ANALYSIS CHINA

CHINA AND RUSSIA:

GAMING THE WEST?

Introduction

ABOUT by François Godement

The Chinese have long been obsessed In September 2016, Russia held joint naval manoeuvres in with strategic culture, power balances and the South China Sea with China, bringing some of its best geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, ships to the party. Two weeks later, China shied away from think-tanks, journals and web-based debates joining Russia in a veto of yet another Western resolution are growing in number and quality, giving China’s foreign policy breadth and depth. on Syria at the UN. The discrepancy sums up the extent and the limits of the strategic convergence between both China Analysis introduces European countries. audiences to these debates inside China’s expert and think-tank world and helps the The “axis of convenience” between China and Russia has, European policy community understand how China’s leadership thinks about domestic without question, grown larger. And the positive dynamics and foreign policy issues. While freedom pushing cooperation forward are largely economic. But of expression and information remain there is also a negative dynamic, coming from the West. restricted in China’s media, these published Both countries have a perception of regime insecurity that sources and debates provide an important emerges from the international promotion of democracy, and way of understanding emerging trends within China. the attractiveness of corruption-free and comparably safe Western societies for individuals, be they Chinese or Russian. Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese But economic growth isn't the only thing drawing China mainland sources. However, it also monitors and Russia together. The possible eastward extension content in Chinese-language publications from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which of NATO, the high-tech superiority of the US and other occasionally include news and analysis that Western armaments has not been undermined by the is not published in the mainland and reflects financial crises and political uncertainties of established the diversity of Chinese thinking. democracies. This is why China and Russia describe their moves as reactive rather than assertive. For Russia, it means the possibility of mounting pre-emptive strikes and sudden regional escalation that leads to conflict dominance, as is the case today in the Syrian civil war. For China, it is the endless increase in military spending and October 2016 2 ECFR/195 November 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA AND RUSSIA: GAMING THE WEST? functioning alliance, butcanwebesurethattheirissue- issues. ChinaandRussiamightnotbeabletoforma for risk-freestrategicconvergence onagrowinglistof the weaknessofWestern alliancescreatesopportunities interests. ChinaandRussiaarenotperfectpartners, but endure, whateverthemisgivings, distrustanddiversityof reason whyastrongChinese-Russianpartnershipcannot engagement policieswithcontainmentpolicies, thereisno from politics,andwhereinternationalrelationsoftenmix separatedincreasingly is economics world where a In ended allianceswithChina. that have century nineteenth the Russian turnaroundssince English by Nonetheless, inaChineseversionofpiecepublished where Russianparticipantsweregrantedfrontrowseats. this October, Beijing PLA-inspired XiangshanForumin Ying, nowakeyspeakerforChina, presidedoverthelatest countries. ItisentertainingtoseethatleadingdiplomatFu dispute lurkbehindthesurfaceofrelationsbetweentwo identity lingering a even and distrust Historical sectors. of technologytoChina, even inthemilitaryandaerospace cannot dictateorhelpwith. Russiaisonlyaminorsupplier Europe andonthepriceofoilgas–thingsthatChina well aware,Russia’swell-beingstilldependsontradewith that makesthisconjunctionimpressive.Asourwritersare It isonlythegrowingmalaiseinsideWestern democracies competition formarketsandinfluence. that thisisaprojectforthelonghaulandwithelementsof cited inthisspecialissueofChinaAnalysismakeitclear domination atseaisanothercause–althoughthewriters significant projectsthatmightsomewhatbalancetheUS strategicallywith landmass Eurasian the years. Bridging over theorganisationhasgrownconsiderablyinrecent influencebudgetary China’s as interest of topic key a becomingis UN the restraining and Invoking situations. law onterritorialissues, althoughinverydifferent share atrackrecordoffloutingorrejectinginternational team uponanissue-by-issuebasis. BothChinaandRussia justifications forsuchanalliance, butmanyopportunitiesto strongare few alliance withRussia.there Indeed,new a debating theopportunityofhas itssecondtrackexperts since thedemiseofSino-Soviettreatyin1960currently alliancesany into enter to refused that has Still, theChina influence. andpower view ofnational more comprehensive much is very farfromtheChinesetradition,whichistotakea adventurismshot”. Military not firethefirst “will that it into militaryassets. Sofar, ithaslived uptoitsaffirmation themturning open spaces,sometimes fills China Instead, Syria. Theytargetorconcernlargecivilianpopulations. Georgia, Chechnya, andSerbiatoCrimea, theDonbasand Russia hasconductedordirectlycondonedhotwars,from with India. Hereagain,thecomparisonrevealsdifferences: of theSouthChinaSea, EastChinaSeaandborderareas deployment, andthegameitisplayinginemptyspaces Foreign Affairs , she cited, at length, the various , shecited,atlength, thevarious existing Westernalliances? by-issue cooperationwon’t yieldstrongerresultsthan Fu Ying’s piece on the subject in Foreign Affairs at the China and Russia: Towards an beginning of 2016 drew much attention.4 In a longer version alliance treaty? published in Chinese in another leading international relations journal, she argues against describing the Mathieu Duchâtel current strategic partnership between China and Russia as an alliance.5 An important point that was omitted in the The possibility of an alliance treaty with Russia has been English version is that China has taken on board the lessons an undercurrent in Chinese foreign policy debate since the of history. In the twentieth century, each successive Chinese reciprocal visits of China’s President Xi Jinping and Russia’s regime signed an alliance treaty with Russia. None of them President Vladimir Putin to the two military parades of was successful in protecting or advancing vital Chinese 2015: Moscow’s 9 May Victory Parade and Beijing’s 3 national interests. In 1896, after the Qing Empire’s defeat in September parade to commemorate the end of the “Chinese the First Sino-Japanese War, General Li Hongzhang signed people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression”. a secret alliance treaty on the sidelines of the coronation The key driver of the current rapprochement between the of Tsar Nicholas II. The treaty granted Russia a railway two countries is China and Russia’s increasingly similar concession in Manchuria in exchange for security guarantees views on the state of international affairs – including a if Japan should invade. Less than five years later, Russian shared hostility towards the United States. After the two and Japanese troops were fighting alongside each other parades, during another state visit by Putin to Beijing in against the Boxer Rebellion and Qing dynasty troops as part June 2016, China and Russia signed a “joint statement on of the Eight-Nation Alliance. In August 1945, a day before strengthening global strategic stability”.1 As argued by Yan Japan’s surrender in World War II, the Republic of China Xuetong, a longstanding supporter of a grand strategy based signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet on alliances, the most significant part of the document is its Union. This treaty forced the Nationalists to recognise the effort to broaden the concept of “strategic stability” from independence of its restrictive definition in the field of nuclear arms control “Fu Ying argues against Mongolia, to to a much wider political context.2 But how far can China describing the current accept a Soviet and Russia actually go? Chinese sources indicate that the strategic partnership military base in prevailing thinking is sober and cautious, and that there is between China and Lushun, still widespread resistance to the idea of any alliance. Russia as an alliance” and to concede ownership of “Friendly neutrality” the Changchun railway to the Russians. The 1950 Treaty of Friendship, The year 2016 marks the twentieth anniversary of the launch Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the two of the China-Russia strategic partnership. Liu Fenghua lists communist giants of the People’s Republic of China and the the many concrete achievements that have been made in the Soviet Union lasted less than ten years and did not prevent framework of the partnership: the final border delimitation a dramatic strategic break that opened the way for decades of 2004; strategic alignment against colour revolutions; joint of military tension. Fu Ying makes it clear: the lessons of opposition against missile defence; the establishment of history are bitter. the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; close cooperation in multilateral international organisations, including the Zhao Huasheng also has vivid memories of a past United Nations; China’s acquisition of advanced defence characterised by tension and strategic competition. The systems; and energy cooperation.3 Economic cooperation current friendly situation was hard won, but in his opinion, has also reached a strategic level (一定的战略性, yiding de there is nothing to suggest that it will last over the long term. zhanlüexing). Bilateral trade totalled $95 billion in 2014, Zhao argues that the present state of China-Russia relations and although it decreased to $69 billion in 2015, China can best be described as “friendly neutrality” (友好中立, remains Russia’s most important bilateral trade partner, youhao zhongli).6 In 2015, trade and investment statistics and Russia is in China’s top ten. China is also the fourth- showed a sharp decline, but mutual strategic trust continued largest provider of foreign investment to Russia. Liu says to increase, and cooperation expanded on all fronts. Zhao that one important characteristic of the partnership is its believes that the key to all this was the decision to coordinate strategic ambition – it aims to shape the international order between the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and and create global strategic stability. This ambition was the China’s One Belt, One Road project. Even though observers starting point of the partnership, but it has since expanded are still searching for a flagship cooperation project that can to encompass many more areas. demonstrate substantial progress, Zhao says that the real value of the agreement is political – it means that Russian 1 “China, Russia sign joint statement on strengthening global strategic stability”, Xin- hua, 26 June 2016, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/26/c_135466187. 