The National Traditions According to Populist Parties and Their Consequences for Euroscepticism

The national traditions according to populist parties and their consequences for Euroscepticism

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam

Author: Bernadet Neven Student Number: 10547339 Main Supervisor: dr. R.J. de Bruin Second Supervisor: dr. A. van Heerikhuizen

January, 2018

Preface

In front of you, you have the thesis “The national traditions according to populist parties and their consequences for Euroscepticism”. This has been written by a qualitative testing method. The thesis is written within the framework of my graduation for the master European Policy at the University of Amsterdam. From March 2017 until January 2018 I have worked on this research.

Together with my thesis supervisor, Robin de Bruin, I conceptualized the research question for this thesis. After a lot of improving the question and the content of the thesis, I managed to answer the research question. During my research, my supervisor, Robin de Bruin, helped a lot. With many meetings and feedback, this is the end result.

Hereby, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Robin de Bruin, a lot with the great guidance and support during this process. At the same time, I would like to thank my friends and family for brainstorming with me about this topic and for supporting me morally during this writing process.

I wish you a lot of pleasure reading this thesis.

Bernadet Neven

Amsterdam, January 15th 2018.

Abstract

Euroscepticism is of all times. It had its ups and downs, but Euroscepticism already occurred since the beginning of the European cooperation. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Euroscepticism had many peaks, for example with the Big Bang in 2004 and the euro crisis in 2008. Partly thanks to the rise of populist parties, the EU finds itself in heavy weathers these days. Populist parties always think that the national history and traditions of their own country is most important, but is this also the main cause of Euroscepticism? In this thesis, this question has been researched on the basis of three populist parties: Front National from France, Alternative für Deutschland from Germany and Partij voor de Vrijheid from the Netherlands. A first important thing that immediately comes forward in the existing literature, is the fact that there are several types of Euroscepticism. In this thesis, one will find out that national histories and traditions are definitely not the only driver of Euroscepticism; other events also contribute to Euroscepticism, such as the euro crisis.

Table of contents

Introduction ...... 1

British Euroscepticism as paradigm ...... 5

Evolution of Euroscepticism ...... 6

Differences in Euroscepticism ...... 8

British Euroscepticism compared to continental Euroscepticism ...... 11

Conclusion ...... 12

Migration processes ...... 13

Colonial migration ...... 14

Labour migration ...... 16

Refugee migration ...... 18

Conclusion ...... 22

Using national past ...... 23

Front National vs. Charles de Gaulle ...... 24

Charles de Gaulle ...... 25

Alternative für Deutschland vs. Konrad Adenauer ...... 29

Konrad Adenauer ...... 30

Partij voor de Vrijheid vs. Willem Drees ...... 34

Willem Drees ...... 35

Conclusion ...... 39

Using traditional enemies and allies ...... 40

Russian threat vs. populism ...... 41

NATO vs. populism ...... 46

Conclusion ...... 50

Conclusion ...... 51

Bibliography ...... 54 1. Introduction

“Seizing on Euroscepticism and anti-immigration sentiment in the face of the refugee crisis, populist right-wing parties have managed to attract voters from across the political spectrum.”1 According to The Telegraph populism is rising in Europe and the main driver of this populism is Euroscepticism. Populism is not very new in Europe, however, the combination of a rise in populism and Euroscepticism is relatively new. Eurosceptics are citizens or politicians who present themselves as critical to the European Union. The EU takes, according to Eurosceptics, the power away from their national government and poses a threat to national sovereignty.2 However, one must be careful with the term Euroscepticism. Where Euroscepticism is adopted in the context of national political debates, it assumes a meaning which must be understood to the different national traditions and experiences of European integration which frames these debates.3 Although we must be careful with the term, many common factors contributed to the fact that people became Eurosceptic. Take for example the refugee crisis as The Telegraph also mentioned: how the EU is handling this crisis is disapproved by a lot of European citizens. Populistic parties used this disapproval to gain popularity in several countries and spark Euroscepticism. However, the handling of the refugee crisis is obviously not the only reason that made many Europeans Eurosceptic. Another factor could be, for example, the national history of the countries. In this thesis, I will research this factor by questioning whether national history is used against the EU, according to populist parties. These parties argue that every time European integration will be expanded, the national states have less influence in the EU. In this thesis it is important to research the perception of these parties when it comes to national history and traditions. How do they use these history and traditions against the EU. Since the EU is too big to research every country, the thesis will focus on three countries: France, Germany and the Netherlands.

1 Ashley Kirk. 2017. How the rise of the populist far right has swept through Europe in 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/24/rise-populist-far-right-has-swept-europe-2017/. Accessed on: October 24th, 2017. 2 Euractiv. 2013. Euroscepticism: more than a British phenomenon. http://www.euractiv.com/section/med- south/linksdossier/euroscepticism-more-than-a-british-phenomenon/. Accessed on: July 12th, 2017. 3 Will Carter. 2016. A Guide to Europe’s key Eurosceptic Parties, and how Successful they are. http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2016/08/guide-europe-s-key-eurosceptic-parties-and-how- successful-they-are. Accessed on: May 17th, 2017. 1

But first of all, what is populism exactly? According to the dictionary, populism is “a political approach that strives to appeal ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups”.4 The book of Anselmi goes further than this; populism is a demand for more democracy on the part of citizens. Anselmi argues that populism refers to a complexity of phenomena which are key to democracy.5 More important is the definition of radical right- wing populism, because I will research this type of populism in my thesis: “The new radical right-wing parties share an emphasis on ethno-nationalism rooted in myths about the distant past. Their program is directed toward strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogeneous and by returning to traditional values.”6 Although all three definitions are slightly different, all are telling us that citizens and the populist party as well are dissatisfied with the national ruling; they want to go back to the old days. The nation must be strengthened and the country needs to return to the old, traditional values. Therefore, the number populist parties is rising in Europe; populism is a big issue nowadays, especially in the Western countries. Populist parties bond together to get their “sovereignty” back and reduce the power of the EU. 7 This has been done by, for example, organising a European counter summit for populist parties. One was held in Koblenz at January 21st of last year, where many European populist parties came together and informally launched the election campaigns in several European countries. Especially the elections in the Netherlands, France and Germany were a focus point during this summit. In January, the popularity of Front National (hereinafter FN) in France has risen after the influx of refugees and the terrorist attacks in this country.8 The party had a big chance to win the elections in France. The party has a conservative, Eurosceptic and nationalist voice. However, this voice was not the one to win in May of this year. Germany has the same sort of party; Alternative für Deutschland (hereinafter AfD). Angela Merkel took a bold step by vowing to welcome one million refugees in her country, but it fired back on her. Since then, the anti-immigrant party Alternative für Deutschland has assumed a more nationalistic platform strongly opposed the influx of migrants.9 In its neighbour country, the Netherlands, one of the populist parties is called Partij voor de Vrijheid (hereinafter PVV); the Freedom Party. The

4 Oxford Dictionary. 2017. “Populism”. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/populism. Accessed on: January 7th, 2018. 5 Manuel Anselmi. 2017. Populism: An Introduction. London: Routledge, p. 2. 6 Jens Rydgren. 2007. “The sociology of the Radical Right”. Annual Review of Sociology 33(1): 242. 7 NOS. 2017. Wilders, Petry en Le Pen presenteren zich als ‘leiders nieuwe Europe’. http://nos.nl/artikel/2154091-wilders-petry-en-le-pen-presenteren-zich-als-leiders-nieuwe-europa.html. Accessed on: June 13th, 2017. 8 CNN. 2016. How populism could shake up Europe: a visual guide. http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/03/europe/populism-in-europe-visual-guide/. Accessed on: May 26th, 2017. 9 Ibid. 2 party has proposed registering Dutch citizens’ ethnicity and banning Islamic schools, and can be seen as the Dutch Front National. FN, AfD and PVV are not the only populist parties in the European Union. However, this thesis will focus on these three parties, since they drew a lot of media attention, due to the recent national elections. Furthermore, as already said, all three parties are radical right and thus arguing that the traditional values need to come back, as states in the definition of Jens Rydgren. Although almost everybody in the Netherlands and France was convinced that Geert Wilders and Marine le Pen would be the biggest winners in their countries, however it turned out to be different. AfD however, did not win the election as well but is new in the German politics and the biggest win for them is that they are the third biggest party in the country and is therefore for the first time in the Bundestag.

In this thesis I have chosen these three countries, since the three countries have more or less the same point of view about the European Union, however, their populist parties do not agree at all. Moreover, when taking national traditions into account, the German, French and Dutch presidents and Prime Ministers who worked on the European integration were also very important for the national history. Respectively Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle and Willem Drees are being called the Fathers of the country and did a lot for the rebuilding of the countries in many ways. For many inhabitants of the three countries these three persons are absolute heroes, but interesting in this thesis is the question whether the populist parties are also content with the history of these persons in their countries, because the Fathers are not only Fathers for their country but also for the European integration and the following European Union, which turned out to be a political disaster according to, especially, populist parties. This feeling of a political disaster for the EU is a form of Euroscepticism. This is not a phenomenon that has occurred since the past few years. However, since the Maastricht Treaty, there is more Euroscepticism in Europe. The Big Bang in 2004, for example, made many people in European countries Eurosceptic; according to many, the European Union became too big and too political with this enlargement of the Union.10 However, not only the politicians are the ones with strong opinions; the ignorance of EU citizens is a cause for Euroscepticism as well. Thereby, since the migration crisis of the past few years, Euroscepticism only rose more. Probably because of anxiety and big cultural differences towards the refugees. Although the countries already had a lot of migrants in their country due to the colonial past, the crisis was a turning point for many citizens. According to many Europeans the borders need to get closed for these immigrants.

10 Kopecký, Petr. 2004. “An Awkward Newcomer? EU Enlargement and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic”. European Studies 20(1): 230. 3

Populist parties always argue that they will keep the national traditions intact. However, the question remains what the national traditions are according to populist parties and thereby, which consequences they have for Euroscepticism? This will be researched in this thesis by examining the national traditions within the three populist parties of these countries. To come to an answer, the thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, several types of Euroscepticism will be researched. This is important, since none of the countries has the same form or arguments when it comes to Euroscepticism. One country could be against the EU on the basis of economic arguments, the other could be against the EU because of their nationalistic thoughts. In this chapter, British Euroscepticism comes into play as well, because Euroscepticism at the island is totally different than Euroscepticism at the continent. In the second chapter, the colonial past will be researched. Since the beginning of the colonial era France and the Netherlands were proud of these overseas territories. In the countries, there was less resistance to migrants from the colonies than there is nowadays for all the migrants in the countries. Is there a real difference for these countries when talking about the migrants of the former colonies and the migrants of other countries as Morocco and Turkey? These first two chapters will be introductory and therefore descriptive in nature. The research will be done by means of existing literature. After these chapters, the thesis will research the national past. It investigates the opinion of FN, AfD and PVV when talking about the national histories of these countries. To give this insight, the chapter is divided into three cases. All three cases contain a former leader of the country and their policy through the eyes of the populist parties. The general question is whether the ideas of the populist party is in accordance with the ideas and legacy of the former leader of the country. The first case focuses on Charles de Gaulle and the ideas of Front National. The second case is about Konrad Adenauer and the views of Alternative für Deutschland. The third case is about Willem Drees and the Partij voor de Vrijheid. These cases will be researched by checking the party lines of the parties, many newspapers and interviews and several speeches of the party leaders. The last chapter examines the former threats and alliances. In this chapter, the Russian Federation and NATO will be discussed. Russia is traditionally a threat for Europe, especially for countries as Germany and the Netherlands. However, the three populist parties would like to strengthen the ties with the Russian Federation. This is also the case with NATO, but then the other way around. NATO is traditionally an alliance with Europe, Canada and the United States, but the populist parties would like to reduce the power of NATO. How do these two views of the populist parties relate to the national traditions? In this chapter, the research will also be done through literature and by checking the programme parties, newspapers and interviews and speeches of the party

4 leaders. At last, the conclusion gives an answer to the research question posed in this introduction.

2. Different types of Euroscepticism

The central question in this thesis is if and to what extent national history is used against the EU, according to the three populist parties mentioned in the introduction. To come to an answer, we first need to know what Euroscepticism is and how it can be divided into different forms. In this chapter different types and forms of Euroscepticism will be described and France, Germany and the Netherlands will be divided over these different types. Furthermore, the British case will be described shortly in this chapter, because it is an extraordinary form of Euroscepticism and important in this thesis, because due to this kind of Euroscepticism the Brexit occurred in 2016. It is important to know their arguments and feelings when it comes to the EU, not only to show that the Brexit might have been inevitable, but also to understand even more that Euroscepticism has all kinds of forms. Great Britain has always been a stranger in our midst; according to a recent British article, the Brexit is the first domino which could topple the entire political project of the “United States of Europe”, as many Brits the EU are calling.11 As will be shown in this chapter, the Brits see themselves as “the other”, which means that they do not feel very European. This is one of the reasons why they voted against the EU in June 2016. According to recent definitions Euroscepticism expresses the opposition towards European integration. When following this definition, Euroscepticism is one of the biggest challenges today. Not only in Great Britain, but also on the continent. Radical Eurosceptics are frightened for the economic effects concerning EU enlargement as well as for the national sovereignty of the states.12 Even in the north-western countries on the continent, Euroscepticism has a strong influence on the citizens. The question is: why is the Euroscepticism present in these developed countries? A possible argument for Euroscepticism in these developed countries might be the idea that Europe is an invention of bureaucracy searching to form a bureaucratic and undemocratic superstate or, according to Eurosceptics, a dictatorship.13 In this chapter the

11 Matthew Ellerly. 2016. Across Europe Euroscepticism is on the rise, and is here to stay. http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/10/08/across-europe-euro-scepticism-rise/. Accessed on: May 16th, 2017. 12 Monica Condruz-Băcescu. 2014. “Euroscepticism across Europe: Drivers and Challenges”. European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 6(2): 53. 13 Ibid. 5 evolution of Euroscepticism will be researched. Because Euroscepticism evaluated over time, one can speak now of several types of Euroscepticism. These types will be researched as well, thereby dividing the three populist parties over these kinds of Euroscepticism. Furthermore, I will examine the British Euroscepticism shortly as well, thereby questioning how this is related to the Euroscepticism on the continent.

