Interests and Partners of German Foreign Policy September 29Th – October 1St, 2006, Berlin

135th Bergedorf Round Table Interests and Partners of German Foreign Policy September 29th – October 1st, 2006, Berlin

CONTENTs

Picture Documentation 1 Protocol Participants 20 Summary 21 Welcome 23 I. Determinants of Foreign Policy: Geography and History ? 24 1. The Significance of Geography for German Foreign Policy 27 2. Historical Responsibility as a Guiding Principle 33 3. German Modesty ? 36 II. Foreign Policy Debates and Institutions in Germany 37 1. We Need a Political Debate on Foreign Policy 37 2. Does Germany Need a National Security Strategy ? 41 III. Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests 44 1. Security Risks 44 2. Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests 47 IV. Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 51 1. Multilateralism 51 2. NATO and the UN 53 3. The Transatlantic Partnership and the “New West” 54 4. Western Values as Principles for German Foreign Policy 59 5. Should Germany Be More Engaged Militarily ? 60 V. Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 65 1. The EU and a Common European Foreign Policy 65 2. Should Germany Lead in Foreign Policy ? 72 3. Objectives of Germany’s EU Presidency 75 4. Enlargement or a European Neighbourhood Policy Plus ? 78 VI. EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 80 Annex 1. The State of EU-Russian Relations 80 2. Germany’s Role in EU-Russian Relations 83 Participants 111 3. Growing Closer by Interweaving ? Four Spaces and the New PCA 88 Recommended Literature 118 4. Russia and the EU: Rivals in the Post-Soviet Space ? 89 Glossary 120 5. The Frozen Conflicts and the Role of Russia 94 Index 125 6. Economic Cooperation 97 Previous Round Tables 131 VII. The EU’s Southern Neighborhood 100 The Körber Foundation 141 1. The EU’s Relations with Turkey 100 Imprint 142 2. The EU and Germany in the Middle East 104 Initiator Eric Gujer, Correspondent, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), Berlin Dr. Kurt A. Körber Dr. Klaus Hänsch, MEP Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, Social Democratic Faction (SPE), European Parliament, Brussels CHair State Secretary Dr. Gert Haller, Head of the Office of the President of the Federal Roger de Weck Republic of Germany, Berlin President, Graduate Institute of International Studies MD Dr. Christoph Heusgen, (HEI), Geneva Foreign Policy and Security Advisor to the Federal Chancellor and Director General, Chancellery of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin Speakers Dr. Werner Hoyer, MdB Deputy Chairman and Spokesman for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Christoph Bertram, Free Democratic Party (FDP) Parliamentary Group, Hamburg German Bundestag, Berlin Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the to the European Communities, Brussels Court of St. James, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Mehmet Dülger, Germany, London Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, MD Dr. Wolf Kischlat, Grand National Assembly, Ankara Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Office of the Sylvie Goulard, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin Lecturer, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris Ali Kizilkaya, (Sciences Po), Paris and College of Europe, Bruges Chair, Islamic Council of Germany, Cologne Jim Hoagland, Philipp Mißfelder, MdB Associate Editor and Chief Foreign Correspondent, Member, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) The Washington Post, Washington D. C. Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin Dr. Ulrich Schlie, Professor Dr. Roger Morgan, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of Defense, London Berlin Dr. Thomas Paulsen, Professor Dr. Fritz Stern, Managing Director, Bergedorf Round Table, Columbia University, New York Körber Foundation, Berlin General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, President, Clausewitz Society, Hamburg participants Tøger Seidenfaden, Executive Editor-in-Chief, Politiken, Copenhagen Dr. Nadia Arbatova, Ambassador Shimon Stein, Head, Department on European Political Studies, Ambassador of the State of Israel to Germany, Institute for World Economy and International Relations Embassy of the State of Israel, Berlin (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow Dr. Klaus Wehmeier, Dr. Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board, fmr. Minister of Economic Affairs, The Hague Körber Foundation, Hamburg Dr. Marek A. Cichocki, Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Programme Director, The Natolin European Centre, Fmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Warsaw Berlin Sir Brian Crowe, Christian Wriedt, Deputy Chairman, Royal Institute for International Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, Affairs, Chatham House, London Hamburg MDg Dr. Markus Ederer, Dr. Gottfried Zeitz, Head of Policy Planning, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin Office of President Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin

20 SUMMARY

I. Foreign Policy Determinants: Geography and History ? Is German foreign policy determined by traditional categories such as Germany’s “middle position” and “responsibility to history ?” Or are such thought patterns superfluous and counterproductive within the enlarged EU ? Can and should Ger- many function as a bridge between the continent’s various parts (pp. 24–35) ? What do Germany’s neighbors worry about: German arrogance or German modesty (pp. 36) ?

II. Foreign Policy Debates and Institutions in Germany: Some speakers saw a lack of debate over Bundeswehr deployments as a potential risk that could foster the growth of populism. A lack of interest in foreign policy within the political class and the non-involvement of the Bundestag in governmental decisions was criticized. Participants agreed that the quality of foreign policy debates in Ger- many is inadequate (pp. 37–40). Some speakers saw a need to develop a German counterpart to the European Security Strategy (ESS), while others said German and European interests are practically identical. (pp. 41–43).

III. Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests: Participants identified terrorism and fail- ing states as focal points for security policy. Western states must uphold their values more, some maintained. A representative of the Muslim community in Germany warned against stigmatizing Islam (pp. 44–46). The claim was debated that the term “German interests” is often invoked, even though the discussion of what they represent is often “diffuse.” It was said interests cannot be defined as abstractions, but only within concrete situations (pp. 47–50).

IV. Germany and its Partners — the UN, NATO, and »the West«: Multilateralism was seen as a model for the future but not a panacea (pp. 51–52). The inefficiency of the UN was discussed and reforms were encouraged. NATO’s loss of prestige was for many a particular source of worry (pp. 53–54). The possibility of a “New West” was explored. Various participants rejected the Bush Administra- tion’s unilateralism and called for reciprocity in transatlantic relations (pp. 54– 57). For some, the lack of willingness to make sacrifices and isolationist tendencies put a question mark over Germany’s military reliability (pp. 57–64)

V. Germany and its partners — the European Union: The EU’s Common For- eign and Security Policy was regarded as a chance of bringing Europe closer to

21 its people, something that would require willingness to part with national privileges (pp. 65–71). The role of the German-French tandem was regarded with skepticism (pp. 68–69). Non-German participants called for more German leadership instead of modesty (pp. 72–74). Several speakers assailed what they saw as an emerging “minimalism in European affairs” during Germany’s EU presidency. Others defended a cautious approach (pp. 75–77). The development of the ENP-plus was seen as a way of extracting neighboring countries from the binary logic of accession or non-accession (pp. 78–79)

VI. EU policy toward Russia and the post-Soviet Space: Is the negotiation of the EU’s new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia a turning point ? Is there a threat of a relapse into the dualism of cooperation/confrontation or are relations stable (pp. 80–83) ? A special role for Berlin in the relationship with Moscow was regarded with skepticism (pp. 83–87). The new PCA is meant to help the two sides “grow closer by interweaving” and to establish mutual decision-making structures (pp. 88–89). Russian participants emphasized Rus- sia’s positive influence in the post-Soviet space and warned against escalation in the frozen conflicts (pp. 89–97). Western participants criticized Russian democratic deficits and unreliability in energy policy (pp. 97–99).

VII: The EU’s Southern Neighborhood: The effects of EU membership for Tur- key were repeatedly referred to. One Turkish representative criticized the lack of sympathy for the difficulty of Turkey’s transformation process (pp. 100–102). It is essential that Turkey fulfill all the rules of the “club,” it was agreed, but some suspected that cultural prejudices were hiding behind more formal objections (pp. 102–104). Some regarded EU participation in military operations to stabilize the Middle East as a chance to overcome the distance between Israel and the EU. All European states, it was agreed, have a commitment to upholding Israel’s right to exist, yet many asserted that that would also oblige Israel to be willing to consult with its allies (pp. 104–107).

22 PROTOCOL

Welcome

I warmly welcome you all to the Bergedorf Round Table. We could von Weizsäcker not have found a more appropriate venue for our discussion about German contributions to European foreign policy than Schloss Bellevue, the official residence of the German President in the heart of Berlin. I might also add that, of all the rooms we have used for Bergedorf Round Tables, none have been as familiar to me as this one is. We will first be investigating Germany’s place in European foreign policy with a retrospective of Germany’s history and identity. I believe that, in the brawl of day- to-day politics, it is greatly beneficial to take time out and ask where one has come from. Party politicians out on the campaign trail generally are not tested on their grasp of history, yet historical awareness greatly facilitates reaching decisions in the present and for the future. Roger de Weck has graciously agreed to lead us through the discussion.

Let us proceed straight to the heart of the matter with an overview by Fritz Stern, de Weck the great historian with a transatlantic perspective on Germany at the center of Europe.

The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ spoken contributions.

23 I. Determinants of Foreign Policy: Geography and History ?

Stern I would like to begin my remarks on the historical development of German foreign policy and Germany’s place in Europe with a personal experience. On the morning of October 13, 1940, I was standing at the port of Hoboken, New Jersey, awaiting the arrival of friends who were coming by ship from Oc- cupied France — now threatened by the Nazis — where they had been living in exile. Only a few meters away from me stood the unmistakable figure of Thomas Mann. For me, fourteen years old at the time, it was a huge event to see such a major literary persona waiting next to me on the pier. I still remember exactly how a rather corpulent gentleman walked down the gangway, proceeding towards Thomas Mann. I watched the two embrace, although in a very reserved manner. It was his brother, Heinrich Mann. Golo Mann and Franz Werfel were also on board. To refresh my memory of the event, I recently read the corresponding passage in Thomas Mann’s diary. In it he briefly summarized a salon discussion he had had with the above-mentioned people after dinner that day: “Much about politics, France, England, Russia, the irreparable nature of much that has taken place on the continent, Germany’s more natural calling of organizing Europe, spoiled by the crude spirit of the regime.” That was a startling expression, I thought: “Ger- many’s more natural calling of organizing Europe” — a kind of relapse into his thought patterns during World War I, collected in the book Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. Did Germany have the During the 19th and 20th centuries there were many people indeed who “calling” of “organizing Europe” ? agreed with Thomas Mann’s belief that the strongest state in the middle of Eu- rope somehow had the “calling” of “organizing Europe.” When speaking of the 19th century, we must remind ourselves that the term “Germany” was, for most of that time, an anachronism. For a long time, of course, there was no Germany, merely a conglomerate of small German states and principalities. Zerissenheit (“inner conflict”) — that is the word that, in historiography, has been used again and again, and rightly so, to describe Germany. German states had more neighbors As we all know, these German states had more neighbors than any other Eu- than any other European state ropean state, something that can simultaneously be regarded as a threat and as enrichment. Therefore, throughout the modern period, there were almost always

Thomas Mann, Tagebücher 1940 –1943, Peter de Mendelssohn, ed. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1982, 165. Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, Berlin: S. Fischer, 1918, Reprint: Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 2001.

Determinants of Foreign Policy : Geography and History ? 24 German disunity practically became the basis of European political history.

Stern

external impulses that could, on the one hand, be regarded as belligerent and hostile while acting beneficially on culture, trade, and science. Conversely, the “central land” projected a strong influence on all Europe. Its geographic position and inner conflict, however, prevented Germany from taking part in Europe’s great expansion during the 16th and 17th centuries. Instead, it became the continent’s preferred battlefield. In this context, we can speak of not one but two quite comparable “Thirty-Year Wars” that affected and devastated Germany; one from 1618 to 1648, the other from 1914 to 1945. In the early modern period there was a notable contradiction regarding Ger- many’s role: Luther’s uprising against Rome, the Reformation, was one of the great moments that shaped modern Europe. Yet the experience tore Germany apart religiously, just as Emperor Maximilian I was attempting to apply uniform organization on the country. The Western states succeeded, especially during the 17th century, in becoming nation-states. Germany did not succeed. Its disunity practically became the basis of European political history. The interplay between threat and enrichment during the 17th and 18th cen- Napoleon gave the impulses turies is best illustrated by German-French relations. France’s predominance dur- for modernizing Germany ing a large part of this period naturally represented a burden for Germany, both politically and intellectually. And yet, Thomas Nipperdey, one of the truly great historians of West Germany, opened his three-volume opus magnum on Germany in the 19th century with the sentence, “In the beginning there was Napoleon.” The impulses and motivations for modernizing Germany were made possible by Napoleon ! Just think of the Prussian Reforms. In the course of the 19th century, the fortunes of the German states, especially Prussia, practically skyrocketed. The “danger” that Prussia would slide toward a parliamentary system prompted King Wilhelm I to appoint Bismarck prime minister in 1862. Within eight years, he succeeded in accomplishing something that had eluded German rulers for centuries, namely “organizing” Germany. Only once the unified German state had been established did the idea gain prominence that this could not be the full extent of Germany’s fruition, and that more would have to be done with regard to Europe. The spectacular vitality that the German Empire soon developed, the breakthroughs in science, culture, and military might at the center of the continent are all well known.

Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat, Munich: C. H. Beck, 1983, 11.

25 Central Europe was Germany’s fate and Germany’s temptation.

Stern

Germany had attained a never-before Still, this empire was also dominated by fear and arrogance, especially dur- seen degree of unity in 1914 ing the later stages of Wilhelmine Germany. The anxiety resulted from the belief that, externally, the country faced the threat of encirclement by hostile alliances, and internally, the specter of democratization. This perception of twofold pressure resulted in an erratic and aggressive foreign policy that ultimately produced the very encirclement it had sought to prevent. One could justifiably say that the Germans, or at least the German elites, were in a state of frenzy in 1914, at the start of World War I, which turned into despair in 1918 –19. The country that had been celebrating in 1914 and had attained a never-before seen degree of unity during a conflict it perceived as a war of self-defense, was suddenly more divided than ever. And yet, the Weimar period witnessed a brief flourishing of science and culture and even economic recovery after the nadir of 1923, the year of hyper- inflation. After 1945 there was no more After the disaster of Nazism, Germany was divided, after which there was no “natural calling” for Germany more “natural calling” for the country. What did exist was the task of the Federal Republic, admittedly with American support, to play a constructive and increasingly important role in European cooperation. The influence that was gained during this time can be hinted at with the catchword Ostpolitik, which played an important part in the context of détente during the 1960s and 1970s. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany became the most powerful state in Europe, but remained hamstrung by its past as well as the effort and costs of actual reunification. The Federal Republic is committed Today, the Federal Republic is committed to upholding democratic develop- to European integration ment in Europe and promoting the integration of the European Union’s new members in the east. Central Europe was Germany’s fate and Germany’s temptation. Today, on the other hand, one could say Germany is on a “calling of reconcili- ation” that has been thriving far and wide, especially regarding Eastern Europe. Think only of the German-Polish relationship, despite all its current difficulties, or of the integration of Russia. Although a half century of German-French partnership has achieved much, perhaps the time is ripe today for taking advantage of more flexible partnerships, with Berlin giving Europe new impulses through fresh cooperation with Warsaw. Even better would be getting Britain on board as well, helping the British become reconciled with the idea and reality of Europe. That would imply that Germany, during an age of so-called Euroskepticism and the threat of renationalization, take up its “more natural calling” by following a clear European policy in its own best interest. This policy’s objective must be to

Determinants of Foreign Policy : Geography and History ? 26 mediate among the oft-cited problems and fissures between East and West while becoming the oft-mentioned bridge between the continent’s various parts. Permit me to conclude with the observation that, for Germany, the key to The key to succeeding in attaining an own identity and succeeding in foreign policy is inner unity. This foreign policy is inner unity requirement of inner unity and consensus, which went unfulfilled in Wilhelmine Germany and which reunification has not yet produced to the desired extent, is an open question, an open problem that is inseparable from German foreign policy.

1. The Significance of Geography for German Foreign Policy

People often refer to the importance of the geographical “central position” to Ger- Bertram many’s foreign policy. To be honest, I have my problems with the terms “center” A “central position” is not and “central position” as foreign-policy categories. Germany is, as is generally a foreign policy category … known, surrounded by friends, or even better by states which are, together with us, parts of the EU. Therefore, the particular geographical position of Germany is insignificant as far as our relations with these partners are concerned. Of course it is important to maintain good relations with one’s neighbors within a political community, as well as to the new EU members in the east. That, however, is a practical matter of the common involvement in this Union; every member state’s right to have a say and the interdependency among the EU countries. All of this has nothing to do with geography. Indeed, the very crux of the European Union has been to replace geography, irrelevant as a strategic consideration, with a system of treaties within whose framework Germany’s relations with Spain are as important as those with Lithuania. Also, it is an illusion to believe that a “central position” would generate spe- … and does not generate special cial possibilities or responsibilities for our country, for example the idea that we possibilities for our country could act as an appropriate mediator in a conflict because we have some special understanding of this or that neighbor. To which neighbor does this apply ? To Poland ? To the Netherlands ? To Denmark ? To France and its current domestic political developments ? Our supposed “central position” can and should not be a factor influencing our policy. In association with the “central position,” one often hears Germany referred to as a “bridge.” This image reminds me of those eccentric Americans who buy venerable Paris bridges, ship them across the ocean, and put them back up some- where in the Texas desert. Picturesque, but completely useless. It may serve Ger- man political sentimentality to perceive oneself as a bridge but between whom,

27 The Significance of Geography for German Foreign Policy Regarding metaphorical dreams of becoming a “bridge” in the middle of Europe, such bridges are an illusion.

Crowe

may I ask, is Germany supposed to function as a bridge ? Between Britain and Po- land perhaps ? I doubt that even one of the two sides would care to use that bridge. It was an illusion, during the Cold War, to believe that Germany could function as a bridge between East and West, and it is much more so today.

Hänsch I know no country within the EU that does not, in one sense or another, consider The EU needs whole-hearted itself a bridge, wants to be seen as a bridge, or act like a bridge. The entire Euro- members, not bridges pean Union consists of nothing but countries spanning others. The term is not much use for the practice of politics or the future of Europe. What the EU needs are countries that are whole-hearted members and want to assume functions within the Union instead of considering themselves “bridges” to other parts of the world.

Crowe Regarding metaphorical dreams of becoming a “bridge” in the middle of Europe, such bridges are an illusion. The people being bridged between do not need them or use them, as the British bridge between Europe and the US has only served to show.

Haller Every country claims to build bridges of some kind. In the end, people forget what was supposed to be bridged in the first place.

Chizhov In a world of globalization and interdependence, everybody is everybody else’s bridge in some sense.

von Weizsäcker Mr. Bertram, the “center of Europe” is no sentimental idea, and geography has a very real significance for Germany’s role. Whether balance or turbulence ema- nates from the continent’s center has always been a core problem of European history. In the 19th century, for instance, there was a strong and constant conflict between the profound wish for unification among the German states and the equally profound unease among neighboring states over the consequences such a move would have for them. Bismarck’s great achievement was to promote Germany’s political and economic rise without permitting unrest to form in the center of the continent. Refuting the cauchemar des coalitions was the guiding principle by which he approached negotiating treaties. Dropping the pilot of these delicate balance-of-power policies soon led to the Wilhelmine restlessness in the middle

Determinants of Foreign Policy : Geography and History ? 28 Geography has a very real significance for Germany’s role. von Weizsäcker

of Europe that its neighbors had feared in 1870–71. We all know what came after that. Germany’s position changed radically on May 1, 2004, not because geogra- The problem of the center phy no longer had any significance in the EU, but because the incorporation of is solved but not irrelevant the eastern neighbors into the EU brought to an end a centuries-long search for stability and security in Europe’s center. Today, the center no longer threatens its neighbors and its neighbors have stopped trying to weaken it. The problem of the center is now solved, but that doesn’t make it irrelevant.

As a historian I would prefer to keep away from a positional description such Reinhardt as “central location.“ It is too strongly associated with the history of the last two centuries to serve in an age of globalization.

The whole terminology of “center” and “central location” regarding the position Cichocki of Germany in Europe rubs me the wrong way. It implies that everything in the EU is oriented toward the center and that the rest, as the periphery, is somehow less significant. In his 1996 Paul Henri Spaak Lecture at Harvard, Ralf Dahrendorf argued along exactly the same lines. He said the entire process of European unification has basically had only one sole objective, the multilateral integration of Germany. I believe that is a fundamental misperception. What was most important to the pioneers of European cooperation was the reconstruction of Europe following World War II. Germany’s incorporation was a prominent part but in no way the determining factor.

The idea of Germany as the middle having the natural task of “organizing” Europe Crowe fills many of us on the periphery with horror. Moreover, Germany’s “middleness” Germany is less central than it used to be is a great deal less central than it used to be when Europe itself was central. But when Europe itself was central the world is a very different place now, with a dominant superpower, the relative decline of Europe and the rise of Asia and particularly China and India.

