of HEPA filters 6

9.4-9 TABLE 9.4-3(Continued)

9. Health Ph sics First Aid and Cold Laborator Room Ventilation Su 1 S stem (HVA-2, ACC-2)

Number of air conditioners installed 1 Number of air conditioners normally operating 1 Fan capacity, cfm 2,150 Exhaust static pressure, in. wg 1 Fan motor, HP 1.5 Filter area, ft 4

10. Countin Instrument and Radio Chem. Room Ventilation Su 1 S stem (HVA-l, ACC-1)

Number of air conditioners installed 1 Number of air conditioners normally operating 1 Fan capacity, cfm 6,050 Exhaust static pressure, in. wg 1.25 Fan motor, HP 2 No. of filters 9 Note: All air conditioners are split. system direct expansion units with air cooled condensers.

9.4->0 The reactor auxiliary building main ventilation system provides a minimum of four air changes per hour for each of the rooms in the building. Ventilation rate is sized to achieve the design ambient maximum temperature of 104 F in the equipment areas with an outside air temperature of 93 F.

The exhaust from potentially contaminated areas is discharged to the plant vent. Exhaust from other areas is directed outside the building. Refer to Section 12.2 for a discussion of the reactor auxiliary building radiation monitoring system.

9.4.2.2.2 Reactor Auxiliary Building Electrical Equipment and Battery Room Ventilation System

Electrical Equipment rooms 1A and 1B are ventilated by a system which includes a louvered intake, steam heating coils, 2 supply fans (HVS-5A,B), a duct distribution system and exhaust fans. Equipment room lA is exhausted by power roof ventilators RV-3 and 4. Equipment room 1B is exhausted through the walls by fans HVE-ll and 12. Room 1A/B, located below rooms lA and lB at elevation 19.5 ft,,draws outside intake air through the walls and exhausts air via fans HVE-18 and 19 located in the wall.

In the event of a failure of one supply fan, the second fan operates at 2/3 capacity, which is sufficient to cool all three equipment rooms and both battery rooms.

Upon loss of off-site power, the system is automatically connected to the on-site emergency diesel generator sets.'ach electrical room exhaust fan is connected to separate emergency buses, as are the battery room exhaust fans. The supply fans are similarly connected to separate buses.

Ventilator air flow rates for the electrical and battery rooms are sized to achieve a temperature less than 104 F with an outside air temperature of 93 F. Electrical equipment room temperatures exceeding 110 F are annunciated in the control room. This ventilation system is safety related since it is required for proper functioning of the emergency electrical distribution equipment. System component design data are given in Table 9.4-3. 9.4.2.2.3 Reactor Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous Ventilation Systems

The design data for the miscellaneous ventilation systems are shown in Table 9.4-3. Flow diagrams are shown on Figures 9.4-1 and P&I diagrams on Figures 9.4-2 and 9.4-3.

The locker and machine shop areas are ventilated by supply fan HVS-3 and exhausted by fans HVE-4 and HVE-5 respectively. Locker area air is clean and is exhausted directly to the atmosphere. Machine shop air is passed through a prefilter and HEPA filter before being vented to the atmosphere.

9.4-11 The cold laboratory, first aid room and health physics office are serviced by split system air conditioner ACC-2. Air is supplied from an outside air intake by fan HVA-2. Air is then directed to the corridor and exhausted by the main ventilation system.

The counting room, instrument calibration and repair shop, and radiological chemical lab are serviced by split system air conditioner ACC-1 and fan HVA-l. Air from these rooms is exhausted via the radiological chemical lab to the main ventilation system.

9.4.2.3 S stem Evaluation Plant ventilation systems required for the operation of safety related components meet the same requirements for redundancy, independence, emergency power, quality assurance, and natural phenomena as the safety systems which they serve.

Where redundant safety related components (such as emergency electrical switchgear) require ventilation for proper operation, each redundant component is served by a separate ventilation fan and associated dampers and controls. In this way failure of a single active ventilation component can affect operation of only one of the redundant safety related components. Each of the redundant ventilation components and its controls are powered from a separate emergency bus which is part of the same emergency electrical load group as the components which it serves. All ventilation system components required to perform safety functions are designed and. installed as seismic Class I equipment and are located in seismic Class I structures. Purchase specifications require manufacturers to submit type test or calculational data to verify the capability of the equipment to function during and following a design basis earthquake. Seismic qualification of Class I components is discussed further in Section 3.7.5.

Battery room ventilation has been sized to avoid buildup of hydrogen.

9.4.2.4 Testin ~ and Ins ection Manufacturer tests include:

a) pressure testing HEPA filter casings at 30 in,. wg vacuum for distortion

d) verifying charcoal adsorber design efficiency

9.4-12 9.4.2.5 Instrumentation A lication

Table 9.4-4 lists the parameters used to monitor and control auxiliary building ventilation systems. The only automatically controlled valves control flow to steam coils. These coils heat the supply air for the main subsystem, electrical equipment battery rooms, and the locker area and machine shop areas.

The reactor auxiliary building vent systems (including the engineered safety features area which is discussed in Section 9.4.3) receive SIAS signals. Table 9.4-5 lists components receiving an SIAS and the control function of that signal. The function of the SIAS is to provide the proper flow path for supply air to the engineered safety features area and to draw all exhaust air from this syst: em through the HEPA and charcoal filter bank. Section 9.4.3 discusses the ECCS area ventilation system.

Components which can be manually operated and/or which have operational interlocks are listed in Table 9.4-5.

System instrumentation design and logic is discussed in Section 7.7.

9.4-13 TABLE 9.4-4

AUXILIARYBUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm(1) Instru- Normal Control (1) ment Operating Instrument System Parameter 6 Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy

Main Su 1 S stem 1) Inlet temperature Control flow to inlet 0-85P 55P +2.0% air steam coils hy means of valve modulation

2) Fan outlet flow 69,015 cfm

Pum Room A 6 B 1) Temperature 0-150P 55-105F +2.0%

ECCS Exhaust Fans 1) HEPA filter differential 0 to -10 in. -1 to -3 in. +l. 0% pressure H 0 H20

2) Outlet flow 30,000 cfm

Main Exhaust S stem 1) HEPA filter differential Alarm or control room 0 to -10 in. -1 to -3 in. +l. 0% pressure indication H 0 H20

2) Exhaust flow 70,600 cfm

Electrical E ui ment E Batte Room Vent S stem 1) Supply system air intake Control steam flow to 0-150P 55-110F +2.0% temperature steam coils via valve modulation

2) Electrical equipment room 0-130P 55-110P +2.0% temperature

Locker Area 6 Machine Sho Ventilation S stem 1) Room temperature Control flow to steam 0-95P 70F +2.0% coils via valve modulation TABLE 9.4-4 (Continued)

AUXILIARYBUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION Indication Alarm Instru- Normal Control (l) ment Operating Instrument System Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy

Radio Chem Lab Count Room & Instrument Sho Vent S stem l) Room temperature Control air conditioner 55-95P 75P +2.0% via "on-off" heating cooling thermostat

(l) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. TABLE 9.4-5 AUXILIARY'BUILDING COMPONENTS WITH SIAS INTERLOCKS OR MANUAL CONTROLS

Manual Control SIAS SIAS Control Contro T Component Local Room Yes No Interlock Function Main supply fans (HVS 4A,4B) Start Main supply steam valve 2. Supply air dampers to engineered HVE 9A,9B Open safety features pump room (Dl,D2,D3,D4) 34 Supply air dampers to HVE 9A,9B Close pipe tunnel (DSA,SB)

4 ~ Supply air(1) dampers to selected HVE 9A,9B Close, areas (D7A,7B,D11A,11B)

5 ~ Exhaust air dampers for engineered HVE 9A,9B Close safety features pump room (D9A,9B) 6. Main exhaust air dampers HVE 9A,9B Close for pipe tunnel (D-.12A,12B)

7 ~ Main»exhaust dampers for shutdown heat HVE 9A,9B Close exchangers (D-5A,5B, D-6A$ 6B) 8. Main exhaust a) fans None None (HVE-lOA,10B) b) inlet None None dampers Selected areas: specific branch ducts to corridor as shown on Fig. 9.4-1

9.4-16 TABLE 9.4-5 (Cont'd) Manual Control SIAS Control SIAS Control Component Local Room Yes No Interlock Function 9. ECCS area exhaust a) fans None Start (HVE-9A,9B) b) fan inlet dampers None Start (D-14,D-16) c) fan outlet dampers None Open (L-7A$7B) Electrical and batter room vent s ste

1 ~ Steam coil valve None None 2. Supply fans (HVE-5A,5B) None None

3 ~ Room lA exhaust fans 'RV-3,4) None None and dampers (L-9,10) 4, Room 1B fans=- (HVE-11,12) None None and dampers (L-9,10) 5. Battery room exhaust fans None None (Rv-l,RV-2) Locker areas and machi ne sho vent s s tern Steam coil HVE-3 valve HVE-5 None 2. Supply fan HVE-3 (HVS-3) HVE«5 None

3 ~ Locker room exhaust fan HVS-3 (HVE-4) HVE-5 None and damper (L-5) 4., Machine shop exhaust fan HVS-3 None (HVE-5) and damper (L-6)

Radio chem lab. count room and instrum ent room o ~ ~ ~ ~ a/c s stem A/C fan * None None

9.4-17 9.4.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM

9.4.3.1 Desi n Bases

The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) area ventilation system is designed to provide post-LOCA filtration and adsorption of fission products in the exhaust air from areas of the reactor auxiliary building which contain the following equipment: a) containment isolation valves b) low pressure safety infection pumps c) high pressure safety injection pumps d) containment spray pumps e) shutdown heat exchangers f) piping which contains recirculating containment sump water following a LOCA

9.4.3.2 S stem Descri tion

The ECCS area ventilation system air flow diagram is shown on Figure 9.4-1, the P & I diagram on Figure 9.4-2 and design data on Table 9.4-6. The air exhaust system consists of two redundant centrifugal exhaust fans (HVE-9A, B), HEPA and charcoal filter banks, and associated duct work dampers and controls. The exhausted air is vented to the outside atmosphere.

Under normal operation, the reactor auxiliary building main ventilation supply and exhaust system provides the necessary ventilation of the ECCS pump rooms. Under accident conditions when several or'll of the pumps are operating, the air supply to the nonessential section of the reactor auxiliary building is directed to the pump rooms to provide the additional cooling air requirement. Dampers are positioned automatically on SIAS signal to provide the proper flow path for supply air to the ECCS area. Simultaneously, the exhaust fans are energized and dampers in the. exhaust ductwork are positioned to allow the fans to 'draw all exhaust air from the area through the HEPA and charcoal filter bank before discharge to the atmosphere. Table 9.4-5 lists the components actuated on SIAS and gives the control function of the SIAS on that component.

The ventilation system is sized to maintain a slightly negative pressure of between 1/4 and 1 inch wg in the ECCS area with respect to surrounding are'as of the reactor auxiliary building. Access into the ECCS area from other parts of the reactor auxiliary building is through gasketed self- closing or locked closed doors. Opening of locked doors is under administrative controls.

9.4-18

TABLE 9.4-6

DESIGN DATA FOR ECCS AREA VENTILATION'SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Fans

Quantity 2 If Capacity, cfm 30,000 Static pressure, in. wg 6 (HVE-9A), 5 (HVE-9B) Actual air flow at inlet, cfm 30,000 Air density, lb/ft3 0.075 Code Class III Type, both systems Centrifugal, variable pitch belt, air foil, non-overloading 2. Motors

Quantity 2 Type Horizontal, 40 HP, 460 volt, 3 phase, 60 cycle Insulation Class B powerhouse Enclosure 6 ventilation Open, drip-proof

3. HEPA Filters

Quantity, per bank 30 Air flow, cfm 30,000 Cell size, in. 24 x 24 x 114 Cell arrangement 5 wide x 6 high Max resistance, clean, in. wg 1.0 Max resistance, loaded, in. wg 3.0 Efficiency 99.97% with 0.3 micron DOP smoke Material Glass asbestos paper separated by aluminum inserts, supported on cadmium plated steel frame Code UL-586, Class 1 4. Charcoal Adsorbers

Quantity per bank 90 Air flow, cfm 30,000 Cell size, in; 24x8x30 Cell arrangement 6 wide x 15 high Max air resistance, in. wg 1. 15 Efficiency 99.9% min of iodines with 5% in the form of methyl iodine, when operating at 70 percent relative humidity and 150 F

9.4-19 TABLE 9.4-6 (cont'd)

Loading capacity, gm 6000 gm stable iodine and 360 gm of radioactive iodine including 30 gm of CH~I including 30 gm of methyl iodine Maximum residence time, sec 0.25 Material adsorber activated coconut shell charcoal Enclosure stainless steel type 304L ASTM Gaskets Neoprene ASTM D1056, Grade SCE -43 Frame Steel ASTM-A36 5. Ducts

Material galvanized sheet metal, ASME A-525 Class E

9.4-20 0 Piping penetrations into the enclosed area are provided with flexible rubber seals which limit the amount of in-leakage. The seals permit differential movement between the piping and the wall due to thermally or seismically induced motion.

