Stonewalling and Suspicion during Presidential Scandals Author(s): Scott J. Basinger and Brandon Rottinghaus Source: Political Research Quarterly , JUNE 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2 (JUNE 2012), pp. 290- 302 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41635234

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This content downloaded from 130.64.11.161 on Fri, 12 Feb 2021 19:30:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Political Research Quarterly 65(2) 290-302 © 20 1 2 University of Utah Stonewalling and Suspicion during Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Presidential Scandals DOI: 1 0. II 77/ 1 0659 1 29 1 1 40 1 4 1 6 http://prq.sagepub.com ® SAGE

Scott J. Basinger1 and Brandon Rottinghaus1

Abstract

Scholars possess little theoretical understanding of how presidents behave during scandals. Existing presidential scholarship has focused on "offensive" communication, aimed at achieving legislative or policy goals, whereas the authors' interest is in "defensive" communication. Using a game-theoretic signaling model of the president-media relationship, the authors identify conditions affecting White House stonewalling and media feeding frenzies.The president's optimal behavior changes depending on circumstances, particularly the level of presidential involvement in the alleged misdeeds. The authors illustrate this with a case study of the -Contra scandals and an empirical analysis of scandals from the Nixon through the Bush administrations.

Keywords presidency, communications, game theory, scandals

All modern presidents must endure scandals within their Barrett 2005), budget proposals (Kernell 2007 ; Canes- Wrone administration. In the short term, a scandal can sink the 2006), agency appropriations (Canes-Wrone 2001), fund- president's approval rating (Zaller 1999; Andolina and ing for foreign policy initiatives (Canes-Wrone 2006), Wilcox 2000). A scandal can prime public opinion on and veto threats (Cameron 2000). In each case, the moti- related issues, as occurred with Central America policy vation for going public is "inciting" or "arousing" or after the Iran-Contra disclosures (Krosnick and Kinder "persuading" the public. A president might be deterred 1990). In the long term, scandals play a central role from communicating if the president's position represents in determining presidents' legacies, and scandals can a minority position (Canes-Wrone 2001) and when undermine public trust (Miller 1999). Scholars have docu- speaking may damage popularity (Brace and Hinckley mented consequences of presidents lying (Alterarían 1993) or if "staying private" would improve chances of 2004) and of presidents perpetuating secrecy (Graubard winning legislative concessions (Covington 1987). Our 2004), but these accounts neither draw from nor contribute interest in this article is in presidential "defensive" communi- to scientific scholarship on the president as a rational public cation strategies when the White House is under attack. actor. According to Cameron (2002, 655), "If scandal This article proceeds in four parts. First, we define seeking and scandal mongering are normal political tac- presidential scandal and outline our assumptions about tics . . . then political scientists need to learn their logic." president-media interactions during a scandal. Second, Several works have addressed presidents' use of public we present a formal model of stonewalling, treating scandal opinion polling during scandals (Heith 1998, 2004; politics as a signaling game.1 We derive postulates about Rottinghaus and Bereznikova 2006) and rhetorical strategies the factors that affect presidential stonewalling. The model for recovery after scandals (Quirk 1998; Dunn 2000; can incorporate a wide range of factors, but we focus on Blaney and Benoit 2001 ; Hacker, Giles, and Guerrero 2003). the effect of suspicion about the president's involvement However, we find no studies of the president's most impor- in the scandal or its cover-up. We examine presidential tant decision: whether to stonewall when allegations ini- behavior in the Iran-Contra scandal, which presents a tially surface. Essentially, stonewalling is the choice not unique natural experiment because of President Reagan's to communicate with the public. This alternative is absent from existing scholarship on presidential communication, which emphasizes "offensive" communication strategies, 'University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA aimed at achieving legislative and policy goals (Cohen Corresponding Author: 1995, 1999; Edwards and Wood 1999; Edwards 2003). Scott Basinger, University of Houston, Department of Political Science, Scholars have rigorously researched presidents' public 447 Philip G. Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204-301 1 appeals on behalf of legislation (Rivers and Rose 1985; Email: [email protected]