4 Fu Ying, “How China sees Russia”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2016. Fu Ying htm. is a former Vice-Foreign Minister, who is now Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Com- 2 “An exclusive interview with Yan Xuetong” (专访阎学通, zhuanfang Yan Xuetong), mittee of the National People’s Congress. Dacankao, 3 July 2016. Yan Xuetong is a professor at Tsinghua University. 5 Fu Ying, “China-Russia relations, are we allies or partners?” (中俄关系，是盟友还是伙 伴 3 Liu Fenghua, “The pattern of China-Russia strategic coordination: formation, features, , Zhong’e guanxi, shi mengyou haishi huoban), Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 4, 2016. and prospects” (中俄战略协作模式:形成、特点与提升, Zhong’e zhanlüe xiezuo moshi : 6 Zhao Huasheng, “Has there been a change in the nature of China-Russia relations?” xingcheng, tedian yu tisheng), Guoji wenti yanjiu, No. 3, 2016, pp. 1-12. Liu Fenghua is (中俄关系质变了吗 ?, Zhong’e guanxi zhibian le ma?), Pengbo, 10 July 2016. Zhao an expert on Russia at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Huasheng is a leading scholar on Russia at Fudan University in Shanghai. 3 4 ECFR/195 November 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA AND RUSSIA: GAMING THE WEST? strategic valueforRussiaof itstieswithChinainthe Chen Yuissimilarlysceptical inhispieceassessingthe to preventfuturedistrust. what isneeded describes at least more concrete,theconcept anything of absence In the concept”. opinion, an“imperfect – evenifitis,inhis neutrality” “friendly he suggests reason, For this distrust. strategic generate easily could that differences the managing is it rather, support; strategic full of level the to partnership bringing the not is challenge real to each other”intimesofcrisis. Zhao support says thatthe full provide not side, andwill other’s on the down come completely not “will sides two the future, In the support. of unconditionalmutual provide evidenceforapattern not do China Sea South in Ukraineandthe situations the Clearly, states. third with conflicts other’s each with deal they that way is the allies Russia andChinafrombecoming prevent to continue will that mainthing Zhao thinksthe Managing differencesandexpectations vision ofafutureinternationalorder. partner inadvancingChina’s strategic a key as Russia sees 没有搞集团政治 ( blocs” of “political a policy not follow alliances anddoes of culture” not havea“political China does Ying agrees: Fu easily. more handled be can differences that means which commitments, hasfewer would: thiskindofrelationship an alliance than better much interests sides’ both serves “flexible a partnership” ( that is reality the However, countries. both of communities for arealalliancein the strategic support is some there and Zhaosays relationship, an alliance of characteristics the of some has partnership actors”. The strategic “independent are both – established firmly been have already stage world on the identities international respective that RussiaandChina’s alliance. Zhaobelieves does notmakean friendliness But general problem inthepast. a major has been which agents, enforcement against byRussian law- discriminated tourists whofelt of complaintsbyChinese number in the decrease a considerable been also has There Russia. to tourists travel as people more Chinese as culture, baquan guoji ( “international hegemony” country thatresists as a among theyoungergeneration–Russiaisperceived says thatRussia’s image isimproving in China, including he news, positive In other addressed. been partially least in Russia’s traditional backyardinCentralAsiahaveat economic presence a dominantChinese concerns about ), and it is also increasingly appreciated for its appreciated ), anditisalsoincreasingly 弹性的伙伴模式 , meiyou gao jituan meiyou gao zhengzhi jituan "Zhao thinks the Russia andChina main thing that will that main thing from becomingallies is the way that they way is the deal witheachother’s conflicts with third with conflicts to prevent continue states. , tanxing de huoban moshi " ). That said, it 国际霸权 ) , Liu Fenghuadrawsthemostoptimisticconclusionof much fromourbilateralpartnership”. overly excited,andweshouldcertainlynotexpecttoo Russia valuesitsrelationshipwithus, weshouldnotbe His conclusion: bewaredisappointments,because“while Chen arguesthatRussia’svaluesareclosesttoEurope’s. of Putin’s ideologicalcontemptforEurope’sliberalism, is a“Europeanist”( is simplythatRussiansareEuropeans, andPutinhimself destination foroutwardinvestment. Thesecondargument focused onRussiaasanexportmarketratherthana being aresultofChina’s policies,whichhavepersistently alsoas this sees Chen happened. not just has replacement” of capitalandadvancedtechnologies.The“strategic Europe alsoremainedtheRussianeconomy’s mainsource trade, morethanfourtimesitstotaltradewithChina. Europe stillrepresented44.8 percentofRussianforeign decrease of40percentsincethepreviousyear, tradewith and cultural.Ontheeconomicfront,in2015,spiteofa economicare arguments major two His policy. foreign never replaceEuropeasthecentreofgravityRussian conclusion isclear-cutandstraightforward: Chinawill Russia has given to China since the Ukraine conflict. Chen’s thatattention increased the describe to used sometimes is context ofWesternsanctions. at theChinaInstituteofContemporaryInternational Relations(CICIR). nei nanyitidaixifang ( term” short in the West the replace not China will East? the to “Russia’s pivot Yu, Chen 7 existing internationalorder.” is incompletingmodernisation, notintransformingthe Russia andofChina: “Atthepresentstage, ourinterest of theinternationalsystemserveinterestsboth forming analliance,becausegeneraltrendsintheevolution Chinese authors.Hearguesthatthetimingisnotrightfor 俄转向东方？中国短期内难以替代西方 ), Fenghuang Zhoukan 欧洲主义者 , E Zhuanxiangdongxiang?Zhongguoduanqi , No.11,2016.ChenYuisaresearchfellow 7 , Thephrase“pivottoAsia” ouzhou zhuyi zhe ). Inspite - Vladimir Putin, who became president in 2000, is Russia’s military strategy: China’s depicted as having “actively revived national power partner, model, or competitor? and military strength”. His policy was that the armed forces should be able to effectively contain any nuclear Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix or conventional threats against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Academy of Military Sciences cites the At the time of the Crimean crisis in 2014, an editorial in two Chechen wars and Serbia as examples of Russia’s the Global Times concluded that Russia’s military power is resilience and initiative: in the Chechen wars, Moscow Moscow’s trump card. So, the article suggested that “China ultimately prevailed after initial defeat, and in Serbia, should speed up its military modernisation”, because “once Russia mounted the surprise occupation of an airfield in the confrontation between the West and Russia goes out of Kosovo in the aftermath of the 1999 NATO campaign that control, it is China that will suffer”.8 But Chinese authors it had opposed. In 2002, Putin said that Russia might have various assessments of the real state of Russia’s military “use nuclear weapons to fight back against a large-scale strength, and of the degree to which Moscow is prepared to conventional attack”. This statement obviously referred partner or compete with Beijing to achieve its goals. to a scenario in which Siberia was invaded, but the Chinese authors do not make this point explicit. Is Russia a weak power? During Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008-2012), Russia In 2013, China’s Academy of Military Science’s Department issued its National Security Strategy to 2020 (in 2009) and of Military Strategy published a third edition of the Science the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (in 2010). of Military Strategy (战略学, zhanlüe xue).9 This exhaustive The Chinese authors say those “Ma and Sun documents made it clear that 276-page manual dedicates four pages to a short description present Russia and analysis of Russia’s military strategy. In these four pages, Russia considered external as a weak threats to be greater than the Chinese authors describe the overall transformation power that is of the Russian military strategy since the end of the Cold domestic threats, with the challenged by US and NATO remaining the War. They note a shift from a global military strategy to a NATO” regional military strategy focused on the homeland, with primary strategic opponents. new strategic frontlines centred on the restricted corridors To resist aerospace attacks, of the Baltic and Black Seas. sea and air blockades, and anti-missile operations, Russia considered that it was essential to be able to deploy joint The Academy of Military Science authors characterise operations by the navy, the air force, air defence units, Russia as a “warlike nation … founded and strengthened and strategic missile forces. In order to facilitate these by war” that has never hesitated to use military force to operations, Russia established four major military area defend its interests. The authors say that Russian military commands – the west, south, central, and east – each with culture favours defensive and offensive operations in order their own joint strategic headquarters. The authors do not to seize the initiative. A year before the seizure of Crimea, endorse Russia’s justifications for the 2008 Georgian War the authors quote Putin as advocating “pre-emptive (Russia said the war came as a result of Georgia’s killing of strikes” to counter the United States and NATO and to Russian military observers): instead, the Chinese writers preserve “strategic parity” and “asymmetrical balance” in describe the war as a Blitzkrieg attack carried out during the the peripheral regions. Beijing Olympic games aimed at countering US and NATO moves to reduce Russia’s strategic space. Meanwhile, in The authors say that after Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev response to increased aerospace threats – from the US’s came to power in 1985, Soviet military doctrine was Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defence plan and Prompt based on five “Nos”: no to being the initiator of military Global Strike initiative – a new Russian “national aerospace operations; no to being the first to employ nuclear defence concept” established a unified national aerospace weapons; no to surprise attacks and pre-emptive strikes; defence system, integrating air and space defence. and no to large-scale offensive operations. But after the fall of the Soviet Union, needing to compensate for the collapse In 2016, three years after the publication of the Academy of its conventional forces, Russia abandoned Gorbachev’s of Military Science’s manual, Ma Jiang and Sun Jie also “no first-use” nuclear policy in favour of an “offence and analysed “Russia’s geopolitical and military relations with 11 defence strategy”.10 major powers”. Unlike the Academy authors, Ma and Sun present Russia as a weak power that is challenged by NATO. They say that the West’s attitude to Russia has continued to be characterised by a Cold War mentality, which is why