9.4.3.3 S stem Evaluation

The ECCS area ventilation system components meet the same requirements for redundancy, independence, emergency power, quality assurance, and natural phenomena as the safety systems which they serve.

Redundant safety related components such as the safety in)ection pumps, shutdown heat exchangers or containment spray pumps require ventilation for proper operation; each redundant component is served by a separate ventilation fan and associated dampers and controls. In this way failure of a single active ventilation component can affect operation of only one of the redundant safety related components. Each of the redundant ventila- . tion components and its controls is powered from a separate emergency bus.

Dampers connecting the ECCS area ventilation system with other parts of the auxiliary building main exhaust and supply systems fail in the closed position upon loss of control air or power. Dampers which align flow from the area through the charcoal filter train and exhaust fans fail in the open position.

The ventilation system is sized to maintain a slightly negative pressure in the engineered safety features area with respect to surrounding areas of the auxiliary building. Ductwork conveying air to the HEPA and charcoal filters will also be at negative pressure.

Upon loss of normal power, the system will be automatically connected to the emergency power source if required to operate. The fans and dampers associated with each of the separate filter trains are powered from separate buses and receive actuation signals from separate SIAS channels. No single failure will prevent both trains 'from operating. All ventilation system components are designed and installed as seismic Class I equipment and are located in seismic Class I structures. Pur- chase specifications require manufacturers to submit type test, or calculational data to verify the capability of the equipment to function during.and following a design basis earthquake. Charcoal filter components receive factory and fluid tests similar to those described for the shield building ventilation system in Section 6.2.3.4.

9.4.3.4 Testin and Ins ection Preoperational tests will be performed on the system to ensure that it is capable of meeting its performance and design basis requirements. All automatic and manual. sequences are tested to ensure proper operation.

9.4-21 Manufacturers tests include:

a) pressure testing HEPA filter casings at 30 in. wg vacuum for distortion

b) pressure testing casings at 2 psig for leaks c) performing filtration tests to verify filter design performance for filtration, air flow capacity, air flow resistance, moisture and overpressure resistance, and shock and vibration d) verifying charcoal adsorber design efficiency

9.4.3.5 Instrumentation A lication

Table 9.4-4 lists the parameters used to monitor and control system operation. The function of the instrumentation is to monitor pressure across the HEPA filters and alarm low exhaust fan flow. The operator manually starts the standby unit on a low flow alarm.

Table 9.4-5 lists the ECCS area vent system components that are actuated by an SIAS and the control function of the SIAS.

Both exhaust fans are automatically started on SIAS, but the operator can manually shut one fan down and place it on standby. The logic and system instrumentation is discussed in Section 7.7.4.

9.4-22 9.4.4 RADWASTE .AREA VENTILATION

The radwaste area is located inside the reactor auxiliary building and is serviced by the reactor building main ventilation system, which is discussed in Section 9.4.2.

9.4.5 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION

The turbine building is an open structure with no ventilation system for the equipment areas except for the switchgear room and chemical storage areas which are enclosed. The areas are ventilated by wall mounted exhaust fans.

The turbine building ventilation system serves no safety function. System design data is given on Table 9.4-7 .

9.4.6 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING VENTILATION

The fuel handling building ventilation system is designed to reduce plant personnel doses by preventing the accumulation of airborne radioactivity in the fuel handling building due to diffusion of fission products from the spent fuel pool. The system is also designed to allow operation of the spent fuel cooling equipment contained within the fuel handling building. The system serves no safety function since it is not required to limit off-site doses resulting from a refueling accident to within the limits of 10CFR100. Accordingly, exception is taken to Item 4 of the regulatory position of AEC Safety Guide 13. The exclusion distance and meteorology for this site sufficiently limit refueling accident doses without reliance on ventilation and filtration systems. The assumptions, evaluation, and results of the refueling accident analysis are given in Section 15.4.3.

The fuel handling building ventilation system consists of two separate supply systems and two separate exhaust systems. The system flow diagram is shown on Figure 9.4-1 and the system piping and instrumentation diagram is given on Figure 9.4-2.

Each supply system consists of a hooded wall intake, an air handling unit with filters, steam coils and fan section, and a duct distribution system. One system supplies air to the fuel pool area and the other system supplies air to the lower areas. The fuel pool area air is exhausted through air inlets around the periphery of the fuel pool. Air is discharged by two 100 percent capacity centrifugal fans to the atmosphere through a prefilter and HEPA filter bank.

Air exhaust from the lower areas is passed through a prefilter and HEPA filter bank before being discharged by a centrifugal fan to the atmosphere.

9.4-23 1'ABLE 9.4-7

DESIGN DATA FOR TURBINE BUILDING FUEL POOL AND DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING HEATING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Turbine Buildin Air Exhaust S stem

Switchgear Room

Number of fans installed (HVE-18 & 19) Number of fans normally operating

Fan capacity, cfm, each 10,000

Fan static pressure, in. wg 0.25

Fan motor HP 1.5

No. of filters none Chemical Storage

Number of fans installed (HVE-20) Number of fans normally operating

Fan capacity cfm, each 250

Fan static pressure, in. wg 0.125

Fan motor HP 0.166

No. of filters none

Diesel Genenerator Buildin Air Exhaust S stems (data given is identical for both rooms)

Number of fans installed (RV-5 & 6)

Number of fans normally generating none

Fan capacity, cfm 5000

Fan static pressure, in. wg

Fan motor HP 0.5

No. of filters none

9.4-24 TABLE 9.4-7 (cont'd)

3. Heatin and Ventilation Room Air Exhaust S stem

Number of fans installed (HVE-17)

Number of fans normally operating

Fan capacity, cfm 2500

Fan static pressure, in. wg 0.33

Fan motor HP 0.5

No. of filters none

4. Fuel Pool Air Su 1 S stem Fuel Pool Area Lower Area (HVS-6) (HVS-7)

Number of fans sections installed 1 1 (HVS-6 6 7)

Number of fans normally running

Fan capacity, cfm 9800 8300

External static pressure, in. wg 0.75

Fan motor HP

No. of filters

5. Fuel Pool Air Exhaust S stem

Number of fans installed (HVE-16A & B, HVE-15)

Number of fans normally running

Fan capacity, cfm 10,000 8,100

Fan static pressure, in. wg

Fan motor HP 7.5

No. of prefilters

No. of HEPA filters

9.4 25 Radiological considerations of system operation are discussed in Sections 11.1.2.4 and 12.2.2.5. I The sole system instrumentation function is to alert the control r'oom on fuel pool air exhaust fan low flow.

1 The fuel pool air exhaust fans are controlled manually from the control room. The fan inlet dampers are opened and closed on the same control signal as the exhaust fans. These dampers are air operated and fail closed on loss of power or compressed air.

The fuel pool air supply fan is controlled from a local switch with fan status lights provided in the control room. The operation of the supply fan is interlocked with the operation of the fuel pool exhaust fans.

Fuel handling building air temperature is thermostatically kept at a minimum of 60 F. Flow to the steam coils in the air intake system is controlled by operation of the steam flow valves in the supply system inlets. These valves can be manually controlled by a local switch. Preoperational tests are performed on'he system to ensure meeting performance and design basis requirments. This system is in service during normal plant operation and so is monitored continuously through its performance.

9.4.7 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM

The diesel generator building ventilation system is designed to provide ambient conditions suitable for occupancy when the emergency generators are not in operation. A power roof ventilator located in each room is sized(5000 cfm) for four air changes per hour. The system serves no safety function since it is not required for'peration of the emergency generators. When the diesel generators are in operation, the fans serving the engine cooling system radiators also provide ventilation air flow through the building. There are no automatically controlled valves in this system. There is only one piece of equipment to be controlled, the power roof ventilator, and it is actuated manually from a local switch.

9. 4-26 9.4.8 CONTAINMENT VESSEL VENTILATION SYSTEM

The major ventilation systems located inside the containment vessel are listed below. Each system is designated according to the scheme used for identification purposes as shown on the P6I diagram, Figure 9.4-3.

Scheme ~S'etem

A Containment Purge System B Containment Vacuum Relief C Containment Fan Coolers D Airborne Radioactive Removal Units E Reactor Support Cooling System F CEDM Cooling System G Reactor Cavity Cooling H Purge System System'ydrogen

A system closely related to the containment vessel ventilation systems is Scheme I, the shield building ventilation system (Section 6.2.3).

Schemes A and D are designed to limit doses to plant personnel and are discussed in Section 12.2. The remaining schemes with the exception of E and G are discussed in Section 6.2.

The system flow diagram is shown on Figure 9.4-1 and design data for schemes E and G are given in Table 9.4-8.

9.4.8.1 Reactor Cavit Coolin S stem The reactor cavity cooling system is designed to ventilate the annular space between the reactor vessel and the concrete primary shield wall to a maximum of 150F. The purpose of the cooling system is to limit ther« mal growth of the supporting steel work and minimize the possibility of concrete dehydration and consequent faulting. The system also cools the reactor vessel insulation.

Basic components consist of two axial fans, each sized for 100 percent capacity, and a ducted air supply system. Cooled air is drawn from'the fan cooler ring header and directed into the annular space formed between the reactor vessel and the primary shield wall. During normal operation only one fan is operated while the other acts as a standby. Each fan can be started manually from the control room. An air flow switch in the discharge of each fan annunciates on low flow after a 10 second time delay.

9.4-27 TABLE 9.4-8

DESIGN DATA FOR REACTOR SUPPORT COOLING SYSTEM AND REACTOR CAVITY COOLING SYSTEM

1. Reactor Su ort Coolin S stem

Number of fans installed (HVE-3A 6 3B) 2, one standby

Number of fans normally operating

Fan capacity, cfm, each 9000

Fan static pressure, in. wg

Fan motor HP 20

2. Reactor Cavit Coolin S stem

Number of fans installed (HVS-2A 6 2B) 2, one standby

Number of fans normally operating Fan capacity, cfm, each 20,000

Fan static pressure, in. wg 1.5

Fan motor HP 10

9,4-28 0 Ambient temperatures are recorded from two locations 180 apart and alarmed at 150F.

All system components are suitable for operation in 120F ambient and 1 rad/hr radiation dose rate environments.

9.4.8.2 Reactor Su ort Coolin S stem

The purpose of the reactor support cooling system (in con)unction with the reactor cavity cooling system) is to limit the temperature of the supporting steelwork to 150F, thus restricting thermal growth. The system is designed to restrict heat transfer from the reactor vessel at 600F to the supporting steelwork at 150F.

The basic system components consist of two centrifugal fans, each sized for 100 percent capacity plus the distribution ductwork. Air is drawn from the space at approximately 120F and directed to the steelwork re- quirig cooling.

During normal operation, one fan is run at a time, while the other acts as a standby. Each fan is started manually from the control room. An air flow switch in the discharge of each fan annunciates an alarm on low flow after a 10 second time delay;

All system components are suitable for operation in 120F ambient and 1 rad/hr radiation dose rate environments.

The temperature of each reactor support is monitored by a temperature recorder and annunciates on temperatures above 200F.

9.4.8.3 Testin and Ins ection

Preoperational tests are performed on the systems to ensure that they are capable of meeting performance and design basis requirements.

This system is in service during normal plant operation and system performance, is monitored continuously.

