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Moving from the Right of Boom in Cyber Security to Left of Boom

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Moving from the Right of Boom in Cyber Security to Left of Boom MOVING FROM THE RIGHT OF BOOM IN CYBER SECURITY TO LEFT OF BOOM CROWDSTRIKE SERVICES FORGE BRIEFING MARCH 18, 2021 § INCIDENT RESPONSE FROM THE FRONT LINES § INTELLIGENCE-LED RAPID RECOVERY: A NEW APPROACH CONTENTS § THE SHIFT TO CONTINUOUS MONITORING & RESPONSE § TRANSFORMING ENDPOINT & WORKLOAD SECURITY 2 OUR SPEAKERS TODAY Tim Parisi is a Director of Eric Bodkin is a Director of John Beck is a Senior Incident Response Endpoint Recovery Federal and DOD Engineer services at CrowdStrike. services at CrowdStrike. at CrowdStrike. Tim has more than 15 years of experience Eric has more than 15 years of experience John has more than 21 years of experience leading incident response investigations in incident response, forensic investigation, in engineering cybersecurity solutions for and advising clients on how to secure their cybersecurity operations, endpoint Federal and Department of Defense networks across the globe. recovery and remediation. agencies. Prior to joining CrowdStrike, Tim performed Prior to joining CrowdStrike, Eric’s career Prior to joining CrowdStrike, John supported incident response consulting at Mandiant focused heavily on OCO and DCO in federal agencies during his previous tenures where he led investigations, red/blue team support of U.S. Government and Military at Forcepoint and McAfee, and prior to exercises and compromise assessments for operations on the front-lines as active duty that acted as Security Lead as a contractor small and large enterprises around the Navy assigned to the National Security for a Federal Law enforcement agency world. Before entering the private sector, Agency, and as an subject matter expert and a Federal agency responsible for Tim performed computer forensics and equipping, enabling, and training Cyber diplomatic missions. insider threat investigations for various U.S. Protection Team’s (CPT) across all Federal Government agencies at ManTech branches of the service. and MITRE and has been an instructor teaching forensic analysis to private companies and law enforcement agencies. 3 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. INCIDENT RESPONSE FROM THE FRONT LINES Tim Parisi Director, Incident Response Services 4 THE ADVERSARIES 150+ active adversary groups tracked across the globe CROWDSTRIKE FALCON PLATFORM 700+ BILLION SECURITY EVENTS PER DAY 140+ MILLION IOA DECISIONS PER SECOND 75,000+ BREACHES STOPPED PER YEAR 5 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. INVESTIGATION: IRANIAN BASED GROUP HIJACKS DNS • Iranian nexus adversary group THREAT ACTOR: SEA TURTLE • TwoFace webshell placed on vulnerable IIS servers HELIX KITTEN • RGDoor Internet Information Server (IIS) backdoor THREAT STATUS: ACTIVE • Network reconnaissance using native Windows tools MOTIVATION: • PowerShell and custom build of PLink SSH client to STATE SPONSORED establish reverse shells ORIGINS: • Moved to AWS space from credentials harvested via IRAN Mimikatz in non-cloud infrastructure MALWARE: TWOFACE • Goal was to re-route traffic to specific domains, MIMIKATZ largely unachievable due to fast detection and RGDOOR response PLINK 6 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. INVESTIGATION: LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA “WANTS TO CONNECT” ON LINKEDIN • North Korea based adversary group • Used LinkedIn to send unsolicited and THREAT ACTOR: targeted recruiting message as initial phishing LABYRINTH lure – did not target corporate email CHOLLIMA • THREAT STATUS: Lure instructed victim to access website only ACTIVE with Internet Explorer. Allowed attacker to exploit zero day exploit CVE-2020-0674 MOTIVATION: Criminal • Reconnaissance performed: net user, reg State-Sponsored query, netstat, reg export terminal server ORIGINS: clients North Korea • Unsuccessful lateral movement attempts due MALWARE: to misspelling of credentials NedDnLoader • Reconnaissance activities detected; system contained 7 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. RANSOMWARE ATTACKS ARE ON THE RISE • 10 million new virus signatures released every month • Signature-based A/V only looks at one attribute of the file • Polymorphic malware is able to easily bypass legacy A/V • Companies can’t keep up with patching • Adversaries lock down & control the environment with better tools 8 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. INVESTIGATION: CARBON SPIDER TURNS UP THE HEAT ON RANSOM DEMANDS • THREAT ACTOR: Affiliation with Pinchy Spider and REvil Ransomware CARBON SPIDER • UPS themed phishing email attack THREAT STATUS: • Links to a compromised sharepoint site deploying ACTIVE Harpy and Sekur malware MOTIVATION: CRIMINAL • Exfiltrated over 1TB of data ORIGINS: • Demanding increasingly higher ransoms ($4M) RUSSIAN FEDERATION • Countdown timers for the release of sensitive data MALWARE: DARKSIDE • Calls to