Thames Lessons Learned Analysis

THAMES ROWING CLUB LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS INCIDENTS 2020 Thames has been involved in a number of serious incidents over the years, with the consequences ranging from significant boat damage, to immersion in the river, and in one case, a fatality. A number of learning points can be taken from these incidents and attention should be paid to these in order to minimise future injuries and damage. There are three primary causes of incidents on the Tideway: 1) Poor navigation; 2) Poor lookout; 3) Poor risk assessment. DOVE PIER INCIDENT The ‘Dove Pier’ incident in October 2006 was the catalyst for many of the safety rules currently in place. The incident involved a novice W8+ from Thames, accompanied by a coaching launch on a fast flood tide. The crew became separated from the launch as it approached Hammersmith Bridge and with a motor vessel approaching coming downstream, the cox moved to starboard (bowside) in order to avoid it. However the cox had not appreciated the strength of the tidal flow which pulled the boat towards Dove Pier. The coaching launch was too far away to assist. The 8 collided with the pier and broke apart. When the coach tried to help his launch was also swamped. Rowers and cox were rescued by the occupants of the Dove Pier houseboats, the RNLI and other clubs and escaped unharmed. Lessons learned: 1) Coaches of inexperienced crews and steers should make all efforts to remain in close contact with their crew in order to take early preventative action in such situations; 2) When proceeding upstream on the flood tide, sufficient distance should be kept from the green buoy which is now placed downstream of Dove Pier, and from the pier itself. If a kit/drink break is planned, only stop paddling upstream of the pier. ELISE LAVERICK/BLACK BUOY INCIDENT An intermediate women’s 4- with an inexperienced steers was out on a weekend morning, accompanied by a coach. They were on the way back from their outing, proceeding downstream with the ebb tide in the fairway. Near the Mile Post the coaching launch ran out of fuel. The coach had a paddle and paddled into the inshore zone to float back downstream and land the launch. The rowers were told to keep paddling back towards Putney in the fairway. The crew were too far to starboard/bowside approaching the Black Buoy and collided with it. With the boat severely damaged they capsized. The rowers were able to climb on to the Black Buoy and two coaching launches were mustered to help. One of them, with an experienced driver and passenger on board, became entangled in an object in the water while trying to gain access to the buoy and flipped, trapping both driver and passenger in the water. One of the rowers, who had managed to climb onto the Black Buoy, was able to pull the launch passenger out of the water while its driver managed to free himself. There were no lasting injuries. The shell was almost snapped in two. Lessons learned: 1) Coaches should always make sure they have sufficient fuel for their outing; had the 4- been accompanied by a coach he would have been able to warn them before the collision; 2) Attention should be paid to the experience of the steers and the shell they are in; the Elise was at the time the top women’s coxless shell and this crew should not have been using it; 3) Steers should stay well away from the Black Buoy and keep a good lookout as they approach it from Barn Elms. ‘FAKE HORR’ INCIDENT This incident was the catalyst for the rules now in place governing rowing below Putney Bridge and the need for risk assessments for that stretch. The Head of the River Race was cancelled in 2017 the day before the event due to forecast high winds on the ebb tide. However conditions were set to be favourable on the flood tide. Thames, together with Imperial College, Tideway Scullers and Edinburgh University agreed to hold a private match. The coaches decided to hold the match on the stretch between Chelsea Bridge and Putney Bridge as they thought it would be quieter. However, instead of running a head race they elected to run a side-by-side race. Before racing the crews encountered a tug vessel. There is disagreement over the exact actions which the tug took; her driver said he had sounded his horn but the TRC coaches and coxes said they did not hear the horn. Racing then began with four crews abreast. Despite being shouted at by coaches in following launches, an Imperial 8 hit Albert Bridge, causing serious damage to their shell and tipping all nine crew members into the water. They were rescued. Lessons learned: 1) Any race involving more than two crews is subject to a risk assessment; 2) No rowing below Putney Bridge within 2½ hours of high tide; 3) Never row three abreast; 4) If a formal race is cancelled, suck it up and do an erg. MICHAEL HILL This is the only incident involving Thames which resulted in a fatality. Although the lessons to be learned are mainly for coaches, rowers and steers should also take note. Mike Hill was a volunteer women’s coach at Thames who had previously coached at Latymer and London and had significant experience on the Tideway. He had joined the club in the autumn; due to his prior experience he did not go through any formal sign-off procedure for launch driving. The club also did not hold details of his next of kin. Mike, together with the head women’s coach, was due to coach an evening outing on a very cold night in February 2015. He had problems with two launches in succession and told the crew he was coaching to get going, and that he would catch them up. The head coach also boated before Mike was ready with a launch. It is unclear exactly what happened next; the theory is that while trying to get his tiller launch started Mike either detached his kill cord from his lifejacket, or had not done his lifejacket up properly. Somehow, after starting the engine, he fell from the launch into the water near the Black Buoy. A passer-by from Imperial heard Mike shouting for help and jumped in to try and find him, but as it was dark was unable to and had to exit the water due to the cold. The unmanned launch was spinning out of control and collided with one of the moored boats. The RNLI and police were called and an extensive search was carried out for several hours, but eventually called off. Mike’s body was later found in the Wandsworth area, without a lifejacket. At the coroner’s inquest the captain and head coach gave evidence and the verdict was accidental drowning. However, as a result Thames significantly strengthened its launch-driving tests and launch-driving criteria. Lessons learned: 1) Particularly in the dark, crews should wait until their coach has successfully boated and started their engine before moving off OR should wait at Barn Elms for their coach; do not proceed with the outing without a coach in the dark and stay in a group; 2) Coaches should always ensure their lifejacket is on and fastened with crotch straps attached before they boat. Kill cords should be attached to the lifejacket; 3) Coaches should also check before the outing that the lights on the launch work, and that a bung is fitted; 4) All potential launch drivers must go through the necessary testing before driving a launch solo; 5) All club members should ensure they have emergency contact details logged on their British Rowing accounts. WILLIAM SAUNDERS INCIDENT In March 2013, the William Saunders (a M8+) was part of a coached group which had paddled to Westminster and were doing a piece back upstream on the way home. It was coxed by an experienced cox. However, as they came through Chelsea Bridge the WS was still too far to starboard, failed to move and hit the first, large mooring buoy upriver of the bridge. The crew held the boat up hard but too late to avoid a collision; 2’s blade took most of the impact and 2 and 4’s riggers were wedged on the buoy. The boat tipped to bowside and then capsized. One of 6-seat’s heel restraints failed to release and he had to be helped to release his feet, although his head was out of the water at this point. Bow’s blade handle broke in the process of the boat capsizing. The rowers used the boat as a buoyancy aid and swam it to shallower water, where they were rescued by the coaching launches. Lessons learned: 1) Proper risk assessments should be carried out when navigating downstream of Putney Bridge, as coxes and steers are generally unfamiliar with this stretch; 2) Bow pair should look around more, especially when in an unfamiliar stretch of river, or when conditions are potentially risky; 3) Always make sure your heel restraints are attached. NEVER untie heel restraints – they are there to enable you to escape from the boat in the event of a capsize; 4) NEVER leave your boat if it capsizes. JOHN STEPHENSON GROUNDING The men’s 1st 8+, rowing in the newest shell and coxed by an experienced cox, were on an evening outing at low tide. Above Chiswick Bridge they grounded the boat hard on a shoal, to the extent that there was significant water ingress and crew members were required to bail on the paddle home.

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