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VIAE-M AILr ule -co mments @ sec.gov

MsEl. izabet hM.Mu rphy Secretary SecuritiesadEx n chang eCommi ssion 100FS treet, NE W ashington, DC 2054 -1099 0 ­

Re: FieNol . SR-NASDAQ-2 10-1370 ProposedRuleCh ang etoAme ndIM-5101-2toP rovid eAc qusiti ionComp anie st he Optio ntoHoldaTe nde rO fferinLiuofaSh areholde rVoeonaP t ropose dAc qusiti ion ­

DerMsMua . rphy: ­

W e are writing to provide comments on proposalbyNa sda q( the —Proposal“) eflecte dint he Commission‘ ­s —N oticeo f Filin gofP roposed Rul eCh ange t oAme ndIM-5101-2toP r ovid e Acquisitio nComp anie steOp h tiontoHoldaTe nde rO fferinLiuofaSh e areholde rVoeo t na ­ Proposed Acqusiti ion“(Re leas eNo . 34 -63239;FieNo l . SR-NASDAQ-2 10-1370 .Capi ta) lized ­ termsu se db ut not definedint hisle tter haveter h espectiv eme aning sgi ntot he m int he Proposal.

Ourfm ir ha sr epresente di ssuer sadu n nder writer sinan mbeu rofi nitialp ub li co fferings (—POs“ )ofSPACs , swe ll as SPACs and acquisitiont arget sinan mbe rofb usin ess combinatio nt ransactions.

Earlier this year, as counsel to the underwriters in the IPO of a SPAC,1 participatedina ­ meetin gwihMe t re dihCrot ss, Director fCo rporationFi nance, a n do the rs enio rsa tff oft he Commissio n( the — Sta ff“)a t th eCommi ssion‘ sh eadquartersinW ashington, D.C., i nwh ic initiallyp ropose dteo h pt io nfraSPAC o toc onduct at ender offerinl ie uo f as hareholde rv o eo nt itsp r oposeda cquisit io n .Si nc et hatIPO wascmpl o etedinMay2 0 10, weh av er epresente ither ­ thei ssueroru nder writ ersintwoo the rcmpl o ete dSPAC IPOswh ic hh av ei ncud et hl et ender offero ption .Th eSPACsh av bee na bl etol ist o nNa sda qb ecaus eoft hee xisting shareholderv ot er equire ment.

W espp u ort Nasdaq‘sp roposal t op rovideSPACswihano t ptio ntoc onduct at ende ro fferinl ieu of as hareholde rv ot eonap roposeda cquisit ion .Aswediu sc ssedwihteSta ht ff earliert hi sy ear,

1 57thSt ree tGe nera lAc qusiti ionCo rp. ( SEC FieNol . 33 -16 13433 ).

U.S. practice conducted through McDermott Will & Emery LLP. 340 Madison Avenue New York New York 10173-1922 Telephone: +1 212 547 5400 Facsimile: +1 212 547 5444 www.mwe.com NYK 1366873-3009900.. 0 021 Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy November 30,2010 Page 2 the hallmarkfeature ofa SPAC is that any shareholder whodoes not wish tocontinue toholdits shares followingthe completion ofthe SPAC‘s business combination transaction may redeem its shares for cash at the time ofthe business combination transaction. Nasdaqdescribedthis feature in its Proposal as the ability ofshareholders to—vote with their feet.“ Shareholders derive nobenefit from an additional requirement that the SPAC holda shareholder vote and,as statedin the Proposal andfurther describedbelow,holdinga shareholder vote carries with it certain detriments.

W e note,however,that the Proposal does not include any exemption from the shareholder voting requirements ofNasdaqListingRule 5635,which requires shareholder approval ofcertain issuances ofshares by a listedcompany in excess ofspecifiedthresholds or where it results in a change ofcontrol. Most SPAC business combination transactions involve the issuance by the SPAC ofa significant number ofshares,which typically triggers one or more shareholder approval requirements ofRule 5635. As a result,we believe that the Proposal alsoshould include a one-time exemption from the shareholder approval requirements ofRule 5635for any share issuances by a SPAC in connection with its initial business combination transaction where shareholders are given the right toredeem their shares for cash pursuant toa tender offer conductedby the SPAC.