2.1 Evolution of Euroscepticism

Since the foundation of the European Economic Community (hereinafter EEC) there have been negative feelings about Europe, because this European project was based on supporting the integration process economically and therefore the citizens of the member states have not been important for years. However, the term Euroscepticism reached the continent only in the 1990s. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU started to be lacking more legitimacy due to more influences the EU institutions got. But not only lacking legitimacy can be assigned to the EU; the institutions were having a democratic deficit as well.14 This has led to a gap between citizens and the political elite, which gave ultimately rise to Euroscepticism. The concept has become increasingly problematic for the Union when the Netherlands and France rejected the European constitution.15 Nowadays it seems that the more ambitious the EU actions are, the more the scepticism of citizens become critical for the political class. Citizens have never had the opportunity to reintegrate with the European Union, and therefore they do not know as much about the EU as they probably know about the national politics. The EU institutions and its integration process is now too far away for them and this is ideal for populism, because they can spread the negative word about the Union through their rank and file.16 Clearly visible in Figure 1 are the enlargements of Euroscepticism since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

14 Ibid, p. 54. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 6

Figure 1. The Evolution of Euroscepticism since the TEU

This Treaty was the first benchmark, but in 1999 with the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, Euroscepticism rose again. In this Treaty the European Union made several adjustments that needed to enable the EU to function more efficiently and democratically in order to cooperate in a better way with the coming enlargement.17 This is probably an argument for some Europeans to become Eurosceptic since this could be more prove to a political union instead of the economic union it used to be. Another noticeable growth in Euroscepticism is 2002 when the euro was incorporated in twelve member states. For many Europeans, it was guessing what the outcome in this Union would be. And according to many Eurosceptics the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a disaster. This is also seen in Figure 1, because Eurosceptical feelings did not drop enormously after the start of the EMU. Moreover, since the beginning of the euro crisis in 2008, Euroscepticism has increased a lot. Thereby, this increase is more pronounced in the Eurozone countries compared to the non-Eurozone countries. The

17 European Parliament. 2017. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.1.3.html, Accessed on: May 22nd, 2017. 7 euro crisis has prompted the Europeans to reconsider their attitudes towards the EU and the integration process from a utilitarian perspective.18

The evolution of Euroscepticism made sure that there are several types of Euroscepticism these days. This is due to the fact that every European or member state have different arguments and opinions when it comes to the EU. If, for instance, a European citizen argues that the EU lacks democracy, his neighbour will argue that the EU never should have incorporated the euro in 2002. This means that they have a different Eurosceptical view. In the next section, the differences in Euroscepticism will be further explained, with dividing the three populist parties over the different types of Euroscepticism.

2.2 Differences in Euroscepticism

The term Euroscepticism was invented on UK soil, but came to the continent in the nineties, due to the debates of the Maastricht Treaty.19 As already said in the Introduction, but very important, Euroscepticism must be understood against the background of the different national traditions and experiences of European integration. This means that Euroscepticism in France is not the same as Euroscepticism in Germany or the Netherlands. One can distinguish several types of Euroscepticism, as stated in Figure 2 below. Although FN, AfD and PVV can be compared with each other, the parties are different when it comes to the origin of Euroscepticism. In her latest election programme, Marine le Pen argues that she will regain the freedom of the French destiny by restoring the French sovereignty. Furthermore, she aims to transform the Common Agricultural Policy into French Agricultural Policy and guarantees that the criteria for subsidies will be set by France and no longer by the EU.20 This means that, when it comes to the different types of Euroscepticism, FN prefers more sovereignty: it is better that many decisions will be left with the national politics. AfD, on the other hand, prefers a more economical Euroscepticism. The party is no longer willing to accept the enforcement of the

18 Loredana Radu, Elena Negrea-Busuioc and Alina Bargaoanu. 2014. “The rise of Euroscepticism in Times of Crisis. Evidence from the 2008 – 2013 Eurobarometers”. Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations 16(1): 12. 19 Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering. 2004. “Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate”. European Studies: A Journal of European Culture 20(1): 17 – 18. 20 Front National. 2017. Election programme ‘144 Engagements Présidentiels’. Statement 1 and 126. Election programme ‘144 Engagements Présidentiels’. http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/144-engagements.pdf. Accessed on: June 13th, 2017. 8 euro rescue package, therefore they call for an end to the so-called “euro experiment” and its dissolution. According to AfD, the introduction of the euro has been a political project and all warning messages were ignored by the European officials. The eurozone was to become the most dynamic and innovative economic zone in the world, however, according to the German party, the currency is not viable without ongoing massive wealth transfers into the member states that do not meet the standards of the currency union. 21 PVV claims that the EU does not bring prosperity and jobs, but only many payments to Brussels and therefore it costs prosperity and jobs instead22, which means that Euroscepticism of PVV is, just as AfD, based on the economic criteria. On the other hand, the party is also related to the sovereign criteria. In a statement in 2010, party leader Geert Wilders stated the following: “We can be a member of the European Economic Area like Norway, or a member of the European Free Trade Association like Switzerland, in order to remain the economic advantages. Without being a member of the EU and the eurozone, we are again the boss of our own rules, like of who is coming in the country, immigration and our own currency.”23 This means that the party would like the Netherlands to withdraw from the EU in order to get their own sovereignty. Because the Dutch party is strongly against immigration of Muslims, it is necessary that the borders will be closed and therefore the Netherlands needs to de-Europeanise.

21 Alternative für Deutschland. 2016. Programm der Alternative für Deutschland. https://www.afd.de/wp- content/uploads/sites/111/2017/01/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf . Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 22 Geert Wilders. 2014. Nederland moet zich bevrijden van de EU. https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert- wilders/7614-pvvopinie100514.html. Accessed on: June 14th, 2017. 23 Geert Wilders. 2010. Wilders wil Nederland uit de EU. https://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article.html?id=5540:wilders-wil-nederland-uit-eu. Accessed on: July 3rd, 2017. 9

Figure 2. Types of Euroscepticism.

Type Explanation Quantifies pragmatically the major benefits and costs Euroscepticism based on arising from EU membership, resulted or not from a economic criteria cooperative process.

Considers that, at EU level, cooperation should not be a challenge to national sovereignty. These Eurosceptics Euroscepticism based on the support supranational cooperation in matters that the state criteria of sovereignty cannot manage alone (such as environmental issues and the fight against organised crime) but wish to preserve national skills for socio-cultural policies.

Perceives the current institutional structure of the Union as Euroscepticism based on inadequate in terms of representation and democratic democratic criteria participation of citizens. Assesses EU action based on the doctrine of belonging to Euroscepticism based on a political family; analysts believe that the dominant form political criteria of this disproof is social.

Source: Condruz-Băcescu, p. 55.

Although Figure 2 shows several kinds of Euroscepticism, and FN, AfD and PVV are very much Eurosceptic, nor the countries of these parties or other continental member states have actually withdrawn from the EU. Great-Britain did only 1.5 years ago and this is mainly due because of the Eurosceptical attitude of, apparently, more than half of the population. In the next section, the British Euroscepticism will be defined and explained, thereby linking it to continental Euroscepticism.

2.3 British Euroscepticism compared to continental Euroscepticism

According to Harmsen and Spiering, British Euroscepticism had a sense of “otherness” in relation to the continental Europe and its economic and political integration.24 The English dictionary defines a “Euro-sceptic” as “a person who opposes closer connections between Britain and the EU”.25 However, British Euroscepticism must be understood as not simply an opposition to the institutional forms of Europe, but it is rooted in a deeper sense of seeing themselves as a different entity. The sense of otherness is also linked to a feeling of solidarity with a wider community of English-speaking nations.26 Moreover, the use of this term must only be understood as more embedded within the British political and historical context. The term is attached to the anti-integrationist position which has found expression in both the Conservative and Labour Parties throughout the post-war period.27 Moreover, there is a complex series of political, economic and cultural factors which can be seen as distinguishing Britain from the continent, which makes the Brits more Eurosceptic than others in the EU. The sense of otherness was best captured in a 1952 speech of Sir Anthony Eden that a British membership of a “federation on the continent of Europe” was something “we know in our bones we cannot do”.28

The island’s Euroscepticism is one of the reasons the country came to the Brexit. The Brexit campaign and UKIP’s rhetoric harkens back nostalgically to a time before joining the EU, when the Westminster parliament was sovereign, society was predominately white Anglo- Saxon, the factories still provided well-paying and secure jobs for workers in the Brits and Britain remained a major economic and military power in the Commonwealth.29 Many voted in favour of Brexit, because it was an opportunistic move to register discontent with either the EU or the national government.30 This sort of Euroscepticism can be defined as hard Euroscepticism:

24 Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, p. 13. 25 Cambridge Online Dictionary. Eurosceptic. http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/eurosceptic?q=Eurosceptic. Accessed on: June 14th, 2017. 26 Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, pp. 16 – 17. 27 Harmsen and Spiering, p. 16. 28 Ibid. 29 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659. Accessed on: September 1st, 2017. 30 Simon Usherwood. 2017. “How has Brexit changed British Euroscepticism?” Political Insight 8(2): 43. 11

“Where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.”31

Another form of Euroscepticism, is soft Euroscepticism. This can be defined as the following:

“Where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.”32

Both principles are important here because eventually, both Euroscepticism will give the negative spirit in the European Union. However, most important in this thesis is the hard Euroscepticism that is mainly seen in, for example, the populist parties. Hard Euroscepticism is seen more and more after the Brexit. Within hours after the Brexit, FN leader Marine le Pen and PVV leader Geert Wilders were demanding referendums in their own countries.33 According to many, the EU must not sit back but listen to its citizens and respond to their concerns, particularly on the repatriation of powers from Brussels.34

2.4 Conclusion

Since the beginning of the EEC, there have been negative feelings about Europe, because the European project was based on supporting the integration process economically instead of socially. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU started to be lacking more legitimacy and as seen in Figure 1, Euroscepticism has known many ups and downs from that period on. Because European citizens never had the opportunity to reintegrate with the

31 Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. 2008. Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 2. 32 Ibid. 33 Will Carter. 2016. A Guide to Europe’s key Eurosceptic Parties, and how Successful they are. http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2016/08/guide-europe-s-key-eurosceptic-parties-and-how- successful-they-are. Accessed on: May 17th, 2017. 34 Ibid. 12

European project, they now do not know much about the EU. The EU institutions and its integration process is now too far away for them and this is where populism comes into play, because the populist parties can spread the negative word about the Union through their rank and file. Because of the development of Euroscepticism since the beginning of the European project, there are now several kinds of Euroscepticism. The Germans, for example, are Eurosceptic since the euro crisis. This has led to an election programme wherein AfD is claiming that Germany needs to withdraw from the euro and get their own mark back. Germans are tired of paying the debt of other countries with their money. According to FN, France would like to have its sovereignty back. This is only possible if the country withdraws from the EU. This is not very strange, since France is a very nationalistic country. Therefore, it is very hard for the French to give its sovereignty to another institution. However, since the victory of Macron in May of this year, France seems far away from withdrawing from the EU. When taking PVV into account, the party claims that the EU only brings many payments to Brussels and therefore it costs prosperity and jobs. This means that Euroscepticism of PVV is based on the economic criteria. But not only the economic criteria is important for the party; the sovereign criteria is as well. The party wants to be the boss of its own rules, when it comes to immigration and the currency. This means that the party would like the country to withdraw from the EU in order to get their own sovereignty back. A whole different form of Euroscepticism is what Great-Britain has. British Euroscepticism is rooted in a deeper sense of seeing themselves as a different entity; the sense of otherness. This feeling ensured the Brexit in 2016. It is a little bit the same form as the sovereignty form on the continent, however, British Euroscepticism has a complex series of political, economic and cultural factors which can be seen as distinguishing Britain from the continent.