This content downloaded from 130.64.11.161 on Fri, 12 Feb 2021 19:30:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Basinger and Rottinghaus 29 1 varying level of involvement December 2006 fits our definition in of scandal, different even though aspects of the scandal. Finally, we Justice provide Department officials chosea simplenot to press criminal empirical analysis of presidential scandals charges. The definitionfrom clarifies the what events Nixon or actions through the Bush administrations. are excluded, particularly instances of negative publicity, such as when Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally shot a hunting partner. This definition excludes unpopular Scandals as Interactions policy decisions and any instances of sheer incompetence, All presidents experience scandals, but not all instances such as FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina (see Adut of presidential deception become scandals. Pfiffner 2008). (2004, We also exclude any unsubstantiated allegations, 18) contends, "Just as most people lie, so do most rumors, presi- innuendo, and gossip (see Schultz 2000). These dents." A president might deceive to "prevent embarrass- limits allow us to avoid (as much as possible) so-called ment and preserve political viability," such as Presidentscandals that are partisan-based charges with little or no Kennedy hiding his Addison's disease (see merit Dallek (Ginsburg and Shefter 2002). 2010). A president also might deceive for reasons Second, of our definition is specific in terms of the class national security. When a U-2 spy plane was downed of actors in whose misbehavior can generate a presidential Russian airspace in February 1960, President Eisenhower scandal. Actors must be part of the executive branch or a claimed it was a weather research plane; he and hisnominee, staff but must also be placed high enough - or close agreed that lying was the best option to save his enough effec- to the president - that the scandal is relevant to tiveness during a summit meeting (Pfiffner 2004, the president's41). image or administration. Even a "lightning When Premier Khrushchev produced the aircraft's rod," rem- who absorbs political damage on the president's nants and pilot, Francis Gary Powers, the administration behalf (see Ellis 1994), can result in some deprivation to was forced to admit that Eisenhower had authorized the the administration. Third, our definition is specific about intelligence-gathering missions (Pach and Richardson 1991, when misbehavior occurred and when it is revealed for it 218). These episodes of deception could have affected to have an impact on the current president. Misbehavior our views of each president, could have undermined by persons who left an administration and revelations of policy goals, and could have led to official scrutiny, legal a former president's misbehavior (e.g., Warren Harding's fights over executive privilege, and termination or resigna- or John Kennedy's affairs) would not directly affect the tion of key staff. What makes a scandal distinct from current president, unless the current president was some- deception is how it is reported and whether public disap- how allegedly involved. Misbehavior by presidential and probation becomes part of the story. vice presidential candidates, especially those who withdrew We define a presidential scandal as allegations of illegal, (e.g., Gary Hart) or lost the election (e.g., John Edwards), unethical, or immoral behavior by the president, a senior might also be scandalous but would not count as presi- administration official,2 or a nominee that comes to light dential scandals. The clarity this definition provides per- during the president's term in office and that occurred mits consistent measurement over time. It also permits one before or while the individual occupied office.3 While to distinguish between - and therefore to study the causal other definitions might be conceivable, our definition is linkage between - scandals and negative media coverage. consistent with the sense that scandals involve a "trans- Our primary interest is in the president's public actions gression" (Thompson 2000) or an act contrary to conven- once a presidential scandal initially comes to light. Our tional morality or "a set of shared values" (Garment 1992), assumption is that "the buck stops" with the president.5 but it is also more specific. President Kennedy's secrecy Discussions of how to cope with a scandal can reach the about his health and Eisenhower's secrecy about spy Oval Office even if the president is not responsible for the planes do not fit our definition because scandal is not alleged misbehavior. According to one veteran of scandal equivalent to deception. battles, there are "two different pathways of handling a Our definition adds specificity to past definitions in scandal crisis once it breaks out, by getting the truth out three ways. First, regarding the class of actions that can yourself - 'tell it all, tell it early' - versus 'deny, deny, generate a scandal, we include inappropriate sexual rela- deny'" (Davis 2006, 17-18). tionships because of the important and unique place they One strategy that the White House can adopt is to coop- hold in the panacea of political scandals,4 and we include erate, by providing a full accounting of the situation, instances of allegedly illegal and unethical behavior. The allowing the truth to become public and ensuring that "White House coffees" scandal fits our definition of scandal responsible parties accept blame and suffer appropriate because the Clinton-Gore reelection campaign was inves- consequences (including resignation or a withdrawn nom- tigated for legal violations, even though it was eventually ination). "Telling it all" may require some investigation uncovered that the coffees occurred in the residence (see to uncover the truth, and presidents have allowed and have Davis 1999). The firing of seven federal prosecutors in even encouraged investigations into alleged misbehavior.

