ARTIKEL A Social Sketch of Radical Islamism in Solo

Abstrak/Abstract

This article examines phenomena of Islamic radicalism in Solo based on the social facts in the city. The assessment is important in tracing the origins of Islamic radicalism in Solo recently. By bibliographical study of Islamic movement and field study in the region, this study describes and analyzes the formats of Islamic radicalism in Solo and its impacts in political situation in . This comprehension on the emergence of this radicalism, according to the writer, could bring to the solving of the problems and the prevention of surfacing Islamic radicalism in the future.

Artikel ini mengkaji gejala radikalisme Islam di Solo berdasarkan pada fakta- fakta sosial di kota tersebut. Pembahasan ini penting bagi melihat asal-usul radikalisme Islam di Solo pada gejala akhir-akhir ini. Dengan studi literatur dan lapangan, kajian ini mendeskripsikan dan menganalisis apa yang menjadi formasi radikalisme Islam di Solo dan dampaknya pada situasi politik di Indonesia. Pemahaman tentang kemunculan radikalisme ini, menurut penulis, dapat mengantarkan pada pemecahan masalah dan pencegahan timbulnya radikalisme Islam di kemudian hari.

Key words Solo, Islamic radicalism, sociology of religion, religious movement

Muhammad Wildan A. Introduction Radical Islamism in Solo is part of Dosen Fakultas Humaniora UIN Sunan social radicalism of the Solonese in Kalijaga general. Therefore, the problem of radical Islamism in the region as the focus of my study here is not merely problem of Muslims nor Islam as a religion as such. Rather, it is the problem of the Solonese in general. The real problem is lying beneath the social structure of the Solonese since it has to do more with their social history, culture, and politics. As Olivier Roy has noted that despite the trans-national factors, some national peculiarities also play a significant role in shaping the resurgence of Islamism.1 In other words, cultural,

1 Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: the search for a new ummah, Hurst & Company, London, 2004, p. 62.

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Social Justice social, and political deprivation on the of the community. By employing this local and national levels have been approach, theories of social production supported by the mainstreaming process and the logic attitude of person in a of modernization and globalization in community could be established. The the global context. theory of habitus argues that an attitude Indeed, all radical Islamism in and behaviour of a person in society is Solo do not have to do with Islam as a shaped unconsciously by common corpus of religion. Likewise, radical behaviour of people in the community. Islamism has nothing to do with the People within the community just take doctrines or dogmas of Islam. Rather, it these attitude and behaviour for granted has to do more with how Muslims (Haryatmoko, 2003: 8). In the context of interpret doctrines within Islam on this Solo, social and political deprivation is a current situation. There were cultural, habitus, while historically the Solonese social, and political problems which have are abangan is the capital, and finally shaped their attitude and behaviour. On politics which sometime triggers the the national level, all Indonesians have emergence of ‘practice’ (radicalism) is undergone almost the same treatment of the field in this approach. the state. The hegemony of the state, the Along with the rise of radical issue of corruption, and the authoritarian Islamism in Indonesia, Islamism is also government are commonly felt by any the phenomenon of the current world Muslims even Indonesians in general. In even at most developed countries. As other words, political grievances are not many scholars argue, radical Islamism is enough tension to produce such one of the products of the globalizing radicalism. In the same way, other mainstream of modernization. Modern similar characteristics may also be found technology has shrunk the world into a at other cities, but they do not breed global village. The rapid growth of radical Islamism. But, why such radical information and technology have Islamism is not becoming a phenomenon marginalized the role of religion in in other cities as it is in Solo. It should be society. For fundamentalists or noted here, therefore, that there are some Islamisists, modernization is an immense peculiarities of Solo or the Solonese threat to Muslims since it is not only a which gave the rise to this radical concept but it is a social process which Islamism. Therefore, beside political produces social products. Traditional factors, I tend also to focus on other Islamic values are marginalized, swept characteristics such as social culture of away, and even replaced by Western the society. On this phase, culture and values. Conventional Islamic preaching politics must be examined to more fully no longer could restrain the influence of understand how radical Islamism is modernization from the West. Among prolific in the region. the influence of modernization and To comprehend this cultural globalization is the spread of secularism phenomenon, Bourdieu’s perspective of as a part of gazwul fikri (the war of habitus may assist me in viewing the ideology). The inability of some practice of radicalism among the Muslims’ groups to follow the beat of Solonese. For him, the attitude and modernity has given rise to such Islamic behaviour of people could not be revivalist groups as a way to counter to detached from social structure in which modernization. The demand of shark‘ah they live. The approach which could also in many Muslim countries is one of the be called as genetic structuralism views ways Muslims counter Western’s that mental structure of a person in a modernization. However, the encounter community is a result of social structure with modernization and globalization is

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JISPO VOL. 1 Edisi: Januari-Juni Tahun 2013 also accompanied by the sentiment of the Chinese to integrate into the majority anti-Westernism. The hegemonic power community. Religion and economic of some Western countries toward differences between the Chinese and the Muslim countries to some extent have Javanese as majority led to such kind of also heightened the situation. The social disparities among them. For this emergence of Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) may reasons, I will explore the ethnics of be one of the examples of such resistance Arabs and Chinese in terms of their movement. striving to survive and to submerge within the majority of the Javanese. B. Social Facts Regarding Islam in Solo Although Arabs do not comprise 1. Diverse ethnics: the failed 1% of the population, the existence of indigenization this ethnic is quite significant in Solo in Solo is characterized by its plural society many senses. Since its presence in the since the beginning of its existence in the region, they have been residing in the 18th century. There are many ethnics Pasar Kliwon sub-district, at the Eastern living in Solo such as Javanese, Arabs, side of the Kasunanan kingdom. It was and Chinese.2 Similar to some other part of the politics of Dutch government plural cities in Indonesia, ethnicity has to locate this ethnic and separated it with become a sensitive issue. However, since indigenous Muslims.4 Although there different ethnicity is also followed by were many Arabs living in other sub- different religions, cultures, and districts of Solo, Pasar Kliwon has been identities, the plurality Solonese has been the major Arab community in the region. heightened by those diverse identities. In Business has become the skill of Arabs fact, the Javanese are the majority of all since their coming to the archipelago. In ethnics living in the region. The the Solo context, the privilege of Arabs insignificant numbers of other ethnics from the royal kingdom gave them many should not bring about social problems chances in businesses especially for the Solonese. However, due to the middleman trade, money lending, and economic successful of several ethnics landownership (Mandal, 1994: 42).5 The over the majority, it led to such kind of success of Arabs in business is supported social tension. With the exception of the 3 Chinese, almost all ethnics share many 4 Dutch government wanted to reduce the things in common especially in terms of influence of pure Islam and the idea of Pan- their religion, which is mostly Islam. The Islamism of JamSl al-Dkn al-Afghani from the different religion and other cultural Middle East in Indonesia by limiting the identities which finally make difficult for immigration of Arabs to Indonesia, banning the assimilation of Arabs in Indonesia, and discriminating Arabs in Indonesia. In Dutch’s view, Islam is identical with Arabs. Therefore, 2 In fact, there are many other ethnics in the city, based on Snouck Hurgronje’s advises, Dutch i.e. Sundanese, Banjarese, Maduranese, Minang government launched some regulations on Arabs and Batak. However, since their number is not in the country. Further see Hamid Al-Gadri, quite significant, their existence is not quite Politik Belanda terhadap Islam dan keturunan Arab di significant in Solo in many senses. Indonesia, CV Masagung, , 1988, pp. 58, 85, 3 Although the name of Chinese is the most 146. common term used to identify the Chinese 5 Since the early of 1900s, most Arabs in the descendants in Southeast Asian countries, its archipelago were engaged in the intermediary translation in Indonesia (Cina) and Javanese Cino trade while others profited from the cultivation of is not common in Indonesia. Since both terms crops, the construction and rental properties, and have some negative connotations, Indonesian batik industry. Further, see Sumit Mandal, Finding Chinese prefer to be called as Tionghoa their place: a history of Arabs in Java under Dutch (Zhonghua). In this thesis, however, I will use the rule, 1800-1924. PhD thesis at Columbia term Chinese with its neutral connotations. University, 1994, p. 52.