3. Migration processes

Many of the political parties in the EU member states that are in favour of withdrawing from the EU are either anti-immigration or Islamophobic. Especially for populist parties, migration is one of the most common issues to become Eurosceptic, since migration and the rise of (radical) Islam are two issues on which the EU and national governments work intensively

13 together.35 However, the flow of migrants coming to the European Union is not a new phenomenon; there has always been migration and it has evolved over the years. Migratory flows such as the flows of asylum-seekers, labour migrants or migrants due to decolonization processes, all of these migration processes are associated with various problems. This includes terrorism, criminality and social unrest and therefore migration and asylum issues have become important topics of contemporary security politics in the EU.36 Migration is thus an evolvement over the years and one can therefore argue that it is embedded in the national traditions of the countries. First, especially France and the Netherlands in this case had to deal with migrants coming from their (former) colonies. However, the European institution had little to do with it, since decolonization processes was not linked to Europe. Another important migration process is labour migration; with labour migration, I mean migration from North-African countries, but also Spain and Italy. Due to the fact that there were at least two European countries involved, Europe has somewhat to do with this kind of migration. The last migration process is the refugee migration; not only today’s crisis, but also the crisis in 90s is important here. Due to the Dublin Regulation and the Schengen Agreement, the EU is definitely involved in this migration process. What is questioned in this chapter is to what extent the three populist parties blame the EU when it comes to migration processes? What is striking, for example, is the fact that France and the Netherlands are proud about their colonial history, but at the same time they do not want migrants in their country nowadays. In my opinion, this is a bit strange and very paradoxical. This chapter will research the three migration processes through the eye of the populist parties and thereby answering the question whether these processes are a cause of Euroscepticism or not.

3.1 Decolonization migration

Despite differences in history with regard to migration, all of the European countries face issues related to migration and integration. Especially in France and the Netherlands many migrants from former colonies are now inhabitants of France and the Netherlands. Although colonial ties

35 Will Carter. 2016. A Guide to Europe’s Key Eurosceptic Parties, and how Successful they are. http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2016/08/guide-europe-s-key-eurosceptic-parties-and-how- successful-they-are, Accessed: May 17th, 2017. 36 Sarah Léonard. 2010. “EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices”. European Security 19(2): 231. 14 are no longer a determining factor in Europe because of the increasing mobility, standardised social relations, convergent politics of immigration and globalised markets, it is important to mention the migration process after the decolonization in this chapter.

When it comes to integration of immigrants in European countries, the demand for recognition is very important. This allows immigrants to emerge from the political sidelines and fully integrate within state structures. In France, the treatment of North African immigrants by local and national authorities has been guided by a fear of Islam since the 1990s. At the same time, the French notion of secular “republican citizenship” is incompatible with an attachment to religious and ethnic identity and this has made Islam a serious struggle in France. This was especially the case after students of North African origins began to wear Islamic clothing in schools and of course nowadays with the war on terror. When it comes to the Dutch case, it is different. Where the ideal Frenchman is a real republican, the ideal Dutchman does not exist. The pillarization in the Netherlands during almost the whole 20th century is the outcome of the multicultural attitude that controlled the country especially during this century. This pillarization goes hand in hand with the multicultural attitude. Many citizens from former colonies are migrated to the Netherlands and are more likely to be seen as compatriots than migrants from other countries. This is because, for example in the Netherlands, these migrants are part of the Kingdom for a long time and they speak Dutch.37 According to PVV, the natives have the right to stay in the Netherlands. Other migrants are guests and need to learn to behave according to the rules the Dutch know; the right of the first.38 Striking is that PVV does not have an opinion about the pillarization as a whole during the 20th century. One might say that this is because the EEC did not have anything to do with it. Moreover, PVV did not exist during the pillarization, thus it is not necessary for them to have an opinion about it.

In the next section I will discuss labour migration, thereby questioning again whether this migration process is a cause of Euroscepticism according to the populist parties or not.

37 Ibid. p. 83. 38 Ibid. 15

3.2 Labour migration

After the Second World War, more specifically in the 1950s and 1960s, European countries competed for cheap labour to rebuild their economy and their society after years of destruction because of the destroying wars.39 From the 1960s on, labour migration rose in Europe due to the booming economy during this decade. Not only North-Africans, but also Italians and Spaniards came to northwest-Europe. Due to the entry into force of the customs union in 1968, which was the fundament of the single market. This is one of the reasons why Italians and Spaniards came to northern European countries. The 1980s marked a real turning point in the relationship between the European countries and immigrants. In 1986 the Single European Act (SEA) entries into force, where Europe was defined as follows: “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.”40 From then on, together with the Schengen Agreement states coordinated their policy of immigration and cooperated to protect a common border from flows of immigration.41 This meant that the era marked the shift from temporary economic migrants to the permanent settlement of immigrant populations and their political participation.42 Furthermore, due to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many East-European migrants came to West-Europe as well. After the Big Bang in 2004, the East-West migration poses the biggest European change since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Nowadays, especially the United Kingdom has these migrants in the country.43 However, although many East-Europeans are located in the UK today, the Netherlands did have some debates about labour migration from East-Europe. In one of the debates, in 2011, PVV reacts to the Report of the Temporary Commission “Lessons from recent labour migration”. Herein is concluded that the migration of East-Europeans to the Netherlands is underestimated and that the influx of these migrants was not steered in the right direction as well.44 “As one of the few parties, we were from the beginning against opening up the labour market for East-

39 Ibid. p. 82. 40 The Single European Act. 1986. Article 8a. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:a519205f-924a- 4978-96a2-b9af8a598b85.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. Accessed on: May 24th, 2017. 41 Riva Kastoryano. 2010, p. 80. 42 Ibid. p. 83. 43 OECD, 2000, Trends in International Migration. https://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/2508596.pdf. Accessed on: June 11th, 2017. 44 Overheid.nl. 2011. “Parlementair onderzoek Lessen uit recente arbeidsmigratie”. https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32680-4.html. Accessed on: January 12th, 2018. 16

European states.”45 According to the Dutch party, labour migration causes troubles such as harassment, less shelter and repression on the labour market. PVV wonders why the government expected a limited influx of labour migrants when the labour market opened up in 2007.46 According to Clingendael Magazine FN has capitalized on the anxieties of the French society towards globalization, the economic and financial crisis as well as the disappointment with the current European project, ever since the electoral breakthrough in 1982.47 Identity, citizenship, French suburbs and “laïcité” (disestablishment) are seen by the right-wing politicians as republican symbols under threat by immigrants.48 However, FN is in contrast to refugee migration not really against labour migration. The party argues that the French have to keep in mind that Islam could be a threat, especially since the War on Terror and the assaults in 2015 and 2016. Nevertheless, this threat is more coming from asylum seekers, or returned foreign fighters, than that it comes from labour migration.

When looking to Germany, the demands by Turks for dual citizenship introduced clear distinctions between nationality, citizenship and identity. The eventual recognition of a Muslim community by the public authority was not lost on those seeking full integration of Turkish immigrants into German society. Debates and arguments about religion in Europe concentrate on the relationship between church and state in order to interpret and acknowledge diversity with regard to Muslim immigration.49 However, this diversity is not acknowledged by many citizens and (populist) parties. AfD got in the latest election a lot of votes from past non-voters (1.2 million). In many ways, this is an anti-Merkel vote, reflecting opposition to her controversial “Willkommenspolitik” towards immigrants in every form. This apparently not only pushed some voters of mainstream parties to switch but also mobilised previous non- voters. 85% of the voters want stronger national borders; AfD has profited from the fact that immigration was the number one issue in these elections.50 AfD is a young party, but has a strong opinion about immigration and this is reflected on the voters. However, just as FN, AfD

45 PVV. 2011. “Inbreng debat over het Rapport van de Tijdelijke commissie Lessen uit recente arbeidsmigratie”. https://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/46-sietse-fritsma/4836-inbreng-debat-over-het- rapportvan-de-tijdelijke-commissie-lessen-uit-recente-arbeidsmigratie.html. Accessed on: January 12th, 2018. 46 Ibid. 47 Sarah Wolff. 2016. “Immigration; an issue in the French presidential campaign”. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/immigration-issue-french-presidential-campaign. Accessed on: January 12th, 2018. 48 Ibid. 49 Riva Kastoryano, p. 82. 50 Cas Mudde. 2017. “What the stunning success of AfD means for Germany and Europe”. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/24/germany-elections-afd-europe-immigration- merkel-radical-right. Accessed on: January 12th, 2018. 17 has more to say about the refugee migration, than about labour migration. For example, stronger national borders is number one priority because of the immigration policy with respect to refugees.

Therefore, I will discuss refugee migration in the next section, thereby questioning again whether this migration process is a cause of Euroscepticism according to the populist parties or not.

3.3 Refugee migration

In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam conferred law-making powers in the field of migration in the EU. It provided the legal basis for the realisation of the call by the European Council in the Tampere Conclusions to develop a common EU asylum and migration policy.51 This policy was part of a broader project of turning the EU into an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). At the Tampere European Council in 1999, the EU Heads of State and Government declared that the EU needs a comprehensive approach to migration. This approach needs to address political, human rights, issues in countries and region of origin.52

Since 2007 the European migration regime has undergone substantial reforms in terms of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). This includes the Dublin Regulation, the Asylum Directives, the European Refugee Fund and European Asylum Support Office. Under the Dublin Regulation, an asylum-seeker must claim asylum in the first EU country they enter. This means that a huge number of migrants will not go further than Italy or Greece, which is something the populist parties in France, Germany and the Netherlands support. They rather do not want any asylum seeker from Syria in Europe, however, when they are not in their country it is fine as well. In an interview with news site Nu.nl PVV claims that the Netherlands does not have to give shelter for the refugees coming from Syria: “The refugees who register in the Netherlands have made a trip through different safe countries (via Turkey, Greece, through

51 Alan Desmond. 2016. “The Development of a Common EU Migration Policy and the Rights of Irregular Migrants: A progress Narrative?”. Human Rights Law Review 16(2): 247. 52 Sandra Lavenex and Rahel Kunz. 2008. “The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations”. Journal of European Integration 30(3): 444. 18

Europe to the Netherlands), so they are not on the run for war and abuse.”53 However, due to the fact that many (Syrian) refugees enter the European Union through Greece the past few years, both the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice decided in 2011 to suspend all the transfers back to Greece on grounds that migrants’ fundamental rights could not be guaranteed.54 For similar reasons, transfers to Italy, Hungary, Poland and Malta have also been suspended for short periods. The EU tried to address this situation with Dublin Regulation II, which includes new safeguards, a requirement for states to assess the rights implications of a Dublin transfer before they remove someone to another member state and an “early warning mechanism” intended to prevent the degeneration of member state’ asylum systems.55 However, in 2015 a total of 4.7 million people immigrated to one of the EU member states and among the 4.7 million there were an estimated 2.4 million citizens of non-member countries and some 19 thousand stateless people.56 Because of these enormous numbers, the Dublin system came under growing pressure. Therefore, the Commission proposed a permanent relocation scheme which would effectively bypass the Dublin rules in cases of emergency situations.57

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon affected a number of important institutional and legislative changes which are for relevance in the field of migration policy. According to Hampshire, the Lisbon Treaty changed the institutional rules of the game. Therefore, the expectation was that the empowerment of supranational institutions would result in greater harmonisation and more liberal policies, because the institutions have traditionally taken a pro- migrant approach.58 However, since there are more migrants coming to Europe the last few years, the opposition towards immigration grows as well. The public opposition towards immigration is not new, but since the EU embarked on its migration project in the late 1990s immigration has become an increasingly salient issue and public attitudes have hardened across many member states. As Euroscepticism and negative public opinion on immigration have increased, national governments have reasserted their authority in the recently communitarised

53 Nu.nl. 2015. Dit zijn de vluchtelingen-standpunten van de politieke partijen. http://www.nu.nl/politiek/4146863/vluchtelingen-standpunten-van-politieke-partijen.html. Accessed on: September 1st, 2017. 54 James Hampshire. 2016. “European Migration Governance since the Treaty: Introduction to the Special Issues.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(4): 538. 55 Ibid. 56 Eurostat. 2017. Migration and migration population statistics. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics- explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics. Accessed on: May 17th, 2017. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid, p. 543. 19 policy process.59 The politicisation of Europe and immigration at the domestic level has reinforced member states’ resistance to further harmonisation. Migration is one of the political priorities of the Juncker Commission, with its main aim to approach the issue in a comprehensive way. The Commission’s migration agenda defines immediate measures needed to prevent human tragedies and to strengthen emergency responses. However, large numbers of and negative publicity about migrants in the past few years, caused a lot of sympathisers for withdrawing from the European Union, especially when looking at the populist parties as FN, AfD and PVV. This is not strange, because looking at Figure 3, these three countries are in the top five of countries who have agreed to relocate migrants from Greece and Italy. Furthermore, the three countries are as well in the top five of approved asylum applications in 2015.60 Therefore, these countries adopted a lot of migrants, especially Germany who had to relocate 662.680 refugees, in 2016 only. France had 61.830 refugees in that year and the Netherlands 14.775 refugees at a total of 1.038.810 refugees in Europe who need to be relocated.61 A lot of resistance came along with this relocation, because of anxiety and the big cultural differences between the national culture and the cultures of the refugees.62 With this resistance there is in some way also resistance to Brussels, where the officials made plans to relocate the refugees within the Member States without asking the citizens.