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I'EACTOR 1 COMTA()(MEE(T 8VILD(b(G ( wA&TC FeLTca 2oo csirl DWG NO. 877D-G-862 I Lp safaev 1 Nsascrv 244 0 ~L ~e 14 1 C4 T10 N I i N 4 CCT I04 pu»Pea (tutee io Csw WJSTC Cotio PV SPP 1100 CCN O~k DA1 SGGOCFN( CDCOCIH 1 4 w 1 L 15 FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY 1'1 Ccac I I AUtlDRY f1LTCR 5 SGOOCFH '5020 Clw CLGICD Duksha 51401 uow4 CJCK, LLUWFRY OR vaieii.iA I'IGO CSH Hutchinsan Island Plant. ~ lff. IA t 44 1& pistips as» ai p l SKUTGOW4 47, tacu.l tt40 cwcw ok, puvc covpsio 1 DR. pil i~ CSH — CF 14 HVAC AIR FLOW DIAGRAM ~5000 cccpewrck Su»ps 4 2600 CVCH, Dk ra»la COO Cctf Siss i 4 Cw, au R. p 70 ATM, ~ Ckeac SNCLGJU&$ D)EBEL GE'AERATOR ()V)LD(t)G PEACTOR AL)X ILIA(SY ()VILD)b)C FIGURE 9.4-1

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HO. 8770-G -879 I Wg»VC 4$ I oat r r»440V LLCCrartaL Prtar R»10 ig ~JQ»s Csfv I FLOR)DA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY I LOCAL Pa I ST ANON ~A-I ~asoavf s l 4 g L~io» avos sg0, I Hutchinson Island Plant 4 1 ( «SOPC St(Tv»0 POT CLASS ~WC I 5 a- I 'Rtk~-Y 'A 04 HOTCI ALL Loca LLavkrcsrs L ro 04 LOLAISD ~ liv 10 A4 SCHEME-H CA(aL Pa RPO» ~ HVAC P(T,I DIAGRAM CREH 0'J'01 ar04 SLDCALPP RAD(0 LAEs, COUNT RN IJHGP I IL5T4LS $ REP Acr DY5TESII NJS ~ AWO I AND OCHRlca 0 COLD LAB,FIRST A(D ROOM ~ HEALTH 4 PHYSICS OFFICE AIC SYSTEM FUEL BANDUNG BUILDING YENTILAT)ON S'VSTEM ELECTRICAL EQUIP NTI - C(.A55-1 La(RDT R VAL'cts AHD COIL S FOR »akvs»o Ccs FIGURE 9.4-2

OPCNS VALVKKc.tl At- 4>4 Pat caoaa D >0 fat LH VIA> St SLTWLL«CO«T> i«MCHT4 O>>TS>DL ~ 0>L&vtata«>L vftaTT55/ NVC aa STat U»0.5>ra> SW w/wo LH«TS 0« a Tc ~ NN fa>5>VSWl>l'i fHH>ls tvfart»5 Nva'405raravfa /5TAKT 'sw.w> DLH,«>0 0 r- --> i R 1515 i loa V ~ »5 CONTaw«t«v isoaav>OH 1 ~ S Ct5V DC t«4«ai (L>ll C t tati fAH i.alH 04 t4 1 la rs'2$ 't SOR «VC >0 aatRD'LCD TD ODCN >CSAL fwa« Pwl'AIF> DifF >Is tll >C>>A>. Faa« tHS 25 ls I.>tpss Paa 25 Hnefcf 25-TT 'T«f l>OV > 5«ALL ST>p Faw a«05TAT I *a tl>5 2P'> ~ rla Kv.tc.+ON also 00'F ~Sov ~ SCV AT Ta>aat. RLRNL>A I OO sal NCWCVWCLL T.CHA r sc>tcvoalawc>a>T to pa> ~ p Soar I CLASS 1 I ~4 I 441, I! RVv'2 1 I +10 ~a>C 1 sar to/>awoa >cf ts 1 a>a act v«v>A2 ~ 0T tCC ts & 1 I I I srU>r srosv rail 25~0 TP>o6 p«0 @to LOCAL aff AVTO.D> CTATHN o~ I I .'/>SO UC«rl I I «,C ~ I 20 al tl I TO-No Ps» I 20-ao PUO I >o-aa PSM I I i«2lCT>ON 5 ~SC ta HFOK fcV.1S-V saNfL L Co«sacr«>H SC 15«i FOR FCV \'2 O g>FH 41OV (VV0> CA>D >15v sc N 5«\14 to ttH r- SSSTEE>> f00«ac Has I ~ >4 MW 25 2 5 5512). CSN>i, cpcy ~ »\ 'O I I g I CLASS 2 I 0 ~ 4 vo I I 55R lclass 2 I a«gaatga 1 I 1>LNOT c>tl« I HSCV1 ca>L>«4 pvto'L I N 1«otv.s N f f I V 25 >O~ 1 LC tatvaNT opa« f.t, >LC N. s 15 S Foa «VL iv P aa«ss a Lfvs>MG I v SS,>>FF 4 LJ5 roa «>chio '0 2%4 foa «' C t> ~ 2>i Fcv 25 2 fav.t> 4 CV >lrr ~ OAI To vL«T Srac\c fav 1 .0 «ct >IBl stoa«cc >4 2» ts s foa it.sa FCOM RN>CI>tAaac «> ~ >SJ To av«os Lla >.54 Ll« 5 SLsala p It roR fcv-151 LOCAL 5TAT>ON >5 FOL K'> ~ —>20 V. I ~ Soar o'H> I ~ 205 T P>stats l l r 8 sw l >-4 1 I CON TU«N CS >1 t>CH rO ~H l«r a««vws 1 0 V) LHC R. I t>FV I I 1 I afaftts EYNAUDT fAND «TL.ISE«ct.>D I >o>>ca> l lo>, R> 1 >Na L>s«>s H>o.a>4«vo >«4 L>a«lo >«O. >4«VO Pttf>LTCts L H NVL«a N FOR>wtr>a,tvtaatg >ll,vtI vvaac tal'>a I5~Citrt>«wl'>alta I i ».D.L>a >0 i«0. L>4«>0 l — Yraaa Valve Y>«sa valtc I v>ass ra> YL I I i«D L>4«TD 4 D HYC >T cilAH>Yfoa «ca 2 Twas0 tIce of $0«avool sf sv>«a>as/ Sf 4'sc a>SST c« a>aoc of.c> c« ,'racl>w>l NV'1 1O it H4 l N4 l>C sr.l a>40! aal la NSNC «00«fa foa Vl 20 >as ~ NS tal.tL tcv 1st f4 Fasts.>5 i>ONL HVC 21 «\C '>1) I I I I I 0«KTOS ill >0 SCC LHB="P-jj S.ca «sv >«facaaoo« I-a«NW>r>s Cc«TNS«c«r -+a sraar svcov FAN I l II SCHEME- B SCHL C D r I I I I EX»AVDT A>>D ilVE >a>ergo.TT>TDTN555 - I CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF CLASS I SCHEME-A t«CRC. ( ~ YoicaL!OK Fcv ts T)fasts fO ofc«$ tai.Yes Kftsh l fcv ' 1 I J 5>C«rc >0aM Po>l'25'I ~ vl «aa «a«>0 falNV>LL 5«A>L STOP FAN to'»aa"Lv'~«T~~T ~> CONTAINMENT PURGE, SYSTEM

'STOP CTA>ir Swale« r O'Ntlra tao> RTSD Ns r-- Clat-Aors~CO> 1 N>ND l,>4 s>ap-avvo.pvaav sw>rc« 2 lad w/«LSA S 04 Rfao N« 2 >if>Sf>WC A-v asov lr4 ~ So f. I 5 Irv 440 K ft ts t fol INS >A «V~F 1 Tc SOR H>a >0 r---- qS ~ Stop sTA>>T 0«>vc« W r r 5440 'll 4 50.40& 1 I Tl t> 4 toa >l>$ IC I 4 >v'«0 LM«>sa« 'lTOO las I 1 I >tov DC Tlrts 0 foa >I>S D I ~0 \La HLRG>r Ef> I PS>S O OPLH I 5>AAT 5rlov FAN N I tO Cr>> I fg +a Dc arcs ~«R las C ~to>$ l5 la>l«H< 4.4 L I I " QA a« afss I r 1 I FL L 2$ 2 I st ~ ALARMcw WJ>ra I St scl. plass asov KC 1 I is«litt J 1 0> fF 2 wc«p wSJc>r ~ tOV AC 1 0>ittoltED Pl> 1> 5 foa«cth CN Rfcs ~ lal CD TD DPCH ttl 254 f>N> >SEE I 5 «tsa co««acv>OH I I (TVtICAL) «t

TD SDPPORTD ~ afoa «ta TD2% f04 «Va >A f0.15.4fl 15 la«l«>a.ti CNC>.OLVRR N>S ii FS'25 fa foa >0 >A ~ a i « ~ FS ~ IS )0 fol va t I «> ~ 0 >C tt ~>CtA WLTCL ~ ts '10 soa >0 >2> Cool«SS «>5 >0 \ Tl-talfat >ah L J» A Di RTCS, laa N 2 C«AKCOAl >c't5Nfoawlc ALAS>5 sar CO>« aosoRDKR arL COOL>«G I I CO>l I ALllMScr AT TOOFC oN RTcs ~ las >0 SCC 0«Rico-i» ON KTCS la4 I r 4 FC I MH FAN ON RTCO ~ laa itov DC . 44 ra Sraav arolv L I L«KKG>LCD Lr ON R'fCS Na o'fSrl I 5 ~A L r i a> I to L r I SCHEME'-C I I SCHEME -0 I -'> case L SK I ~ NT +5040 ~ F'AN - — ~%0 ~.So.aotr CONTAINMENT COOLERS -CLASS T AiRSORNE RADIOACTIVITY RELTO>/AL U>2>TS 1 T>LS 1 JI Tsca Sva .Sfaav SWWCN H COW > SCHEME-E L-- - fc>wt L>4«>so>a>00 las SCHEME F wli «000> «TD w> K rod- as REACTOR 51/PPORT COOLINCF SY5TEM CE DM COOLING SYSTE.M LEGEND SOLLHO>D KLL«C«T LOCAL fao 2 LOCA>. Po STAT«w tDld PRSSS, D>44,«>0 SW>TCH I 5VOP START Swi>CN p~ Hc co«lao> s«»Tc >Tov Ac «5 w/>at L>ss>5 T 4 TKHPCKAT>wa RtcoaocR, I WIVALVL~Ds>t>o« «>acava f«ate'ttD I 1 ~ F R, PH>W LLCHKHT ,OOPLH I N,O. NOF.H LLY OPL«tD «Swl TO ATHOS «la T>ON 5 r H.4 NO>t« Lsv Ci OSLD v asof SAMf(t Co««CCT>ON V I 00«5 P ~ 0 PA>i OPEN 10 Ir----—>5@ Ca~> /D. 1 ~ SOU tvv F I ~ > P,OOA> cc c. Fall cLDLCD 11 i>i'ill>OCLWS«1 iitta T,D, T>HL DR«AY «aX oi>&KD Fd PLOW SW>TCH s I Nwls«H> 20 1'>LTKRS TL To opaH ~ 100>C «I ~«>slats / srar>ON Ta«taaav»RL LLKMKNf I E socaL p>s w Tl 'rc«tc>>ATvac >ND>cAvo>L ~f oc arcs. >aa 0> Td LIH>'r Cw>fc« r ~A L 1 J'l/L>LV CR ~ « PDT- D>FSCCLN'f>al PRLls.TRAHSl>>TTLQ HC I DJ> >lao>«V rs T«LN«osTAT >2>>2> co«s>NAT>ON svaavtiacotc>«r 2 2 CV Ci >2255 Y->5.4 Y 252 sassy I S.CV ~ S TO VKNT STARTER, ~ toM DOHL P 52 LC LC STACK SCHEME P r K l4 V.>sd F>LTCR GAGC TocsH o Y RooM5 Ex>IAUST rlc Tcswcaawac N>0>calwc CD>v>NLLCR 10 VS st>c LOCKCD CL0510 VALVC clcc 1, «>4 olkacoaL >f250 4 ova ir«) M CO> 400040tao a>AKH f5 Hasta Gas illAT cowtatlaoics l l FOR ADWT>OHA> LLOLHDSt a Dwors Sat a N FC f25«5 AC NOTE str 2 p.v itof Dittcl>tD Apt>l COMTA>HHLNT ANH>ILUB tf 1 raota« ALL >!2>W FLOW ALARMS TO I hcc 1540 r ADOV BE 5ET AT 25'/ OS FLOW, 'tov ~LOFAL «asfsar>MG CfHTROI sPQ~--- CWLE55 OTNE>>W>5E NOTED. 1 >w>«NTL«NT>alvc,to«c>ha L- s ra- aN arcs-as NC l ~ I Lo >0 lls >.N H LOCAL Po slAT>M> CHatr«LLtocso>c.faH To ROH 5 W/i«0. UCN>5 Itov AC I L~g.--«raa> oc aves-Ns DHLTw>RH v*lvtis >Hr c>SLLD )aaaaD>ttD I I ~oors> 4> >I q DWG NO. 8770-G -878 LOCATC Two TlEVMaaaVP>cs I >00 APART >RU> li C 10 f54 5 2H:VH5 SIDS V IDG Ncvlaa« 50>40» D.CV.T ocllclaas I I L ll FROH DOH LC LC FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY svap.sraar swwc« frH>R L>45>of« avao >04 T.t CV D SCHEME NG ovvs>DL a>Q Hutchinson Island Plant LC V >S i NOTE> ALL Nvtaoot« P«ala SVSTCN REACTOR CAVITY COOLING SYSTEM ster t WKL«~R 4«vwN- HVAC PB I DIAGRAM SCHEME- J HYDROGEN PURGE SYSTEM- CLAFSS-I FIGURE 9.4-3

