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Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 29, November, 1983 South Korea, Soviet Union, Page 32513 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Shooting down of South Korea airliner by Soviet ﬁghter International repercussions

Summary and key dates

South Korea airliner shot down by Soviet fighter (Sept. 1 Soviet veto of draft UN security Council resolution (Sept. 12 European Parliament resolution critical of Soviet Union (Sept 15. Temporary ban by airline pilots on flights to and from Soviet Union agreed (Sept 6. Suspension of Aeroflot landing rights by many Western countries (mid-September)

A South Korea Boeing 747 airliner was shot down by a Soviet fighter on the night of Aug. 31–Sept. 1, 1983, apparently while flying over the Soviet territory of Sakhalin (a large island in the Sea of Okhotsk, to the north of Japan), and all 269 passengers and crew were presumed to have died in the ensuing crash although only four bodies had been recovered from the sea by late October. The incident caused widespread protest (particularly among the non- communist countries of the world, but also from the People's Republic of China and from Yugoslavia) at what was felt to be an inadmissible use of Soviet military force against a civilian craft in peacetime, and many of these countries decided in the following weeks to impose retaliatory sanctions against the Soviet Union, such as the suspension of landing rights for the Soviet airline Aeroflot or the suspension of their own airlines” flights to and from the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile investigations continued into the reasons for the airliner's presence over Soviet territory, although no clear conclusions had been reached by late October. While Western sources variously attributed the airliner's deviation from its planned route either to a failure of its navigational equipment or to an attempt by the pilot to save time and fuel by deliberately shortening the route, Soviet sources consistently maintained that it had instead been conducting an intelligence operation on behalf of the United States with the aim of establishing details of military installations in the area. In this connexion the United States authorities conceded on Sept. 5 that an American RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft had indeed ﬂown a mission in the area on the night of the shooting, although they maintained that it had remained in international airspace throughout its mission and that it had landed on a Japanese island one hour before the shooting took place.

The Boeing 747, belonging to Korean Air Lines, had been on flight KAL-007 from NewYork to Seoul (the South Korea capital) at the time of the shooting, and had made a refuelling stop at Anchorage (Alaska) before heading south-west along a course which should have taken it first across the North Pacific, to the east of the Kurile Islands, and then to the south-east of Hokkaido (the most northerly island of Japan) before crossing Japan to reach South Korea. Instead of this, according to the Japanese air traffic controllers, it veered off course after leaving Alaska and set a direct course for Seoul so that it passed over the Soviet territory of the Kamchatka Peninsula, then on into international airspace over the Sea of Okhotsk and finally across the island of Sakhalin where it was intercepted and later destroyed by the Soviet aircraft.

There was considerable uncertainty as to the nationality of persons aboard the aircraft at the time of its destruction. A revised list issued on Sept. 4 by Korean Air Lines stated that, apart from the 29 crew members (all of whom were South Koreans), there had been 81 other South Koreans, 56 Americans, 28 Japanese, 23 citizens of Taiwan, 15 Filipinos, 13 residents of Hong Kong, 10 Canadians, six Thais, four Australians, one Swede, one Malaysian, one Indian and one Vietnamese citizen aboard; however, subsequent reports claimed that the number of US citizens had been 61, and also that a British citizen named as Mr Ian Powrie had been killed in the incident. Among the Americans was Mr Lawrence P McDonald (Democrat, Georgia), a member of the US House of Representatives.

Mr George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, told a press conference in Washington on Sept. 1 that the aircraft had been destroyed over Sakhalin by a missile ﬁred by one of eight Soviet ﬁghters which, he claimed, had tracked it for some 2 1/2 hours across the Sea of Okhotsk but had made no attempt at communication with it before attacking. He said that the United States reacted “with revulsion” to this “appalling act” for which he saw “no excuse whatsoever”.

President Reagan, who was on holiday at the time, issued a statement on Sept. 1 ordering the State Department to demand “an immediate and full account” of the incident from the Soviet Union, for which he said that that country owed an explanation to the world. He met the National security Council on Sept. 2, when he said that the “brutal” Soviet action indicated a “stark contrast… between Soviet words and deeds”, adding: “What can we think of a regime that so broadly trumpets its vision of peace and global disarmament and yet so callously and quickly commits a terrorist act to sacriﬁce the lives of innocent human beings?”.