8 “West-Russia rivalry puts world on edge”, Global Times, 18 March 2014, available at 11 Ma Jianguang and Sun Jie, “Changes affecting the Russian National Security http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/849162.shtml. Strategy” (俄罗斯国家安全战略的变化及影响, eluosi quojia anguan zhanlüe de bianhua ji yingxiang), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, Vol. 3, 2016, pp. 15-22 (hereafter, Ma and Sun, 9 Shou Xiaosong (ed.), The Science of Military Strategy (2013) (战略学, zhanlüe xue) “Changes affecting the Russian National Security Strategy”). Ma Jianguang is deputy (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013) pp. 54-58 (hereafter, The Science of Military director of the Center for International Studies at the People’s Liberation Army National Strategy). University of Defense Science and Technology (NUDT). Sun Jie is a researcher in Inter- 10 The Science of Military Strategy, p. 55. national Relations at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences, NUDT. 5 6 ECFR/195 November 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA AND RUSSIA: GAMING THE WEST? does not meet the Russian Federation’s nationalsecurity Russian Federation’s the not meet does that “Russia’sconventionalarmedforces’combatcapability and Sunsay Ma Russia’s militarystrength, With regardto endangering Russiannationalsecurity. is now that economic hardship has caused prices resource by Westerneconomicsanctions, the fallin Exacerbated market. commodities world the to very sensitive economy government revenues”, making federal the country’s more thanhalfof[Russian] and mineralexportsconstitute from oil,gas, “earnings that note authors and Ukraine.The Moscow’s reactionsinGeorgia dramatically, whichexplains at amomentwhenitsarmedforcesweredecreasing space Russia’sstrategic squeezed This policy architecture. security their into Russia integrate to trying without to expandeastward European UnionandNATOsought the 政策及其对中国海洋争端的影响 Disputes: AnalysisBasedontheUSAsia-Pacific RebalancingStrategy”( 13 LiuFei,“Russia’sPolicyintheSouthChina SeaandItsImpactonChineseMaritime the RussianResearchCentreatShanghaiInternational StudiesUniversity. zhongdong zhanlüe 亚危机, 新地区战争与俄罗斯的中东战略 disputes. 12 BiHongye,“Syriancrisis,anewregional war, Russia'sMiddleEastStrategy”( maritime China’s on influence its China Seaand South in the Russia’s policy analyses Liu Fei “strategic competitor”? China: Russia’s or a “natural ally” airand missile strikesinSyria. of Russia’s efficiency the by impressed is Hongye Russia’s militaryweakness,Bi emphasise Ma andSun,who itspartner, support Israel. just asWashingtonwould Unlike Damascus, to support ought and energy.Therefore,Moscow in weapons Russia’s majortradingpartners,particularly of from interveninginSyria. Furthermore, Damascus isone for Russianforcesthantherisk of muchhighercasualties in theNorthernCaucasusandVolgaregions,witharisk provokewarandhavoc the groupcouldeventually believes (ISIS) Islamic for concern: as Russia’s State real cause Bi the Instead, Bisees Baltic States. in Polandandthe troops its reinforce to decision Alliance’s the of Russia, inspite to and NATOthreat US the Ocean. ButBidownplays Indian route tothe on the located which isconveniently naval base, foreign Russia’s only with NATO, along by regionthatisdominated in aMediterranean asset strategic only country’s the defend to urge an reflects Syria to troops analysis. and Sun’s Ma with somewhat disagrees Syria, BiHongye On Turkey. confrontation with to prevailinalarge-scale unable be would its navalandairforces that authors believe the Fleet, Sea Black the modernise to efforts Russia’s of spite in And ABM system,fromSpaintoRomania, Poland, andJapan. and land-based asea- is building asymmetry. Washington the increased US andJapan have gradually but evenso,the investment in and reform has increased of themilitary– because of a lack of sufficient funding”. They agree that Putin behind arsenal islagging nuclear Russia’s huge while conflicts, low-intensity handle only can and requirements 12 All three agree that Russia’s willingness to send that Russia’s willingness agree Allthree ), Waijiao pinglun , eluosi denanhaizhengcejiqiduizhongguoHaiyang , January2016.BiHongyeisdeputydirector of , Suliya weiji,xindiquzhanzhengyueluoside 13 According 俄罗斯的南海 叙利 to “safeguard world peace and stability”. Liu believes that and stability”.Liu believes worldpeace to “safeguard in order action, carriedout maritime defensive as ajoint Russia characterises which naval exercises, in joint engaged 2012 have since Russia China and China Sea”. South in the factor a majordestabilising “as US the denouncing disputes, for China in support its maritime has publiclyexpressed and regionalstabilityin general”. Asaresult,Russia peace maintenance ofglobal footing andwithmutualtrust…forthe China onanequal with enhance cooperation to continue will strategy has “alsomadeitclearthatacomprehensive issues”. core and other security, sovereignty, territorialintegrity, other’s concerning each other “onissues each support should they that state country which by the of 2016 signed statement FarEast joint to points for Russia.He China isa“naturalally” that the from Liu believes Sciences, of Russian Academy the of Institute experts Russian Quoting benefits”. sound andpractical for largervisibility,inordertosecure in exchange tocontribute resources fewer “pragmatism with are core principles Russia’s that notes Liu Pacific”. the in of “re-balancing the US’sstrategy and NATOoppose cooperation withChina so astoresistpressurefrom the US strengthen to effort pragmatic a is policy Russia’s Liu, to politics/2016-06/26/c_1119111908.htm 14 Thefulltextofthestatementcanbefound here: Engineering, Wuhan. at theDepartmentofHumanitiesandSocial SciencesatthePLANavalUniversityof zhengduan deyingxiang the whether China, Liuwonders to closer getting of necessity China’s rise.GivenRussia’sstrategic and balance check to Moscow renewing theoldSovietalliancethatenabled a certainextent partnership”, to strategic “comprehensive to a Vietnam andRussiahasbeenupgraded between block forChina. a stumbling The relationship created power, Russiahas China’s expanding Vietnam tocounter higher thanitwastenyearsago.Liusaysthatbyarming times five billion, $3.5 over is Vietnam with trade bilateral Russia’s The volumeof disputes. China Sea South in the Philippines, bothofwhichareparticipants and perhapsthe to other countriesin the region, weapons including Vietnam more export to preparing is Russia that notes Liu also from any itabstains further involvementintheDiaoyu/Senkakudispute. but Zone”, Identification Defence East ChinaChina’s Sea, Russiadefactorecognises “Air the In negotiations”. through differences their resolve and restraint the partiesconcernedwillexercise “Russia hopes China’s approach: with China’s claims,evenasitalignsitself endorsing far as as go not does China Sea,Russia South In the competitor”. a strategic China istoacertainextent Russia, “for that admits he policy: to Russia’sChinese limits “ China istoa that “for Russia, that a strategic competitor” certain extent Liu Fei admits Liu Fei 14 Liu notes that Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept Policy Russia’s Foreign that Liunotes ), Dongbeiya luntan . with China. It wants to build China. Itwantsto with of relations development priority isthe Russia’s top Nevertheless, Liu sees some Liu sees Nevertheless, US. is tosay,fromthe – that ocean” from the threat the resist “to bilateral militarycooperation , Vol.1,No.123,2016.LiuFeiisalecturer http://news.xinhuanet.com/ country will have to suspend its cooperation with Vietnam. But he points out that such a move would be very costly, The Silk Road goes north: Sino- both in terms of image and in terms of contracts worth Russian economic cooperation several billion dollars. The Asia Pacific region accounts for 60 percent of Russian arms exports, and Liu says that and competition Vietnam is one of the two largest importers of Russian Michal Makocki arms, along with Venezuela.