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In October 1964, Chief of Staff Under what Walter conditions willJenkins presidents decide was to stone- arrested on a morals charge, "a polite wall? What way factors influence of sayingthis decision? Existing that liter- he has been caught in a compromising ature on presidential sexual scandals consists encounter mainly of isolated with another man" (Schultz 2000, case studies, including363). rich President descriptions of events Johnson(e.g., requested the FBI to investigate Stewart 1996; whether Toobin 2000; Woodward Jenkins's and Bernstein behavior created a security risk. The 1974, 1976)investigation and participants' evaluations concluded of the events that national security had not (e.g., been Blumenthal compromised, 2003; Davis 1999; Walsh 1997). although These Jenkins resigned voluntarily. studies are In informative September but fail to provide 1979, theoretical Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan was insight accusedinto presidents' strategies.of using One might cocainespeculate at a New York nightclub, Studio that presidents' 54. personalitiesUtilizing are relevant, the and whilenew some provi- sions of the Ethics in Government presidents are unwilling Act, to cede politicalPresident ground to oppo- Carter appointed an independent nents, otherscounsel, would be willing who to endure conducted scrutiny. a lengthy investigation but Alternatively, found one might no conjecture concrete that the type evidenceof alleged to support the allegations. misconductIn April is relevant, 1991, and while some when presidents areChief of Staff John Sununu was accused defensive about of certain using character traitsmilitary or facets of their aircraft for personal trips, President reputation Bush(Pfifíher 2004), asked others have differentthe sensitivities.comptroller general to investigate. Sununu To move beyond was speculation required and conjecture, to we requirerepay the government and later resigned a stronger and morewhen general theoryfurther to predict and financialexplain improprieties came to light. the conditionsEven in thewhich presidentsIran-Contra are likely to stonewall. scandals, which we discuss in detail Ourbelow, thesis is that presidentialwere strategiesinitially depend on theinvesti- gated by a presidential commission, media environment as well known as the political as environment the Tower Commission. and contemporary political practices (see Ginsberg and The alternative strategy that the White House can adopt Shefter 2002). The public looks to elites in the media to is to interfere with the truth becoming public and insulate judge the importance of an alleged scandal (Miller 1999; the responsible parties against blame or consequences. Kiousis 2003; Woessner 2005). The way that a scandal is So-called stonewalling covers a broad range of actions: reported and the questions that the reporters ask influence selective release of information to create a false impression, whether the public perceives the president to be culpable counterallegations ("a vast, right-wing conspiracy . . ."), (Brody and Shapiro 1989; Maurer 1999). We suggest that misleading statements ("I don't recall . . ."), claims ofthe media's anticipated reactions are a critical determi- executive privilege claims, cover-ups, and outright lying. nant of the president's actions. How obsessively will the President Nixon's actions after the Watergate Hotel break- media pursue the story if the president stonewalls? in provide a multifaceted example of stonewalling tactics.6 Consider the following three quotes. First, according to Although Nixon did not authorize the actual break-in, his Sabato (1993, 63), "Ever since Watergate, most investi- approval of a scheme to expand domestic intelligence gative journalists' goal has been not just sensational reve- gathering was the genesis for the operation. President lation but the downfall of their target, a trophy head for Nixon delayed the release of the truth from the very first their wall." Second, according to Garment (1992, 81-82), moment he found out about the connection between the "The aggressive, investigative, adversary style of journalism burglars and the White House (Small 1999, 276). The and the attitudes that go along with it have become the president and his White House counsel, John Dean, decided accepted measure of journalistic excellence they could ensure the continued silence of those involved purpose of the journalistic craft ... is to bring citizen's in the cover-up by providing them "hush money" attention to the flaws in their institutions and leaders." (Woodward and Bernstein 1976, 14). Several of those Third, Isikoff (1999, 355) defends his reporting on Clinton's under indictment, including James McCord, alleged that sex scandals: "This was not Watergate - nor did I ever they were pressured to remain silent and to plead guilty. imagine that it was. But that doesn't mean it wasn't right The White House press secretary, Ron Ziegler, repeatedly to undertake the enterprise. Presidents ought not be per- denied the allegations and counterattacked the Washington mitted to deceive the public. . . . Clinton's recklessness Post , accusing its editor-in-chief of aiding a partisan and arrogance deserved to be uncovered. Exposure, not campaign against the president. Later, White House impeachment, was the only remedy that interested me." staff obstructed a congressional investigation by denying When the president is not forthcoming, the media become the Senate Watergate Committee's lawyers access to the increasingly suspicious of presidential involvement, Oval Office tape recordings, citing executive privilege. which shapes the media's reaction. Consequently, The president fired special prosecutor Archibald Cox. the president's anticipation of suspicion shapes the Ultimately, in a May 1973 statement, Nixon lied about his president's action. We formalize this expectation in the role in the cover-up. next section.

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We acknowledge that A Signaling Congress Model of Stonewalling also has a role to play in the outcome of a presidential scandal, but for a multi- tude of reasons we focus on the media in this article. Our model of presidential scandals treats the White House- First, the media tend to move first in releasing allega- media interaction as a sequential game of incomplete tions and tend to be more critical in raising public inter- information. Specifically, we use a signaling game because est. When a Democratic congressman attempted the better informed player acts, and the worse informed belatedly to jumpstart interest in "Debategate" (Sabato player reacts after potentially updating his or her infor- 1993, 11, 81), the media frenzy quickly subsided. mation. The actions available to players, the order of Second, congressional investigations are sensitive to the actions, and the information held by the players when media's and the public's initial and continuing interest they act are illustrated using the extensive form in Figure 1 . in a scandal. Garment (1992, 153) describes congres- The president can adopt one of two actions when con- sional attention to scandals as "erratic" and writes that fronted with an alleged a scandal: cooperate or stonewall. "because of the general climate and the demands of After the president acts, the media can adopt one of two modern election campaigns, congressmen thirst with possible reactions: they must decide whether to "pursue" special intensity for media exposure, while competitive the matter and continue to investigate or "accept" the media scramble after scandal news." The media and president's action and turn their attention to other matters. Congress benefit from coordination;7 therefore, The game begins with "nature" selecting the type of scan- Congress is likely to pursue the same scandals as dalthe that is revealed: have the media uncovered misbehavior media. Importantly, congressional involvement does innot which the president became involved , or was the imply a greater likelihood that the truth will emerge president not involved ? The president is assumed to be because grandstanding may impede the investigation fully of aware of his involvement, but the media observe a target (see Walsh 1997), or because so-called watch- only whether the president stonewalls or cooperates, but dogs might pursue a partisan wedge rather than the truth not the scandal's type. The media's uncertainty is illus- (see Nyhan 2009). Ultimately, congressional and prose- trated by combining pairs of the media's choice nodes cutorial actions are filtered through the media, making into "information sets." We assume that the media's sus- our choice to focus on media reaction as a first step picion, a that is, their prior belief about the probability that justifiable one. the president became involved in the scandal, is common Regardless of whether "players" other than those knowledge. in the White House and the media are taken into account Identifying an equilibrium requires identifying two by the theory, one fact is clear: the president and his strategies, one for each player, that are mutual best persecutors interact in a setting of asymmetric informa- responses. A strategy is a complete, contingent plan: tion. When the media first uncover a potential scandal, it specifies an action whenever a player hypothetically they do not know how politically damaging it might be would have a choice, regardless of whether that choice to the president. We have already discussed how scan- node is reached along an equilibrium path. A strategy for dals differ by the type of allegation that is made, and the president specifies two choices: to cooperate or stone- scandals also vary in the degree to which the president wall if involved and to cooperate or stonewall if not is involved. Presidents do not need to have been involved involved. Allowing mixed strategies, the president's strategy in an initial, first-order transgression to become involved is represented by two variables: a = pr(cooperate'involved) in a scandal because presidents may have committed and ß = pr(cooperate'not involved)* A strategy for the second-order transgressions in preventing the initial media specifies two choices: to accept or pursue if the misbehavior from coming to light. The Watergate scan- president cooperates and to accept or pursue if the presi- dal exemplifies this point. dent stonewalls. The media's strategy is represented by Because the media are initially uncertain about an 0 = pr{accept'cooperate ), and q> = pr(accept'stonewall). allegation's validity and the president's degree of The equilibrium strategies should also be a best response involvement, the media's level of suspicion is relevant. to beliefs, which refers to the posterior probability distri- At one extreme, Carter desired to run a "purely ethical" bution over the scandal's "type." The president is fully White House in the aftermath of Watergate (Kaufman informed when he acts; the media know that the president 1993). At the other extreme, Clinton was besieged by is fully informed and use the president's action to update accusations about his personal life during the campaign, their belief about the scandal's type. The president ratio- and when Clinton was accused of having a sexual affair nally anticipates that the media will use the president's with an intern, the media were suspicious because of actions to update their beliefs. Let p = pr(involved) denote past allegations (Brock 1994; Isikoff 1999). In the for- the common prior belief about the probability that the mal model presented in the next section, suspicion of president was involved, assuming 0