9.5 OTHER AUXILIARYSYSTEMS

9.5. 1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM

9.5.1.1 Desi n Bases

Equipment and facilities for fire protection, including detection, alarm and extinguishment, are provided to protect plant equipment, structures and personnel from fire or explosion. Both wet and dry types of fire fighting/suppression equipment are provided. Fire prevention is empha- sized by using noncombustible and fire resistant materials wherever practical and minimizing the exposure of combustible materials to fire hazards. j The system is designed so that its inadvertent operation does not 'produce an unsafe plant condition. The system is not designed to withstan'd design basis earthquake loads; however, its failure does not prevent the proper operation of safety related systems and components. 1 . The fire protection system is designed to comply with the applicable codes and regulations of the State of Florida. l

9.5.1.2 S stem Descri tion The fire protection system supplies city water to plant fire hydra'nts, deluge systems and hose racks in the various areas of the plant for fire fighting purposes. The fire water system as illustrated in Figure's 9.2-5 and 9;5-1 is comprised of a 12 in. diameter underground fire loop around the plant, with hydrants spaced approximately 200 ft apart. Fire mains and hose reels extend to various locations in the turbine and auxiliary buildings to provide coverage for fighting plant fires. Other fire mains supply water to the deluge systems serving the main, auxiliary and start-up transformers. -Post indicator isolation valves for sectiona- lizing the header increase reliability of fire water supply in case of a fire main break.

The fire protection system, when not operating, is kept pressurized by 'he domestic water hydropneumatic tank (refer to Section 9.2.5). The tank pressure is maintained in the range of 95 to 125 psig by the domestic water pumps. If the transformer deluge system or a fire hose is actuated causing system pressure to decrease, both fire pumps starts automatically when header pressure drops to 85 psig. The two motor driven fire pumps draw suction from two city water storage tanks (500,000 gallons each) and discharge into the fire loop. A 500 gpm fire pump (portable, gasoline engine) is also provided.

Readily accessible l-l/2 inch hose lines and continuous flow type hose reels are distributed throughout the. plant except within the containment and the'.new and spent fuel storage area, so that all areas are within 'reach of a fog nozzle when attached to not more than 75 foot lengths of hose. Portable chemical fire extinguishers are provided at key locations including the control room, new fuel storage area, cable and relay room, and containment areas. The extinguishing media utilized are pressurized ~ater, C02 and dry chemicals .as appropriate for the service requirements of the area. The electrical transformers located in the transformer yard are suitably spaced from one another or separated by masonry walls as are

9.5-1 the main unit transformers. All transformers except the auxiliary transformers have heat sensors which activate their respective deluge systems. A local panel contains the alarms from the fire detection monitoring system. All local alarms are annunciated'n the control room. The fire protection system also provides water from the fire main for insulator washing.

Design data for components in the fire protection system are given in Table 9.5-1.

9.5.1.3 -S stem Evaluation

The plant fire protection system. is designed such that failure of any component 'of the system will not cause an accident or significant release of radioactivity to the environment and will not impair the ability of redundant equipment to safely shutdown and isolate the reactor or limit release of radioactivity to the environment in the event 'of a postulated accident. Compartments containing only electrical equipment.do not contain fire lines. Portable extinguishers are located in or adjacent to these compartments and throughout the plant to combat electrical fires.

1 Fire protection lines are not in areas which. house'safety related iequip- ment such as the engineered safety features pump'.room; Floor drains to these rooms are. routed to sumps in the auxiliary'building where accumulated water is pumped to the floor drain tanks. The sumps are provided with high level alarms. Should the sump pumps be unable to prevent rising level due to flooding, the alarms allow for corrective action by the operator.

Electric motors for Class I equipment are drip proof and electrical controls are contained in weatherproof', drip proof enclosures which prevent damage from water impingement.

Since the fire protection. system.and.reactor auxiliary building are designed to prevent flooding of'.redundant safety related equipment in the event of fire line damage, the system is not designed to seismic Class I standards. The floor drain sump level alarm instrumentation is sei'smic Class I.

Two 100 percent capacity motor driven fire,pumps with minimum recirculation lines to prevent pump overheating are provided. The two 2500 gpm motor driven fire pumps are connected to separate electrical power buses. If a loss of off-site power occurs,.the buses can be manually connected to the emergency diesel generator sets. Additional backup is provided by a 500 gpm portable gasoline engine driven fire pump. Low header pressure alarms are provided in the control room.

The use of the hydropneumatic tank for small makeup and the maintenance pumps'.5-2of a system pressure helps prevent frequent starting of the motor driven

TABLE 9.5-1

DESIGN DATA FOR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Fire Pum Electricall Driven

Type Horizontal centrifugal Number 2 Capacity, gpm 2,500 Discharge pressure, psig 125 Material: Discharge head Cast iron Impeller Bronze Motor 250 HP/460 Volts/3 Phase/60 hz Codes Motor: NEMA Pump: Standards of the Hydraulic Institute and NFPA

2. Fir'e Pum Gasoline En ine-Driven

Type Horizontal centrifugal Number 1 Capacity, gpm 500 Discharge pressure, psig 125

Material: F Discharge head Cast i'ron Impeller Bronze Codes Pump: Standards of the Hydraulic Institute and NFPA Engine HP (Continuous) 85

3. Domestic Water Pum Type Horizontal centrifugal Number 2 Capacity, gpm 350 Discharge pressure, psig 125 Material: Discharge head Ductile iron Impeller Cast iron Motor 50 HP/460 Volts/3 Phase/60 hz Codes Motor: NEMA

Pump: Standards of the < Hydraulic Institute

9.5-3 TABLE 9.5-1(Continued)

4. Pi in Fittin s And Valves

UNDERGROUND ABOVEGROUND

Material Cast iron Carbon steel Design pressure, psig 200 200 Design temperature, F 110 110 Construction Mechanical )oint Welded 6 screved Valves Cast iron Cast iron Mechanical )oint Flanged 175 psi 175 psi U. L. label U. L. label

5. H dro neumatic Tank

Material Carbon steel Capacity, gallons 3000 Length 19 1 5 II Diameter 6'-0 Design pressure, lb 200 Design temp, F 150 Code ASME Section VIII

9 '-4 0

0 9.5.1.4 Testin 'nd Ins ection

The fire protection system is provided with test hose valves for periodic testing. All equipment is accessible for periodic inspection. All pumping equipment is shop tested to assure that specifications are met.

The systems are operated and tested initiallywith regard to flow path, transfer capability and mechanical operability. The transfer capability will be tested periodically.

9.5.1.5 Instrumentation A lication

The parameters used to monitor and control the fire protection. system are listed in Table 9.5-2.

The system fire pumps are started" automatically by low pressure signals as indicated on Table 9.5-2. Once started, the pumps continue to operate until they are shut down manually.

The domestic ~ater pumps are controlled by level signals from the city water storage tank. These pumps can also be started and stopped locally. The only automatically operated valves in the fire protection system are those used for transformer deluge.

9.5-5 TABLE 9.5-2

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Instru- Normal Control (1) ment Operating Instrument System Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Function Range Range Accuracy Domestic Water Pum Outlet Pressure 0-200psig 125 psig + 0.5% H dro neumatic Tank

1) Pressure (2) 0-200 psig 95 -125 psxg + 0.5% .2) Level Control domestic Sight water pump operation glass 1-2.5 ft via low, low-low & above bottom high level signals

F~1re Pum Suction 1) pressure 0-20 psig 8.2 psig + 1.0% 2) Outlet discharge pressure 0-200 psig 125 psig + 1.0% Transformer

1) Deluge system pressure Start fire pump when pressure drops to 85 psig 0-200 125 psig + 1.0% psig (3) 2) Temperature Start transformer deluge Diesel Generator Buildin (4) 1) Temperature 95F (1) All alarms,and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated; (2) Alarm located at water treatment panel. (3) For all tranformers in transformer yard except auxiliary transformer. (4) Local building alarm. 9.5. 2 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

9.5.2.1 Desi n Bases

The communications systems are designed to assure reliable and diverse intraplant communications and outside telephone service for normal operation and emergency conditions.

9.5.2.2 S stem Descri tion 9.5.2.2.1 Intraplant Communications

Intraplant communications facilities are as follows:

a) A low level intraplant paging and communication (PA) system with two independent communications channels, one page and one party.

The PA system is composed of handset stations, speakers (horn and cone type), speaker amplifiers, and associated cabling and hardware all mounted in suitable enclosures and located throughout the plant to 'provide full plant coverage. b) A sound powered communications system for operating, testing, and maintenance purposes.

The sound powered communications system consists of headsets, remote jack stations, central monitoring station and patchboard,. together with associated cabling/wiring and hardware. Jack stations are located to facilitate periodic 'testing and maintenance of equipment.

The sound powered communication system requires no external power. The power necessary for communication is derived from the spoken voice. c) An interoffice communications system with a private automatic exchange (PAX) system for telephone and code calling communications. The PAX system consists of a central switching unit and supporting equipment together with associated cabling/wiring, telephone sets, co'de call chimes, horns, lights, and switching devices all mounted in enclosures located throughout the plant and offices. d) Radiation and fire alarms are incorporated into the PAX system. Each alarm is a distinct signal generated from a different tone generator, and is initiated by operator action. The signals are applied to horns located throughout the station. 9.5.2.2.2 External Communications Ten Bell Telephone System lines plus two additional lines for telemetering, load control and supervisory control, are provided for external communications via phones located in the control room and service building.

9.5-7 0

0 In the event of complete loss of all plant telephone service, a telephone line is provided for voice communication between the plant control and the System Load Dispatch Office. This is in addition to the normal plant telephone service.

As back-up to the telephone lines, a two-way radio facility (operating on 37.7 megahertz) is maintained between the control room and Florida Power & Light Company's Riviera Plant which maintains radio and telephone contact with the System Load Dispatch Office. The System Load Dispatch Office has direct telephone lines and either patched, or indirect radio contact with all plants and radio equipped vehicles in the Florida Power & Light Company System. The emergency power supply for the two-way radio is from the 120 volt ac vital instrument power system described in Section 8.3.1.1.6.

9.5.2.3 S stem Evaluation

Communication facilities of the types described are conventional and have a history of reliable operation at Florida Power & Light Company Plants.

The availability of the PA and PAX systems is assured by powering the systems from the vital ac bus which has three alternate supplies: a) inverter, fed from an emergency MCC b) voltage regulating transformer, fed from emergency MCC c) dc power from station battery

In the event of a loss of the normal off-site power sources, the communications system will remain operable since it can be powered from the station batteries. The diverse means of communications available ensure that no single active failure will prevent operation of the communications system. The PA, PAX and sound powered communication systems interconnecting cable is segregated to prevent common mode failure. 9.5.2.4 Testin and Ins ection

Most of the communication systems are in routine use and this provi'des a check of their continued availability. Those systems not frequently used will be tested at periodic intervals to assure operability when required.