The then South Korea Foreign Minister, Mr Lee Bum Suk, said on Sept. 2 that his country was uncertain as to why the airliner had been off course but that its destruction had been a “shameless” and “savage” act; he called on the Soviet Union to apologize, to pay compensation for the loss of life and property and to “punish the perpetrators” of the attack, and he demanded a meeting of the United Nations security Council. [see below]

Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, summoned the Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mr

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Viktor Popov, on Sept. 2 to demand an apology, compensation and the punishment of the offending ofﬁcers, although he stressed in a television interview later that day that the incident should not be allowed to disrupt the Geneva talks on arms control which were currently being conducted between the Soviet Union and the United States. [see 32460 A]

It was also reported that the French, West German, Dutch and Japanese Governments had on Sept. 2 conveyed to the respective Soviet ambassadors in their countries the seriousness of their concern over the issue; the West German Government called the shooting “an inconceivable act of unsurpassed brutality”, while the French Government said that it “placed in question the principles which govern international relations and respect for human life”. The Italian Government referred to it as “a mad gesture of war” which could harm the Geneva talks, and the Belgian Foreign Ministry called it a “cynical action”. The Chinese Government on Sept. 2 expressed its “shock and regret” at the Soviet action, and the Australian and Canadian Governments voiced strong protests over the issue during the following days. The Netherlands cancelled a Soviet ministerial visit which had been planned for Sept. 13, and the French Government postponed (to Sept. 9–10) a proposed visit to Paris by Mr Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, which had been scheduled for Sept. 5–6. [For further cancellations of meetings with Soviet ministers and ofﬁcials, see below.]

Pope John Paul II on Sept. 2 expressed his shock at the incident and conveyed his “heartfelt condolences” to South Korea, but he refrained on the whole from further comment on the issue. Anti-Soviet demonstrations over the shooting were reported on Sept. 4 in South Korea, in Japan and in the United States.

The Soviet news agency Tass stated on Sept. 1 only that “an unidentified plane” had twice violated Soviet airspace (i. e. over Kamchatka and then over Sakhalin) on the night of Aug. 31–Sept. 1, and claimed that it “did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries and did not enter into contact with the despatcher service”; therefore, it said, Soviet fighters belonging to the anti-aircraft forces had attempted to guide the “intruder plane” to a Soviet airfield (as had also happened to a Korean Air Lines jet in April 1978–see 29060 A), but that it had ignored their signals and warnings and had proceeded towards the Sea of Japan.

While confirming on Sept. 2 that a Soviet fighter had fired warning tracer shots at an “unidentified intruder plane”, it was not until Sept. 6 that Tass issued a revised government statement acknowledging that the Soviet pilot had “fulfilled the order of the command post to stop the flight” of the South Korea plane, after the latter had allegedly ignored attempts to communicate on the international emergency frequency [but see also below], and after it had also ignored warning tracer shells fired by his fighter. (Western press sources later maintained that the aircraft responsible for the attack, a Sukhoi-15, was not equipped with guns which could have fired tracer shells but was armed solely with two missiles, both of which were used in the shooting.) Tass insisted that the Soviet action had been “fully in keeping with the law on the state border of the USSR”, and added that its forces would “continue to act in keeping with [Soviet] legislation, which is fully in accord with international regulations”, insisting that the country had a right to protect its borders and its airspace.

The Soviet Union had in late November 1982 introduced a new law on the state borders [see page 31898]which had, according to Western reports, not merely reorganized the structure of border defence commands but had substantially enhanced the authority of regional commands to order the opening of ﬁre on intruders.

The Tass statement of Sept. 6 alleged that the Soviet pilots had not recognized the South Korea airliner as a civilian passenger aircraft but had believed it to be a Boeing RC-135 reconnaissance plane (a modified version of the Boeing 707 which, Tass claimed, had flown near to the “intruder plane” during its flight. Adding that the South Korea plane had “transmitted from time to time… short coded radio signals such as are usually used in transmitting intelligence information”, it concluded that the airliner had been on a spying mission; therefore, while reiterating the Soviet Government's regret over the death of entirely innocent people, the statement placed the “entire responsibility for this tragedy wholly and fully [on] the leaders of the United States”. (In a number of statements on Sept. 6 Soviet commentators asked why, as both Japanese and US monitoring services were apparently aware of the aircraft's incorrect flight path, they did not inform the pilot of his error.)