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Figure I . Formal model in extensive form

OC.(p p r = pr(involved'cooperate) = a .p + ß.(l -p) to the president and whether the transgression was first order or second order. Second, if the president stonewalls ( 1 - a ).p and the media accept, then the story will disappear s =pr (involved'stonewall) = quickly. Although there may be some initial detriment to (l-a)./> + (l-ßHl -p) the president, these costs are already sunk; therefore, we normalize the payoff of this outcome to a loss of 0 utiles. The first equation can be solved only if it is not the Third, if the president stonewalls and the media pursue, case that a = ß = 0; the second equation can be solved then the president is sure to bear some additional losses, only if it is not the case that a = ß = 1 . but it is not certain that the scandal will be proved. Before the model can be solved, outcomes and payoffs Therefore, when the media pursue following presidential must be specified. There are three essential outcomes. stonewalling, the president's utility loss has both a proba- First, if the president cooperates and the media accept, bilistic and a certain component. We assume that the pres- then the president loses utility, although the amount ofident suffers the utility losses identified above (1 or xp, utility lost depends on both the type of misbehavior and depending on the scandal's type) probabilistically when the level of presidential involvement. We assume that if ithe stonewalls and the media pursue. We let q denote the is proved that the president is involved in either a first- probability of a scandal being proven, with 0 < q < 1 . order or a second-order transgression, then the loss isThe president loses additional fixed costs certainly; substantial; we normalize the value to 1 utile. If the pres- these fixed costs represent the president's lost prestige or ident is not involved in a proven scandal, then the loss popularityis while under attack. We assume that cp utiles are 0 < xp < 1 utiles; the magnitude of xp might vary, for subtracted from the president's payoff in a stonewall-pursue example, depending on how close the accused official outcome,is regardless of the scandal's type.

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The president suffers (i.e., s = p). For the amedia loss to accept the president'swhen stone- a scandal is proved, but the media benefit. walling, it must If be the thecase that the presidentprobability that the admits to a scandal, we normalize the media's president is involved (p )gain is relatively low. to Another 1 way utile if the president is involved M and 0 < ofx, stating this< condition 1 is utilesthat the media's opportunity if the president is not involved. If the president stonewalls and the media accept, cost of pursuing (cM) is high relative to the probability the media's payoff is normalized to 0 utiles. If the president that a scandal is proven times the benefits if the scandal stonewalls and the media pursue the matter, then the media is proven: cM> q • (p + (1 - p) • * ). If these conditions benefit probabilistically, receiving the payoffs listed above are met, then this equilibrium obtains for any value of cp. (1 or with probability q, but must expend effort and scarce resources to pursue a scandal: cM utiles are sub- Pooling Equilibrium 2: Under Siege tracted from the media's payoff, regardless of the scandal's Strategies and beliefs {a = 0; ß = 0; 0 = 1, type. A key comparison for the media is whether its likely cp = 0; r = 0, s =/?} payoff (the product of q and 1 t°rxM) offsets the opportunity cost of pursuing one scandal. Payoffs are displayed at each parameter conditions p > terminal node of Figure 1; the president's payoff is listed first and the media's payoff is listed second. c

In the Above the Law equilibrium, the president stone- Separating Equilibrium walls, regardless of whether the president is involved or not involved. The media react to stonewalling by accept- Strategies and beliefs {a = 0; ß = 1 ; 0 = 1 , ing, and as a consequence, the truth of the president's (p = 0;r = 0, 5=1} involvement is not revealed. Because the president stone- walls for both minor and major scandals, the media cannot parameter conditions p > update their beliefs; therefore, their posterior probability that the president is involved equals their prior probability Xp- (1 -q)

