MP_C34.qxd 11/23/06 2:38 AM Page 266

34

Thomas Aquinas on God’s Existence and Simplicity

Summa Theologiae

Part I, Question 2. Does God Exist? With respect to this question there are three points of inquiry:

1. Is it self-evident that God exists? 2. Can we demonstrate that God exists? 3. Does God exist?

Article 1. Is it self-evident that God exists? 1. It seems that ‘God exists’ is self-evidently true. For we say that things are self-evident to us when we know them by nature, as by nature we know first principles. But as Damascene observes when beginning his book, ‘the knowledge that God exists is implanted by nature in everybody’.1 So, ‘God exists’ is self-evidently true. 2. Moreover, a proposition is self-evident if we perceive its truth immediately upon perceiving the meaning of its terms – a characteristic of first principles of demonstration (according to Aristotle).2 For example, when we know what wholes and parts are, we know at once that wholes are always bigger than their parts. But once we understand the meaning of the word ‘God’, we immediately see that God exists. For the word means ‘that than which nothing greater can be signified’. So, since what exists in thought and fact is greater than what exists in thought alone, and since, once we understand the word ‘God’, he exists in thought, he must also exist in fact. It is, therefore, self-evident that God exists. 3. Again, it is self-evident that truth exists, for even denying so would amount to admitting it. If there were no such thing as truth, it would be true that there is no truth. So, something

1 On the Orthodox Faith 1.1. PG 94.789. 2 Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a7–8. MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage267 1a3.4. 7 PL opposite ofwhatitself-evident. On thecontrary occupy space’. are self-evidentandcommonplacesonlytothelearned,as,forexample,thatbodiescan evident initself,willnotbesotothem.ThisiswhyBoethiuscansaythat‘certainnotions people donot allofus(suchas‘being’and‘non-being’,‘whole’‘part’,thelike).Butifsome to is clearlythecasewithfirstprinciplesofdemonstration,whichemploycommontermsknown essence ofthesubjectandpredicate,propositionwillbeself-evidenttoeverybody.This since beingananimalispartofthemeaning‘humanbeing’).Andifeveryoneknows of itssubject’sdefinition(thus,forexample,itisself-evidentthathumanbeingsareanimals (b) bothinitselfandtous.Forapropositionisself-evidentwhenitspredicateformspart Reply that Godexists. by God’seffects. strated bythingsmoreknowntous,thoughlessasfartheirnaturegoes–thatis, we donotknowwhatGodis,thepropositionisself-evidenttousandneedsbedemon- 6 Psalms13:1.ThenumberingofthefollowsthatLatinVulgate. 5 4 John14:6. 3 show, the life.’ is trueand,therefore,theretruth.ButGodtruthitself:‘Iamtheway,truth,and For ‘thefool’inthePsalms‘saidhisheart:“ThereisnoGod.”’ Hence: So, Imaintainthattheproposition‘Godexists’isself-evidentinitself,for,asshalllater 64.1311. .Someonehearingtheword‘God’mayverywellnotunderstandittomean‘that 2. KnowledgethatGodexistsisnotimplantedinusbynatureanyclearorspecific 1. How SubstancesAreGoodinVirtueoftheirExistencewithoutBeingSubstantial Goods Metaphysics : Apropositioncanbeself-evidentintwoways:(a)itself,thoughnottous,and 7 of Godwouldgrantthis),theconclusionthatinfactexists doesnotfollow. exists thanwhichnothinggreatercanbethought(andnobody denyingtheexistence rather thanmerelyasthoughtabout.Ifwedonotgrant that somethinginfact that thepersoninquestionthinkswhatissignifiedby ‘God’existsinreality by ‘God’is‘thatthanwhichnothinggreatercanbethought’,itdoesnotfollow God tobesomethingmaterial.Andevenifsomeonethinksthatwhatissignified than whichnothinggreatercanbethought’.Indeed,somepeoplehavebelieved such thing. that theultimategoodwillmakeushappyisriches,orpleasure,some of Peter(evenifitisreallywhoapproaching).Many,infact,believe that thereisaGodanymorethantobeawareofsomeoneapproaching happiness, whichistobefoundonlyinGod.Butthisnotknowunequivocally way. Admittedly,wenaturallyknowwhatnaturaldesire,anddesire its subjectandpredicateareidenticalsinceGodishisownexistence.But,because 3 So, itisself-evidentthatGodexists. 4.3, 1005b11; know theessenceofitssubjectandpredicate,thenaproposition,thoughself- 6 , asAristotle’sdiscussionoffirstprinciplesmakesclear,nobodycanthinkthe Posterior Analytics 4 But wecanthinktheoppositeofproposition‘Godexists.’ 1.10, 76b23–7. 5 So, itisnotself-evident ( De Hebdomadibus ). 267

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage268

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 268 1. Itseemsthatwecannotdemonstrate Article 2.CanwedemonstratethatGodexists? while faith,asStPaulsays,isconcernedwith‘theunseen’. exists, andwecannotdemonstratemattersoffaithsincedemonstrationcausesknowledge 3Romans1:19–20. 13 Romans1:20. 12 11 icate ofanother.Thusintheargument‘SisP,allPsareQs,soS is Q’,themiddleterm‘P’. TheterminanAristoteliansyllogismthatletsonelinkthesubjectof onepremisewiththepred- 10 scene tellsus,wedonotknowwhatGodis,onlyheisnot. demonstrate whatinitselfisnotself-evidenttous,namely,thatgodexists. on causesandcanoccuronlyiftheirexist.So,fromeffectsthatweknow better knowntous,anyeffectofacausedemonstratesthattheexists,foreffectsdepend its cause,wecometoknowthecausethrougheffect).But,incaseswhereeffectis of whatisfirstsofarasweareconcerned(forwhenaneffectmoreapparenttousthan other, ‘demonstrationthat’somethingisso,arguesfromeffecttocauseandproceedsbymeans so, arguesfromcausetoeffectandproceedsbymeansofwhatisunqualifiedlyfirst.The Reply need toknowaboutit. strate thatGodexistsfromwhathehasmade,forsomethingisthefirstthingwe On thecontrary to demonstratethatGodexists. not bedemonstratedbyeffectsthatareincommensuratewithit,itdoesseempossible infinite andhiseffectsfinite,thefinitecannotmeasureinfinite.So,sinceacausecan- ceed byreferencetohiseffects.ButGodandeffectsareincommensurable,foris that Godexists. understood fromwhathehasmade’. strate thatGodexists. Hebrews11:1. 9 i.e.provebydeducingfromknownpremises. 8 Hence: 3. Again,ifwecoulddemonstrateGod’sexistence,thedemonstrationwouldhavetopro- 2. Moreover,themiddleterm .Itisself-evidentthattheretruthingeneral.Butitnottous 3. .ThetruthsaboutGodthatStPaulsayswecanknowbyournaturalpowers 1. On theOrthodoxFaith : Therearetwokindsofdemonstration.Onekind,‘demonstrationwhy’somethingis there isaFirstTruth. of reasoning(thatGodexists,forexample)arenotarticlesfaith. cannot personallydemonstrate. nothing tostoppeoplefromacceptingonfaithsomedemonstrable truththatthey nature, andjustasallperfectionspresupposethatwhichtheyperfect.Butthereis presupposed bythem.Forfaithpresupposesnaturalknowledge,justasgracedoes , StPaultellsusthat‘theinvisiblethingsofGodcanbeclearlyseen,being 1.4. PG 94.800. 10 in ademonstrationiswhatsomethingis.But,asDama- 12 And ifthatisright,thenwemustbeabletodemon- 8 that Godexists.Foritisanarticleoffaith 9 So, itisimpossibletodemon- 11 So, wecannotdemonstrate 13 They are MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage269 modifies it.Butsomethingcannotbesimultaneouslyactually (actually hot)causeswood(abletobebecomeactuallyhot,andthusitchanges ity toactuality,andthiscanonlybedonebysomethingthatissomehowactual:thusfire can beactually permitted thesecausestooperate. saying thatwhatcausedtheshipwreckwasstormandhidden reef,butthepilot’sabsence that thepilot’sabsencecausedshipwreck,then,Aquinaswould parsethismorepreciselyby Aquinas’sclaimisthatcausescauseduetoapropertytheyhave,not one theylack.Whenwesay 16 Exodus3:14. 15 1a13.1ff. 14 is actual it endsupbeingafteritsprocessofchange–whilesomethingcausesinsofaras by somethingelse.Fornothingcanbeundergoingchangeunlessitispotentiallywhatever that somethingsintheworldundergochange.Butanythingprocessofchangeischanged Reply On thecontrary by humanreasoningandwill.So,thereisnoneedtoacceptthatGodexists. God doesnotexist.Thusweexplainnaturaleffectsbycauses,andintentional seems thatwecanfullyaccountforeverythingobserveintheworldwhileassuming So, Goddoesnotexist. if Godexisted,nobodywouldeverencounterevil.Butwedoevilintheworld. be completelydestroyed.Butbytheword‘God’weunderstandacertaininfinitegood.So, 1. ItseemsthatthereisnoGod.Forifoneoftwocontrarieswereinfinite,theotherwould Article 3.DoesGodexist? mediate causesproducechange(ifahanddoesnotmovethe stick,thestickwillnotmove subsequent causesofchange.Foritisonlywhenactedupon byafirstcausethatinter- this regressofcauses,otherwisetherewillbenofirstcause ofchange,and,asaresult,no itself changedbyyetanotherthing;andthislastanother. Buttherehastobeanend of changeischangedbysomethingelse.Andthis else,ifinprocessofchange,is cause thatsamechange.Itcannotchangeitself.Necessarily,therefore,anythinginprocess tially hot,thoughitcanbepotentiallycold).So,somethinginprocessofchangecannotitself The firstandmostobviouswayisbasedonchange.Itcertain,cleartooursenses, 2. Moreover,anythingthatcanbecausedbyfewprinciplesisnotmany.Butit .Effectscangivecomprehensiveknowledgeoftheircauseonlywhentheyarecom- 3. .Whenwedemonstrateacausefromitseffect,theeffecttakesplaceofwhat 2. : TherearefivewaysinwhichwecanprovethatthereisaGod. cannot helpustoknowhimcomprehensivelyforwhatheis. exists. So,God’seffectscanservetodemonstratethatGodexists,eventhoughthey mensurate withit.But,asIhavesaid,anyeffectcanmakeitclearthatacause what wepredicateofGodisderivedfromtheseeffects. we areabletostartfromwhattheword‘God’means,for,asIshalllaterexplain, name ofthethingtomean.ButwhendemonstratingfromeffectsthatGodexists, cannot evenaskwhatitisuntilweknowthatexists)butareusingthe when provingthatsomethingexists,themiddletermisnotwhatthing(we the causeisinproofthatexists,especiallyifGod.For, 16 in someway.Afterall,tochangesomethingissimplybringitfrompotential- , ExodusrepresentsGodassaying,‘Iamwhoam.’ x and potentially y (something actuallyhot,forinstance,cannotalsobepoten- x and potentially 15 x , thoughit 14 269

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage270

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 270 fully inbeing. is hottest.So,somethingthetruestandbestmostnobleofthings,hence what ismostF.Forexample,thingsarehotterandtheclosertheyapproachto of variousthingsasbeingmoreorlessFinsofartheyapproximatewaysto be moreandlessgood,true,noble,soon.Butwespeak something whichisthecausethatotherthingsmustbe. to positsomethingwhichisintrinsicallynecessary,owingitsnecessitynothingelse, series ofthingswhichmustbeandowethistosomethingelse.Thismeansthatweareforced just aswemuststopsomewhereinaseriesofefficientcauses,soalsothe thing thatmustbeeitherdoesornothaveacauseofitsnecessityoutsideitself.And, of thingthatisabletobeornotbe.TherehasgotsomethingmustYeta and nothingwouldexistnow,whichispatentlynotthecase.So,everythingsort something thatdoesexist.Therefore,ifnothingexisted,couldhavebeguntoexist, be nothingevennow,forsomethingthatdoesnotexistisonlybroughtintobeingby to be,atsometimetherewasnothingintheworld.Butifthatweretrue,would something thatiscapableofnotbeingatsometimenot.So,ifeverythingable perished (and,therefore,abletobeornotbe).Buteverythingcanlikethis.For of thethingsweencounterareabletobeornotbe,forfindthemgeneratedand case. So,wehavetopositafirstcause,whicheveryonecalls‘God’. would benointermediateefficientcauseseither,andlasteffect,whichisclearlynotthe the seriesofefficientcauses,therefore,andif,asaconsequence,thereisnofirstcause, cannot bealastcause,noranintermediateone,unlessthereisfirst.Ifnoendto be oneormany).Ifyoueliminateacause,however,alsoitseffect.So,there in itcausesanintermediate,andtheintermediatealast(whether cannot do.Butanorderofefficientcausesgobackinfinitely.Forearliermember something efficientlycausingitself.Forthiswouldmeanthatitprecededitself,which order ofefficientcausesintheobservableworld.Yetweneverobserve,norevercould, by anything,whichiswhateverybodytakesGodtobe. anything else).So,weareboundtoarriveatsomefirstcauseofchangethatisnotitselfchanged 18 Causationintheusualsense. 17 we callthisbeing‘God’. need archers.So,thereisabeingwithintelligencewhodirects allnaturalthingstoends,and to agoalonlyasdirectedbyonewithknowledgeandunderstanding. Arrows,forinstance, therefore reachtheirgoalbypurpose,notchance).But thingslackingintelligencetend fact thattheyalways,orusually,actinthesamewayso as toachievewhatisbest(and intelligence (i.e.materialobjectsinnature)actforthesake of anend.Thisisclearfromthe goodness, andwhateverotherperfectiontheyhave,wecallthis‘God’. other thingstobehot.So,thereissomethingthatcausesinalltheirbeing, causes itintheothers.TouseAristotle’sexample,fire,hottestofallthings, But whenmanythingspossesssomepropertyincommon,theonemostfullypossessingit 19 The fourthwayisbasedonthegradationsthatwefindinthings.Wesomethingsto The thirdwayisbasedonthepossibleandnecessary,itrunsasfollows.Some The secondwayisbasedonthenotionofefficientcausation. The fifthwayisbasedonthegovernanceofthings.Forwe see thatsomethingslack Metaphysics Metaphysics 18 2.1, 993b30. 2.1, 993b25. For, asAristotlesays,thetruestthingsaremostfullyinbeing. 17 We findthatthereisan 19 MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage271 implies imperfectionandincompletenessinthematerialworld,Ishallthenask: him, suchasbeingcomposite,changing,andthelike.So,Ishallask: The waysinwhichGodisnotwillbecomeapparentifweruleouteverythingunfittingto exist ratherthanthewaysinwhichhedoes.So,nowIconsider: 20 God is, exists, sothatwemaycometounderstandwhatitisexists.Butcannotknow Having recognizedthatsomethingexists,westillhavetoinvestigatethewayinwhichit Part I,Question3.God’sSimplicity and thelike. concrete thingsconsistcompletelyofparts,butalsoabstract ones–essences,accidents, pletely ofdifferentsortspart:books,say,bothquarksand molecules.Aquinasthinksthat concrete thingsfromwhichotherareassembled.But thesamethingcanconsistcom- Literallyconsistingoforhavingbeenputtogetherfromparts.Weusually thinkofpartsas 22 know whatitistobedivine. tually graspthisproperty.Wecanknowwhatitistobeomniscient ortobehuman,butwecannot etc. Deityissomepropertyotherthananyofthese.Aquinas’sclaim hereisthatwecannotintellec- not telluswhatitistobedivine;thecasethatdivine istobeomniscient,omnipotent, potent, omniscient,etc.ButGodsatisfiesthesebecauseheisdivine. ForAquinasthesedescriptionsdo AccordingtoAquinas,weknowthatGodnecessarilysatisfiesmanydescriptions –thatheisomni- 21 About thefirstofthesequestionsthereareeightpointsinquiry: First, aboutGod’ssimplicity,thusrulingoutcomposition. Hence: .Ishecomposedofformandmatter? 2. IsGodabody?he,thatistosay,composedofextendedparts? 1. .Sincenatureactsfordefiniteendsunderthedirectionofahighercause,itseffects 2. .AsAugustinesays,‘SinceGodissupremelygood,hewouldnotpermitanyevilat 1. A HandbookonFaith,HopeandLove back toafirstcausethatcannotchangeandisintrinsicallynecessary. these arechangeableandlacking.And,asIhavesaid,wemusttraceallsuchthings tionally mustbetracedbacktoahighercausethanhumanreasoningandwill,for must betracedtoGodasthefirstofallcauses.Similarly,eventhingsdoneinten- to existanddrawsgoodfromthem. from evil.’ all inhisworks,unlessheweresufficientlypowerfulandgoodtobringeven 21 only whatheisnot.WemustthereforeconsiderthewaysinwhichGoddoesnot 20 So, itbelongstothelimitlessgoodnessofGodthathepermitsevils third, thewaysinwhichwedescribehim. second, thewaysinwhichweknowhim; First, thewaysinwhichGodisnot; fifth, abouthisoneness. fourth, abouthisunchangeableness; third, abouthislimitlessness; second, aboutGod’sperfection; ( Enchiridion ) 11. PL 40.236. 22 And becausesimplicity 271

