DOCSLIB.ORG

A Problem in Aristotle's Continuity Theory

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Problem in Aristotle's Continuity Theory The Trouble With Touching: A Problem In Aristotle's Continuity Theory by Sammy T. Jakubowicz Graduate Program In Philosophy Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario July 1999 O Sammy T. Jakubowicz 2999 National Library Bibliotheque nationale 1*1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada Your Me Vofre referame Our fire Notre reference The author has granted a non- L7auteura accorde une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive pennettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, dstribute or sell reproduire, preter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format eiectronique. The author retains ownerslup of the L'auteur conserve la propriete du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. thesis nor substantial extracts fi-om it Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent Ctre imprimes reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Abstract Aristotle's physics rests upon the foundation of the continuum. This entails understanding space to be infinitely divisible. However, when space is understood in this way we find a number of problems. In particular, this work deals with the difficulties posed by the problem of touching in Aristotle's continuum. It would seem that, given his understanding of space, it would not be possible for any two objects to come into contact. And this would apply not only to physical situations, but to geometricaf ones as well. In order to solve this difficulty, or, more accurately, to see how it might have been possible for Aristotle himself to have solved it, a number of related topics are examined. The early stages of the examination focus primarily on the geometry of the situation and explore the concepts of points and boundaries. After acquiring a better understanding of these and of what they entail, we are able to move to the physical side of the problem and examine such concepts as intelligible matter, mixing, and actuality. When taken together, these allow us to do two things. First, we are more easily able to see the relation between the physical and the geometrical concepts and difficulties. More importantly, we are able to see how the initial problem of touching, as well as the variations on the problem, could have been solved by Aristotle within his own framework. Keywords: Aristotle, touching, point, boundary, limit, geometry, intelligible matter, mixing, actuality, potentiality, place, continuum, space, unit, tangent, history of mathematics, history of physics Appropriately enough, given Aristotle's views, a thesis is not written in a vacuum. There are a great many people who should be acknowledged for the parts they played in bringing this work to completion. My supervisor, John Thorp, deserves a great deal of credit for guiding me through the process of writing this thesis. My finding this topic is a direct result of having taken, and having enjoyed, his courses. Without his advice and constructive criticism this would have been a far different - and probably far less interesting - work. I would also like to thank the members of my advisory and defence committees - John Bell, Lome Falkenstein, Paul Potter, hing Block, and John Magee - for their comments on the thesis. Thanks are also due to John Scott who, at the 1997 meeting of the CPA, commented on a very early draft of the chapter on points. Their comments were helpful and appreciated. Since my arrival in this department I have felt welcome, and this has made my work all the easier. This is in no small part due to the people who REALLY run the show - Andrea Purvis, Julia Mcdonald, Glenda Ogilvie, and Ella Young. Credit should also be given to the friends I have made while living in London. Thank you all for putting up with my idiosyncrasies. And last, though by no means least, are the members of my family. None of this work would have been possible had it not been for the support and encouragement they gave me from an early age. I place the blame for my love of learning squarely on your shoulders, and I thank you for giving me the blame to place. Table of Contents Page .. Certificate of Examination ll .. Abstract 111 Ac know Iedgements iv Table of Contents v A Note on Texts vii Chapter 1 - Introduction 1 The Problems 2 The Method 8 Chapter 2 - Points 11 The Traditional Interpretation of Points: The EuclideanKartesian View 13 What Is a Unit? - A Digression Into How Units Relate to Points 16 Problems With the Traditional Interpretation of Points I. The Place of Points 26 2. The Size of Points 29 3. Points in Contact 3 1 A Different Interpretation: Ideal Versus Real 35 The Advantages of this Interpretation 47 Chapter 3 - Boundaries 53 What is a Boundary? 