9.5-8 9.5.3 LIGHTING SYSTEMS There are two lighting systems, the normal ac system and the emergency dc system. The normal ac lighting system is designed to provide indoor illumination levels in accordance with recommended levels published in the Illuminating Engineering Society Handbook (4th Edition). The normal ac system also provides outdoor lighting levels for orderly maintenance of plant equipment and for surveillance of the plant exclusion area. All indoor lighting is fluorescent except in the containment and fuel pool area where incandescent fixtures are used. The housing for the fixtures inside the containment are made of ferrous or brass material.

The outdoor lighting is provided by high intensity mercury discharge lights controlled by a photo«electric cell. A control room selector switch allows manual or photo-electric operation of the lighting. Specific outdoor lighting (e.g. doorway lighting) is locally switched.

The essential ac lighting consists of two (A and B) physically and electrically separate systems. Either of these two systems will provide the necessary indoor and outdoor lighting, to allow orderly maintenance and continuance of plant operation. Section 8.3.1 gives a detailed description of the on-site power system. P Upon failure of off-site power, the essential lighting circuits are powered by the diesel generator sets through the emergency portion of the auxiliary bus. The building egress areas are part of the essential lighting system. In the case where neither the A or B emergency system is operating (as during the time between loss of off-site power and the assumption of the lighting load by the diesel generator sets) there packs which supply an additional backup source. These packs are'attery provide four hours of additional lighting with complete loss of ac power. The'ontrol room is supplied with emergency dc lighting. There are two physically and electrically separate A and B systems energized from separate station batteries through separate conduits, fixtures and panels. Section 8.3.2 discusses the dc power system in detail. The lighting system is automatically energized by fail closed relays located within the control room.

Lighting supports inside the control room have been designed as seismic Class I.

9.5.4 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM

The diesel generator fuel oil system is designed to: a) provide oil storage capacity for at least seven days full load operation of one emergency diesel generator set

9.5-9 b) maintain fuel supply to at least one diesel generator set, assuming a single active or passive failure c) withstand design basis earthquake loads without loss of function

withstand maximum flood levels and tornado wind loading without loss of function

9.5.4.2 S stem Descri tion

The diesel fuel oil system is shown in Figure 9.5-2 and design data is found in Table 9.5-3.

The diesel generator fuel oil system is used to transfer diesel fuel oil from the on-site storage tanks to the day tanks which supply the emergency diesel generator sets.

Two completely redundant subsystems are provided, each consisting of a diesel oil storage tank, transfer pump, day tank, interconnecting piping and valves and associated instrumentation and controls. Subsystem A serves diesel generator lA and subsystem B serves diesel generator 1B. All electrical power necessary for operation of each subsystem is supplied from the associated diesel generator bus. The main components of the system are the following:

a) Day tanks — Two tanks in each redundant system are inter-. connected to provide a total of 400 gallons of fuel to each diesel generator set. The tanks have capacity for two full h'ours of full power operation of the diesel generator set.

b) Diesel oil storage tank — Tanks (20,000 gallons each) are provided in the system. Both diesel generator sets can operate for four days on 40,000 gallons. One set can operate for eight days on this same amount.

c) Fuel oil transfer pump — One 25 gpm pump in each system to transfer oil from the storage to the day tanks. Interconnecting piping and valves — Cross connection lines with locked closed valves are provided for transferring oil between the redundant systems. The cross connection lines are provided at both the pump suction and discharge.

The diesel fuel oil system is located on an outdoor platform except for the day tank and its associated instrumentation. The diesel oil transfer pumps are located above the maximum flood level to ensure their operation during floods.

9.5-10 TABLE 9.5-3

DESIGN DATA FOR DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM

1. Material Carbon Steel

Suction 50 D is charge 100

3. Tem erature F

Suction 120 Discharge 120

2Q inches and over Schedule 40 2 inches and under Schedule 40 5. Connections

24 inches and larger Butt weld 2 inches and smaller Socket weld 6. Valves

24 inches and larger Butt weld and/or flanged 2 inches and smaller Socket welded

7. Code ANSI B 31.7 Class III

9.5-11 9.5.4.3 S stem Evaluation

The design of the diesel generator fuel oil systems provides electrical and physical separation of components to assure that the system can withstand a single active failure. The pumps, tanks and other equipment in the system are designed for seismic Class I service. The equipment is designed to withstand the normal outdoor conditions of heat, humidity, and salt spray prevalent at the site. The system can also withstand tornado winds of 360 mph. The redundant fuel oil systems are far enough apart to prevent simultaneous damage by a single missile.

9.5.4.4 Testin and Ins ection

The components are inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the system. Instruments are calibrated during testing and automatic controls are tested for actuation at the proper set points. Alarm functions are checked for operability and limits during plant preoperational testing. Automatic actuation of system components is tested periodically in accordance with Section 16.4.8 of the Technical Specifications.

9.5.4.5 Instrumentation A lication Table 9.5-4 lists the measured parame'ters for monitoring the performance of the diesel generator fuel oil system.

Each diesel oil transfer pump has its own STOP/AUTO/RUN selector switch. Each pump is controlled by the level of its corresponding day tanks. The transfer pump is stopped on a high level signal whether it is operating in the automatic or manual (run) mode. If the pump is in the manual mode and is stopped by the level switch, the signal can be overridden by putting the pump in the automatic mode. This override capability permits manual transfer of fuel oil to either tank through each pump.

9.5-12 TABLE 9.5-4

DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm Ins tru- Normal Control (1) ment 'Operating Instrument System Parameter & Location Local Room High Low Recording Control Fun'ction Range Range Accuracy Diesel Oil Stora e. Tank Level (2) 0-20ft Full-4 ft '+3.0% Full-50% (3) 1) Control opera- 0-100% Full +3.0% tion of diesel oil transfer pump

2) Stop pump on high level when pump is in manual mode

(1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated. (2) Local alarms only.

(3) Local alarm and control from diesel generator panel alarm to control room.

(4) This "stop" can be overridden by switching pump to "automatic" mode. 0 Pied l)7PC 595755 + 7IC TCAO ~CIC SIIOVVC CCLCVL~ ~. ~ ~9

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DWG. NO. 8770.G.086

IDENTIFIES IN'IERFACE OF DUALITY FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY GROUP A, B, C OR D COMPONENTS. Hutcbinson Island Plant DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL PILI DIAGRALI FIGURE 9.5-2 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 10

STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM

I Section Title ~Pa e

10. 1 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION 10.1-1

10. 2 TURBINE-GENERATOR 10.2-1

10.3 MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM 10.3-1

10.3.1 DESIGN BASES 10.3-1

10.3.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 10. 3-1

10.3.3 SYSTEM EVALUATION 10. 3-2

10.3.4 TESTING AND INSPECTION 10. 3-3

10. 4 OTHER FEATURES OF STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10.4-1

10.4.1 MAIN CONDENSER 10.4-1

10.4.2 MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM, 10.4-1

10.4.3 TURBINE GLAND STEAM SYSTEM 10.4-2

10.4.4 STEAM DUMP AND BYPASS SYSTEM 10.4-2

10.4.5 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM 10.4-3

10.4.6 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM 10.4-4

10.4.7 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM 10.4-5

10.5 AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM 10.5-1

10.5.1 DESIGN BASES 10.5-1

10.5. 2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 10.5-1

10,5.3 SYSTEM EVALUATION 10.5-2

10.5.4 TESTING AND INSPECTION 10.5-2

10.5.5 INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION 10.5-3 LIST OF TABLES

Title ~Pa e

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS 10.1-2

EXPECTED RADIOACTIVITYCONCENTRATIONS IN THE STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10. 2-3

SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS- AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM 10.5-4

AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION 10.5-5 LIST OF FIGURES

~Fi ure Title

10. 1-1 MAIN, EXTRACTION AND AUXILIARY STEAM SYSTEMS P&I DIAGRAM

10. 1-2 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER, AUXILIARYFEEDWATER, AND AIR EVACUATION SYSTEMS P&I DIAGRAM

10. 1-3 HEATER DRAIN AND VENT SYSTEMS P&I DIAGRAM

10. EI-1 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM P&I DIAGRAM

10.5-1 AUXILIARYFEEDWATER REQUIRED AFTER LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER CHAPTER 10

STEAM AND POMER CONVERSION SYSTEM

10. 1 SEBfARY DESCRIPTION

The steam and power conversion system is designed to convert thermal energy in the form of steam, as produced in the two steam generators, into electrical energy by means of a regenerative cycle turbine-generator. The turbine consists of a high pressure turbine element, four moisture- separator/reheater assemblies, and two low pressure turbine elements all aligned in tandem. After expanding in the turbine, the steam is con- sed in the main condenser and the energy which is unusable in the thermal cycle is rejected to the circulating water system. The condensate is collected in a hotwell. Noncondensible gases in the steam are removed by the steam get air ejectors. The condensate is returned to the steam generators by means of two condensate pumps and two steam generator feedwater pumps. The feedwater passes through five stages of heat exchangers (i.e., high and low pressure heaters) arranged in two parallel trains where it is heated by steam extracted from various stages of the turbine. The drains from the first three stages of low pressure heaters are eventually cascaded back to the condenser hotwell, and the drains from the fourth stage low pressure heaters and the fifth stage high pressure heaters are returned to the feedwater system by two heater drain pumps. Heat produced in the reactor core is transferred from the reactor coolant to the water in the steam generators producing steam for use in the turbine. In the event of a turbine trip, the heat transferred from the reactor coolant to the steam generators is dissipated through the steam dump and bypass system to the condenser and/or through the atmospheric dump valves.

Safety related features of the steam and power conversion system include steam line isolation and auxiliary feedwater supply. These features are discussed in Section 10.3 and 10.5, respectively.

Design data as well as design codes applied to system components are given in Table 10.1-1. The system PEI diagrams are shown on Pigures 10.1-1, 2 and 3.

10.1-1 TABLE 10.1-1

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

1. Turbine-Generator

a. Turbine

Throttle flow, max. guaranteed, lb/hr 10 j446,749

Throttle flow, max. calculated, lb/hr 10,9 71,649 Throttle pressure (rating/VWO)*, psia 765/765 Steam moisture, max., percent 0.40

KW 8 rating, KW 841,926

KW 8 VWO, max. calculated, KW 876,543

Turbine back-pressure, in. Hg abs 3.2

No. of extractions b. Generator

Rating, KVA 1,000,000

Power factor 0. 85

Voltage, volts 22,000

Frequency/Phase, Hz 60/3

Hydrogen pressure, psig 60

2. Main Feedwater Pumps

Type two-stage centrifugal, horizontally split case, single suction, double volute Quantity

Capacity each, gpm 14,100 Head, feet 1,780

Design fluid temperature, F 380

*VWO — valve wide open

10.1-2 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Material

Case 11-13 Cr Steel

Impeller ASTM A-296, Gr CA 15

Shaft ASTM A-276, Type 410 HT

Driver Constant Speed, 3-ph, 60 cycle, Electric Motor, 7000 hp, 3560 rpm, 6600 v, 1.15 S.F.

Codes ASME Section VIII through Summer 1969 addenda

3. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Motor Driven Steam Trubine Driven

Type Single suction, horizontal, split, double volute, horizontal centrifugal

Stages Quantity

Capacity each, gpm *325 **600

Head, feet 2660 2660

Design fluid temperature, F 120 120

S.F. — service factor

* includes minimum recirculation flow of 75 gpm

** includes minimum recirculation flow of 100 gpm

10 '-3 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Motor Driven Turbine Driven Material

Case ASTM-351-52-T Gr CF8 ASTM-351-52-T Gr CF8

Impeller ASTM A-296, Gr CA 15 ASTM A-296, Gr CA 15

Shaft ASTM A-276, Type 410 HT ASTM A-276, Type 410 HT

Driver Constant Speed 3-ph Single stage, non- 60 cycle, electric condensing steam turbine, motor, 350 hp, 3570 575 hp, 2000 to 3600 rpm. rpm, 4000 v, 1.15 S.F. Seismic requirements Class I Class I

Codes ASME Sections III, 1971 class 3.

4. Condensate Pumps

Type Vertical centrifugal, 8-stage, can type Quantity

Capacity each, gpm 10, 200

Head, feet 19230

Fluid temperature, F 117.3 Material

Case ASTM A-48, C1.30

Impeller ASTM A-48, C1.30

Shaft ASTM A-276, 410 HT

10.1-4 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Driver Constant speed, 3-ph, 60 cycle, electric motor, 4000 hp, 1190 rpm, 4000 v, 1.15 S.F.