President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China in May 2014 Ma and Sun say that in the longer term, Russia will have to was an important milestone in China-Russia relations. contend with the external threat represented by the US’s Isolated by the post-Ukraine sanctions regime, Russia Prompt Global Strike and the external and internal threat turned to China not only for political support but also of a Western-sponsored “colour revolution”, which could as an alternative to Western markets and investment. undermine its domestic political stability.15 And while The leaders of the two countries touted trade and Chinese commentators seem wary and even slightly envious economic cooperation as one of the key pillars of their of Russia’s ability to use its military forces to support its comprehensive strategic partnership. Lofty goals were interests, they also point out that Russia may not have the established, including to reach a bilateral trade volume economic means to support its assertive strategy. of $100 billion by 2015; to enable China to tap the East Siberian gas fields through the Power of Siberia pipeline; and to allow China to invest in infrastructure in Russia, in particular in the underdeveloped Russian Far East.

Two years since the visit, progress on many of the goals is mixed at best. Despite the rhetoric, the China-Russia relationship continues to suffer from strategic mistrust, preventing the two sides from fully embracing mutual commercial opportunities. This is particularly the case for projects that would lock the two countries into long- term dependency, such as the Power of Siberia pipeline. Bilateral trade has not been going as well as could be hoped, either: with a 28 percent decrease from the previous year, bilateral trade between China and Russia totalled $64 billion in 2015 – well short of the stated target, as Liu Changmin observes.16 In spite of setbacks like this, the majority of the Chinese research community continues to emphasise the enormous potential of economic cooperation between the two countries. However, some authors disagree, suggesting the possibility of a less cooperative relationship, or even a direct clash, between the two countries, especially in Central Asia.

Russia’s missed opportunity

Chinese analysts recognise that Russia’s rapprochement with China is driven by Western sanctions. Zhao Mingwen says that Russia simply has no alternative to embracing China: “Russia’s hopes for cooperative ties with the West have been dashed after the imposition of sanctions. As a result, China has become the only global player with which Russia can cooperate.”17 Liu Changmin agrees: “As China’s relationship with the United States increasingly