It worries me that Germany’s attention is directed more and more inwards. In do- Hoyer ing so we are not taking advantage of our favorable geographical position or the

Ralf Dahrendorf, From Europe to EUrope: A Story of Hope, Trial and Error [ = 15th Annual Paul-Henri Spaak Lecture, 2. Oktober 1996], in: Andrew M. Moravcsik, ed., Europe Without Illusions: The Paul-Henri Spaak Lectures 1994–1999, Lanham: UP of America, 2005.

29 The Significance of Geography for German Foreign Policy German foreign policy is no longer conditioned by an assumed central position in Europe but, if at all, by the geography of Europe in the world.

Bertram

opportunities of a reunified Europe. What do we actually know about our direct neighbors, what expertise have we developed ? A large part of the eastern German population, both longtime residents and people who moved in from the west, have no real idea of Poland, even though the border is only sixty kilometers from central Berlin. During the Easter holidays I went with my family to Slubice, and when we told our Berlin friends about it, they replied “Oh, that’s interesting. We have never been there”. People travel to Spain and Ireland on vacation but not to Poland. Our awareness of our smaller northern, western, and southern neighbors is not much better. Hardly any German media outlet reports regularly from Copenhagen, Lux- embourg, or Berne about important aspects of domestic politics there.

Bertram The influence of geography on history is indisputable. Yet the present and future of German foreign policy are no longer conditioned by an assumed central position in Europe but, if anything, by the geography of Europe in the world.

von Weizsäcker If a country has practically no immediate neighbors thanks to an insular location, An insular location determines that has enormous importance for its foreign policy. We can see that in the cases a country’s foreign policy … of Japan, Britain, and the United States, all of which are separated from most of the world by oceans. Conversely, if a country is surrounded by nine neighbors, that situation also strongly influences its foreign relations.

Ischinger Geography remains an important consideration for foreign policy. Even if geo- … as one can see in the case of Britain graphical circumstances appear less important to us because Germany is integrated in the European Union, they remain elementary to our neighbors and partners. That applies in particular to Britain, where, for obvious reasons, geography is decisive.

Hänsch Geography certainly has significance for international politics, even though it is true that the relevance of geography can no longer be directly derived from a strategic location in Europe. It influences one’s self-perception and how one wants to be seen by others. Just compare the self-perception of countries like Finland, Sweden or Denmark that see themselves as the EU’s Northern Dimension with the Mediterranean countries and Portugal, which regard themselves as links to Africa or Latin America. It is precisely these patterns of perception that result from geography, have been growing for centuries, and cannot be organized away, that make finding a common foreign and security policy so elusive.

Determinants of Foreign Policy : Geography and History ? 30 The EU is forcing us to redefine the influence of geography.

Cichocki

We like to associate the idea of a balance of power in Europe with the age of The balance of power is now attained alliances in the 19th century, but establishing equilibrium remains a centerpiece through common institutions of European politics. The EU is an organization developing a balance among states that carry differing weight in an international context. That is why we have these various compensating mechanisms between rich and poor, north and south, big and small, old and new member states. The spectacular difference of this arrangement from former times is that, instead of being achieved through alliances and counter-alliances and on battlefields through blood and iron, balance is attained in and through common institutions. That is a civilizing act of the highest order.

I would like to partly confirm the decreasing relevance of geography in international Chichocki relations from the Polish perspective, but I would also like to differentiate a bit. Within the mechanisms and institutions of a large community of states such as the EU there can be flexible interest-based coalitions among countries that are geographically far apart while neighboring countries do not necessarily have to cooperate. In pushing common interests on issues such as Structural Funds, countries such as Poland and Spain can become partners. The Visegrád Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia), on the other hand, which some called an eastern Benelux when it was established in 1991, remains void of real political substance to this day — despite centuries of close geographical, cultural, and historical relations among its member states. This is because their interests in Europe differ. Regional cooperation within the EU must be based on common interests, such as Poland’s cooperation with the Baltic States in the areas of security, energy, and ecology. The securer a country is, the less important geography becomes. Since Poland’s Security makes geography less important accession, Germany borders on member states only and its border is no longer the eastern frontier of the EU. That means simultaneously that we Poles cannot yet completely dismiss geography as irrelevant, for obvious reasons. I would therefore not dismiss geography but think the trend is heading in that direction. The EU is forcing us to redefine the influence of geography.

Many of the problems facing us today exist irrespectively of our geographical posi- Reinhardt tion. Our physical distance from the Congo or Afghanistan is relevant to the Ger- man military missions there only in terms of transport. The decisions to dispatch troops there took place independently of Germany’s location on the globe.

31 The Significance of Geography for German Foreign Policy Geography’s importance has shrunk in this world of globalization.

Hoagland

Goulard On the subject of geography’s relevance, during the referendum campaign people Many Europeans still identify themselves in the French countryside often told me “What do I care about the EU ? What do according to traditional parameters … I care about Poland and the Czech Republic ? I’ve never met a person from those countries in my entire life !” Anyone living in Clermont-Ferrand or near Toulouse and who never goes anywhere else does not have much chance of making such an encounter. In contemporary Europe many people still identify themselves according to traditional parameters determined by geography and history. Political attitudes often function on the basis of proximity or distance, of relationships or alienation. … while the EU of 25 and It is therefore our business to communicate to the people of Europe that the soon 27 is a new model EU of 25 and soon 27 is a new model, one in which the geographical distance between Ireland and Greece is irrelevant, where Germany is no longer trapped by its history, where Britain is no longer just an island, and so forth. Only if we succeed in doing that will we succeed in our constitutional project.

Stein As an Israeli I am probably biased regarding the political consequences of ge- Geography cannot be ignored ography. I think it would be a German misperception to think that geography could be ignored just because the country now lies in the middle of Europe in a globalized world. The same is true of European integration. The Europe of Six constituted a more or less cohesive unit. The larger the European Community and later the EU grew, however, the more important the geographical location of its respective member states became. With the accession of Greece the EC became a neighbor to a host of regional conflicts that had previously held little significance to the Community, all at a stroke. And should Turkey one day become an EU member, the move would have far-reaching geo-strategic consequences for the EU.

Bertram But not for Germany.

Stein Germany is part of the EU and its foreign policy, and this policy is largely determined by geographic factors.

Hoagland Geography has not disappeared, but its importance has certainly shrunk in this world of globalization. The CNN effect causes us to know much more about crises, dangers and desperate poverty. At the same time, people in other parts of the world know much more about our affluence and comfort and strive to have a

Determinants of Foreign Policy : Geography and History ? 32 What historical responsibility does Germany have toward Afghanistan or Lebanon ? None !

Bertram

part in it. Also on a very concrete level, societies in a world with differing stages of development collide through the globalization process, and that does shrink geography.

Winston Churchill once said about the Balkans, “Too much history and too little Chizhov geography.” That could today be applied to Europe. Of course, the perception of the role played by geography has evolved tremendously and it cannot be considered in the same mindset as it used to be in the 20th century or, even more so, in the 19th century.

Geography remains important to foreign policy, if not in the old categories of Hoyer glacis and retention spaces, thank goodness. In energy resources and transfers, for The effects of geography are obvious example, its effects are particularly obvious, which our Polish and Baltic friends in energy resources and transfers could tell us a thing or two about.

Of course geography has significance for the self-image and history influences Bertram identity. How Europe reacts to other international developments is certainly relevant for Germany. But Germany’s position in the middle of the continent neither offers us a special opportunity for our foreign policy nor is it a hindrance.

2. Historical Responsibility as a Guiding Principle

Another favorite yet mostly useless notion is that of “Germany’s historical respon- Bertram sibility.” Whenever Germany becomes active anywhere in the world, as surely as the sun will rise, there will be a politician, journalist, or academic who declares that Germany’s historical responsibility necessitated the move. What responsibility does Germany have toward Afghanistan or Lebanon ? None ! Germany’s responsibility as it stems from the country’s history is to use its historical experience as an orientation aid to define German interests in a given situation. Moral aspects naturally play a part as well. For the life of me, however, I cannot discern a general German responsibility to the rest of the world. Using vacuous terms such as “responsibility” to justify German foreign policy Vaguely defined “responsibilities” will, in time, avenge itself. If we keep on talking about “responsibility” without cannot justify a foreign policy being able to define it more closely, we will eventually have trouble convincing our people of the necessity of taking certain steps, especially if they carry a heavy price tag, both materially and, perhaps, in immaterial ways as well.

33 Historical Responsibility as a Guiding Principle Hoagland The idea of acting solely from a sense of guilt or historical responsibility rather than from one’s self-interest in foreign policy would occur to very few Americans.

Seidenfaden Why do so many people still frame the issue of Germany’s position in Europe in I thought that the issue of Germany’s terms of lessons drawn from history ? I thought that the issue of Germany’s histori- historical role had been laid to rest for good … cal role being a specter for Europe’s future had been laid to rest for good a long time ago. It stimulated a kind of last-gasp debate some sixteen years ago, at the time of the German Reunification, when policymakers and editorialists in neighboring countries asked themselves ominously, “Are we really comfortable about Germany or not ?” But that debate was very rapidly concluded. We were comfortable. What has followed has made us even more comfortable. Partly because of the increasing problems of Germany, nothing threatening has happened ever since.

Crowe Constant agonizing about the past undermines the constructive, leading role Ger- … because it undermines many should take in the European Union. It nourishes withdrawal from responsi- Germany’s role in the EU bility, a responsibility the rest of us need Germany to take for the furtherance of our own as well as Germany’s European objectives.

Reinhardt As a concept, “historical responsibility” is far too vague to help formulate real “Historical responsibility” is too vague a foreign policy. Just think of Helmut Kohl’s remark that German troops should concept to help formulate foreign policy never again be sent where German troops once stood. He was talking about the Balkans and, as a doctrine, his words remained valid for about a year before the Bundeswehr showed up precisely there — justified, predictably, by Germany’s “historical responsibility.” It all goes to show how malleable this kind of historical rhetoric can be.

Stein History is not without relevance as a category for the making of real policy. Policy for the future is often based on deep awareness of history. At least that is the way it should be: learning from the past to design the future. Take for instance the CSCE, which is tremendously attractive to us in the Middle East ! The European precedent, meaning the progression of history since the CSCE process was initiated, teaches us that there is such a thing as progress and transformation in relations among states, once one can agree on concrete steps on the basis of jointly-agreed principles.

Schlie As a historian I am not impartial on the question of how much history lies in the present. One cannot live without history. Otherwise one would fall into a void. It is

Determinants of Foreign Policy : Geography and History ? 34 an individual human experience as well as a collective one. One does not necessarily have to invoke Ernest Renan’s famous definition of a nation, un plébiscite de tous les jours, to arrive at the realization that a nation is the sum of all the experiences of the living, the dead and the coming generations. Thomas Mann answered his own 1940 question of what Germany’s mission in Europe is when in 1947, in Deutschland und die Deutschen, he wrote that “the relationship of the Germans to the world” is “abstract and mystical,” equating the “relationship of a professor with a demonic touch: clumsy and yet defined by a disdainful awareness of being the world’s superior in ‘deep’ matters.” The problem of German history in my opinion is that the question of the Ger- mans’ relationship to the world could not be answered in 1918 or 1930, because there was always catching up to do. Prussia ascended relatively late into the pen- tarchy of European powers when it broke international law by invading Silesia in 1740. This upstart essence remained with the Empire after 1871 and continued to affect and burden German policy in the decades thereafter. Stresemann, one of the most gifted practitioners of foreign policy, was essentially a revisionist whose policy swings could never be a model for today. We always had a problem with our situation in Europe and had problems to find our role for a long time. That is one answer to the question of how the extremes of German history originated. Today’s Europe is also much more history than we perhaps realize. The fact Today’s Europe is much more that we have yet to find a fitting term for our age (which becomes abundantly clear history than we realize when confronted with names like “postclassical nation state”) however does not mean that we have parted company with historical continuities.

You might think it is a déformation professionelle, but the way I see it, an understand- Stern ing of history is vital. It is incomprehensible that a government, party, or society could make important decisions without at least a latent awareness of history coming into play, an ability to establish analogies and lines of historical association.

History and a geographically central position decisively influenced Germany’s Bertram foreign policy in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. But as a point of reference for the 21st century ? For that they are irrelevant, due to the simple fact that the EU is a community of countries with varying histories and geographical locations, not an institution based on Germany’s history and location.

Thomas Mann, Deutschland und die Deutschen, Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer, 1947, 15.

35 Historical Responsibility as a Guiding Principle It is also perfectly obvious that history is of elementary importance to our national identity. I know why I am German, after all. But I also know of only one single foreign policy conclusion that stems from Germany’s history, and that has to do with our relationship with Israel. We have an obligation to succor Israel in the case of great danger. I would not know what else.

3. German Modesty ?

Stein People say Germany’s foreign policy is “modest,” that it chooses not to exploit the country’s own power on the international stage. In my opinion Germany dis- carded that modesty during the Iraq crisis. Chancellor Schröder clearly distanced himself from the approach of his predecessors when he began speaking insist- ently of “German interests.” The same goes for his remarks about the EU. Schröder bluntly said that German interests are defined in Berlin and not Brussels.

Goulard The demand for more assertiveness on the part of Germany seems to me perfectly I would not call Schröder’s public remarks justified. However, I would not call Schröder’s public remarks on German inter- on German interests progress ests progress. For a long time the Federal Republic cleverly pursued its interests within an international framework without anyone noticing. Schröder did not do anything new; he was simply louder than his predecessors, perhaps because he spent too much time together with Chirac.

Morgan The German identity and historical experience still leaves its imprint on the way foreign policy is conducted by Berlin. The title of Helga Haftendorn’s book Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung captures Germany’s leeway pretty well. Today we are witnessing more of Selbstbehauptung, and this should lead us to hope for active German leadership during the German Presiden- cies of the EU and the G8. But I believe that the long tradition of Selbstbeschränkung, the abstaining from attempts to influence the outside world still influences the way German foreign policy is conducted rather strongly.

Stern I have taken part in many conferences, but I have never heard German humility spoken of in a disapproving sense. Something decisive has changed here.

Helga Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung: 1945–2000, Stuttgart and Munich: Dt. Verlags-Anstalt, 2001.

Determinants of Foreign Policy : Geography and History ? 36 II. Foreign Policy Debates and Institutions in Germany

1. We Need a Political Debate on Foreign Policy

Since I have less experience in foreign policy than in grass-roots politics, I would Mißfelder like to share an impression. Because our overseas military deployments have been insufficiently legitimated to the public, both in terms of politics and program, the people are steadily gaining the impression that German foreign policy contradicts the interests of the average citizen. When Bundestag lawmakers inadequately articulate their constituents’ doubts over sending German troops abroad, they are not living up to their responsibilities as the people’s advocates. When decisions on foreign policy are expedited through parliament, as were the most recent deployment resolutions, I do not accuse the government or parliament of base motives, but the impression they leave is a negative one ! The inadequate public debate over German foreign policy and interests has Foreign policy cannot be made two effects. First, the vital foreign policy consensus within the political class dis- on the basis of opinion polls … solves. Not only the Left Party but also the liberal FDP voted against the Lebanon operation ! Secondly, the threat of populist tendencies emerges that would ask “what do crises in other regions of the world have to do with Germany ?” Foreign policy cannot be made on the basis of opinion polls or barroom sloganeering. Yet if we completely ignore the people’s resistance we will have a serious problem. More and more voters would turn to the populists. This danger of foreign-policy populism is especially likely regarding EU poli- … especially regarding EU politics … tics. The CDU has always claimed to be a European party. It has a great tradition that includes names like Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl. At many of the regional party events I have visited in recent years, however, denouncing the EU was the norm. “Brussels” was the equivalent of a four-letter word. I may not have consciously experienced the “Eurosclerosis” debate of the early 1980s, but I fear the current mood is far more defeatist than it was then. We cannot give in to the temptations of populism, yet must also beware of the … yet we must also beware of the expanding expanding gap between politicians and the public in foreign and European policy. gap between politicians and the public We must clearly explain, communicate, and speak with the people. A significant step in that direction would be to examine the pros and cons of foreign policy decisions openly on the political stage, not behind closed doors.

Mr. Mißfelder, you rightly demand a broader public discussion of Germany’s for- Heusgen eign- and security policy. In the postwar years, when the Federal Republic had far

37 We Need a Political Debate on Foreign Policy We badly need a domestic debate over where our interests lie.

Reinhardt

less foreign policy leeway, foreign policy issues were, paradoxically, discussed in parliament and publicly far more spiritedly than they are today. Our elected officials lack One reason for that is, if I may say so, the lack of foreign policy competence foreign policy competence … among our elected officials today. There are few foreign policy experts among the members of the current Bundestag. Only when you and your colleagues develop a bigger interest in foreign policy, for example when more of you take part in the foreign policy working groups, will our foreign policy discussions attain a higher level, both in parliament and in public, and what you call the danger of populism will countered.

Stein Compared to Washington, foreign policy expertise here is indeed modest. Even … compared e. g. to Washington among the major parties one could count the specialists on two hands. In the United States the security policy debate takes place in academic journals, conferences, popular magazines, and even on television. People move from think tanks to political positions and departmental positions. You could use some more of that here.

Bertram The terms we use to make foreign policy more plausible do not help form the popular consensus that we so urgently need. The consent of the citizens can be obtained through convincing analyses of our interests and not through the no- tions of center, responsibility, geography, or bridge functions. Some time ago I received a call from a German officer in Afghanistan. He told me that “we’re sitting here in Mazar-e-Sharif and do not really know why we are here. Couldn’t you come here sometime and explain it to us ?” I referred him to more appointed persons. Still, if I had accepted the invitation, I could hardly have announced that “dear soldiers, you are here because of our ‘national responsibility.’” These kinds of things have to be justified in other and more convincing ways. Consensus is built by the clarification of interests of a country that is part of the European Union and that must help the EU to become more effective internationally to promote its own interests. The existence of the EU is actually the relevant, fundamental change. It is of central importance that we are no longer alone but part of a network of states that functions by certain rules.

Reinhardt We badly need a domestic debate over where our interests lie. We can no longer, as we recently did for the Congo mission, force a debate and vote through parliament in half an hour and then think the matter is settled. That ensures only that the soldiers and commanders charged with implementing these decisions on the

Foreign Policy Debates and Institutions in Germany 38 Europe is an island surrounded by reality.

Stein

ground will have no idea of why they were sent to these countries in the first place. I was in charge of these kinds of operations for nine years and right at the start of one of the first, the 1993–94 Somalia mission, I asked my minister “What is my assignment in Somalia ?” To this day I have not received a satisfactory reply to that fundamental question.

A debate about where the interests of Europe lie and why we are sending troops Seidenfaden to different regions of the world is urgently called for. Even Denmark has soldiers stationed in both Afghanistan and Iraq and we have not sufficiently discussed our motivation and how long these missions might last.

As an external observer I can only confirm that German foreign policy has a Stein problem with democratic legitimacy, because people here have not yet realized Europe cannot defend its interests that Europe is an island, an island surrounded by reality. The confrontation with around the globe without casualties reality still lies ahead. Imagine the horror scenario if a large number of German soldiers were to be killed in an attack in Afghanistan ! The public, asking “what are we doing there in the first place ?” would demand the German troops’ immediate pullout. If Europe is going to commit itself and defend its interests around the globe, the people have to be psychologically prepared for the possibility of a large number of casualties among its troops. Other regions have, necessarily, advanced farther in this respect.

The Bundeswehr’s missions in crisis regions such as the Middle East will unleash a Ischinger more vociferous internal debate than we have yet known. For decades, the foreign Germany’s foreign ministers usually minister, no matter who he was or what party he was from, has practically had a only brought positive news … reserved place as the country’s most popular politician. That is not true in other countries, so why here ? Because the foreign ministers have almost always brought only positive news. Given the changing priorities of German politics, the foreign minister will inevitably have to bring some unpleasant tidings in the future.

Perhaps foreign ministers in Germany are so popular because their work does not Stein dig directly into people’s pockets. They do not come into contact with health care, … and they did not dig into people’s pockets pensions, the labor market, and the like.

There is also an institutional reason for the lifelessness of Germany’s foreign pol- Bertram icy discourse. Since foreign policy in Germany is the prerogative of the govern-

39 We Need a Political Debate on Foreign Policy ment, the parliamentarians’ possibilities of exercising influence or of distinguish- ing themselves politically, remain extremely limited — even in the foreign affairs committee. That is a reason why so few lawmakers want to define themselves as foreign policy experts. Therefore, parliament should demand an annual “Report on the International Situation of Germany” from the government. Such a report could give an impulse for controversial and informed debates inside and outside parliament.

