CTC Sentinel Objective

february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents A Beacon for Extremists:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 A Beacon for Extremists: The Ansar al-Mujahideen The Ansar al-Mujahideen Web Forum By Evan Kohlmann Web Forum By Evan Kohlmann Reports 5 Al-Qa`ida and Hamas: The Limits of Salafi-Jihadi Pragmatism By Mary Habeck 8 Lebanon at Risk from Salafi-Jihadi Terrorist Cells By Bilal Y. Saab 11 The Changing Scene in Londonistan By Raffaello Pantucci 13 Political Islam in Central Asia: The Role of Hizb al-Tahrir By Emmanuel Karagiannis 16 How Terrorist Groups End By Leonard Weinberg and Arie Perliger

18 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 20 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

uring the last decade, a terrorists have taken to the internet in virtual revolution has quietly force, employing jihadist-themed social taken place in the world networking forums as a new base for of international terrorism. propaganda, communication, and even DThe traditional hubs of logistical recruitment. It was only in retrospect, activity—radical mosques, bookstores years after this phenomenon began, that and guesthouses—have been strictly governments recognized the degree to monitored by law enforcement and which al-Qaìda’s leadership was aware of intelligence agencies. As a result, in a the existence of these social networking strategy pioneered by eager cyber-savvy forums—and the extent of their interest youth such as London resident Younis in using them to harness the power of the About the CTC Sentinel Tsouli (known as “Irhabi 007”),1 aspiring web. The Combating Terrorism Center is an independent educational and research Although official scrutiny initially institution based in the Department of Social 1 In July 2007, Younis Tsouli and two co-defendants pled focused on Arabic-language websites Sciences at the United States Military Academy, guilty to charges filed by British prosecutors accusing with clear connections to al-Qaìda, West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses them of “inciting another person to commit an act of ter- recent events have forced a reappraisal of the Center’s global network of scholars and rorism wholly or partly outside the UK contrary to Section this relatively limited approach. Whether practitioners to understand and confront 59(1) Terrorism Act 2000.” The charges stemmed from, it is Fort Hood shooter Major Nidal contemporary threats posed by terrorism and among other activities, Tsouli’s high-profile online role as Malik Hasan’s passion for the English- other forms of political violence. the internet media coordinator for al-Qaìda in Iraq. Part language blog of Yemeni-American cleric of this mission included using web social networking fo- Anwar al-Àwlaqi, or conversely the rums to help link up prospective jihadist recruits with al- online ramblings of the failed Christmas The views expressed in this report are those of Qaìda contacts based in Damascus, Syria. For more, see Day airline bomber Umar Farouk the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, “Three Men Admit to Using Internet to Incite Terrorism the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. in First British Case,” United Kingdom Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), press release, July 5, 2007.