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage272

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 272 and broaderthanthesea.’ you do?Heisdeeperthanhellandhowwillknow?Hismeasurelongertheearth sacred ScriptureascribesthreedimensionstoGod:‘Heishigherthanheavenandwhatwill 1. ItwouldseemthatGodisabody.Forbodysomethingwiththreedimensions,and Article 1.IsGodabodycomposedofextendedparts? not abody. you shallbewrittenintheearth’). are towardstherighteous’ God, sayinginJob,‘HaveyouanarmlikeGod?’, is abody. 41a2.3. 34 John4:24. 33 Jeremiah17:13. 32 Psalms33:6. 31 Isaiah3:13. 30 Isaiah6:1. 29 Psalms117:16. 28 Psalms33:16. 27 Job40:4. 26 Hebrews1:3. 25 Genesis1:26. 24 Job11:8–9. 23 But IhaveshownabovethatGodistheunchangingfirstcauseofchange. Reply God: thusIsaiah‘sawtheLordsitting’, a body. On thecontrary the brightnessofhisglory,andfigure[thatistosay,image]substance’. ment (‘Cometohimandbeenlightened’) it isabodyorbodily.ButScripturereferstoGodasthefinishing-pointofspatialmove- is abody. in ourimageandlikeness’, as such.ButGodseemstohaveashape,forinGenesisweread,‘Letusmakehumanbeings 3. Moreover,anythingwithbodilypartsisabody.ButScriptureascribesto First, nobodycauseschangewithoutitselfbeingchanged,ascanbeshowninductively. 4. Moreover,onlybodiescanassumepostures.ButScriptureascribescertainposturesto 5. Again,nothingcanbethestarting-pointorfinishing-pointofaspatialmovementunless 2. Moreover,everythingwithshapeisabody,forcharacteristicofextendedthings .Doesheenterintocompositionwithotherthings? 8. Isthereanywayinwhichheiscomposite,oraltogethersimple? 7. Ishecomposedofsubstanceandaccidents? 6. Ishecomposedofgenusanddifference? 5. Ishecomposedofessenceandexistence? 4. Ishecomposedof‘whatness’(essenceornature)andsubject? 3. : Godisinnowayabody,andwecanshowthisthreeways. , Johnwrites:‘Godisspirit.’ 23 24 27 So, Godisabody. where ‘image’means‘figure’or‘shape’asinHebrews:‘whois and ‘therighthandoftheLorddoesvaliantly’. 32 So, Godisabody. 29 and saysthat‘theLordstandstojudge’. 31 33 and asastarting-point(‘Thosethatdepartfrom 26 and inthePsalms,‘TheeyesofLord 34 So, Godisclearly 28 So, Godis 30 25 So, God So, God MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage273 So, Godcannotbeabody. principle (inourcase,thesoul).Suchawillbemoreexcellentthanbodyassuch. of beingabody(otherwiseallbodieswouldbeliving);itisalivebecausesomeother living bodiesareclearlythemoreexcellent.Yetabodyisnotalivesimplyinvirtue a bodycannotbethemostnobleofbeings.Forbodiesareeitherlivingornon-living,and we haveseenthatthefirstbeingisGod. be changedfromastateofpotentialitytooneactualityexceptbysomethingactual.Now precedes theactuality,absolutelyspeaking,potentiality,fornothingcan in anyonethingthatpassesfrompotentialitytoactuality,thetemporally God cannotbeabody. bodies, however,thereisalwayspotentiality,becausetheextendedassuchdivisible.So, 38 1a1.9. 37 1a2.3. 36 1a2.3. 35 9Genesis1:28. 39 Hence: Second, thefirstbeingmustofnecessitybeactualandinnowaypotential.For,although Third, Godisthemostnobleofbeings,asclearfromwhatIhavealreadysaid. .OneapproachesGod,andonedrawsaway fromhim,notbybodilymovement, 5. TheascribingofposturetoGodisagainsimplymetaphor.Hesaidbesitting, 4. TheScripturesascribebodilypartstoGodbyametaphordrawnfromtheir 3. .AsIremarkedearlier,sacredScriptureusesbodilymetaphorstoconveytruthabout 1. .WesaythathumanbeingsareinGod’simage,notbecausetheyhavebodies, 2. The DivineNames were likebeingmovedinspace. ing’ and‘drawingaway’aremetaphorsthatpicturebeing moved inspiritasifit since heiseverywhere,butbymovementoftheheart.Inthis context,‘approach- ing becausehismighttriumphsinthefaceofallopposition. for instance,becauseofhisunchangeablenessandauthority.Heissaidtobestand- similarly withotherpartsofthebody. to hispowerofseeingthingsinanintelligibleratherthanasensorymanner.And functions. Eyes,forexample,see;so,whenweattributean‘eye’toGoditrefers intellect andreason,whichareincorporeal. superiority toreasonandintellect.So,theyareinGod’simagebecauseoftheir boundless reachofGod’sguardianshipenvelopingallthings. essence, lengthasthepenetrationofallthingsbyGod’spower,andbreadth love. OrthereisDionysius’sexplanationofdepthastheincomprehensibilityGod’s things; length,thelastingqualityofhisexistence;breadth,universality his powertoknowwhatishidden;height,theloftinessofaboveallother bodily extensiontosignifytheextentofGod’spower:depth,forexample,signifies God andspiritualthings. have dominionoverthefishesofsea’, saying, ‘Letusmakehumanbeingsinourimageandlikeness’,adds,‘thattheymay but becauseoftheirsuperioritytootheranimals.AndthisiswhyGenesis,after 9.5. PG 3.913. 37 So, inascribingthreedimensionstoGodtheyareusing 35 So, therecanbenopotentialityinGod.In 39 and soon.Humanbeingsowethis 38 36 But 273

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage274

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 274 says thepsalm,‘waskindledagainsthispeople’. the firstefficientcause. primarily andintrinsicallyform.YetGodistheprimaryagent,since,asIhaveexplained,he on thetypeofformtheyhave.Whatisprimarilyandessentiallyanagentmustthereforebe composed ofmatterandform. Article 2.IsGodcomposedofform made upofparts. of matterandform. body. composed ofmatterandformmustbeabody.AsIhaveshown,however,Godisnot On thecontrary not somethingpredicableofmanyindividuals.So,Godiscomposedmatterandform. are eithersubstantialoraccidental.Foranyx,x their bearers:Socrates’humanityissomethingabstractthat‘in’andparticulartoSocrates.Forms Arealattribute‘in’thething.Aquinasthinksofformsasabstractconstituents,particular 40 by faith,andifheshrinksbackmysoulwillhavenopleasureinhim’. thus inHebrewswefindquoted,asiffromthemouthofGod,‘myrighteousoneshalllive anything withasouliscomposedofmatterandform.ButtheScripturesascribetoGod; 1. Godseemstobecomposedofformandmatter.Forsincesoulisthebody, being goodbyessenceispriortoakindofparticipation. cipates inform.Butthefirstandbestgood(i.e.God)doesnotparticipategoodness,for goodness. Suchcompositethingsthereforeonlyparticipateingoodness,formatterparti- potentiality. Reply 91a2.3. 49 Something‘participatesin’aformjustifitbearstheand isnotidenticalwithit. 48 1a3.1. 47 1a3.1. 46 Psalms105:40. 45 44 Hebrews10:38. 43 a formbutnosoul. and makesitsmatteralivingcaninebody,sodog.Butnot everyformisasoul.Waterhas (or be)actuallyx ForAquinas,foranyx,x 42 parts ofwhichxiscomposed,ormostgenerallythatwaspotentially xandbecameactuallyx. Thatwhich‘bears’or‘receives’forms.Foranyx,x 41 quality orasoul. accidental justifitisnotsubstantial.Aformmaybe,forexample,ashape,structure,power, is astructurewhichmakesofgroupatomsaninstancethekind (q.v.) becomeand/ormakesitbeactuallyx Third, allagentsactinvirtueoftheirform,sothewaywhichtheyarewilldepend 2. Moreover,accordingtoAristotle,anger,joy,andthelike,arepassionsofsomething 3. Again,matteriswhatmakesathinganindividual.ButGodseemstobeindividual, Second, inthingscomposedofformandmatter,theirgivesthemperfection First, becausematterispotential,whileGod,asIhaveshown,sheeractualitywithno On theSoul : Godcannotcontainmatter. 46 So, heisnotcomposedofmatterandform. 47 So, Godcannotbecomposedofmatterandform. , sincehavingdimensionsisoneoftheprimarypropertiesmatter,anything 1.1, 403a3ff. ′ kind ofthing.Everysoulisaform:dog’sthatinthedog whichmade 44 But theScripturesascribesuchpassionstoGod:‘theangerofLord,’ 49 So, Godisessentiallyformandnotcomposedofmatterform. ′ form isthatinxwhichmade(ormakes) 40 and matter ′ kind ofthing.Thesubstantialformwater,forinstance, ′ substantial formisthatinxwhichmade 45 41 So, Godiscomposedofmatterandform. ? ′ matter isthestuffofwhichxmade, water molecule 43 ′ So, Godiscomposed 48 matter (q.v.)become So, Godcannotbe . Aformis ′ matter 42 MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage275 beings asthingsthathave the matterandpropertiespeculiartoitasanindividual.Wedonot,forexample,definehuman makes humanbeingstobebeings).Butwedonotdefinethespeciesofanythingby of humanbeing,forthismakesustobeandiswhathumanitysignifies(i.e. what fallswithinthedefinitionofaspecies–ashumanityincludes be thesameastheirnaturesoressences.Foressencenatureinthesethingsincludesonly Reply is divinityitself. the life.’ On thecontrary is nothumanity).So,itseemsthatGoddivinity. individual createdthingsartotherthantheirnatures(aparticularhumanbeing,forinstance, from hisessenceornature. say thatGod’sessenceornature(hisdivinity)isinGod.So,itseemsGodmustdiffer 1. ItseemsthatGodisnotthesameashisessenceornature.Fornothinginitself.Butwe and subject? Article 3.IsGodcomposedof‘whatness’(thatis,essence but nottoitsnature.Individualhumanbeingsthereforepossess somethingthathumannature flesh and a watermoleculeacquiresitsessence, the answertoquestion‘whatisx?’Thingsacquiretheiressences byacquiringtheirsubstantialforms: Foranyx,x 50 2John14:6. 52 tured aswatermoleculesare)andtheresultingissubject thatbearstheessence. up awatermolecule,theatomsaresubjectthatreceives essence(thatis,cometobestruc- Subject:thatwhichreceivesorbearsanessence.Whenhydrogenandoxygenatomscome tomake 51 humanity issomethingabstractthat‘in’andparticulartoSocrates. molecule. Aquinasthinksofessencesasabstractconstituents, particular astheirbearers:Socrates’ We shallunderstandthiswhenwenotethatthingscomposedofmatterandformcannot 2. Moreover,effectsresembletheircauses,forwhatathingdoesreflectsitis.But Hence: .Theformsofmaterialthingsareindividualizedbymatter,whichcannotbe 3. ScriptureascribesangerandtheliketoGodbyametaphordrawnfromtheireffects. 2. ScriptureascribessoultoGodbyametaphordrawnfromitsactivity.Forsince 1. : Godisthesameashisessenceornature. not followthatthereismatterinGod. just becauseitcannotbereceivedinasubject,andGodissuchform.So,does form whichcannotbereceivedinmatter,andisself-subsisting,individualized as such(unlesssomethinginterferes)canbereceivedbymanythings.Buta predicable ofasubjectsinceitisitselfthefirstunderlying–thoughform bution isthereforemetaphoricallycalled‘anger’. For itischaracteristicofangerthatstimulatesustorequitewrong.Divineretri- his soul’. soul istheseatofvolitioninus,wecallwhatpleasingtoGod’swill‘pleasing 52 these But divinitybearsthesamerelationshiptoGodaslifedoesliving.So, 51 bones, andthepropertiespeculiartothem,belongindeed , wespeakofGodnotonlyaslivingbutlife:‘Iamtheway,truthand ′ having itsessencemakesxthekindofthingitis,andsoisthatwhich makestrue this flesh and being water these , bycomingtohostthedistinctivestructureofawater bones, orarewhite,black,thelike. 50 or nature) this human being, This 275