Schlie The Federal Government’s new White Book will surely provide a certain impulse The new White Book is the for discussion of German foreign policy. Some expect the White Book to provide a beginning point for a constantly revised long-term definition of Germany’s interests and objectives, mainly because there definition of national interests has not been any attempt at making such a definition in so long a time. The White Book is something else, however. It is the beginning point for a constantly revised definition of national interests within a European framework in an open political discussion because we must constantly redefine Germany’s interests if we take them seriously. Unfortunately the foreign policy debate in parliament and the public does not keep pace with the ever-faster developments in the world’s problem zones. Today we simply do not have the time we would need to think through our experiences and then draw the right conclusions for the future while establishing a consensus in parliament and the public through debate; that might lead to inadequate explana- tion and legitimacy, not just in Germany but in the Netherlands and Italy as well. One thing we can do, however, to keep the legitimacy deficit from getting worse is to level with the people in articulating our foreign policy goals. For example, we should not talk about defending the “statehood” of the Congo, thereby implying that statehood there is the same as in Germany. The decision-making processes in international institutions such as the EU, NATO, or the UN are often too complex to be transparent to the public. Therefore we need new approaches that get people more closely involved. Important elements would be stronger integration and the ability to see the world through an outside perspective. Foreign policy in the future will rather resemble “public diplomacy,” being more strongly oriented towards domestic imperatives and being articulated within the immediate circle of the heads of state and of government. The position of the German foreign minister will in the future be more like that of a Minister of State in the Chancellery than that of an independent cabinet minister.

Foreign Policy Debates and Institutions in Germany 40 2. Does Germany Need a National Security Strategy ?

Do we need codified guidelines for German foreign policy, a German security de Weck strategy ?

There are some good reasons to have a national security strategy but we should Heusgen also ask ourselves whether the European Security Strategy would not suffice for our national purposes as well. Operationally, guidelines are helpful in reaching concrete decisions, not only Some people believe that Germany keeps for those people who have to make these decisions but also for the democratic stumbling into foreign deployments foundation of the decisions themselves. The Bundestag, for example, discusses the extension of a foreign armed forces mission regularly. Because these individual decisions often are not based sufficiently on clearly formulated foreign policy directives, some people gain the fatal impression that Germany keeps stumbling into this or that foreign deployment that has no relevance for the security of our country. Three positive things could be expected from a security strategy: more con- Maybe we do need a ceptual clarity for the decision makers, an impulse for public debate during the national security strategy … process of formulation, and higher quality and broader reach in future public discussions, because the arguments in the political discourse would be based on a closely-defined, mutual guideline. We must clarify, however, what place there would be for a national strategy … within the parameters of the ESS within the European Security Strategy. The ESS already provides us with an excel- lent foreign policy framework. At the height of the dispute within the EU over joining the US-led coalition in Iraq, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Britain, and Javier Solana resolved that this could not be allowed to ever happen again. Even in extremely difficult situations, they agreed, there should be a yardstick for the foreign policy decisions of EU member states. Solana was therefore given a mandate to design a European Security Strategy. The ESS fulfils its task very well. Against this background I have still not decided whether we need or could even accommodate a national variant. The ESS also lays down the priorities of Ger- man security strategy, which is always embedded in the principle of joint action with our neighbors. Having Germany actively influence the continued development of the ESS and its implementation in operational European foreign policy is at least as important as the idea of having our own security strategy.

41 Does Germany Need a National Security Strategy? Of course we need a German security strategy.

Ischinger

On the other hand, there would definitely be some merit in systematically thinking through what the ESS principles mean for Germany, and to think about the institutional architecture of our foreign policy, for instance in redesigning departments. And a national debate over foreign policy would probably be most easily launched on the subject of a national strategy. I hope that the “White Book on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr 2006” will take us a good step forward conceptually and contribute to a broader political debate. If that does not take place in the hoped-for dimensions, it would be worth thinking about a German security strategy.

Reinhardt It would be short-sighted to think that Germany could make decisions using only We need a German security strategy the European Security Strategy. To decide what part one is going to play and what resources one is going to commit, one has to think soberly on the basis of one’s own interests and resources.

Ischinger Of course we need a German security strategy. Foreigners would hardly understand why we are even asking that question.

Bertram Mr. Ischinger, I am quite shocked to hear that you do not consider the European How should a German security strategy Security Strategy sufficient for Germany. In what area, then ? As the core elements differ from the ESS ? of the ESS were supported by the government, they can easily be transferred to Germany. How should an explicitly German foreign and security strategy differ from the ESS ? The security interests of the European states are not all that different after all.

Ischinger The European Security Strategy serves our interests very well. Still, we should com- plement it with a German foreign and security strategy. The ESS is so compatible with our national interests in part because we pushed for these interests during the conceptual phase. Yet having our politicians base their concrete decisions on a codified security strategy would substantially enhance our domestic policy debate and the democratic legitimacy of our foreign policy.

Hoyer Naturally, the European Security Strategy must be applied to the national stand- point in question. The national translation of a multilateral strategy necessarily

http:��//��www.weissbuch.de/

Foreign Policy Debates and Institutions in Germany 42 generates differing interpretations. In Warsaw we observe different attitudes than in Lisbon. The same is true, of course, for Germany. I would very much welcome a discussion of what we believe are Germany’s interests within the European framework. It would be fatal to fabricate some supposed contradictions between national and European interests, although I am sure that a debate would demonstrate that such contradictions do not exist.

43 Does Germany Need a National Security Strategy? III. Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests

de Weck What are the challenges that German and European foreign policy must rise up to ? And what are Germany’s foreign policy interests against this backdrop ?

1. Security Risks

Hoagland The challenges for German and European security have changed fundamentally. Germany must, as most other countries, develop a new security agenda for a world where bipolar confrontation has given way to completely different threats. In the Cold War even hinting at the possibility of a Mittelweg for Germany with a conference under a title such as “Germany at the Center of Europe” would have been taboo. The idea of Germany balancing equal distance between Moscow and Washington made people nervous. Today, people on both sides of the Atlantic are so sure about the orientation of Germany that such conferences are possible and indeed needed. Today’s world is non-polar … Today’s world is not the bipolar place we used to believe it was, nor the unipo- lar world some claimed existed briefly, but non-polar. Its main dangers are fragile states, extremist tendencies and asymmetric threats. In this world the power to destroy everything does not equal the power to control everything, or indeed to control much of anything. Just recently, the World Bank issued a comprehensive report in which the writers concluded that the number of “fragile states” increased from 17 in 2003 to 26 this year and is likely to continue increasing into the future at a catastrophic rate. Population pressure and regressive economies force people in the lands of have-nots to flee to developed countries, like Germany, France and the US. We need to find ways to manage migration as a ticking political time bomb. … and it needs a new security agenda This non-polar world needs a new security agenda. The center of gravity of transatlantic security concerns has moved from Europe proper to the troubled zones on Europe’s periphery. An increasing number of societies feel that danger comes from spreading weakness and fragility within their own borders rather than from a military juggernaut or an invading army. The three main challenges today are Jihadist ideology and terrorist action, the troubling retreats on demo

The Independent Evaluation Group of The World Bank (Hg.), Engaging with Fragile States: An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress, Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 2006. http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/ 24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/a4d6461b0067e049852571f500551e1b/$FILE/licus.pdf

Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests 44 In a globalized world, traditional beliefs in the effectiveness of diplomacy and military policy on international politics become obsolete.

Haller

cracy and state maturity that have followed the inspiring advances made in the former Soviet Union, and energy uncertainty.

In a globalized world, traditional beliefs in the effectiveness of diplomacy and Haller military policy on international politics are becoming increasingly obsolete. The EU and NATO will not be able to compensate the population explosions in some parts of the world by sending troops. Demographic studies show that in 20 to 30 years, the West including Russia will constitute only about 15 % of the world’s population.

All states in the West share the elementary interest of helping our children exist Hoyer in peace and prosperity without being forced to give up their way of life. In the debate over cultural identity one gets the impression that the West is People are in a state of shock because heading down the losing road. We are paying for past mistakes and present defi- they see their values threatened cits such as a lack of willingness to integrate, without confidently defending our own way of life. The Deutsche Oper Berlin cancelled performances of Mozart’s Idomeneo because of an alleged threat of Islamist terrorist attacks stemming from a scene blaspheming against the Prophet Muhammad. People are in a state of shock because they see their values threatened and are losing confidence in the resoluteness of our policy makers.

The more people recognize that they are defending their freedoms and rights, Mißfelder the more they support measures for defense and security policy. Germany is in A democracy that believes in acute danger, not — like Israel — of military attacks, but of terrorism. The planned itself must defend itself tenaciously attacks in German trains demonstrate the dimensions of the attack on our funda- against terrorist threats mental values. A democracy that believes in itself must defend itself tenaciously against such attacks. We all remember the slogan from Cold War days that freedom has to be fought for all the time. That might have been easier in a bipolar world than in our present- day global jumble. In fact the words are more true today than ever before. Our freedom is threatened when we give in to the Islamists’ pressure on us to behave a certain way. When, in fear of Islamist attacks, the director of the Deut- sche Oper Berlin takes the opera Idomeneo off the schedule, in which an effigy of the Prophet Muhammad is decapitated, the terrorists have succeeded in running our lives. It is an unacceptable betrayal of the freedoms of speech and artistic expression as integral values of a free society when Germany’s ARD public TV net-

45 Security Risks The Q’uran says murder is the worst of sins. Killing an innocent is tantamount to killing all humanity.

Kizilkaya

work, out of misunderstood political correctness and exaggerated consideration for German Muslims, banishes a movie about a violent young Turkish criminal to a late-night time slot. Islam is not peace-loving In our postmodern society we face a problem of self-definition. Many intel- lectuals and politicians are not even sure about what is still worth defending. Much of the population sees things differently. Many people neither understood why the media reacted so severely to Pope Benedict XVI’s Regensburg Speech nor saw why the Pope thought he had to apologize for a passage he quoted criticizing the violent aspects of Islam. Islam, and especially its Islamist incarnation, is not peace-loving.

Kizilkaya Literally translated, “Islam” means peace. The Q’uran says murder is the worst of sins. Killing an innocent is tantamount to killing all humanity. The abuse of this law by some fanatics does not change anything in it. At the Islamic Conference on September 27, 2006, German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said Muslims enrich German society. On the basis of this long- overdue recognition, Muslims in Germany can now identify more closely with German society. We should not compromise that effect by making unqualified remarks about the nature of Islam. German Muslims have always emphasized Whenever people talk about the caricature uproar or the Idomeneo production that they are part of this society they refer to the pressure that people in authority are subjected to. Yet we should also recall how muted the reaction among German Muslims has been. Given the fact that many felt personally insulted in their faith, I think they demonstrated appropriate restraint and conducted themselves as responsible citizens of a democratic state. And despite all criticism of the Regensburg Speech — was it really necessary, in an academic lecture, to include this truly disparaging quote ? — Ger- many’s Muslims have always emphasized that they regard themselves as part of this society.

Mißfelder The leaders of associations of German Muslims, with whom we politicians have Not all Muslims are moderates contact, mostly represent moderate positions. However, many movements and developments in Germany’s Muslim community are not included in these official associations. What takes place outside these structures is shown, for example, in the Annual Reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and it is worrying. Saying that is neither demonizing nor generalizing. It is simply realistic.

Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests 46 German security policy is a policy for peace and freedom; the values of the Basic Law and international law constitute the foundation of our actions.

Schlie

2. Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests

Let us now turn to analyzing Germany’s foreign policy interests. Ulrich Schlie, de Weck Director of Policy Planning in the Defense Ministry and production chief of the just-released White Book, will open the discussion.

Discussions of German interests are often unfocused and banal, sometimes even Schlie on a beerhall level. The 19th century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston once German interests are often answered the question of what foreign policy is: He could only say that one seeks discussed on a beerhall level to do what one considers the best from case to case, with the vital interests of one’s own country providing the yardstick. Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary under Margaret Thatcher and John Major, said the best interests are those that serve one’s country. All that is certainly correct, but it does not replace a definition of national interests. Frederick the Great, in his Political Testament of 1752, rightly observed that, “to act in accordance with one’s own interests, one must know them. Arriving at this knowledge requires study, collection of thoughts, and hard work.” German interests are defined against this backdrop of two basic questions: In which direction is the world going ? And, how much integration can we expect of our nation states without losing our identity ? In the first place, Germany needs its own identity before it can begin defining its interests. Charles de Gaulle once referred to an idée de la France that guided his policies. Related to Germany this formula could read: Germany must be capable of making alliances, helping things take shape, and therefore assuming leadership. The framework is pretty much clear: German security policy is a policy for peace and freedom; the values of the Basic Law and international law constitute the foundation of our actions. In the White Book we therefore differentiated between the goals and interests of German policy. The goals include safeguarding Germany’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, ensuring the safety and protection of its people, warding off dangers to the country and helping contain and peacefully resolve crises. The dignity of all people must be respected and the rule of law implemented. Our interests are defined by our country’s scarcity of raw materials and depend- Our interests are defined by our ence on exports on the one hand and its scientific and technological potential on country’s scarcity of raw materials the other. Germany’s central interest is therefore to see that European integration and dependence on exports and the transatlantic alliance promote the stability that makes free and unfettered trade possible, contains crises and conflicts, and abets respect for human rights and

47 Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests international law. In terms of instruments we require a comprehensive approach that increasingly integrates the military option with political instruments. Without the transatlantic partnership, NATO, the EU, and the UN, none of this is attainable. For Germany it is therefore of prime importance to answer the question of how to develop these institutions in a constantly changing world. Also, Germany requires a stable and constructive relationship not only with its Euro- pean neighbors such as France and Great Britain, but also with important partners of the EU such as Russia and Ukraine. The effects of change in global politics and multiple integration in multilateral associations, each of which must struggle with their own problems, restrict Germany’s scope of movement in foreign policy and its possibilities for assuming leadership. Allow me to conclude with a list of national interests. It comes from Denis MacShane, former British Minister of State for Europe and reads: “Prevent conflicts, promote well-being, no adjectives, no metaphors about punching weight, no false fights between Europe and the United States, no Palmerstonian distinction between allies and interest, and above all, no dichotomy between realism and idealism”.

Gujer At debates over national interests in both Germany and Russia one always hears the question, “Why is it always the others who succeed in defining and asserting their national interests ?” Germany has furthered its With this kind of negative self-image, Germany is hiding its own light under national interests quite adroitly a bushel. By favoring an indirect approach and veiling its own national interests, Germany has actually furthered its national interests quite adroitly. The best example of that was the diplomatic preparation and safeguarding of reunification.

Stein “Germany’s interests” have never been the subject of discussion as often as in A Congo mission is not in the EU’s recent years. Just think of former Defense Minister Peter Struck’s now-famous interests just because a member state remark that Germany’s interests would be defended “in the Hindu Kush.” In my has interests in the Congo opinion a foreign policy approach in which Germany, as the chancellor recently said in connection with the Lebanon mission, merely “does its share,” does not go far enough. That just lets others define the goals while leaving yourself to always react to events or, more precisely, thinking you have to react in a certain way. I would welcome seeing the EU member states explicitly define their interests and then stand up for them. To my mind, a mission in the Congo is not in the EU’s interest just because a member state has national interests there.

Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests 48 We must muster the courage to raise topics such as Iran and Iraq within NATO.

Ischinger

A group of Princeton scholars recently noted that for the past five years, the US Hoagland has followed a threat-based foreign policy, rather than an interest-based foreign policy. Whether Democrats have battled the Republicans on the United States’ lack of safety, or Republicans the Democrats on their weakness in confronting international terrorism, the only question is which party is at fault. It is refreshing to hear Germans talk about an interest-based foreign policy without any shame.

Foreign policy interests can be defined only in definite situations, and only there Ischinger does one progress from banal abstractions to the necessity of making difficult political decisions. For example, Germany sees the safeguarding of Israel’s right to exist as a cen- Does Germany know how exactly tral moral and political priority. What does this gratuitous expression of intent it wants to defend Israel’s right mean ? Take the following, purely hypothetical scenario: In 2010, a new Mideast to exist against concrete threats ? war breaks out and Germany declares its solidarity with Israel. The declaration is implemented, as in the past, by the delivery of defensive missile systems. The new nuclear power and enemy of Israel in the region that has by then acquired long-range ballistic missiles, threatens to attack Germany. Do German politicians really know how they would react in that kind of situation ? What connections, obligations, partnerships, or treaty clauses would be activated ? One conclusion would be that, despite all the EU’s progress in the area of security policy, NATO remains irreplaceable. We must therefore muster the courage to raise topics such as Iran and Iraq within NATO. Another example: One of Germany’s chief interests is the success of European integration. Can Germany influence the Europe debate in other EU countries and help the constitution stand a realistic chance in Euroskeptic countries such as France, the Netherlands, or — more explosively — in Britain ? Translating an abstract commitment to Europe into concrete action requires difficult political decisions. I can think of only one way for Britain. The new Conservative leader, David Cameron, has announced an ambitious program in climate and immigration policy. If Germany wants an EU-friendly Britain, we should encourage Labour to point out to Cameron that he can reach his goals only within the transnational framework of the EU. Are we prepared to do that ? Or is our commitment to the EU more abstract ? If not, how do we intend on working toward the goal of helping the EU constitution succeed ?

It is an illusion to believe that foreign policy interests can be nailed down by com- Bertram posing extensive strategy papers. There exists a core tenet that can be expressed in

49 Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests a few words, namely in Germany’s case “never again on our own” — which helped beget the EU — and second “as much international order as possible” — expressed in support for the UN, NATO, and the transatlantic partnership. All else is defined through the conflict of priorities in concrete circumstances.

Ederer The discussion of foreign policy interests should envisage fewer abstract defini- The discussion of foreign policy interests tions and more concrete problems. It is not difficult to design a matrix of interests should envisage fewer abstract definitions at the national or European level and win over the public for things like European and more concrete problems integration, transatlantic cooperation, and coping with international challenges through the United Nations. Differences in opinion appear once priorities must be laid down, interests weighed off against one another, and opposing concepts coordinated.

Ischinger Until 1990 German foreign policy had a truly simple guideline: change the status quo. Yet Germany could not actively pursue that objective. Therefore German foreign policy committed itself to strengthening multilateral structures and institutions such as the EC, NATO, the UN, and the CSCE. These could promise stability and dialog, thereby contributing to conflict resolution and long-term change in the status quo. Since 1990, however, Germany has itself become a status-quo country. The stable situation in Europe’s center has permitted Germany to develop, for the first time, policies to exert influence beyond its immediate neighborhood.

Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests 50 IV. Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West”

Germany’s foreign policy is embedded in a web of multilateral contexts, from the de Weck EU to NATO and the United Nations. To what extent is Germany’s multilateral integration in its own best interest ? Or, how much does it obstruct Germany from asserting these interests ?

1. Multilateralism

It is not difficult to define, assert, and defend one’s national interests unilater- Goulard ally. The real challenge is to realize interests multilaterally. No country, neither Germany nor France, the United States or China will manage to accomplish much alone against the challenges that will face humanity in the future, such as climate change, migration, or terrorism. The EU is an experimental model for the future. The EU founders’ programmatic statements show that they did not want only to resolve internal conflicts or problems. They regarded their task as a civilizing one with an eye to all of humanity, seeking nothing less than making world peace come true. Paul-Henri Spaak’s 1956 report on the preparation of the Treaties of Rome formulates the idea of globalization avant la lettre, including in the sense that the centrality of national interests in the formation of politics must be overcome. Germany’s role is defined not by the twelve years of Nazism, but by what Germany took the lead in restricting came afterwards. Proceeding from the nadir of their own country’s destruction nation states’ national might and a catastrophe of the national idea, the Germans built up a sound democratic through multilateral cooperation polity and truly accepted multilateralism. The fact that a country with as great a history as Germany could accomplish that is of fundamental significance. In his famous Zurich speech in 1946, Churchill not only said that Germany and France must cooperate in reforming Europe, but that they would also have to work together with the smaller states. By restricting its own might through multilateral cooperation, Germany took the lead in something that the United States, too, will not avoid.

As far as multilateralism goes, as an Israeli I am excluded from many structures. Stein The way I would put it is that Germany’s commitment to multilateralism could also be explained by the conviction that it could best assert its interests within a multilateral framework.

51 Multilateralism The framework of action for pursuing our national interests, meaning securing our way of life, is the United Nations, the EU, and NATO.

Hoyer

Reinhardt Anyone who believes that all the problems in the conflict regions of this world Multilateralism sometimes can be resolved through multilateralism might as well believe in Santa Claus. In means a lack of coordination … Kosovo, for example, one might have the impression that the main mission of the UN, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE seems to be to wrestle over authority and become mutually snarled in the resulting confusion. The picture is a sobering one, especially when one considers that all these organizations represent practically the same states. After thirteen years in Bosnia, seven in Kosovo, and five in Afghanistan, we still have no durable successes to show for our efforts, one reason being the struggle over authority and the inability to agree on a common policy.

Goulard Multilateralism may be compromised by human weaknesses articulated in jeal- … but that is no reason to fundamentally ousies and conflicts over authority, but that is no reason to fundamentally ques- question multilateralism tion it. Mr. Reinhardt is perhaps right to be skeptical of multilateralism, but in the future cooperation within international institutions will be the only chance to act effectively. Of course multilateralism was Germany’s only possibility of asserting its interests after World War II. But it was also the best possibility ! And it remains so even after German reunification and reattainment of full sovereignty.