employees to create additional pressure to HARPY pay ransom note SEKUR • Created a Ransomware-as-a-Service affiliate program for Darkside 9 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. BIG GAME HUNTING Notorious ransomware threat actors actively engaged in attacks • Low volume, high return ransomware • Ransom demands usually exceed $250,000 and often reach over $5,000,000 • Penetration testing tooling and tactics used for lateral INDRIK SPIDER WIZARD SPIDER PINCHY SPIDER movement BitPaymer Ryuk GandCrab Ransomware Ransomware Ransomware • Administrator accounts used to deploy ransomware directly 10 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. CROWDSTRIKE ACCELERATED APPROACH TRADITIONAL IR APPROACH THREATS DEPLOY SCAN REMEDIATE WEEKS / MONTHS DAYS WEEKS MONTHS • BREACH NETWORK • SHIP SERVERS • RUN SYSTEM SCAN (SINGLE SNAPSHOT) • PLUG HOLES AS THEY ARE FOUND • ESCALATE PRIVILEGES • LOAD SOFTWARE • ANALYZE RESULTS • REIMAGE MACHINES (“DISRUPT USERS”) • ACHIEVE LATERAL MOVEMENT • FLY CONSULTANTS • REPEAT UNTIL ACTIVITY IS SEEN • RERUN SCANS TO LOOK FOR MORE ACTIVITY • UNDETECTED (SILENT FAILURE) • REPEAT UNTIL CONSULTANT FEELS THERE IS NO MORE ACTIVITY BREACHES GO LONG DISCOVERY SLOW START & VERY COSTLY UNDETECTED PROCESS REMEDIATION & DISRUPTIVE BREACH DISCOVERY IR START VISIBILITY IR FINISH CROWDSTRIKE ACCELERATED IR CROWDSTRIKE VALUE GAIN CONTAIN RECOVER SECURE • Accelerate incident response VISIBILITY THREAT ENDPOINTS ENVIRONMENT • DEPLOY MINS HOURS DAYS WEEKS • Minimize downtime CLOUD- BASED SENSORS • IMMEDIATE • TRIAGE • EJECT • THREAT • Reduce business interruption THREAT INTEL INCIDENTS ADVERSARIES HUNTING • PRESERVE • ISOLATE • RECOVER • FULL INCIDENT • Greater visibility for better decision making FORENSICS HOSTS ENDPOINTS INVESTIGATION • Lower cost investigation and remediation • Reduced adversary impact IMMEDIATE FAST START & QUICK & COST DISCOVERY REMEDIATION EFFECTIVE 11 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. WHAT MAKES CROWDSTRIKE STANDOUT? The Falcon Platform provides immediate visibility and threat actor information that informs our remediation efforts FALCON FALCON SERVICES INSIGHT INTEL TO GET YOU BACK TO NORMAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS FAST 12 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. QUESTIONS Q&A 13 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. INTELLIGENCE- LED RAPID RECOVERY: A NEW APPROACH Eric Bodkin Director, Endpoint Recovery Services 14 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. COMMON ATTACK CHAIN Initial Lateral Execution Persistence Impact Access Movement 12 Account/RDP WMI Cobalt Strike Scheduled Tasks BitPaymer Brute Force Ransomware Internet Exposed PSEXEC Powershell Empire Persistent Service Ryuk Vulnerabilities Creation Ransomware Phishing / Social Remote Service TA-Specific GPO GandCrab 11 Engineering Creation Loaders/Trojans Configuration Ransomware 10 MITRE ATT&CK PHASE 9 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Initial Execution Persistence Privilege Defense Credential Discovery Lateral Collection Exfiltration Command Impact Access Escalation Evasion Access Movement & Control 15 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. RECOVERY: CARBON SPIDER CROWDSTRIKE EXTINGUISHES RANSOMWARE ATTACKS • THREAT ACTOR: Visibility of full threat context within minutes of CARBON SPIDER deploying the Falcon platform THREAT STATUS: • Active containment of infected hosts to stop further ACTIVE lateral movement and infection MOTIVATION: • Real time response to kill malicious processes and CRIMINAL delete infected files with speed & precision ORIGINS: RUSSIAN FEDERATION • No system reimaging and no system reboots MALWARE: required DARKSIDE • No disruption to the end users and no business HARPY interruption SEKUR • Get back to business faster 16 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. TRADITIONAL RECOVEY APPROACH “Tear down and rebuild everything” Identify infection, isolate the threat Assess options for recovering systems and data Recover systems and data Identify and mitigate initial exploit/access vectors Eliminate active malware; Prevent reoccurrence Discover and remediate attacker persistence Remediate impacted users, accounts, and access points Monitor for re-entry and evaluate effectiveness of remediation 17 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. TRADITIONAL RECOVERY Incomplete and costly INEFFECTIVE INCOMPLETE TECHNOLOGY INSIGHTS LACK OF PREVENTION UNINFORMED DECISIONS LACK OF VISIBLITY INEFFECTIVE ACTIONS “WHAT GOT YOU HERE” ROOT PROBLEM UNADDRESSED ATTACK DOWNTIME AND REOCCURANCE INTERRUPTIONS BACK TO SQUARE ONE INCREASED TIME WASTE OF TIME AND INCREASED COSTS RESOURCES CRITICAL OPERATIONS 18 2021 CROWDSTRIKE, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. INTELLIGENCE-LED RAPID RECOVERY Endpoint recovery with zero business interruption TECHNOLOGY INTELLIGENCE EXPERTISE ▪ Deployment and configuration ▪ Observed events + enriched data = ▪ TTP identification and analysis
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