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage276

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 276 71a3.3. 57 vidual andthemselvessubsistasthings.Suchthingsarethereforeidenticalwiththeirnatures. from thisorthatindividualmatter.So,theformsofsuchthingsmustbeintrinsicallyindi- a thingdefinitionisformativewithrespecttothematterthatgivesitindividuality. same thing.‘Humannature’namestheformativeelementinhumanbeings;forwhatgives does not,andparticularhumanbeingstheirnaturearetherefore,altogetherthe he is. not hisessence. On thecontrary 6StHilaryofPoitiers( 56 1a2.2. 55 Wisdom14:21. 54 1a3.2. 53 cause (asheatinwaterderivesfromsomefire).So,ifthe existence ofsomethingisother humour characteristicofhumanbeingsderivesfrom nature),orfromanexternal principles oftheessenceitself,asaccidentspeculiartoaparticular species(asthesenseof shown inanumberofways. Reply So, whatsubsistsinGodishisexistence. says, ‘theygavethe (the existencewecanpredicateofeverything).Butthisisnotso.AsthebookWisdom and existencearethesameinGod,word‘God’wouldmean‘existencegeneral’ added isexistenceingeneral(thethatpredicatedofeverything),and,ifessence were, therewouldbenothingaddedtoGod’sexistence.Butexistencewhichis 1. ItseemsthatessenceandexistencearenotthesamewhenitcomestoGod.Ifthey Article 4.IsGodcomposedofessenceandexistence? of him. is identicalwithhisowndivinity,life,andwhateverelsesimilarlypredicated In thesameway,then,God,who,asIhavesaid,isnotcomposedofmatterandform, However, theindividualityofthingsnotcomposedmatterandformcannotderive 2. Moreover,asIsaidearlier,wecanknowthatGodexists,butcannotwhat First, whatbelongstoathingoverandaboveitsessencemust becaused:eitherfromthe Hence: .God’seffectsresembleGodasfartheycan,butnotperfectly.Thisfailureinresem- 2. Whenwetalkaboutsimplethingshavetousethecompositefromwhich 1. : IhaveshownthatGodishisownessence. 55 with theirnatures. simple andone.Asaresulttheyarecompositecannot,therefore,beidentified blance isduetothefactthattheycanrepresentonlybymanywhat,initself, in whichweconceiveofhim. should notattributethediversitythatthisimpliestoGodhimself,butway when wetalkofdivinity,orlife,somethingthatsort,residinginGod, iar arecomposite),andweuseabstractnounstoexpresshissimplicity.Therefore, nouns tosignifyhissubsistence(sincethesubsistentthingswithwhichwearefamil- our knowledgederivesasmodels.So,whentalkingaboutGodweuseconcrete So, God’sexistenceisnotthesameaswhatGod–hisessenceornature. , Hilarywrites,‘ExistenceisnotanaccidentinGod;itsubsistingtruth.’ incommunicable nametowoodandstones’. c . 315– c . 368), On theTrinity 57 8. That heisalsohisownexistencecanbe PL 10.208. 54 So, God’sexistenceis 56 53 MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage277 God doesnotcontainpotentialities. is notwhatamountstoexistenceassuch,then,itmustexistpotentially.Now,Ihaveshown, the actualityofgoodnessorhumannaturebyspeakingthemasexisting).So,whena cannot saythatGod’sexistenceissomethingotherthanhisessence. to Godineitherrealityorunderstanding.So,doesnot belongtoagenus. On thecontrary are thesame,asIhaveshown. existing, withoutbeing‘existenceassuch’,participatesinexistence.Now,Godandhisessence and existenceishisessence. that Godisthemeasureofallsubstances. are measuredbylength,andnumbersnumber).Butit seems fromwhatAverroessays self-subsistent’) ismostfullyapplicabletoGod.So,Godbelongsthegenusofsubstance. 1. ItseemsthatGoddoesbelongtoagenus.Forthedefinitionofsubstance(‘something Article 5.IsGodcomposedofgenusanddifference? this cannotbesoinGod’scase,for,aswehaveseen,heisthefirstefficientcause. therefore, itsexistencemustbecausedbysomethingotherthanthethinginquestion.But existence isderivedcanbringitselfintobeing.Ifathing’sdiffersfromitsessence, But itcannotbecausedbytheprinciplesofthing’sessence,fornothingwhich than itsessence,itmustderivefromthething’sorhaveanexternalcause. existence. primary existent,whichheclearlyis.So,Godisnotonlyhisownessence,butalso his essenceamountsto),thenheonlyparticipatesinexistenceandwillnotthereforebethe 62 Ibn Rushd, also known as Averroes (1126–98), IbnRushd,alsoknownasAverroes (1126–98), 62 1a2.2,especially 61 1a2.3. 60 1a3.1. 59 1a2.3. 58 Second, existenceiswhatmakeseveryformornatureactual(whichwhyweonlyexpress Third, anythingonfire,withoutbeingfireitself,participatesinfire.Similarly, 2. Moreover,anymeasuremustbelongtothesamegenusas the thingsitmeasures(lengths Hence: .Weusetheverb‘tobe’intwoways:tosignifyactofexistence,and 2. Wecanunderstand‘somethingtowhichnothingisadded’intwoways. 1. said, weknowthatarespeakingtrulyherebecauseofGod’seffects. we knowourselvestobespeakingtrulywhensaythatGodexists.AsIhave know hisessence.ButwecanGod’sbeinginthesecondsensesofaras we cannotknowwhatGod’sactofexistenceamountstoanymorethancan the mentalunitingofpredicatetosubjectwhichconstitutesaproposition.Now, existence withoutadditionisingeneral. way, divineexistenceiswithoutaddition.Understoodinthesecond of animalsingeneral,thoughneitherisitexcluded).Understoodthefirst addition isjustnotincludedinthedefinition(asreason by definitionfromirrationalanimals).Wecanalsotakeitasimplyingthatfurther take itasimplyingthatfurtheradditionisexcludedbydefinition(asreason , agenusislogicallypriortothethingsthatexemplifyit.But nothingisprior ad 2. 60 And ifGodisnot‘existenceassuch’(ifexistencewhat 59 In him,therefore,essencecannotdifferfromexistence, 62 So, Godmustbelongtothegenusofsubstance. Commentary onAristotle’sMetaphysics 61 10.7. 58 So, we 277

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage278

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 278 essence. ButGod’sessenceistoexist,asIhaveshown. genus. So, sincerealizationofpotentialitiesdoesnotoccurinGod,hecannotbeaspecieswithin human beingsrealizespotentialitiesoftheirsense-life.Andweseethelikeinothercases. the notionofareasoningcreature(awhichlivesbyitsmind).Butmind-life animal beingsomethingthatlivesbysense-perception),whilementallifegivesriseto notion. Thussense-life,envisagedintheconcrete,givesrisetonotionofanimal(an ation isalwaysbasedonsomeactualizationofthepotentialitythatgaverisetogeneric But Godbelongstoagenusinneitheroftheseways. quantity; andblindness,likeallotherdefects,isreducedtothegenusofitscorresponding. do. Forexample,unityandthepointarereducedtogenusofquantityasprinciples the speciesthatfallunderagenus;andbywayofreduction,asprinciplesprivations Reply not existinGod, or whatitis,mustdifferfromitsexistence.AsIhaveshown,though,thisdifferencedoes ticular man,andthismanisnotthatman.So,whensomethingbelongstoagenus,itsnature, they are.Asexistingthings,however,differ,forsomeparticularhorseisnotpar- 64 1a3.4. 63 61a44.1. 66 1a3.4. 65 number. ButGodinitiateseverythingthatis,asIshalllatershow. ineffective outsidethatgenus:onlythepointgeneratesextension,andunity ing it.Foranythingthatinitiatesagenusinsuchwayitmediatelybelongstois posed ofgenusanddifference,demonstrationdependsupondefinition. nor demonstrateanythingofhimexceptbymeanshiseffects;fordefinitionsarecom- any particulargenussoastobelongit. differentiate ifitdidnotexist). genera, andnodifferentiatingfactorcouldbefoundthatdidnotalreadyexist(it no suchgenus:forgeneraaredifferentiatedbyfactorspotalreadycontainedwithinthose God couldbelongwouldbethegenusofbeing.Aristotle,however,hasshownthatthereis Second, sincethegenusofsomethingstateswhatthingis,amustexpressthing’s First, becausewedefinespeciesbydifferentiatingsomegenericnotion.Suchdifferenti- We canshowthathecannotbeaspecieswithingenusinthreeways. Third, allmembersofagenusshareoneessenceornature:thatthestatingwhat It isalsoclearthatGoddoesnotbelongmediatelytoagenusbyinitiatingorgenerat- And thisshowswhywecannotassigneithergenusordifferencetoGod,nordefinehim, Hence: .Thisargumentsupposesthatlikeismeasured bylike.Strictlyspeaking,however, 2. Theword‘substance’doesnotmeanbaldlythatwhichexistsofitself,forexistence 1. Metaphysics : Therearetwowaysofbelongingtoagenus:strictlyandwithoutqualification,asdo as thecloserthingscometoGodmorefullytheyexist. God isnotlikeanything,thoughhecalledthemeasureof allthingsinasmuch So, itisclearthatGoddoesnotbelongtothegenusofsubstance. of anessencesuchthatitwillexistitself,eventhoughto exist isnotitsessence’. is notagenus,asIhaveshown.Rather,‘substance’means‘that whichispossessed 3.3, 998b22. 65 God, therefore,clearlycannotbeaspecieswithingenus. 64 So, weareleftwithnogenustowhichGodcouldbelong. 63 So, theonlygenustowhich 66 So, hedoesnotinitiate MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage279 potentiality fromGod. mode inwhichthesubjectachievesactuality.But,asIhavesaid,wemustentirelyruleout Reply in God. accidental toanything’. 1. ItseemsthatthereareaccidentsinGod.ForAristotlesays‘substanceisnever existent, butyoucannotaddtoexistenceitself’ Article 6.IsGodcomposedofsubstance All derivationstartsfromhim.ItthereforefollowsthatGodcontainsnoaccidents. such accidentsderivefromasubject’sessentialnature.ButthereisnothingderivedinGod. existing inhimbynature(as,forexample,peoplehaveasenseofhumournature).For absolutely primeexistent,nothingcanexistinhimbyaccident.Northerebeaccidents erties besidesbeinghot–suchaswhitenessbutheatitselfcannotbeotherwisethanhot). since, asBoethiussays,‘nosimpleformcanbeasubject’. On thecontrary other principalmembersbesidesGod;andthisdoesnotseemright. accidents. So,iftheprincipalmembersofthesegeneraarenotinGod,therewillbemany we ascribetoGod,areaccidentsinus.So,thereGod. proves thatitcannotbethesubstantialformoffire.Butwisdom,power,andlike,which substance ofanother.Thefactthatheat,forexample,isanaccidentalformsomethings 31a13.5. 73 Hebdomadibus 69 questions abouthowthingsarerelated). to questionsinthe‘howisit?’or‘whatitlike?’families)relations (whichmaketrueanswersto make trueanswerstoquestionsinthe‘howmuch?’family),qualities (whichmaketrueanswers that is‘in’andparticulartoSocrates.AsAquinasseesit,allrealaccidents areeitherquantities(which accidents asabstractconstituents,particulartheirbearers:Socrates’ weightissomethingabstract Accidents:attributes(forms)thatarenotessencesorsubstantialforms. Aquinasthinksof 68 Aconcreteparticularthingthatbearsattributes. 67 72 1a3.1. 71 70 First, becauseaccidentsrealizesomepotentialitiesoftheirsubject,sinceanaccidentisa Second, becauseGodishisownactofexistence,andasBoethiussays,‘youmayaddtoan Hence: Third, becausewhatexistsbynatureispriortoaccidental,sothatifGodthe 2. Moreover,ineverygenusthereisaprincipalmember.Butaremanygeneraof .Sincesubstanceispriortoaccidents,theprinciplesofaccidentsarereducible 2. .AsIshallexplainlater,wedonotascribepowerandwisdomtoGodusin 1. Physics How SubstancesAreGoodinVirtueofTheirExistencewithout BeingSubstantialGoods On theTrinity : WhatIhavealreadysaidmakesitclearthataccidentscannotexistinGod. genera. in thegenusofsubstance,heisstillfirstwithrespecttoallbeing,transcending the principlesofsubstanceastosomethingprior.AndalthoughGodisnotfirst the samesense. 1.3, 186b1–4. ). PL , everyaccidentisanofsomesubject.ButGodcannotbeasubject, 64.1311. 2. PL 73 64.1250. 71 So, itdoesnotfollowthataccidentsexistinGodastheydous. 69 So, somethingthatisaccidentalinonethingcannotbethe 67 and accidents? 72 (just asahotthingmayhaveotherprop- 68 70 So, therecannotbeaccidents ( De 279