55 The Problem of Coincident Boundaries 66 The Problem of a Shared Boundary 70 Aquinas' Solution - Touching Boundaries vs. No Boundaries 76 Another Solution - Boundaries in Contact vs. Mixed Boundaries 83 The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Mixing 87 Chapter 4 - Geometrical Objects and Intelligible Matter 9 1 Why the Subject of Mixing Is Important to the Project 92 Aristotle's Views on Mixing 94 Difficulties with Aristotle's View 1. The Problem of Coincident Bodies 97 2. The Problem of Instantaneous Change 100 3. The Problem of Generation 100 4. The Problem of Geometricd Mixing 102 Intelligible Matter - Solving the Problem of Geometrical Mixing 103 The Difficulty of Making the Transition from Physical to Geometrical Objects 1 15 Solving the Other Difficulties 120 Chapter 5 - Actuality and Potentiality Connecting Intelligible Matter to the Actual/Potential Distinction Explaining Actuality and Potentiality Actualization and Geometry Actualizing Potentials Solving the Problems with Boundaries Solving the Problems of Coincident Boundaries, Instantaneous Change, and Generation Chapter 6 - Conclusion Review: What Has Been Uncovered Thus Far Solving the Original Problems 1. Basic Tangency 2. Touching at Boundaries 3. Physical Tangency and Abstraction The Significance of the Findings Bibliography Vita A Note on Texts References are made throughout this dissertation to the works of Aristotle. Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations of the works of AristotIe have been taken from Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. The information about the Greek texts I have used can be found in the bibliography. vii Cha~ter1 - Introduction The Problems There are a number of important problems which arise when we Look closely at the concept of continuity as it is presented in Aristotle's writings. This section introduces four difficulties related to the problem of touching in a continuum: the problems of geometrical and mathematical tangency, the problem of contact at boundaries, and the problem of abstraction. These need to be addressed in order to understand how Aristotle understood the idea of contact in both a geometrical and a physical context. The Method This section serves as a rough guide to the manner in which the project will proceed. In particular, the objectives of the ensuing chapters are mentioned in order better to place them in the broader context of the project at large. 2 The Problems Much of Aristotle's physics rests on the foundation of what is called 'continuum theory'. This theory consists in seeing matter, space, and time as divisible ad infiniturn. However, there is a difficulty with this theory in that it cannot coherently deal with the idea of two objects touching one another. It may be that Aristotle himself was aware of this problem and this can be seen through his various attempts in his works to solve related problems. These attempts, though, often do as much to complicate matters as they do to solve them. In fact, at times the entire exercise seems like a neurotic effort on Aristotle's part to save his theory. Consider the following diagram. If two circles touch at a single point, call this point C, they are understood as being tangent to each other at that point; we standardly anaiyse this mathematical situation as one in which the two circles share a single point, and this analysis gives us little trouble. This problem becomes more complicated when we try to see how it would work in a physical setting. Assume that the circles represent two material spheres which touch one another and which exist as continuous bodies in a continuous space of the type for which Aristotle argues so vehemently. What analysis can be made of the point at which the spheres 3 come into contact? When the problem dealt only with nonmaterial elements such as Iines and circles we were not troubled by saying that two shapes shared a point. However, unlike the situation where the circles are mere geometrical entities, in the material version of the problem we would not want to say that this point is in both spheres. If it were, then the two objects would intermingle and lose their discreteness; we would have a single object, not two objects touching one another. We might say that the spheres could be divided at the point of contact, but this would not work either. To do so would be to say that points are divisible and, therefore, have size.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • World, Senses, Human Spirit: Extrapolating the Direction from the Past Through the Present and Into the Future
    International Tinnitus Journal, Vol.ll, No.2, 103-105 (2005) EDITORIAL World, Senses, Human Spirit: Extrapolating the Direction from the Past Through the Present and Into the Future or human life, time is a specific monodirectional The Roman philosopher Lucius Aenaeus Seneca F dimension forcing us into serial development (4 Be - AD 65) then defined the phrase nihil in intel­ and behavior. We are living in the now, but we [ectu, quod non erat ante in sensu (from Naturales know that we stem from yesterday and that we are fac­ Quaestiones; "nothing can enter into the intellect if it ing the future: our tomorrow. With respect to bodily ex­ does not first pass through the gates of the senses"). In istence, every human seemingly has only one life. The this, Seneca coined the essentials of humans' communi­ human life can be regarded as constructing a wheel : We cation with the world and fellow men within the world. can imagine that year by year we fit a new spoke into We can encode from our surrounding things, facts , pic­ that circular element, a wheel that we call life and that tures, smells, odors, and sounds only after they have rolls us in only one direction, the future. Through de­ been perceived by our senses. veloping the species for many generations of humans, This really was an important philosophical step in many of these virtual wheels have been linked serially, the description of how human spirit works. All our un­ one behind the other. On the basis of culture and civili­ derstanding within our "now" needs information that zation, many humans have formed swarms of such arrives through the senses.