Tass referred on Sept. 6 to Kamchatka as “an area where a most important base of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR is located”; the reconnaissance ﬂights of the American RC-135 in the international airspace of the Sea of Okhotsk were, although routine, thought by Western observers to be connected on this occasion with the planned test launch of a prototype Soviet missile which would eventually carry nuclear warheads.

The Soviet armed forces had for some years been increasing their strength in the area of the north-west Paciﬁc [see for example, pages 30792-93], and only two days before the shooting down of the airliner the Japanese Defence Agency had reported that a new force of Soviet MiG-23 ﬁghters had been stationed on the island of Iturup (one of the Kurile Islands–at its nearest some 80 miles from Hokkaido–which Japan claimed was held by the Soviet Union illegally [ibid.]). It was reported in early September that there were about 1,600 naval personnel and two ground divisions of about 16,000 men each based on Sakhalin.

Western press sources noted in connexion with the shooting that both the United States and the Soviet Union regularly infringed each other's airspace. Gen. Semyon Romanov, the chief of the main staff of the Soviet anti-aircraft forces, claimed in a statement published by Tass on Sept. 4 that US military aircraft had already violated the Soviet border in the region of the Kurile Islands nine times since the beginning of 1983, while the United States for its part maintained that during the same period 77 Soviet airliners travelling from Murmansk (in the extreme north-west of the Soviet Union) to Havana (Cuba) had entered the air defence monitoring zone of the

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United States. (For the November 1981 flight of two Aeroflot airliners over restricted US military zones see page 32220], The American magazine Time reported on Sept. 5 that US reconnaissance flights by military aircraft had “triggered the firing of more than 900 ground-to-air missiles, so far without a hit”, while on the other hand the Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda claimed on Sept. 6 that the Soviet Union possessed “reliable information showing that American special services are increasingly using civil aviation planes for reconnaissance missions”, and that “such reconnaissance is also conducted systematically during flights through the established [air] corridors”.

As far as could be ascertained from Soviet sources the Soviet monitoring authorities claimed to have identified seven American RC-135 reconnaissance flights in the nearby international airspace on the night of Aug. 31–Sept. 1, when the shooting took place (the USA having in turn reported a noticeable increase in Soviet aerial activity on the same night). They had despatched anti-aircraft planes to notify the airliner of its intrusion but had apparently lost contact with it until it reached Sakhalin, when a new group of fighters was sent up. Gen. Romanov claimed on Sept. 4 that these fighters had, after the failure of attempts at radio contact, flashed their lights and rocked their wings in accordance with international aviation practice to attract the attention of the airliner's pilot, but that the airliner had flown on over Sakhalin at a height of some 30,000 feet (Japanese accounts concurring with this estimate), whereupon tracers and eventually missiles had been fired.

American and Japanese sources agreed that the pilot had told the Japanese air traffic control (which was reponsible for its flight path from the vicinity of Kamchatka southwards) throughout the journey that he was on course as scheduled, whereas the aircraft was in fact up to 300 miles to the west of its determined path. The Soviet fighter which eventually attacked it was thought to have made initial contact at 18.12 hours GMT (Aug. 31-i. e. early on Sept. 1 local time), and to have fired both missiles at 18.26 hours, having manoevred to within one or two kilometres of the airliner and having moved forward and backward along its sides (the Soviet authorities subsequently claiming on Sept. 13 that the airliner had slowed down in an attempt to evade its pursuers). The Sukhoi-15 was one of four Soviet fighters which intercepted the airliner, the others involved being thought to include MiG-23 aircraft; its pilot had reported immediately after firing that the target had been destroyed, but according to Japanese air traffic controllers the airliner had glided down for 12 minutes, disappearing from radar screens at 18.38 hours GMT. Apart from a sudden burst of interference shortly before loss of radio contact when the aircraft was hit, Japanese controllers said that there was no indication from the pilot that he suspected that anything was wrong until the shots were fired. (Subsequent processing of the tapes of this last communication suggested a sudden loss of pressure and the failure of more than one engine immediately upon the impact of the missiles.)