16 Liu Changmin, “A closer investigation and consideration of the Eastern Sino-Russian border” (中俄东部边界近距离观察与思考, zhong’e dongbu bianjie jinjuli guancha yu sikao), Taipingyang xuebao, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2016, pp. 59-67 (hereafter, Liu, “A closer investigation and consideration of the Eastern Sino-Russian border”). Liu Changmin is a professor at the Chinese University of Politics and Law. 17 Zhao Mingwen, “The decline of bilateral trade and the development of Sino-Russian ties” (贸易下滑与中俄关系发展, maoyi xiahua yu zhong’e guanxi fazhan), Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, Vol. 3, 2016, pp 107-121 (hereafter, Zhao, “The decline of bilateral trade”). Professor Zhao Mingwen is a researcher at the China Institutes of International Studies. 15 Ma and Sun, “Changes affecting the Russian National Security Strategy”. He also teaches at the University of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. 7 8 ECFR/195 November 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA AND RUSSIA: GAMING THE WEST? the HeilongjiangProvincialAcademyofSocial Sciences. prospects ofSino-Russianindustrialcooperation”). WangGangisaresearcherbasedat Yanjiu ( 20 WangGang,“Thefoundationandprospects ofSino-Russianindustrialcooperation” 19 Zhao,“Thedeclineofbilateraltrade”. 18 Liu,“Acloserinvestigationandconsideration oftheEasternSino-Russianborder”. 中俄产业合作的基础与前景 the trade relations between the two neighbours, as well as neighbours, two the relations between trade the prices. oil drop incrude of the because declined, still exports dollar valueofthese total the previous year–but from the increase tonnes ofcrudetoChinalastyear, a 28percent 37.63 million a record exported actually Russia prices”. oil fall ofcrude landslide to the trade was“mainlydue relationship. Heexplainsthatthe2015 drop in bilateral the yardstick forassessing not bemadethe says, should and, Zhao Sino-Russian relations to exogenous factors With this in mind, the fallin by trade can be explained foreign diplomacyoutlook.” in China’s to riseintheiroverallimportance continue will and uncertainty,Sino-Russianties turbulence experiences Cooperation trumpscompetition education, investment, technology, medicalcare, andtourism. finance, building, infrastructure high-speed railway, civilaviation, outerspaceexploration, competitive advantages in fields such as agriculture, forestry, Wang GangpointsouttheconvergenceofChinaandRussia’s the developmentofasatellitenavigationsystem. Likewise, civilian manufacture jet enginesusingRussiantechnology, andjointR&Din to efforts joint countries’ two the as of Xi’an City,Park ontheoutskirts aswell Road Innovation examples ofthiscooperationarethenewChina-RussiaSilk willingness toexpandhigh-techcollaboration.Some this view: ZhaosaysthatthisisonereasonforRussia’s Russian politiciansandindustryleadersapparentlyshare than other energy andprimarymaterialsexports.” fields in China with cooperation embracing butinsteadfully characterises itstradewithEurope, that sales on oil dependence of pattern the replicating not off better be would Russia and China, of rise the on capitalise to opportunity the lost country that the meant decades two past inthe on Europe Zhao, “Russia’sfocus is notsustainable,particularlyforRussia: according to to beovercome. of oil-for-cashtrading This pattern needs that is aweakness deals toenergy cooperation exclusively economic countries’ two the from Russia,limiting imports fuel cheaper from benefits China although that says Zhao provider ofrawmaterials,andChinaistheirconsumer. roles: Russiaisthe theirclearlydelineated as evidencing eastern provinces from Russia’s East Siberian gas fields. gas Siberian East Russia’s from provinces eastern gastoChina’s north- whichistosupply gas pipeline, Power ofSiberia is the major opportunity for China.One benefits significant has Russia with cooperation Energy , Vol.43,No.2,April2016,pp.10-11(hereafter, Wang,“Thefoundationand 19 This underlines the importance of fossil fuels in Thisunderlinestheimportanceoffossilfuels , Zhong’e chanyehezuodejichuyuqianjing 18 20

), Xiboliya 24 Jiang,“ChinaandRussiajointlybuildthe ‘OneBelt,OneRoad’”. Russian StudiesInstituteatHeilongjiangUniversity. Russia jointlybuildthe“OneBelt,OneRoad”). JiangZhenjunisaresearcherwiththe Eluosi DongouZhongyaYanjiu 合作研究 Sino-Russia economiccooperationandtrade” ( 23 JiangZhenjun,“ChinaandRussiajointly buildthe‘OneBelt,OneRoad’,Astudyof 22 Wang,“Thefoundationandprospectsof Sino-Russianindustrialcooperation”. University ofFinanceandEconomics. Vol. 18,No.1,January2016,pp.33-40.LiXiisalecturerattheLawSchoolofAnhui Zhong’e youqìhezuoxinfazhandetezheng,dongyinjiyingxiangtanxi in Sino-Russianoilandgascooperation”( 21 LiXi,“Astudyofthecharacteristics,movers,andimpactnewdevelopments is currently characterised by its outdated industrial outdated its by characterised is currently for therevival “impetus of theChineseRustBelt”,which providing region, thus in the industry petrochemical new could createtheconditionsfora Russia’s gas supplies the territoryofintermediarycountries. transiting through to Chineseconsumerswithout directly supplied to be energy allow it will routes, because these concerns than geopolitical China raisesfewer northeast linking Russiato pipeline needs. Butthe their energy coastal regionswithmostof provide the gas supplies sea-borne oiland of China’s natural gasimports,while share largest the supplies Turkmenistan currently that notes Li Xi supply. energy its China todiversify help will pipeline the operational, becomes When it prices. over gas of disagreements mainly because agreed, years tobe ten took pipeline regions, the north-eastern China’s industrial Even though Russia’s gas fields are geographically close to China-Russia cooperationratherthancompetition. for potential great offers says Jiang that region a Asia, could jointlyimplementotherrailwayprojectsinCentral companies hasnotyetbeenruledout). ChinaandRussia the construction, althoughpartneringwithWestern participation incompanies’ Chinese with (potentially Kazan, acity800kmeastofMoscow,isbeingdeveloped only asmallpartoftheroutebetweenMoscowand however, theprojectremainsonlyaspirational: sofar, from almostafullweekto17-24hours. which couldcuttravellingtimebetweenthetwocities between MoscowandBeijing(roughly7,000km apart), railway the high-speed as such projects, flagship some oncooperate should Russia and China rapprochement, speed railway. for infrastructureconstruction,inparticularhigh- Economic Beltinitiativebothcreateopportunities national strategyof“goingeast”andChina’sSilkRoad Russia’sthat says Zhenjun Jiang strategies. development “ Russia’s nationaland regional development to contribute to to contribute also say that Chinese that say also companies should companies seize the opportunity the seize strategies” The Chinese authors The Chinese , Zhong’e gongtongjiansheyidaiyiluyushuangbian jingmaohezuoyanjiu 23 Jiangsuggeststhat, tohighlighttheir , Vol.4,2015,pp.41-47(hereafter,Jiang,“China and 中俄油气合作新发展的特征、动因及影响探析 中俄共同建设“一带一路”与双边经贸 opportunity to should seizethe companies that Chinese authors alsosay The Chinese capacity. and regional nationalRussia’s contribute to 21 Wang adds that 24 Atthisstage, 22 ), Guoji Luntan ), , , These suggestions mirror the tone of the official both sides – but in spite of official statements, it is announcement on pairing the Eurasian Economic Union increasingly clear that the strategic mistrust between the and the Silk Road Economic Belt, which was signed at two countries will prevent them from capitalising on the the sidelines of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow in available opportunities. May 2015. Jiang thinks Central Asia could be the “meeting place” where the two strategies intersect. He sees potential for “a second Eurasian Intercontinental railway as a crucial part of the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative”.25 However, Xiang Yijun and Zhang Jinping do not share this optimistic view: they see potential for “conflicting and overlapping interests in third countries, particularly in Central Asian states, which both regional projects of China and Russia claim as their main operational space”. They add: “political stability and economic nationalism in third countries could also be a risk factor”.26 Xiang and Zhang seem to be in agreement with many Western commentators, who tend to see potential for a clash in China’s commercial expansion into the region that Russia perceives as its own backyard.