    [Show full text]
  • Issue N°2: Modeling Nothingness
    t a m i n g _ t h e h o r r o r vacui issue #2 modeling nothingness March 2020. Reeds from the River Rupel in a potential state before being set in motion at Rib. IN ABSENCE OF SPIRIT by Christiane Blattmann Do houses have a soul that dwells within? A place has a spirit – Why should a habitation, then, not have a soul? Can buildings contain evil? When I studied architecture for a brief period of time, I had a professor who was obsessed with Heidegger. Her lectures were poetic and heavy, and we had to spend hours looking at slides of her watercolors in which she tried to capture the spirit of places she would travel to on weekends. The genius loci of a site – she explained. Der Ort. She always said DER ORT in a religious way that I found puzzling – the me of first semester, who had never read a line of Heidegger (and still don’t get much of it). Whenever she said DER ORT, I felt strangely ashamed, for I couldn’t decipher the charge of her expression. I had a feeling that I didn’t share in her religion. What I could explain better to myself was the much older understanding my professor was referring to. The genii in ancient belief were protective spirits that guarded a place or a house. They would make the difference between a place and DER ORT: between an anonymous area on the map, a mere fenced-off field and a textured site, with history, character, a view, underground, traps, and inexplicable vibes to it.
    [Show full text]
  • The Place of Otherness and Indeterminacy in Aristotelian Science
    Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1997 The Place of Otherness and Indeterminacy in Aristotelian Science Joshua William Rayman Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Rayman, Joshua William, "The Place of Otherness and Indeterminacy in Aristotelian Science" (1997). Master's Theses. 4266. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/4266 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1997 Joshua William Rayman LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO THE PLACE OF OTHERNESS AND INDETERMINACY IN ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY BY JOSHUA WILLIAM RAYMAN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS MAY 1997 Copyright by Joshua William Rayman, 1997 All Rights Reserved DEDICATION For Allison, Graham, young William Henry, and Mom and Dad TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT........................................................................ v INTRODUCTION . 1 CHAPTER ONE--OTHERNESS AND INDETERMINACY . 4 CHAPTER TWO--POTENTIAL AND MATTER........................... 53 CHAPTER THREE--THE ACCIDENTAL..................................