59 Ibid, p. 544. 60 BBC. 2016. Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven Charts. http://www.bbc.com/news/world- europe-34131911. Accessed on: May 17th, 2017. 61 Werkwijzer vluchtelingen. 2017. Aantallen & herkomst. http://www.werkwijzervluchtelingen.nl/feiten- cijfers/aantallen-herkomst.aspx. Accessed on: June 14th, 2017. 62 RTL Nieuws. 2016. Nederlander worstelt met vluchteling: angst en twijfel. https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nederland/politiek/nederlander-worstelt-met-vluchteling-angst-en-twijfel. Accessed on: June 14th, 2017. 20

Figure 3: EU member state migrant quotas

Populist parties make grateful use of the fact that Brussel plays a large role in the relocation of migrants and designate the scapegoat to Brussel to spark Euroscepticism. Therefore, the EU only fades away for many citizens: “Code red now applies for the European Union” is the headline of the Dutch newspaper NRC in the beginning of 2017.63 However, according to the authors of this article only the political parties in the EU are complaining about the European project, so do they drag the European citizens with them into the Eurosceptic position? They probably do. As already stated, for many citizens the EU is an institution which is too far away to know something about it. Therefore, when a politician argues that their country need to withdraw from the EU or Brussels needs to have less power, many people take this for granted and side with these politicians. Due to the Refugee Crisis among other things, populist parties

63 Stéphane Alonso and Tijn Sadee. 2017. Voor de Europese Unie geldt nu ‘code rood’. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/02/01/voor-de-europese-unie-geldt-nu-code-rood-6510117-a1544058. Accessed on: June 14th, 2017. 21 as Front National, Alternative für Deutschland and Partij voor de Vrijheid have risen because of their position to immigrants. Many citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands stand completely behind these populist parties because they have an absolute and clear opinion about this crisis and immigrants in general. This means that the populist parties are the ones that can take care of these immigrants and not the EU and therefore the party members of these parties are becoming Eurosceptic as well.

3.4 Conclusion

Migration has occurred in Europe for centuries. However, since colonial ties are no longer a factor of immigration because of the increasing mobility and globalised markets, many other migrants come to the EU. From the 1960s, labour migration rose in Europe due to the booming economy during this decade. Due to the entry into force of the customs union in 1968, which was the fundament of the single market, not only North-Africans came to Europe, but Italians and Spaniards as well. Because of the entry into force of SEA in 1986, the era marked the shift from temporary economic migrants to the permanent settlement of immigrants. Furthermore, the collapse of the Berlin Wall introduced East-European migrants in West-Europe. Where colonial migration was a real matter of the country itself, labour migration is already a bit of a European matter. The three political parties are not that eager when it comes to labour migration. However, only PVV has a real opinion about it, namely that the Netherlands had to pay more attention when it comes to labour migration; FN and AfD are only warning for the refugee migration. Since the past few years, migration has become one of the causes for European citizens to become Eurosceptic. When looking at the election programmes of FN, AfD and PVV, one might say that they have a more severe immigration policy than ever. Due to their speeches about immigrants in Europe, the parties create anxiety in their country and because citizens become anxious, people listen more and more to the party leaders in order to get more hold and hope and less anxiety.

Where migration in Europe is something that occurs with the national tradition of colonialism, it is a problem for Europeans nowadays. During the colonial past, people were proud of the colonies and the migrants it brought with them, but this kind of nationalism lies behind them and people feel more anxiety to immigrants than that they feel the need to integrate them in the country.

4. Using national past

According to the authors of the article “Can the EU survive populism?”, the European Union is caught between nationalists (the populists) and internationalists (the liberals). Furthermore, they argue the following: “The EU as an organisation could suffer great damage from the populist wave. The Union’s purpose, European integration, is a transnational project built on the principles that populists most oppose: shared sovereignty, supranational authority, compromises between different interests and mutual tolerance.”64 The Eurozone and the migration crisis have accelerated trends of polarisation and fragmentation, as already seen in the previous chapters. This is in some ways also due to the populist parties, because populists accuse the elite of being alienated from the people and of being arrogant, incompetent and selfish. According to populists, the elite has no idea what ordinary people want and focus only on their own interests.65 However, one might say that not only the elite focus on their own interests, but the populists are doing the exact same thing, and therefore arguing that the elite is alienated from the people might be two-faced.

Although populists claim that they are revolutionary and that they want to give the national pride back to the people in the country, the question not only remains whether they are doing what the citizens really want, but also whether these parties really focus on the national pride and history. In this chapter, the national histories of the countries will be researched through the eyes of the three populist countries. Here, the question is whether the three parties appeal to this history and whether this can be seen in their election programmes or interviews and other such materials. To research this, this chapter contains three cases in which the national history will be researched, as well as the contemporary national thoughts. First is the case of Front National vs. Charles de Gaulle. How is the party of Marine le Pen arguing the case of the Algerian Independence War and does she agree with the decisions made by Charles de Gaulle as a president? The second case is Alternative für Deutschland vs. Konrad Adenauer and his “Westbindung”. AfD is accused of trying to get rid of this Westbindung; do they not agree with this phenomenon and Adenauer's policy at all? The third case will be Partij voor de Vrijheid vs. Willem Drees. Prime Minister Drees was very much pro-Europe; he helped to start the ECSC

64 Heather Grabbe and Stefan Lehne. 2016. Can the EU survive populism? http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/14/can-eu-survive-populism-pub-63804. Accessed on: May 24th, 2017. 65 Matthijs Rooduijn, Sarah de Lange and Wouter van den Brug. 2014. “A Populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe”. Party politics 20(4): 564. 23 back in the time. Partij voor de Vrijheid is against the European Union nowadays, can it then be stated that they are negative about Drees as well? The reason that these three men will be researched through the eyes of the three populist parties is because these three men can be seen as the founding fathers of the nation. They all wanted the same things: the country had to become united, as far as this was possible for West-Germany, and the economic prosperity of the three countries had to be improved. They can be best described in the national history and therefore the chapter will examine whether there is some common thread seen in the political decisions made by the founding fathers and the populist parties.

4.1 Front National vs. Charles de Gaulle

Front National (established in 1972) emerged in the 1983 – 1984 elections as, in that time, a “petty-bourgeois” party, which is the social class between the middle and the lower class. Like many European radical right parties, FN moved from pro-integrationist nationalism to increasingly structured opposition to the EU in the late 1980s.66 Since the 1990s, the position of FN on Europe is underpinned both by the promotion of the nation and by the rejection of immigrants. Since her election at president of Front National in 2011, the leader of the party (Marine le Pen) has steered the party according to the “dédiabolisation” strategy, which means de-demonization. Marine le Pen has put forward some supposedly left-wing economic and social positions. Nowadays FN has progressively made its mark as one of the main opponents to the European Union in both the French and the European politics. FN is strong against the European elite. However, while it has been difficult for the radical right to form stable coalitions at the European level, at every opportunity since the 1980s FN has actively participated in the creation of parliamentary groups and the development of formal partnerships.67 For the new party leadership, EU elections and the choice of European partners provides an opportunity for forging alliances for a domestic de-demonization strategy and to assert the new president’s leadership on this question at the EU level.68

66 Emmanuelle Reungoat. 2015. “Mobilizing Europe in national competition: The case of the French Front National”. International Political Science Review 36(3): 303. 67 Ibid, p. 299. 68 Ibid, p. 301. 24

In this section, the leadership of Charles de Gaulle will be researched. This will be done by examining the Algerian Independence War of 1954 – 1962 and how de Gaulle handled several issues during this period. Thereby, the comparison with Front National will be made and at the end there will be concluded if there is a common thread in the decisions that have been made.

4.1.1 Charles de Gaulle

When looking at Charles de Gaulle, he once declared the following:

"All of my life, I have had a certain idea of France. This idea is inspired by sentiment as much as by reason. The emotional side of me naturally imagines France, like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. Instinctively I have the feeling that Providence has created her either for complete success or for exemplary misfortunes. If in spite of this, mediocrity shows in her acts and deeds, it strikes me as an absurd anomaly, to be imputed to the faults of Frenchmen, not to the genius of the land. But the positive side of my mind also assures me that France is not really herself unless in the front rank; that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people; that our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness.69

In line with this, FN has said something similar in its election programme of this year. FN states here that France needs to find its freedom and control of its destiny by restoring the sovereignty of the French people.70 When looking at the statement of Charles de Gaulle, you might say that FN agrees with his argument about French greatness. According to de Gaulle, this greatness could only be achieved by a politics of grandeur or by a politics that tried to carve out an equal and independent role for France among the great powers.71 The politics of grandeur aimed at strengthening the moral and political unity of France. De Gaulle believed that foreign policy entails an attitude of self-regard. This self-regard was both a cause and a consequence of

69 Cited in D.J. Mahony. 2000. De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur and Modern Democracy. London: Transaction Publishers, p. 3. 70 Front National. 2017. “144 Engagements Présidentiels”. Number 1, p. 3. 71 Reed Davis. 2011. “A Once and Future Greatness: Raymond Aron, Charles de Gaulle and the Politics of Grandeur”. The International History Review. 33(1): 28. 25 grandeur. De Gaulle’s drive for grandeur was guided by the spirit of promoting French sovereignty and grandeur, amass French military power and enhance French diplomatic prestige.72

De Gaulle had a very specific vision of the Europe he wanted to build, namely, an intergovernmental organisation centred on France and Germany but including the Six. France blocked hereby British membership in the EEC in order to show that France did not accept the indefinite postponement of a political Europe and the supremacy of the US in Western Europe. De Gaulle's EEC policy was a function of his distinctive policy regarding NATO, nuclear weapons, the Cold War and nationalism, which followed from his geopolitical vision. 73 After a period behind the scenes de Gaulle’s return to power was in May 1958, due to the Algerian Independence War that had begun in 1954. The origins of this War can be traced to the last day of World War II in Europe. Nationalists in Algeria had associated themselves with American anti-colonialism and organized celebratory marches. These marches quickly turned into bloody clashed between Algerians and Frenchmen. Here, French forced massacred ten thousands of Algerians.74 This meant the beginning of many years of War in the French region. The military rebels supported de Gaulle with the understanding that he would preserve Algeria, but de Gaulle never had this intention. Moreover, de Gaulle found a way to separate Algeria from France while restoring the military to obedience to civil authority and dealing with the one million colons of European origin.75 Therefore, de Gaulle decolonized the oversees region of France, then restore the political stability and third he had to establish the foundation of his external policy. Charles de Gaulle wanted to transform France into the spokesman in the developed world for the aspirations of the nations in the Third World. France tried to achieve the better things in life brought by a higher standard of living. Therefore, they had to decolonize the colonies, because colonised countries, in the long run, cost a lot and the question for France then was if this fits in the higher standard of living they had in mind.76 According to Charles de Gaulle, decolonize Algeria was the greatest service he had rendered France in his career.77 However, according to the French citizens, the loss of Algeria was not what they expected.

72 Andrew Moravcsik. 2012. “Charles de Gaulle and Europe: The new Revisionism”. Journal of Cold War Studies. 14(1): 54. 73 Ibid., pp. 55, 56. 74 Matthew Connelly. 2001. “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: the Grand Strategy of the Algerian War for Independence”. International Journal Middle East Studies. 33(2): 222. 75 Irwin Wall. 2002. “De Gaulle, the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and the Algerian War”. Journal of Strategic Studies. 25(2): 119, 120. 76 Ibid., p. 121. 77 Ibid., p. 120. 26

When de Gaulle became president, the majority of the French were already unwilling to pay more to sustain the Algerian war and they were increasingly sceptical about the French future of Algeria. However, this does not suggest that the French were really ready for an instant and total abandonment of Algeria in 1958.78 The transformed relationship with Algeria was to be the key to the French community and the basis for French leadership in Europe. Although Algeria was independent now, de Gaulle hoped to enlist the cooperation of Europe and Africa in the task of keeping Algeria tied to France.79 This does not mean that de Gaulle was not dissimulating in at least one respect. He did not interpret “Algérie française” in the sense of full assimilation of the Muslim population to the status of Frenchmen equal to all others: “These people aren’t like us”, he often remarked of the Arab population.80

When looking at the position of FN, one might say that the party is not agreeing with Charles de Gaulle in many ways. Where de Gaulle has a strong positive opinion about European integration, FN argues that France loses its sovereignty because of the European integration that is taking place right;81 in the very first point of the program Front National argues that they want to

"Find our freedom and control of our destiny by restoring the sovereignty of the French people (monetary, legislative, territorial, economic). Therefore a negotiation will be initiated with our European partners followed by a referendum on our membership of the European Union. The objective is to achieve a European project respectful to the independence of France, national sovereignties and serves the interest of people."82

The politics of grandeur that Charles de Gaulle was striving for, is something le Pen wants as well. The grandeur of de Gaulle aimed at strengthening the moral and political unity of France. De Gaulle believed that a foreign policy is linked to and necessarily entails an attitude of honourable self-regard. De Gaulle believed that the patriotic love could heal the deep social divisions that so often plagued France.83 When looking back to figure 2 of chapter 2 in this thesis, we might say that Charles de Gaulle should now be a sovereign Eurosceptic, just as FN

78 Gil Merom. 1999. “A ‘Grand Design?’ Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War”. Armed Forces & Society. 25(2): 276. 79 Irwin Wall, p. 121 80 Ibid., p. 124. 81 Front National. 2017. “144 Engagements Présidentiels”. Number 24, p. 6. 82 Ibid., number 1, p. 3. 83 David Reed, pp. 28-29. 27 now is as well. On the other hand, a great empire also belongs with grandeur, which is something de Gaulle lost with the decolonization of Algeria. One might say that FN is in favour of a big empire, because of the grandeur and the nationalistic thoughts and is thus against the decision to decolonize Algeria. If we continue further with this grandeur and European integration, FN would like to recover the security of the border by ensuring the protection of individual freedoms. This has to be reached by a massive rearming of the common forces.84 The rearming of national forces is something Charles de Gaulle wanted as well, because of the loss during the two wars. However, these are two different aims of rearming the forces; de Gaulle had the aim of a better military force because the French military forces had to bear a lot during the war. Marine le Pen, on the other hand, wants to rearm the forces because of the threat of a terrorist attack and sees this rearming as the beginning of a war, where de Gaulle saw it as the end of the war and wanted to rearm it before there would be another war.