Hoagland Every country has to define its national interests, but then it should act multilaterally in carrying them out. The USA have proven this recently in the negative sense.

Hoyer The framework of action for pursuing our national interests, meaning securing our way of life, is the United Nations, the EU, and NATO. One might promote additional institutions or recalibrate existing ones, but I wouldn’t know what other fundamental alternatives there were.

Seidenfaden Using the language of the business world, Germany is the largest shareholder of Germany is the largest the EU Inc. and therefore can both reap the greatest benefits and should enjoy shareholder of the EU Inc. the largest degree of identification with it. But the arrangement is equally ad- vantageous to the small shareholders: Our interests are best served within the framework of the company. The stronger the company and the better the rules governing it are, the greater are our chances of taking care of our interests.

Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 52 The UN must come to grips with elementary problems facing humanity’s future. von Weizsäcker

2. NATO and the UN

What roles do NATO and the United Nations play as multilateral organizations for de Weck Germany’s foreign policy ?

When the UN was founded in 1945, security and military issues were at the fore- von Weizsäcker front. The main objective was to prevent Word War III. Therefore the agenda and approach of the Security Council, the UN’s most important body, are determined by security policy. Today, however, the majority of the world’s population is facing problems that cannot be dealt with by traditional patterns of military conflict resolution — I will mention only poverty, imbalances in the global economy, and environmental issues. We must further develop the Security Council’s agenda and authority. The UN must come to grips with elementary problems facing humanity’s future. That, and not Security Council seats, is the crux of the problem. However, the absence of permanent seats for African or Latin American countries is quite conspicuous.

We must make the UN more effective by reforming its institutions while making Schlie sure that Germany is integrated in the decision making process in a way that corresponds to its political heft.

Whoever is in favor of multilateral cooperation should be concerned about the Hoagland inborn inefficiency of the UN. It is questionable whether a mere reform will create The UN should have been blown to the kind of impetus enabling the major positive changes in international relations pieces after the end of the Cold War which are needed today. The UN, just like the CIA, should have been blown to pieces after the end of the Cold War and replaced by a totally new organization. This may sound like a Boltonesque statement, but it really would have been the only possibility to create an effective organization.

Today we cannot overcome any of the crises we face by going it alone, either as Heusgen Germans or in the EU. That is why NATO always remains a decisive player we should pay our contribution to.

It is worrying to see opinion surveys indicating that NATO is becoming less impor- Schlie tant in people’s minds. We must urgently both redefine our military partnership with the Americans and push forward the political transformation of the whole

53 NATO and the UN We must ensure that NATO holds on to its capacity as an effective security alliance.

Schlie

alliance. We should be aware, though, that the European members of NATO are hardly ever in complete agreement. The East-Central and Eastern Europeans regard Russia as the biggest threat to their security, while Europe’s southern flank tends to focus on the Islamic world and Africa. We must ensure that NATO holds on to its capacity as an effective security alliance. Words must finally be followed by actions There are often huge gaps between the aspirations and reality of multilateral in EU security politics integration, and especially in security policy. The NATO Response Force is often held up as a prime example of joint security policy, but in reality, despite 1.4 million soldiers in Europe, the force is unable to meet its designated strength of 25,000 troops. It’s not just a matter of defense budget percentages of total state expenditures or GDP, but also of what expertise we have developed. Do the states have access to effective intelligence services, for example ? Words must finally be followed by actions in EU security policy.

3. The Transatlantic Partnership and the “New West”

de Weck How should the transatlantic partnership develop ? In what ways can the Euro- Atlantic partners best adapt to today’s world and its challenges ?

Hoagland What are the implications of the new security threats for Germany’s foreign policy within the Euro-Atlantic context ? The US is increasingly relaxed The US is increasingly relaxed regarding European integration. One hears lit- regarding European integration tle talk in Washington today about Old Europe versus New Europe. The US sees with satisfaction Romania and Bulgaria join the EU of 27 and is relieved that Euro- pean troops carry the main burdens in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. While it is concerned about the negative aspects of the EU debate on Turkey, Washington has also gained a better understanding of how huge a cultural and economic challenge a Turkish accession would be for Europe. Many Americans believe that the EU has gone as far as it can for the time being with respect to further integration and to expansion. New impetus will be needed on both fronts, not just one. With a mixture of hope and apprehension the US observes the increased willingness of European powers to be involved through NATO in the war against terrorist networks in Afghanistan and through the UN to help stabilize Lebanon, send peacekeepers to the Congo and perhaps to Darfur. The biggest change has occurred in Germany, which now sees forward-deployed security that establishes a security perimeter abroad as being in its best interest. This watershed was evi-

Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 54 The model of the future will be a consortium of major European powers working in concert with the United States.

Hoagland

denced first in Kosovo and spurred by 9/11 and the campaign in Afghanistan. More recently, the collapse of the Middle East peace process and the destructive Israeli-Hezbollah war in Lebanon have brought home the dangers creeping toward Europe. So have the American problems in Iraq. The theological opposition to a substantial European defense and security The theological opposition to a identity has waned. On both sides of the Atlantic, differences over Iraq are subsid- substantial European defense and ing as a sense of being in the same boat grows again. security identity in the US has waned So which policy should Germany pursue to promote its interests in the non- polar world ? It will not be an easy question to answer. Germany will not have a natural partner in promoting an ambitious European agenda. Neither France, its former main partner, nor Britain, nor Italy, will substantially support the serious transformation of the EU that Germany would like to accomplish during its presidency. Is Germany prepared to go the way all alone ? Perhaps greater opportunities for German leadership lie in helping define what I would call the New West. I believe that the model of the future will be a consortium of major European powers working in concert with the United States, rather than a stifling US dominance of a coalition of the willing, and rather than a further strengthening of the EU common security and defense structure. The EU CFSP was developed in a Cold War mindset. Today, balancing the United States is hardly worth the effort, and certainly not responsive to the three big challenges in the non-polar world. The New West will have to address issues raised by the emergence of asym- A New West will have to master metric warfare: How to master the challenges of al-Qaeda and associated networks the challenges of al-Qaeda in in accordance with international law. We have seen a bitter discussion about the accordance with international law … Geneva Convention and the interrogation of terror suspects in the US recently, unfortunately not in a reasoned but in a political way. The New West must be a forum where the US and its European partners jointly develop an appropriate response to the changes of the non-polar world. Europe must join the debate constructively instead of decrying America’s violation of the Holy Grail of the Geneva Conven- tion. In return, Washington will be comfortable with Europeans and particularly Germany taking on a leadership role in developing and adapting conventions and international law to reflect today’s changed world. Defining a New West cannot be limited to the usual suspects of Western Eu- … and therefore should not be limited rope and North America. We have to focus on democracies which are evolving into to Western Europe and North America the direction of having a distinct strategic culture. That is a development which is noticeable in the cases of both Japan and India. Despite earlier reservations, Japan

55 The Transatlantic Partnership and the “New West” The foreign policy of the Bush administration is a major threat to Euro-Atlantic solidarity.

Arbatova

has clearly taken on a greater military responsibility since 9/11. And whereas India has long had a strategic culture, it used to be targeted in other directions. Now the country is in the process of becoming one of the most important strategic partners of NATO, even if not in treaty terms. As we all address more clearly and consistently the extent to which we face common dangers and common tactics on the part of the enemy in the War against Terror, this might lead to the foundation of a common strategic culture. It is possible that we are still decades away from achieving that goal, but we should start to take it into account.

Hoyer The idea of a “New West” in this age of globalization is an exciting one. Common The idea of a New West is exciting … values connect Europe, the US, and some other states, even if the old adhesives of the Cold War era no longer bond as strongly as they once did. … yet we cannot allow a hierarchy of major Yet we cannot allow a hierarchy of major players and minor states to arise players and minor states within the EU within the EU. That would mean throwing overboard the incomparable success story of the EU, which was based on equal communication between big and small. It would also be devastating in a time when even the Americans have stopped talking about “coalitions of the willing” and once again place more store in multilateral institutions. For the West I would emphasize, besides the confident defense of its values, that it exercises modesty in asserting these values in other parts of the world. Con- cepts like nation building resemble blueprints in avant-garde architecture firms. Programs without respect for cultural realities belong in the dustbin.

Arbatova The foreign policy of the Bush administration is a major threat to Euro-Atlantic Clinton lost Russia and Bush is losing Europe solidarity which used to be a cornerstone of stability. While President Clinton was accused of having lost Russia, President Bush’s unilateralism and wedge-driving policy might be seen as responsible for losing Europe. The Iraq war is not so much proof of a failure of the European Security and Defense Policy but of an expanding breach between political cultures. Security strategies depend on agreed definitions of threats, principles, means, and allies. The US and Europe agree only about common threats, but increasingly disagree about principles, means, and allies. The European experience of wars, hardship and bloodshed has created an approach based on tolerance, compromise, and negotiation. The US is far away from that. The joint declaration of Germany, France, and Russia of February 2003 highlighted the overcoming of fixed Cold War relationships. The three dismissed the

Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 56 use of force as a legitimate method in the case of Iraq. The dividing line went not between the East and the West, but inside the Euro-Atlantic society. This is often seen as problematic by Germans but it was a positive example of engaging Russia on behalf of Germany and, in this sense, a real model for the future.

Europe and North America are still perceived as “the West” in the globalized von Weizsäcker world, and I hope that remains so. Yet there is a great amount of friction in the transatlantic relationship. Absurd phrases such as “alliance of the willing” are harbingers of a new, disturbing American attitude toward its European partners. Happily though, these tendencies seem to be swinging back in the other direction at the moment. Also worth remembering is Washington’s curious advice to the EU to admit Georgia, Israel, or Palestine as members as soon as possible. We must discuss our differing viewpoints far more actively within the trans- The way America deals with atlantic partnership, seek out common ground, and develop new approaches. We terror suspects is not acceptable … have to do this regarding the Mideast conflict and especially regarding Iran and Syria. The same goes for the fight against terrorism. The transatlantic partners agree that this struggle must be fought with the greatest resoluteness. Meanwhile, however, recognition also appears to be growing that terrorism cannot be defeated by military means alone. We also face challenges in the field of international law. The way America deals with terrorists and suspects is not acceptable in the long run. Here, too, we must work together constructively toward a solution.

We need reciprocity in transatlantic discussions on the future of international law. Hoagland Just as the Europeans have to engage American demands for adapting interna- … yet we need reciprocity in transatlantic tional law to the necessities of a multipolar world and of fighting international ter- discussions on the future of international law rorism, the US has to take a more open attitude towards the International Court of Justice. In this regard, the recent decision by the US Supreme Court in the Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld case should be of particular interest even outside American borders. In arguing that the American government has overstepped its prerogatives, the justices did not only refer to traditions of American law like the Uniform Code of Military Justice but also cited international law, quite explicitly the Geneva Con- vention. This is a welcome stimulus for any future domestic debate on the status of international law in the American justice system.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., 29 June, 2006. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl ?court=US&vol=000&invol=05-184

57 The Transatlantic Partnership and the “New West” I suggest defining the “West” through the idea of democracy.

Stein

Stein I’d like to suggest defining the “West” in a broader sense than only through the The cultural gap between the US transatlantic partnership, namely through the idea of democracy. Should not we and Europe is nothing new understand the “West” today as the community of democracies ? The cultural gap between the United States and Europe is nothing new. It was simply swept under the rug during the Cold War while facing a common enemy. There is another common enemy in international terrorism, but this enemy is perceived in different ways, which is why differences become apparent much more clearly today. That becomes plain to see regarding the role of NATO, which was established as an instrument of the Cold War and has yet to find its niche in the 21st century.

Schlie The transatlantic partnership remains fundamental for German foreign policy, but it will change. The Americans will always have global interests but are very preoccupied with themselves at present. We continue to need America as a force in Europe, even though Europe is no longer the obvious strategic partner of America that it was during the Cold War.

Haller A common definition of Western interests reaches its limits whenever positions that differ in content are represented. There is a major gap between America and Europe in climate protection, for example, and in how to assess or deal with international financial flows which, moving completely detached from real economies, could endanger the global economy. The two sides have diametrically opposing views on flexibility of labor, exporting production to low-wage countries like China and India, and so on. Whereas the EU countries want to maintain their social model, the United States is much more flexible in that regard.

Hänsch The interests of the Europeans overlap with those of the Americans, but the two are in no way identical.

Crowe Mr. Hoagland’s concept of a “New West” is similar to the Old West, one in which Europeans are still operating on the Americans are making the decisions and the Europeans trail after them. In the coattails of the Americans foreign policy, Europeans are still operating on the coattails of the Americans, whether in support or, as during the Iraq crisis in rejection, but almost always in response. There are exceptions. The EU sometimes takes the initiative when the US shows a lack of interest, as in the case of Congo. But all-in-all the European tune is to a large degree still an echo to music composed in Washington.

Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 58 The Bush administration has served as a catalyst for the Europeans to discover that they have other interests than Washington.

Brinkhorst

We have to end the “America plays and Europe pays”-approach. In some regard, Brinkhorst the Bush administration even has served as a catalyst for the Europeans to discover that they have other interests than Washington.

4. Western Values as Principles for German Foreign Policy

What part should there be for values in German and European foreign policy, and de Weck to what extent do the European and American partners share common “Western” values ?

The term “the West“ has evolved during the past few centuries. The 18th century Stern origins of the concept of a “West” are closely connected to the victorious march of the Enlightenment, and thereby have profound philosophical and political con- notations. Sentiments opposed to the Enlightenment in the 19th century led to widespread anti-Western movements in Russia as well as in Germany. One of the Federal Republic’s great achievements has been to break through this fateful political tradition and so completely overcome this anti-Western sentiment that in the most important parts of the society it has utterly vanished. Paradoxically, the idea of the “West” finally succeeded in Germany at a time when the substance of the idea is in danger of being lost in our world. In various Western countries, especially in the United States, we see demographic, cultural, and political tendencies that point to the establishment of a new fundamental- ism — activities with anti-scientific tendencies that can no longer be reconciled with Western norms. The “West” is not something static. Both the idea and the reality are constantly in flux. And yet, the idea of the West constitutes an important, indeed an essential, pillar of our world view.

Interest-based policy with no moral basis is dangerous. Germany should also play Goulard a part in standing up for democracy and law as guiding principles on the international level. Germany’s recent support for international courts has put the country on a good course that it should keep walking down. The importance of values in foreign policy is another trump card for Europe The importance of values in foreign policy and Germany. Emphasizing and actively defending one’s own values is vital for is a trump card for Europe and Germany a credible foreign policy that continues to put people first. That is no nebulous or idealistic statement. It is simply realistic and concrete. If we do not live our values, if we just talk about democracy without taking people into consideration,

59 Western Values as Principles for German Foreign Policy we will fail. When people talk about a clash of civilizations, the decisive question is whether our values are important enough to us to enter into a critical dialog with countries that want to destroy those values. I am not talking about exporting democracy by force of arms or arrogance, but making the successful European model credible as a positive example.

Stein I, too, as an Israeli, welcome the democratization of the international community. However, we Israelis have made the recent, unfortunate discovery that democratic elements within Israel’s neighboring societies have not necessarily led these countries to discard their hostile stances. Instead, elections allowed radical Islamists to take power. Are the Europeans and the Germans I welcome demands for standing up resolutely for “Western” values. But are willing to make sacrifices ? the Europeans and the Germans willing to make the sacrifices that doing so entails ?

5. Should Germany Be More Engaged Militarily ?

de Weck Embedded in the European Union and NATO, Germany today is involved in military deployments to an extent that would have been unthinkable not too long ago. Yet its partners are demanding even more commitments. Must Germany beef up its military resources and play a more prominent role in this field ?

Morgan Today countries believing in the use of military force for political purposes are urg- We should make use of ing Germany to join ranks with them and play a bigger part in that area. Postwar Germany’s civilian expertise Germany has defined itself as a Zivilmacht and concentrated on building European and international institutions for non-military activity. I believe that we should make use of that. It is essentially these civilian fields, especially the aspect of economic prosperity, which will primarily shape the nature of the EU’s international role. Common diplomatic actions and even common military operations will of course have their part to play in the EU’s external relations, but the basic foundation of these should continue to be economic and social.

Stein Europe and especially Germany have become accustomed to taking part in peace- No peacekeeping without peace enforcement keeping operations. Peacekeeping is a noble pursuit, but what about peace enforcement ? Creating peace in the first place demands sacrifices.

Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 60 In the early phases of the Afghanistan mission Germany’s KSK special forces cer- Ischinger tainly did take part in peace enforcement. I had hoped it would be possible to speak openly about it for once, perhaps by letting a German officer give CNN an interview. But the SPD-Green government decided to keep this part of our foreign and security policy secret, thereby keeping our activities under the table, so to speak.

One reason for this discretion might have to do with a fact brought to light by an de Weck opinion poll conducted by the German military’s Social Sciences Institute in the spring of 2006. Only 34 % of those surveyed thought Germany should help other countries militarily, while 43 % were opposed. The institute identified a mood that would be called “isolationist” if the US was concerned.

I do not accept Mr. Stein’s dichotomy between peacekeeping and peace enforce- Reinhardt ment, because it uses peacekeeping pejoratively, in the sense that “peace enforcement is hard and peacekeeping is only for the softies.” We hear that from our American friends, too. At this point we should briefly recap history and recognize that in the past, Peacekeeping is the right Germany has done little good in the world by trying to assert its interests by approach for Germany military means. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, if properly understood, is an eminently sensible approach that we in the Federal Republic of Germany had to develop in a long process in close coordination with the experiences of our partners. We in Europe are justifiably glad that we have now attained the longest period of peace in history. We should consent to peace enforcement only in cases of existential threats to survival, and then we would also be ready to do so. However, such a situation does not currently exist, I am happy to say.

Would you then agree, Mr. Reinhardt, that there is at least a logical hierarchy Stein and that peacekeeping takes effect only once peace enforcement has taken place ? The question I was asking was simply of who should be responsible for peace enforcement, without which peacekeeping is not possible in the first place.

Heiko Biehl / Olaf Theiler, “Abgestufte Zustimmung: Der erweiterte Auftrag der Bundeswehr im Meinungsbild der Bevölkerung”, Information für die Truppe 50.3/4 (2006), 72-5.

61 Should Germany Be More Engaged Militarily? The Europeans must redefine the transatlantic partnership and overcome the old, convenient division of labor.

Gujer

Gujer I do not necessarily agree that peace enforcement is a prerequisite for peacekeeping. They are two sides of the same coin, of which sometimes the one side and sometimes the other is lying face up. The close relation implies, however, that countries should at least be prepared to do both. The problem of Germany and its military, however, is that it is not yet prepared for active combat duty in Afghanistan. Ger- many concentrates on peacekeeping in the north of the country while leaving the peace enforcement in the south to others. That is becoming a fundamental question between Germany’s ambitions and the resources it is willing to commit.

Bertram Just sending troops is no coherent policy. We see that in Lebanon and Afghanistan. Just sending troops is no coherent policy The Bundeswehr is more of a symbol there than an instrument for the implementation of a specific regional policy: It was sent to Afghanistan to prevent transatlantic relations from deteriorating further, and to Lebanon out of some nebulous feeling that Israel wanted it.

von Weizsäcker Still, it is good that Germany deploys troops to important international missions when its partners ask it to. We could not play an appropriate political part if we do not take part militarily !

Bertram Yes, but instead of having a strategy of what one wants to accomplish with these soldiers which, in turn, is embedded in an overall strategy, we act out of a diffusely mixed sense of duty and awareness of the expectations of others.

Gujer German security policy after 1990 was initially marked by a business-as-usual attitude that continued to depend on US military might while keeping its own military ambitions small. The Dayton Accords for Peace in Bosnia reflected the old division of labor. First, America’s cannons enforced the peace. Then, the Europe- ans moved in to rebuild the destroyed houses. This division of labor is no longer up to date. Since the mid-1990s we have been able to observe signs of American imperial overstretch, as Europe hands over most military affairs to the United States. The US failure in the Iraq war indicates that the United States is overburdened and the allocation of roles between the USA and Europe is obsolete. The Europeans must redefine the transatlantic partnership and overcome the old, convenient division of labor. How should Germany’s commitment appear in the future ? The focus of the discussions is Afghanistan, where the decision must be made whether Germany

Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 62 It is not the military’s job to construct legal systems or stabilize and rebuild countries.

Reinhardt

stays concentrated on civilian-military cooperation or sends the Bundeswehr into the more heavily contested south of the country. Some say that, in its own interest, Germany should withdraw completely from Afghanistan and other countries. Germany and Europe must also assume responsibility in the fight against Germany and Europe must assume terrorism instead of staying in the comfortable position of moral authority and responsibility in the fight against terrorism ducking away from the dirty work. The Europeans accuse the Americans of violat- ing human rights in Guantánamo and secret CIA prisons while seeking to use the knowledge gained there for fighting terrorism. That is not partnership, and it’s not a fair division of labor. It is simply a double standard.