An emergency meeting of the United Nations security Council was held at the instigation of the United States in New York on Sept. 3–4, when the South Korea observer, Mr Kim Kyung Won, described the attack as “a barbaric act” on the part of the Soviet authorities; the Soviet delegate, Mr Richard Ovinnikov, however, dismissed the meeting as a propaganda exercise staged by the United States with the aim of showing the USSR in a misleading light.

A further session of the security Council was called on Sept. 6 at which recordings of the Soviet pilot's conversation with his ground control were played. It emerged from these that he had attempted to contact the Boeing 747 using a standard IFF (Identify, Friend or Foe) transponder, but Western press sources reported (i) that no civilian airliner was normally equipped with IFF transmission equipment, which was used exclusively for military purposes, and (ii) that Soviet military aircraft might, unlike US ﬁghters, be unable to trigger the airliner's SIF (Selective Identiﬁcation Feature) transponder using their IFF equipment. (The United States disputed throughout this period the Soviet claim that an attempt at contact had been made using the international emergency wavelength of 121.5 metres.)

The security Council issued on Sept. 9 a draft resolution on the incident which was approved on Sept. 12 by nine members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Jordan, Malta, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Togo and Zaïre) but opposed by Poland and the Soviet Union, which used its veto to block the adoption of the resolution. China, Guyana, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe abstained in the vote.

The blocked resolution stated that the security Council:

“ (i) deeply deplores the destruction of the Korean airliner and the tragic loss of civilian life therein;

“(ii) declares that such use of force against international civil aviation is incompatible with the norms governing international behaviour and elementary considerations of humanity;

“(iii) urges all states to comply with the aims and objectives of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation [of 1944];

“(iv) welcomes the decision to convene an urgent meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] Council to consider the Korean airliner incident;

(v)“ urges all states to co-operate fully with the ICAO in efforts to strengthen the safety of international civil aviation and to prevent any recurrence of such use of armed force against international civil aviation;

(vi)“ invites the (UN) Secretary-General, making use of such expert advice as he deems necessary and in consultation with appropriate international bodies, to conduct a full investigation into the circumstances of the tragedy;

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(vii)“ further invites the Secretary-General to report his ﬁndings to the security Council within 14 days;

“(viii) calls upon all states to lend their fullest co-operation to the Secretary-General in order to facilitate his investigation pursuant to this resolution;

(ix)“ decides to remain seized of the issue.”

It had been reported on Sept. 8 that a more strongly-worded resolution naming the Soviet Union had originally been proposed by the Western member nations, but that its tone had been modiﬁed in order to attract the support of enough members of the developing world to reach the nine votes required for the passage of the resolution. The Soviet veto was its 116th use of this measure and the ﬁrst since the security Council's resolution of 1980 condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan[see pages 30236-37].

The Soviet permanent representative, Mr Oleg Troyanovsky, said at the Sept. 12 session that the United States, in introducing the draft resolution, had tried “cynically” to distract world attention from the persons responsible for the tragedy, and claimed that the airliner had been used as “a shield for unsavoury and inhuman operations”. Tass, in reporting the use of the Soviet veto, said on Sept. 12 that the United States had failed “to push through an illegitimate resolution and thus to avoid responsibility for the gross espionage provocation carried out against the Soviet Union”.

President Reagan made a televised speech to the American nation on Sept. 5, when he announced the suspension of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on various matters of cultural, scientific and diplomatic significance as a token of protest over the incident. (However, contrary to the demands of many conservative politicians within the USA, he did not order the suspension of grain sales to the Soviet Union, as President Carter had done in response to the Afghanistan crisis–ibid.-nor did he ban sales of high-technology items, as for example in 1981–82 over the Polish crisis—(see 31453 A; 31722 A; 31965 B) He said that negotiations over the opening of a Soviet consulate in New York and of a US consulate in Kiev were to be suspended again (having first been stopped in 1980 by President Carter) and that the ban on landings by Aeroflot airliners in the United States (in force since the beginning of 1982—see 31453 A) was to continue. The closure of the Aeroflot offices in New York and in Washington and the temporary expulsion of their staffs were announced by the President on Sept. 9, and the US House of Representatives decided on Sept. 15 by 416 votes to none to condemn what it termed “one of the most infamous and reprehensible acts in history”.