    [Show full text]
  • Plato, Aristotle, and the Order of Things the Pre-Socratics Athenian
    1 Plato, Aristotle, and the Order of Things 2 The Pre-Socratics ß Ionians ß Pythagoreans ß Atomists o Provided first basic outlines of the core concerns of science o Demonstrated the range of possible approaches 3 Athenian Science ß The first time we have substantial written records ß The creation of the first sustained “schools” of philosophy ß Shaped the subsequent path of science (“natural philosophy”) for about 2000 years 4 Plato ß Philosopher ß Interesting in "knowing" ß Concerned with the soul and goodness ß Rejects concern with origins or nature of the world o This is from Socrates 5 Plato ß Design the central concept ß Perfection characterizes the design of the world uPerfect motions, perfect forms in the heavens uThe earth is corrupted 6 Aristotle ß Most influential of all Greek philosophers ß Pupil of Plato ß Observer of Nature 7 Master of Logic and Argument:The Syllogism ß Premise: Humans are mortal ÿ A general rule about the world that most people will have no trouble agreeing with. ß Observation: Socrates is human ÿ A specific instance that is readily confirmed by the senses. ß Conclusion: Socrates is mortal 8 BUT--the bad syllogism: ß Premise: Your dog had puppies ß Observation: Your dog is a mother 1 ß Conclusion: Your dog is your mother 9 Observer of Nature ß Classification of species ß Important correlations ß Embryology ß Hierarchy of Nature uPlants [vegetative soul] uAnimals [animal soul] uHumans [rational soul] 10 The causes of things ß Material uWhat something is made of ß Formal uThe design or form of something ß
    [Show full text]
  • PHI 110 Lecture 2 1 Welcome to Our Second Lecture on Personhood and Identity
    PHI 110 Lecture 2 1 Welcome to our second lecture on personhood and identity. We’re going to begin today what will be two lectures on Rene Descartes’ thoughts on this subject. The position that is attributed to him is known as mind/body dualism. Sometimes it’s simply called the dualism for short. We need to be careful, however, because the word dualism covers a number of different philosophical positions, not always dualisms of mind and body. In other words, there are other forms of dualism that historically have been expressed. And so I will refer to his position as mind/body dualism or as Cartesian dualism as it’s sometimes also called. I said last time that Descartes is not going to talk primarily about persons. He’s going to talk about minds as opposed to bodies. But I think that as we start getting into his view, you will see where his notion of personhood arises. Clearly, Descartes is going to identify the person, the self, with the mind as opposed to with the body. This is something that I hoped you picked up in your reading and certainly that you will pick up once you read the material again after the lecture. Since I’ve already introduced Descartes’ position, let’s define it and then I’ll say a few things about Descartes himself to give you a little bit of a sense of the man and of his times. The position mind/body that’s known as mind/body dualism is defined as follows: It’s the view that the body is a physical substance — a machine, if you will — while the mind is a non-physical thinking entity which inhabits the body and is responsible for its voluntary movements.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction to the Principles of Vacuum Physics
    1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF VACUUM PHYSICS Niels Marquardt Institute for Accelerator Physics and Synchrotron Radiation, University of Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund, Germany Abstract Vacuum physics is the necessary condition for scientific research and modern high technology. In this introduction to the physics and technology of vacuum the basic concepts of a gas composed of atoms and molecules are presented. These gas particles are contained in a partially empty volume forming the vacuum. The fundamentals of vacuum, molecular density, pressure, velocity distribution, mean free path, particle velocity, conductivity, temperature and gas flow are discussed. 1. INTRODUCTION — DEFINITION, HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS OF VACUUM The word "vacuum" comes from the Latin "vacua", which means "empty". However, there does not exist a totally empty space in nature, there is no "ideal vacuum". Vacuum is only a partially empty space, where some of the air and other gases have been removed from a gas containing volume ("gas" comes from the Greek word "chaos" = infinite, empty space). In other words, vacuum means any volume containing less gas particles, atoms and molecules (a lower particle density and gas pressure), than there are in the surrounding outside atmosphere. Accordingly, vacuum is the gaseous environment at pressures below atmosphere. Since the times of the famous Greek philosophers, Demokritos (460-370 B.C.) and his teacher Leukippos (5th century B.C.), one is discussing the concept of vacuum and is speculating whether there might exist an absolutely empty space, in contrast to the matter of countless numbers of indivisible atoms forming the universe. It was Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who claimed that nature is afraid of total emptiness and that there is an insurmountable "horror vacui".