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In the separating equilibrium, is to look at how theythe affect president increases in potential stonewalls stone- if involved and cooperates walling behavior.if not That involved.is, we ask, how do parameterBecause the president takes distinct changes actions, shift the prediction the away media from the Out learn for Justice that the president is involved if poolingand equilibrium only in ifwhich the presidents president always cooperate stone- walls (i.e., s = 1 and r = and 0). the truthConsequently, is always revealed? the media will pursue the story when the Suppose president we fix a condition, stonewalls, cM the president's perspective, if we hold cp and q constant, ) an increase in xp reduces the likelihood of surpassing the threshold between Under Siege and the separating equi- Cp>(1~ <Ù librium. Thus, an increase in xp should have the direct effect of making it more likely that the president will In the final pooling equilibrium, the president does not stonewall. From the media's perspective, if xM is very low, stonewall in any case but instead cooperates, regardless of then cM is more likely to exceed the q • (p + (1 -p) • x^) whether he is involved or not involved. The media accept, threshold, which implies that we should observe Above but because its costs are relatively low, it would have pur- the Law. If we hold c and p constant, then an increase in sued had the president chosen to stonewall. This credible xM reduces the likelihood of cM surpassing this thresh- threat that the media would pursue combined with a high old. Thus, an increase in M x makes more credible the cost for continued hostilities induce the president to coop- media's threat to pursue the story if the president stone- c M~q-XM walls. Consequently, if xp is high relative to cp and q , erate. This equilibrium holds as long as s > . and if xM is high relative to cM and q , then we will observe the Under Siege pooling equilibrium in which the presi- In the Out for Justice pooling equilibrium, the truth of dentthe stonewalls and the media pursues. president's involvement is revealed for certain. To summarize this discussion we draw the following four propositions from the formal model. First, presi- The formal model contains five parameters; in the restdents are more likely to stonewall when the president is of this section we move toward generating testable involved in a scandal than when the president is not hypotheses by studying how variations in the exogenous involved. Second, the president is more likely to stonewall parameters affect the endogenous variables (i.e., both when the media is not highly suspicious of the president players' behavior in equilibrium), noting that changes (low p) or when the media faces high costs for pursuing between equilibria occur at key thresholds. In our opinion, the scandal (high cM). The former point is counterintuitive: the best way to understand the various parameters' effects presidents who seem more trustworthy are more likely to

This content downloaded from 130.64.11.161 on Fri, 12 Feb 2021 19:30:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Basinger and Rottinghaus 297 abuse that trust in the administration, an individual only Secretary of State Schultzinstance and and to get away with it, all else equal. Secretary of DefenseThird, Weinberger presidentsexpressed opposition, are more likely to stonewall when it arguing is thatimprobable the operation violated the Arms Exportthat Control the truth is revealed (low q ) and when Act.the McFarlane, president accompanied by North, will traveled to notIran suffer much if the media pursues (low in late Maycp). to negotiate Fourth, for hostage releases; hethe left the president is more likely to stonewall meeting - empty-handed,in spite but an October of shipment the of 500 media's greater likeli- hood of pursuing antitank - whenweapons secured thethe release ofscandal hostage David is viewed as more significant (high Jacobsenhigh on November xp), 2. 10 Botheven the McFarlane though delega- the president is not involved. Reversing tion's visit to Tehran any and the armsof shipments these were conditions will lead to greater cooperation exposed on November on 3, inthe the leftist partBeirut magazine of the president and a greater probability Al Shiraa that .n the truth will be revealed. Another scandal involved a policy of covertly support- ing rebels in Nicaragua. Reagan had campaigned on a A Case Study/Natural platform of opposition to the Marxist Sandinista regime, Experiment The attention of fearingthis a domino effectarticle in Central America now (Woodward shifts from presenting our theory of presidential 1987; Alterman 2004). Congress passed twobehavior amendments to evaluating a key proposition from in the1982 and 1984, formal both introduced by Representative model. We begin by present- ing a case study, Edwardthe Boland; thefocus first prohibited theof CIA from whichspend- is stonewalling ver- sus cooperating in ing funds the to overthrow thetwo Sandinistas. Millionsdistinct of dollars scandals within the Iran-Contra scandal. for Nicaraguan Becauseaid was restored to the 1984 Departmentthe president was directly involved in one aspect of Defense (DOD) appropriation;of the however, thescandal second (arms sales to Iran) but not the other Boland aspect amendment prohibited (diverting the CIA, DOD, or any funds to the ), this case study presents other agency or entity of the Uniteda natural States from spend- experiment. We hold constant the main ing actorsfunds on behalf of the and Contras. With the the mandate political environment and vary only the president's against aiding the Contras in place,involvement North arranged to in the alleged mis- behavior. The formal divert proceeds frommodel the arms sales to aimplies so-called and the case study confirms that presidents Enterprise headed by retired General are Richard moreSecord, likely to stonewall if involved than who arrangedif fornot weapons purchases involved, and deliveries. all else being held constant. In June 1986, the House of Representatives passed a The Iran-Contra scandal is two separate scandals, "Resolution of Inquiry," requesting documents related to affecting two policies in two separate hemispheres, withNSC contacts with Contras or with "private persons or different levels of presidential involvement. One scandal foreign governments involved in Contra resupply." involved a covert policy of arms sales to Iran, aimed Poindexter at knowingly lied that NSC staff were complying convincing moderate elements in Iran to assist American with the Boland amendments. In August, North testified efforts to release several American hostages held falsely by before the House Permanent Select Committee on Hezbollah. In the summer of 1985, Israel shipped more Intelligence that he had not violated the Boland amend- than 500 American-supplied antitank weapons to Iran, ments. The covert operation collapsed when, on October 5, achieving the release of Reverend Benjamin Weir. When an American cargo plane loaded with weapons was shot Iran rejected a subsequent shipment of antiaircraft mis-down in Nicaragua. One of the three Americans on board, siles, claiming they were defective (including being Eugene Hasenfus, survived the crash and acknowledged marked with the Star of David), a top-secret intelligence that he was part of a CIA operation. Although the admin- directive, a "finding" that signed istration on had bought enough time to get a $100 million January 17, 1986 (Woodward 1999, 99), authorized aid packagea through Congress, on November 22, 1986, new policy of selling weapons directly from the United Justice Department officials investigating the Iranian States. arms sales uncovered an NSC memorandum that outlined , then a Lt. Colonel in the Marines and how a North would divert profits to the Contras. staff member at the National Security Council (NSC), Public perceptions of the president's involvement in acted as the go-between for the national security adviser the Iran-Contra scandals were of specific concern to the (first Robert "Bud" McFarlane, and then ) White House staff. The results of internal polls conducted and the Iranians. According to the independent counsel's by Dick Wirthlin revealed that a majority (55 percent) report, Reagan, Vice President Bush, Attorney General disagreed with the statement "John Poindexter and Oliver Meese, Chief of Staff Regan, and CLA Director Casey Northwere operated independently in setting up the Iran-Contra present at NSC meetings that discussed the Iran operation, arms deal, without any specific instructions or authority and all approved of the sales. Within the highest levels from of President Reagan."12 In the same survey, 64 percent