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Social Justice by the facts that this community has Arabs descendants do not marry with good networks across the country. other ethnics especially Arab women. Although initially the Arabs had Interestingly enough, although not all problem in term of their assimilation Arabs know a lot about Islam, most with the indigenous people, since the Javanese consider them as having higher early of the 20th century and the degree in terms of their religiosity.8 involvement of some Arabs in the Undeniably, therefore, that some Arabs struggle for Indonesia independence, the become religious scholar. I want to problems has been settled (Ibid: vii). underline here that being Arab is Along with any other Arabs all over blessing among the Javanese although Indonesia, Arabs in Solo are Yemeni- only a few of them could speak Arabic. descendant firstly coming to Indonesia in Nevertheless, I would assert that only a the 13th century. Similar to any other few Arabs in the region involved much Arab communities, however, Arab in proselytizing of Islam. One significant community in Solo is characterised phenomenon to support my argument is sharply by the Sayyid and non-Sayyid or that the most Javanese living in the ‘Alawy and Irshady.6 In the context of neighbourhood of Arabs are still abangan. Solo, however, both groups seems Unsurprisingly, therefore, the villages in developed each own activities within the the sub-district of Pasar Kliwon has been region. among heavily abangan communities in Owing to their religious Solo. similarity, the relationship between On the religious role of Arabs Arabs and the Javanese goes well. among the Javanese, it is necessary to Although they have different culture, the assert here the existence of Habkb ‘Ali bin Arabs could easily submerge into the Muhammad bin Hussein Al-Habsy in Javan Solonese. Van den Berg underlined Solo. Although he died about 95 years that the Arabs’ acculturation was also ago, thousands Arabs and Javanese supported by the fact that most Arabs coming from many different regions men at first married with Javanese across the country appear at the mosque women.7 Nowadays, however, most of Riyadh at Pasar Kliwon annually on 20th Rabi‘ al-Awwal to commemorate his k 6 Sayyid or well known as ‘alawy or ‘alawiyyin or death (haul). Hab b ‘Ali is well known for HabSib is those having direct link to the prophet his efforts to do dakwah during his life, Muhammad through his grand-son Hussein. The especially to the poor. The figure also word ‘alawy is taken from Hussein’s descendant well known of its poetic prose of the k Hab b ‘Alwi bin Ubaidillah bin Ahmad Al- prophet’s history namely, Simtu al-DurSr Muhajir who lived in Hadramawt, the south of Yemeni. While non-Sayyid are just common Arabs (necklace of pearls). The attendants who do not have any link to the prophet. Prior to which could reach as many as 50,000 the independence of Indonesia, the first group are recite the prose, sway to and fro as if in those united in Jami‘at al-Khair (charitable association). It was the Sudanese Achmad Soorkati (1872-1943) who was disagree with this Nusantara, INIS, Jakarta, 1989 (the original book distinction and finally established Jam‘iyyah al- was in Dutch and published in 1887). IshlSh wa al-Irshad al-Islamiyah or well know as Al- 8 Van den Berg also argued that it was mistaken to IrshSd in 1913. believe that most Arabs master in Islamic 7 According to van den Berg, only few Arab-born theology. Rather, he stated that only a few Arabs women stayed for long period in Indonesia. That are good in Arabics as well as in Islam, even more is among the reason why most Arabs married to be a teacher on Islam. In fact, some Javanese with Indonesian women. Most Arabs in Indonesia ‘ulama also dislike Arabs since there were such the 20th century were born in Indonesia. The belief among Javanese that indigenous ‘ulama existence of sayyid as the descendants of Prophet could be consider as ‘a half Arab’. Further see, Muhammad is among the exception. See L.W.C. L.W.C. van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni, p. van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di 103-104.

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the spiritual ecstasy. The spiritual earlier that the Dutch or even the Arabs. gatherings of Habkb ‘Ali are well known When the Dutch arrived at Batavia in the to be so spiritually surcharged that they end of 16th century, traders from draw many non-Muslims to Islam. Most southern China were already well Javanese Muslims come to the gathering established in some port cities of Java are poor people coming from many (Purdey, 2006: 5). Similar to the presence suburb areas across the and of Arabs, the Chinese came to the hoping that they would get barakah archipelago for living due to the (blessing) from Habkb ‘Ali. economic and political difficulties of The talent of Arabs to run a their countries. Lombard (1996) asserts business also support their acculturation that in 18th century, Chinese assimilated with the indigenous Javanese. Initially, broadly in Java. Further Carey (1984) the Pasar Kliwon village was such kind notes that in 1704, the region of of an enclave of Arabs. However, their Pekalongan was granted to a big family expertise in business have attracted more of Chinese with the name of Jayaningrat. people to cooperate with or work for The growth population and the triumph them which finally led the village of Chinese in business which became such kind of plural community. endangered the existence of the Dutch’s Batik and clothes trading which was business company (Vereenigde initially run by Javanese has been Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) especially surpassed by the Arabs. The necessity of in Batavia led the massacre of about Arabs to expand their network of 10,000 Chinese in 1740-1742. Some of the business has given rise to the necessity of survived Chinese fled to Central Java more workers which mostly done by the (Lombard, 1996: 358). Javanese. Such patron-client relationship It was not until the Dutch made more possibilities for Arabs to be occupation that this ethnic has problems accepted well among the Javanese. with some indigenous people especially in Java. Prior to the coming of Dutch, the Figure 1: Ethnic Population in Solo Chinese could immerse easily into any Num- Percent- ethnics and communities In Indonesia, No. Ethnics bers age (%) even to adopt some local cultures. Some 1. Javanese 460,080 94,01 scholars argue that among prominent 2. Chinese 17,594 3,59 wali (Islamic preachers in Java) are 3. Arabs 3,874 0,79 Chinese descendant such as Sunan 4. Sundanese 1,940 0,40 Ampel, Sunan Bonang, Sunan Kudus, 5. Banjarese 1,017 0,21 Sunan Kalijaga and Sunan Gunung Jati 6. Maduranese 968 0,20 (Muljana 2005). The Dutch’s policy gave 7. Batak 708 0,14 the Chinese higher social status than the 8. Minang 290 0,06 Javanese especially during the Cultuur 9. Others 2,949 0,60 Stelsel (work force) in 1830-1870. The TOTAL 489,420 100 closeness of the Chinese to the Dutch government and royal families Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) established an uneasy relationship with branch of 2000. the Javanese. According to Cribb, it was