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Abdulmutallab,2 it is increasingly women dedicate countless hours of its creation. “I am one of those so-called second- and third-tier extremist their own personal time—often with ‘New Muslims,’” wrote Abu Omar al- social networking forums managed little reward or acknowledgement—to Maqdisi. by unaffiliated fringe activists—many translating and redistributing jihadist of them offering dedicated English- propaganda and instructional materials, For years of my life I was living language chat rooms—that appear to promoting the mission of al-Qaìda, and in ignorance and God guided play pivotal roles in the indoctrination establishing new online sanctuaries for me so I gave myself to Him after and radicalization of some of today’s jihadist activists. I understood the meaning of most notorious aspiring terrorists. This how God graces and puts faith is a significant shift that has yet to be As a result of the tireless efforts of its in someone’s heart, and since I fully understood, as it could herald in a administrators, in less than two full years originally work in the media, I new generation of English-speaking or of operation the Ansar al-Mujahideen thought about starting some work Westernized violent extremists. Arabic-language forum has accumulated for the victory of the mujahidin... 3,784 registered users, 13,845 All that we want is the glory of Indeed, while certain discussion forums discussion threads, and nearly 57,000 this religion, and to encourage receive substantial endorsements and individual message posts.3 Beyond the believers to fight, and to patronage directly from al-Qaìda, many these already impressive numbers, spend money and offer victorious others are the product of independent Ansar al-Mujahideen administrators words for the mujahidin…We efforts by loyal, web-savvy grassroots enjoyed further viral success upon were ordinary members at the supporters who simply possess an the launch of mirrored Ansar forums al-Ekhlaas forum and we learned overflowing passion for Usama bin dedicated exclusively to English- and a lot from the brothers who took Ladin and the subculture of jihad. German-language users. Unveiled charge of jihadi media work before Occasionally, this self-selecting form of months after the Arabic parent site was us—and it is only normal for us to internet-based terrorism can become so already active and open for business, start our own active campaign at significant as to arguably even rival that its English-language Ansar cousin has the first chance we got. And that’s which has been blessed by al-Qaìda rapidly closed the distance, amassing what we did, so we established this itself. These websites may not rank nearly 15,000 threads and 60,000 site, and told everyone we knew at the top of the conventional online individual message posts. As such, the from the al-Ekhlaas network about jihadist hierarchy, but understanding multi-layered Ansar al-Mujahideen this forum…We went outside the the methodology and mindset of the network has become a key beacon for usual jihadi media route, but we idealistic web entrepreneurs behind lone wolf extremists originating from terrorize in the real world as much the forums has nonetheless become a wide array of communities, including as we terrorize online, so whoever essential in countering a new wave Asia, the Middle East, Western Europe, wishes to join is welcome, and of international terrorism—both the and North America. those who don’t should hold their organized and disorganized variety. tongues about us and go away. Yet, the somewhat amateurish origins of And although low in number, we This sobering lesson is clearly reflected the Ansar al-Mujahideen network have are strong in determination, and in the brief yet meteoric rise of one also become an unwitting Achilles heel. anyone who joins us will realize contemporary jihadist discussion forum During their path to success, the forum’s that immediately.4 in particular: the Ansar al-Mujahideen administrators made a litany of costly website. The website began in 2008 as a software installation errors, allowing The ruffling of Abu Omar’s feathers came rather low-frills, Arabic-language clone outsiders brief access to the website’s amid a torrent of online gossip in late forum with questionable credibility user database. Along with various 2008 concerning the trustworthiness and a membership of mostly silent Internet Protocol (IP) addresses—and of the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum, observers. Today, however, the Ansar much heated invective and rhetoric—the and rumors that the al-Fajr Media al-Mujahideen forum has blossomed data stored in the forum offers a clear Center—the official group responsible into a prolific, multi-language picture of how Ansar al-Mujahideen was for media distribution and other online enterprise with an enviable following of created, and what purpose it serves in logistical tasks on behalf of al-Qaìda— skilled and highly-motivated English- the greater context of terrorist activity was questioning its legitimacy.5 Abu speaking members. These men and on the internet. Omar haughtily rejected these charges and the perceived backstabbing by 2 Under the username “Farouk1986,” Umar Farouk The Rise of the Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum the “snobs” at al-Fajr: “None of us is Abdulmutallab posted scores of messages to at least one Created in 2008, Ansar al-Mujahideen more privileged than any other, except third-tier English-language Islamic forum, the “Gawaher was established by a group of “ordinary through his zeal for his religion and Network,” in 2005 and 2006. The postings included ex- members” from the well-known al- supporting the mujahidin. Our work 6 pressions of sympathy for the Guantanamo Bay detain- Ekhlaas forum. In a private retort sent to serves as testament to our credibility.” ees, anger at the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, an online critic of Ansar al-Mujahideen, descriptions of travel to Yemen, and his lamentations the self-declared “Media Amir” of the about leading the life of a solitary bachelor. For details, forum, Abu Omar al-Maqdisi, explained 4 This quote was available at www.as-ansar.com/vb/pri- see Philip Rucker and Julie Tate, “In Online Posts Ap- vate.php?do=showpm&pmid=502. parently by Detroit Subject, Religious Ideals Collide,” 3 This information, drawn from www.as-ansar.com/vb, 5 Ibid. Washington Post, December 29, 2009. was accurate as of February 2010. 6 Ibid.