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage280

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 280 81a50.2, 78 77 1a2.3. 76 1a2.3. 75 On thecontrary not assertthatGodisaltogethersimple. elements, forexample,andelementsarebetterthantheirconstituentparts.So,weshould we arefamiliar,compositethingsbetterthansimpleones:compounds is good.ButnothingderivingfromGodentirelysimple.So,notsimpleeither. thus everythingderivingfromthefirstbeingexists,andgood 1. ItseemsthatGodisnotentirelysimple.Forthethingsderivefromresemblehim: Article 7.IsthereanywayinwhichGodiscomposite,orheentirelysimple? 74 light, isnotpiecedtogetherfromthingsthataredarkness.’ out whenhesaid,‘God,beingpower,isnotmadeupofthingsthatareweak;and, existence itself.So,hecaninnowaybecomposite.AndthiswaswhatHilarypointing whiteness), intheformitselfthereisnothingotherthanitself.ButGoditself,indeed that isnotitself(e.g.awhitethingcontainselementsincludedintheconceptof posite itself.Now,evenifwegrantthatathingpossessedofformmaycontainsomething no partofitwilldoso).So,inallcompositesthereissomeelementthatnotthecom- drop ofwateriswater),otherwaysdonot(thusifaunitoccupiestwocubicfeet, of describingthewholeapplyalsotoparts(everybitair,forexample,isandevery part ofafootisfoot.Andalthoughincompositesmadeupsimilarpartscertainways obvious incompositesmadeupofdifferentparts,fornopartamanisman,and components togetherarepotentiallythewhole. for eitherthepotentialitiesofonecomponentarerealizedbyanother,or,atanyrate,all the firstefficientcause. bine unlessmadetodosobyacause.AsIhavesaid,though,Godisnotcausedsincehe But God,asIhaveshown,isthefirstofallbeings. simple. and accidents.ItisthereforeclearthatGodinnowaycomposite.Rather,heentirely nature fromhisexistence.Norcanwedistinguishinhimgenusanddifference,norsubstance he isnotabody),norofformandmatter,doesdifferfromhisownnature, Reply 2. Moreover,weshouldascribewhateverisbettertoGod.But,intheworldwithwhich Hence: Fifth, wecannotpredicateanythingcompositeofitsowncomponentparts.Thisis Fourth, inanycompositethereisarealizingofpotentialitiessuchascannotoccurGod: Third, everythingcompositeiscaused;forelementsdiverseofthemselvesdonotcom- Second, everythingcompositeissubsequenttoitscomponentsanddependentonthem. First, relyingonwhatIhavealreadysaid,Godisnotcomposedofextendedparts(since .ThingsderivingfromGodresemblehimas effectsresembleaprimarycause.But 1. On theTrinity On theTrinity : TherearemanywaysofshowingthatGodisentirelysimple. simplest itsexistencediffersfromessence,asIshalllater explain. it isinthenatureofaneffecttobecompositesomeway, becauseevenatits ad 3. , AugustinesaysthatGodistrulyandabsolutelysimple. 7. 4.4–8. 4.4–8. PL 10.223. 76 PL 42.927–9. 75 77 74 78 MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage281 that ‘theexistenceofeverythingisthedivinenature,whichbeyondbeing’. 1. ItseemsthatGoddoesenterintocompositionwithotherthings.ForDionysiusdeclares Article 8.DoesGodenterintocompositionwithotherthings? people haveheldthatGodisthesoulofworld. Reply by minglingpartwithpart’. On thecontrary are identical. fore becomposite.ButGodandprimematterarealtogethersimpleand,therefore,they this argument:thingsthatdifferdosobycertaindifferentiatingfactors,andmustthere- into thecompositionofthings.So,Godmustdosotoo.–Toprovemiddlestepin exist withoutdifferingandare,therefore,completelyidentical.Yetprimematterenters ‘is unformedform’. with otherthings. tence ofeverythingentersintothecompositioneach.So,God something. form ofaneffect,thoughspecificallysimilartoitsefficientcause(e.g.peoplebegetpeople), whether asaformalprincipleormaterialone. opinions areclearlywrong.Godcannotenterintocompositionwithanythinginanyway, mistake wasthereallystupidthesisofDavidDinant–thatGodisprimematter.Allthese is theformofallthings–reputedviewAmauryBèneandhisfollowers.Thethird those whosaidthatGodisthesoulofoutermostheaven. 80 1a4.2, 79 61a2.3. 86 crystalline spheres,theheavens. AquinasacceptedAristotle’scosmology,inwhichtheearthwassurrounded byaseriesof 85 84 83 of elements,forAquinas,everyphysicalthingcontainsprimematter. chemical elements,andhecallsitprimematter.SinceforAquinas everyphysicalthingiscomposed more fundamentalchemicalstuff.Aquinasinfersthatthereis a morebasickindofmatterthan and waterare that firstbearstheattributeofbeingearthandthen ofbeingwater.Butifearth ing, ratherthanbeingreplacedbyanotherbodyofstuff,something mustbetherethroughout air, fireandwater–thatsomeearthcanchangeintowater. Ifthisisonebodyofstuffchang- Theultimatereceiverofallattributes.SupposewithAquinasthattherearefourelements–earth, 82 Sermons38. 81 2. Moreover,Godisaform,forAugustinesaysthat‘theWordofGod’(whichGod) 3. Again,thingswhichexistwithoutdifferingareidentical.ButGodandprimematter First, becauseGodisthefirstefficientcauseofthings,asIhavealreadysaid. .Intheworldwithwhichwearefamiliarcompositethingsbetterthansimple 2. The CelestialHierarchy The CityofGod The DivineNames : Onthispointthreemistakeshavebeenmade.AswelearnfromAugustine,some perfection isfoundinonesimplething,asIshallshortlyshow. ones, becausecreatedperfectionisfoundinmanythings,notjustone.Butdivine ad 1. elements , Dionysiussaysthat‘nothingcantouchGod,noristhereanyunionwithhim PL 7.6. 38.662. 81 2.5. , theyareultimatekindsofchemicalmatter:notmade upofsome But formisacomponentofthings.So,Godmustbe PL PG 4.1. 41.199. 3.643. 83 PG 3.177. 84 We canincludewiththesepeople 85 Others havesaidthatGod 79 80 But theexis- 86 But the 82 281

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage282

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 282 tiality, andpotentialityisunqualifiedlysecondarytoactuality,asIhaveshown. form ofcompositethings(theirfirstparts)betheamongbeings.Formatterisinpoten- warms byvirtueofitsheat.So,Godcannotbeacomponentanything. hand doesnotact.Rather,humanbeingsactbymeansoftheirhands,anditisfirewhich and essentially.ButacomponentisnotanefficientcauseprimarilyThus are actual. numerically norspecificallyidentical,formatterisinpotentialitywhileefficientcauses is notnumericallyidenticalwiththeefficientcause.Matterandcausesareneither we speakofthingsasknowthem.Heretherearetwelvepointsinquiry: Having consideredhowweknowGod,Inowturntoconsiderspeakofhim,for Part I,Question13.TalkingaboutGod fire. ButIhavealreadyshownthatGodistheprimarybeing,withoutqualification. thing thatparticipatesin when apartofsomethingcomposite,isformwhichparticipatesinsomething.Nowsome- 90 Theprototypeormodelinaccordancewithwhichthingsare made. 89 1a2.3. 88 1a.3.1. 87 1i.e.dowordsinthecategoryofsubstance expressGod’snaturewhenusedtodescribehim? 91 Third, nopartofsomethingcompositecanbethefirstbeing.Normatteror Second, sinceGodisthefirstefficientcause,activitybelongstohimprimarily Hence: For example,thefirethatisinthingsareonposteriortowhichbynature .Simplethingsdonotdifferfromoneanotherbecauseofdifferences.Thatisthe 3. TheWordisnotacomponentformbutanexemplaryone. 2. DionysiusmeansthatGod’snatureistheexistenceofallthingsbyefficient 1. .InspeakingofGod,canweusewordsthat implytemporalsuccession? 7. Giventhatweactuallyusethemanalogically, dowepredicatethemprimarilyof 6. ArewordsweusebothofGodandcreatures usedunivocallyorequivocally? 5. ArethemanytermswepredicateofGod synonyms? 4. DowepredicateofGodliterally,ormustalwaysdosometaphorically? 3. DowepredicateofGodsubstantially? 2. CanweuseanywordstoreferGod? 1. Metaphysics does notfollowthattheyareidentical. Strictly speaking,then,Godandprimematterarenot things arenot factors todifferentiatethemonefromanother.Strictlyspeaking,therefore,simple differentiate peopleandhorses,thesefactorsthemselvesdonotrequirefurther case onlywithcomposites.Hence,althoughthefactors‘rational’and‘irrational’ causality andasanexemplar,notbyitsessence. are absolutelydistinct,butthingsthatdifferentinsomerespect. God orofcreatures? 10.3, 1054b24. different x is posteriortothatwhichessentially , but diverse . AccordingtoAristotle,thingsthatarediverse 91 different x 89 . but diverse 87 Again, form, . So,it 88 90 MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage283 name ofhissonifyouknow?’ the naturethatanamesignifiesisdefinition. of ‘humanbeing’isgivenbyadefinitionhumanbeingwhichexpressesitsessence,for is intendedtoexpressbyitsmeaningtheessenceofhumanbeingasit–for that divineessenceasitisinitself.Inthistheydifferfromatermlike‘humanbeing’,which creaturely. So,wecandesignateGodfromcreatures,thoughthewordsusedonotexpress him astheirsource,andthensurpassingthemalllackinganythingthatismerely of things. Reply On thecontrary or demonstrativepronoun.So,thereisnowayofreferringtoGod. these dependsontheprevioususeofsomeotherreferringtermsuchasanoun,participle to thesenses;moreoverhecannotbereferredbyrelativepronounssinceuseof attributes; heisnon-temporal;andcannotbepointedtobecausenotavailable some relationship.NoneoftheseisappropriatetoGod:hehasnoqualitiesoraccidental ticiples signifyitasenduringintime;pronounsbeingpointedoutor not signifyacompletesubsistentthing.So,wecanpredicatenotermofGod. to Godbecauseheisaltogethersimple;andwecanruleoutabstractnounstheydo there isnonamingnoranyopinion’, 1. ItseemsthatnowordsaresuitablefortalkingaboutGod.ForDionysiussays,‘ofhim Article 1.AreanywordssuitablefortalkingaboutGod? we cannotseeGod’sessenceinthislife. nate somethinginsofaraswecanknowitintellectually.Now,Ihavealreadyshownthat 95 Exodus15:3. 94 Proverbs30:4. 93 92 61a12.4. 96 Hence: 3. Again,anounsignifiessomethingascomingundersomedescription;verbsandpar- 2. Moreover,nounsareeitherabstractorconcrete.Butconcreteinappropriate .Sincewecome toknowGodfromcreatures,andsincethisishowwecomerefer 2. WesaythatGodhasnoname,orisbeyond naming,becausehisessenceisbeyond 1. 2 CanweformulateaffirmativepropositionsaboutGod? 12. Is‘TheOnewhoIs’themostappropriatenameforGod? 11. WhenitisusedofGod,whatsharesindivinity,andmerely 10. .Isthename‘God’peculiartoGodornot? 9. Is‘God’thenameofanatureorcertainactivity? 8. On Interpretation The DivineNames : Aristotlesaysthatspokenwordsaresignsforthoughts,andthoughtslikenesses to thematerialcreaturesweordinarilyknow.Amongsuch creatures thecomplete to him,theexpressionsweusenamehimsignifyinaway thatisappropriate what weunderstandofhimandthemeaningnames weuse. supposed todoso,isitusedunivocallyorequivocally? 95 So, wordsrefertothingsindirectlythroughthoughts.Wecanthereforedesig- , inExodusweread,‘TheLordisagreatwarrior;HisnameAlmighty.’ 1.1, 16a3. 1. PG 3.593. 93 92 and wereadinProverbs,‘Whatishisnameorthe 96 We onlyknowhimfromcreatures.thinkof 94 283