not until 19th century that the Chinese Although it is not quite clear have been becoming ‘problem’ for when the Chinese came to the Indonesians when the Dutch archipelago for the first time, it is government introduced and maintained obvious that its existence in Java is much a system of racial classification. It was in

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Social Justice 1825, that the troops of Pangeran central point of the Chinese problem in Diponegoro led by Ayu Yudakusumo Indonesia is the social identity of the killed a Chinese community in Ngawi Chinese which never been regarded by which could be regarded as the first other ethnics as part of Javanese war toward Chinese in Java.9 Indonesian.11Currently, although The prohibition of Pangeran Diponegoro Indonesian government has for his followers to have (sex) interaction continuously revised the regulations on with Chinese women afterwards had the peranakan, ethnic Chinese which seeded the hatred of Javanese toward make up 1.5 per cent of the Indonesian Chinese. Unlike the Arabs, Carey even population still lack the same legitimacy notes that the Chinese has no significant as pribumi Indonesians. Regardless of the role in the struggle to achieve Indonesian unfair treatment of the government independence (Carey 1986: 10).10 toward ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, this Although after the Indonesian ethnic has a strong nationalism on independence almost all Chinese were Indonesia. The willingness of this ethnic born in the country (peranakan), they still to learn local and national languages for have problems to assimilate with the instance is among their efforts to adopt indigenous people. This uneasy their new identity. In many cases, relationship was supported by the fact Chinese living in Central Java for that the New Order also neglected the example speak Javanese more ‘totok’ than existence of this ethnic within the Javanese people, and so Chinese living in diversity of the nation-state of Indonesia, other regions. Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). It is not quite clear either when In the mid of 60s, the New Order regime the Chinese firstly came to Solo. introduced a series of laws and policies However, it was quite obvious that this to repress expressions of Chinese ethnic was already around when the identity and culture. The laws and Mataram kingdom moved from policies forbade Chinese language and Kartasura to Sala in 1743 during the characters, and cultural festivals, while at reign of Pakubuwono II (1745-174). The the same time encouraged ethnic business interest of the Chinese always Chinese to adopt Indonesian-sounding brought them to the centre of political names (Purdey, 2006: 21). Hence, the institution. The ability of Chinese to adapt to new social changes and play in 9 Further on this issue, see Peter Carey, Changing it made them could survive in any Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities situation.12 Their successful in economics in Central Java, 1755-1825, in Indonesia, Vol. 37, brought them to be closed to the elite 1984. 10 Since the birth of the proto-nationalism of politics of the Dutch government and Indonesia which was marked by the emergence of Surakarta kingdom at that time. Due to both national and Islamic organizations, the the Dutch government’s policy, the Chinese was never involved. Even more, the population of the colony was divided Chinese domination in batik business in Surakarta at that time invoked the rise of the Sarekat Islam into three categories: European, foreign (SI). While the Arabs were involved much in this Orientals, and native/inlander (Mandal, “age of motion” in the forms of the Jami‘at al-Khair and also Al-IrshSd for instance, no single Chinese organization arising in this category. Undeniably, 11 Since the early of 19th century, the Chinese even therefore, that in 1928, the Chinese was excluded proposed to Dutch government to have the same in the Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Oath) for the rights as European. The government refused it hallmark of the Indonesian nationhood. Cf. Leo and finally issued the regulation which Suryadinata, Pribumi, Indonesians, the Chinese categorized Chinese as part of Foreign Orientals. minority and China: A study of perceptions and 12 Further see Ricklefs, M.C., Yogyakarta di Bawah policies, Marshall Cavendish Academic, Singapore, Mangkubumi 1749-1792: Sejarah Pembagian 2005,pp. 9-11. Jawa, Matabangsa, Yogyakarta, 2002

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1994: 55). The Chinese descendant which business for Javanese. The emergence of was initially part of inlanders was the Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1912 in Laweyan separated from them and thus later was was precisely as a reaction to the separated from the category of domination of the Chinese and also the “Indonesians”.13 Arabs and Chinese are VOC (Larson, 1979: 62). Indisputably, in the second category which has also therefore, that the acculturation of the some privileges rather than the third Chinese to the Javanese as the category. Therefore, the most populous indigenous went so slowly. The ‘hatred’ region of Chinese in Solo was at Balong of Javanese toward its business rival had and Warung Pelem which located at the given rise to the belief that the Chinese northern side of the European vicinity. has older “awu” (spirit of descendant) Therefore, Chinese which now are rather than that of the Javanese. widely spread across Surakarta are Therefore, although along with coming from these two villages. Similar the reluctant of the Chinese to assimilate to any other regions in Indonesia, the with the indigenous people, the Javanese Chinese in Solo has also been the pioneer reject this assimilation with the Chinese in business. Since the Dutch era, the in term of marriage. Some Javanese existence of the Chinese was significant believe that due to the ‘spirit’, the later for the kingdoms especially as the lender descendents would have stronger of money and advisor of the kingdoms’ Chinese characters rather than that of the trade (Carey, 1986: 11).14 In late of the Javanese. Although some Javanese may 19th century, Solo had become the centre take the benefit from business of batik which had its market almost relationship with the Chinese, the rivalry major cities in the archipelago at the between these two ethnics remains at the time. On this business, the raw materials bottom of social structure of the of batik were mostly under the control of Solonese. In addition, the triumph of the the Chinese (Sariyatun & Hermanu: 40). Chinese in business in general to some Obviously, the relationship extent has positioned it as different social between the Chinese and the Javanese in class. All above privileges, social status, Solo was not quite good. Although the residential situation and opportunities or Chinese had a good relationship with the political access have led to such kind of aristocrats, it is not with the common social gap between Chinese in the one people of Javanese. Reportedly, there hand and Javanese on the other. The were also some Chinese converted to nowadays success of Chinese in business Islam in the early of the 20th century and is another social jealousy which add even established Persatuan Islam Tionghoa another social gap with the lower level (Chinese Muslims Union, PIT) in 1936. Javanese. Rather than Arabs who tend to cooperate Along with the half-hearted with the Javanese in business, the process of indigenization, religion has Chinese could be seen more as a rival of become major difference between the Chinese and the Javanese. Culturally the 13 Robert Cribb, “Criminality, Violence and Chinese’s culture has been curb by the Chinese in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1930- New Order regime15 and, hence, it has 1960.” Paper presented for International Conference ‘Decolonisasi and Posisi Etnis Tionghoa Indonesia 1930-1960. Padang, 18-21 15 Lombard asserts that Chinese in Java had 2006, p. 2. adopted much of Javanese traditions since prior 14 Carey even asserts that the Chinese was the occupation of the Dutch in Indonesian involved much in the kingdom’s matter especially archipelago. The Chinese ethnic leading in during the reign of Pakubuwono IV (1788-1820) business brought it to such of special status since he was so wastrel. See Carey, p. 18. among the Javanese. This phenomenon was