Sir Geoffrey Howe said on Sept. 6 in Madrid (where he was attending the follow-up session of the Conference on security and Co-operation in Europe) that the United Kingdom agreed with the main themes of President Reagan's speech and that it would be co-ordinating with its allies “a carefully considered reaction”. Mr Lee Jin Hie, the South Korea Minister of Information and Culture, said on Sept. 6 that his country welcomed and supported the President's “just and appropriate” sanctions, and Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone, the Japanese Prime Minister, said on the same day that his country was considering sanctions over the “unimaginably barbarous act” committed by the Soviet Union.

The French Government said on Sept. 6 that it was “studying” President Reagan's proposals, although it subsequently introduced no sanctions, and the Dutch Government announced that a forthcoming visit to Moscow by its Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries, Mr Gerrit Braks, was to be cancelled while a visit to the Netherlands by Mr Viktor Kompletkov, a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, was also being postponed (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the United Kingdom also postponing visits by Soviet Foreign Ministry ofﬁcials during the following weeks). A meeting (at permanent representative level) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries was held in Brussels on Sept. 9 at the suggestion of West Germany; as explained below, most NATO countries subsequently imposed a 14-day ban on Aeroﬂot landings in their territories.

The member countries of the European Community made repeated efforts during this period to reach agreement on a statement condemning the Soviet Union for its actions during and after the incident, but such efforts were repeatedly blocked by Greece (currently holding the presidency of the Community), which refused at a meeting of ofﬁcials in Athens on Sept. 6 to agree to any resolution beyond a call for an inquiry. A subsequent meeting at Foreign Minister level in Athens on Sept. 12 resulted only in a statement declaring that the 10 member countries “reafﬁrm their deep emotion at the destruction of the aircraft of Korean Air Lines, which resulted in the loss of a great number of human lives”, after the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr Ioannis Charalambopoulos, had again refused any criticism of the Soviet Union. The European Parliament, however, approved on Sept. 15 a resolution condemning the Soviet Union over the issue (with principally Greek Socialist members voting against).

There was widespread agreement among non- communist countries on the need to press through the ICAO for the reform of international civil aviation legislation, and particularly for the addition of an annex to the Chicago Convention banning attacks on international civil aviation in times of peace (Canada formally proposing such an annex on Sept. 20), for greater co-operation between military and civilian air trafﬁc controllers and for a full inquiry into the incident. The ICAO Council began an emergency session in Montreal on Sept. 15, and approved on Sept. 18 by 26 votes to two (with China, India and Algeria abstaining, and with Lebanon and Iraq absent) a motion “deeply regretting” the incident but not directly criticizing the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union opposed the resolution, which also called for an ICAO investigation and which declared that military force was unacceptable against international civil aviation.

Pilots of the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) declared a 60-day ban on ﬂights to the Soviet Union, starting on Sept. 7, while

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Finnish and Italian pilots also refused to fly to the Soviet Union for periods of 60 days, following a recommendation to this effect which was approved on Sept. 6 by the governing committee of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots” Associations (IFALPA- representing some 57,000 affiliated members from 67 countries including the Soviet Union). The recommendation, which was not binding on members, was endorsed by the British Air Line Pilots” Association (BALPA), which banned all flights to the Soviet Union from Sept. 7, and also by the Dutch, West German, and Irish associations. The West German Government, which did not formally authorize a flight ban by the airline Lufthansa at first, was nonetheless forced in mid-September to abandon such flights to the Soviet Union because it was unable to organize crews, and French and Spanish airlines were also forced to withdraw flights despite the wishes of their respective governments. Italy, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands withdrew Soviet flights by their national airlines for periods of two months from mid-September, and the Belgian, Japanese and Swiss Governments suspended flights for periods of two weeks. The IFALPA ban on flights to and from the Soviet Union was on Sept. 30 suspended effective Oct. 3 in the light of the evident determination among ICAO member countries to “achieve an international instrument to prevent any recurrence of a tragedy similar to the KAL-007 incident”.