Although there are some similarities between the policies of Marine le Pen and Charles de Gaulle, there is some doubt if FN cares about the policy of Charles de Gaulle. The greatness of de Gaulle is obviously something FN wants to achieve as well and the party can therefore find itself in de Gaulle’s policy. However, according to de Gaulle this greatness could be achieved by getting rid of the colonies France had, but this is no longer the case in Marine le Pen’s era. Where de Gaulle was in favour of a better European understanding between the countries, Marine le Pen’s election programme is all about withdrawing from the EU. Both parties want to achieve greatness in France, however, they have different definitions of this greatness. Furthermore, where de Gaulle wanted to decolonize Algeria, he never wanted no migrants of Algeria in France. On the other hand, le Pen is seeking her voters by appealing as a non-partisan president, that is: a president without a party. The idea of this was initiated by Charles de Gaulle; he liked to present himself as being above the political parties. By doing this, Marine le Pen can present herself as “a candidate of the people” and not of the system.85 But the idea of the non-partisan president is fiction; even de Gaulle needed a party to help him win the elections. Furthermore, de Gaulle stands for Gaullism, which means three things for France: French independent power, a pro-welfare state and anti-Communism. These three pillars are typical FN, because the party wants a better economic prosperity, more democracy

84 Front National. 2017. “144 Engagements Présidentiels”, number 12 and 13, p, 5. 85 Susan Collard. 2017. Why did Marine le Pen resign from her party? It’s all part of a plan. https://theconversation.com/why-did-marine-le-pen-resign-from-her-party-its-all-part-of-the-plan-76662. Accessed on: June 19th, 2017. 28 and more power.86 Overall, one might say that FN agrees a lot on the decisions made by Charles de Gaulle during his policy, however, FN differs in making the decisions about the same policy. This is probably because of the time difference: where de Gaulle governed in the aftermath of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, FN does not see the threat of communism anymore. The Cold War and communism played an important role back in the days and is important to describe this period in my thesis as well. I will react to this in chapter 5.

4.2 Alternative für Deutschland vs. Konrad Adenauer

With its anti-European and anti-immigration policy, Alternative für Deutschland has become a very successful (quite) new party in Germany. Only founded in 2013, the AfD received already nearly 5% of the votes in the Federal Election 2013, entered five state parliaments and gained several seats in the European Parliament.87 Due to the rapid development of AfD many people expect that the Germany party system is undergoing structural changes and that the AfD has the potential of becoming a permanent extension of the German party system. Particularly in eastern Germany, the AfD is increasingly adopting a xenophobic, nativist and law and order rhetoric. However, the sudden surge in German right-wing populism and therefore Euroscepticism has to be understood as part of a constellation of wider cultural changes, a lack of political choice and a moral panic about the impact of European monetary policy in the German stability culture.88

The rise of the AfD is strongly connected to Euroscepticism. From the first elections AfD participated in, the AfD mobilised voters with a Eurosceptic programme that sets it apart from the pro-European position of Germany and its biggest parties as CDU, CSU and SPD. The European critique of AfD is directed at the fiscal and monetary regime of the EU and the failure of the Maastricht Treaty in establishing the EMU. The party argues that the Euro has created social and political tensions within the Member States and threatens to become a major risk for European cooperation.89 The lack of democracy for the EU and the EMU was a source of

86 Front National. 2017. “144 Engagements Présidentiels”. 87 Michael Jankowski, Sebastian Schneider and Markus Tepe. 2016. “Ideological Alternative? Analysing Alternative für Deutschland candidates’ ideal points via black box scaling”. Party Politics 23(6): 1. 88 Robert Grimm. 2015. “The Rise of the German Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland, between ordoliberal critique and popular anxiety”. International Political Science Review 36(3): 265. 89 Ibid. 29 concern from when the Maastricht Treaty was drafted; ratification of the Treaty implied changes to German Basic Law, which critics saw as disempowering German democratic institutions. Alternative für Deutschland is a reference to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s speech about the importance of the European Stability Mechanism in stabilising the single currency in the Bundestag in September 2011.

“After centuries of wars, the European Union is the permanent driver for reconciliation and the guarantee for a peaceful Europe since the end of the Second World War. (…) History tells us that countries that share the same currency were never at war with each other. That is why the Euro is much more than just a currency. The Euro is a guarantee for the unity of Europe, or in other words, if the Euro fails, Europe fails. Because a democratic and free Europe is our homeland, the Euro cannot fail and will not fail."90

In this section, the leadership of Konrad Adenauer will be researched. This will be done by examining his Westbindung during the Cold War. After this, the decisions of Alternative für Deutschland will be compared with the decisions of Konrad Adenauer and at the end there will be concluded if there is a common thread in the decisions that have been made.

4.2.1 Konrad Adenauer

Until the German unification, West-Germany denationalised post-war state identity and due to Konrad Adenauer, West-Germany was oriented towards its Western allies (this is called ‘Westbindung’) and wanted to create a supranational European community that guaranteed peace and mutual cooperation rather than political isolation.91 In September 1949 Konrad Adenauer became the first West-German chancellor and the federal government was led by an individual who had very early accepted the division of Germany and sought to prioritise the new country's cooperation with the West. Adenauer could profit from the strategic importance of the Federal Republic to the western allies and enjoyed strong support from the Americans. In order to make West-Germany a strong ally in the Western Cold War against communism,

90 Angela Merkel. 2011. “Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Haushaltsgesetz 2012”. Deutscher Bundestag. http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/2010-2014/2011/09/86-2-bk-bt- haushalt.html. Accessed on: June 6th, 2017. 91 Robert Grimm, p. 267. 30 the United States would help Adenauer by gaining more independence for the Federal Republic as a sovereign state. Adenauer's policy become known as the “Policy of Strength” and was characterized by his belief that West-Germany should not negotiate with the Soviet Union until the Soviets were forced to give in to the strength of the western alliance. Thus, where it was impossible for the Soviet Union to become a stronger country with this policy, West-Germany (and more painful for the Soviet Union) the United States, became stronger with this “Policy of Strength”. Adenauer's success in rebuilding West-Germany and making the Federal Republic a strong partner within the western alliance was rewarded with election victories in 1953 and 1957.92 After coming to power, Adenauer sought to keep his position as chancellor as exclusive as possible. Adenauer was, for example, able to claim the role of negotiating partner to the West exclusively for himself. The West German government had very few competencies in the field of international diplomacy and all contact with the three high commissioners who represented the United States, France and the United Kingdom went through the chancellery. After the small revision of 1951, the West German government was allowed to have its own minister of foreign affairs and Adenauer took up that position as well.93

Adenauer is commonly known of his “Westbindung”. His aim of this policy was to make the Federal Republic a trustworthy partner for the West and it served several purposes. First, the West needed to be absolutely convinced that the West Germans were their ally in the Cold War. Second, it was essential to prevent the occupying powers from coming to an arrangement about the future of Germany above the head of Adenauer and his government. Adenauer would only have the reunification if Germany could be a free and democratic country, safely tied into the western alliance. Furthermore, he tended to have Westbindung because of sovereignty: “The only way to freedom for us is to try to regain our freedom and responsibilities, step by step and with the consent of the High Commission.”94 The support of the United States was crucial, but they also needed to convince the other western countries, especially the French, that economic revival and rearmament in the Federal Republic would not pose a new threat. Proposals made by the US were not good enough for France; West-Germany would not have a separate army participating in the alliance but would instead be part of a European force under an American supreme commander. However, in 1950 France presented their own alternative in the form of the Pleven Plan that would give the West-Germans contributions limitations to the smallest

92 Joost Kleuters. 2012. Reunification in West German Party Politics from Westbindung to Ostpolitik. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 26, 27. 93 Ibid., p. 31. 94 E. Bahr. 1996. Zu meiner Zeit. München: K. Blessing, p. 317. 31 possible military unit.95 Adenauer was fully aware of the opportunities that were presented for the Federal Republic. Moreover, it was not just the French, but also the Russians who feared West German rearmament, and maybe they feared even more than France because to the Soviet Union, the prospect of German rearmament in the context of a wider western alliance was extremely unwelcome. The fact that Germany could have at least some sort of national defence represented an important concession from the Soviets. However, in the end, it were the French conditions that delayed the negotiations; France wanted guarantees from the United States and United Kingdom concerning the eventuality of West Germany leaving the European Defence Community (EDC).96 Although almost everyone wanted this EDC, France voted against in 1954. This also putted an end to a supranational Europe, according to the federalists.97 However, the EDC treaty was not the only focus for the member states: in 1954, the signing of the Paris Accords took place, the final agreement on the role of the Federal Republic as a full partner within the western alliance and this sealed the success of Adenauer’s Westbindung.98

When looking at the policy of AfD with Adenauer's Westbindung in mind, one can conclude that AfD has a different line of reasoning than Adenauer's CDU. Where Adenauer really wanted to connect (West-)Germany with the Western allies and thereby modern West- Europe, AfD’s party leaders Alexander Gauland and Alice Weidel are not to talk about the EU and thereby the modern western countries. AfD will probably agree with the fact that Adenauer wanted eventually one Germany, but until that time Adenauer wanted more influence not only in West-Germany but also at the western allies. AfD state in the preamble of its political programme that they no longer can remain idle and observe the breaches to justice and the rule of law, the destruction of the constitutional state and irresponsible political actions.99 In contrast to Adenauer’s Westbindung, AfD states the following:

95 Joost Kleuters, pp. 35, 36. 96 Ibid., p. 37. 97 CVCE. 2016. The refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty. http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_refusal_to_ratify_the_edc_treaty-en-fe1c3284-c9e9-4d0e-8ce1- cba01b013352.html. Accessed on: August 30th, 2017. 98 Ibid., p. 39. 99 Alternative für Deutschland. 2016. Programm der Alternative für Deutschland. https://www.afd.de/wp- content/uploads/sites/111/2017/01/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf . Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 32

"We commit ourselves with all our energy to restoring these principles, and fundamentally reform our country in the spirit of freedom and democracy. We maintain an open mind towards other nations and cultures but wish to be and remain German at heart. Therefore, we shall continuously strive to uphold human dignity, support families with children, retain our western Christian culture, and maintain our language and traditions in a peaceful, democratic, and sovereign nation state for the German people."100

Here, AfD shows that they would like to remain German at heart and retain the western Christian culture. In my opinion, they are actually stating that they will try to be openminded towards other European countries, but they do not want to have the European norms and values, but only the German, which is a totally different view than Adenauer’s Westbindung. On the other hand, Adenauer's policy was eventually to ensure the (West-)Germans that they are and always will be German and no other country can decide what will happen with them. Where AfD does not agree with Konrad Adenauer is in the power of political parties. As stated above, Konrad Adenauer had a lot of power within West-Germany; he was not only the chancellor but also the minister of foreign affairs and the party leader of CDU. According to AfD should political parties participate within the political system, but they should not control it.101 The party states that only through direct democracy political parties can return to the democratic system. Nowadays, Members of the Parliament are loyal to the political parties they belong to. This dependence leads to the estrangement from their voters and is therefore in many ways a punch to West-Germany’s first chancellor.

Adenauer’s Westbindung had a concrete outcome in the building of the ECSC and later the EEC. Where Adenauer wanted a cooperation between the western states, AfD wants less power in Brussels and less cooperation with the western Member States. Therefore, Adenauer is not AfD’s favourite when it comes to national history of Germany. However, Adenauer is a very delicate case because he was the first West-German president and the first German president after the Second World War who tried to bond Germany with the other European states. This is something every German is proud of and is thanking Adenauer for, also AfD. However, AfD is certainly not agreeing with Adenauer’s aim of Westbindung in the sense of more cooperation between the Western states. In its election programme, one cannot find anything back about a stronger and powerful EU, but the exact opposite.