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Social Justice adopted much of the Javanese’s such the differences among them have given rise language of Javanese. Besides, the to different cultural identity. In fact, Chinese has also been forced not to show historically there were many Chinese in up its cultural traditions such as the Solo who adopted Javanese culture as Chinese New Year and other celebration part of their traditions.16 The days. However, since religion has been insignificant number of the Chinese who playing significant role in Javanese did so which could not unite their society, this distinction has given rise to identity. The absence of common identity such kind of tension between them. Most among them is a hindrance to the unity of ethnic Chinese’s religions are among them. Therefore, as long as this Confucianism and Christianity, while the main problem is not resolved, Javanese’s are Islam and Javanese indigenization and identity would syncretism. The religious differences always be problems lying beneath the between the Chinese and Javanese was communities in Solo. the major obstacle of the first parts’ indigenization. In many cases in 2. Social and economic deprivation: the Indonesia, furthermore, religious seeds of fragmentation difference has been considered to see Social fragmentation is among the factors other adherent of religion as ‘otherness’. behind the rise of radical Islamism in Although many Chinese have adopted Solo. Since the beginning of the Solonese some Javanese culture such as in naming history, the lower level abangan Javanese of their offspring, religion is still the majority of the Solonese have been main hindrance of inter-marriage deprived socially and in economics. The between the Chinese and indigenous social stratification during the Dutch people. occupation had put the abangan Javanese It should be noted here, however, into the lowest level after the Dutch and that many Javanese especially residing at Javanese priyayi (high level class) at the Balong and Warung Pelem could take top level, while Arabs and Chinese on the advantages of the Chinese triumph in the second level.17 This privilege of the business. Therefore, since the Dutch gave also possibilities not only for relationship between these two ethnics in Chinese to live at urban areas, but also the villages in quite good, the Chinese in other business conveniences. Eventually, these villages is never became the the lower level abangan Javanese were victims of riots in Solo. In fact, the above marginalized not only socially, but also case could be a good sample for other in economics. Such social and economic residents in Solo in term of their situation did not change significantly relationship. Indeed, it seems on the until recently. Although many of the surface that the relationship between lower level Javanese today are living at Chinese and the indigenous people in general in Solo is good. I believe, 16 Rustopo notes that there were several cultural however, that cultural and religious institutions founded and run by Chinese in Solo especially during the Old Order period such as Wayang Orang Panggung (Human Puppet on the marked by the belief among the Javanese that the Stage, WOP). There were also some Chinese blood of a murdered-Chinese is doubled involved in the Perkumpulan Masyarakat Surakarta compared to that of a Javanese. The presence of (The Association of Surakarta Society, PMS) Dutch in Batavia in 1619 twisted the assimilation especially on the department of art. Further on process of the Chinese ethnic in Java particularly this issue, see Rustopo, Menjadi Jawa: Orang-orang and in the archipelago in general. On this issue Tionghoa dan kebudayaan Jawa di Surakarta, 1895- see, Dennys Lombard, Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya. 1998, Penerbit Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2007. Kajian Sejarah Terpadu Bagian II: Jaringan Asian. 17 On the account of Arabs in Java see Mandal, Jakarta:Gramedia, 1996, p. 357. Finding Their Place.

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JISPO VOL. 1 Edisi: Januari-Juni Tahun 2013 the periphery of urban areas, they are business also has deprived the lower constantly marginalized economically. level Javanese economically. Along the Current success of Chinese in business is history of Solo, ethnic Chinese plays a another social jealousy which add significant role in major business in the another social gap with the lower level region. In the early 1990s, although Javanese. In turn, recurring anti-Chinese Chinese population was only about 4.4 riot has became long-lasting crucial issue per cent (24,000) of the total population in Solo. Interestingly enough, most riots of the city, about 80 per cent of shop caused by any social problems would owner in Solo were Chinese (Purdey, finally lead to the destruction of Chinese 2006: 126). The domination of Chinese in properties.18 business is considered by Javanese as The legacy of Dutch’s law to their main rival. Undeniably, therefore, regulate society according to their social many people believe that Chinese behind status sustains social deprivation. the sudden disappearance of certain Furthermore, the regulation of products from the market. On the other Kasunanan kingdom during the Dutch hand, the failure of the government to occupation to arrange society according overcome Indonesian’s economic crisis to their social status also positioned the and to distribute welfare to society has lower level Javanese into the periphery worsened socio-economic condition. of the city. This situation was not only Therefore, it is obvious that social gap deprived the lower level Javanese between the poor and the wealthy is socially, but it also led them to have represented by the Javanese and the limited access to economic resources. Chinese respectively. In many cases, the Along with the modernization process of Javanese actions could be seen as class Indonesia, Solo is also developing well in actions, i.e., proletariat against the many aspects economically. Similar to bourgeois. Since the bourgeois is other big cities in Indonesia in general, represented by Chinese, this ethnic the economic development in Solo is also become the ‘victims’ of many proletariat followed by demographic changes Javanese actions. especially the movement of suburb Social gap based on ethnicity is a people to urban areas. Job opportunities, big challenge of the Javanese in Solo. The however, do not provide enough space social disparities has become vulnerable for the new dwellers coming for their factors behind the phenomenon of social living. As a result, the more people live radicalism in the city. Therefore, anti- in the slum areas of Solo, the more Chinese riots is the long-lasting crucial unemployed youth living in the areas. issue in Solo. Interestingly enough, most This social situation is worsened by the riots triggered by any trivial social economic crisis hit Southeast Asian problems would finally lead to the countries, and even monetary crisis of destruction of Chinese properties. Hence, Indonesia. This socio-economic situation along the history of Solo, the issue of has given rise to the emergence unstable religion has become the most critical society. issue which could lead to social violence. In addition to the social In other words, religious sentiment has deprivation, the surpassing of Chinese in strengthened the break down of the Solonese social structure. The recurring 18 On this issue, see Jemma Purdey “The 'other' social riots in Solo is due partly to the May riots: anti-Chinese violence in Solo, May failure of the government as well as 1998” in Charles A. Coppel, Violent conflicts in social thinkers to create such a melting Indonesia: analysis, representation, resolution, Routledge, New York, 2006. pot for the diverse ethnics. The