In addition to the above action by pilots” associations, a large number of Western countries suspended Aeroﬂot landing rights on their territories, generally for the fortnight from Sept. 15 to 28 inclusive but in some cases–including Canada on Sept. 5–for a longer period of up to 60 days. (For continuing ban on Aeroﬂot landings in the United States, see above.)

The Soviet press claimed that the bans on flights to and from the Soviet Union would damage only the interests of Western countries, but it was noted that the closure of Shannon airport in the Republic of Ireland to Aeroflot would effectively close the Soviet air routes to Cuba, which used Shannon as a refuelling point. Aeroflot announced on Sept. 14 that it would refuse to accept any Aeroflot tickets which had been issued by US carriers, although other countries” Aeroflot tickets would be accepted.

Although the airliner had been shot down inside Soviet airspace, parts of it were thought to have landed in international waters near Moneron island (to the west of the southern tip of Sakhalin) in the Sea of Japan, and a large number of Soviet, US and South Korea vessels immediately began a search in international waters for the wreckage, although all foreign ships were turned back from Soviet territorial waters. The “black box” ﬂight recorder, which would normally emit sonar signals for about one month after a crash, had not been reported found by late October.

Japan was ﬁrst informed on Sept. 3 by the Soviet Union that wreckage had been found near Moneron island, and 76 objects from the wreck were handed over to Japan on Sept. 26. By this time parts of four bodies had been found in the sea.

By mid-October a number of relatives of the dead were seeking compensation in the US courts from the Soviet Government, from Korean Air Lines, from the estates of the pilot and co-pilot, from the Boeing Corporation and from Litton Industries (which had built the airliner's navigation equipment). The Soviet charge d”affaires in Washington, Mr Oleg Sokolov, refused on Sept. 12 to receive either a US or a South Korea diplomatic note demanding compensation, and the Soviet embassy in Ottowa rejected on Sept. 16 for the second time a similar demand from Canada.

The debate continued throughout September and October as to the reasons for the airliner's presence over Sakhalin. Japanese and South Korea experts regarded the simultaneous failure of all three independent navigation systems aboard the Boeing as unlikely, although it was subsequently claimed that one system had been giving trouble during the first part of the flight to Anchorage. Other Western sources maintained that the airline's pilots had often entered Soviet airspace in order to shorten their flight paths (by flying a great circle route) and to save up to six tonnes of fuel. Japanese flight controllers pointed out on Sept. 2 that the pilot had given his position as 41 degrees north and 147 degrees east at a time when it was actually close to 47 degrees north and 141 degrees east, and raised the possibility of human error.

Tass, on the other hand, maintained on Sept. 19 that the aircraft had aligned its ﬂight path with that of a US intelligence satellite which it claimed had been passing overhead at the time, and the Soviet Army newspaper Red Star claimed on Sept. 16 that Korean Air Lines had been supported since the late 1960s by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which, it claimed, had installed special equipment in its aircraft.

According to a report in the New York Times (on Oct. 7), US intelligence experts, after reviewing all the available evidence, had by mid-September come to the conclusion that Soviet air defence personnel did not know that the aircraft was a commercial one before the attack. The specialists were confident that the SU-15 fighter involved was below and behind the airliner rather than parallel to it, and that “given the difficulty of identifying a plane from below… the Soviet pilot probably did not know what kind of plane he was shooting down”. The report went on to state that many of the analysts who had examined the tapes and electronic reconnaissance information now believed that “the Soviet air defence command was operating on the assumption that the SU-15 was tracking a smaller US Air Force RC-135 reconnaissance plane”, one of which had indeed been flying in the area on the night of the shooting. [see above]—(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts - Soviet Embassy Press Department, London - Times - Guardian - Daily Telegraph - New York - Times International Herald Tribune - Le Monde - Neue Zïrcher Zeitung - Japan Times Weekly) (Prev. rep. 29060 A)

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