We must embed military deployments into an overarching political concept. Af- Schlie ghanistan and other crisis regions show that, if durable success is to be achieved, military force must be combined with political instruments, development aid, reconstruction of civil society, and cooperation with NGOs. Germany can make an important contribution in this area.

German soldiers on foreign missions have the task of limiting risks to Germany’s Reinhardt domestic and foreign interests. They are not supposed to be good Samaritans in uniform or stand for a foreign policy that cannot be articulated otherwise. The core duty of soldiers is to guarantee security. It is not the military’s job to construct legal systems or stabilize and rebuild Military forces can only provide the ground- countries. That is what civilian administrators are for. Protection from crime and work for reliable civilian administration the safeguarding of an economic and living framework through a civil administration are fundamental conditions for freedom and democracy. If, after years of Western military presence in crisis regions, power and water supplies are still unsecured, one should not wonder why the public is no longer receptive to lofty goals. Military forces can only provide the groundwork for reliable civilian administration by creating a secure environment. The civilian administration must be established in an early phase of a peace operation because otherwise in civilian affairs we have no choice but to continue depending on the governments of these failed states, which are the wrong partners. We must completely rethink foreign missions and put the civilian aspect much farther in the forefront as the supplement to the 1999 Helsinki Civilian Headline Goals foresees. As soon as the intervention troops arrive, civilians such as police and justice experts have to begin work as well to ensure public order. That also serves our own soldiers’ security. Often, however, there is not enough

63 Should Germany Be More Engaged Militarily? money. Bernard Kouchner, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and myself had huge difficulties getting a budget to build up a UN-supported Kosovo government, a budget which we needed to pay the officials we had employed. Javier Solana told us the EU was not willing to provide the needed funds. It was finally the Americans who guaranteed our budget for the first year and thereby made our work possible.

Hoagland If the Germans conclude that it is not in their country’s best interest to be present in Afghanistan or in Lebanon, Berlin should indeed withdraw its forces. Otherwise, they will not stay anyway when the struggle becomes decisive. That was the problem with American military engagement in Somalia in the 1990s. Because we did not have sufficient perceived self interest at stake, we were not able to stay the course when real fighting erupted.

de Weck In recent years Germany has developed a willingness to make commitments to regions where prospects of success were strong, such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Congo, while keeping away from places that were less promising, such as Iraq. This selectivity has been a big success for German foreign policy.

Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 64 V. Germany and Its Partners: The European Union

1. The EU and a Common European Foreign Policy

One can safely say that the EU is Germany’s most important framework for con- de Weck ducting foreign policy. What are the prospects today for a common European foreign policy, and what should Germany do to help move it forward ?

A fundamental paradigm change has taken place within the EU. For half a century Hänsch integration was directed internally and gave absolute priority to establishing and securing freedom, prosperity, and the reconstruction of Europe. These tasks have more or less been accomplished. The main job can no longer be only to implement the Four Freedoms, get to know each other, and harmonize. In practical terms im- provements might still be needed in this place or that, but it is no longer a factor that mobilizes people, no longer a motive for European integration. In the future, vigorous European policy will be able to unfold only through the EU’s external definition of itself, namely by agreeing on a common foreign and security policy and, in doing so, develop ideas on how to come to grips with the effects of globalization. People’s reservations toward the EU will melt away when they see that Eu- The people want the EU to provide rope guarantees their economic, ecological and military security externally as safety against the world outside well. They no longer hope imploringly that the EU will support this or that small project in their home country. They want the EU for safety and advantage against the world outside. It is extremely regrettable that the constitutional treaty in its draft form was unacceptable to some countries. The constitution will not create a common foreign and security policy on its own, but it would at least provide the instruments which would allow us to finally arrive at a mutual definition of what European interests are. We must show stamina toward the EU. It will take years before we can overcome the deeply ingrained behavior, reflexes and reactions of administrations and entire member states and can finally work toward a common analysis.

When I think back to Helmut Kohl and the EU politics of his day, the contrasts Haller are glaring. In retrospect we can say that European policy in those days was very European policy was bold and vigorous bold and vigorous, and I wish it had a worthy successor today. The courageous in the days of Helmut Kohl project of Monetary Union was successfully pushed through with impressive political determination against strong resistance. I do not see anything comparable in European foreign policy today.

65 The EU and a Common European Foreign Policy Today European foreign policy Even after the approval of the European Security Strategy, when I look at lacks a guiding principle how clumsily the European contribution to the Lebanon peacekeeping mission was cobbled together, I see no real guiding principle that would indicate a clear, a priori division of labor among the partner states. The European coordination in the whole process was not particularly inspiring. I remember France announcing it would take over leadership of the operation and then saying it would provide only 200 troops. Then the Italians jumped in and then the French reconsidered everything. All that hardly gave the impression of consistent, thought-through European strategic stances.

Heusgen The Economic and Monetary Union was not built in a year either. It was the result of a lengthy process. In comparison, Mr. Haller, European foreign policy is not doing all that badly. Think of the EU’s advances in the field of foreign policy during the past 15 years. In the early 1990s the civil war in former Yugoslavia cost the lives of 200,000 people and brought 400,000 refugees to Germany. Europe was unprepared for that kind of crisis, had no instruments at its disposal, and could not prevent the tragedy. In the Macedonia crisis of 2001, which hardly anyone remembers today, a civil war was also looming, but this time Europe was equipped and could help prevent an escalation. Nobody talks about how much the situation in the Balkans has stabilized under the influence of European policy. Unlike Mr. Haller, I see the Lebanon mission as a success of European policy making. Israel’s Prime Minister Olmert telling Chancellor Merkel that his country hoped Europe and, above all, Germany could contribute to stabilizing the situation was a historic event ! Israel harbored huge doubts for so long about a possible EU commitment in the Middle East. The coordination among states over division of labor and contingent sizes was a prime example of the efficiency of EU foreign policy. When Germany could not take immediate action because of the Parliamen- tary Participation Act, the French, Italians, and Greeks stepped into the breach as a matter of course, so that the Israeli naval blockade could be lifted. Javier Solana took care of that in a few phone calls. Incidentally, we also owe possible progress in the Iran nuclear talks to Solana, who negotiates day and night with Tehran. We have accomplished a thing or two ! We have therefore accomplished a thing or two ! Of course we must keep going. It is very regrettable that we have not yet managed to give EU foreign policy more coherence through the constitution. I hope that we will make these institutional advances before all too long.

Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 66 Mr. Heusgen, you are right to praise Mr. Solana’s work, but let us be honest. How Goulard many people on the streets of Florence or Malmö have heard of Solana ? But that How many Europeans have heard of Solana ? is not what is important here. For many, the relevance of the EU does not depend on whether a European Security Strategy or adequate mechanisms for consulta- tion exist, but on the results of European foreign policy. Do we have influence as Europeans in Lebanon, in Israel, China, or the United States ? If the answer is yes, then our foreign policy has been successful in the eyes of the people and can bolster the popularity of the EU.

If EU citizens do not know who Solana is or what he achieves, then the fault Crowe lies with the member states. Solana is exactly what they allow him to be. I have worked with Solana and I know that, confronted with enormous structural difficulties, he has done a heroic job.

I am concerned about how people regard Europe’s disunity. In his interview in Goulard Spiegel magazine, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad referred only to “the Europeans” instead of “Europe” or the EU. I would wish that Tehran could identify very clearly what the EU is and what its attitude is toward Ahmadinejad’s policies. The United States succeeded in dividing Europe during the Iraq War. On the one hand the EU governments came to the conclusion that this kind of embar- rassment could never be permitted again. On the other, the voters of Spain and Italy made known that they reject their governments’ unconditional support of the Americans.

Those who see in the lack of EU coordination on Iraq at the UN Security Council a Crowe failure of European foreign policy may be justified but they overlook a key point: Neither the UK nor France accept that neither the UK nor France as permanent members has ever accepted that their their actions in the Security Council actions in the Security Council should be “coordinated” in Brussels. The UK has should be “coordinated” in Brussels always insisted that its judgment in New York must be independent. This used to be the French position as well — I do not know if it still is.

European integration requires that cherished privileges be relinquished. Mr. Crowe, Goulard if it remains British and French policy that matters before the UN Security Council are not coordinated in Brussels, then I as a French citizen vehemently reject my

Der Spiegel 22/2006 (May 31). http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/0,1518,418312,00.html

67 The EU and a Common European Foreign Policy country’s position. Anyone taking such a position should not talk about common European foreign and security policy. You cannot have it both ways, being both inside and out and have your cake and eat it too, le beurre et l’argent du beurre as the French say. We are here in Prussia and here one can certainly point out that the legal partnership of the EU also demands obligations from its member states.

von Weizsäcker The supposed British and French position against discussing anything within the European Council that is before the UN Security Council means that London and Paris can claim a standing right to reject debate. They have to say only that these problems are being discussed by the UN. That is no way towards a common Euro- pean foreign policy.

Stein It is a familiar picture, watching EU member states think only about their national interests during crises while putting European interests on the back burner. The Iraq War was only one example among many.

Crowe As UN Security Council permanent members the British and French often fail to consult their European partners when it comes to making important foreign policy decisions. During the Lebanon War, Paris negotiated the Security Council resolution without even speaking to the other EU member states (even Britain). The notion that the EU should speak (and vote) as one in the Security Council, or that there should be a single EU seat, is only conceivable once Britain and France are confident in the EU’s foreign policies, and the means of arriving at them. Until that happens they will continue to believe that they have more ability to influence international developments on their own in New York. Building that kind of confidence will take a long time between Britain and France, let alone among 27.

de Weck During the buildup to the Iraq War Germany and France cooperated closely and Germany and France cooperated supported each other in their difficult oppositional stance. Could that become the closely during the Iraq crisis … foundation for renewed French-German cooperation in European foreign policy ?

Goulard I hardly sing the praises of how the German-French opposition to Washington was … but this Iraq duet contradicted conducted. There should have been more coordination with the partners. I back the European spirit strong cooperation between France and Germany for example in the UN Security Council, but the Iraq duet contradicted the European spirit.

Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 68 The states must learn to finally let the EU represent their foreign policy interests.

Bertram

The German-French alliance in the run-up to the Iraq War was simply an ad hoc Stein coalition to achieve a certain goal.

As important as German-French cooperation is, the opposition to the Iraq war von Weizsäcker was no model for a coordinated EU foreign policy. In brief one can say that both camps at the time were wrong, one side in the matter itself and the other in its method. Even with the best of intentions, that is no foundation for European foreign policy.

We need the German-French bilateralism that was so useful to the EU in the past. Schlie But foreign policy also always has a domestic base. Therefore, if the German- French partnership is to continue to thrive, we Germans will have to recognize and consider French political tendencies and trends.

We should no longer see EU politics as foreign policy issues but as domestic is- Seidenfaden sues. Getting rid of the idea of the Union as a geostrategic alliance would allow The idea of a French-German motor the member states to form coalitions much more flexibly, which would be good. is outdated And of course such coalitions are not just coalitions of nation states, but political coalitions — this is precisely what EU institutions and the EU framework make possible. The last gasp of geopolitical thinking within the EU was the French-German “motor.” Historically attractive and on some occasions highly useful — but basically an outmoded kind of thinking within an EU within which even two or three large countries can no longer dominate.

In the question of EU foreign policy we are currently in the worst of all possible Bertram worlds. The member states have ceded too much authority to Brussels to achieve The EU could be more than the sum of much on their own, but in their nostalgic dreams of national sovereignty they use its parts when it comes to foreign policy the competences they have left to obstruct the EU from effectively conducting foreign policy. That they are still capable of, barely. The states must learn to finally let the EU represent their foreign policy interests. It is in their own fundamental interest to do so because when it is operating effectively, the EU is more than the sum of its parts and can generate clout from which all member state would profit. Unfortunately, we are still far, far away from that. I have always regarded the German-French partnership as central for the EU. Looking at the domestic political scene in France, however, I am not sure whether Paris could still be a partner in making the EU internationally more effective

69 The EU and a Common European Foreign Policy The EU needs to move beyond its by now traditional role of doing the washing-up after the Americans have done the cooking.

Crowe

through mutual forgoing of sovereign rights. I fear we may have to move on to the method suggested by Mr. Seidenfaden of promiscuity among partner-states. That will probably mean a great loss compared to what we used to have — the German- French consensus as the basis for an European consensus — but maybe we do not have another chance for the time being.

Hoyer If we are going to let the EU represent our national interests, we must make sure that that is what actually takes place. The WTO negotiations are in a decisive phase, but EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson appears to be somewhat neg- ligent in his responsibility for reaching a durable settlement.

Schlie Germany defined and pushed forward the EU as a decisive framework for conducting foreign policy. Franz-Josef Strauß once said that Germany cannot play a double role as economic giant and foreign policy dwarf for long, which is why it needs the European framework. That is as true today as ever. Yet Brussels’ excessive regula- tory zeal also makes the EU a problematic and restricting factor sometimes. We must overcome the crisis of the EU !

von Weizsäcker Among the population we are seeing on the one hand a sense of crisis because of Brussels’ growing power and the EU enlargement. On the other hand people want closer cooperation in foreign and security policy. Britain and France should recognize that the Hundred Years’ War is over and that the time of a new Entente Cordiale is dawning. That would also be advanta- geous for Germany. Wherever we cannot influence the French, the British might be more successful through closer cooperation. The value of Britain’s stock in Washington It is also time that people in London finally register that the value of Britain’s stock depends on its influence in Europe in Washington depends very much on how much influence Britain has in Europe.

Crowe The EU is legitimately proud of its response to the Lebanon conflict, but we need to be clear that although the concentration in Brussels played a helpful role in facing member states up to their responsibilities, the troop contributions to UNIFIL were not made by the EU and it was not an EU action. Individual EU member states have contributed to an existing UN force, so today there are Europeans troops in the Middle East, but not EU troops as such. The EU needs to move beyond its by now traditional role of doing the washing- up after the Americans have done the cooking as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ameri-

Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 70 cans want more European involvement, but if they mean what they say, they will need to accept and support the Europeans as they develop more of a leadership role, to take them more seriously and to respect them as partners in formulating joint strategies. But the Americans cannot be expected to do this unless Europe speaks with one voice and has a foreign and security policy that genuinely brings about the coordination of national policies into common positions. The European Security Strategy, in part a mere reflex to the American National Security Strategy of 2002 and to the Iraq debacle, does not meet this need. Moreover, to the extent that it does represent a common policy, it is based on the same kind of ill-conceived liberal imperialism promulgating the spread of democracy as a panacea to cure the world. Europeans must think through their own independent contributions to the policy process which, with few exceptions, has been a largely American monopoly.

Do Germany’s domestic political problems obstruct it from contributing effec- de Weck tively to European foreign policy ?

If historically the question was whether Germany will be a force of balance or Seidenfaden of imbalance, today the question should read: will it be a force of stagnation or In Germany and Europe a force for progress ? Unfortunately, in Germany and Europe we mostly see stag- we mostly see stagnation nation, even though the EU’s institutions are rational and would be capable of producing a balanced and thought-out evolution.

Becoming again a motor of the EU’s economic development would be the best con- Crowe tribution Germany could offer for the well-being of Europe. The Wirtschaftswunder played a key role in the development of a Common Market. Germany still has the largest economy in the EU and must make it a force for dynamism and progress again. We need a Germany that is both more self-confident and more successful economically.

Germany is the EU’s most populous country and has its biggest national economy, Hoyer but growth rates are hardly overpowering at present, even if minor progress is being made. We still have not overcome reunification. But only an internal and, above all, economic reinvigoration of Germany can help us to become a foreign policy motor for Europe. A Germany that constantly makes itself smaller than it is would be just as much of a problem for its partners as an arrogant Germany that overestimates its power.

71 The EU and a Common European Foreign Policy Germany should play the role of an honest broker, a competent deal maker.

Seidenfaden

2. Should Germany Lead in Foreign Policy ?

Seidenfaden What is needed from Germany within the context of European foreign policy ? We need German political strength First we need political strength and political will instead of self-restraint and worries deduced from a terrible past. Second, we need German creativity, new ideas, suggestions, projects uninhibited by historical constraints. Even in the field of foreign policy, institutional issues cannot be avoided, if we want a European position to emerge, and to be pursued in a consistent, constructive and influential way.

Bertram Would you call it leadership ?

Seidenfaden Why not ? But I would immediately add my third point which is that Germany should also play the role of an honest broker, a competent deal maker. Not because of its dark past or because being an honest broker is in the best Bismarckian tradition, but because Germany is the largest member state. Angela Merkel can become Germany is extraordinarily lucky to have a new Helmut Kohl as chancellor. a true European visionary. Angela Merkel has created enormous expectations throughout Europe. She has proven that she can arrange a good compromise at the very last minute as she did during the budget crisis. If she starts infusing ideas at an earlier stage of developments, she can become a true European visionary.

Heusgen German foreign policy should be centered around a very sober principle, namely that Germany, as the EU’s most populous and economically potent country, must do its share. The decision of when, where, and in what way should be based on thorough analysis of German interests and the risks of a concrete situation.

Reinhardt The driving moment of German foreign policy cannot be to just contribute to a task because that task has been given to us by someone else. We should not only want to go where we others want to see us, but coolly weigh where our own interests lie and what we want to reach accordingly. As far as “German leadership” is concerned, however, we should first agree on where our interests lead us.

Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 72 I do not want to adopt the phrase of “German leadership.” I insist on the simple principle of doing our share.

Heusgen

Why do so many associate the — comprehensible — demand for more German Heusgen creativity, the exploitation of our strengths, and a role as “mediator” within the EU with demands for “strength” or leadership ? I think we already and definitely practice the first set of demands. We are conscious of our strong points and the heft we carry that derives from our demo- graphics and economy. Furthermore, we practice all this in the service of the EU, such as in the Union’s budget compromise which the Chancellor helped to bring about in December 2005. Yet I do not want to adopt the phrase of “German leadership.” I insist on the simple principle of doing our share. What additional economic or political advan- tages would the formula of “German strength” bring ? We do not need it. I think the phrase smacks of hubris and I fear that its elevation to the level of foreign- policy principle would not only not help, but cause many destructive misunder standings.

It is an old tune in discussions of German foreign policy: Foreigners call on Ger- Gujer many to lead, but the Germans turn the request down, preferring instead to invoke the common EU foreign policy. Abroad, two different kinds of wishes for “German leadership” predominate, Germany leads … which Germany disappoints in equal measure: “Leadership through willingness to compromise” or “through modesty,” and “leadership through strength.” “Leadership through willingness to compromise”: When, several years ago, … neither through willingness the EU decided on a set of pseudo-sanctions against Austria because of the FPÖ’s to compromise … participation in government, Austria and, incidentally, Switzerland were let down by Germany. As an immediate geographical neighbor, Germany could have attempted to use its familiarity and cultural closeness with its smaller neighbor to direct the whole misguided enterprise along a more reasonable path. Germany’s services as mediator are likewise in demand in the area from Ukraine to the Caspian Sea. These countries hope that Germany could act as solicitor, if not for their accession, then at least for closer cooperation. When Angela Merkel demonstratively slams the door in Ukraine’s face even before Ger- many’s turn at the EU presidency begins, that is nothing like “leadership through modesty.” “Leadership through strength” is something Germany could demonstrate … nor through strength towards Russia. On the basis of its good relations with Moscow, Berlin should for once muster the courage to show the Russians the limits of their author-

73 Should Germany Lead in Foreign Policy? Please tell Chancellor Merkel that the European Union needs an ambitious German Presidency.

Brinkhorst

ity in the post-Soviet region. The deportation of Georgians from Russia and the abrupt closure of the Russian-Georgian border should not go unanswered. Un- fortunately, however, Berlin generally avoids taking clear positions in conflicts of interest between other states and Russia. The Germans prefer to hide behind Europe.

Heusgen Now that the chancellor has demonstrated the leadership so often demanded by publicly stating that she opposes EU membership for Ukraine for the time being, everyone descends on her. Her rejection of Ukrainian accession in the near future means that deepening should have priority over visions of enlargement and that the constitution remains an important goal.

Chizhov Let me offer a small comment from a big country that does not have to worry about bigger neighbors. “Leadership” was mentioned several times today — during my time in Brussels as Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the EU I almost forgot that the word exists. With the exception of occasional transatlantic visitors, it is very rarely invoked there. We need leadership of Europe as a whole I welcome the notion, but in my eyes we need leadership not of individual countries, even as important as Germany, but of Europe as a whole. Europe is not always showing its leadership on the international stage even though the continent is destined to become one of the major poles of influence in an emerging multipolar world. So many partners hope that Germany during its upcoming EU presidency will show leadership in bringing about European leadership.

Hoagland Germany is a country where being accused of leadership is something that can be seen as negative while the US has recently taken to an extreme the opposite of modesty.

de Weck Our discussion has made clear that leadership, which I would define more mod- estly in German as Federführung (coordination), is expected of Germany. German coordination can be observed in Russian-European relations and, to an extent, in European efforts to broker a solution to the Iran crisis. In these examples German foreign policy avoids all appearances of brazenness, maintaining instead a sense of modesty and proportion.

Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 74 The value of an EU presidency is measured in results, not goals.

Heusgen

3. Objectives of Germany’s EU Presidency

Mr. Heusgen, when I hear you state only one foreign policy goal, that of “doing Brinkhorst our share,” I fear that not many constructive projects will be pursued during Germany’s EU presidency. It sounds too much like “we are too modest, we are too weak” to be gearing up for bold initiatives. This lack of courage among German politicians makes me worry. I would be very concerned if the only presidency ambition would be “to mind the shop”. Please tell Chancellor Merkel that the EU needs an ambitious German Presidency.

I think that, under present circumstances, proclaiming far-reaching goals for Ger- Heusgen many’s EU Presidency would be counterproductive. What use would solemn declarations be, such as categorically committing Solemn declarations would be of no use ourselves to having a European Constitution stand by June 30, 2007 ? We do not even know who our partners in Europe policy will be, how France and the Neth- erlands will soon be governed. It would simply be implausible to announce a binding timetable for passing a constitution just to see it turn into a whitewash in those few months. The value of an EU presidency is measured in results, not goals. Instead of rais- ing hopes too high, it would be better to demonstrate that, in the final analysis, one managed to move Europe forward. I have worked for six years in Brussels and saw twelve presidencies come and go. Every one of them started off with a concrete timetable, and each was practically steamrolled by events. One can show a good presidency by succeeding in resolving the tasks at hand in a somewhat organized manner and giving one’s European partners the impression that Germany speaks and acts on behalf of all EU members instead of following its own national agenda.

Mr. Heusgen, you will not get through the EU Presidency with your minimalist Hoyer European policy. I can understand the impulse not to place the bar so high that You will not get through the EU Presidency one can only run under it, pursued by the hooting European public. But our part- with a minimalist policy ! ners have certain expectations of the German Presidency and are counting on our ideas ! Nobody but our chancellor is currently considered capable of providing the motivational push that Europe so badly needs.

Mr. Hoyer, the German government is not conducting a “minimalist” European von Weizsäcker policy. It is a sober one, and very rightly so. We cannot allow ourselves to be This is not a minimalist but a sober policy

75 Objectives of Germany’s EU Presidency pressured by unrealistic expectations, including those from our friends within the EU. There are already so many hopes and expectations riding on the German presidency that an overburdening seems practically inevitable to me. Defending oneself from that and reminding others that even a relatively big country cannot work miracles in Europe is no minimalism. It is perfectly appropriate to turn aside exaggerated hopes that do not comprehend the political situation in some member states. If we’re going to talk about minimalist European policies we should currently look at Paris instead of Berlin. The conservative presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy recently made sweeping statements on the frontiers of Europe and ex- cluding Turkey practically as a matter of course, while laying down a binding timetable for the approval of a “mini-constitution !” What should Chancellor Merkel do in such a complicated situation prior to elections in a neighboring country ? Simply send off the existing draft constitution to Paris with the request to “kindly vote once again, but correctly this time ?” Keeping the constitutional project alive Keeping the constitutional project alive and continuing to pave the way for is in itself a big task its eventual ratification by all member states is in itself a big and key task. The EU Constitution pursues great and noble goals. For now the EU simply lacks the structural prerequisites for implementing the epochal project of a common foreign and security policy. We therefore need changes as they were laid down in the draft constitution. It is also in no way a lack of vision when one reacts soberly and factually to a palpable change in Ukraine, as Chancellor Merkel recently did.

Heusgen Rest assured, the chancellor will do everything she can to move the constitution forward. It would be frivolous to think, however, that even if it wanted to, Ger- many could push the constitution through within a matter of weeks or months. Presidential elections in France will not take place until April-May 2007. Demands for a more “proactive” policy and attacks on an alleged “minimalist” European policy by the German government may sound good but they don’t help us reach our political goals, indeed they hinder us because they awaken false hopes and thereby ensure utterly unnecessary frustration.

Stein Is it truly realistic to expect that Germany will succeed in bringing Europe a big step forward within six months ? Progress won’t depend on Germany alone, af-

Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 76 The European model of international cooperation is the only way for Germany to remain relevant in a world with new centers of power.

Ederer

ter all. Attaining even a fraction of the hopes articulated here will be extremely difficult.

I have been in the European Union too long to expect very much of six months of Brinkhorst Germany’s EU presidency. But I hope that Berlin will manage to help the Union overcome its internal problems and stagnation because only then can the EU concentrate on its three most important challenges: One is energy policy. From a geopolitical point of view, we are really whis- tling in the dark in this regard in Europe, especially as far as energy security is concerned. We have to take urgent steps to create a common European Energy Policy, both in terms of energy supply/security and in terms of energy saving by individual member states. The second issue we urgently have to address is immigration, because this is very much a European, not a national problem. I felt bloody ashamed when the European Ministers of Justice again agreed about 10 days ago that they cannot agree in this regard and concluded that Europe for quite some time will not adopt a common asylum and immigration policy. Third, we are rightly fearful about the clash of civilizations. Unless Europe tackles this issue we will become irrelevant and history will pass us by.

During its turn at the EU presidency Germany will work proactively, not just sit Ederer and wait on the sidelines. That applies to the Balkans as much as to accession talks with Turkey and the eastern dimension of EU foreign policy — towards Russia, in the European neighborhood, and in Central Asia. We should not just talk about Euroskepticism and Eurosclerosis. The many Let us get our European house in order ! countries and regions eagerly seeking membership and the EU’s security and military assistance — the Balkans, the Congo, Lebanon — show that Europe is in demand. The EU has a good deal of expertise in climate change, poverty, development, and migration. Yet balancing interests within the EU is the best example of global domestic policy. The European model of international cooperation is the only way for Germany to remain relevant in a world with new centers of power such as India and China. And the extension of the European model in our neighborhood is the best way for the EU to strengthen its position. Let us get our European house in order, let us use our strengths and stand up for the expansion of our successful models ! That would be the best way to serve Germany’s and Europe’s interests.

77 Objectives of Germany’s EU Presidency It would be very much in Germany’s interest to more effectively formulate the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Hänsch

4. Enlargement or a European Neighbourhood Policy Plus ?

de Weck Let’s take a closer look at European foreign policy. Generally, enlargement is called the EU’s most important foreign policy instrument, but this instrument cannot be used towards all partner countries. With the European Neighbourhood Policy the EU has put forward a different offer, one that is designed to secure stability in the countries along its borders. How should these two instruments, enlargement and the ENP, be used in the future ?

Schlie People rightly feel cheated by enlargement policy. Slogans that enlargement and deepening could take place side by side were proclaimed since the early 1990s. That was never true and people have recognized as much.

Hänsch The EU’s successful history is based on accomplishments in combining interests, which is why EU consolidation must be given priority over enlargement. Instead of making the prospect of membership an instrument of EU foreign policy, it would be very much in Germany’s interest to more effectively formulate the European Neighbourhood Policy. To paraphrase Hamlet, I emphasize that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our theoretical integrationist philosophy. These include strengthening area-specific cooperation on the acquis communautaire, which basically means that, instead of conducting a comprehensive regional neighborhood policy, one concludes bilateral agreements with the individual countries, thereby establishing a network of treaties around the EU.

Ederer Europe is an example of successful “global domestic politics” in the sense of integrating and harmonizing the interests of disparate states. The EU should make a goal of gradually and incrementally anchoring this process model in its immediate neighborhood as well. That would support stability, prosperity, and democratic tendencies in these regions. I am not talking about a new edition of imperial designs by which the world should benefit from Europe’s example, and not about exporting a European norm, but about supporting integration processes similar to those in the EU in our neighborhood. Our Neighbourhood Policy should make use of existing structures, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The EU doesn’t have to reinvent the

Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 78 wheel of international cooperation. It only has to strengthen existing forms of cooperation and adapt them better to Europe’s needs. In concrete terms the task in the immediate future will be to develop a per- Any further concrete membership suasive concept for an EU Neighbourhood Policy Plus. In the neighbourhood policy prospect would be politically naive … the main task at hand is to overcome the binary logic of accession or non-accession. Blocking all prospect of accession for countries such as Ukraine would be counterproductive, but any concrete membership prospect would be both politically naive, hardly implementable within Europe, and would have hard-to-predict ramifications. The EU must therefore make these countries a more attractive offer than it … but the EU must make has been doing, one that creates the possibility of joining without preordaining it its neighbors an attractive offer from the start. The idea originally favored within the European Council and which is now gaining strong support within the Commission is the partial assumption of the EU’s legal framework, the acquis communautaire. If countries are ready and willing, they can adapt, sector by sector, in a transformation process such as in energy or transport policy, the internal market, in building capacity in the justice and law enforcement systems, or by securing eastern borders in return for visa facilitation. The countries would thereby themselves establish the conditions for conducting a more realistic dialog over accession in the more distant future. The EU would profit from enhanced stability and therefore a better investment climate in its neighboring countries. The whole package must be rounded out by an improved financial offer. The ENP Plus will be effective as a new concept only if we have something to offer. In a regional approach for the Black Sea region, the development of which is on the agenda, we should build on established cooperation platforms such as the BSEC.

Germany has stated its intention to further develop and intensify the European Chizhov Neighbourhood Policy during its presidency, and Foreign Minister Steinmeier has expressed the hope of obtaining an appropriate mandate at the European Council in December 2006 during his speech at the 35th anniversary of the Schwarzkopf Foundation in Berlin on August 30. We are looking forward to this German initiative and are sure that it will take Russian interests into account.

79 Enlargement or a European Neighbourhood Policy Plus? VI. EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space

de Weck An especially big and important neighbor of the EU and an important partner for Germany is the Russian Federation. How should Germany shape its foreign policy toward Moscow within the EU framework ? How should Berlin contribute to a common European policy ? I would first like to ask what condition EU-Russian relations are currently in.

1. The State of EU-Russian Relations

Arbatova Some say there is a crisis in the EU-Russian relations. If you define “crisis” as a The EU has approached threat of collapse, you cannot at all speak about a crisis since our interdependence a crossroads with Russia is very high and growing all the time. But if you define a crisis as a situation of uncertainty which could lead to radical changes, we could indeed diagnose such a crisis. We have approached a crossroads and it’s not clear whether we will travel together or take divergent paths. Under the worst scenario, relations between the West and Russia would be trapped between confrontation and selective cooperation, just like in bipolar times. Many European countries are prone to perceive Russia merely as a nuclear power and as supplier of gas and oil. If this approach prevails, Russia will never become a real partner of the European Union. The reasons why Western-Russian relations are at a crossroads are to be found in mutual distrust and in the lack of a strategic vision for the final outlook of Rus- sia’s position in Europe. Both parties are disappointed with each other. In the early 1990s, the EU expected Russia to become a flourishing democracy with a market economy overnight while Russians hoped that cooperation with the EU would deliver an economic miracle. Neither of these expectations were fulfilled. Democracy works only in a democratic country, not if it is imposed and grasps an unprepared society. That is the hard lesson taught by the dramatic developments which had a grip on our society since the 1980s. In his famous article “America and the Russian Future”, George F. Kennan predicted the downfall of the Soviet Union as early as 1951. But, quite lucidly, he cautioned his readers against expectations that overcoming a Communist system would automatically equal copying the Western model of liberal democracy. He thought that the West should engage a post-Soviet Russia not on the condition of complete submission to its own political model but on the adherence to three broader principles. Developing friendly relations with Russia, Kennan thought, was in the best interest of the Western democracies as long as the country would not become totalitarian, anti-Western, or neo-imperial. I think Russia today does meet all of these preconditions.

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 80 Lack of trust in Russia induces the EU to distance itself from its eastern neighbor and perceive it chiefly in terms of “oil, gas and nuclear weapons”.

Arbatova

Russia was in favor of EU enlargement in Eastern Europe because it saw such a development as an alternative to the unwelcome prospect of the accession to NATO. But these processes are not substitutive, they are complementary. It is now the predominant perception of our political elites that NATO membership has become a de facto precondition for EU membership of former Communist countries, even if this is not explicitly stated in the Copenhagen criteria. Applying this logic to the post-Soviet space will create serious crises in the relationship between the West and Russia. It is therefore expedient for the German EU presidency to work on a mutual initiative enabling cooperation not confrontation in the post-Soviet space. What is the balance sheet of EU-Russia relations ? We have the outdated PCA, EU-Russia relations are trapped the brilliant St. Petersburg Initiative, which cannot be implemented on the basis in a vicious circle of an outdated PCA and the EU Neighbourhood Policy that excludes Russia and refers to the St. Petersburg Initiative as a foundation for strategic partnership, which as has been demonstrated cannot advance within the present framework without major changes. It looks as though EU-Russia relations are now trapped in a vicious circle. The only way to get out of this vicious circle is to create a new legal foundation for the St. Petersburg decision that, if implemented could upgrade the level of the EU-Russia partnership and tackle other problems, the energy dialog and the CIS space included. Upgrading relations between Russia and the EU, drawing closer not only on the basis of common interests but also of common values, would remove or greatly diminish the chances of a clash of interests in the territory of the CIS (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus). In other words, the stability of greater Europe and the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation in countering new threats to international security hinges on how the “2007 problem” will be solved. Without a new legal form of relationship, the EU’s potential enlargement to the CIS space will be opposed by Russia, a contrast to her initially positive attitude towards the EU’s widening strategy. The future of EU-Russia relations will depend a great deal on what the EU countries with a long history of democracy want from a Russia still involved in the painful process of transition from communism that began only 15 years ago. Lack of trust in Russia, which can be partly put down to the legacy of the past and partly to Russia’s present development, induces the EU to distance itself from its eastern neighbor and perceive it chiefly in terms of “oil, gas and nuclear weapons.”

81 The State of EU-Russian Relations Our relations are solidly based on common interests and values, and normal disagreements between partners on specific issues do not amount to a crisis.

Chizhov

New conflicts between Russia and individual If this approach prevails in the EU, it will have dramatic consequences for Russia’s EU countries are indeed possible internal evolution and could lead to a scenario in which EU-Russia relations are trapped between cooperation and confrontation. Indeed, in the absence of clear strategic goals in the relations between Russia and the EU, there remains the danger of Russia being stuck with the role of supplier of raw materials and a temptation to use economic levers for political purposes thus creating the possibility of new conflicts between Russia and individual EU countries. If the EU needs Russia as a stable and reliable partner, there needs to be a totally different scenario, more beneficial to European and international security not to mention the European Union and Russia themselves.

Chizhov In the spirit of intellectual pluralism for which my country is well known I would like to disagree with Mrs. Arbatova’s diagnosis of a crisis between the EU and Rus- sia. Our relations are solidly based on common interests and values, and normal disagreements between partners on specific issues do not amount to a crisis, even though analysts have regularly been declaring EU-Russian crises for many years. We might not be moving as fast as both sides would wish. But if we were completely satisfied with each other, something would be very wrong.

Gujer It would be misleading to call the current differences of opinion with Russia a Worst-case scenarios are usually crisis. The term “crisis” has long been excessively used by the Russian side. Worst- employed to force concessions case scenarios are employed to force concessions. I personally experienced a news conference at which Boris Yeltsin predicted nothing less than World War III if the West did not change its Balkan policy. Remarks by Kremlin officials on NATO eastward enlargement were similarly hysterical. However, after every one of these “crises” it was possible to find a solution and return to courant normal, which is distinguished by the two sides being able to have differing viewpoints. One hopes that the West could make its position as clear as Russia has.

Schlie The European-Russian relationship could suffer short-term damage through a new EU Ostpolitik, an escalation of the frozen conflicts, and developments in Kosovo. Russia remains a difficult partner The European Union must decide whether it gives priority to stabilizing or for the foreseeable future democratizing Russia. The one option could certainly cancel out or obstruct the other. Stabilizing contemporary Russia means stabilizing a country that will remain a difficult partner for the foreseeable future.

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 82 The European Union must decide whether it gives priority to stabilizing or democratizing Russia.

Schlie

Western arrogance toward Russia is completely out of place. We must acknowl- von Weizsäcker edge the difficulty of governing this gigantic country. The Russians are again The Europeans have a fundamental clearly displaying greater satisfaction that the importance of their country in interest in helping Russia geostrategic terms becomes manifest as a result of this size. Yet Russia still faces a huge array of intractable internal problems. The Europeans have a fundamental interest in helping resolve these problems and not in weakening Russia.

The ghost at the feast at discussions on relations between the European Union Crowe and Russia is the mutual distrust of both parties. The strategic partnership will never work unless we find a way of dealing with it. How can there be a strategic partnership, itself a much abused term, with such mutual distrust ? The main burden of overcoming the distrust falls on the shoulders of the Russian policy making is simply at odds Russians. The nature of Russian policy and decision making is simply at odds with European principles with European principles of open and democratic processes and the rule of law. There exists in Russia today a connection between government and industry, between commerce and energy, not necessarily of ownership but rather of influence, which is unhealthy for every open society. It does not help that there have been some specific instances in which representatives of Gazprom or of the Russian government (all too frequently combined, symptomatically in the same person) quite openly declared that their energy supplies would be used politically.

2. Germany’s Role in EU-Russian Relations

What part should Germany take in EU-Russian relations ? de Weck

In the media these days one hears the catchword of a “new Ostpolitik” that the Ederer German government intends to pursue during its EU presidency. Three major projects involving the post-Soviet region have to move forward We need a coherent approach in the first half of 2007 — the successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agree- for the post-Soviet space ment with Russia, a progress report on European Neighbourhood Policy, and the development of a European Central Asia strategy. Given that all these will take place simultaneously during the German presidency, Berlin is attempting to integrate the innumerable concepts and instruments involved into a coherent approach. That doesn’t mean, however, that this amounts to a “new Ostpolitik.”

83 Germany’s Role in EU-Russian Relations I hope Germany uses its EU Presidency to strengthen the partnership between Russia and the EU.

Chizhov

Chizhov I hope that Germany will use its EU Presidency to invest its capital of strong Rus- sian-German ties into the further development of the partnership between Rus- sia and the EU. That approach was confirmed a week ago in Paris at a trilateral summit between Vladimir Putin, Angela Merkel and Jacques Chirac. The German contribution to the EU policy towards Eastern Europe should be commensurate with its important role in the EU, its geostrategic location and the high level of trust in its bilateral relations with Russia. This method proved its productivity in the case of visa facilitation: a bilateral agreement between Russia and Germany was followed by a number of similar accords with other interested EU member states and, eventually, an agreement with the EU as a whole. Certain EU member states are trying to link the development of EU-Russian or even German-Russian cooperation to a solution of their bilateral problems with Russia. It is in the interest of Russia, Germany and the EU as a whole to counter those efforts.

Arbatova The best framework for Russian-German cooperation is multilateral. For well- The best framework for Russian-German known reasons, a special bilateral relationship between Moscow and Berlin will cooperation is multilateral be rejected both by Germany’s and Russia’s neighbors.

Cichocki It is vitally important that a European eastern policy be suggested, conceived, developed, and implemented on a truly multilateral basis. Germany needs partners to really assume leadership within the EU. Who should be Berlin’s partner in rescuing the EU constitution or launching a new Ostpolitik ?

Ederer Of course Germany should move forward with its contributions to policy toward states in the eastern neighborhood in the closest collaboration with our Polish partners, for instance. Of course we must act in unison as the EU towards Russia. I believe that since starting my current job I have conferred with my Polish colleague Mr. Bratkiewicz more than any other planning staff colleagues. We developed our ideas on European Neighbourhood Policy in the basis complete transparency and a free exchange of ideas with our Polish, Baltic and Visegrád counterparts. I was recently delighted that a Polish non- paper put forward nearly the same ideas we developed in the German Foreign Office.

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 84 Any special role for Germany would come at the expense of the multilateral dimension.

Cichocki

Europe — and especially Germany — should take a significant role in charting Hoagland transatlantic policy toward Russia and the post Soviet space. Germany has enor- Germany should take a significant role in mous expertise on this area. It must now use it to define a strategy that puts that charting transatlantic policy toward Russia knowledge to active work.

Interestingly, there are many parallels among American and Russian ideas regard- Cichocki ing Germany’s role in shaping EU-Russian or Western-Russian relations. Mr. Hoag- land has called for a guiding German role in the “New West’s” relationship with Russia. As this position corresponds almost 100 % with Zbigniew Brzezinski’s ideas, it is probably no isolated argument but a consensus within the United States.

Mr. Brzezinski would be as horrified as I am to learn that we are in agreement Hoagland on a specific point. We often are not, although he was my professor at Columbia University and I have a great regard for his intellect and abilities.

Mr. Chizhov spoke analogously of a strategic partnership between the Russians Cichocki and the Germans. This idea of a special function for Germany in the West’s eastern policy applies not only to the practical question of what Berlin can attain during its EU presidency, but in the framework of a longer-term acquisition of functions. Any special role for Germany would come at the expense of the multilateral dimension. Specifically, that means this kind of relationship matrix would weaken the position of the EU. Both the Americans and Russians try to use the Europeans for their own purposes and I hope that Germany would refuse to engage in any such games. They would diametrically oppose the EU’s interests.