Nasdaqhas statedthat the shareholder approval requirements in NasdaqListingRule 5635were designedtoprovide shareholders with a greater level ofparticipation in corporate affairs and with protection from the potential effects on them ofcertain significant corporate transactions. 2 In the case ofa SPAC,its sole purpose is toengage in a significant corporate transaction. Every investor in a SPAC understands that the SPAC intends toengage in an initial business combination transaction that,by definition,is transformational. The protection that SPAC investors desire,andthe participation which they are afforded,is the ability to—vote with their feet“andredeem their shares. This protection is embeddedin the terms ofthe SPAC shares,and, as Nasdaqacknowledges in the Proposal,is affordedin the tender offer structure even absent a shareholder vote.3

Moreover,without a one-time exemption from the shareholder approval requirements ofRule 5635,a dichotomy wouldexist between a transformational transaction effectedwith cash consideration,in which shareholder approval wouldnot required,anda transformational transaction effectedwith stockconsideration,in which shareholder approval wouldbe required, despite the fact that the SPAC‘s business has been transformedtothe same extent. 4

2 See Commission Release No. 34-26433 (January 13,1989). ­ 3 —Nasdaqbelieves that the protections providedby the existingrule wouldcontinue tobe available.“Id. ­ 4 W hile a transaction effectedwith stockconsideration wouldcause dilution,as opposedtoa transaction effected ­ with cash consideration,in the context ofa SPAC,where under the Nasdaqrule the SPAC must complete its ­ business combination with a target havinga fair market value ofat least 80% ofthe value ofthe trust account,we do ­ not believe that this is meaningful difference. ­

NYK 1366873-3.009900.0021 Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy November 30,2010 Page 3

The requirement for the SPAC toholda shareholder vote adds noprotectionbeyondthe ability ofshareholders to—vote with their feet.“ As we understandit,the shareholder vote requirement was originally includedinthe SPAC structure for tworeasons.

The first was toprovide a mechanism for disseminatinginformationtoinvestors about the SPAC‘s proposedbusiness combinationtransaction, i.e. the proxy statement. As describedinthe Proposal,the tender offer alternative accomplishes the very same purpose.

The secondwas toseektoensure that only well-receivedtransactions (i.e.,transactions receiving approval ofthe holders ofa majority ofthe shares votedonthe transaction)are consummatedby the SPAC. W hile this may have beenwell-intentioned,—greenmail“tactics by opportunisticand activist investors,as well as the ability ofthe SPAC itselftouse —forwardcontracts,“ 5 has allowedtransactions tobe consummatedthat were not,inreality,supportedby holders ofa majority ofthe shares votedonthe transaction.

As notedinthe Proposal,the shareholder vote requirement has resultedincertainnegative consequences from what Nasdaqcalls —greenmail“by certainopportunisticandactivist investors. Inadditiontothe negative consequences specifiedinthe Proposal,the potential for —greenmail“andother delays andcosts engenderedby the shareholder vote couldhave the effect ofnarrowingthe pool ofquality acquisitiontargets for the SPAC,which is contrary tothe interests ofshareholders whowant the broadest array ofquality acquisitiontargets tobe available for the SPAC‘s business combinationtransaction.

Inthe tender offer context,onthe other hand,Rule 14e-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,as amended,prevents the issuer andcertainother coveredpersons from purchasingor enteringintoarrangements topurchase any subject shares outside the tender offer. As a result, we expect that the potential for any —greenmail“will be substantially reduced.

***

5 Ina forwardcontract,the SPAC agrees toredeem the shares ofcommonstockheldby one or more shareholders immediately followingthe closingofthe business combinationtransactionfor a cash payment inexcess ofthe amount they wouldhave receivedhadthey chosentoredeem their shares at the time ofthe business combination transaction. The shareholder that is party tothe forwardcontract typically votes infavor ofthe transaction,with the result that the transactionis approvedby holders ofa majority ofshares voted,eventhough some ofthose holders do not wish tocontinue toholdtheir shares followingthe transaction.

NYK 1366873-3.009900.0021 Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy November 30,2010 Page 4

W e appreciate the opportunity tocomment onthe Proposal. W hile we support the Proposal,we believe that it must alsoinclude a one-time exemptionfrom the shareholder approval requirements ofRule 5635for any share issuances by a SPAC inconnectionwith its initial business combinationtransaction. Otherwise,we donot believe that the Proposal wouldresult in SPAC issuers listingonNasdaqifthey wish toinclude the tender offer option.

W e wouldbe pleasedtodiscuss any questions the Commissionor its Staff may have about this . Any questions may be directedtoeither ofthe undersignedat 212.547.5400.

Sincerely,

/s/ /s/ Joel L. Rubinstein JonathanRochwarger

NYK 1366873-3.009900.0021