100 Ibid. 101 Ibid., “1.5 Limit the influence and power of political parties”, p. 10. 33

4.3 Partij voor de Vrijheid vs. Willem Drees

The far-right Partij voor de Vrijheid was established in the Netherlands in 2006. In the same year the party gained nine of the 150 seats in the parliament during the national elections. Right now, after the national elections of March 2017, one can say that we need to call PVV a serious partner in the Second Chamber because it is the second largest party in the Netherlands.102 Geert Wilders is the leader of PVV, which has no official members other than himself. Wilders is commonly known for his negative position on Islam and in parliament, he has proposed several motions in which the government is asked to completely stop immigration from Islamic countries, a prohibition of the building of new mosques, a closing of Islamic schools, and most famously the legal ban on the Koran.103 In 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal decided that Wilders is to be prosecuted for inciting hatred and discriminating against Muslim. Despite (or maybe thanks to) this hate against the Islam, Wilders has been successful in gathering public support. From 2007 on, Wilders and his followers repeatedly assert that the widespread immigration of Muslims is part of an Islamist strategy to colonise Europe.104 Furthermore, the party hints at social changes at multiple levels; when discussing the country’s illness, the 2012 programme states:

"Just as worrying is the changing social composition of the population. Everywhere non-natives are increasing in the share of the population, meaning ever more Islam, even more, head scarves, ever more criminality, dilapidation, reliance on social benefits and medieval beliefs."105

Although PVV fits into the profile of a right-winged populist party, there are some differences. First, Wilders himself does not acknowledge ideological relation with other right-winged populist parties, except the Danish people's Party and the UK Independence Party. Second, the

102 Parlement en Politiek. 2017. Uitslag Tweede Kamerverkiezing 2017. https://www.parlement.com/id/vkcolpqcqetk/uitslag_tweede_kamerverkiezingen_2017. Accessed on: June 7th, 2017. 103 Maykel Verkuyten. 2013. “Justifying discrimination against Muslim immigrants: Out-group ideology and the five-step social identity model”. British Journal of Social Psychology 52(2): 345. 104 Wouter van Gent, Elmar Jansen and Joost Smits. 2014. “Right-wing Radical Populism in City and Suburbs: an Electoral Geography of the Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands”. Urban Studies 51(9): 1778. 105 PVV. 2012. Hu’n Brussel, o’ns Nederland. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012 – 2017. http://pubnpp.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/root/verkiezingsprogramma/TK/pvv2012/PVVTK2012.pdf. Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 34 party now wishes to maintain student benefits for low-income households, pension rights, health care support and labour protection, which is very left-wing while they started as an economic right-wing programme. On the other hand, the party is hostile towards subsidies for arts, development aid, providing asylum, immigration and EU membership, which is not very left-wing. Third, rather than a traditionalist, family-oriented stance, PVV defends gay and lesbian rights, gender equality and the right to abortion and euthanasia.106

In this section, the leadership of Willem Drees will be researched. This will be done by examining his social politics and the early negotiations of the ECSC. After this, the decisions of Partij voor de Vrijheid will be compared with the decisions of Willem Drees and at the end there will be concluded if there is a common thread in the decisions that have been made.

4.3.1 Willem Drees

Looking at the policy Willem Drees made during his years of governing in the Netherlands, one might say he was pro-European. Starting from the beginning, the German invasion of the Netherlands in 1940 made it terribly clear that the policy of neutrality had failed and that some form of cooperation in post-war Europe had to be achieved. The Dutch government then started a closer cooperation on small scale with the customs union between Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands (known as Benelux). After the War, the Dutch suggested the creation of a European Council of Ministers and this was eventually established, led by Prime Minister Willem Drees.107 Drees was one of the most popular Prime Ministers in the Dutch history, mostly due to the law on state old-age pensions. He was from 1948 onwards ten years Prime Minister of the Christian Democrat and Social Democrat coalition. Drees was closely tied to the years of recovery in the Netherlands after the Second World War. Employees agreed to low wages to achieve a competitive position in the Netherlands in respect of other countries. Drees built the Dutch welfare state during his time as Prime Minister.108

106 Wouter van Gent, Elmar Jansen and Joost Smits, pp. 1778, 1779. 107 Peter C. Hylarides. 2001. “The Netherlands: from Eurosceptic to Europhoria”. Contemporary Review 279(1629): 226. 108 Frits Oostrom. 2007. A key to Dutch history: the cultural canon of the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press: 198, 199. 35

Despite some objections to the ECSC, Drees stood on the eve of the ECSC and he was one of the founding fathers of the Council of Ministers. According to Martin Bosma, Drees was a convinced Eurosceptic, which is not in line with the fact that he was the founding father of the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, Drees was against a welfare state because this would make it seem that the state is responsible for the welfare of all its citizens. Drees would have thought about a “guarantee state” where “the State the social security guarantees when this will fail”.109 On the other hand, under the authority of Willem Drees, European integration was desirable as long as it served the ultimate goal of making European politics and Atlantic trade liberalism identical phenomena. Therefore, the Netherlands wished to keep European integration as depoliticised as possible, the process of integration must be limited to technocracy in the service of free trade. High politics, on the other hand, should be kept with the NATO. Dutch policy towards the EEC was a specific mix of revisionism and conservatism. The Dutch government remained strongly revisionist with regard to the size of the “relatively small protectionist club”, as Drees had characterised the EEC.110 However, the Dutch were also anxious to let go of the political dependence from US dominance. On the other hand, the Drees government was prepared to oppose the policies of Washington and London when needed. Consequently, the Dutch stance becomes conservative in terms of European integration. Backed by the Germans, the Dutch negotiators managed to get a successful deal for the Netherlands in the package of May 1960, which laid the groundwork for the completion of the EEC and the beginning of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).111

At the time of the negotiations about the Common Market in 1956, Prime Minister Drees had long anticipated a British-initiated free-trade outcome. However, Konrad Adenauer opposed against the British initiative, this intention got off the table and this meant that the initial idea was the final idea: only six states became members of “Little Europe” and not seven as Drees would have liked. The Netherlands had since 1950 consistently taken the most sceptical line among the Six on the issue of supranationalism, however, Drees saw that it was worth trying supranationalism for two reasons. First, demanding supranationalism appeared to be a good way of keeping integration among the countries as technocratic as possible. Second, this gave Dutch European policy a positive image in the public eye.112 After difficult

109 Martin Bosma. 2010. De schijn-elite van de valsemunters. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker: 67. 110 Matthieu Segers. 2010. “De Gaulle’s race to the bottom: The Netherlands, France and the Interwoven Problems of British EEC Membership and European Political Union, 1958 – 1963”. Contemporary European History 19(2): 118. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid., p. 119. 36 negotiations, finally the EEC stood and the Six could cooperate together in a more economical way.

Geert Wilders ideas are in some ways in line with Willem Drees’ ideas. However, Wilders is definitely not in line with Drees about the EU. In line with this EU point of view, PVV believes that due to the EU, Europe now has to fear the Islam. For the last election, PVV had just one page of election programme, where his first point was that the Netherlands has to de-Islamise113, which is not surprising as the party is commonly known about the aversion to Islam. However, important in this chapter is the second point of the election programme where is stated the following: “The Netherlands has to be independent again. Thus, get out the EU”.114 About the EU, Wilders states on the website of PVV that the Netherlands is too big for Europe and it needs to liberate itself from the EU.115 To prove that PVV is right, Wilders state that the most prosperous country in Europe, Switzerland, is not in the EU. According to Wilders, when the Netherlands chooses for an exit, it does not have to pay billions of euros to Brussels and South-Europe, it regains its sovereignty and the country can close its borders.116 Geert Wilders has never been in favour of the EU and probably also not the EEC because it has too much economic perspective within Europe.

Talking about the other decisions Willem Drees made, such as the state pension scheme, PVV glorifies Drees as much as possible. As already stated above, PVV is very left-wing orientated when it comes to social affairs. That the party is left-winged can be seen in several points of the election programme. For example, and in line with Drees, PVV wants to lower the retirement age back to 65 years.117 The fact that Drees has made this law back in the time, gives PVV the opportunity to get this point into the election programme. Overall, in social ways one might say that PVV likes the ideas of the social-democrat Drees, but economically speaking, Drees could not be the favourite of PVV front-man Geert Wilders. Where Wilders agrees with Drees is when it comes to immigration. In the time that Drees was Prime Minister of the Netherlands, mass immigration in form of guest workers was a serious issue. According to Bosma, Drees was in favour of return migration: so as soon as it was safe in their own country,

113 PVV. 2016. “Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2017 – 2021”. Number 1. https://www.pvv.nl/images/Conceptverkiezingsprogrammma.pdf. Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 114 Ibid., number 2. 115 Geert Wilders. 2014. Nederland moet zich bevrijden van de EU. https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert- wilders/7614-pvvopinie100514.html. Accessed on: June 7th, 2017. 116 Ibid. 117 PVV. 2016. “Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2017 – 2021”. Number 6. https://www.pvv.nl/images/Conceptverkiezingsprogrammma.pdf. Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 37 or when it comes to guest workers, if the Netherlands had enough Dutch workers, the migrants should have returned to their own country.118 In Economisch-Statistische Berichten in 1975 Drees writes about this the following:

“The situation now is more serious than I recently suspected. On January 8th of this year was communicated that in The Hague the number of foreign workers did not descend and that 6.000 out of the 14.000 foreigners are from the EC and therefore they are untouchable. It is remarkable that this issue gets so little attention.”119

However, according to Bosma no one ever listened to him and that is the reason why there are so many migrants in the Netherlands nowadays. Somebody has to say that the Netherlands is full, like Drees did. Although Bosma wrote practically a whole book about Drees, Drees’ family is not really eager about this. The grandson of Drees wrote the following: “Bosma sees sympathizers of PVV in them (Willem Drees Sr. and Willem Drees Jr.), but from an unsuspected angle: ‘the thought to make an end to mass-immigration and to start with return migration was in the seventies and eighties an ardent wish of father and son Drees, icons of the Dutch social-democracy. Who now has the same opinion, is radical right.’”120 According to Willem B. Drees, grandson of Prime Minister Drees, his grandfather was not against immigration, but pro. In an interview Drees sr. gave in 1984 he said that Dutch citizens should treat immigrants fairly. This is a passage that Bosma is not mentioning in his book.121 For Drees Jr., father of the writer of this article, Islam was not an issue. According to Drees Jr., a lesson of the Second World War is that we must not bow for threats and every person counts, irrespective of nationality, race or religion.122 Bosma is thus not really fair when it comes to Drees’ political position.

Where Drees and Wilders are at the same level of understandings when it comes to the left- wing programme, it is impossible that right-winged Wilders agrees with Drees’ policy when it comes to the EU, or ECSC in that time. As already stated in this section, PVV is very left- winged when it comes to social benefits of the Dutch citizen. PVV is a party for the citizens, just as FN. This means that only the Dutch citizen needs to get as much profits as possible in

118 Martin Bosma, p. 65 119 Ibid., p. 67. 120 Willem B. Drees. 2010. “De naam Drees wordt misbruikt”. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2010/10/06/de- naam-drees-wordt-misbruikt-11951690-a613506. Accessed on: January 14th, 2018. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 38 the Dutch policy. Therefore, the citizens will get a lot and the party will take care of the money they need to spend on the EU. However, what many party members do not realize is that the money for, for example, the law on state old-age pensions or better health care is not growing on trees. In other words, PVV gives the citizens and institutions the money but the citizens need to pay for this as well. Drees on the other hand, wanted low wages in the years after the War, because according to him it was not good for the Dutch economy to get high wages immediately. Furthermore, Drees knew that the law on state old-age pensions would raise the tax for every citizen but the benefit would be for the elderly. This means that many elderly could take care of themselves for a long time and this eventually would benefit the economy. The difference between PVV and Drees is the benefit both are trying to achieve for the citizens. Where Drees was really a man of people, he was called “vadertje Drees” (father Drees), Wilders is more nationalistic which means that he only wants benefits for the ‘real Dutch’, the people who are born and raised in the Netherlands, which is by all means somewhat racial. This makes a real difference between the two leaders. However, Wilders agrees with Drees on many things and does think that Drees is the real father of the Netherlands.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, the national histories of the countries are researched through the eyes of the populist parties. More specifically, the chapter researched whether the three parties appeal to their national history when taking their election programme or interviews into account. This has been researched through three different cases. The first case was Front National vs. Charles de Gaulle. In this case the conclusion has been made that there are some similarities between FN and de Gaulle, for example the greatness de Gaulle was trying to achieve in his presidency time. There, he tried to make France the spokesman of Europe by innovation and by decolonizing the colonies which would give more economic prosperity in his country. Furthermore, being the spokesman of Europe could only be achieved when France worked together with other European countries. However, Marine le Pen firmly disagrees with every form of cooperation in Brussels and is therefore in favour of withdrawing from the EU. On the other hand, Gaullism, which is an opinion of de Gaulle, is something FN strives for as well. In this case is concluded that FN agrees on many decisions made by de Gaulle during his policy, but they differ in making the decisions about the same policy. This means that FN is definitely

39 influenced by the decisions de Gaulle has made, but the party looks past the blinkers and tries to achieve the same things with a different policy. The second case was Alternative für Deutschland vs. Konrad Adenauer. These two are standing face-to-face when it comes to cooperation with the West. Where Adenauer wanted a cooperation between the Western states, AfD only wants less cooperation with the Western Member States. AfD does certainly not agree with Adenauer’s aim of Westbindung, however, it was in that time the first step towards a better and stronger Germany and more faith in Germany for the other Western states. This is something AfD cannot forget as well and the party is Adenauer grateful for these decisions. But, this does not mean that AfD agrees on every decision Adenauer made in that time. In line with this, AfD does not have an election programme based on the decisions Adenauer made, therefore it can be concluded that in this case the populist party is not positively influenced by the decisions made after the Second World War. This means that Adenauer’s Westbindung resulted in the creation of the EU and AfD is trying to make this Westbindung unclear and withdraw from the EU. The third case in this chapter was Partij voor de Vrijheid vs. Willem Drees. Willem Drees was frontman of the labour party and since PVV is very left-winged when it comes to social benefits, the two are here on the same level of understandings. PVV is a party for the citizens, this means according to the party that it will give the citizens and institutions the money, but what they do not tell them is that they need to pay for this as well. Drees, on the other hand, knew that, for example, the law on state old-age pensions would raise the tax for every citizen but the benefit would be for the elderly. The difference between the two is the benefit they both try to achieve for the citizens; Drees is a man for the people, but Wilders is more nationalistic. PVV is relying on the decisions Drees made after the Second World War and Wilders’ policy is therefore very influenced by this, especially the social part of the party.