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Social Justice difficulties and inability of ethnics business company (VOC) in both especially Chinese to immerse to the internally or externally social problems. Javanese society is one of the reason of The rise of the Sarekat Islam in the early the disparity between Chinese and 20th century as the peak of social protest Javanese. However, different religion to the hegemony of the authoritarian and culture prohibit them to interact Dutch government was not responded each other more than just in business positively by the aristocrats. This matters. ignorance was also supported by the disharmonic relationship between the 3. Political deprivation: the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran fragmentation of political authorities kingdoms which is lasting until recently. Along with the above characteristic of The Kasunanan kingdom which was the Solonese, political deprivation also relatively closer to society finally did not played a significant role in the care much to what really happened in fragmentation of the society. Since the the society. On the other hand, the social early history of Solo under the rule of gap or distance between the aristocrats Kasunanan kingdom, the rulers had and kawula19 (lower class people) was not neglected the grassroots due to political well mediated by the priyayi (upper class matters. History records that the patron- people). On the emergence of the Sarekat client system was not maintained well Islam, Kuntowijoyo asserts that it was as especially during the Dutch occupation. a result of collectively sub-conscious The fact that religious leaders do not culture due to the failure of the priyayis play a significant role in Solo is also mediate between raja and kawula. supported by the reality that neither Until the independence of traditional nor modern Solo leaders do Indonesia in 1945, the kingdoms let alone pay enough attentions to the society. Kasunanan reluctantly acknowledged Finally, the political deprivation has the new state and still accepted the given to the destruction of social system. return of Dutch government in 1948. The The emergence of such radical Islamic detachment of the Kasunanan to the groups as Sarekat Islam or current lower class people was responded by the vigilante forces is only a symptom of this reluctant of the people to the planning of fragmentation. Indonesian government to give the The absence of such social Kasunanan a special autonomous region cohesion among the Solonese is also in 1946.20 The social actions in the name another major factor to the social fragmentation. The hegemonic power of 19 For the case of social class during that time, I the Solo kingdoms during the Dutch tend to employ Kuntowijoyo’s category: raja- occupation is another deprivation of the priyayi-kawulo (king-upper class-lower class). lower level Javanese abangan. The Further on this account, see on his work Raja, aristocrats of the Kasunanan and Priyayi & Kawulo: Surakarta 1900-1915, Penerbit Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2004, p. 9. Mangkunegaran kingdoms did not play 20 On August 1945, the Pakubuwono XII who just a significant role in the society. Since the inaugurated as the king of the Kasunanan very beginning of the history of Solo kingdom was selected as the leader of the Komite (Surakarta) in the 18th century, politics Nasional Indonesia Daerah (Regional Indonesian was becoming a dominant issues among National Committee, KNID) as part of the effort of the Republic of Indonesia to compose government the aristocrats which finally split the of the regional level (swa-praja). Some people Mataram kingdom into several considered this appointment as an effort of the kingdoms. The inability of the aristocrats Indonesian government to re-empower the to handle social problems properly had kingdom. They kidnapped some prominent figures of the kingdom and demanded (1) the drawn the involvement of Dutch omission of the swa-praja region of Surakarta, (2)

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JISPO VOL. 1 Edisi: Januari-Juni Tahun 2013 of anti-Swapraja (anti-autonomous traditional leaders in Solo, the king of government) were supported by Kasultanan Yogyakarta has more majority of the Solonese.21 Obviously, the authoritative and much more powerful failure of the kingdoms to be such kind among the people of Yogyakarta. of social cohesion for the society, to some Historically, since the beginning of the extend, have split the unity of the history of Kasultanan Yogyakarta, the society. Nowadays, the traditional elites of the kingdom are closed to the leaders or kings of Kasunanan and grassroots. Mangkunegaran kingdom do not have The authoritarian government of any significant power in society. Politics the New Order worsened the political and power within the Kasunanan deprivation of the society. The political kingdom is much more interesting for attitude of regime was felt by the rulers rather than caring society. Due almost all communities in Indonesia at to disharmonic relationship among the the time, yet it was much worse in the princess of the Kasunanan (the children context of Solo since the Solonese have of Pakubuwono XII), currently there are long history being deprived politically. two kings, Hangabehi and Tedjowulan , The single majority of Golongan Karya who declare that each of them is the most (Functional Group, Golkar) had deprived authoritative as the king of Kasunanan any political aspirations of society entitled as Pakubuwono XIII. In especially that against the government. addition, both kings are trying to regain The phenomenon of the Mega Bintang of the king’s recognition from society by Mudrick M. Sangidoe in 1997 clearly exhibiting some kingdom’s cultural signed the enormous opposition of the heritage to public and giving certain society against the hegemonic power of people kingdoms’ titles.22 Regardless of the New Order. In fact, the phenomenon the enthusiastic of some people about of Sarekat Islam in 1912 is similar to the these events, many consider all these phenomenon of Mega-Bintang. The activities as cultural and historical events longing of the Solonese to the rather than to acknowledge the authority government caring much of its society of kingdom. Unlike the power of resulted the emergence of such social radicalism. Undeniably, therefore, that the resignation of Pakubuwono XII, and (3) on the reformation era, the PDI-P which changing of some rules of swa-praja which is not rooted at the grassroots gains its suitable with modern era. Further on this issue, enormous voters in Solo. Current see Bram Setiaji (et al), Raja di Alam Republik: political elites which satisfied the keraton Kasunanan Surakarta dan Pakubuwono XII, PT Bina Rena Pariwara, Jakarta , 2000, pp. 88-90. necessity of lower level abangan Javanese Apart of the refusal of the autonomous region, which hopefully could reduce radicalism some unrecognized people kidnapped the prime in the region. minister Syahrir when he visited Solo on June 1946.On this issue see, Soejatno, Revolution and social tensions in Surakarta 195-1950 in Indonesia, C. Political Impacts of the Social Facts No. 17 (April), Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, for Radical Islam in Solo 1974, pp. 104-105. Political and social climate of the post- 21 Further on this account, see Noto Soeroto, Pro New Order era have given rise of some Swapraja, Mataram, Solo, 1950, pp. 24-25. Islamic activisms. Many groups of Soedarmono and Muh. Amin, Solusi Konflik Pribumi dan non-Pribumi di Kota Solo. Laporan Muslims responded differently to the Penelitian Dosen Muda at UNS, 2002, p. 1. opportunity. In general, however, in 22 Tempo, 06 September 2004 on more open political atmosphere the www.tempointeraktif.com (Accessed 20 demand of more formalistic Islam would September 2007); Seputar Indonesia, 03 September surface since conservative Muslim 2007.