Does the embedding of Germany in the EU then ultimately mean that Berlin de Weck should be banned from maintaining special relations with Moscow ?

Nobody should play a special role ! If we are not willing to play together, disputes Cichocki such as the one between Germany and Poland about the Baltic Sea Pipeline are Nobody should play a special role ! guaranteed. For its EU presidency Berlin is preparing an “ENP Plus” to be directed at the EU’s eastern and southeastern neighbors. The point is to offer these countries more than previous bilateral agreements have, and to accentuate Russia’s role in the process. But the ENP must be a truly multilateral process, meaning more than an extension of bilateral approaches under an alibi banner. The Scandinavian and

85 Germany’s Role in EU-Russian Relations Baltic states, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland must have their proper say in formulating and implementing the ENP Plus in the east. Russia must learn to give Russia must learn to give all EU members the same rights. That goes above all EU members the same rights all for the new members in Central Europe and involves psychology and historical symbolism as well as problem areas such as trade, energy, politics, and legal standards. It would be better for all if Russia would stop treating the eastern EU states as instruments.

Hänsch The appeal against instrumentalizing the Russian-European relationship for national interests is directed not only toward the Russians, but also to the EU’s individual Member States, especially the new ones.

Schlie A fundamental insight of German foreign policy in the second half of the 20th cen- Bilateral relations must never come at the tury has been that there is no road back to Rapallo. That means that bilateral rela- expense of the other European partners tions with Russia must never come at the expense of the other European partners. Yet it is worth asking whether we must really go so far that nobody in Europe takes a special role anymore, not even in the dialog with Russia. Eliminating German- Russia bilateralism would be a loss for Europe, not a gain. Assuming that German and European interests are identical seems naive to me in this context.

Hänsch Speaking about relations between Russia and Norway, former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland once told me, “We will never allow Russia to dictate to us, but we never forget that Russia is also our direct neighbor”. Both the nations in Russia’s neighborhood and the EU should take those words into account.

von Weizsäcker With due respect to all justified reservations, even Poland and the Baltic States will Russia should be regarded as a partner sooner or later have to recognize that the EU is dependent on regulated and tension- instead of a potential enemy free ties in which Russia is regarded as a partner instead of a potential enemy. Our Polish partners did not criticize Germany and Russia over gas exports and a pipeline through the Baltic Sea. They criticized us for the way those agreements came about. It was unilateral conduct that disregarded European obligations, and was rightly denounced.

Reinhardt The topic of German-Russian special relations reminds me of a story from 1991. I was being officially received as the first NATO general in Moscow by the chief

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 86 of the Red Army’s general staff. General Mikhail Moiseyev confidentially offered especially close German-Soviet cooperation at the military level. He suggested reviving the secret German-Soviet activities from the days of the Weimar Republic that helped circumvent the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty. I answered that I would pass the suggestion on to the German government but added that I could not imagine any cooperation with the USSR that would come at the expense of our obligations to NATO. An official reply by the German government became superfluous when, a month later, the General Moiseyev lost his position in the aftermath of the failed coup against Gorbachev. Of course this episode shouldn’t be overblown, but Russia has repeatedly attempted to lure Germany away from its partners.

Many think that energy supplies are the chief motivating factor in Germany’s Gujer policy toward Russia. In fact, the Federal Republic’s main motivation for nearly The chief motivating factor in Germany’s the last two decades has been concern over Russia’s stability. Given the burgeon- policy toward Russia: stability ing Russian Federation of today, one occasionally forgets that many in the 1990s regarded Russia as a “giant with clay feet” or even an “Upper Volta with missiles” and feared instability there. The German-Russian relationship cannot be only about stability. It must en- compass values as well. The resulting discussion must finally be conducted more frankly and publicly, to support more comprehensive democratization for Russia and respect for human rights. Even though three consecutive chancellors — Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel — constantly emphasized that relations with the Soviets or Russians, respectively, might have to be reconsidered, the cautious approach always won out. Germany has often closed more than one eye, for example during the suppression of disturbances in the Baltics and Georgia under Gorbachev, or regarding Chechnya and problems with the rule of law under Yeltsin and Putin. Under Schröder this tendency was reinforced by his special relationship with President Putin.

The desire for stability is not the all-encompassing determinant of Germany’s Ischinger Russia policy. Certainly, since the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl there has been something like a philosophical underpinning to this policy. Parallel to the process of Germany’s westward orientation since 1945, it hopes to give Russia the possibility of opening up and overcoming centuries-old dividing lines in Europe. That’s assuming, of course, that Russia wants the same.

87 Germany’s Role in EU-Russian Relations The concept of Annäherung durch Verflechtung (“growing closer by interweaving”) is pure Realpolitik.

Ederer

3. Growing Closer by Interweaving ? Four Spaces and the New PCA

de Weck How should the EU policy of the future towards Russia look ? In concrete terms the Four Common Spaces await development and new negotiations are due with Russia for a revised Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was first agreed in 1997 for ten years. The PCA is automatically extended every year after it expires, but Brussels and Moscow want to place their common relations on a broader footing.

Ederer Towards Russia we support the concept of Annäherung durch Verflechtung (“growing closer by interweaving”). This concept is pure Realpolitik. There is no more effective way of preventing conflicts than promoting a convergence of interests through economic integration. Hurting one’s own interests when hurting those of your neighbor would be the best incentive against starting conflicts with one’s partner. That is especially true for energy policy. The Four Common Spaces with Russia, which are based on this idea of integration, must be better filled with substance and meaning. Too much remains on paper only, even though initial successes have been made in facilitating visas.

Chizhov The Four Common Spaces do not only exist on paper. A number of very practical agreements have been reached.

Ederer The successor pact to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia must be comprehensive, forward-looking, and equipped with a strategic compo- nent. After all, it will have a duration of 10 years. The agreement should place the principle of rapprochement through integration at its center and in no way have selective engagement of Russia as its objective. It shall seek a comprehensive partnership. The issue of values will also play a part. We believe that a strategic partnership requires some common values. These values are also anchored in the current PCA. However, complete congruence is not necessary. After all, we did not suspend our strategic partnership with the United States until achieving complete agreement on the treatment of illegal enemy combatants.

Chizhov We envisage the new treaty between the EU and Russia to be a forward-looking, comprehensive framework document of a legally binding nature that determines

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 88 goals and principles of Russian-EU cooperation, covers all areas and establishes a versatile, flexible mechanism of joint decision-making. We need first to flesh out the basic elements without including every detail. The new PCA should be a This framework can serve as a stem on which sectoral arrangements can be at- comprehensive framework tached in accordance with future needs that are hard to foresee today. As to the mechanisms of joint decision-making, the treaty should establish common procedures and replace the present situation of a very inflexible scheme of reaching decisions. The only decision-making body envisaged in the original PCA was the Cooperation Council meeting at foreign ministers’ level once a year. We have made some progress through a constructive and pragmatic approach to the provisions of the treaty, introducing permanent partnership councils in various areas of cooperation. The new treaty should go farther, because we are past the phase of having lunches to exchange views. We need to make decisions together. The only multilateral framework where Russia and the EU are doing that at the moment is the Middle East Quartet. In the Contact Group or the Iran format we are working with individual member states, not with the EU as an entity. Even the relations with NATO are better organized in that regard because the NATO-Russia Council meets at various levels and is capable of taking decisions, if only on a limited scope. The active phase of work on a new Strategic Partnership Treaty between Rus- sia and the EU to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement will take place in 2007. Although the negotiations will take longer than six months, its mode, its parameters, its base and its quality will largely depend on the first steps. In this regard we count on German presidency to give necessary signals to the Commission. Russia also expects Germany to play a positive, stabilizing role in designing the EU Common Energy Policy — especially its external aspects.

The Germans have had good experiences with their principle that foreign policy Ischinger should strive to create win-win situations. We should attempt to escape the logic of gain against loss, including in the new negotiation of the EU-Russian Partner- ship Agreement.

4. Russia and the EU: Rivals in the Post-Soviet Space ?

Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the states of the South Caucasus are linked to de Weck the EU through action plans within the framework of the European Neighbour-

89 Russia and the EU: Rivals in the Post-Soviet Space? hood Policy, while Russia is engaged through a different kind of pact — the Four Common Spaces. In addition to their relations with the European Union and NATO, the countries of Eastern Europe also have various ties to the Russian Fed- eration — through the CIS, the BSEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other multilateral platforms. Mr. Chizhov, is Russia a competing source of integration for the states of the EU’s eastern neighborhood ?

Chizhov Russia is a large self-sufficient country with its own views on European and Euro- Atlantic integration. In contrast to some smaller Eastern European or South Cauca- sus countries striving for EU-membership Russia is neither a subject nor an object of the European Neighbourhood Policy. As to countries in the Eastern neighborhood of the EU, Russia will always remain their immediate neighbor and share a great part of history with them, no matter how complicated some turns of this history might have been. Post-Soviet countries are not chips The EU and Russia should see these countries as our common neighborhood in a global power play … where the long-term and fundamental interests of Russia and the EU — having good relations with peaceful, stable and prosperous states — converge. Russia does not claim a monopoly on cooperation with these countries but welcomes cooperation with all parties that have interests in that part of the world, as e. g. the EU and its member states. The precondition of a fruitful dialog is that other parties also respect the legitimate political and economic interests of Russia and the sovereignty of the post-Soviet countries as full-fledged members of the international community and not chips in a global power play. … and they have the right These countries have the right to integrate into the EU — and that should to integrate into the EU not influence negatively the relations between Russia and the EU. It would be counter-productive to force countries of the former Soviet Union to choose between Russia and the EU. As we saw in Ukraine, this can destabilize the domestic political situation and negatively influence relations with both Russia and the EU. With regard to Belarus, it is sometimes difficult not to have the impression that EU’s resentment towards the authorities in Minsk has little to do with any lack of democracy. The EU has good relations with many states that have a much poorer record in that respect. The new strategic partnership treaty will lay down the modalities of Russia-EU future relations in the post-Soviet space. Eventually we will need to find a modus vivendi in a kind of integration triangle between Russia and the EU, between Russia and its partners in the post-Soviet space and between those countries and the EU.

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 90 We believe that the reinvigorated ENP will take into account the interests of all relevant multilateral structures, including those where Russia plays an active role.

Chizhov

We believe that the reinvigorated ENP will take into account the interests of all relevant multilateral structures, including those where Russia plays an active role.

The problem with “ENP Plus” will be that in many ways it goes too far for Russia Hänsch and not far enough for many EU member states.

Mr. Chizhov, I support your recommendations for constructive cooperation in the Ederer post-Soviet space, in the common neighborhood, as you call it. Yet we should never give reason for impressions that an EU-Russian consortium intends to decide the fates of the countries there. Nothing would be more wrong or devastating than the sense that we do not respect these states’ sovereignties in their entirety.

Especially in the Black Sea Region which has become more important for the EU Chizhov with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria on January 1, 2007, broader prospects for Russian-EU cooperation open up. We expect the EU to respect the regional cooperation which is already in place, namely BSEC in the field of trade and the BLACKSEAFOR in the field of regional security. Unfortunately some self-proclaimed pro-European representatives of the po- The EU and NATO should not cover up litical elites in the post-Soviet region have demonstrated an irresponsibly con- anti-Russian escapades frontational attitude towards Russia. Encouraging them does not contribute to European and Euro-Atlantic security. The EU and NATO have better things to do than cover up these countries’ anti-Russian escapades.

The primary goal of the EU’s relations with Russia is to stabilize the post-Soviet re- Cichocki gion, but many Russians, Europeans, and Americans have differing ideas of what that Russia is pursuing different goals than means. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has rightly demanded the EU in our common neighborhood permanent partnership links between Russia and the EU. Yet we should be aware that Russia is pursuing different goals than we are in our common neighborhood.

The stabilization of the post-Soviet space has been the overriding priority of the Hoagland Clinton and Bush administrations in their dealings with Russia. Eliminating nu- Reducing Russian influence in clear weapons in the hands of states like Ukraine and Kazakhstan has been at the ex-Soviet lands has come at a cost top of the agenda. But the reduction of Russian influence in the former Soviet space is an equally important point. But there are certain tradeoffs when you adopt priorities. Reducing Russian influence in ex-Soviet lands has come at a cost.

91 Russia and the EU: Rivals in the Post-Soviet Space? We have seen that particularly in the wake of 9/11. We may not have done a good job of finding tradeoffs for Russia in exchange for increased self-restraint in the post-Soviet space.

Chizhov You might be right in stating that the reduction of Russian influence in the post- Soviet space was a priority of US foreign policy — but I have no idea how that policy could be justified. America should be grateful to Russia for its important role in stabilizing the region and try to support that positive Russian influence instead of diminishing it.

Arbatova The approach to Ukraine will be crucial for the future relationship between Rus- sia and the West. The EU has to rethink its attitude towards the political situation in the country. Despite Western suspicions that Victor Yanukovych is no more than a Russian undercover agent undermining any democratic progress, he has as a result of free elections again become prime minister. Whether one likes him or not, the elections have shown that he actually has support inside the country which has to be taken into account.

Schlie What happened in Ukraine in the past nine months is particularly important. Mos- cow’s conduct toward the free elections in its neighbor and the way it influenced the formation of a pro-Russian government will have long-term consequences on relations between Russia and the EU.

Arbatova With regard to Ukraine, the main bone of contention between Russia and the West NATO’s enlargement process is the question of NATO membership. Unfortunately, the NATO enlargement proc- has provoked tensions ess has reached the post-Soviet space and that has provoked tensions. I hope that the EU engages in talks with NATO to encourage a more cautious process.

Chizhov We have to actively work to ensure the compatibility and complementarity of various integration processes in Europe. Soon we will need a mechanism to manage interaction between organizations such as the EU, NATO, the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The integration of post-Soviet I hope that, for example, Ukraine will at the same time establish a free trade states with the EU … area with the EU and a common economic space with Russia, Belarus and Kaza- khstan without playing off one against the other.

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 92 Some of the existing organizations have offered their input to the EU without … and with Russia must not receiving adequate responses. The EU has shown interest in establishing con- be mutually exclusive tacts with the Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO), perhaps because its member and observer countries represent more than half of the world’s population. But other institutions could just as well become partners of the EU, e. g. the Eurasian Economic Community. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), covering most of the CIS states, has had initial contacts with NATO but we would also welcome an exchange with the ESDP structures of the European Union. Some new EU member states promote the lingering notion of EU and NATO meaning a shifting of a dividing line between two blocs further east. These states believed that entering the EU was like jumping over a hurdle into a sort of para- dise where you can sit back and relax, but now they experience that life in the EU is not without problems — just think of Hungary. The EU would be well advised to make sure that the new member states do not declare they want to shift the dividing line e. g. from the Western to the Eastern border of Ukraine. That would be detrimental to the interests of Ukraine and the EU alike. EU and NATO accession are both based on the acceptance of certain democratic principles. I must say that I have the impression that sometimes the standards are adapted to political needs in a way which one might see as compromising these standards: In the protocol of the 129th Bergedorf Round Table in Lviv Toomas Ilves, the former Foreign Minister of Estonia, gave advice to countries eager to join the EU. Instead of knocking on the EU’s door too hard, he said, they should take an indirect approach by acceding to NATO first, because “the standards for democracy, corruption and similar issues are much lower in NATO.” Also we believe that something must be wrong with the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria if some of the new EU members states are thought to have fulfilled them. At a North Atlantic Council meeting at foreign ministers’ level in New York An accession of Georgia to NATO on September 21st, NATO decided to intensify its dialog with Georgia which is would affect Russia’s interests perceived by the Georgian side as a major step towards accession. Every NATO enlargement brings along substantial changes to the security environment but Georgia is a special case not only due to its geographical proximity to Russia but also because of the complexity of problems in the Caucasus. Georgia’s accession to NATO would affect Russia’s political, military and economic interests and would have a negative impact on the fragile situation in the Caucasus.

93 Russia and the EU: Rivals in the Post-Soviet Space? If the EU or NATO treat the post-Soviet states in the South Caucasus as accession candidates, tensions are assured.

Schlie

Schlie The enlargement of the EU and the issue of Europe’s frontiers in the east are closely tied to relations with Russia. We need relations that both organize and shape our common interests. Yet if the EU or NATO treats the post-Soviet states in the South Caucasus as accession candidates, tensions are assured. Of course, Russia cannot be given veto rights on enlargement but we must be aware of the consequences.

von Weizsäcker Caution will be needed in integrating the states of the post-Soviet space into multilateral Western organizations. I consider suggestions of accepting Georgia into the EU simply as utopian game-playing. However, negotiations over the more realistic scenario of that country’s membership in NATO must be entrenched in sensible relations with Russia.

Arbatova Russia was in favor of EU enlargement in Eastern Europe because it saw such a development as an alternative to the unwelcome prospect of the accession to NATO. But these processes are not substitutive but complementary. It is now the predominant perception of our political elites that NATO membership has become a de facto precondition for EU membership of former Communist countries, even if this is not explicitly stated in the Copenhagen Criteria. Applying this logic to the post-Soviet space will create serious crises in the relationship between the West and Russia. It is therefore expedient for the German EU presidency to work on a mutual initiative enabling cooperation not confrontation in the post-Soviet space.

5. The Frozen Conflicts and the Role of Russia

de Weck Georgia is a topic mainly in the context of the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that topic is hardly free of problems for European-Russian relations. Georgia is demanding greater participation by the EU in resolving the disputes and accuses Russia of pressuring Georgia unacceptably, while for its part, Moscow calls Georgia irresponsible in its conduct toward the frozen conflicts.

Chizhov We expect the EU and the German presidency in particular to develop a responsible and well-balanced approach to the so-called frozen conflicts. That means, inter alia, not to support proponents of unilateral solutions based on pressure and violence like those that can be found in the Georgian government. Let me just remind you of Georgia’s recent provocations such as reclaiming the Kodori Gorge

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 94 by military means and stationing military forces there in violation of existing agreements or arresting four Russian military officers assigned to supervise the withdrawal of the remaining Russian troops from Georgia. We expect an appropriate reaction from the EU to this irresponsible and dangerous behavior. The EU should also take a firm stand against the Georgian ambitions to disrupt Georgia is behaving irresponsibly the existing negotiating and peacekeeping formats. Tbilisi does not even try to conceal the fact that it wants to shift the burden of conflict resolution in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the EU and NATO. The Joint Control Commission is an effective mechanism for solving the Georgian-Ossetian conflict by way of establishing an accountable working group which would prepare a program for peace settlement on the basis of the existing Georgian and South Ossetian initiatives. Russia expects the EU to support the JCC. Despite Georgian maneuvers seeking to discredit and undermine the format we still hope that in the end a pragmatic and objective approach to today’s reality will prevail in Tbilisi. The situation in Transnistria is less dramatic and explosive than that in South Ossetia, but the peace settlement remains at square one since the Kozak Memo- randum was derailed by the fears of some of our partners in 2003. Also, the intro- duction of a tougher customs regime on the border to Ukraine for Transnistrian enterprises supported by the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) is seen by many primarily as an instrument designed to bring Transnistrian enterprises under Moldovan jurisdiction and only secondarily as a means to fight smuggling. Transnistria held a referendum on independence from Moldova and on forg- ing a closer relationship with Russia on September 17, 2006. The EU declared its non-recognition even before the referendum took place — wrongly, as we believe. First, it is normal for democracies to sound the opinion of the people on important issues. Second, the referendum was a reaction to the attempts to impose a unitary model for conflict settlement, to arbitrarily change security mechanisms in force and to put pressure on Transnistrian enterprises through the border regime. We believe it is not justified to disregard the result of the referendum. Objectively, Transnistria has better reasons to claim independence than e. g. Transnistria has better reasons Kosovo. Transnistria has no interethnic tensions, fewer security problems, a func- to claim independence than Kosovo tioning legislative, executive and judiciary, and, above all, a sound economic basis — Transnistrian industrial products are exported to Germany, too. We believe that if the EU simply declares that Kosovo is not a precedent it will achieve nothing but invite allegations of applying double standards — Kosovo’s independence will be seen as a precedent anyway.

95 The Frozen Conflicts and the Role of Russia In its statement on the referendum, the EU called for immediate resumption of the 5 + 2 negotiations forestalled for a long time by Chisinau. As a co-sponsor and guarantor of the settlement process, Russia is prepared to restart the negotiations. In fact, the referendum proved to have some positive aspects because it has persuaded Moldova to come back to the negotiating table after a long time of abstinence.