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage284

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 284 say ofhissimplicityinordertosignifysubstance.’ On thecontrary substantially (wecannotsaywhatheis). do notunderstandGod’ssubstance(whatGodis).So,wecannot predicateanythingofhim are notpredicatedofGodsubstantially. acts. Buttospeakofsomething’scausalactivityisnotitsessence.So,suchwords the wordswhichholyteachersuseinpraisingGoddifferaccordingtohisdifferentcausal substance. tionship tosomethingelse,orthatfollowsfromhisnatureactivity.’ words usedofGodmustsignifynotwhatheissubstantiallybutnot,orhisrela- 1. ItseemsthatwepredicatenotermofGodsubstantially.ForJohnDamascenesays,‘The Article 2.DowepredicateanytermofGodsubstantially? 100 guish clearlyandlaudablythedivineprocessionsinnamingofGod.’ 99 98 Seethereplytoobjection2inpresentarticle. 97 3. Again,wedesignatethingstotheextentthatunderstand them.Butinthislifewe 2. Moreover,Dionysiussays,‘Youwillfindachorusofholyteachersseekingtodistin- .Tosignifysomethingascomingundersomedescriptionistoitsubsist- 3. On theTrinity The DivineNames On theOrthodoxFaith concrete nounsforGodistoindicatehissubsistenceandcompleteness; ing inacertainnatureordefiniteform.Ihavealreadysaidthatthereasonweuse for inthislifewedonotknowhimasheishimself. completeness) –thoughneitherwayofspeakingmeasuresuptohisbeing, at othertimeswerefertohimbyconcretenouns(toindicatehissubsistenceand So, wesometimesrefertohimbyabstractnouns(toindicatehissimplicity)while that bywhichsomethingiswhite. subsistent, butasthatbywhichsomethingis:‘whiteness’,forexample,signifies speak oftheformitselfweuseabstractnounswhichdonotsignifysomethingas are appropriatetocompositesubjects.When,ontheotherhand,wewant the wordsweusetosignifycompletesubsistentthingsareconcretenounswhich is notasubsistentthing,butthatbywhichsomethingsubsists.Becauseofthis subsistent thingisalwaysaconcreteunionofformandmatter;fortheitself pronouns cansignifyGod,sorelativepronouns. ever way,wecanpointitout.So,justasnounsandparticiplesdemonstrative seen, buttosomethingunderstood,forsolongasweknowsomething,inwhat- can usedemonstrativepronounsofGodinsofarastheypoint,nottosomething composite andtemporalthingsthatweordinarilynaturallyunderstand.We speak ofthesimplicityeternityonlyaftermannertemporalthings.Itis simple andsubsistentonlyasthoughitwerecomposite,sowecanunderstand him becausehiseternityincludesalltime.Justaswecanunderstandwhatisboth Although theyimplytemporalsuccession,wecanuseverbsandparticiplesof the samereasonthatweusenounssignifyingathingundersomedescription. Now Godisbothsimple,likeaform,andsubsistent,somethingconcrete. , Augustinesays,‘TobeGodistostrong,wise,or whatever elsewe 6.4. 1. PL PG 42.927. 1.9. 3.589. PG 94.835. 100 So, allsuchtermssignifyGod’s 99 This meansthat 97 it isfor 98 MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage285 was dealingwithGod’sperfection. the formsofinferiorbodiesimitatepowersun.Iexplainedthisearlierwhen cause althoughfailingtoreproduceperfectlytheformof–asinacertainway species orgenus.Itresembleshimasaneffectmayinsomewayresembleatranscendent God is(theyarepredicatedofhiminthecategorysubstance), he differsfromalifelessbody. of the‘livingGod’theydonotsimplywanttosaythatGodiscauseourlife,or who takesit.Butitisthelivingbodythatwecallhealthyinaprimarysense. as whenwesaythatmedicineis‘healthy’,meaningmerelyitcauseshealthintheone a body’becausewewanttodenythatheismerelypotentialbeinglikeprimematter. not say‘Godisabody’sincehethecauseofbodies?Likewise,wecouldalso So, if‘Godisgood’meansnomorethanthatGodthecauseofgoodnessinthings,why rather thanothers.Godisjustasmuchthecauseofbodieshegoodnessinthings. likewise inothersuchpropositions. that whenwesay‘Godisgood’meanGodthecauseofgoodnessinthings,and 105 1a4.3. 104 1a4.2. 103 Theyexpresshisnature. 102 MosesMaimonides(1138–1204), 101 wise forallsuchpropositions.ThiswastheviewofRabbiMoses. when wesaythatGodislivingmeanhenotlikesomethinginanimate,andlike- in factusedtodenysomethingofGodratherthanassertanything.Thus,forexample, ther negativenorrelationalterms,andaboutthesethereareseveralopinions. related tohim.Thequestionisconcernedwithwordslike‘good’and‘wise’whicharenei- what heisnotorhowrelatedtosomethingelse–or,better, the relationshipofGodtocreatures.Theseobviouslydonotexpresswhatheisbutrather Reply as Ihavealreadynoted. simply anduniversallyperfect,haspre-existinginhimselftheperfectionsofallhiscreatures, creature, insofarasitpossessesanyperfection,representsGodandislikehim,forhe,being since weknowhimfromcreaturescanonlyspeakofastheyrepresenthim.Any to representwhatheis.ThereasonforthisisthatwespeakofGodasknowhim,and because heisgood.AsAugustinesays,‘Becausegood, weexist. way. ThusGodisnotgoodbecausehecausesgoodness.Rather, goodnessflowsfromhim not evil’.Itmeansthatwhatwecall‘goodness’increatures pre-existsinGodahigher represent Godimperfectly. do signifysomethingthatGodreallyis,buttheyitimperfectlybecausecreatures So, wemustfindsomeothersolutiontotheproblem:thatsuchwordsdosaywhat Third, thisisnotwhatpeoplewanttosaywhentheytalkaboutGod.Whenspeak Second itwouldfollowthateverythingwesayofGodistrueonlyinasecondarysense, First, onneitherviewcantherebeanyreasonwhyweshouldusesomewordsaboutGod Neither oftheseviewsseemsplausible,however,forthreereasons. Others saidthatsuchsentencesareusedtosignifytherelationofGodcreatures,so Some havesaidthatsentenceslike‘Godisgood’,thoughtheysoundaffirmations,are So, ‘Godisgood’doesnotmeanthesameas cause ofgoodness’or‘Godis : Itisclearthattheproblemdoesnotarisefornegativetermsorwordswhichexpress On ChristianDoctrine 103 1.32. But acreatureisnotlikeGodasitanothermemberofits PL 34.32. Guide forthePerplexed 104 So, wordslike‘good’and‘wise’whenusedofGod 1.58. 102 but theyfailadequately 105 101 285

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage286

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 286 not goodorwiseanysuchthingthantosaythatheis. not touseitthanit.ButaccordingDionysiuswouldbetruersaythatGodis metaphorically whentalkingaboutGod. words metaphoricallyofGod,aswhenwecallhima‘rock’or‘lion’.So,onlyspeak word weusewhentalkingaboutGodfromourspeechcreatures. 1. ItseemsthatwecannotuseanywordliterallyofGod.For,asIhavesaid,takeevery Article 3.CanwesayanythingliterallyaboutGod? 108 107 1a13.1. 106 and theseperfectionscertainlyexistinhimamoreexcellent waythantheydointhem. Reply of Godmetaphorically.Weusesomethemliterally. predicate ofGodmetaphoricallyandthroughacertainlikeness. and someexpresstheluminoustruthofdivinemajesty, butthereareotherswhichwe On thecontrary we usesuchwordsonlymetaphoricallyofGod. succession andcompositionofmatterform,whichbelongtothematerialworld.So, incorporeal. Butallsuchnamesimplycorporealconditions,fortheysignifytemporal literally ofGod. 0 1a13.2. 109 Hence: 2. Moreover,wedonotuseawordliterallyofsomethingifitwouldbemoreaccurate 3. Again,weapplythenamesofbodilythingstoGodonlymetaphorically,forheis .Sometimesthereasonwhyawordcomestobeusedisquitedifferentfrom 2. DamasceneissayingthatthesewordsdonotsignifywhatGodsincenoneof 1. .InthislifewecannotunderstandGod’sessenceasitisinitself.Butcandoso 3. : AsIhavesaid,weknowGodfromtheperfectionsthatflow fromhimtocreatures, On Faith The CelestialHierarchy meaning oftheword.Take,forexample,Latinword he is,justascreatures,representhimimperfectly. them expresscompletelywhatheis;buteachsignifiesimperfectlysomethingthat we usecansignifyit. in sofarastheperfectionsofhiscreaturesrepresentit.Andthisishowwords higher waythanwecanunderstandorsignify. use thesentencetosaythatlifepre-existsinsourceofallthings,thougha causal acts.‘Living’in‘Godisliving’doesnotmeanthesameas‘causeslife’.We in hisvariouscausalacts.Nevertheless,wedonotusethesewordstosignify the differentperfectionsincreatureswhichrepresenthim,howeverimperfectly, activity, forourunderstandingofhim,andlanguageaboutdependson of Godwemaysaythatthereasontheycametobeusedderivesfromhiscausal Otherwise everythingthathurtsafootwouldbestone.Inthecaseofwordsused used tomean‘whathurtsafoot’,butreferparticularkindofphysicalobject. Latin derivethewordfrom 2, prol. , Ambrosesays,‘Somenamesclearlyshowforthwhatispropertodivinity, PL 16.583. 2. PG 3.41. laedens pedem (what hurtsafoot).However,itisnot 107 So, wesaynoneofthesethings 108 lapis So, wedonotuseallwords (stone). Speakersof 106 But weusesuch 109 MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage287 1 Jeremiah32:18. 111 110 strong, mightyandpowerful,yournameisLordofarmies.’ inappropriate tospeakof‘thegoodGod’oranythingthe kind.YetJeremiahsays,‘Most just thesameas‘garments’.So,ifeverythingwesayabout God issynonymousitwouldbe On thecontrary ing: theyaresynonymous. describable inmanyways,andthethingswesayabout himallhavethesamemean- something thatcanbedescribedinmanyways.ButGod is supremelyone.So,henot different pointsofviewwhichdonotcorrespondtoanydifferenceinthethingviewed. so fromdifferentpointsofview,thereisananswerwecangive:thatituselesstohave essence. So,alltheseexpressionsaresynonyms. same realityinGod,forhisgoodness,andwisdom,such-likeareidenticalwith that meanexactlythesamething.ButwhateverwordsweapplytoGodrefer 1. ItseemsthatallthewordsweapplytoGodaresynonymous.Forsynonyms Article 4.AreallthewordswepredicateofGodsynonymous? appropriate tocreatures. is concerned,weusethewordsinappropriately,fortheyhaveawayofsignifyingthat and onlysecondarilytootherthings.Butsofarasthewayofsignifyingtheseperfections appropriately thanweusethemofcreatures,fortheseperfectionsbelongprimarilytoGod perfections signifiedareconcerned,weusethewordsliterallyofGod,andinfactmore (goodness, life,andthelike);second,wayinwhichtheyaresignified.Asfaras we usetoattributeperfectionsGod:first,thethemselvesthataresignified them soweusewordstospeakofthem.Thushaveconsidertwothingsinthe Yet weunderstandsuchperfectionsasfindthemincreatures,and 3. Again,somethingthatcanonlybedescribedinonewayismoreperfectlythan 2. Moreover,ifsomeoneshouldarguethat,althoughtheysignifythesamething,do Hence: .Thesewordsimplybodilyconditionsnotinwhattheymeanbuttheway 3. .ThereasonwhyDionysiussaysthatsuchwordsarebetterdeniedofGodis 2. SomewordsthatsignifywhathascomeforthfromGodtocreaturesdosoin 1. The CelestialHierarchy ditions aspartofwhattheymean. which theysignifyit.Buttheonesthatareusedmetaphoricallyhavebodilycon- substance andlife. in ahigherway.InthesamepassagehethereforesaysthatGodisbeyondevery that whattheysignifydoesnotbelongtoGodinthewayit,but ‘good’, ‘living’,andsoon,wecanusewordsliketheseliterallyofGod. indication ofhowtheseperfectionsarepossessed–words,forexample,like‘being’, are otherwords,however,thatsimplymeancertainperfectionswithoutany it isamaterialthing.WecanusesuchwordsofGodonlymetaphorically.There creatures shareinGod’sperfection.Thusitispartofthemeaning‘stone’that such awaythatpartofthemeaningwordisimperfectinwhich , pilingupsynonymsaddsnothingtothemeaning:‘clothing garments’are 110 2. PG 3.41. 111 287

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage288

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 288 imperfectly) alsohavedistinctmeanings. I havepreviouslysaid of him,orthedifferenteffectstowhichwearereferring.Butitshouldbeclearfromwhat creatures. Suchwordsdifferinmeaningaccordingtothedifferentthingswewishdeny the caseofwordsweusetodenysomethinghim,orspeakhiscausalrelation Reply 1 1a13.1. 114 1a13.1and2. 113 1a13.2. 112 But accordingtoGenesisthereisaresemblancebetweencreatures andGod:‘Letusmake creatures. must beaunivocalone.So,weunivocallypredicatetheterms thatweuseofGodand is basedontheunivocalitseemsthatfirstagentupon whichallothersarebased it causesheat,forthesunitselfisonlyequivocallyhot. Since, therefore,theequivocal beings, forexample,isalsoahumanbeing.Butsomecauses are equivocal,asisthesunwhen their effectshavethesamenameanddescriptionasthemselves–whatisgeneratedbyhuman nowhere tostartfromandweshouldgobackforever.Nowsomecausesareunivocalbecause because itisfirstusedunivocally(ofthethingsthatbark);otherwisetherewouldbe used equivocallyoftheanimalsthatbarkandsomethinginsea[i.e.dogfish],butonly cal isbasedontheunivocalasmanyone.Awordsuch‘dog’maybe 1. ItseemsthatwordsusedbothofGodandcreaturesareunivocally.Theequivo- Article 5.DoweusewordsunivocallyorequivocallyofGodandcreatures? mous, fortheysignifyitfrommanydifferentpointsofview. for theperfectionsweattributetoGod,thoughtheysignifywhatisone,arenotsynony- altogether simplewhichtheyenableusimperfectlytounderstand.Thusthewordsweuse Thus thedifferentandcomplexconceptsthatwehaveinmindcorrespondtosomething creatures correspondtoonesinglesourcewhichtheyrepresentinvariedandcomplexways. way isdividedamongcreaturesasmanyandvariedperfections.Theperfectionsof tions thatcreaturesreceivefromhim.Whatpre-existsinGodasimpleandunified know Godfromcreatures,weunderstandhimthroughconceptsappropriatetotheperfec- 2. Moreover,thereisnoresemblancebetweenthingsthatare onlyequivocallythesame. Hence: What wemeanbyawordistheconceptformofwhatsignifies.Since .ItbelongstotheperfectionofGod’sunitythatwhatismanyanddiversein 3. Themanydifferentpointsofviewarenotbaselessandpointless,fortheyall 2. So,thesolutiontofirstobjectionisclear.Synonymssignifysamethingfrom 1. : ThewordsweusetospeakofGodarenotsynonymous.Thisisclearenoughin represented bycreatures. in manyways,forourmindslearnofhimthewayswhichheis others shouldinhimbeunifiedandsimple.Thatiswhyheonethingdescribed correspond toasinglerealitywhicheachrepresentsimperfectlyindifferentway. things bywayofthoughts,asInotedabove. different waysdonot,properlyspeaking,signifythesame,forwordsonly the samepointofview.Wordsthatsignifythingisthoughtin 112 that eventhewordssignifywhatGodis(thoughtheydoit 113 114 MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage289 cally ofGodandcreatures. all theperfectionswhichincreaturesaremanyandvariouspre-existGodasone. the sunproducesmanydifferenteffectsinthingsonearth.Insameway,asIsaidearlier, will bedividedupandtakevariousdifferentformsinsucheffects–asthesimplepowerof same kindofthingasitsagentcause.Thuswhatexistssimplyandinaunifiedwaythecause that fallsshortofthepoweritsagentcauserepresentsitinadequately,forisnot Reply univocally ofcreaturesandGod.Everythingwesaythemmustequivocally. of them(whentheydifferingenus,forexample).Muchless,therefore,canwesayanything each other.Nowtherearesomecreaturessodifferentthatwecansaynothingunivocally equivocally whenweapplythemtobothGodandcreatures. is partofthedefinition.Thesameappliestootherwords.So,wemustuseallthem So, itmusthaveadifferentmeaning,forweheredifferenceinthegenuswhich example, meansaqualitywhenitisusedofcreatures,butnotappliedtoGod. no wordwhenusedofGodmeansthesameasitisacreature.‘Wisdom’,for On thecontrary as creaturesandsomethingcanthereforebesaidunivocallyofboth. But Godisthefirstmeasureofallbeings,asAristotlealsosays.So,sameorder 1 Romans1:20. 119 clusion –thatis,theargumentisinvalidbecause‘pen’hasadifferent senseinitstwooccurrences. write with,thereforeallpigsarekeptinsomethingtowith. The premisesdonotimplythecon- Thefollowingargumentcommitsthisfallacy–allpigsarekeptinpens, pensaresomethingto 118 1a13.4. 117 116 Genesis1:26. 115 such argumentwouldbeinvalidatedbytheFallacyofEquivocation. so wecouldneverarguefromstatementsaboutcreaturestoGod–any are notmerelyequivocatingwhenweusethesameword,assomehavesaid,forifthiswere and creatures. people, andthesamegoesforallotherwords.So,wecannotusethemunivocallyofGod but goesbeyondit.So,itisclearthatwedonotuse‘wise’inthesamesenseofGodand predicate ‘wise’ofGod.Whatitsignifiesinhimisnotconfinedbythemeaningourword define thelimitsofaspecthumanbeingsthatitsignifies.Butthisisnotsowhenwe or existence.Whenwepredicate‘wise’ofahumanbeingwe,sotospeak,circumscribeand talking aboutGodwedonotintendtosignifysomethingdistinctfromhisessence,power him –hisessence,forexample,powers,orexistence.Butwhenweuse‘wise’ that amaniswise,wesignifyhiswisdomassomethingdistinctfromtheotherthingsabout and eachonesignifiesaperfectionassomethingdistinctfromallothers.Thuswhenwesay human beingsinourownimageandlikeness. are madeknownbythosethingsthatmade.’ about GodbutalsofromtheteachingofStPaul,forhesays, ‘TheinvisiblethingsofGod happen weknownotmerelyfromtheteachingsofphilosophers whoprovemanythings 3. Again,asAristotlesays,themeasuremustbeofsameorderthingmeasured. Furthermore, Godismoredistantfromanycreaturethantwocreaturesare Yet althoughweneverusewordsinexactlythesamesenseofcreaturesandGod, The wordsdenotingperfectionsthatweuseinspeakingofcreaturesalldiffermeaning : ItisimpossibletopredicateanythingunivocallyofGodandcreatures.Everyeffect Metaphysics , thesamewordwhenusedwithdifferentmeaningsisequivocally.But 10.1, 1053a24. 115 119 So, itseemswecansaysomethingunivo- 118 That thisdoesnot 117 116 289