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Social Justice groups would have more mass supports curbed during the regime were and political resources. In the national also suppressed during the first 25 years context, there are at least three features of the Suharto regime. Undeniably, there appeared in such scene, (1) the were many conflicts between Islam and establishment of a number of Islamic the state during this period which political parties that mostly adopted brought about the marginalization of Islam as their basis instead of the Islam.23 To support the authoritarian Pancasila, (2) the increasing demand of state, Suharto gave certain limited people implementation of shark‘ah in some parts access to the natural resources of the of Indonesia, and (3) the emergence of state. The current complicated and vast some Islamic vigilante forces such as corruptions among the elite politicians Lasykar Jihad (Jihadi Troops), Front are among the way how Suharto Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender establishes his ‘kingdom’. It was such Front). Along with the emergence of behaviour which gave rise to the radical Islamic groups in Indonesia, the emergence of resistance movements city of Solo also witness the among the society. Horizontal conflicts distinctiveness of radical Islamists in the in the form of ethnic or religious conflicts region. were happened as part of the process of The dramatic changes from the democratization of Indonesia. Several New Order to the Reformation Era have structural conflicts were also occurred as changed political system of the state. part of their disappointment with the Although there is no exactly similar government which could not share some practice of democracy in the world, the natural resources equally with local democracy of Pancasila adopted by the governments or traditional leaders. New Order regime was flawed and ill- Apparently, it takes long time and described. In the name of ‘democracy’, painful prior to the birth of a new the state did not give much opportunity democracy a la Indonesia. for society to actively participate in The current democratization governing the state. In fact, the process of Indonesia has opened many democracy during the Suharto regime possibilities. Undeniably, the decline of was much alike with that of during the Suharto was worsened by the monetary Sukarno era, the guided democracy crisis of Southeast Asia. The inability of (demokrasi terpimpin), which is pseudo- the government to overcome the crisis democracy. Obviously, the which hit almost the entire society of democratization process of Indonesia is Indonesia has also worsened the meant to compose an imagined nation or legitimacy of the state among its citizens. nation-of-intent. Since the practice of Along with social and religious conflicts, democracy during both the Old and New there are also some groups of people Order could not accommodate all stake demanding the inclusion of Islam on the holders of the nations, many people felt governmental level such as the shark‘ah that their existence was not really ‘fever’ in various parts of Indonesia. On recognize by the state. Therefore, the the parliament, there was vicious debate nationhood of Indonesia is not a finished about the necessity of applying the process yet. Pancasila as stated in the Jakarta Charter. Many groups of people The long debate finally did not resolve disappointed with the nation- state of the problem. The economic problems Indonesia protested in many various and longing of society to such a good ways. The government, however, limited only for certain groups of people to have 23 Further on this issue, see Bachtiar Effendy, Islam access to politics. Muslims who had been and the Sate in Indonesia, ISEAS, Singapore, 2003.

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JISPO VOL. 1 Edisi: Januari-Juni Tahun 2013 governance attracted more groups of which obviously could be categorized as people to participate in forming better radical Islamism, i.e., (1) the emergence governmental system. Not only are of many various Islamic vigilante forces, many uneducated people involved in and (2) the emergence of new publishers politics, there are also many religious on Islamic activism. Unlike the leaders on the elite politics. Social and emergence of vigilante forces in other political problems finally led to the regions across Indonesia, there are at polarization of the society. The least 10 Islamic vigilante forces have inexistence of such a melting pot among emerged in the region. There are (1) the society has worsened the situation, Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (the beside also the absence of social and Surakarta Youth Muslim fRONT, FPIS), religious leaders as an adhesive for the (2) Laskar Hizbullah Sunan Bonang (the unity of the society. The emergence of party of Allah soldier of Sunan Bonang), Laskar JihSd and Front Pembela Islam in the (3) Laskar Jundullah (the soldier of Allah), beginning of the Reformation Era signed (4) Hawariyyun (the disciples), (5) Brigade the inability of the government to Hizbullah (the party of Allah Brigade), (6) overcome the socio-political problems of Barisan Bismillah (the Path of Bismillah), the country. (7) Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta (the In the context of Solo, the soldier of Surakarta Muslim, LUIS), (8) disappointment of the society toward the Al-Ishlah (the reform), (9) Gerakan Pemuda state has been reflected by many various Ka’bah (the Ka’bah Youth Movement, forms. In general, however, such GPK), and (10) Front Pembela Islam (the complicated socio-political situation has front of Islamic defender, FPI). Although given rise to the emergence of social the last two vigilante forces are only the radicalism. Among the social radicalism branches of those in Jakarta, the in the region is the emergence of many existence of eight other vigilante forces various forms of radical Islamism. In in Solo is a significant phenomenon of fact, some Islamists have already around radical Islamism in the region. since the early of the New Order regime Obviously, the above list does not and to some extent had shown their include the Jama‘ah Islamiyah (JI) since it radical activities. During the is a national phenomenon although Solo conduciveness of political system of the is central for the clandestine Reformation Era, some Islamists emerge organization. as a protest toward the state and also to Another feature of the rise of participate in the reconstruction of the radical Islamism in the region is also nationhood of Indonesia. Some people characterised by the emergence of some view that Islam is not merely as religion publishers on Islamic activism. In many but is also as a way of life including respects, Solo is just after Jakarta in term politics. Along with the socio-economic of its publishers on Islamism; various problems faced by lower level people, current publications on Islamic activism Islam is giving many promises which are mostly published either in Jakarta or would lead them to a better life. Solo. Out of other publishers on common Different from other regions teachings of Islam, there are at least nine which currently already adopted shark‘ah publishers on conservative Islamism as regional regulation (perda shark‘ah), including Islamic activism. There are (1) the Solonese Muslims articulate their Pustaka Al-‘Alaq, (2) Jazeera, (3) Era views on Islam distinctively. At least Intermedia, (4) Media Insani Press, (5) there are two features of the Pustaka Mantiq, (6) Arofah, (7) Aulia distinctiveness of the Solonese Muslims Press, (8) At-Tibyan and (9) An-Nadwah.