    [Show full text]
  • Plato Aristotle Plato’S “Realm of Being”
    Plato Aristotle Plato’s “Realm of Being” P.58 "The philosopher's arithmetic applies precisely and strictly only to the world of Being". I am having a hard time understanding this part which seems to be Socrate's thinking. He is taking about equal and unequal units in math- where he says that the ordinary arithmetician operates with unequal units (becoming) and the philosopher with equal units (being). My question is: why does he think this and does that tell us something about how he sees the nature of numbers ultimately? — Loreta Plato’s “Realm of Being” If the realm is meant to be unchanging, and everything has a form, I find it hard to believe that the realm of being contains every possible object for the rest of time. But when new things such as computers are conceived into this world, does the realm of forms not change to account for a new concept? —Ariel Plato’s “Realm of Being” Just the other day I was thinking about why it is we dream of perfection and yet the world is never perfect in any regard. In that sense, I can understand why Plato posits that there is such thing as a world of Being and a World of Becoming, because I recognize the distinction. However, the World of Forms still seems to be a human's idealistic dream, something we believe will never exist in the physical world but is meant to exist anyway. I'm not sure if I can believe in something that is driven by just the idea of wanting it, since we dream of it.
    [Show full text]
  • D.O.A. (Danto, Warhol, Derrida) Adam Rosen-Carole 1 the Case Is Open and Shut. Clearly, It Was a Frame Up. Yet This Tells Us
    D.O.A. (Danto, Warhol, Derrida) Adam Rosen-Carole 1 The case is open and shut. Clearly, it was a frame up. Yet this tells us noth- ing, or next to nothing. As much as this will be a tale of the lucidity of mod- ern art and of philosophy’s insightful illumination of the logic of artistic inno- vation, indeed of convergent if competing aspirations to ideality, it will be, in a certain fashion, a murder mystery: tracking the mutual implication of death-dealing clarifications and turning on the death of the subject, the end of art, and la nature morte. None of which remain reposed in their authorita- tively pronounced passing. Thus this will be a ghost story of sorts: a tale of haunting, of survival and mutilation, of ruins and remnant forces, hence of undischargeable debts. Our main subject, if indeed there is one, and our frame, if we can speak of only one, will be complicity. “The guilt context of the living.”1 In this open and shut case, which is as much fiction as argu- ment and example, complicity is all-embracing. Dislocated already, awash in excess? Or just a middlebrow, commodi- fied rendition of the fate of high culture? Shadow-woven textures: condition and consequence of whatever light may be put into play. Dark indeed, for in this tale all are culprits. No accu- sation without self-implication: no privileged position from which to level charges and prosecute claims; no clean hands pointing to the guilty party without simultaneously implicating the accuser in a more or less symmet- COLLOQUY text theory critique 27 (2014).
    [Show full text]
  • Catalogue of Titles of Works Attributed to Aristotle
    Catalogue of Titles of works attributed by Aristotle 1 To enhance readability of the translations and usability of the catalogues, I have inserted the following bold headings into the lists. These have no authority in any manuscript, but are based on a theory about the composition of the lists described in chapter 3. The text and numbering follows that of O. Gigon, Librorum deperditorum fragmenta. PART ONE: Titles in Diogenes Laertius (D) I. Universal works (ta kathalou) A. The treatises (ta syntagmatika) 1. The dialogues or exoterica (ta dialogika ex terika) 2. The works in propria persona or lectures (ta autopros pa akroamatika) a. Instrumental works (ta organika) b. Practical works (ta praktika) c. Productive Works (ta poi tika) d. Theoretical works (ta the r tika) . Natural philosophy (ta physiologia) . Mathematics (ta math matika) B. Notebooks (ta hypomn matika) II. Intermediate works (ta metaxu) III. Particular works (ta merika) PART TWO: Titles in the Vita Hesychii (H) This list is organized in the same way as D, with two exceptions. First, IA2c “productive works” has dropped out. Second, there is an appendix, organized as follows: IV. Appendix A. Intermediate or Particular works B. Treatises C. Notebooks D. Falsely ascribed works PART THREE: Titles in Ptolemy al-Garib (A) This list is organized in the same way as D, except it contains none of the Intermediate or Particular works. It was written in Arabic, and later translated into Latin, and then reconstructed into Greek, which I here translate. PART FOUR: Titles in the order of Bekker (B) The modern edition contains works only in IA2 (“the works in propria persona”), and replaces the theoretical works before the practical and productive, as follows.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 a REFUTATION of QUALIA-PHYSICALISM Michael