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage290

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 290 animal, andaswhenitsignifiesacauseofthathealthpredicatedmedicine. different relationstosomeonething,as‘healthy’,saidofurine,indicateshealthinan different senses,aswithequivocation.Theseveralsensesofawordusedanalogicallysignify city, forthewordisneitherusedinsamesense,aswithunivocalusage,nortotally the perfectionsofthingspre-existmostexcellently. virtue oftheorderthatcreatureshavetoGodastheirsourceandcause,inwhichall use ofcreatures,asIhavesaid.So,whateverwesaybothGodandcreaturesin creatures, butanalogically,forwecannotspeakofGodatallexceptinthelanguage is usedofmedicineandanimalsbecausetheformercausehealthinlatter. same wordusedoftwothingsbecausesomerelationthatonehastotheother–as‘healthy’ animals, theformerasacause,lattersymptomofit.Second,thereiscase ‘healthy’ ofbothmedicineandurinebecauseeachthesehassomerelationtohealthin because eachofthemhassomeorderorrelationtoathirdthing.Thusweusetheword or proportionalusesoflanguage.First,thereisthecaseonewordbeingusedtwothings accordance withacertainorderbetweenthem.Wecandistinguishtwokindsofanalogical 121 1a4.3. 120 as weknowthemsince,Aristotlesays,wordsaresigns for thingsasunderstood. 1. ItseemsthatthewordsweuseofGodapplyprimarilyto creatures. Forwespeakofthings Article 6.DowepredicatewordsprimarilyofGodorcreatures? Hence: This wayofusingwordsliessomewherebetweenpureequivocationandsimpleunivo- In thiswaysomewordsareusedneitherunivocallynorpurelyequivocallyofGodand So, wemustsaythatwordsareusedofGodandcreaturesinananalogicalway, .TheresemblanceofcreaturestoGodisanimperfectone,forasIhavesaid,they 2. Evenifitwerethecasethatequivocalpredicationsarebasedonunivocal, 1. .Godisnotameasureproportionatetowhatmeasured.So,itdoesfollow 3. On Interpretation do notevenshareacommongenus. on onenon-univocal,analogicalpredicate,thatofbeing. this wouldbeparalleltothecaseofspeech,forallunivocalpredicationsarebased resemblance betweenitanditseffects.Wecouldcallananalogicalcause, equivocal eventhoughitisnotunivocal,forthentherewouldbeabsolutelyno be priortoaparticularcause,isnon-univocal.Suchhowever,notwholly individual shouldbeamemberofthespecies.So,universalcause,whichmust a memberofthatsamespecies)butistheparticularcausethisor cause ofthewholespecies(otherwiseitwouldbeitself,sinceis being anypeople.Aunivocalcause,ontheotherhand,cannotbeuniversal cause iscausalwithrespecttoanentirespecies–asthesunaccountsforthere same cannotbetruewhenitcomestoagentcausation.Anon-univocalefficient ally ofGodandcreatures.Buttheydonotshowthat are usedequivocally. that heandhiscreaturesbelongtothesameorder. The twoargumentsinthecontrarysensedoshowthatwords arenotusedunivoc- 1.1, 16a3. 120 121 But MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage291 things, asDionysiussays. it isusedfirstofthecreature.So,suchwordsapplyprimarilytoa whom allfatherhoodinheavenandonearthisnamed’; On thecontrary that causesitshealth.So,weapplysuchwordsprimarilytocreatures. secondarily –as‘healthy’appliesprimarilytoalivinganimalandonlythemedicine 123 122 our useofthewordsweapplythemfirsttocreaturesbecause weknowthemfirst.That (the perfectionstheysignify)flowsfromGodtocreatures. Butfromthepointofview they areusedprimarilyofGodandderivativelycreatures, forwhatthewordsmean eminently. So,weshouldconcludethatfromthepointof viewofwhatthewordsmean simply meanthathecauseswisdomorgoodness,but hepossessestheseperfections They alsosaywhatheisessentially.Whenwethatgoodorwisedonot creatures’. to God. we knowcreaturesbeforeGod.So,ourwordsapplytothey to creaturesandsecondarilyGod. in termsofwhatitmeanswhenappliedtocreatures;andhence‘good’wouldapplyprimarily ‘God isthecauseofgoodnessincreatures’word‘good’asappliedtoGodmustbedefined God’s causality,assomehavesupposed.If,forexample,‘Godisgood’meantthesame creatures. word asappliedtoGoddependsonandissecondarythemeaningithaswhenusedof mean that,likealion,heismightyinhisdeeds.Itobviousthatthemeaningofsuch there isalikenessbetweenthem.Inthesameway,ifwespeakofGodas‘lion’,only it showsatitsbestwhenflowers,justaspeopleshowtheirtheysmile: a creature.Whenwespeakmetaphoricallyofmeadowas‘smiling’onlymeanthat to God.WhenweusethemofGodtheysignifymerelyacertainlikenessbetweenand this use. first. Otherapplicationswillbemoreorlesssecondaryinsofarastheyapproximateto The primaryapplicationofthewordistocentralthingthathasbeunderstood you canunderstandwhatismeantby‘healthyurine’,whichasymptomofthathealth. of whichitisthecause.Similarlyyoumustunderstand‘healthy’asappliedtoananimalbefore explain whatyoumeanby‘healthy’medicinewithoutmentioningthehealthofanimal or analogicaluseofaworditisnecessarytomentionthiscentralthing.Thusyoucannot of someorderorrelationtheyhavetocentralthing. other wordsusedofGodandcreatures.So,weusetheseprimarilyGod. 2 1a13.2. 126 125 Ephesians3:14–15. 124 3. WordsusedofbothGodandcreaturesarehiminthatheisthecauseall 2. Dionysiussaysthat‘thelanguageweuseaboutGodisderivedfromwhatsay But IhavealreadyshownthatwordsofthissortdonotonlysayhowGodisacause. This wouldbethecasefornon-metaphoricalwordstooiftheywereonlyusedtoexpress Thus allwordsusedmetaphoricallyofGodapplyprimarilytocreaturesandsecondarily Reply Mystical Theology The DivineNames Metaphysics : Wheneverawordisusedanalogicallyofmanythings,itthembecause 122 But whenawordsuchas‘lion’or‘rock’istransferredfromcreaturetoGod , wereadinEphesians,‘IbendmykneestotheFatherofourLordJesus,from 4.7, 1012a23. 1. 1. PG PG 123 3.1000. 3.596. But whatwesayofsomethinginacausalsenseappliestoitonly 124 125 and thesameseemstoapply In ordertoexplainanextended 126 291

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage292

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 292 creatures. is why,asIhavementionedalready,theyawayofsignifyingthatappropriateto 129 Seethebodyofpresentarticle. 128 1a13.3. 127 what Godisinhimself.ThusAmbrosesaysthat‘Lord’indicateshispower, we arespeakingofhisrelationtocreatures.Itisgenerallyagreedthatsuchwordssignify 1. ItseemsthatwedonotapplytoGodwordsimplytemporalsuccession,evenwhen Article 7.InspeakingofGod,doweusewordsthatimplytemporalsuccession? in the without theother–forexample,knowablecanexist without knowledge,asweread truly Lord,whichisclearlyfalse. not reallyhavebutweremerelyawayofthinkinghim, itwouldfollowthatGodisnot because ofitswhiteness.If,therefore,therelationlordshipweresomethingthatGoddid we refertosomeoneas‘lord’becauseofthelordshiphehas,justcallsomethingwhite God inatemporalsense. he isbeyondtime,itcannotbetemporal.So,seemsthatwedonotusesuchwordsof nothing fromitsopposite.Therelation,therefore,mustbesomethingrealinGod.Yet,since would callGod‘Lord’invirtueoftheoppositerelationexistingcreature.Butwename or inthecreaturealone.Itcannot,however,beonlycreature,forifthiswereso,we all otherwords,suchas‘Lord’or‘Creator’,areapplicablefrometernity. knew andlovedcreaturesfrometernity–‘Ihaveyouwithaneverlastinglove.’ such arelation.Butweapplysomeoftheseasfrometernity.Wesay,forexample,thatGod words implyarelationtocreatures,thenthesamewouldbetrueofeverywordthatimplied say nothingofhiminatemporalsense. (as, forexamplewhatiswhitehasbeenmadewhite).ButnothinginGodmade.So,we as applicablefrometernity. is nottemporalbuteternal.So,wedoapplythesewordstohiminasense divine substance,and‘creation’indicateshisaction,butthisisessence.God,however, 131 Jeremiah31:3. 130 Hence. 6. Again,whenthetwotermsofarelationshiparenot sameorder,onemayexist 5. Moreover,wecallsomethingrelativeinvirtueofsomerelationshipithas.Forinstance, 4. Moreover,thesewordssignifyarelation,andthismustthereforeberealityinGod 3. Moreover,ifthereasonwhyweusewordsofGodinatemporalsensewerethatsuch 2. Moreover,whateveristrueofsomethinginatemporalsensecanbesaidtomade .ThisobjectionwouldbevalidifallwordswereusedtoexpressGod’scausality 3. WordsusedofGodmetaphoricallyarenotinthesamecaseasothers,Ihave 2. Thisisvalidsofarasourfirstapplicationofthewordsconcerned. 1. On Faith Categories Categories not whatitconsistsin. and nottosaywhatheis,as‘healthy’expressesthecausalityofamedicine said. 127 128 1.1. 7, 7b30. . 131 PL But inthecaseofrelationsbetweenGodandcreatures, twoterms 16.553. 129 but thisisthe 130 So, MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage293 by y by senses ormindof lies outsidetheorderofknowledge.So,whilerelation they arerelatedtoothersbutbecausethem. of achangeinthecreatures;justaswecansaythatcolumn haschangedfrombeingon words implyingtemporalsequenceandchange,notbecause of anychangeinhimbutbecause relation increatures.Soitisthatwhenwespeakofhis tocreatureswecanapply being relatedtocreaturesisnotarealityinGod.Wesayit abouthimbecauseofthereal him butnothetothem),itisclearthatbeingrelatedGod isarealityincreatures,but on therightof a columnistherightsidebecauseitonofsome animal;therelationof do haveanaturalorderorrelationtoothers.Since,wheneverwecansayof something createdbyourwayofthinkingaboutthings.Butthisisfalsebecausesomethings not asapplicablefrometernity. Reply 133 132 to knowing quantity, forexample,aswiththerelationsof of somerealityin tions thataresetupaspartofourthinking–therelation the mindtreating‘nothing’asthoughitwereaterm.Thesameisgenerallytrueofallrela- has arelationtoitself.Similarly,anybetweenthingandnothingissetupby exist becausethemindtakesonethingandthinksofittwice,thustreatingasthough instance, wesaythatsomethingisidenticalwithitself,thetwotermsofrelationonly any realityinthem,butbecausetheyarebeingthoughtofaparticularway.When,for the truthabout so forth. activity as double for instance. temporal sense. On thecontrary eternity andarenotusedinatemporalsense. creatures didnotexist.Inthiswaywordslike‘Lord’and‘Creator’canapplytoGodfrom are notofthesameorder,andsosomethingcouldbesaidrelativelyGodeventhough x and Now, sinceGodisaltogetheroutsidetheorderofcreatures (becausetheyareorderedto Some havesaidthatbeingrelatedtosomethingisneverarealityinnature–it In ordertoexplainthiswemustfirstsaysomethingaboutrelations. Sometimes bothwhatwesayof In thethirdcasetruthabout In thesecondcasebothwhatwesayof y y , wecanalsosayof , is notarealityin : SomewordsthatimplyarelationtocreaturesaresaidofGodintemporalsenseand Metaphysics On theTrinity x y and is notinandbyitselfsomethingknowable.Insofarasitexistsitsownright are notofthesameorder.Take,forexample,relation (whether wemeanknowledgebythesensesormind).When being whatischangedby being half is realintheanimalbutnotcolumn. , Augustinesaysthattherelativeterm‘Lord’isapplicabletoGodina 132 5.15, 1021a29. y that itisrelatedto 5.16. y x , andsoforth.Itisthesamewithrelationsthatresultfromcausal – forknowingiswhatmakesarealdifferencetothese and x PL . ThusAristotlesaysthatwecallsomethingsrelativenotbecause y y 42.922. that itisrelatedto . Theyarerelatedbecauseofsomethingthatbelongstoboth– and x x that itisrelatedto x and whatwesayof being whatchanges is notduetoanythingrealin x and whatwesayof x , therearethreepossibilitieshere. being biggerthan , y being fatherof is duetosomethingrealin y is trueofthemnotbecause being aspeciesofcertaingenus knowing x and 133 y is trueofthembecause We saythatonesideof being smallerthan y being knowableby . Thishappenswhen and is arealityinthe x being sonof that itisrelated en knowable being x is knowable , x , and being being , but and , 293