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Social Justice While the Pustaka Al-‘Alaq publishes a general. As radical Islamism, however, series book on jihSd of Abdullah Azzam, both could be said as successful radical the second publisher Jazeera is famous Islamism. While the Pondok Ngruki because it publishes the book of Imam could influence and attract abangans at its Samudera, Aku Melawan Teroris. In surrounding until it formed such an addition, it is also significant to add in ‘enclave’, the jama‘ah Gumuk is this category that there are also several successful in term of attracting abangan small companies producing cassettes and people to join to the exclusive Islamic compact disk (CDs) on radical Islamism teachings and also the FPIS as well as the such as cassettes on the preaching of Hawariyyˆn. Conclusively, although they Abdullah Sungkars and CDs on have some differences, they have many Afghanistan and Maluku/Ambon things in common as radical Islamism. battles. In addition, it is also worthwhile D. Concluding Remark to note that while Ikhwani activisms is Obviously, the nation-state of Indonesia flourishing among highly educated is on trial. Although Indonesia has people in Solo such as university achieved its independence since about 60 students, salafy pietism is also flourishing years ago, the notion of nationhood of among less educated people. In the one Indonesia is not finished yet. Rebellious hand, the first characteristic is common conflicts in several parts of Indonesia phenomenon in many cities in Indonesia apparently do not only split the unity of such as the abundant followers Kesatuan Indonesia, but also left the question on Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (United the nationhood of Indonesia. In fact, Action of Indonesian Muslim Students, there are some groups of people KAMMI) as the underbow of Partai dissatisfied with the nation-state of Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperity and Justice Indonesia especially due to economic Party) and also well accepted of Hizbut matters. Compared to some of its Tahrkr Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party counterparts in Southeast Asia, of Liberation, HTI) in many various Indonesia is left in many aspects in universities in Indonesia. On the other economics. Such this disappointment, hand, salafy pietism is broadly accepted finally, led to the eagerness of some among less educated and lower class groups of people to change the national people such as those of the Pondok identity. The classical problem such as Ngruki and jama‘ah Gumuk. However, the Jakarta Charter and the Pancasila as the salafism of both institutions is the state’s ideological foundation different from other salafy school in the resurfaced. Along with the split of East region. While some others tend to be Timor from Indonesian and also some purist salafy, the Pondok Ngruki and other potential conflicts’ regions such as jama‘ah Gumuk is salafy in term of its Aceh and Papua, some Islamists demand ideology. shark‘ah as the positive law. Some Finally, it is difficult to conclude Islamists view that shark‘ah is the ultimate that either of Islamic activisms, the solution for current endless social and Pondok Ngruki and jama‘ah Gumuk, is political problems of Indonesia. better than another. In fact, they are The inability of the government different in many respects since they are to deal with current socio-political different type of Islamic activism. problems is due to the complexity of the Although they could be categorized as problems. The problems do not only lie salafy, their salafism is different each other on the political level but also within the which also different from the society. It is the problems on the political mainstreaming salafy in Indonesia in level which finally led to the difficulties

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JISPO VOL. 1 Edisi: Januari-Juni Tahun 2013 of the government to deal with korupsi, disability of the government to deal with kolusi and nepotisme (corruption, religious conflicts such as in Ambon and collusion and nepotism, KKN). It was the Maluku. tough pressure of the New Order All the above forced some groups government toward Muslims which have of people to be involve in dealing with given rise to the breakdown of social the problems by conducting street structure of the society. For such politics as an alternative. The patriarchal society as Indonesian establishment of many vigilante forces is especially Javanese, the legacy of chosen by some groups of people as the traditional social status or social most suitable solution to address the hierarchy is necessary to maintain the problems. With this power, these groups social system within the society. of people conducting demonstrations in Therefore, the existence of religious and the street protesting government’s traditional leaders is absolutely needed policies and raiding cafés, hotels and for Indonesian society especially to other entertainment places as done by interpret new and modern values into the FPI in Jakarta and the FPIS in Solo. the society. In the context of Reformation Even more, several vigilante forces in Era, such cultural brokers as traditional Solo conducted ‘sweeping’ of Westerners leaders and ulamas are needed to sustain in the city. The ‘sweeping’ was social exchange within the society. conducted as their attempt to protest the Otherwise, in the era which permit any interference of US to Indonesia’s politics possibilities, people would loose their and also the invasion of US to Iraq in control and do whatever they want as a 2002. In many cases, some vigilante political euphoria. forces even cooperated with the Obviously, the government is authorities to conduct raids etc. Some powerless to handle the complex leaders of the vigilante forces argue that problems faced by Indonesia. The their attitude is to impose the realization disappointment of society toward the of some regional regulation (peraturan government has brought about their daerah, perda) such as on drunken distrust toward the government. The beverages (minuman keras). In general, disappointment finally led to they see that their attitude is still on the questioning on the nationhood of ordinary manner since they do not use Indonesia and the possibility of another violence as their attitude. identity to overcome the problems. In Besides, these groups see the addition, the weak of the government is necessity of another social system which deteriorated by its powerless to impose could be an ultimate solution for their some positive laws into the society. problems. They see Islam as a Endless monetary crisis hit Southeast comprehensive religion which does not Asia and Indonesian in particular only regulate worship to Allah but also deteriorate the legitimacy of the as a social system. Along with the Majelis government among society. All the Islam Indonesia (MMI), some of the above have given rise to the breakdown vigilante forces also utterly summon the of some laws among the society. In the necessity of shark‘ah and jihSd in order to context of Solo and also some other cities compose ummah (Muslim society). generally, the most obvious breaking of Currently, the notion of shark‘ah is law is the disobedience of some cafés accepted well among the society rather and restaurants to be closed down than the concept of negara Islam (Islamic during the fasting month (ramadhan). State) which were did not responded This situation was worsened by the positively among the society. Although