Codes ASME Sections VIII through Winter 1969 addenda.

5. Heater Drain Pumps

Type Vertical centrifugal 10-stage can type Quantity recirculation Capacity each, gpm 4390 (including minimum of 140 gpm)

Head, feet 840

Fluid temperature, F 320 Material

Case 13-4 Cr-Ni Steel Impeller 13-4 Cr-Ni Steel

Shaft ASTM A-276, Type 410 HT

Driver Constant speed, 3-ph, 60 cycle, electric motor, 1250 hp, 1760 rpm, 4000 v, 1.15 S.F.

Codes ASME Sections VIII through Summer 1969 addenda.

6. Main Condenser

Type Two shell, single pass with divided water boxes, surface condenser

10.1-5 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

9 Design duty, Btu/hr 5.850 x 10 Heat transfer area, ft2 546,000

Design pressure, psig Shell: 15 psig and 30 in. Hg vacuum Water Box: 25

Condenser Flow, max. guaranteed, lb/hr 7,820,492

Condenser Flow, max. expected, lb/hr 8,212,960 Material

Shell ASTM A-285, Gr C

Tubes ASTM B-ill, admiralty brass in main section 70-30 annealed Cu-Ni in air cooler section

Tube Sheets ASTM B-171

Codes Heat Exchanger Institute Standards for Steam Surface Condensers 1965 7. Steam Jet Air Ejector a. Inter-Condenser

Type single pass 2 Heat Transfer Area, ft 415 Design Pressure Tube side, psig 750 Shell side, psig 25 Material

Shell ASTM-A285, Gr C

Tubes 316 S.S. ASTM A249

Tube Sheets 316 S.S. ASTM A240

10. 1-6 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Codes Heat Exchange Institute Steam Jet Ejector Standard, Third Edition, 1956 b. After-Condenser

Type single pass 2 Heat Transfer Area, ft 160 Design Pressure Tube side, psig 750 Shell side, psig 25 Material

Shell ASTM-A285, Gr C

Tube 316 S.S. (ASTM A249)

Tube Sheets 316 S.S. (ASTM A2490)

Codes Heat Exchange Institute Steam Jet Ejector Standard, Third Edition, 1956

8. Feedwater Heaters

Heater Numbers 1A&lB 2A&2B 3A&3B 4A&4B 5A&5B

Type Closed, U-tube Closed, U-tube Closed, U-tube Material

Shell ASTM A-515-70 ASTM A-515-70 ASTM A-515-70

Tubes Admiralty ASTM B-111 Ann. ASTM-5B-163

Tube Sheets ASTM A-105-II ASTM A-105-II ASTM A-266-II Feedwater flow, lb/hr 7,818,000 117164,100 11,164,100

Codes ASME Section VIII through summer 1969 addenda; Heat Exchange Institute Standards for Closed Feedwater Heaters, 1968

10.1-7 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM 'AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

9. Drain Coolers

Cooler Numbers A&B

Type Straight Tube Material

Shell ASTM A-515-70

Tubes ASTM SB-111

Tube sheets ASTM A-105-II Feedwater flow (lb/hr) 7,818,000

Codes ASME Section VIII through summer 1969 addenda; Heat Exchange Institute Stan- dards for closed Feedwater Heaters, 1968

Heater Design duty Design press. (psig) Design temp. (F) Heat transfer / 6 1A, 1B 258.2x106 50 & V 750 300 * 300 18,740 2A,2B 165. 4xl06 50 & V 750 300 300 12,695 3A,3B 224.5x106 75 & V 750 320 320 12,390 4A,4B 39 3. 2x106 300 750 422 422 18,130 5A,5B 331.0xl0 425 1875 460 460 21,335 Drain Cooler No. 6 A,B 127. lxl0 300 750 422 422 4,710 10. Pi in and Valves

a. ~Pi 9.n Material Codes

Main Steam+ ASTM A 155~ GR KC 65 ANSI B31~7~ CL IIj 1969 CL I

Main Steam to ASTM A-106, GR B ANSI B31 ~7~ CL IIIj 1969 Auxiliary Feed Pumps

Feedwater* ASTM A-106, CR B ANSI B31,7, CL II, 1969

10.1-8 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS

Balance of Piping ANSI B31.1, 1967

Auxiliary Feed Pumps Suction-above ground ASTH A-106, GR B ANSI B31.7, CL III, 1969 Suction-under ground TYPE 316 SS ANSI B31.7, CL III, 1969

Discharge ASTH A-106, GR B ANSI B31.7, CL III, 1969 *To first steam isolation valve b. Hain Steam Isolation Valves I-HCV-08-1A B)

Type Stop 6 check

Quantity 2, 1 per main steam line Design Pressure, psig 985

Design Temperature, F 550 Haterials

Body 6 bonnet ASTH A216, Gr WCB

Steam ASTM A182, Gr F6

Backseat, seats & discs ASTH A182, GR F6

Code ASME Draft Pump and Valve Code, Class II, 1968 c. Hain Steam Safet Valves Refer to Table 5.5-2. d. Atmos heric Dum Valves I-V-08-312)

Type Globe, angle body

Quantity 2, 1 per main steam line Design Pressure, psig 985

Design Temperature, F 550

10.1-9 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS Materials

Body 6 bonnet ASTM A216, Gr WCB (carbon steel) ASTM A351, Gr F8 or F8M (stainless steel)

Stem ASTM A182, Gr F6

Basket, seats & discs ASTM A182, Gr F6

Code ASME Draft Pump and Valve Code, Class II, 1968

e. Steam Dum Valves (PCV-8802 8803 8804 8805)

Number

Type Globe Operator Pneumatic

Size/Class 10 in., 600 lb ANSI Materials

Body ASTM A-216 Carbon Steel

Bonnet ASTM A-216 Carbon Steel

Seat, Plug ASTM A-276, Type CA40

Code ANSI B16.5-1968 f. Steam B ass Valve (PCV-8861)

Number

Type Globe Operator Pneumatic

Size/Class 8 in., 600 lb ANSI Materials

Body Bonnet ASTM A-216 Carbon Steel

Seat, Plug ASTM A-296, Type CA40

Code ANSI B16.5-1968

10.1-10 TABLE 10.1-1 (continued)

DESIGN DATA FOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM COMPONENTS g. Steam Flow Elements (FE-8011 FE-8021)

Number ape Venturi Pipe I.D., inches 31.50

Venturi Throat .I.D., inches 20. 757

Diameter Ratio 0.659 Area Ratio 0.434 Materials

Pipe ASTM A-155, Gr Kc-65 Class I

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T I J ~ I~ I Q I a ass IN OI V »COT la ~ ue>'t ~ ~0 DY))G. NO. 8770-6-081 ~«~a-st Vrs vr oss ~ a-I TS ltt Its] wa 0 I; I .I' I ~stc 0) 4 \ ~ra FLORIOA POWER L LIGHT COMPANY ~ g' +r l ~ ~sc 00~00 Rr)00 ct 43 t ~WODo. I «2 va 41st IS I t CCS Hutchinsan Island Plant C L2TI> vr ktsk I v4Naa so coro sva I —~LV»~» — ~(irsasc -))- I'lo \ 040'CDS) I l ~~CN)r VN SYSTEM scca«ll I'0 kts I HEATER DRAIN AND VENT CTW) 3 I P8 I DIAGRAM L stot swkaoc NCATCL Cvakas»css OVIAO >0 FIGURE 10.1-3 I WA'\" O', ~ I't o i Vg III 10. 2 TURBINE-GENERATOR

The turbine-generator is intended for load following operation and is designed for load changes from 15 to 100 percent power and 100 to 15 percent power at a maximum rate of 5 percent per minute and at greater rates over smaller load change increments, up to a step change of 10 percent. The turbine-generator has a guaranteed gross rating of 842 Mwe when operating at zero percent makeup with five stages of feedwater heaters in service. It has a maximum calculated rating of 877 Mwe. Table 10.1-1 lists other pertinent performance characteristics.

The turbine is a Westinghouse Electric Corporation, tandem-compound, four-flow exhaust, 1800 rpm unit with 44-inch last row blades, and has moisture separation and reheat between the high pressure and the two low pressure elements. The ac generator and brushless-type exciter are direct-connected to the turbine-generator shaft. The turbine consists of one double-flow high pressure element in tandem with two double-flow low pressure elements. There are four horizontal-axis, cylindrical-shell, combination moisture- separator/reheater (MSR) assemblies located alongside the low pressure elements on the turbine building operating floor. This equipment receives steam from the exhaust of the high pressure turbine element. Internal manifolds in the lower section of these assemblies distribute the wet steam and allow it to rise through a chevron type moisture-separator where the moisture is removed. Steam extracted from the main steam line upstream of the turbine enters each MSR assembly, passes through the reheater tube bundle and leaves as condensate. The steam leaving the separator rises past the reheater tube bundle where it is reheated to 485 F when operating at full power; the steam is reheated to 498 F at 25 percent power. This reheated steam passes through nozzles in the top of the assemblies, flows to the low pressure turbine elements and finally exhausts to the condenser (see Figure 10.1-1). The turbine is equipped with an automatic stop and emergency trip system which trips the stop and control valves to a closed position in the event of turbine overspeed, low bearing oil pressure, low vacuum, or thrust bearing failure. An electric solenoid trip valve is provided for remote manual trips and for various automatic trips. The turbine control system is discussed in Section 7.7-3, Upon occurrence of a turbine trip, a signal is supplied to the reactor protective system to trip the reactor. The logic circuitry for this trip function is discussed in Section 7.2. A turbine lube oil system supplies oil for lubricating the turbine-generator and exciter bearings. A bypass stream of turbine lubricating oil flows continuously through an oil conditioner to remove water and other impurities.

The generator is a hydrogen-cooled, rotor-and-stator unit rated at 1000 mva with the capability to accept the gross rated output of the turbine at rated steam conditions. The generator shaft seals are oil sealed to prevent hydrogen leakage.

10.2-1 The main extraction and auxiliary steam system P&I diagram is shown on Figure 10.4-1.

The heating steam for the feedwater heaters is extracted from the turbine as follows: Extractions for the high pressure„ heaters (5A & 5B) and low pressure heaters (4A & 4B) are from the high pressure turbine element; the extractions for the remaining low pressure heaters (lA & 1B, 2A & 2B, 3A & 3B) are from the low pressure turbine elements. High pressure heaters 5A and 5B are drained into low pressure heaters 4A and 4B; the drains from the low pressure heaters 4A and 4B are directed to the drain coolers. The condensate accumulated in the drain coolers is then pumped by the two heater drain pumps back to the condensate and feedwater system upstream of heaters 4A and 4B. Shell drains from the remaining low pressure heaters are normally cascaded to the next lower pressure heaters and ultimately to the condenser. Alternate drains are also provided to automatically drain all the heaters directly to the condenser when a condition of high heater water level occurs. In addition, heaters 5A and 5B collect the drains from the reheater drain collectors and heaters 4A and 4B collect the drains from the moisture-separator drain pots.

The turbine-generator unit as well as other steam handling components of the steam and power conversion system are not expected to contain significant radioactive concentrations. Refer to Table 10.2-1 for expected radioactivity concentrations in the system. Refer to Sections 11.2.5 and 11.3.5 for discussion of radiation concentrations and expected releases of radioactivity during operation. The anticipated operating radioactive concentrations in the system do not require shielding or access control in the turbine building.

10.2-2 TABLE 10.2-1

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10.3 'AIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM

10.3.1 DESIGN BASES

The main steam piping system has the following safety design bases:

a) Provide containment isolation in the event of a loss of coolant accident

b) Prevent uncontrolled blowdown of both steam generators in the event of a steam line rupture accident

c) Provide means for reactor coolant system decay heat removal in the event of a loss of off-site power

Provide system integrity by design to seismic Class I standards for those components serving a containment isolation function and/or other safety function

e) Provide over-pressure protection for the steam generators and main steam supply system

10.3.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The main steam supply system is shown in Figure 10.1-1.

Each of the two steam generators supplies steam to the turbine through a separate 34-inch O.D. main steam line. The main steam line containment penetrations are designed with the flexibility'to accommodate the expansions and contractions of the containment vessel. The steam lines, which are anchored on the outside of the penetration assemblies, have enough flexibility to accommodate the expansions and contractions of the steam generators and the lines up to the anchor point. The design of the main steam line penetration assemblies is discussed in Section 3.8.2. There are eight spring-loaded main steam safety valves located outside the containment in each main steam line upstream of the isolation valve which discharge to atmosphere when actuated. Refer to Section 5.5 for a detailed description of these valves.