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage294

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 294 I haveturnedaround. my lefttobeingonright,notthroughanyalterationinthecolumn,butsimplybecause 135 Psalms89:1. 134 Hence: .Relationsthatweattribute toGodinatemporalsensearenotrealhimbutbelong 2. Somerelativewordssignifyarelationship,othersthatonaccountofwhich 1. .Whenweaskwhetherthetermsofarelation areofthesameorderornot,we 6. Godisrelatedtocreaturesinsofaras arerelatedtohim.Sincethe 5. God’stemporalrelationstocreaturesareinhimonlybecauseofourwaythink- 4. Thinkingisnotsomethingwedotootherthings,butremainswithinus;andthe 3. Metaphysics become arefugeforus.’ true ofanybecomingthatweattributetohim–aswhensay,‘Lord,youhave to himasawayofspeakingandwithnorealchangeinhim.Thesameis cate themtemporallyinsofarastheysignifydirectlyorindirectlythedivineessence. they conveyexpresslyorbyimplicationarelationtocreatures.Wedonotpredi- relationship. Butweusebothsortsofwordhiminatemporalsensesofaras are ofthesecondkindandsignifysomethingonaccountwhichGodhasa ‘Saviour’ or‘Creator’whichreferdirectlytoGod’sactivity,ishisessence, for hecouldnotbelordwithouthispower,whichisessence.Otherssuchas but arelationtocreatures,thoughitpresupposessomethingaboutwhatGodis, are ofthefirstkindandsomesecond.‘Lord’,forinstance,signifiesnothing thing onaccountofwhichthereisarelationship.SomethewordsweuseGod however, suchas‘mover’and‘moved’,‘head’‘beingheaded’,signifysome- the sameistrueofwordslike‘father’,‘son’,andsoforth.Otherrelativewords, stands insomerelationship.Tobealordpreciselyistorelatedservant– there isarelationship.Thus‘lord’saysnothingmoreaboutlordexceptthathe of thesameorder–aswith of therelativewordsused.Ifoneentailsother,andvice versa,thentheyare are notaskingaboutthethingsthatsaidtoberelatedbut aboutthemeaning his beingtheLord. the relationshipoflordshipinhimthatissuppliedbyour minds, notthefactof relation ofsubjectiontoGodisreallyinthecreature, isreallyLord.It is relatedtoit. to Aristotle,wesaythattheknowableisrelatedknowledgebecause is relatedtoacreaturebecausethehim–justas,according talking asthoughtherewerealsomatchingrelationsinGod.So,wesaythatGod that takesplaceinacreature,forwecannotexpressrealitycreatureswithout creatures. ItisquiteadmissibletoattributearelationGodbecauseofsomething ing ofhim,buttheoppositerelationscreaturestohimarerealitiesin the casewithwordslike‘Creator’and‘Saviour’. from himtoexternaleffects,theycanbeusedofinatemporalsense.Thisis that ensuefromactswhich,accordingtoourwayofthinkingaboutGod,proceed that ensuefromGod’sthinkingandwilling.When,however,theysignifyrelations same istrueofwilling.So,weapplyfrometernityexpressionssignifyingrelations 5.15, 1021a30. 135 134 being double and being halfof or with being fatherof and MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage295 On thecontrary nature. So,theterm‘God’cannotsignifywhatthatis. ity. So,‘God’signifiesanactivity,notanature. word ‘God’isusedtosignifythedivinenature. 137 136 as Ihavesaid,wecanderivethelanguageuseinspeakingofhimfromthese. the wordtomeansomethingissameaswhatitusedmean. cold, heat,whiteness,andsoon)fromanythingelse.Intheircasesthereasonwhyweuse it does.Ontheotherhand,though,wedonotnamethingsknowinthemselves(e.g. hurting thefoot( of it.Forexample,speakersLatinderivetheword‘rock’( we oftenderiveournameforthesortofthingsomethingisfromsomepropertyoractivity used tomean.Wecomeunderstandwhatathingisfromitspropertiesoractivities,and Reply things inperfectprovidenceandgoodness’. mind onewhocaresforallthings.ThusDionysiussays,‘theDeityiswhatwatchesover word isderivedfromhisuniversalprovidence:everyonewhousesthe‘God’hasin is thereforethenameofanactivity,foritactivityGodthatleadsustouse– derived from 1. Itseemsthat‘God’isnotthenameofanature.ForDamascenesays( Article 8.Is‘God’thenameofanature? 139 1a13.1. 138 α θε - θειν = 2. Moreover,wenamethingsinsofarasknowthem.ButdonotGod’s Hence: Now, Godisnotknowntousinhisownnature,butthroughactivityoreffects;so, .EverythingJohnDamascenesayshere referstodivineProvidence,whichiswhat 1. σθαι : Thereasonwhyweuseawordtomeansomethingisnotalwayswhatthe On Faith On theOrthodoxFaith The DivineNames makes ususetheword‘God’infirstplace. that itshouldhavethepowertoknow able ispriortoknowing)since‘ knowing it.Inaparallelway,althoughGodispriortocreatures(asbeingknow- actual exerciseofknowledge,forathingcannotbesoknownunlesssomeoneis able’ tomeanbeingactuallyhereandnowintelligible,thenitcoincideswiththe gibility assomethingpriortoactualknowledge.If,however,wetake‘beingknow- not ofthesameorder.Thisiscasewith being sonof until hehadacreaturesubjecttohim. other, to beknowableby , whichmeans‘toburn’–forourGodisafireburningupallwickedness;orfrom , whichmeans‘toconsiderallthings’. being lordof 1.1. θ , Ambrosesaysthat‘God’isthenameofanature. 0 ειν laedens pedem PL . If,however,oneentailstheother,butnotviceversa,thentheyare , which means ‘to take care of’ or‘tofosterallthings’;elsefrom , whichmeans‘totakecareof’ 16.553. 12. PG 1.9. and y 3.969. it isnotnecessarythat PG being subjectto ). Yettheword‘rock’signifieswhatarockisinitself,not 94.835, 838. x is lordof 139 are ofthesameorder.So,Godwasnotlord But, althoughderivedfromthisactivity,the 136 x . Thus‘beingknowable’signifiesintelli- All theverbsmentionedheresignifyactiv- y knowing y should beknowing ’ and‘ y and lapis is subjectto being knowableby. ) fromsomethingitdoes– 137 x ; itissufficient x ’ entaileach For 138 θε ‘God’ 9 x ς ) is 295

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage296

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 296 others: ‘Hehasbestoweduponuspreciousandverygreatpromise the divinenature, shares inwhatanamesignifiescansharethename.ButIhavejustsaidthat‘God’ 1. Itseemsthat‘God’isnotpeculiartoGod,butcanbeusedofotherthings.Forwhatever Article 9.Isthename‘God’peculiartoGodalone? in thepsalm:‘Ihavesaidthatyouaregods.’ mon noun,notapropername,asisclearfromthefactthatitcanbeusedinplural, 4 Wisdom14:21. 146 1a13.8. 145 Psalms81:6. 144 2Peter1:4. 143 1a13.8. 142 1a12.12. 141 140 stones’, On thecontrary all applicabletomanythings.So,‘God’isaswell. other wordsthatweuseofGodbecausehisactivities(e.g.‘good’,‘wise’,andthelike)are of asbeing,butinfactisnot,commontomany.Thereason forthisisthatthemind common tomanyinthisway.Thenatureofthesun,on the otherhand,canbethought thought ofasbeingcommontomany.Humannaturecan bethoughtof,andinfactis, recognize thateveryformisinstantiatedbyanindividualeitheroratleastcanbe The courageousorthestrongcanbespokenofinthiswayas‘lions’. it isalsoappliedmetaphoricallytootherthingsthathavesomethingofthelionaboutthem. example, properlyspeaking,appliesonlytothethingsthathavenatureitsignifies,but used metaphoricallywhensomepartofwhatitmeansbelongstoeach.Theword‘lion’,for is properlyusedofmanywhenthewholewhatitmeansbelongstoeachthem; Reply become partakersofGod’snature.’ 3. Again,asIhavesaid,thename‘God’isappliedtoGodbecauseofanactivity. 2. Furthermore,onlypropernamesarealtogetherincommunicable.But‘God’isacom- To understandwhichnames,properlyspeaking,applytomanythingswemustfirst .Themeaningofthenamewe give tosomethingdependsonhowmuchofitsnature 2. : Anamemaybeusedofmanythingsintwoways,eitherproperlyorbymetaphor.It Metaphysics what astoneis;for‘whatwordmeansisthedefinition’. it isinitself.Itsmeaningthedefinitionofastone,knowingwhichweknow stand whatastoneisinitself,theword‘stone’signifiesnatureofas we understandfromitspropertiesandeffects.Sincecanunder- that useitmeantobeused. and thatisthesourceofallthingsdistinctfromthemall.Thishowthose signifies thedivinenature:itisusedtomeansomethingthataboveallis, and aslackinginanythingmerelycreaturely. what Godis.Weknowhim,asIhavenoted,onlybeingexcellent,causal, we donotcometounderstandwhatGod’snatureisinitself,soknow 146 and thereferenceistoGod’sname.So,name‘God’incommunicable. , wereadinWisdom,‘Theygavetheincommunicablenametosticksand 4.7, 1012a23. 142 which, accordingto2Peter,issomethingthatcanbecommunicated 143 So, ‘God’maybeappliedtoothersbesidesGod. 144 So, ‘God’isapplicabletomanythings. 141 Its isinthiswaythattheword‘God’ 140 But fromGod’seffects s... that bythiswemay 145 But MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage297 we usetosignifythenaturesofcompositethings. the nounsweusetosignifysimplesubsistentnaturesaregrammaticallysameasthose to theopinionofhumanbeings.’ cannot havemorethanoneinstance, 5 ThefourHebrewlettersthatspell outGod’spersonalname. 153 Psalms81:6. 152 1a13.1, 147 word ‘Sun’asapropernamedesignatingthisindividual. was usedinthiswayamongtheHebrews:itwouldbeasthoughsomeoneweretouse gether incommunicableandinnowayapplicabletoothers–perhapstheTetragrammaton as somethingdistinct,regardinghimanindividual,suchapropernamewouldbealto- ‘I sayyoushallbegods.’ can meanthosewhobyresemblingGodshareinsomewaythedivine,aspsalm: ing. Itisappliedmetaphoricallytothingsthatsharesomethingofwhatitmeans.Thus‘gods’ gods whobynaturewerenotgods’, think of‘sun’asapplyingtomanythings.ThuswereadinGalatians,‘Youwereslaves applying tomany–ratherassomeonewhomistakenlythoughtthereweresunswould fact signified,thewordcannotbeusedofmany,thoughitcanmistakenlythoughtas 5 Interlineargloss. 151 Galatians4:8. 150 1a11.3. 149 1a13.8. 148 apply tothemconcretenounsthatsignifyanatureasinstantiatedinanindividual. the compositethingsthathavetheirformsinmatter.Forthisreason,asIsaidearlier,we self-subsistent formsastheyareinthemselves.Wehavetothinkofthemonthemodel of resemblanceaswithindividuals.Infact,however,wedonotunderstandsuchsimple and alsocannotbethoughtofasbeingcommontomany–exceptperhapsbysomesort these astheyareinthemselves,itwouldbeclearthatnotcommontomanyfact individual, butbythemselves(inasmuchastheyaresubsistentforms).Ifweunderstood a manmaymetaphoricallybecalled‘anAchilles’becausehehasthebraveryofAchilles. communicable tomany,thoughitmaybethroughsomeresemblance–as be manyofsomeparticularindividual.Hencenopropernameisproperlyspeaking fact, norcanitbethoughtofasapplicabletomany.Itisimpossiblethinkthattherecould Hence awordthatisusedpreciselytosignifyanindividualcannotbeapplicablemanyin we understandanaturecanalwaysthinkofitasbeinginmanyinstances. one individualorinmanyisirrelevanttoourunderstandingofthenatureitself.Giventhat understands suchnaturesinabstractionfromindividualinstances;hencewhetheritbe Now, asIhavesaid,weuse‘God’tosignifythedivinenature, Hence: If, however,anameweregiventoGod,notassignifyinghisnaturebutreferringhim Nevertheless theword‘God’doeshaveseveralapplications,thoughnotinitsfullmean- But Considerthecaseofformswhichareinstantiatednotbybeingforman An individual,however,fromtheveryfactofbeingisdividedallothers. .God’snaturecanbecommunicatedtoothers onlyinthesensethattheycanshare 1. in God’slikeness. ad 2. PL 192.139. 152 151 150 149 and aglosssays,‘notgodsbynaturebutaccording it followsthat,fromthepointofviewwhatisin 148 and, sincethisnature 147 Thus 153 297