Jiang sees Northeast China as a key element of the Silk Road initiative. He envisions a dynamic regional economy “centred on Harbin and connected with Russia’s Siberian railway system, river ports, and airports in the region to form a mega-transportation network.”27 However, his expectations overestimate the economic opportunities available in Russia’s Siberia, which is a depopulated and underdeveloped region with little economic activity. Similarly, Russia’s unfavourable business environment, including cumbersome customs controls at the border, will also work against Jiang’s vision – as will Russian perceptions. As Xiang and Zhang note, “The perception of China as an economic threat, particularly related to Chinese investment and immigration into Russia’s under- populated Far East, will continue to adversely affect Russians’ willingness to cooperate with China.”28

Jiang’s ideas also include a very imaginative link through the Arctic, which he calls the northern part of the Silk Road. He suggests that “Russia and China can jointly build a logistics port along the projected Arctic navigation route. The two countries can also join hands in developing the mineral resources along the route, particularly energy resources.” If developed, the Arctic route would provide China with an alternative maritime connection to the congested Malacca strait and the Suez Canal and increase its energy security by diversifying trade routes.

Trade and infrastructure cooperation between China and Russia has the theoretical potential to greatly reward

25 Jiang, “China and Russia jointly build the ‘One Belt, One Road’”. 26 Xiang Yijun and Zhang Jinping, “The obstacles and conflicts in merging Sino- Russian regional economic strategy” (中俄区域经济合作战略对接的障碍与冲突, Zhong e quyu jingji hezuo zhanlve duijie de zhangai yu chongtu), Zhongguo Jingmao, Vol. 1, 2016, pp. 33-38 (hereafter, Xiang and Zhang, “The obstacles and conflicts in merging Si- no-Russian regional economic strategy”). Professor Xiang Yijun and Associate Professor Zhang Jinping both teach at the School of Economics at Harbin University of Business. 27 Jiang, “China and Russia jointly build the ‘One Belt, One Road’”. 28 Xiang and Zhang, “The obstacles and conflicts in merging Sino-Russian regional economic strategy”. 9 10 ECFR/195 November 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA AND RUSSIA: GAMING THE WEST? htm/ June 2002,availableat 定 on theRegionalAnti-TerroristStructure( 32 AgreementBetweentheMemberStatesof theShanghaiCooperationOrganisation February 2016,pp.30-39. fankong jizhidefalüwentiyanjiu mechanism” ( 31 JiangShengli,“ResearchonlegalproblemsintheSCO’sregionalantiterrorist content_281315.htm shanghai gongye 怖主义、分裂主义和极端主义上海公约 30 ShanghaiConventiononCombatingTerrorism,Separatism,andExtremism( Kyrgyzstan, Russia,andTajikistan. 29 TheShanghaiFivewasahead-of-state-levelgroupmadeupofChina,Kazakhstan, Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure waslaunched summit. group’s SaintPetersburg during the Regional Anti-Terrorist was signed Structure Shanghai CooperationOrganisationonthe of the States assistance. other any and ammunition, weapons, finance, of sources and their to combatterroristactivities and legislation of measures ontheimplementation and experience information exchanging to committed states member Separatism, andExtremism. Shanghai ConventiononCombatingTerrorism, is the documents founding organisation’s two main the of Uzbekistan. One Five countriesplus including theShanghai established, formally was On 15June2001, SCO the meetings’ toppriorities. among the was issues non-traditional security as early1996. cooperation annually topromoteregional Shanghai Five, began tomeet in 2001, the The SCOwasestablished but itspredecessor, terrorism cooperation The institutional basis of SCO’s counter- effects onregionalcounter-terrorismcooperation. of newmembersIndia and Pakistan will haveprofound accession and the member states, from sixtoeight expand to organisation isset even moreimportant.Moreover,the Asia makescounter-terrorismcooperation and Central (ISIS) expansion oftheIslamic State into South possible threat, asthe a new facing is SCO Today, the establishment. for theShanghaiCooperationOrganisation(SCO)sinceits a has been Counter-terrorism cooperation , Organisation the ShanghaiCooperation terrorism cooperationand Back tothebasics:Counter- Marc Julienne Shanghai hezuozuzhichengyuanguoguanyu diqufankongbujigoudexieding . 上海合作组织地区反恐机制的法律问题研究 31 ), 15June2001,availableat . In 2002, the Member Between the Agreement http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2003-02/24/content_5307526. ), JournalofShanghaiPoliceCollege,Vol.26, No.1, , daji kongbuzhuyi,fenliezhuyihejiduan 上海合作组织成员国关于地区反恐怖机构的协 “ 29 Organisation since has been a been has Cooperation d’être raison its establishment” the Shanghai cooperation http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2001-12/12/ Antiterrorism 30 Even then, cooperation on Eventhen,cooperation In this document, the document, Inthis 32 Following this, the Following , Shanghai hezuozuzhidiqu raison d’être raison for 打击恐 ), 7 available at 行会谈 36 See“XiJinpingandRussianpresidentPutin holdtalks”( nese ambassadortoRussia”). at zhongfang yuantongeshenhuafankonghezuo tion withRussia”( 35 “ChineseambassadortoRussiasaysChina hopestodeepenantiterrorismcoopera at urges jointeffortstocombatinternetterrorism”, an “anti-extremismconvention”.See“Chinesepresidentproposesanti-extremismtreaty, discourse, andsinceSeptember2014,ChinesePresidentXiJinpinghasbeencallingfor “terrorism” concept.However,theideaof“threeforces”isstillusedinpolitical notion thattheyconstitutespecificpoliticalmotivesalreadycomeunderthebroader SCO wasoriginallysupposedtofight.Theomissionofthosetwotermsislikelyduethe constituted, alongwith“terrorism”,the“threeforces”( 34 Interestingly,the2009textdoesnotmention“separatism”and“extremism”,which xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-12/28/c_1113803830.htm zuzhi fankongbuzhuyigongyue on Counter-Terrorism”( cn/wxzl/gongbao/2015-02/27/content_1932688.htm hezuo zuzhifankongbuzhuyigongyue 33 SCOConventiononCounter-Terrorism,( and the bilateral relationship between the twoiscrucial and thebilateralrelationshipbetween cooperation, of security a keypartinthedevelopment powers, ChinaandRussiaplay As theSCO’stwoleading the SCO and cooperation bilateral China-Russia 组织 zhuyi xingwei of “terrorism”,“actterrorism”( whereas the2009documentlegallydefinesconcepts broad notionsofterrorism,separatism, andextremism, instance, the2001Convention onlybrieflydescribedthe areas, the2009 textismoredetailedandcomplete. For and Extremism, whichwasshortonspecificsinmany Convention onCombatingTerrorism, Separatism, in June 2009. Counter-Terrorism attheSCO’s Yekaterinburgsummit came withthesignatureofSCOConventionon A furtheradvanceincounter-terrorismcooperation cooperation mechanism. SCO’s counter-terrorism of the feature institutionalised first the represented It 2004. in Uzbekistan, Tashkent, in projects. To ensure this stability, Li Hui stressed that Li Huistressed stability, this To ensure projects. these implement to is aprerequisite stability Regional Statement onStrengtheningGlobalStrategicStability”. another “China-RussiaJoint in June2016, signed they Coordination andAdvocatingWin-winCooperation”.And Partnership of Strategic Comprehensive Deepening on “China-Russia JointStatement Union” andthe Silk RoadEconomicBeltandEurasian the of ConnectionBetween on Cooperation “Joint Statement a signed Vladimir Putin Jinping andRussia’sPresident Economic Union. In May 2015, China’s President Xi Eurasian Russian-led and the Silk RoadEconomicBelt led regional economicprojects,theChinese- their respective of integration the discussing been lately have Moscow and cooperate. to willingness great shown had sides Hui,the Li in 2015 ambassador toRussia, noted thatboth Chinese organisation. the entire of efficiency the to http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2015-12/11/c_1117435036.htm http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/12/c_133639464.htm , Xi Jinpingtongeluosizongtongpujingjuxing huitan , kongbu zhuyi zuzhi http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-06/25/c_1119111635.htm 中国驻俄大使说中方愿同俄深化反恐合作 ), and“terroristorganisation”( 中国批准上合组织反恐怖主义公约 33 Incontrastwiththe2001Shanghai ), Xinhua,28December2014,availableat ), 16June2009,availableat ). 34 上海合作组织反恐怖主义公约