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Social Justice at its minimum fashion, each of these powerful Islamic organizations such as groups are trying to impose shark‘ah the MTA which has enormous members among their own limited group or in Solo in particular and the ex-residency enclave. By reinforcing shark‘ah, they are of Surakarta in general. trying to alter national identity to be On the emergence of many more religious. Each of these radical Islamic vigilante forces in Solo, I tend to Islamic organization, however, has its say that it has to do with the habitus of own way to implement shark‘ah. In the the Solonese. While the socio-political context of Solo, however, Abu Bakar deprivation on the Solonese is the habitus Ba'asyir’s demand on the regional and historical precedence is the capital, regulation (perda) based on shark‘ah, for the political conduciveness in the field on example, was not responded positively Bourdieu’s theory of habitus. Since the by many other Islamic organizations in early history of Solo, such radical Solo. The jama‘ah Gumuk see that it is not response of Muslims toward socio- the precise time to impose shark‘ah since political problem is becoming part of the the society is not ready yet. It fears that Solonese culture. The emergence of the the notion of shark‘ah would even rejected vigilante forces of the Tentara Kanjeng by Muslim communities, even more the Nabi Muhammad (Army of the Lord Khilafah Islamiyah which still burred Prophet Muhammad, TKNM) and Sidiq among radical Islamists. Tabligh Amanah and Vatonah (to confirm, The emergence of some radical convey, and propagate goodness, SATV) Islamic organizations, however, is not during the early of the 20th century was inline with the acceptance of the such a precedence for the Solonese Solonese of the notion of shark‘ah. In fact, Muslims to response any violating issues the phenomenon of abundant vigilante on Islam. Radical responses of the forces and the acceptance of Pondok Solonese to the autonomous government Ngruki among abangan is only trivial during the early of the Old Order period phenomenon and not mainstreaming yet was also part of the habitus of the among abangan Solonese. In other words, Solonese. In general, I would argue that the limited acceptance of the notion of radical activism either violence or not Islamism among the Solonese is due has become part of the habitus of the mostly to the inability of some leaders of Solonese. The radical responses of the Islamism to frame the current social Solonese toward the dramatic changes of problems. Unlike the Sarekat Islam (SI) in the political system in 1998 were among the early 20th century which was the phenomenon of this habitus. mainstreaming in the society, the notion Finally, I would argue that the of shark‘ah is only accepted among certain emergence of such radical Islamism in levels of abangan communities. In this Solo is due mostly to the failure regard, I tend to say that the propaganda relationship between santri and abangan. of Islamists does not touch the heart It is obvious that most radical Islamic problems of the society yet. Undeniably, activisms are well-accepted among lower therefore that although there are many level abangan, although this trend is not radical Islamic organizations in Solo, the mainstreaming. The indifference of the demand on the perda shark‘ah is not Solonese Muslims to the regional responded positively by the Solonese regulation (perda) of shark‘ah and Muslims. In addition, this occurance is Islamism in general sign that there are also due partly to the various colour of various levels of abangan in the region. Islam in the region. Although such At least there are two kinds of abangan in radical Islamic vigilante forces are the region, i.e., those attached to abundant in Solo, there are several other Javanese syncretism and those attached

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JISPO VOL. 1 Edisi: Januari-Juni Tahun 2013 to communism. For those attached to Lombard, Dennys, Nusa Jawa: Silang Javanese syncretism, it is easier for them Budaya. Kajian Sejarah Terpadu to convert to be Islamists, while those Bagian II: Jaringan Asian. previously communists tend to convert Jakarta:Gramedia, 1996, p. 357. to Christianity as their religion for their Mandal, Sumit K., Finding their place: a own safety. Meanwhile, the Solonese history of Arabs in Java under Dutch Muslims who were previously on the rule, 1800-1924. PhD thesis at category of santri nowadays could accept Columbia University, 1994. modernity easily. The widely spread of Purdey, Jemma “The 'other' May riots: radical Islamism in the region is due anti-Chinese violence in Solo, mostly to the failure of santri to involve May 1998” in Charles A. Coppel, abangan in their mainstream. Finally, it is Violent conflicts in Indonesia: difficult to say which school of Islam is analysis, representation, resolution, mainstreaming in the region since all Routledge, New York, 2006. schools of Islam, traditional, moderate Rawls, John, ‘Justice as fairness political and conservative has its own vast not metaphysical’ Philosophy and communities in the region. Public Affairs 14 (1985). Ricklefs, M.C., Yogyakarta di Bawah Sultan Bibliography Mangkubumi 1749-1792: Sejarah Al-Gadri, Hamid, Politik Belanda terhadap Pembagian Jawa, Matabangsa, Islam dan keturunan Arab di Yogyakarta, 2002. Indonesia, CV Masagung, Jakarta, Roy, Olivier, Globalised Islam: the search 1988. for a new ummah, Hurst & Barber, Benjamin, The Conquest of Politic Company, London, 2004. Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Rustopo, Menjadi Jawa: Orang-orang Times(Princeton, NJ, Princeton Tionghoa dan kebudayaan Jawa di University Press, 1988). Surakarta, 1895-1998, Penerbit Carey, Peter, “Changing Javanese Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2007. Perceptions of the Chinese Seputar Indonesia, 03 September 2007. Communities in Central Java, Setiaji, Bram (et. Al.), Raja di Alam 1755-1825,” in Indonesia, Vol. 37, Republik: keraton Kasunanan 1984. Surakarta dan Pakubuwono XII, PT Cribb, Robert, “Criminality, Violence Bina Rena Pariwara, Jakarta , and Chinese in the 2000. Decolonization of Indonesia, Soedarmono and Amin, Muh., Solusi 1930-1960.” Paper presented for Konflik Pribumi dan non-Pribumi di International Conference, Kota Solo. Laporan Penelitian Dekolonisasi dan Posisi Etnis Dosen Muda at UNS, 2002. Tionghoa Indonesia 1930-1960. Soejatno, “Revolution and social tensions Padang, 18-21 2006. in Surakarta 1905-1950,” in Effendy, Bachtiar, Islam and the Sate in Indonesia, No. 17 (April), Cornell Indonesia, ISEAS, Singapore, 2003. Modern Indonesia Project, 1974. Kukathas, C. dan Pettit, P., Rawls: A Soeroto, Noto, Pro Swapraja, Mataram, Theory of Justice and its Critics Solo, 1950. (Oxford, Polity, 1990). Suryadinata, Leo, Pribumi, Indonesians, Kuntowijoyo, Raja, Priyayi & Kawulo: the Chinese minority and China: A Surakarta 1900-1915, Penerbit study of perceptions and policies, Ombak, Yogyakarta, 2004. Marshall Cavendish Academic, Singapore, 2005.

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Social Justice Tempo, 06 September 2004 on www.tempointeraktif.com (Accessed 20 September 2007). van den Berg, L.W.C., Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara, INIS, Jakarta, 1989. Wolff, Jonathan, An Introduction to Practical Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996).

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