Ederer It goes without saying that we had the frozen conflicts in Transnistria and the Caucasus in mind when formulating the revised Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia. Mr. Chizhov, you rightly demand a constructive EU approach toward the frozen conflicts, but I would like to request the same of Russia. There are strong voices within the EU who say Moscow is practically holding these regions in the post-Soviet space hostage. Russia should not misuse Kosovo It is not helpful when the Russian government refers to Kosovo as a “precedent” as a precedent that could prefigure developments in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Transnistria. Re- gardless of my doubts about making this connection being in Moscow’s interest in the first place, it certainly has no legal basis. Security Council Resolution 1244, the role of NATO in Kosovo, and the Contact Group all make Kosovo a unique case that has nothing in common with the frozen conflicts.

Chizhov Russia is not trying to use Kosovo as a precedent for the frozen conflicts. We Russia only warns that only warn that others will try to do so. About 150 foreign monitors observed the others will try to do so recent referendum in Transnistria. The biggest delegation came neither from Russia nor from the EU but from Kosovo. They were there to find out how such a referendum could be organized. At the same time, people in Tiraspol, Sukhumi or Tskhinvali are observing the developments in Kosovo. Kosovo could serve as a positive precedent if a solution is based on negotiations with all sides and directed at something more comprehensive than unilateral independence. If that fails, Kosovo will be used as a precedent anyway, like it or not, but in a totally different context.

Schlie In Kosovo we will soon be confronted with a unilateral declaration of independence, to which the international community will have varying reactions. Moscow will try to use this development for its own purposes. By constructively harnessing Russia’s influence on Serbia we can prevent that from happening. Admittedly, this assumes a unity among EU states on this issue that we are still far away from.

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 96 Russia’s WTO regulations will be used as a starting point for a more far-reaching agreement on trade with EU member states.

Chizhov

I do not know whether we can or should anchor a dimension of joint conflict Ederer resolution mechanisms pertaining to the frozen conflicts in the new Agreement. I doubt that the required political will is present on either side or whether we have progressed far enough conceptually. Yet we are certainly thinking about mutual conflict resolution, such as through joint Russian-ESDP military actions. The technical hurdles will have to be overcome first. Currently the troops cannot be commanded by officers from the other side; the EU has the Madrid Commitments and the Russians something according. We must first resolve these details before defining a platform for joint political action.

In questions of cooperation with Russia the military sphere appears less than Reinhardt promising at first glance. The reason is the secrecy principle that continues to stand in the way of close cooperation. However, I can also relate an example to the contrary from my personal experience, which demonstrates how well and closely cooperation with the Russian military can function in certain areas. As commandant of the KFOR peacekeeping force in Kosovo, I had a deputy, a Rus- sian three-star general, who commanded four Russian battalions. I could discuss in confidence all issues of operational leadership and planning with him and he gave me real support. The daily cooperation with the Russian units — who didn’t do anything different than the German, American, and British ones — was completely unproblematic.

6. Economic Cooperation

Let’s discuss the economic aspects of the German-Russian and European-Russian de Weck relationships in a bit more detail. Russia is not only about to begin renegotiating the PCA, accession to the WTO seems fairly certain at this point.

We envisage something like a WTO-plus provision in the renegotiated partnership Chizhov treaty with the EU which means that WTO regulations will be used as a starting point for a more far-reaching agreement on trade with EU member states. But as long as the baseline is not clear, we cannot start to confer substantively with the EU on this topic. The controversies concerning the WTO negotiations lie not between Brussels and Moscow, but stem from Washington’s position. I am confident, though, that these problems will be solved soon.

97 Economic Cooperation Regarding open markets, The EU applies double standards regarding the opening up of markets — it is the EU applies double standards not following the path it is preaching to others. Recently, a new wave of demands on Russia to open up its energy market coincided with the statement by France and Germany that Russia cannot take part in EADS decision-making after Russia’s foreign trade bank WTB bought a 5 % share of EADS this August. Russia has no intention of Russia has no intention of maintaining monopolies forever, be it Gazprom’s or maintaining monopolies forever anyone else’s. But we expect equitable arrangements suitable to the necessities of our increasingly interdependent world. The involvement of the two German companies E.ON and BASF with Gazprom in the Nord Stream project is a good starting point. There is no downstream monopoly when Gazprom offers 49 % of its shares for sale. I see no insurmountable problems for future upstream investments of European companies either. The only condition we have is to get fair deals. Regarding the Sakhalin projects the ecological concerns are very serious. Be- sides, there is a financial aspect. Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II are based on a so-called “production sharing agreement,” in which a consortium of foreign companies invests into a project without any Russian participation and starts sharing the profits only from the moment the whole enterprise becomes profitable. But while the project is still far from completion, its costs has already almost tripled from the original estimates, so the moment when the profits will be shared is moving further and further away. When the Energy Charter was conceived in 1991, political and economic conditions were different. Russia signed the Charter in 1994 under the explicit reservation that the treaty would not be ratified until some specific deficiencies concerning energy transit, the protection of investments and trade in nuclear fuel were alleviated. Although Russia adheres to the principles of the Treaty, it still refuses to ratify it — just like Norway, Australia, New Zealand and Belarus. If our concerns are taken into account, we are very willing to reconsider our position. By the way, the EU has been engaged in lengthy, but inconclusive discussions with Russia, but concerning the other four countries — may I remind you that Norway is no small supplier of oil and gas to the EU — no similar efforts have been undertaken.

Haller If we take seriously the commitments to free markets enshrined in the WTO and other pacts safeguarding international investment, we should, in principal, not have any objections against seeing foreign capital flow into EADS. On the contrary, the stronger integration of these major international corporations of

EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 98 strategic significance might even be desirable. In this sense, the WTB stake is also the economic counterpart to the political attempt to integrate Russia more strongly and secure energy supplies from there and should be welcomed as such. Of course there must be guarantees that the two sides meet on the same level and play by the same rules, and aspects of security and defense policy must be taken into account separately.

In the field of energy distribution, reciprocity is an essential concept. The chair- Brinkhorst man of Gazprom, Alexei Miller, has requested equal treatment for his company In the field of energy distribution, in comparison with Shell, Total and BP concerning direct access to the European reciprocity is an essential concept distribution market. But what is good for the goose is also good for the gander and Gazprom is in no position to criticize European exclusivity as long as they want to keep an upstream monopoly for themselves. This ambiguity is detrimental to the development of a true and fully-fledged strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union. Only a multilateral approach and equal treatment can guarantee credibility in this respect.

As to non-discrimination, the British government, after some agonizing, decided Crowe that it would not stand in the way of Gazprom taking over Centrica, the holding company of British Gas. That was a fairly remarkable decision even given the Thatcherite principles that the Blair government holds on to.

99 Economic Cooperation VII. The EU’s Southern Neighborhood

1. The EU’s Relations with Turkey

de Weck The EU’s accession talks with Turkey are underway, not least because Germany’s SPD-Green government pushed very hard for them in Brussels. Chancellor Merkel, who entered office advocating a privileged partnership, must now continue the negotiations in the manner they were begun. What should Germany contribute to the EU’s Turkey policy ?

Dülger Turkey’s imminent accession will be a watershed revolutionizing the European Turkey’s accession to the EU will trigger identity no less than the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution have a Cultural Revolution in Europe done. It will trigger a third revolution, the Cultural Revolution. Germany, with its deeply embedded tradition of justifying the nation-state on the basis of cultural coherence, is aware of how fundamentally Europe will have to change. Hans-Diet- rich Genscher recently said that the EU prepared a hole in the wall for Turkey the size of a Volkswagen but Turkey turned out to be a huge truck. The transformation has already set in, because ever since Turkey’s membership became a real possibility, minds have thought about it and deeply engrained perceptions have started to change. The whole process of these discussions reminds me of two groups of people reflecting each other with mirrors focused on the others, showing what perception they have of each other. Turkey is a real bridge, not only between Europe and Asia but also between Europe and Africa. But it is also a bridge for another purpose. In Europe, the file of the First/Second World War was closed by European integration but in the Middle East, this file is still open and every problem is related to it. Turkey is the bridge between these two files. On the one hand, Turkey needs the EU: Some problems dating from the Ot- toman Empire still prevail in Turkey. To resolve them we need the cooperation and understanding of Germany and the EU. I would like to see Western European culture be promoted in my country and see a dialog between Turkey and EU countries, between East and West. Many people in Turkey place their hopes regarding the ideal of democracy on EU membership. On the other hand, the EU can profit immensely from Turkey regarding the internal review of its values and systems which also affect its standing on the international stage. Ever since the 19th century Europe has unconditionally promoted its fundamental beliefs of democracy and capitalism. They are the political and the eco-

The EU’s Southern Neighborhood 100 Turkey’s imminent accession will be a watershed revolutionizing the European identity no less than the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution have done.

Dülger

nomic principles responsible for its prosperity and liberty. But these beliefs do not apply equally well to all countries and to all times. Inside Europe democracy is promoting equality and human rights and capitalism fosters prosperity, but outside Europe, they often appear in the guise of political imperialism and neo-imperialism. By requiring democratic standards from small dependent countries, Europe exerts hegemony indirectly. Democracy is exported along with industrialization and secularity and is turning other countries into Europe’s slaves. Without recognizing the difference between democracy inside and outside, the EU will never be fully accepted on the international floor. Also, the realities of the 21st century require us to question some of these beliefs. Industrial capitalism and democracy, human rights and equality are no longer universal values. The difference between the West and the rest of the world is continuously increasing. While Africa is dying from famine, European farmers produce an incredible surplus of butter, milk and meat. The problem of redefining democracy and capitalism is one where the EU can benefit immensely from Turkey, and I believe this essential problem is much more important than individual Turkish difficulties like relations to Cyprus, minority problems with e. g. the Kurds or ecumenism. But no other candidate for EU membership had to overcome as many difficul- No other candidate had to overcome ties as Turkey. Last year, a Social Democratic member of the Italian Parliament so many difficulties told me that when it comes to Turkey, the EU does not care about the number of files that are to be discussed but wants to discuss history, identity and culture. The EU complains that Turkey does not fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. To the Turk- ish population many of these demands seem to be unjustified — therefore their enthusiasm for the European Union wanes. I believe in the European future of Turkey and will work hard for it. But we need a commitment from both sides to achieve this important goal.

As we all know, there is no such thing as unanimity within the German govern- Ederer ment towards Turkey’s accession prospects. The coalition agreement lays down that the accession negotiations represent a “process with an indeterminate result.” That means first that, in accordance with the pledges given to Turkey, the accession talks will be conducted fairly. At the end of the process the EU has the right to decide whether to offer Turkey full membership or a “privileged partnership.”

101 The EU’s Relations with Turkey We should not allow ourselves to be distracted by discussions about the EU’s current inability to absorb new members. When negotiations with Turkey come to an end, the EU will be different from the way it is today. The EU is a club with far-reaching Turkey must understand that the EU is a club with very far-reaching and and established rules established rules that one must accept in their entirety. Of course transitional solutions are also used to adapt some things to the aspirant’s needs. Yet there is no way around the acquis communautaire. It would unnecessarily burden the German EU presidency if Germany had to suspend the accession talks because of a lack of cooperation on Ankara’s part. After all, it was Germany that made a strong commitment to offering Turkey the prospect of accession. As for the Cyprus problem, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn compares it to two express trains on a collision course. In this situation the German government is acting as a discreet mediator that tells both parties unmistakably that they have to make some moves.

Dülger We know that the EU is a club with established rules we have to accept to be able to join it. We are working on this diligently. But sometimes we get the impression that the EU is pressing specific points with dubious motivations. For example, for centuries, under the Seljukid and the Ottoman Empires, foundations had been an established part of Turkish culture. In 1936, all foundations in Turkey were forbidden and their resources were confiscated. The EU is now demanding that this regulation be lifted. The problem is that the EU is pressing this point only in relation to Christian foundations, even if a lifting of the ban will actually result mainly in the creation of Islamic foundations. Suspending the negotiating process when a conflict arises is at odds with the European Union’s own credo of resolving conflicts by way of debating and not by confrontation. The negotiation process will inevitably entail some debates and some conflicts and our contribution to adhering to the rules of the club is by taking the idea of lively debates on open questions seriously. Those who rant against democracy and market economy in Turkey do not have a workable alternative but they are not isolated, they have followers. This leaves the supporters of Europe squeezed in the middle between the radicals for selling out the country and from Brussels with very demanding and tight calendars of making progress in the briefest possible time. Maybe the German EU Presidency will give us a chance to better explain this dilemma.

The EU’s Southern Neighborhood 102 Acceptance of Turkey into the EU would be a credible affirmation of the principle of cultural diversity without which Europe cannot function.

Kizilkaya

One gets the impression that the talks over Turkish accession operate with deceiv- Kizilkaya ing labels and dishonest arguments. It is completely undisputed that the Copen- hagen Criteria are non-negotiable as essentials. Turkey must implement them if it wants to be a member of the club. Increasingly, however, it seems as if alleged violations of the criteria by Ankara are simply pretexts that mask other motivations. What is being highlighted, in fact, are the cultural differences that, officially, are not objects of negotiation but are trotted out nonetheless to oppose Turkish accession. At least that is my interpretation of the rather phony debate over values that has been started, even though the application for membership implies a commitment to values such as democracy and human rights ! Whoever opposes Turkish EU membership should come out and say so instead Fake arguments only increase of using fake arguments. That only increases the mutual distrust. One cannot the mutual distrust suddenly slam the door in the face of a country that has been waiting forty years for membership with the argument that conditions have changed and now that twenty other countries have gained admission, capacities are exhausted. It is ir- ritating when one constantly emphasizes that the talks’ outcome is open on the one hand, but on the other the option of “privileged partnership” is pointed out again and again. That kind of behavior creates great unease, not only among Turks, but also among most Muslims in the EU. Acceptance of Turkey into the EU would be a credible affirmation of the principle of cultural diversity without which Europe cannot function. A “no” to Turkey would be a serious setback to the integration of Muslims and immigrants in the European states. The whole episode would be seen as a signal that the rules do not apply to all and that a different culture is principally unwanted in Europe. Yet Islam, which has long been part of daily reality in the European states, represents an enrichment to Europe, not a threat. In strategic terms as well, EU membership would lend Turkey greater credibility in acting as mediator in regional conflicts. That would mean besides the Middle East both the Caucasus and possibly Central Asia and Africa, and in any case the entire Muslim world.

The relationship with Turkey is a key aspect of EU neighbourhood policy, regard- von Weizsäcker less of whether or not the negotiations result in EU membership. The question of how to deal with Islam and the Muslim world has been oc- cupying European politics since the Middle Ages, so one should not overstate the importance of today’s events. Still, the possible acceptance of Turkey into the EU would represent an epochal change in relations with the Muslim world. As a

103 The EU’s Relations with Turkey The attempt to bring Turkey closer to Europe is a more sensible contribution to the fight against terrorism than the Iraq War was.

von Weizsäcker

former mayor of Berlin who, on trips to Turkey, was regularly welcomed as the mayor of the biggest Turkish city outside the country’s borders, I know what I am talking about. That is also why I was emphatically committed to having accession talks launched. One of the EU’s most important foreign policy tasks is to contribute signifi- cantly to understanding and coexistence with the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims. The EU has a fundamental interest in that; after all, it is the EU and not the United States that borders directly on the Muslim world. Regardless of how the details of the accession negotiations proceed, the attempt to bring Turkey closer to Europe is a more sensible contribution to the fight against terrorism than the Iraq War was. The lengthy negotiation process will itself change both sides’ perceptions and the Earth will likewise not remain still over the next fifteen years. One cannot emphasize strongly enough that the accession talks should be conducted honestly and with an open outcome. That means on the one hand that no one can enter into the talks with the position that they are about accession and nothing else. Con- versely, that also means one cannot say the talks can touch upon anything, but that in the end membership remains out of the question. This second variant would amount to a disinvitation of our negotiating partners. Therefore the long negotiating process also holds risks, because the way it is conducted by the EU side could provoke negative reactions among the Turks that none of us could welcome.

Hänsch I cannot comprehend the argument that the EU must accept Turkey to enrich Islam is already a vibrant part Europe by Islamic culture. Fifteen million Muslims already live within the EU’s of this community borders and Islam is a vibrant part of this community.

Kizilkaya The fact that 15 million Muslims live in the EU is no evidence by itself of their integration. We also have three million Muslims in Germany without there being a social consensus accepting cultural diversity. Accepting Turkey would send a strong signal of tolerance and integration.

2. The EU and Germany in the Middle East

de Weck Israel’s request for German participation in UNIFIL shows respect for German foreign policy and the fruits of successful confrontation with one’s own past. How do you evaluate the part Germany is playing in the EU’s policies towards the Mid- dle East ?

The EU’s Southern Neighborhood 104 Communication between the EU and Israel has taken the form of monologues rather than dialog.

Stein

The military commitment in the wake of the fighting in Lebanon gives the Euro- von Weizsäcker peans their first chance to join the discussion over the future of the Middle East with enhanced credibility. That is all the more important because the Americans, who are heavily committed in Iraq, have been acting quite hesitantly towards the Mideast conflict. The new balance of European and American contributions in the Middle East should also get fresh discussions moving about a common approach to the region. For both America and the EU, Israel’s right to exist stands at the center of Mideast policy. We should now attempt to agree on how to safeguard Israel’s long-term security. I think Israel must build up stable relations with Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian state that so far has existed only in rudimentary terms. Can’t Europe help persuade the Americans into a consensus that involving Syria would make sense ? Syria is not a clerical state and has no interest in seeing Iran’s influence in the region grow further. Steps toward Syria would be steps toward stabilizing the entire Middle East.

Although the EU has major interests in the Middle East, communication between Stein the EU and Israel has taken the form of monologues rather than dialog since European Political Cooperation was launched at the European summit in The Hague in December 1969. Both sides must make efforts to understand each other better and understand the conflict against the background of each others’ circumstances. Above all, though, we should stop always shouting the same slogans at each other that, because of our differing experiences, have completely different meanings. One of these slogans is “never again !” When a German says it, he means “never again war.” Coming from an Israeli’s lips it means “never again Auschwitz.” Before the EU accuses Israel of human rights violations it should take the regional context into account, in which constant violations of Israel’s right to exist are the norm. The claim that defending Israel’s survival is one of the cornerstones of the Germany’s commitment to Israel Federal Republic reminds one Israeli of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Israel’s ex- might be little more than lip service istence was in jeopardy at the time and the Americans wanted to support us by providing weapons. However, Chancellor Willy Brandt declared that Germany’s neutrality in the Middle East would not permit transport on German soil. When the going got tough, Israel could not rely on Germany. We have reason, then, to suspect that Germany’s commitment to Israel’s right to exist might be little more than lip service.

105 The EU and Germany in the Middle East The moment of truth comes closer with every step forward Iran’s nuclear program takes. Chancellor Merkel has said an Iran in possession of nuclear weapons would “not be acceptable.” However, what policies does that imply ? I hope to finally hear an unequivocal pledge from Germany. To what extent is Berlin willing to make sacrifices in acting against Tehran ?

Crowe Not just Germany but all European countries are committed to the survival of Israel. Europe cannot be expected However if the Israelis look to Europe for support of their policies, then they also to follow Israel blindly ought to listen to it sometimes. Europe cannot be expected to follow blindly wherever Israeli leaders want to lead. For example some believe that Israel is considering unilateral military steps against Iran. How can Israel expect European support if it does nor consult about these or other far-reaching plans that effect us all ?

Brinkhorst Despite the talk about Europe’s commitment to Israel’s security, there is some alienation. The Netherlands has always supported Israel’s position wholeheartedly but it takes two to tango. If Israel asks for our unqualified support, we must be assured that our voices will be heard even if we criticize some of Israel’s actions. It is unacceptable that the Dutch fund the construction of the port of Gaza only to see it destroyed by Israeli bombs. If Israel needs us as guarantor for its security, our voice must be heard in these kinds of military issues.

von Weizsäcker Today we can and must discuss German foreign policy and German interests differently than we did before the fall of the Iron Curtain and reunification. We must constantly reflect on our goals and instruments precisely because Germany’s role in helping meet foreign policy challenges facing the international community has changed and will continue to chance rapidly. In discussions with our European and transatlantic partners we must again and again make sure of where we are going and whether that’s the right direction. To do so we will have to rely both on analyzing the moment’s challenges and distributions of power and, quite simply, our history. I am delighted that, on the threshold of Germany’s EU and G8 presidencies, we were able to conduct a frank exchange with representatives of all our Euro- pean neighbor states, the United States, and important partners such as Russia and Turkey. It seems to me that the expectations of our European partners are as diverse as are opinions within Germany on where to place our emphasis. Essentially, how-

The EU’s Southern Neighborhood 106 ever, we all agree: Germany has arrived in the center of Europe and is making a decisive contribution. European foreign policy is by far not as strong as I would wish or as it should be, but hopeful steps are being made and Germany is playing a good part in helping them happen. When I think of the Germany I knew as a young man, and look back at all the wrong turns and horrors of German history, it almost seems like a miracle to me, or at least a miraculous gift. I thank you all for your contributions and Roger de Weck for his moderation. Have a safe trip home.

107 The EU and Germany in the Middle East