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agreed with the statement of not making"It concessionsis simply to terrorists too remains hardintact." to believe that only two men in Second,the the White president routinely House proclaimed inknew public and anything about money from arms private sales that "we didto not Irantrade arms forbeing hostages," ashifted clear to the Contras."13 This was fabricationespecially (Morris 1999; Alterman worrisome 2004). Although the given the belief that the media's presidentattitude had admitted toward to Secretary of State the Shultz presidentthat had also changed since the he knew early of the shipments Reagan of arms to Iran, administration. Schultz and Immediately after the 1981 Weinberger assassination defended the president in attempt,their briefings the media were perceived as friendly to the congressional and intelligence deferential committees (Woodward (Alterman 2004, 243; see also Hertsgaard 1999). Third, the administration 1988). refused But to declassify the infor- expansion of news outlets, especially mation needed to onprosecute cable North. North television,14 and Poindexter led Donald Regan to opine, shredded "The documents atpress the NSC, even wasdestroying sothe orig- excited that the atmosphere had become inal presidential finding primal" that authorized (Woodward the Iran arms 1999, 113). Countering this impulse sales (Abshire 2005, is 68;the Cannon fact 2000, 617). that Finally, the media depend heavily on official the strategy sources to protect the president in hingedcovering on blaming foreign affairs (Hallin, Manoff, McFarlane, and evenWeddle though numerous 1993), individuals which were ensured that the media would have aware thata thehigh president cost had authorized of thepursuing arms sales with an uncertain benefit. (Alterman 2004, 285; Morris 1999). On the elements of the TheIran-Contra president's mea culpa onscandal national television that on did not involve President Reagan, March 4, the1987, continued White to deflect Houseresponsibility. Reaganchose a strat- egy of cooperation. First, stated, "AsAttorney angry as I may be about General activities undertaken Edwin Meese was put in charge of internally without my knowledge, investigating I am still accountable for those White House staffers' possible legal activities.infractions As disappointed as I may(Walsh be in some who 1997).served Second, on the same day that Attorney me, I'm still the oneGeneral who must answer Edwin to the American Meese admit- ted that some of the funds people." A frommemorandum thefrom Mitch Iranian Daniels notes, arms sales had been diverted to fund the Contra rebels, national security adviser John Poindexter For now,resigned the public separates and this incident, North however was fired (Woodward 1999, 113). horrific, Reagan from the rest admitted of the president's record. in his diary that the "smoking gun" This necessitated is another good reason to express these regret about resignations (Reagan 2007, 453). Reagan the actions was taken in willingpursuit of the Iran to policy letand Poindexter and North testify before aboutCongress, the consequences. toWe must "get show thatthis we, d - m thing over with," if they received too, view thisimmunity as one aberrational misstep from in an prosecution (Reagan 2007, 460). William otherwise consistentCasey, and successful director Presidency.15 of the CIA, resigned a month later after recovering from a stroke (Woodward 1999, 116; Despite Abshire appearing apologetic, 2005, Reagan did not67). cooperate Third, days after the Justice Department with an investigation uncovered of the arms-for-hostages the deal. InNSC memo, Reagan formed a special fact, Reagan commission, did not acknowledge that he had headed authorized by for- mer senator John Tower and including former the shipments to Israel until his autobiography (Reagan Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and former National 1990, 501). Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. The Tower Commission The Iran-Contra scandals' revelation led to the largest issued a lengthy and critical report on February 26, and fastest drop in presidential approval in recorded 1987, that identified no direct role for Reagan in the history, from 67 percent to 46 percent, according to the scandal. Fourth, seeing potentially serious legal viola- November 1986 New York Times/CBS News poll. Reagan tions, Attorney General Meese sought appointment of an survived the scandal, however, and the Gallup poll independent counsel. recorded a 64 percent approval rating for Reagan when On the elements of the Iran-Contra that did involve the he left office in 1989. Alterman (2004, 293) summarizes president, particularly the arms-for-hostages trade, the scandal: "The nation never faced up to the conse- the White House stonewalled. Independent counsel quences of what it meant to be led by dishonest officials. Lawrence Walsh described this as "a willful cover-up that ... In the long run, President Reagan's reputation returned extended all the way to the Oval Office" (Walsh 1997, xv). to its pre-scandal levels and the entire episode came to This occurred at several points. First, Poindexter and be viewed by many as just a bump on the road to Cold Casey argued against disclosure of the Iranian arms sales, War victory." Ginsberg and Shefter (1990) argue that this even though the story was confirmed by the speaker of the strategy protected the president, the presidency, and the Iranian Parliament, Rafsanjani (Walsh 1997, 8). The White Reagan administration's agenda in Congress. In the Iran- House released a press statement asserting that "our policy Contra case, stonewalling on Iran while allowing

