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Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice Fair cake-cutting in practice Kyropoulou, M., Ortega, J., & Segal-Halevi, E. (2019). Fair cake-cutting in practice. In Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329592 Published in: Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice Document Version: Peer reviewed version Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal: Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal Publisher rights Copyright 2019 ACM. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher. General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact [email protected]. Download date:26. Sep. 2021 Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice SUBMISSION 148 Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We find that envy-free procedures, in par- ticular Selfridge-Conway, are fairer and also are perceived as fairer than their proportional counterparts, de- spite the fact that agents very often manipulate them. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting mechanisms. We also find that subjects learn their opponents’ preferences after repeated interaction and use thisknowl- edge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning reduces truth-telling behavior, but also reduces envy. 1 INTRODUCTION The problem of how to fairly divide a divisible good among agents who value different parts of it distinctly has been thoroughly studied in many areas of science over the last seventy years. The heterogeneous good is often referred to as the cake [55], and thus this problem is known as cake-cutting (see 11, 53 and 46 for textbook references). This problem has multiple real-life applications, which include the division of land, inheritances, and cloud computing. Although fun- damental breakthroughs have been achieved on the construction of fair cake-cutting procedures, the question of which procedure is fairer in practice has not yet been tackled. This paper reports the results of an experiment that provides useful insights to help answer this question. Let us start by clarifying what we mean by fair. Although several notions of fairness have been proposed, two important ones stand out for their intuitive formulation. The first one is proportion- ality, proposed by Steinhaus himself. A division of the cake among n agents is proportional if every agent obtains at least what she considers to be 1/n of the cake. The second one is envy-freeness, proposed by [31] and [29]. A division of the cake is envy-free if no agent prefers the allocation re- ceived by any other agent over hers. If the entire cake is allocated, any division that is envy-free is also proportional. Proportionality and envy-freeness are often considered “the two most important tests of equity” [45, p. 166]. The literature has developed procedures that produce envy-free cake divisions when all agents report their preferences over the cake pieces truthfully. We will refer to these as envy-free proce- dures. Although the ones used for the division of a cake among two agents have been known and used since ancient times, all others rely on complex algorithms which are far from straightforward to general audiences: the Selfridge-Conway procedure for three agents is a case in point. These procedures obtain envy-free allocations at the cost of being hard to understand by the audiences for whom they are intended. If those procedures are not perceived as envy-free in practice (or at least fairer than proportional ones), there would be little support for their implementation in practice. Therefore, the first key question is whether those algorithms produce allocations thatare not only fair in theory, but that are also perceived to be fair in practice. Furthermore, the envy-freeness of these division procedures can only be guaranteed if the agents report their preferences truthfully. If agents strategically misrepresent their preferences, an allocation with envy can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game associated to envy-free procedures [13]. In fact, as we show in Lemma 4, envy can rationally emerge in envy-free procedures even when only one agent lies. Therefore, a second key question is whether cake-cutting procedures are manipulated in practice, and whether such manipulations, if they ex- ist, significantly increase envy. Manuscript submitted for review to ACM Economics & Computation 2019 (EC ’19) under the one-page extended abstract option. Submission 148 2 Our third and final key question is whether agents can successfully learn their opponents’ pref- erences through repeated interaction. This question is related to the previous two in that an agent needs some information about their opponents’ preferences to successfully manipulate a cake- cutting procedure. An agent can acquire this valuable information through experimentation, i.e. varying her strategies over time and observing her opponents’ best responses to them. If agents do not learn through experimentation, there is little concern about the manipulation of cake-cutting procedures in environments in which agents’ preferences are privately known, and thus no con- cern about the emergence of envy in otherwise envy-free procedures. We tackle these three questions by means of a lab experiment. In the experiment we study: (1) the perceived fairness of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures, (2) the extent to which agents manipulate those procedures, and (3) whether agents learn their partners’ preferences and use that information to their advantage. We consider the most popular cake-cutting procedures and compare their theoretical properties against their actual performance in the lab. The procedures we consider, which are described in detail in subsection 3.1, are: • For 2 agents: symmetric and asymmetric cut-and-choose; • For 3 agents: Knaster-Banach last diminisher, (a discrete adaptation of) Dubins-Spanier mov- ing knife, and Selfridge-Conway; • For 4 agents: Knaster-Banach last diminisher, (a discrete adaptation of) Dubins-Spanier mov- ing knife, and Even-Paz. These cake-cutting procedures are well-known in the literature because they all achieve propor- tional allocations. Furthermore, the asymmetric and symmetric cut-and-choose and the Selfridge- Conway procedures are even envy-free.1 In the experiment, 131 subjects divide 8 cakes using the aforementioned procedures versus au- tomata agents who play truthfully. Agents divide each cake 7 times in what we call rounds, during which their opponents’ preferences remain constant. This gives agents incentives to try to learn their opponents’ preferences. In addition, during the final two rounds agents are directly told their opponents’ preferences, so that we are able to differentiate between manipulations made to learn the opponents’ preferences and those made to directly increase the subjects’ immediate payoff. Subjects observe which share of the cake they get in each round and the value (in their own eyes) of their opponents’ shares. This way, subjects can assess the fairness of the allocations received. At the end of the experiment, agents complete a questionnaire which asks them to rank the fairness of the division procedures and allows them to give their feedback on their experience with the cake-cutting procedures. Agents are also asked which procedure was the fairest and why. 1.1 Overview of Results We find that all cake-cutting procedures are very frequently manipulated, in fact at least halfof the time (subsection 5.4). As a consequence, envy-free procedures generate envy. Envy is gener- ated in 7% of cases when using the asymmetric cut-and-choose procedure in which the subject cuts the cake, in 18% of cases when using the symmetric cut-and-choose procedure in which both subjects cut the cake, and in 28% of cases when using Selfridge-Conway. However, these proce- dures still generate substantially less envy than their proportional counterparts, which generate envy in over 50% of cases (subsection 5.3). The difference in envy is noticed by the subjects. Envy- free procedures receive a significantly better fairness ranking than their counterparts (over 80%of 1We do not include an envy-free procedure for four agents because the only finite one known to date, proposed by [2], is too complicated to be implemented in the lab. Submission 148 3 subjects view them as fair, compared to less than 50% for their proportional counterparts). More- over, agents were at least three times more likely to rank envy-free procedures as the fairest ones than proportional ones (subsection 5.1). Overall, the experimental results provide support for the use of the cut-and-choose and Selfridge-Conway procedures, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting procedures. These procedures are manipulated in practice just as much as their pro- portional counterparts, but nonetheless they generate substantially less envy. As a consequence, they are perceived as significantly fairer than their proportional counterparts. We find some evidence of successful learning, in particular in both of the cut-and-choose proce- dures, the Knaster-Banach last diminisher, and to some extent in Selfridge-Conway.
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