. See“ChinaratifiestheSCOConvention ), Xinhua . Xinhua 恐怖主义行为 三股势力 , 12September2014,available , 11December2015,available , , Zhongguo pizhunshanghe Zhongguo zhuedashishuo 习近平同俄罗斯总统普京举 (hereafter, ), Xinhua , san gushili http://www.npc.gov. . , 25June2016, . Xinhua 35 恐怖主义 , , http://news. Shanghai kongbu Beijing ) thatthe , “Chi 36 - - China and Russia are committed to strengthening into – especially in Central Asia. SCO governments take cooperation on fighting terrorism, transnational criminal this threat very seriously. organisations, cybercrime, and drug trafficking, adopting a “zero tolerance” (零容忍, ling rongren) policy.37 According to Jin Kai, the “rapid expansion” of ISIS in Afghanistan and Central Asia has made the Fergana One area in which this cooperation is realised is in the valley, shared between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and joint counter-terrorist exercises known as “Cooperation”. Kyrgyzstan, an attractive and vulnerable target for the “Cooperation” is a bilateral joint training programme terrorist group. The valley is an important economic between the two countries’ counter-terrorist special and strategic hub – but it has a small land area and forces: the Chinese People’s Armed Police (PAP) and its a large population, so land and water resources are Russian equivalent, the Russian National Guard, which insufficient. Moreover, religious influence is quite was established in June 2016. Zhang Lue and Luo Hu say strong, and economic development has stagnated. All that exercises under the programme have been held three these conditions make it an easier target for ISIS, so times: in 2007, 2013, and 2016. The exercises in Russia the area could become a security threat for the “Eurasia in July 2016 involved 80 troops, including the PAP’s heartland”, and a serious danger to China and Russia.40 renowned Snow Leopard (雪豹突击队, xuebao tujidui) and Falcon (猎鹰突击队, lieying tujidui) Commandos.38 The north of Afghanistan, bordering Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, offers another “paradise” into The authors also emphasize that counter-terrorism joint which ISIS could expand in Central Asia. Turkmenistan training exercises present an opportunity to promote has been fighting terrorist attacks on its border with mutual understanding, pragmatic cooperation, and Afghanistan since 2014. To combat the threat, the military exchange between the two countries. They also Turkmen government facilitate wider military cooperation: one example of this “Li Jinfeng thinks has tried to strengthen is the China-Russia joint naval drill, “Joint Sea”, which that competition its security forces by has been held since 2012, with the last one held in the between China and recruiting veterans South China Sea in September 2016. Russia centres only from the Soviet era and on economic and enrolling high school soft power issues. students in the army. Other bilateral and multilateral military exercises take On security, their In 2015, Turkmenistan place within the framework of the SCO. China and interests largely asked for direct Kyrgyzstan held a bilateral joint military exercise in 2002, coincide” assistance from the within the framework of both the SCO and their bilateral United States, but no exchange, but the first truly multilateral exercise was held moves to provide it have been made so far.41 in August 2003, two months after the signature of the “Memorandum on holding joint antiterrorism exercises by SCO member states’ armed forces” during the SCO’s Jin says that Central Asian ISIS combatants are not 2003 Moscow summit. Since then, SCO member states recruited in Central Asian countries directly – instead, have participated in and organised joint military exercises they are mostly recruited in Russia. This is because most almost every year. The most recent SCO joint military Central Asian young people who immigrate to Russia exercise was held in September 2016 in Kyrgyzstan have trouble integrating, which makes them vulnerable to (“Peace Mission” 2016).39 All of these exercises’ stated extremist ideology. purpose is the fight against terrorism. The Uzbek Ministry of State Security estimates that more The growing terrorist threat in Central than 5,000 Uzbek nationals have already joined ISIS. The Asia Tajik government says that interest in ISIS is spreading fast among the young people of Tajikistan. In 2015, 400 young Tajiks joined ISIS, and 120 of them died in the After 15 years of increasing counter-terrorism Middle East. cooperation, the SCO faces several new challenges. One of the most serious is ISIS. From its beginnings in Syria and Iraq, ISIS is searching for new territories to spread Kyrgyzstan is also a privileged target for ISIS in Central Asia. On 16 July 2015, domestic security departments 37 Xinhua, “Chinese ambassador to Russia”. arrested six alleged members of ISIS in Bishkek. According 38 Zhang Lue and Luo Hu, “Terrorist attacks increase, urging China and Russia to join hands to find countermeasures” (恐怖袭击频发，催促中俄携手寻找应对之策, kongbu to the Kyrgyz government, the suspects were planning an xiji pin fa, cuicu zhong’e xieshou xunzhao yingdui zhi ce), China Youth Daily, 14 July 2016. Zhang Lue and Luo Hu are from the Shijiazhuang People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attack during Eid al-Fitr the next day, with a car bomb Ground Force Command College. 伊斯兰国挺进中亚 39 “Joint antiterrorist military exercise ‘Peace Mission 2016’ to be held from September 40 Jin Kai, “Islamic State progressing in Central Asia” ( , Yisilanguo 15th” (“和平使命-2016”联合反恐军演将于15日举行, heping shiming-2016 lianhe tingjin zhongya), Phoenix Weekly, 2 February 2015 (hereafter, Jin, “Islamic State fankong jun yan jiang yu 15 hao juxing), People’s Daily Online, 12 September 2016, progressing in Central Asia”). Jin Kai is a reporter with Phoenix Weekly. available at http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0912/c1011-28708666.html. 41 Jin, “Islamic State progressing in Central Asia”. 11 12 ECFR/195 November 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA AND RUSSIA: GAMING THE WEST? 47 Li,“SCOenlargement:opportunitiesand challenges”. Europe andCentralAsiaattheChinaAcademy ofSocialSciences(CASS). and challenges”).LiJinfengisaresearcherat theResearchInstituteonRussia,Eastern and CentralAsiaStudies 战与机遇 46 LiJinfeng,“SCOenlargement:opportunities andchallenges”( International Studies(CIIS). Research CentreonSCOandheadoftheEurasian InstituteattheChinaof tiaozhan ments” ( 45 ChenYurong,“FifteenyearsofSCO,challengesandopportunitytheseachieve 44 Jin,“IslamicStateprogressinginCentralAsia”. fujin jibiyimingkongbufenzi suburb” ( 43 “KyrgyzNationalSecurityCommissionsaidtohavekilledaterroristinthecapital’s dongtu fenzixijizhongguodashiguan 恐怖组织下令 东突分子袭击中国大使馆 ordered anETIMmembertoattackChineseEmbassy”( 42 LiangFulong,“KyrgyzNationalSecurityCommission:Syrianterroristorganisation in Central Asia after the Cold War (officially to fight (officially War Cold the after Asia Central in established was base military US first the since ever that Asia. Central in influence US counter to is Li Jinfeng saysthatthemain motive oftheSCOexpansion body. ( Russia-India-led” a “dual-core”( from SCO also transformthe points out,itwill Li Jinfeng itseconomicandsecuritycooperation. and expand will enhance the SCO’s international status and influence, it attractiveness; organisation’s the reflects enlargement the that Yurong believes Chen enlargement. of phase Tashkent summitinJune2016, a new at the it isentering members as full Now, withIndiaandPakistanapproved partners. and dialogue to observerstates up opening gradually SCO hasbeen years, the than ten For more “dual-core” organisation? SCO enlargement:towards the end ofa this issue. Syria. on to go might are givenvisastoTurkey, and then they immigrate toThailand, Malaysia, or Indonesia, where illegally to militant Uyghurs young helping have been Turkish organisations some that for China,Jinreports As a beheading. a Kazakhnationalperpetrating a videowith for SyriaandIraq. released nationals haveleft ISIS even In Kazakhstan, official statistics indicate that about 1,000 member” inanoperationaBishkeksuburb. “internationalterroristorganisation shot analleged Forces Special counter-terrorist Kyrgyz On 29August, for fighting Syria in Jabhat al-Nusra, now renamedJabhatFatahal-Sham. time spent have might He (TIP). Turkestan IslamicParty andhadlinkstothe 20 August from Istanbulon arrived inKyrgyzstan Tajik passport; he a with Uyghur an ethnic driver was the that indicated Commission in Bishkek. Security The KyrgyzstanState at theChineseEmbassy car bomb injuredthreepeople 2016, a suicide 30 August On in Kyrgyzstan. air base planning anattackonaRussian also were square; they in apublic crowd gathered to rushintothe supposed 上合组织15年，成就机遇与挑战 ), , 46 吉国安委称在首都附近击毙一名恐怖分子 44 Shanghai hezuozuzhikuoyuan:Tiaozhanyu jiyu Global Times However,notmuchinformation is availableabout 双核 , 23June2016.ChenYurongissecretarygeneralofthe , No.6,2015(hereafter,Li,“SCOenlargement: opportunities , ), 中俄印三国 shuanghe China News ), , , The Observer Ji’erjisi sitanguo’anwei:Xuliyazuzhixialing Shanghe zuzhi15nian,chengjiujiyuyu , 7September2016. ) organisationtoa“China- , , Zhong e yinsanguo Ji guoanweichengzaishoudu , 6September2016. 吉尔吉斯斯坦国安委：叙利亚 ), Russia, EasternEurope 上海合作组织扩员:挑 47 Hethinks 43 45 As - 42 )