An atmospheric dump valve, operated manually from the control room, is connected to each main steam line upstream of the steam line isolation valve. Together the two valves have the capacity to dissipate decay heat at the level existing immediately following reactor shutdown, with an adequate margin to initiate cooling at 75 F/hr down to approximately 325 F. Cooling beyond this would be accomplished at a lower rate. Using both valves, the plant can be cooled down to 300 F in about 34 hours. During normal start-up, shutdown and load change operations, secondary steam will not be released to the atmosphere. The steam dump and bypass system, which uses the condenser as a heat sink, will be utilized.

10.3-1 Additional cooldown capability is provided by the steam dump and bypass system which consists of four dump lines and one bypass line. These lines connect to the steam lines going to the moisture-separator/reheater tube bundles and discharge through control valves to the condenser.

The two main steam lines are cross connected between the isolation valves and the turbine stop valves. Steam from the common header is supplied to t'e high pressure turbine leads, four moisture-separator/reheater assemblies, turbine gland steam sealing system, auxiliary steam system, steam jet air ejectors, and water box priming ejectors. Each steam turbine lead has an automatic turbine stop valve and a steam turbine governing control valve upstream of the turbine.

Each of the two main steam lines is provided with one main steam line isolation valve assembly consisting of an air operated stop valve but welded to a check valve. The assembly is located outside the reactor containment structure and as near to it as practical. The isolation stop valve, mounted on the steam generator side of the assembly, is used to prevent steam from flowing from the steam generator to the turbine inlet manifold. The check valve is used to prevent backflow if the steam generator pressure drops below the turbine inlet manifold pressure.

The isolation stop valves will close automatically on a main steam isolation signal (MSIS), which is actuated on steam generator low pressure, to prevent rapid flashing and blowdown of water in the shell side of the steam generator in the event of a steam line break, and thus avoid a rapid uncontrolled cooldown of the reactor coolant system. The isolation valve assemblies also prevent simultaneous release to the containment of the contents of the secondary sides of both steam generators in the event of the rupture of one main steam line inside the containment vessel. The check valve in the assembly prevents backflow through the cross connection. The isolation valves can be remote manually operated from the control room.

The isolation stop valves will fail in the open position on loss of electric power to the solenoid valve and in the closed position on loss of air supply. An air accumulator tank is provided to hold the stop valves open for at least 8 hours after a loss of normal air supply,'unless the valves are tripped or closed. The isolation stop valves have limit switches for valve operation and open/close position indication in the control room. A pressure switch will initiate an alarm in the control room in the event of low pressure in the air accumulator system. The trip circuitry for the main steam isolation valves is discussed further in Section 7.3.

10.3.3 SYSTEM EVALUATION

The steam and power conversion system is designed to meet its safety design bases under conditions postulated to exist for each of the abnormal incidents for which it must perform a safety function.

The main steam system from the steam generator up to and including the main steam line isolation valves is designed as seismic Class I. This

10.3-2 portion of the system provides a containment isolation function in case of a loss of coolant accident. Each main steam line isolation valve receives a closure signal upon MSIS actuation. Further information on the isolation function of this system is given in Table 6.2-16.

The main steam system is designed to prevent blowdown of both steam generators in the event of a postulated steam line break accident. If the break should occur downstream of the main steam line isolation valves, low steam generator pressure signals will cause closure of the main steam line isolation valves. The system is designed such that no single failure will cause both isolation valves to remain open. If the break should occur upstream of the steam line isolation valve of a steam generator, blowdown of the other steam generator by backflow will be prevented by the check valve in the broken steam line. If the check valve should fail to close, blowdown of the intact steam generator will still be prevented by the steam line isolation valve in the unbroken steam line. A steam flow element, venturi type, in each main steam line upstream of the main steam isolation valves is a component of the feedwater control system and also acts as a flow restrictor to impede. the discharge of steam into the containment following a postulated steam line break accident. Further discussion of the control circuitry for the main steam line isolation valves is given in Section 7.3.

The main steam system piping is arranged and restrained such that a rupture of one steam line cannot cause rupture of the other steam line, damage containment or prevent reactor system residual heat removal through the intact steam generator. This is done by the placing of pipe whip restraints and a guard pipe around the main steam line as it penetrates the containment. Further discussion of the design and analysis of the main steam line piping is given in Sections 3.7.3 and 3.9.2.

Operating instrumentation is adequate to permit the operators to monitor individual component and system performance as well as secondary system radioactivity.

10.3.4 TESTING AND INSPECTION Inservice inspection and preoperational testing requirements are provided for as described in Chapter 16 and Chapter 14 respectively. Test- ing of system performance can be accomplished during normal operation. Qualification testing of system components is in accordance with requirements of the design codes listed in Table 10.1-1.

10.3-3 10.4 OTHER FEATURES OF STEAM AND POMER CONVERSION SYSTEM

Except for a portion of the feedwater system piping, the features, components and systems described in this section serve no safety function since they are not required for safe shutdown or to mitigate the effects of a LOCA and their failure will not resul't in the release of significant uncontrolled radioactivity.

10.4.1 MAIN CONDENSER

The main condenser is of the deaerating type and is sized to condense exhaust steam from the main turbine under full load conditions. The condenser consists of two 50 percent capacity, divided-water-box, surface condensers of the single pass type with tubes arranged perpendic- ular to the turbine shaft. The condenser shells are connected to the low pressure turbine exhausts by belt type, rubber expansion points.

The condenser hotwell is a storage reservoir for the deaerated condensate which supplies the condensate pumps. The storage capacity of the hotwell is sufficient for, four minutes of operation at maximum throttle flow. The hotwell supply of condensate is backed up by the condensate storage tank from which condensate may be admitted into the condenser for deaeration.

The surface condenser water boxes were shop hydrostatically tested to 30 psig. After installation, the condenser was tested for leak tightness by fillingwith water to a level above the turbin'e exhaust flange. Field tests run to demonstrate performance are governed by the provisions of ASME Power Test Code for Steam-Condensing Appa'ratus.

Refer to Table 10.2-1 for a listing of expected condenser radioactivity inventory during normal operation.

10.4.2 MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM

The main condenser evacuation system is shown on Figures 10.1-1 and 2. The main condenser evacuation system consists of two hogging e)ectors, a steam jet air ejector with associated inter-and after-condensers, manifolds, valves and piping. The system is designed to establish and maintain condenser vacuum during start-up and normal operation.

- During start-up, the two hogging ejectors evacuate a combined turbine and main condenser (empty hotwell) steam space of 142,000 cu ft within a period of 60 minutes and thereafter maintain a condenser pressure of 5 in. Hg absolute. The steam-air mixture from the hogging e)ectors is discharged to the atmosphere via discharge silencers. As start-up progresses, condenser evacuation is maintained by the two-stage, twin- element, steam jet air ejector. The steam get air ejector is designed to achieve a condenser vacuum of 3.5 to 1 in. Hg absolute during normal operation.

10.4-1 The steam jet air ejector passes the evacuated mixture of air and water vapor through its inter- and after-condensers where most of the water vapor is condensed and the remaining noncondensable gases are discharged to atmosphere. Noncondensable gases from the steam jet air ejector and the gland steam condenser are monitored for radioactivity prior to being discharged to atmosphere. The presence of radioactivity would indicate a reactor coolant-to-secondary system leak in the steam generators and gases having a concentration greater than 0.8 p Ci/cc, instead of being directly discharged to atmosphere, would be diverted for discharge through the plant vent. Refer to Section 11.4.

Low condenser vacuum will cause a turbine trip as discussed in Section 7.7.

10.4.3 TURBINE GLAND STEAM SYSTEM

The turbine gland steam system is shown on Figure 10.1-2.

The turbine gland steam system controls the steam pressure to the turbine glands to maintain adequate sealing under all conditions of turbine operation. The system consists of individually controlled diaphragm operated valves, relief valves, and a gland steam condenser.

The design of the diaphragm operated valves is "fail safe" such that failure of any valve will not endanger the turbine. Gland steam is supplied from the main steam system. At high plant loads, the spillage from the high pressure turbine element glands provides more steam than the low pressure turbine element glands require. The excess steam is relieved to the .turbine condenser through a pressure regulating valve.

Noncondensable gases from the gland steam condenser are monitored for radioactivity. If radioactivity is detected, these gases are routed to the plant vent instead of being directly discharged to atmosphere. Refer to Section 11.4.3.11.

10.4.4 STEAM DUMP AND BYPASS SYSTEM

The steam dump and bypass system is shown on Figure 10.1-1.

The main function of the steam dump and bypass system is to limit the pressure rise in the steam generators to avoid opening the main steam safety valves. If the turbine cannot accept all the steam being produced in the steam generators, for example in the event of a turbine trip or partial loss of electrical load on the generator, an alternate heat removal path is provided to remove the sensible heat in the reactor coolant and the reactor decay heat to limit the pressure rise in the steam generators. Steam dump and bypass valves, located downstream of the main steam isolation valves, connect the main steam header outside containment directly to the main condenser and are programmed to bypass steam directly to the condenser when such a high pressure condition

10.4-2 should arise. The system is designed to enable the plant to accept a loss of electrical load on the generator of 45 percent of full power, without tripping the turbine.

The system is also used to remove reactor decay heat following a reactor shutdown or during hot standby conditions.

The dump valves are positioned by the reactor coolant average temperature error signal. A quick-opening signal is provided which opens the four dump valves and the turbine bypass valve fully until the reactor coolant average temperature signal begins to modulate the valves. The turbine bypass valve is modulated by either secondary steam pressure or reactor coolant average temperature, whichever signal is higher. The valves are designed to fail closed upon loss of actuator power or control signal. To prevent opening the main steam safety valves, the control program partially reopens the condenser dump valves in case the bypass valve inadvertently closes while at hot standby conditions. In the event of a loss of condenser vacuum, the valves close automatically. The system controls are designed for either automatic operation or remote manual control. The controls and instrumentation are described in Section 7.7.

The total capacity of the dump valves and turbine bypass valve is 40 percent and 5 percent, respectively, of reactor full power. This flow is sufficient to control the secondary steam pressure following a turbine trip at full power and thus avoid lifting the spring-loaded safety valves.

The steam dump and bypass system has no safety functions since overpressure protection is provided by ASME Code safety valves. Conse- quently, design of the system to seismic Class I or limiting environmental conditions is not required.

During plant shutdown with off-site power available, one dump valve is remote manually positioned to remove reactor decay heat, pump heat, and reactor coolant system sensible heat to reduce the reactor coolant temperature. Since steam pressure decreases as the system temperature is reduced, dump valve flow capacity becomes limited at low pressures and additional dump valves are opened to finish the cooldown at the design rate until shutdown cooling is initiated.

For plant shutdown without off-site power, the atmospheric dump valves may be used to remove reactor decay and sensible heat by venting steam from the steam generators directly to the atmosphere. Preoperational testing will be performed to demonstrate that the system operates to control reactor coolant temperature during turbine load transients. Refer to Section 14.1.

10.4.5 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM

The circulating water system is designed to provide a sink for the removal of heat from the main condenser under normal operating and

10.4-3 shutdown conditions. The system is discussed in Section 9.2.3.

10.4.6 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The condensate and feedwater system is designed to supply heated condensate to the steam generators for steam production.

The feedwater and condensate systems are shown in Figure 10.1-2. The heater drain and vent systems are shown in Figure 10.1-3. Refer to Figure 10.1-2 for the following discussion: The feedwater cycle is a closed regenerative system with deaeration accomplished in the main condenser. Condensate from the hotwell is pumped by two vertical, can-type, motor-driven centrifugal condensate pumps (operating in parallel) through the steam jet air ejector inter-and after-condensers, the gland steam condenser, three stages of low pressure heaters (two heaters per stage), the low pressure drain coolers, and a fourth stage low pressure heaters to the suction of two horizontal, motor- driven, multi-stage feedwater pumps (operating in parallel). The feedwater is then pumped through one stage of high pressure feedwater heaters to the steam generators. At low loads minimum condensate flow for condensing the supply steam for the steam jet air ejectors and gland steam condenser is maintained by recirculating condensate downstream of the gland steam condenser to the main condenser. Each feedwater pump is protected from overheating during start-up and reduced load operation by a recirculation control system which discharges to the main condenser.