    1 To appear in M. O’Rourke and C. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry (MIT Press) A REFUTATION OF QUALIA-PHYSICALISM Michael McKinsey Wayne State University Recent defenders of reductive physicalism such as Brian Loar (1990, 1997) and John Perry (2001) have adopted an intriguing new strategy:i (1) accept as so much common sense (nearly) everything that property-dualists want to say about sensory qualia, including the central claims that sensory qualia determine ‘what it’s like’ to have a given sense experience, and that persons are directly aware of these qualia in the having of such experiences; (2) contend that while these common sense facts about qualia may show that our ways of thinking and speaking about qualia are conceptually different from our ways of thinking and speaking about physical properties of the brain, these facts do not show that sensory qualia themselves (as opposed to our ways of thinking and speaking about them) are distinct from physical properties of the brain; (3) use this contention to turn aside the few existing arguments against reductive physicalism by such property dualists as Kripke (1972), Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982), and Chalmers (1996); and finally (4) insist that sensory qualia are in fact just identical with physical properties of the brain, so that consequently, the facts about the sensory qualities of conscious experience are nothing over and above physical facts about the brain. I will call the view that incorporates this strategy ‘qualia-physicalism’, or ‘Q-physicalism’ for short. In this paper I will argue that Q-physicalism is false.
    [Show full text]
  • Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, 1646-1716
    http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt2779p48t No online items Finding Aid for the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, 1646-1716 Processed by David MacGill; machine-readable finding aid created by Caroline Cubé © 2003 The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Finding Aid for the Gottfried 503 1 Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, 1646-1716 Finding Aid for the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, 1646-1716 Collection number: 503 UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections Manuscripts Division Los Angeles, CA Processed by: David MacGill, November 1992 Encoded by: Caroline Cubé Online finding aid edited by: Josh Fiala, October 2003 © 2003 The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Descriptive Summary Title: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Papers, Date (inclusive): 1646-1716 Collection number: 503 Creator: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716 Extent: 6 oversize boxes Repository: University of California, Los Angeles. Library. Dept. of Special Collections. Los Angeles, California 90095-1575 Abstract: Leibniz (1646-1716) was a philosopher, mathematician, and political advisor. He invented differential and integral calculus. His major writings include New physical hypothesis (1671), Discourse on metaphysics (1686), On the ultimate origin of things (1697), and On nature itself (1698). The collection consists of 35 reels of positive microfilm of more than 100,000 handwritten pages of manuscripts and letters. Physical location: Stored off-site at SRLF. Advance notice is required for access to the collection. Please contact the UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections Reference Desk for paging information. Language: English. Restrictions on Use and Reproduction Property rights to the physical object belong to the UCLA Library, Department of Special Collections.
    [Show full text]
  • EDITORIAL Horror Vacui
    EDITORIAL Horror Vacui Each completed issue of the Laboratories shall be encouraged to follow suit in the PJP is no small feat. The editorial upcoming issues, as NRL outputs are critical to fill in the process is not as simple as gaps in national laboratory policies. receiving articles, laying them out and sending them to press. This second issue now also features representative Additional processes, based articles for the “Review” and “Autopsy Vault” sections. on international standards, The article by Bajpai and Pardhe proposes a working are now in place in between classification for oral neoplasms with basaloid point of submission and final morphology. The submission by Lo and Lique discusses publication, to assure quality: a a clinical enigma whose rare cause was solved checklist of requirements and postmortem. Both provide important learning points forms need to be submitted at the outset; a review of for pathologists and diagnosticians. statistical methods, if applicable, need to be hurdled; a blind peer review system must be completed to help Moreover, we are happy to introduce “Diagnostic the editor arrive at a decision to either accept or reject Perspectives,” a new type of article for the PJP with a submitted manuscript; and then, there is the back characteristics in between a feature article, a case and forth communication between author and editor, report, and images in pathology. Through this, we to ensure that suggested changes are discussed and aim to feature new technologies and innovations considered. It does not end there. Between author that improve diagnostics and ultimately, clinical resubmission to final publication lie copyediting and management.
    [Show full text]