5. Using traditional enemies and allies

According to the news site of the EU, Russia and the EU have clashed since 2014 several times. Mostly about the incorporation of East-Ukraine and the Russian support to the separatists. For the Netherlands the crash of airplane MH17 in Ukraine and the laborious investigation contributed a lot to the cold relationship with Russia.123 However, is the clash of (West-)Europe

123 Europa Nu. 2017. Relatie EU-Rusland. https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vhkuiga832pv/relatie_eu_rusland. Accessed on: July 12th, 2017. 40 and Russia not a clash of all times? Historically speaking, Europe has always had Russia as an enemy. The tsar clashed with the Prussian emperor, Stalin clashed with the capitalist west during the Cold War and Putin is clashing with the EU. However, where the Russian Federation is traditionally the enemy for West-Europe, FN, AfD and PVV are trying to strengthen the ties with Russia nowadays. This chapter researches why these parties are trying to strengthen the bond with Russia and if this historically speaking can be declared. The case of NATO is the other way around; NATO is traditionally an alliance between Europe, Canada and the United States of America and therefore not a threat for Europe. This alliance kept the security in West- Europe when the threat of the Soviet Union was big. Many European countries are still grateful for this alliance, however, Eurosceptics think NATO is old and out of date. They would like to see that the influence of NATO reduces. This chapter researches the clash between NATO and the populist parties as well. Can these negative feelings about NATO historically be declared, just as the Russian case? Furthermore, an interesting question here is to what extent the parties take over the rhetoric of Russia about the unreliable NATO?

5.1 Russian Federation

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been attributed to several factors ranging from thirty years of economic stagnation to the rising costs of keeping up with the United States. The signing of the liquidation of the Soviet Union was perceived more as freeing Russia from the burden of supporting the unmanageable Baltics and the poor Central-Asia than as a concession on the part of the weakened centre to assemble nationalist demands.124 After signing the liquidation of the Soviet Union, the whole world thought that the Western capitalist countries had won the Cold War and the threat from Russia was over. However, when Putin came to power in 2000 patriotism became a core value in Russia, as much as Russia's great power mission and social solidarity. Putin was young, had a modern education and many Russians were, therefore, pleased to have him as a President, but on the other side, Putin's endorsement of free market reforms endeared him to those who might otherwise have been repelled by his authoritarian style of governance.125 Putin's first step, invading the terrorist-ridden Chechnya,

124 Michael Rywkin. 2015. “Russia and the Near Abroad under Putin”. American Foreign Policy Interests 37(4): 229. 125 Ibid., p. 234. 41 pleased the public but in reality, his motives did not always correspond to their appearance. Therefore, not all oligarchs experienced Putin's anger; those who did include media magnates who were seen as political obstacles to his rule, while others were not disturbed. Putin always does something to please the Russians, however, the abroad will not believe him anymore. Because of this policy of Putin, the Russian threat is visible again and Europe is in danger once more. However, is really everyone in Europe so afraid of Putin and his Russian policy? It is important to research the Russian question because the national history of the Netherlands and France, but especially of Germany is marked by the Soviet Union and subsequently the Russian Federation. The three countries are dependent on Russia for several things and it might be necessary to strengthen the ties between the countries. However, many political parties and many citizens in these countries are not agreeing on this but FN, AfD and PVV do. This means that these parties do not see the threat of this Federation in the East. Why is do they not see this threat, the rest is seeing. Is the Russian Federation a real threat for Europe and the world or are other political parties seeing things that do not exist? This will be examined in this section.

An article by an American strategic is sceptical of Putin's post-September 11 friendly image. Therefore the author emphasises Putin's “assaults on Russian democracy” and his increased reliance on the internal security apparatus.126 On the other hand, Michael Rywkin argues that the attacks of 9/11 confirmed the correctness of Putin's policies. Putin endorsed Washington's antiterrorism campaign without preconditions, despite the overwhelming opposition from Russia's Security Council. These decisions allowed him to sell his military campaign in Chechnya as a purely antiterrorist enterprise, which is certainly not the case.127 After Putin's alignment with the American antiterrorist campaign, Washington was in dilemma: how to benefit from Russia's adherence to the war on terror without paying too high a price for Russian cooperation. Shortly after September 11, it became clear that Washington had toned won its criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya and included some Chechen groups in its list of terrorist organisations. The foreign policy of Russia is based on the principle of “being simultaneous with, within and against the West”. This policy makes it easier for Russia's political elite to personally integrate into Western society while at the same time enabling them to keep society closed off from the West. However, the essence of the Russian system remains unchanged regardless of the constant modifications and attempts to adapt it to new conditions: it remains focused on oppressing society and the individual in order to serve the interests of the

126 Stephen J. Blank. 2002. “Putin’s twelve-step program”. The Washington Quarterly 25(1): 150. 127 Michael Rywkin, 235. 42 state bureaucracy and its affiliated business circles. According to Lilia Shevtsova, Russian's system is dying. The protests against election fraud and the gradual radicalization of the protest movement and the remaining bitterness after the elections are over a show that the most dynamic and educated sections of Russian society are now rejecting the Putin regime.128 However, Putin and his team are not even willing to consider either holding free elections or loosening the system. Putin will fight to preserve his hold on power by all means possible. During the last election campaign, the authorities have started to set one section of the population against the other and provoke the rise of nationalism.129 Some Russian and Western observers state with the hope that Putin will have no choice but to start a process of reform and even liberalisation. These hopes are based on the assumption that the personalised power model is still capable of change or that Russia can be modernised only from the top.

According to a recent article in The Guardian, in Russia’s new confrontation with the West, the Kremlin’s strategy is to exploit western weaknesses and confusion as much as it is geared towards showing warlike face, whether in Ukraine, Syria or on the internet. Public officials or investors who have met with Putin sometimes point to his particular brand of pragmatism: if he senses strong pushback, he adapts and if he detects gaps, he bumps in.130 Since Russia deployed its troops in Ukraine and annexed territory there and Russian's policy in Syria has been analysed as overtly hostile to western endeavours, aggressive Russia has become a pillar of the West's official political discourse. According to Russia, Brexit has the potential to divide the West just like the growth of populist movements because this echoes the Kremlin's illiberal narrative and produces, therefore, useful allies.131 When it comes to Syria, the key question is no longer how best to remove the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but it is how to stop the Russian military which is held responsible (directly or indirectly) for a number of lethal aerial attacks against civilians, hospitals and schools. Because Putin is held responsible for these attacks, almost simultaneously, Putin rejected a US-Russia agreement to reprocess excess plutonium to prevent its use in nuclear weapons. Not coincidentally, massive civil defence

128 Shevtsova, Lilia. 2012. “Russia under Putin: Titanic looking for its iceberg?”. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45(3-4): 210. 129 Ibid, p. 211. 130 Natalie Nougayrède. 2016. If the West is weak, Putin’s Russia is a much greater threat. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/02/west-weak-russia-putin-threat-kremlin-mi5-nato. Accessed on: June 8th, 2017. 131 Ibid. 43 exercises were held inside Russia, in apparent preparation for a nuclear war.132 Furthermore, Putin was also considering reopening military bases in Cuba and Vietnam and Russian ships joined military exercises with China. However, any consensus in the West over what to do about Russia remains elusory. There are too many opinions in Europe because many countries are dependent on Russian energy supplies. The decision of the US not to intervene militarily after al-Assed used chemical weapons in Syria left the door open for Russia. By going to the aid of Assad, Putin saw a chance to expand Russian influence in the Middle-East at American expense and secure military bases on Syria's Mediterranean coast.133

According to another article in The Guardian, the far right populist parties see virtues in Putin; they are fascinated by his strong-man image, the ultra-conservative Christian values he espouses and by the hostility they share towards Muslims. Is this also the case for Front National, Alternative für Deutschland and Partij voor de Vrijheid? For FN several authors claim that the ties with the Kremlin have been growing stronger. Until recently, Marine le Pen was unknown in Russia, but after le Pen praised Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Putin invited her to Moscow to observe the March referendum on Crimea’s accession to Russia. Meanwhile, Russian media and bloggers embraced le Pen’s endorsement.134 France’s ProRussia TV is staffed by editors with close ties to FN. Furthermore, FN wishes to replace the EU and NATO with a pan-European partnership of independent nations, which includes Russia.135 Furthermore, Putin and le Pen have a shared anti-Americanism. Russians’ opinion of the United States is the lowest since the fall of the Soviet Union. Throughout the Ukrainian crisis, Russian media framed the US as the instigator and sponsor of the revolution. le Pen sees the United States help in Ukraine as American meddling in European affairs, Marine le Pen’s niece called the EU “the poodle of the United States”.136

Alternative für Deutschland is quite new in Europe and has therefore not a real shared history with Russia as FN has. However, in its election programme, AfD alleges that Germany needs a better relationship with Russia. The argument for this is the following: “The Cold War is over. The US remains our partner. Russia will be. The AfD is therefore committed to ending

132 Simon Tisdall. 2016. Aleppo, Ukraine, cyber attacks, Baltic threats: what should we do about Putin?. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/15/what-should-we-do-about-russia-aleppo-ukraine-cyber- baltic-vladimir-putin. Accessed on: June 8th, 2017. 133 Ibid. 134 Alina Polyakova. 2014. “Strange Bedfellows: Putin and Europe’s Far Right”. World Affairs 177(3): 37. 135 Mitchell A. Orenstein. 2014. “Putin’s Western Allies”. http://www.saintjoehigh.com/ourpages/auto/2014/3/27/36730719/14- 0326%20Putin_s%20Western%20Allies.pdf. Accessed on : June 24th, 2017. 136 Alina Polyakova, p. 39. 44 the sanctions and improve the relations with Russia”.137 In line with this, in its manifest AfD state that the relationship with Russia is important because European security cannot be attained without Russia’s involvement. AfD is in favour of a foreign policy which is committed to safeguarding the security, economic and cultural interests of Germany.138

As for Partij voor de Vrijheid, it has the same shared hatred against Muslims, just as FN. However, it remains unclear whether PVV really wants better ties with Russia or not. Wilders cannot be openly pro-Russian due to the anti-Russian sentiment in the Netherlands, which is related to the shooting down of MH17 by Russia-backed separatists using the Russian Buk missile system.139 Although Wilders cannot be pro-Russian, he probably is because of his clear Eurosceptic attitude and the aversion to Islam. Another indication that Wilders really is pro- Russian, is the fact that a few years ago Wilders tried his party members to prevent being too critical about Russia. Sources within the party state that the prevention from critique on Russia has to do with the cooperation with Front National that remains warm ties with United Russia, the party of President Putin.140 Finally, several times during the past few years Wilders stated that sanctions on Russia can cause major losses in the Netherlands and will not give any benefit for the Dutch citizen.141

Overall, populist parties are in favour of the Russian Federation rather than the European Union. This means that when the populist parties will govern, the ties will be strengthened with Russia and Putin. According to the three populist parties, there is no reason to be afraid of Russia. Instead, Russia is FN’s best friend and PVV is on its way for a better bond with Russia as well. Furthermore, FN as well as AfD have better relations with Russia in their election programme of this year. According to both parties, European security cannot be attained without the help of the Russian Federation. This means that the Russian army is not a threat, but a weapon against the threat from outside Europe; mostly IS and terrorism in general. Only

137 Alternative für Deutschland. 2016. Programm der Alternative für Deutschland. https://www.afd.de/wp- content/uploads/sites/111/2017/01/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf . Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 138 Ibid. 139 Christopher Stroop. 2017. “Between Trump and Putin: the Right-Wing International, a Crisis of Democracy, and the Future of the European Union”. https://www.politicalresearch.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/06/PE_spring17_Stroop.pdf. Accessed on: June 24th, 2017. 140 Tom Reijner. 2014. Mogen PVV’ers geen kritiek hebben op Rusland? http://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/politiek/news/2014/06/mogen-pvvers-van-wilders-geen-kritiek-hebben-op- rusland-1538245W/. Accessed on: June 9th, 2017. 141 Raymond de Roon. 2014. PVV: welk belang heeft Nederland bij de sancties tegen Rusland? https://www.pvv.nl/37-fj-related/raymond-de-roon/7463-pvv-welk-belang-heeft-de-nederlander-bij-sancties- tegen-rusland.html. Accessed on: June 9th, 2017. 45

Wilders does not agree with the measures made by Russia in Ukraine, however, this might be a distraction for his party members, because the overall feeling in the Netherlands is that Russia is the enemy, this is more than in France and Germany. Therefore, Wilders does not have any supporters for a policy that contains more Russia instead of less. However, one might say that there is definitely a Russian threat since Putin came to power in 2000, but the populist parties agree a lot with the decision Putin made during the past years and therefore there is no Russian threat according to them. This threat is only felt by the parties that are in power in several European countries now. This means that when it comes to today’s political culture, one might say that European countries definitely fear the big Russian state. However, politicians like le Pen, Wilders and Weidel and Gauland are choosing more and more to be part of this big and strong state.