49 Li,“SCOenlargement:opportunitiesand challenges”. 48 Jin,“IslamicStateprogressinginCentral Asia”. extremism] from spreading from SouthandWestAsia”to extremism] fromspreading “prevent the‘threeforces’[ofterrorism, separatism, and to be to continue missionwill SCO’s counter-terrorism says, the Li Jinfeng cooperation. As and bilateral for multilateral SCO’s scope broaden the should states member new of accession as the well as current threats organisation. So, the of the process institutionalisation the to contributed strongly and has SCO the of component a core been Counter-terrorism hasalways interests largelycoincide. thinks that their On security, issues. power on economicandsoft LiJinfeng China andRussiacentresonly between competition enlargement. the by affected much be not should relations However, China-Russia and Russia. er di a “UkraineII” ( that itcouldbecome tianran jingjichang “natural arena”( powers’ great also the but Valley, terrorist threat, for example, isnotonlyapotential Fergana the says Kai Jin influence. of sphere traditional Russia fromregainingits prevent to region hasbeen in the US’s realpurpose terrorism inAfghanistan),the Central Asia,China,andRussia. ), caught up in the fight for influence between the US the between influence for fight the in up caught ), 48 ). In the future, it is “highly possible” possible” ). future, itis“highly In the 49 乌克兰第二 天然竞技场 , Wukelan , About the authors

François Godement is director of the China & Asia programme and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He is also a non-resident senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., and an outside consultant for the Policy Planning Staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He can be reached at [email protected].

Mathieu Duchâtel is senior policy fellow and deputy director of the Asia & China Programme at the European Council of Foreign Relations. He can be reached at mathieu.duchatel@ ecfr.eu

Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix is a researcher-lecturer at the French Defense Historical Service. He can be reached at [email protected]

Michal Makocki is Senior Visiting Academic Fellow at Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin and Associate Analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. He is an EU civil servant (currently on sabbatical leave) and has worked as a policy analyst at the Strategy Unit in the Directorate for Trade at the European Commission. Prior to that, he was part of the European External Action Service and was posted at the EU Delegation to China. He can be reached at [email protected]

Marc Julienne is a PhD candidate at INALCO, as well as a Research Fellow with the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) in Paris. His research focuses on China’s security policy, especially terrorism, military affairs and foreign policy. He can be reached at [email protected]

Jérôme Doyon is the editor-in-chief of China Analysis, and an associate policy fellow for the ECFR's Asia & China Programme. He can be reached at [email protected].

ECFR would like to thank Justine Doody for her help in preparing the text for publication.

This paper does not represent the collective views of ECFR, but only the view of its authors.

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13 14 ECFR/195 November 2016 www.ecfr.eu CHINA AND RUSSIA: GAMING THE WEST? • that defineitsactivities: ECFR hasdevelopedastrategywiththreedistinctiveelements andvalues-basedEuropeanforeignpolicy.effective promote informeddebateonthedevelopmentofcoherent, conduct cutting-edgeresearch,buildcoalitionsforchange,and pan-European think-tank.Launchedin2007,itsobjectiveisto The ABOUT ECFR Wissenschaft. of Daimler-Fonds fürdieDeutsche imStifterverband This issueofChinaAnalysiswasproducedwiththesupport www.ecfr.eu to individualsorinstitutions. other think-tanksandorganisationsbutdoesnotmakegrants values-based EUforeignpolicy. ECFRworksinpartnershipwith These donorsallowustopublishourideasandadvocatefora national governments,companiesandprivateindividuals. ECFR isaregisteredcharityfundedbycharitablefoundations, •  •  and MabelvanOranje. countries. TheCouncilischairedbyCarlBildt,EmmaBonino on policyideasandhelpwithECFR’s activitiesintheirown withadviceandfeedback forces, membersprovideECFRstaff a year. Throughregulargeographicalandthematictask member statesandcandidatecountries–whichmeetsonce decision makers,thinkersandbusinesspeoplefromtheEU’s distinguished Councilofover250members–politicians, A pan-European Council. reaches out to strategic media outlets. reaches outtostrategicmediaoutlets. debates, and“friendsofECFR”gatheringsinEUcapitals; publishes policyreports;hostsprivatemeetings,public a pan-Europeanfocus.ECFRproducesoriginalresearch; out innovativeresearchandpolicydevelopmentprojectswith researchers andpractitionersfromalloverEuropetocarry ECFR hasbroughttogetherateamofdistinguished debate, advocacyandcommunications. in Europeancapitals,andprovidesaplatformforresearch, European presenceputsusatthecentreofpolicydebates perspectives ofawiderangeEUmemberstates.Ourpan- allowing theorganisationtochannelopinionsand in Berlin,London,Madrid,Paris,Rome,SofiaandWarsaw, Uniquely amongEuropeanthink-tanks,ECFRhasoffices Developing contagious ideas that get people talking. Developing contagiousideasthatgetpeopletalking. A physicalpresenceinthemainEUmemberstates. European CouncilonForeignRelations ECFR has brought together a ECFR hasbroughttogethera (ECFR) is the first (ECFR)isthefirst

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