This content downloaded from 130.64.11.161 on Fri, 12 Feb 2021 19:30:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Basinger and Rottinghaus 299 investigation of the media constitute Contra no monolith, aidand news wasorganizations successful,16 and the media's interest are in too disorganized the and complextoo competitive for much andplot- enigmatic story dwindled. ting to occur." However, despite the apparently growing polarization of news organizations, especially on cable television, a pack mentality ensures that few organiza- An Additional tions are left out of a feeding frenzy. We also chose not to Empirical Examination incorporate Congress, independent counsels, U.S. attor- We acknowledge that the Iran-Contra scandal may neys, not or Garment's (1992) "cast of thousands" of poten- be a representative scandal. An unusually large number tial prosecutors. Our empirical research focuses on the of individuals were accused of misbehavior - fourteen effect of presidential involvement and suspicion of the faced criminal charges and eleven were convicted - and president, to the exclusion of other factors that might the scandal involved international security issues where the play a role. Nevertheless, this research extends our media faces hurdles to investigating. To assess whether the understanding of presidential behavior in the context of pattern of behavior observed in the Iran-Contra scandal "defensive"is communication, gives us insight into how echoed in other presidential scandals, we generated presidentsa behave in a strategic fashion. list of presidential scandals from the Nixon administra- For a political environment obsessed with political tion through the Bush administration. (The appendix at"spin" resulting from scandal (Quirk 1998), there has http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/ provides further been little scholarly work on how presidents "play defense" detail on our data collection.) Between 1972 and 2008, when confronted with allegations of scandal. Apolitical we identified 87 events as scandals, including the Iran scandal, whether large or small, has the potential to derail and Contra scandals, for an average of 2.35 scandals per a presidential policy message, focus attention on govern- year (roughly one every five months). Utilizing news- ing mishaps, highlight an administration's flaws, or paper articles and presidential papers, we coded whether deprive the president of his cabinet members, advisors, the president's initial action was to cooperate or stone- surrogates, nominees, and so forth. Our formal model pro- wall. The initial behavior was coded as stonewalling if vides a framework for understanding presidential public the White House delayed releasing information, released behavior in these politically damaging situations. The only partial information, did not cooperate with another model also focuses our attention on the contextual factors institution's investigation, or deflected blame with a par- that induce presidents to stonewall or cooperate. tisan attack. The initial behavior was defined as cooper- In particular, we identify three important implications ating if an involved party immediately resigned, was or revelations resulting from this article. First, one clear disciplined internally, or made financial restitution (pay- implication of the formal model is that the president's ing fines, fees, taxes, etc.), or if the White House called dominant strategy is not always to hide the truth, and the for an internal or external investigation or released full dominant strategy is not always to "tell it all." Although information and documentation about an event. the media are perceived to always be "on the hunt" and Overall, we observe a nearly even division of presi- presidential perceptions of being "hunted" never dissipate dential initial behavior: forty instances of stonewalling (Stewart 1996), optimal presidential behavior necessarily (46 percent) and forty-seven instances of cooperating changes depending on circumstances. For example, higher (54 percent). When the president was involved in a scan- costs to the president from prolonged investigation tend dal, the initial behavior was to stonewall in ten of fifteen to decrease stonewalling, although this depends on the scandals, roughly 67 percent. When the president was not media's relative costs and perceived benefits of pursing. involved, the administration stonewalled in thirty of The advice to "tell it early, tell it all, and tell it yourself' seventy-two scandals, roughly 42 percent. A difference- (Davis 1999) should be dependent on the circumstances of-proportions test allows rejection of the null hypothesis of the scandal and on the context. The nature of opposi- at conventional significance levels.17 In summary, the tion, the relative costs, the probability the truth would be hypothesis that the administration is more likely to stone- revealed, and the country's suspicions about the presi- wall when the president is involved in a scandal than dent's involvement influence which strategy is optimal. when not involved withstands empirical scrutiny. Second, the findings here shed light on political accountability. Avoiding a mutiny of justice requires that Conclusion the truth regarding the president's involvement be revealed. Truth is more likely to be revealed when presidents cooper- This article has advanced the scientific analysis of ate presi- than when they stonewall, and the formal model allows dential scandal and has clarified presidential behavior us to in establish that there are four equilibria; predicted response to political scandal. We are aware that this behavior study and hence the probability that the truth is has its limitations. Our formal model treats the media revealed as a differ across the four equilibria. A scandal will unitary actor, despite Sabato 's (1993, 52) caution that remain "the unproven in the Above the Law equilibrium