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage298

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 298 155 Seethebodyofpresentarticle. 154 On thecontrary univocally inthetwocases. things. ButpagansmeanthesamewhentheysaythattheiridolisGod.So,wordused say thereisoneGodtheyunderstandby‘God’somethingalmighty,tobereveredaboveall also beusedunivocallyofthesupposedandrealGod. piness’ isusedunivocallyofthissupposedhappinessandtruehappiness.So,‘God’must of thedelightsfleshissupposedtobefelicity,butnotsoinfact.Butword‘hap- ‘The idolisGod.’So,‘God’beingusedunivocallybyboth. contradiction. ButwhenCatholicssay‘TheidolisnotGod’,theycontradictpaganswho same meaningforthewordwecannotcontradicteachother.Equivocationeliminates what sharesinthisnature,andissupposedtohaveit.Forwhenwedonotthe 1. Itseemsforthreereasonsthat‘God’isusedunivocallyofwhathasthedivinenature, divinity andofwhatismerelysupposedtodoso? Article 10.Isthename‘God’usedinsamesenseofGod,whatshares animals tobehealthybeforewecanunderstandwhatexpressions like‘healthyurine’or to understandwhywecallsubstancesbeings.Likewise, need toknowwhatitmeansfor its meaninginanothersense.Thustounderstandwhywe callaccidents‘beings’wehave But whenitisusedanalogicallyitsmeaninginonesense tobeexplainedbyreference application. Whenitisusedequivocallyhasanentirely different meaningineachcase. but analogically.Whenawordisusedunivocallyithasexactly thesamemeaningineach Reply predicate itequivocallyofthetrueGodandwhatissupposedtobeGod. God theymeanthis.So,Catholicsandpagansdonotusetheterm‘God’univocally.They is God’,theydonotmeantruedivinity.YetwhenCatholicssaythatthereonlyone understand. Butpagansdonotunderstandthedivinenature.So,whentheysay,‘Theidol is thoughttobeGodusedequivocally.Furthermore,wecannotmeanwhatdonot picture, weareusingthewordequivocally.So,‘God’usedofrealGodandwhat pretation 3. Again,wordsareusedunivocallyiftheyhavethesamemeaning.ButwhenCatholics 2. Furthermore,anidolissupposedtobeGod,butnotsoinfact,justastheenjoyment .‘God’isacommonnounandnotpropername because itsignifiesthedivinenature 2. .Weapplywordslike‘good’and‘wise’toGodbecauseoftheperfectionsthatflow 3. : Inthethreemeaningslistedabove,‘God’isusedneither univocally norequivocally On Interpretation fact, thename‘God’isincommunicable,ratherasIsaidof‘Sun’. however, namethingsastheyareinthemselvesbuttoourminds.In in theconcrete,thoughGodhimselfisneitheruniversalnorparticular.Wedonot, signify hisnature. of theactivitypeculiartohimwhichweconstantlyexperience,anduseit to manythings;theyactuallyareso.Butweapplytheword‘God’himbecause perfections absolutelyspeaking.So,notonlycanwethinkofthemasapplicable from Godtocreatures.TheydonotsignifyGod’snature;rather,theythese says. 155 , whatisinthemindasortofpicturereality,as But whenwesay‘Thatisananimal’,bothofarealanimalandonein 1, 16a5. 154 On Inter- MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage299 So, itisnotthemostappropriatenameforGod. are demons’). Catholics dowhentheysometimesusethewordinthatway(cf.‘Allgodsofpagans that whichismerelysupposedtobeGod.Iftheywere,wouldspeakingtruly,as to signifythetrueGod.Whenpaganssay‘TheidolisGod’theyarenotusing‘God’mean idol isnotGod,arecontradictingpaganswhoaffirmthatitforbothusing‘God’ 158 Psalms95:5. 157 refer toChristians. AquinasusedthistoreferallWesternChristians,andinparticular useitmightsimply 156 Aristotle usestheword‘equivocal’inabroadsensetoincludeanalogical, ‘animal’ isnotusedwhollyequivocallyofarealanimalandaninpicture. in meaning. to dowiththedifferentstatementswecanmakeaword,notdifference to signifyastoneorsomethingelse.ThusitisclearthatCatholics, it tosignifydifferentthings–if,forinstance,onespeakerusedamanandanother it ispredicatedof,whethertrulyorfalsely.Itwouldbesaidtohaveseveralusesifwemeant but becauseithasdifferentmeanings.Thus‘man’onemeaningandusewhatever is involvedinalltheothersandwordthereforeusedanalogically. God. So,itisclearthatwhile‘God’usedwithdifferentmeanings,oneofthesemeanings that anidolisagod,wetake‘god’tomeansomethingpeoplesupposebethetrue ing indivinitywemeanthatitsharesthenatureoftrueGod.Similarly,whensay divinity orwhicharesupposedtobegods.Whenwesaythatsomethingisa‘god’byshar- ‘God’ asmeaningthetrueGodinordertoexplainitsuseappliedthingsthatshare animals healthy. medicine’ mean.Forhealthyurineindicatesastateofhealth,andmedicinemakes as Ihavesaid. know himasinsomewaycausingcreatures,surpassingthemandsetapartfromthem, different categories. sometimes saysthat‘being’,whichisusedanalogically,equivocallyofthe ‘God’ cannotbeshared,asIhavesaid. 1. Itseemsthat‘TheOnewhoIs’isnotthemostappropriate nameforGod.Forthe TheOne whoIs’themostappropriatenameforGod? Article 11.Is‘ ing theydidnotknow. whatever aboutGodwouldnotbeabletouse‘God’atall,exceptasawordwhosemean- what Catholicsmeanwhentheydeclare,‘TheidolisnotGod.’Peoplewhoknewnothing 6 1a13.9. 160 1a12.12. 159 4. Astothefourthargumentwhichtakesoppositepointofview:word 2, 3.Wecanmakethesamereplytosecondandthirdobjections.Forthesehave 1. Wesaythatawordhasdifferentusesnotbecausewecanuseitinstatements Hence: It isthesamewithcaseIamnowconsidering.Forwehavetoreferuseof 5. NeitherCatholicsnorpagansunderstandthenatureofGodasheisinhimself,butboth Categories 157 159 1, 1a1. In thiswaywhenpaganssay‘TheidolisGod’theycanmeanby‘God’just 160 But ‘TheOnewhoIs’isanamethatcanbeshared. 156 when theysaythatan 158 thus he 299

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage300

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 300 unlimited.’ Is”, forhecomprehendsallinhimself,hashisexistenceasanoceanofbeing,infiniteand to God.ThatiswhyDamascenesays,‘ThefirstofallnamesusedGod“TheOnewho are, andthemoregeneralsimpletheyappropriatelydoweapplythem of himisawayfailingtounderstandashereallyis.So,thelessdeterminateournames this lifeourmindscannotgraspwhatGodisinhimself;whateverwaywehaveofthinking at leastaddsomenuanceofmeaningwhichrestrictsanddeterminestheoriginalsense.In its form. knows neitherpastnorfuture,asAugustinesays. being inthepresent,anditisespeciallyappropriatetopredicatethisofGod–forhis an infiniteoceanofbeing. ‘The OnewhoIs’fixesonnoaspectofbeingbutstandsopentoallandrefersGodas 6 Seethebodyofpresentarticle. 166 165 164 1a3.4. 163 Exodus3:13and14. 162 161 shown), Since theexistenceofGodishisessence,andsincethistruenothingelse(asIhave for God. Reply etm oyu”’ sent metoyou.” name?” whatshallIsaytothem?,’theLordreplied,‘Saythisthem,“TheOnewhoIshas On thecontrary priate nameforGod. from creatures.But‘TheOnewhoIs’impliesnosuchrelation.So,itisnotthemostappro- name forGodis‘TheGood’ratherthanOnewhoIs’. is supremelycharacteristicofGodtobethesourceallthings.So,mostappropriate Second, becauseofitsuniversality.Allothernamesareeitherlessgeneralor,ifnot,they 2. Dionysiussays,‘TocallGodgoodistoshowforthallthatflowsfromhim.’ Third, ‘TheOnewhoIs’isthebestnameforGodbecauseofitstense.Foritsignifies Hence: First, becauseofitsmeaning;foritdoesnotsignifyanyparticularform,butexistenceitself. 3. EverynameofGodseemstoimplyarelationcreatures–forweonlyknow .‘TheOnewhoIs’ismoreappropriatethan‘God’becauseofwhatmakesususe 1. .‘TheGood’isamorefundamentalname for Godissofarasheacause.Butit 2. : Therearethreereasonsforregarding‘TheOnewhoIs’asthemostappropriatename On theTrinity On theOrthodoxFaith The DivineNames in whichitsignifieshim,andbecauseofitstense,asIhavejustsaid. the nameinfirstplace,thatis,hisexistence,becauseofunrestrictedway is notmorefundamentalsimplyspeaking,fortobecomes before beingacause. say suchathing,theindividualsubstanceofGod. the Tetragrammatonwhichisusedtosignifyincommunicableand,ifwecould appropriate, forweusethistosignifythedivinenature.Evenmoreappropriateis we considerwhatusethewordtomean,mustadmitthat‘God’ismore 163 it isclearthatthisnameespeciallyfittingforGod,weeverythingby 164 Any othernameselectssomeparticularaspectofthebeingthing,but , wereadinExodusthatwhenMosesasked,‘Iftheyaskme,“Whatishis 162 5.2. So, ‘TheOnewhoIs’isthemostappropriatenameforGod. 3. PL PG 42.912. 1.9. 3.680. PG 94.836. 165 166 But when 161 But what MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage301 to thehighestdegree,asIhavealreadyshown. 7 1a3.7. 170 1a3.7. 169 168 167 ‘Negative propositionsaboutGodaretrue,butaffirmativeonesvague.’ 1. ItseemsthatwecannotformulateaffirmativepropositionsaboutGod.ForDionysiussays, Article 12.CanweformulateaffirmativepropositionsaboutGod? bringing themtogetherinanaffirmativestatement. of thinkingGodinthedifferencesubjectandpredicate. Werepresenthisunityby sponds asinglesimplicitythatisoneandthesameforall. We representthedifferentways of himthroughanumberdifferentconceptsbecausewecannot seehimasheisinhimself. being lookedat.Now,God,consideredinhimself,isaltogether oneandsimple,yetwethink while thefactthattheyareputtogetheraffirmativelyindicatesitisonething and weunderstandsubjectsmaterially(asreferringtowhathastheform)’. thing, inaccordancewiththesaying‘weunderstandpredicatesformally(asmeaningaform), to something,whereasinthepredicateplacewethinkofitassayingsomethingabout the samemeaning,forwhenweputaterminsubjectplacethinkofitasreferring which wecallitahumanbeing. sensitive naturebecauseofwhichwecallitananimalandtherational are animals’.Thatwhichishumantrulyananimal:inoneandthesamethingwefind as whatitistobeawhitething.Butalsotrueforstatementsuch‘humanbeings refer tothesameobjectbutdifferinmeaning,sincewhatitisbeamannot tial predication.Afterall,in‘Themanisawhitething’itclearthat‘man’and‘white both inpropositionsthatexpressanaccidentalpredicationandthoseessen- is infactsomewaythesamething,theydosofromdifferentpointsofview.This Reply formulate trueaffirmativepropositionsaboutGod. ters offaith,as,forexample,thatGodisthreeandone,healmighty.So,wecan On thecontrary we cannottrulyformulateaffirmativepropositionsaboutGod. every affirmativeactoftheintellectunderstandsanobjectascomposite,itwouldseemthat is. NowGodisaltogetherwithoutcompositioninhisbeing,asIhaveproved. propositions areabouttheirsubjects.So,wecannotformulatesuchGod. 2. Moreover,Boethiussays,‘Asimpleformcannotbeasubject.’ 2. But althoughwethinkofhiminthesedifferentwaysalso knowthattoeachcorre- The differencebetweensubjectandpredicaterepresentstwowaysoflookingatathing, There isevenadifferenceinpointofviewbetweensubjectandpredicatewhentheyhave 3. Again,wefallintoerrorwhenunderstandsomethingasdifferentfromthewayit .God’snamesneednotnecessarilyimplyarelationtocreatures.Itisenoughthat 3. : Ineverytrueaffirmativeproposition,althoughthesubjectandpredicatesignifywhat On theTrinity The CelestialHierarchy name ‘TheOnewhoIs’. creatures, andofthesetheprimaryoneisexistenceitself,fromwhichweget they shouldcometobeusedbecauseoftheperfectionsthatflowfromGod , whatisoffaithcannotbefalse.Butsomeaffirmativepropositionsaremat- 2. PL 64.1250. 2. PG 3.140. 169 So, hecannotbeasubject.Butaffirmative 168 But Godisasimpleform 167 170 So, since 301

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD’S EXISTENCE AND SIMPLICITY MP_C34.qxd 11/23/062:38AMPage302

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 302 7 1a13.6. 171 Hence: .DionysiussaysthatwhatweassertofGodisvague(or,accordingtoanother 1. .Inthesentence,‘Wefallintoerrorwhenweunderstandsomethingasdifferent 3. Ourmindscannotunderstandsubsistingsimpleformsastheyareinthemselves. 2. in itswayofsignifying,asIhaveobserved. translation, ‘incongruous’)becausenowordusedofGodisappropriatetohim ments aboutGodarecompositedoesnotmakethemfalse. position isinvolvedinourwayofunderstandingthem.So,thefactthatstate- things; notthatweunderstandthesimplethingstobecomposite,butcom- them weunderstandinourownway,thatisonthemodelofcomposite understanding. Similarlywhenourmindsunderstandsimplethingssuperiorto they understandthemtobenon-material,butthatwehaveanon-materialwayof that ourmindsnon-materiallyunderstandmaterialthingsinferiortothem;not is alwaysdifferentfromthewaythingunderstoodis.Itclear,forexample, way ofunderstanding,thenthepropositionisfalse,forunderstanding We understandhimtobesimple.Butifwetake‘differentfrom’applythe formulate propositionsaboutGodwedonotsaythathehasanycomposition. is true,butitirrelevantwhencomestoourpresentconcern,forwe are mistakenwhenweunderstandsomethingtobedifferentfromwhatitis.That way ofunderstanding.Takenintheformersensepropositionmeansthatwe from thewayitis’,‘differentfrom’canrefereithertothingunderstoodor apprehend asimpleformasifitweresubject,andweattributesomethingtoit. there isthesubjectofaformandsomethingthatexistsinsubject.Andsowe We understandtheminthewaythatwecompositethings,which 171