The feedwater heaters are of the U-tube type and are arranged in two parallel streams. Each stream carries approximately half of the feedwater flow and consists of our low pressure heaters and one high pressure heater. The two lowest pressure heaters are mounted in the neck of the main condenser. Bypasses and crossties between the split streams are provided for flexibilityin operation.

Each steam generator feedwater line is provided with a three-element controller which combines the steam generator steam signal, feedwater flow signal and steam generator water level. The output of each three- element controller actuates the 100 percent capacity feedwater regulating valve to effect the desired feedwater flow to each steam'enerator. In addition to the air operated feedwater regulating valve there is a remote manually operated 15 percent capacity bypass valve and a 100 percent capacity motor operated bypass valve used for backup in case of outage of the regulating unit. Refer to Section 7.7 for a complete description of steam and feedwater control. Cyclohexylamine and hydrazine are added to the condensate at the condensate pump discharge to control pH and oxygen, respectively. Phos- phate is injected into the steam generators for water conditioning. No other additives are contemplated.

10. 4-4 The condensate and feedwater system is not designed to seismic Class I standards except for the piping from the steam generator to the first check valve outside containment. Details of isolation provisions are contained in Table 6.2-16. The auxiliary feedwater system described in Section 10.5 is used to achieve safe plant shutdown by removal of reactor decay heat from the steam generators in the event of loss of the normal feedwater system or loss of off-site power.

The main feed pumps, heater drain pumps and the condensate pumps are tested at the manufacturer's shop, in the presence of the purchaser's inspector, to demonstrate sucessful operation and performance of the equipment. Hydrostatic and performance tests were governed by the provisions of the ASME Power Test Codes for Centrifugal Pumps and the Hydraulic Institute Test Code for Centrifugal Pumps. Performance tests for feedwater heaters will be conducted during operation in accordance with the ASME Power Test Code for Feedwater Heaters No. PTC 12.1. Shop Hydrostatic tests at 1-1/2 times the design pressure on shell, tube side and external drain receiver were performed at a minimum temperature of 60 F. Preoperational testing of this system as an integrated unit is discussed in Section 14.1 and is designed to verify pump, valve and control operability and setpoints, and to verify design head capacity characteristics of pumps.

10.4 ' STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM

The steam generator blowdown system is shown in Figure 10.4-1.

The steam generator blowdown system is designed to control radioactivity levels associated with nonvolatile radionuclides, and to maintain purity standards established for the steam generators.

Each steam generator has a blowdown line that discharges to the blowdown tank. Each line is provided with two automatic isolation valves outside containment that close on CIS. The steam generator discharge is accumulated in the blowdown tank and routed either to the waste management system or to the discharge canal. A sampling line permits continuous sampling of steam generator activity to identify and alarm conditions threatening violation of technical specification limits. The maximum total allowable primary-to-secondary leakage rate is listed in the technical specifications.

A radioactivity monitor is located in each steam generator sample line. When a radioactivity level exceeding the technical specification limit is detected, an alarm is annunciated in the control room and the liquid effluent from the steam generators is diverted to the radioactive waste management system by the control room operator. Radioactivity monitoring and processing is more fully discussed in Section 11.4.3.9.

10.4-5 Refer to the Section 11.2.5 for an evaluation of radioactivity discharge rates, a failure analysis of system components, system performance during abnormally high primary-to-secondary leakage, and an analysis of steam generator shell side radioactivity concentration during system isolation.

Preoperational testing of the steam generator blowdown system is discussed in Table 14.1-1.

1

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10.5.1 DESIGN BASES

The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to: a) Provide feedwater for the removal of sensible and decay heat from the reactor coolant system t b) Provide sufficient feedwater capacity to permit plant cooldown to 300 F, assuming a single active failure and loss of off-site power c) Withstand design basis earthquake loads without loss of function

10.5.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The major active components of the system consist of one full flow capacity and two 50 percent flow capacity auxiliary feedwater pumps. The larger pump is driven by a noncondensing steam turbine. The turbine will receive steam from the main steam lines upstream of the isolation valves and exhaust to atmosphere. The two motor driven pumps are powered from the emergency generators in case of a loss of normal power. The pumps take suction from the condensate storage tank and discharge to the steam generators. Refer to Figure 10.1-2.

The turbine-driven pump is capable of supplying auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators for the total expected range of steam generator pressure (985 psig to 50 psig) by means of a variable speed turbine driver controlled by a variable speed hydraulic governor. The turbine operates through a speed range of 3600 to 200 .rpm when supplied with saturated steam from 985 to 50 psig respectively.

Each motor-driven pump supplies feedwater to one steam generator. The turbine-driven pump supplies feedwater to both steam generators by means of two separate lines each with its own control valve. The control of auxiliary feedwater flow and steam generator level is accomplished by means of control-room operated control valves.

During normal operation, feedwater is supplied to the steam generators by the feedwater system. If this system is unavailable due to loss of feedwater pumps or off-site power an alarm is sounded in the control room. The operator then has 10 minutes in which to start the auxiliary feedwater pumps and open the flow control valves to the steam generators. If the auxiliary feedwater pumps were operating when off-site power was lost, the pumps would automatically restart using diesel generator power. Refer to Section 7.4.1.4 for further discussion of system circuitry.

The steam generated during decay heat removal and cooldown after a loss of off-site power will be discharged through the atmospheric dump valves, except for that steam used by the auxiliary feed pump. If off-site power and the main condenser are available, the condenser will be used as a heat sink.

10.5-1 10.5.3 SYSTEH EVALUATION

The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to provide feedwater for the removal of sensible and decay heat from the reactor coolant system. The system can cool the reactor coolant system to 300 F in the event the main condensate pumps or the main feedwater pumps are inoperative due to pump failures or to a loss of normal electric power. The auxiliary feedwater system may also be used for normal system cooldown to 300 F. Reactor decay heat and sensible heat are transferred to.the steam generators by natural circulation of the reactor coolant if power is not available for the reactor coolant circulating pumps. The storage capacity of the condensate storage tank is 250,000 gallons, a sufficient quantity to meet the requirements for decay heat removal and cooldown of the nuclear steam supply system. Figure 10.5-1 represents auxiliary feedwater requirements after a loss of normal feedwater. Approximately 110,000 gallons of water are required to permit cooldown to 300 F following a reactor trip.

Figure 10.5-1 indicates that 138,000 gallons are used for 8 hours of hot standby following.a reactor trip. This includes 28,000 gallons to raise the water level to the normal operating level. It would be at a lower level because of the time lapse in initiation of the auxiliary feedwater system following loss of main feed pumps. The auxiliary feedwater system is designed to provide a means of reactor coolant system cooldown for emergency plant shutdown in the event of a loss of off-site power. The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps can be powered from the emergency diesel generators. The turbine driven pump requires no external source of electrical power for its operation. The auxiliary feedwater system is designed as seismic Class I and is capable of withstanding tornado wind loading. The auxiliary feedwater system is protected from flooding by placing all system components susceptible to flooding damage above the probable maximum flood level.

The system is designed such that no single active failure can prevent plant cooldown to 300 F in the event of a loss of off-site power. Refer to Table 10.5-1.

10.5,4 TESTING AND INSPECTION

Auxiliary feed pumps were tested with cold water at the manufacturer's shop, in the presence of the purchaser's inspector, to demonstrate successful operation and performance of the equipment. Performance tests were governed by the provisions of the ASME Power Test Codes for Centrif- ugal Pumps (PTC 8.2) and the Hydraulic Institute Test Code for Centrif- ugal Pumps. Pump casings underwent hydrostatic tests at 150 percent of maximum operating head.

The auxiliary feedwater pump and noncondensing turbine manufacturers have supplied calculations which substantiate that the equipment will not suffer loss of function due to design bases earthquake loadings.

10.5-2 Both motor-driven pumps and associated controls will be given preoperational tests after erection and before plant start-up. All three of the auxiliary feed pumps can be tested during normal operation by recirculating to the condensate storage tank through miniflow lines. The system will be tested periodically as described in Section 16,4.10.

10.5.5 INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Refer to Section 7.4 for a description of the auxiliary feedwater system controls and instrumentation required for safe plant shutdown.

The controls and instrumentation for this system are shown in the system PAID, Figure 10.2-3, and tabulated in Table 10.5-2.

10. 5-3 TABLE 10.5-1

SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS — AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM

Component Identification Method of (1) and uantit Failure Mode Effect on S stem Detection 'onitor Remarks

Off-Site Power Lost Main feedwater system lost. Various loss of CRI Two 50% capacity motor Operator must switch to power alarms. driven pumps powered by auxiliary feedwater system to the emergency diesel genera- permit plant cooldown to tor sets operate supplemen- 300F. ted by one 100% capacity steam turbine driven um

Auxiliary Feedwater Valve inadver- No feedwater flow. Operator Pump suction line CRI The remaining open line Pump Suction Line tantly closed. must switch to alternative low pressure supplies either the 100% (2) feedwater supply. alarm. capacity steam turbine driven pump or the two 50% ca acit motor driven um s. v Steam turbine Sticks closed No feedwater flow. Operator No discharge line CRI Two 50% capacity motor driven pump steam must switch to alternate flow or pressure driven pumps available. inlet valve (2) feedwater su l indication.

Motor driven Fails to start Loss of one 50% caPacity No discharge line CRI 100% capacity steam turbine pump (2). motor driven pump. flow or pressure driven pump and on 50% indication. capacity motor driven pump available.

Lose air supply Fail open valves — no Feedwater flow CEI interruption of feedwater indication Pneumatic Flow flow Control Valve (4) Fails to open One feedwater line lost Feedwater flow CRI Remaining three lines indication available for delivering required feedwater to steam enerators.

Diesel Generator Fails to start Loss of one 50% capacity No discharge line CRI 100% capacity steam turbine Set (2) motor driven pump. flow or pressure driven pump and on 50% indication. capacity motor driven pump available. (l)CRI-control room indication TABLE 10.5-2

AUXILIARYFEEDWATER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION APPLICATION

Indication Alarm(1) Instru- Normal Control (1) ment Operating Instrument S stem Parameter & Location- Local Room Hi h Low Recordin Control Function Ran e Ran e Accurac Condensate Stora e Tank Regulates flow from Full-4 ft. Level (2) demineralized water min. vol. system to maintain 200,000 minimum condensate gal tank level. Aux. Feedwater Pum s

1. Steam pressure at 0-1200 985— turbine inlet (3) psig 50 psig

2. Pump suction pressure 0-20 11.5 psig C) psig + 0.5 %

3. Pump discharge pressure 0-2500 1200 psig + 0.5% psig Motor driven 325gpm 4. Pump discharge flow Flow is manually 0-300 Steam- regulated from gpm driven control room 600gpm

5. Pump speed (3) 3600— 2000rpm

(1) All alarms and recordings are in the control room unless otherwise indicated.

(2) A low-low leve'larm is provided in control room; high 6 low level alarms provided on water treatment panel.

(3) For turbine driven pump only. I ~ I) ~ I ~ I ;: 'i'i )!!ii:ll'.ii!

~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I ~ * I.'IR ~ ' ~ ~ ~

~ III ~ I

~ I X 3 200

ill', ~ I yo ri \ P ~- f! f:8 .". ~1 w 150 "~ - 40 O ~ ~ i ~ i f 0 0 , fiili-li . iii if« I' . I C,nl I:li Oo ;l.i Il P Fl! 4: ii!!K ~ \ il 0 O I" f}9 '~0+, iffy I'P } 100 COOLDOWN TO 300 F AND ; SWITCH TO SHUTDOWN COOLING I pj nlf'j |."':i

~ I ~ 41'i I ,ll. !Ii" ~ ~

1 J I ~ Il NOTE: =-'-

~ ~ SG WATER LEVELMAINTAINED $ "::: Illr, o) I b) AUX FEED PUMP FLOW RATE Il 600 GPM

0 0 10 15

TIME AFTER LOSS OF HORMAL FEEDWATER 8 REACTOR TRIP — HOURS

FLORIDA POWER 8 LIGHT COMPANY Hutchinsan Island Plant AUXILIARYFEEDWATER REQUIRED AFTE LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FIGURE 10.5-1 ' ~, C I k

0'