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(probability = 0). The truth3. Our inquiry includesis revealedpersons other than the bypresident; chance in Out for Justice (probability therefore, = q) our topicand is distinct in from the "the character separating issue" equilib- rium (probability = 1 -p+ as studied bypq Pfifïher ). (2004). A scandal will be proved with certainty in Under 4. See Apostolidis Siege and Williams (probability (2004), Hagood (1998), =1). Factors that affect the president's Ross (1988), and Sullivan the (1994). media's strategies affect political accountability. 5. This Circumstances assumption allows us to investigate instances that where make it more likely that the president the president will himself stonewall, apparently had no knowledge suchof the as a lack of media suspicion (low p) events surroundingor the the scandal. presence of procedures that keep some material 6. For excellentclassified reviews of how presidents or privilegedhave used execu- (high q ), have the potential to dislocate tive privilege to hidethe damaging proper information from thecourse pub- of consti- tutional governance. lic, the media, and Congress, see Rozell (2002) and Fisher Third, proactive communication (2003). is not uniformly essential to presidential 7. We cansuccess. envision the interaction Presidents between the media and do not neces- sarily need to talk their Congress way being modeled out either asof a minimum a problemeffort coor- when an administration is confronted dination game, with where both allegations players profit only when bothof wrongdoing. Indeed, recent literature invest, suggestsor a "Battle-of-the- Sexes" that game, where presidents both players do not necessarily find success wish toin focus communicatingattention on the same alleged scandal but may their policy positions to the public value(Edwards different scandals differently. 2003). These results hint at a theory of presidential 8. Consequently, speech pr(stonewall'involved) restraint = 1 - oc, andwhere, despite being involved in the pr(stonewall'not "hyper-rhetorical" involved) = 1 - ß. presidency where presidents are expected9. One must also specify to off-equilibrium-path continuously beliefs. We go public (Dilulio 2007), presidents assume shouldthe following: a presidentbe strategicallywho was expected to selec- tive in where and under stonewall which but cooperates conditions instead must have been uninvolvedthey address the public. This finding is (rin = 0 off line the equilibrium with path); and thosea president who of was others who discover that a president's expected tobest cooperate butstrategy stonewalls must have is been not to always go public but to do so selectively involved (s= 1 off the equilibrium when path). The theassumption conditions is are tactically favorable (Canes-Wrone benign. A less restrictive assumption is simply 2001). that s > r (i.e., Although it seems counterintuitive thefor conditional presidents probability of having been involvedinvolved is higher in a public relations problem to say if the little,president stonewalled in than someif the president cooperated).instances this is the president's best strategy 10. The independent and counsel's reportone indicates that that missiles is at odds with the dominant paradigm were of sent topresidential Israel in May and on to Iran on communication.October 28. Israel's missiles were replaced with "a more recent vintage" Declaration of Conflicting on November 7. Interests The authors declared no 11. Itpotential is crucial to note that theconflicts Iranian component of theof scan- interests with respect to the authorship daland/or was reported after publication the aid to the Contras was discov-of this article. ered, when an American cargo plane was shot down in Financial Disclosure/Funding Nicaragua. Therefore, discovery of the president's authori- The authors received no zationfinancial of arms sales could supportnot have raised suspicion for about the research and/or authorship of this article.the president's involvement in the Contra aid. 12. Ronald Reagan Library, PR 15, Iran: polling data 5 of 6 Notes (464525), folder 7 of 8, March 26-27, 1987 D/M/I poll, 1 . This model is been formulated generally, to facilitate easybox 12. adaptation to other contexts, such as presidential and 13. vice Ibid. presidential candidates, governors, and legislators, 14. with See Baum and Kernell (1999). minor adjustments. 15. Ronald Reagan Library, PR 15, Iran: polling data 3 of 6, 2. We include cabinet secretaries and cabinet-level officers folder 5 of 8, "Daniels to Regan," December 4, 1986, box 12. (e.g., White House chief of staff, director of the Office of 16. President Clinton was less fortunate when he stonewalled. Management and Budget); assistant, deputy, and under- "For years, Clinton went into a full Watergate defense. He secretaries of cabinet departments; heads of independent denied, stonewalled, parsed the language, belittled, and federal agencies and bureaus; and the first lady. We also attacked. In the course of defending himself, he lost control include nominees during the period when their confirmation of his presidency" (Woodward 1999, 516). is being considered, including Supreme Court nominees, 17. z = 1.854, with a 95 percent confidence level critical value because the president can withdraw a nomination. of 1 .645 (one-tailed).

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