5.2 NATO

The North Atlantic Trade Organisation was established in 1949 in order to fight against the communist countries of the Soviet Union. Nowadays 29 countries are a member of NATO and with its Membership Action Plan, the organisation helps aspiring members to prepare for membership and meet key requirements.142 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the European Union as a single market with its own political institutions, Europe is no longer the source of worry for the USA.143 NATO remained as a kind of insurance policy against the receding threat from Russia and was furthermore in process of being reoriented as a tool for the transatlantic community in addressing common concerns as crisis management, terrorism, cyber warfare, piracy and climate change. The initial post-Cold War relationship was characterized by shared optimism based on both sides’ willingness to step beyond Cold War divisions. NATO wanted to reach out eastwards in the spirit of partnership to help consolidate market-democratic polities through support for democratic security building efforts. Nonetheless, Russia’s great power complex, importance on international stage, immense energy resources and nuclear triad did not preclude partnership.144 Although in the beginning there were really positive visions about the Russian-NATO partnership, there was still bureaucratic

142 NATO. What is NATO? http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html. Accessed on: June 11th, 2017. 143 Bernard E. Brown. 2014. “ Europe and NATO are back”. American Foreign Policy Interests 36(3): 201. 144 Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme Herd. 2015. “Russia and NATO: From Windows of Opportunities to Closed Doors”. Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23(1): 43. 46 resistance and scepticism to deepening relationships.145 For most Russians, NATO continued to be a Cold War institution and “aggressive bloc”. The notion that Europe was no longer a problem but more a partner turned out to be an illusion again with the Ukraine crisis in 2014.146

Now, in any dealings with Russia, the EU members, most of them formerly under Soviet domination, fear threats to their independence. The UK, France, Italy and Germany are heavily involved in investment and trade with Russia and are wary of sanctions. Furthermore, the European Commission was in charge of the negotiations with Ukraine on an economic association. With the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, diplomats took a huge drawback in dealing with Ukraine. With the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, several participants of NATO raised questions about the role of NATO in this issue. Article 5 of the Nord Atlantic Treaty states that an armed attack against one or more parties shall be considered an attack against them all. Each party will assist those attacked “by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties such action as it deems necessary”.147 However, would Portugal really agree to go to war with Russia if, for example, Latvia is attacked or might Portugal conclude that Latvia is not worth the shedding of blood because it is too far away? Furthermore, NATO creates an alliance of sovereign states and it is therefore inconceivable that these states would bind themselves to automatically go to war. No such treaty would be drafted, signed and ratified. All NATO members retain the right to use force for self-defence or cooperate with NATO. However, in the case of Ukraine, the country is not a full member of NATO and therefore, Ukraine is not covered by Article 5.

At every point of the political spectrum, there is a distinctive attitude about the need for and meaning of NATO. In France, the presidential election of 2012 Marine le Pen received nineteen percent of the vote on the first ballot. She argued to withdraw from NATO entirely, not just from the integrated military command. The reasons for this were that FN has hostility towards the lead power (the United States) and NATO was identified as a threat to French independence. The French national interest would be served best by an understanding and perhaps an alliance with Russia; let the small countries in Russia’s near abroad work out their own problems. Expansion of NATO to the East was a mistake; the organisation needlessly provoked the

145 Ibid, p. 44. 146 Bernard E. Brown. 2014, p. 201. 147 NATO. 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5. https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf. Accessed on: June 11th, 2017. 47

Russians with this. Only recently, Marine le Pen has claimed that France needed closer ties with Russia as she blasted what she saw as NATO meddling in Eastern Europe. According to le Pen, the NATO had become an outdated organisation which was no longer needed in the post-Cold War world.148 Furthermore, le Pen rejects global trade deals and multilateral governance, defending the importance of cultural identity and national independence. Also on defence, NATO is not good enough for FN; for example, on the Middle East, she criticised Western efforts to strike deal with Syria.149

Where FN firmly disagrees with NATO, does PVV frontman Geert Wilders agree with this organisation. In an interview, he stated that it is time that other countries contribute to NATO as well. Furthermore, Wilders supports the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, but this is of course because ISAF tackles Islamic fundamentalism and maintains international stability.150 NATO's core component is nuclear weapons; therefore they set up the Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW). Most parties in the Netherlands want these NSNW removed. However, NATO has emphasised that only through consensus decision-making involving all allies can change be made in the deployments of NSNW.151 In the Netherlands, NATO’s failure to come to a plan for the eventual withdrawal of NSNW caused a shift in how some political parties perceive NATO in general. However, the opinion of PVV remains unclear in this debate.152 Overall, one might say that PVV is agreeing with NATO as long as the organisation is critical against Islam as well and it is doing something about Islamic fundamentalism in several countries.

Many party members of AfD think Germany should leave the Western defence alliance. At least fifty AfD members are stating that Germany should withdraw from NATO, where others at least want withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany. A growing group in AfD wants the election programme to contain that “the membership in NATO's military alliance is no longer oriented on the foreign and security policy interests of Germany” and that further fate

148 Cyrus Engineer. 2016. ‘Frexit is ON!’ Marine Le Pen hammers EU and NATO in explosive interview. http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/747209/Marine-Le-Pen-EU-Brexit-Nato. Accessed on: June 11th, 2017. 149 Elizabeth Bryant. 2017. “le Pen blasts EU, NATO, praises Trump”. http://www.dw.com/en/le-pen-blasts-eu- nato-praises-trump/a-37696454. Accessed on: June 11th, 2017. 150 PVV. Interview: I miss freedom, says Dutch Islam critic Geert Wilders. https://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/7-nieuws/780-interview-i-miss-freedom-says- dutch-islam-critic-geert-wilders.html. Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 151 Wilbert van der Zeijden. 2014. “A Dutch revolt? The salience of the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue in Dutch politics”. European Security 23(1): 45, 46. 152 Ibid, p. 46. 48 of the alliance should be discussed.153 Furthermore, Höcke, who is an important member of AfD, state that: “if the NATO strategy does not change immediately and fundamentally, which cannot be assumed in the current internal power constellation, Germany must also be prepared for an unconventional step in order to secure peace in Europe. And this would ultimately lead to the withdrawal from a former line of defence.”154 However, in the latest election programme AfD state that NATO’s membership corresponds to Germany’s interests with regard to foreign and security policy, but then NATO’s role has to remain that of a defensive alliance. AfD does not want to withdraw from NATO, but they are in favour of strengthening the European component of the organisation. In order to achieve this, AfD calls for a restoration of Germany’s defensive capabilities. Furthermore, AfD believes that any engagement of NATO must be aligned to German interests. The organisation has to be reformed and the armed forces of the European partners have to be restructured in order to ensure security in Europe.155

Overall, the populist opinions are split between leaving NATO or not. They know, historically speaking, that NATO brought a lot for their countries. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO spread its wings to East-Europe, in contrast to what was agreed. Although there was no Soviet Union anymore, Russia still had the feeling of a great power and felt threatened with this extension of NATO. According to FN, AfD and PVV, Russia is not a threat anymore for Europe; NATO on the other hand, is an organisation that needs to be reorganised. This is also in line with creating better bonds with Russia. Especially FN and AfD share the opinion of reorganising NATO. FN has, just as Russia, an aversion to the USA as a lead power. This means that France need to withdraw from NATO and instead of this alliance, create an alliance with Russia. AfD does not agree with leaving NATO, but would like to have strengthened the European component of NATO. Therefore, the organisation has to be reformed and the armed forces of Europe have to be strengthened in order to ensure the security. The Dutch party is not really negative about NATO. Moreover, PVV thinks it is time to expand the organisation with more countries. In conclusion, one might say that NATO needs some changes in order to keep the populist parties pleased. This is not that strange, since NATO is an old organisation and time practically stood still here, but the time in the world did not.

153 Matthias Kamann. 2016. AfD-rechter Höcke stellt NATO-Mitgliedschaft infrage. https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article154582778/AfD-Rechter-Hoecke-stellt-Nato-Mitgliedschaft- infrage.html. Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 154 Ibid. 155 Alternative für Deutschland. 2016. Programm der Alternative für Deutschland. https://www.afd.de/wp- content/uploads/sites/111/2017/01/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf . Accessed on: June 12th, 2017. 49

5.3 Conclusion

When looking at the Russian threat, the three populist parties do not see any harm of Russia. Moreover, they are all trying to get a better bond with Putin’s Russia. According to FN, they even need to withdraw from NATO in order to create an alliance with Russia. This would help the security of the outside borders of Europe. The populist parties are agreeing with Russia on the IS issue and terrorism. Because Russia is disagreeing a lot on what NATO decides and does, the populist parties disagree on this organisation as well. The Russian Federation is a strong influences for these three parties. Because the populist parties look up to this country, Russia gives a good example for the country that the parties want to have for their own; strong and independent. Therefore, the parties copy a lot what Russia decides and does and this is not only because they want to become this strong and independent country they have in mind, but also to become friends with the country they admire. Doing the same thing as Russia does, means creating a better bond with Russia because the country likes what the parties are doing.

The fact that the parties are positive about Russia and would like to have a better bond with this country, reflects also on NATO. Because Russia is not seen as a threat anymore, according to FN, AfD and PVV, the parties are in favour of at least big changes in this organisation. However, the three parties are not influenced by the national history of their country in this case. Where these countries were previously against Russia and for NATO, the tables have been turned. The populist parties making their own plans and try to create better relations with Russia by, for example, disagreeing on decisions that have been made by NATO.

6. Conclusion

This thesis researched the question whether national history is used as an argument against the EU, according to populist parties. This research was done by examining three populist parties in Europe, namely the French Front National, the German Alternative für Deutschland and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid. First of all, it is important to determine that Euroscepticism is different in every single European country. Where some countries are feeling a deep sense of nationalism and would like to have their sovereignty back, other countries think that “Brussels is deciding too much”. According to the last group, the EU project was not only an economical concept anymore, but also a political one. However, not only Brussels or populism influences Euroscepticism, but big events as well. Think about the Big Bang and euro crisis, but also the refugee crisis let Euroscepticism rise in Europe. Although many migrants are coming to Europe nowadays, it is not a new phenomenon. Migration in Europe is of all times, definitely when we look to countries as the Netherlands and France with their colonial history and the immigration flows from that colonies. During the EEC period, immigration was used to enhance integration between states, it would develop relations between states defined policies of entry by establishing quotas. Nowadays, migration has become a salient issue and the attitude of the European citizens have hardened across the Member States when it comes to this issue. Large numbers of migrants and the negative publicity for them cause the past few years a lot of Euroscepticism, especially in France, Germany and the Netherlands. This is not strange, since there are a lot of migrants heading to these countries where their own citizens are overloaded with anxiety and cultural differences. According to the populist parties and their followers, the EU does not do a thing about this problem; the EU only fades away more and more for many citizens. Because citizens of the EU do not know a lot about the EU, they listen easily to the political parties. When parties such as Front National, Alternative für Deutschland and Partij voor de Vrijheid get the chance to speak negatively about Brussels and the elite over there, their supporters take it for granted and decide that the only truth is the truth of these parties. These populist parties are the only parties that have a strong opinion about the EU and immigrants and this gives people the feeling of being heard and helped and this is for many a feeling they did not have for a long time.

When it comes to the national traditions of the nations and the populist parties, one might say that all three populist parties have adopted some bits and pieces of the men that have been researched. However, because de Gaulle, Adenauer and Drees have a different policy in 51 comparison with the three populist parties not everything of these policies is adopted by the parties. For example, FN and Charles de Gaulle: the greatness of France that de Gaulle tried to achieve is something le Pen would like to see as well. However, where de Gaulle tried to make France the spokesman of Europe, Front National wants to achieve this greatness in a different way; by withdrawing from the EU and making new and better bonds with Russia. But this is not only FN’s purpose: all three populist parties would like to have better relations with Russia and do not see any threat that the rest of the world is seeing. However, PVV is not that clear about the Russian relations with the Netherlands, but this is probably because a majority of the Dutch do see this Russian threat and PVV therefore tries to be tactical about this issue to lose as less party members as possible. The reason that Russia is popular with the populist parties, is because this country is seeking the same thing as these parties want for their own country; the Russian Federation is strong and independent since Putin came to power in 2000. FN, AfD and PVV are trying to achieve the same thing and would therefore like to learn from the master, which means that they need to create better relations with the countries in order to learn something from Putin. Furthermore, all three parties would like to see that NATO gets less power or at least changes its power in order to let the United States not have so much power. This is also in line with the opinion that Russia is not a threat anymore. Since NATO was founded to arm West-Europe for the Soviet Union, it is not necessary anymore. According to the parties, NATO is obsolete and needs to reorganise, not to say discontinue.

Overall, one might say that at least FN and AfD are not really influenced by the national history of their country and therefore they do not use their national history against the EU. The national histories are not the reason of Euroscepticism, but several other factors. The populist parties are definitely proud of what their predecessors have reached. Besides, the populist parties are very much nationalistic, but they have a different view when it comes to politics than their predecessors. On the other hand, the parties are trying to get several decisions back the founding fathers made. For example, Marine le Pen would like to get the greatness back as Charles de Gaulle tried to achieve in France. Although these two parties are not influenced by the national history, they cannot forget or ignore what these historical men meant for the countries they were governing, especially when it comes to European integration. For PVV it is a bit different. PVV has a totally different view about the Dutch politics than Willem Drees had in his time, but the party definitely agrees with Drees on several points. Moreover, the Dutch populist party glorifies Drees with every social decision was made during the government period of Drees. Another crucial point according to Wilders is migration, which is

52 also in line with Drees’ thoughts. The social aspects and dealing in a better way with migration is something that PVV misses in the EU and these are one of the reasons why Wilders want to withdraw from the EU.

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