The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras BY DOUGLAS FARAH AND KATHRYN BABINEAU ara Salvatrucha (MS 13) is rapidly evolving into a criminal-economic-military-politi- cal power that poses an existential threat to the states of El Salvador and Honduras.1 MIn Guatemala, the gang remains a tier two threat—dangerous, but with far less influence and fewer capabilities than in the other two nations of the Northern Triangle. With growing ties to Mexican drug cartels, while assuming an ever-greater role in the transportation of cocaine transportista networks across the Isthmus, the gang is acquiring financial resources, advanced weaponry, and the ability and sophistication to wield increasing political power. Factions that once relied exclusively on violence and threats for control are now trying to win the hearts and minds of the communities in which they operate; taking concrete steps to consolidate themselves in the cocaine trade; and becoming credible alternatives to the state. MS 13 in many ways now better resembles a criminal business enterprise rooted in brutal violence than a traditional gang. This transformation is not uniform across all gang structures nor is it the same from country to country. MS 13 is divided into neighborhood structures called clicas, which are grouped into programas that respond to the ranfla, or national leadership, in each country. Each clica has responsibility for its own economic needs, as well as payments to the central leader- ship, meaning that each clica and each programa is different. Those that control key cocaine transportation routes or crack/cocaine retail areas are far wealthier than the clicas that lack access to lucrative ventures. These disparities make generalizations difficult because few things are universally true across the structures. Even so, it is evident that MS 13 is operating with clearer strategic goals than in the past, and amassing political and economic power. As a recent Freidrich Ebert Foundation report noted, Mr. Douglas Farah is a visiting Senior Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations. He also is President of IBI Consultants, where Ms. Kathryn Babineau is a Research Coordinator. PRISM 7, NO. 1 FEATURES | 59 FARAH AND BABINEAU Regarding the use of violence (armed political decision to build a loyal political confrontations, homicides, extortions) the base moving forward. behavior pattern of the contemporary This is not to say that MS 13 has aban- gang appears to be guided by a high level doned extortion; the decision in Honduras of strategic logic. Taken together, the has not been replicated in El Salvador. violent acts of the gangs become an Furthermore, payments from larger compa- instrument to protect the vital interest of nies—e.g. those selling LNG tanks, snack the gang and broaden its opportunities. It food, beverages—that transit MS 13-con- is a reproductive rationale, which explains trolled territory in Honduras remain a major the search for new sources of economic, source of income. The impact of such large social and political power. business extortions has far less of an impact on communities, many of whom now Key Strategies and Trends actively support MS 13 efforts to expand their territorial control because of the halt to small Criminal business extortions. “People will call the MS 13’s recent success is derived in part from police to tell them who the local leaders of a strategy, begun at least four years ago, of Calle 18 are, and the police and MS 13 infiltrating members into the police and mili- coordinate to take over that area,” said one tary, and sending selected cadres to universi- resident familiar with MS 13 strategy. “People ties to become lawyers, accountants, and know now that where the MS 13 is in charge MBAs. These members are now in positions they won’t be extorted, they can leave their to exercise influence on behalf of the gang in cars unlocked, there is some security, but multiple spheres, with a far more sophisti- only as long as you do exactly as they say.” cated understanding of the world.3 This shift does not imply that life under Perhaps the most transformative political MS 13 control is pleasant. One resident who step taken by MS 13 in Honduras is the daily has to navigate between MS 13-con- countrywide decision to stop extorting small trolled territory where she lives and numer- businesses that operate in the communities ous disputed territories to get to work that the gang controls. The decision removed described her life as one of tension-filled an important source of revenue for the gang; negotiations, seeking permission from each however, it also bought the gang significant group in control (the Terecereños, Los Ponce, political goodwill by removing the most Los Chirisos, etc.). Control can change on a hated facet of the gang’s presence in those daily basis, adding to the stress, as does the neighborhoods. As described by gang leaders constant worry that her young teenage in four different communities in and around daughter will be taken by one of the groups. San Pedro Sula, the decision to forego the The woman explained that every day her life revenue from small-scale extortion was made is a version of Shakira’s hit “Blind, Deaf and possible because of increased revenue from Dumb,” (Ciega Sordamuda) because, in the MS 13’s growing participation in different neighborhoods that is what everyone acts parts of the regional drug trade. Furthermore, like in the face of the brutality: “We see the change was described as a conscious everything and act just like the song says: 60 | FEATURES PRISM 7, NO. 1 THE EVOLUTION OF MS 13 IN EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS blind, deaf, and dumb. We see everything but General, the gang had also set up a special say nothing because we know we can’t say financial committee known as The Federation anything without getting killed.” (La Federación) to manage its financial assets.4 These trends will likely continue to serve Ironically, much of the seed money for as drivers of high-levels of violence, which the gang’s legitimate investments came from will in turn drive high levels of immigration their negotiations with the government of toward the United States. In conversations Mauricio Funes (2009–14) and their ill-fated with gang leaders, they stated that it is easier gang “truce,” in which the government paid now than at any time in recent memory to up to $25 million to the gang in an effort to move migrants through Mexico because reduce the nation’s homicide rate. This Mexican officials are much less rigorous in included putting some notorious gang trying to halt them, because of the tension members on the government payroll in some with the U.S. Government over the proposed municipalities.5 These payments are at the border wall. This has served to greatly root of many of the ongoing internal strug- facilitate the movement of gang members gles within MS 13 in El Salvador. back and forth to the United States. At the same time, according to both gang “The government asks us what we want, and leaders and law enforcement officials across we tell them—and then they give it to us,” said the region, the gangs are already beefing up one gang leader with a laugh, in an interview their ranks due to the recent influx of gang as the truce negotiations were underway. “We members being deported from the United have found that if they say no, we just have to States. These members are immediately dump enough bodies on the street, then they incorporated into the existing gang struc- say yes.” tures. The gangs, particularly MS 13, are also offering immediate employment opportuni- ties to other criminals with special skills, The truce was the result of a secret pact particularly in the financial and military among drug trafficking organizations, then fields. President Mauricio Funes, his Defense Minister, David Munguía Payes, and the Economic imprisoned leadership of the gangs. In The increasing gang capabilities are directly negotiating the truce directly with the govern- reflected in the gang’s growing, visible ment, the gang leadership discovered for the financial fortune. Recent judicial investiga- first time that they had real political power. tions into the activities of MS 13 in El “The government asks us what we want, and Salvador uncovered a multi-million dollar we tell them—and then they give it to us,” structure of legitimate businesses owned by said one gang leader with a laugh, in an the gang. The 157 businesses uncovered in interview as the truce negotiations were Operation Check (Operación Jaque) in underway. “We have found that if they say mid-2016 included bus and taxi companies, no, we just have to dump enough bodies on luxury car lots, brothels, motels, restaurants, the street, then they say yes.”6 and crack houses. According to the Attorney PRISM 7, NO. 1 FEATURES | 61 FARAH AND BABINEAU While the fact that the gang leaders had met with gang leaders. During these meet- directly negotiated with leaders of El ings, Valencia offered MS 13 an estimated Salvador’s two main political parties was $10 million in micro-credit, with the previously well-established, the magnitude of acknowledgement that the gangs would what was negotiated has only recently come control the funds for their own needs, to light. During the past year, MS 13 has making it essentially a payoff. These revela- posted a series of YouTube videos and audio tions came a few months after another recordings of their leadership directly released audio recording, in which Valencia negotiating with leaders of the two main could be heard negotiating with gang leaders political parties, the right-wing Republican to obtain their support during the second Nationalist Alliance (Alianza Republicana round of the 2014 presidential elections.