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He admitted, attempts at website maintenance, an youths in West to awake and take English-speaking deputy administrator the path of glory-jihad. Our forum maybe some of my productions nicknamed “Insurgent” explained to should do the maximum it can, to have some basic mistakes…but that up-and-coming forum contributor achieve this…i hope by the grace doesn’t mean I am on an untruthful “Terrorist 001” that of allah we can bring the english path…We are located in al-Ansar forum to a better position and room on PalTalk alongside the we need a lot of brothers who are thus providing a great service to jihadi Shaykh Abu Abdulrahman, ready to do something fi sabielellah, the mujahideen in spreading their may Allah protect him, one of and of course you can look out words, and making the audience the commanders in Somalia—so for more brothers who can cut aware of what is happeining [sic] why would he trust us and allow videos and audio too. We need to in the ongoing global jihad.11 us to record and broadcast his develop our skills and this cannot interview? We also have brothers be achieved when every one of us These sentiments square neatly with the from the Islamic State of Iraq, working alone, no discussions, no ever increasing demand by al-Qaìda Chechnya, and Dagestan.7 ideas…We need to adopt the way and its global affiliates for Westernized of thinking of our enemies and we operatives who defy traditional Abu Omar professed his growing need each other to strengthen each stereotypes and are capable of evading “boredom” with online “work” and his other…our mission is very long heightened security measures. desire “to join the battlefields to fight and dangerous…It’s not just about with my weapon, and with my camera copying and pasting…we need to To put their plan into action, Ansar and computer so I ask God to grace us. develop our media skills, produce al-Mujahideen administrators such as All I want now is a strong and solid media more videos and audio releases “Insurgent” and Abu Omar al-Maqdisi network operating at an elite level in order in arabic and also in english, and began to systematically identify to terrorize our enemies and uncover the other languages if it possible. and recruit individuals within their truth.”8 Abu Omar further scoffed: Doing this is gonna improve the immediate social network to help quality and the professionality contribute in spreading the word of Why have the brothers become [sic] of the brothers and sisters jihad in alternative languages. Abu scared of their own shadows? If and you know very well how Omar sent a private message over the you really perceive yourself to be important media is.10 forum to one such user, inviting him to in danger here [on the Ansar al- support the mission: Mujahideen forum] according to His statement reflects the what these brothers have told you, decentralization of online jihadist Dear brother, i guess i know you then don’t come in here again…We propaganda. It is also evidence from several jihadi forums and i don’t need you or anyone else… of the continued attraction of al- realized your activity to support just ask the brothers at the al- Qaìda’s narrative, and the efforts of our brothers on jihad fronts and Tahadi forum to vouch for us…I propagandists to influence Muslims therefore I am inviting you to join say, if any of the brothers at al- living in Western countries. me on the chat program…to discuss Fajr Media wishes to receive with you the responsibility of the assurances about us and if you are Providing Propaganda in Multiple Languages english german section on our in communication with them, then The Ansar al-Mujahideen forum forum, if you are ready to make inform them that we would like administrators have recognized more differences in this important to meet with them. We ask them to the utility of providing jihadist historical time which we are living come here and distribute a bulletin propaganda in multiple languages. In in. I am waiting for you now if outlining the action plan for the al- his own messages to other users, the you are ready. We speak arabic, Ansar network—and we are willing administrator known as “Insurgent” english, spanish, german.12 to blow ourselves up near the repeatedly emphasized the importance infidels at any moment, and if they of making hardcore al-Qaìda content The “work” that Abu Omar al- have enough resources to provide available to English-speaking Muslims: Maqdisi spoke of extended far beyond us with the necessary financing, merely translating Arabic-language then a terrorist is ready.9 i think a very important problem propaganda. When Abu Omar expressed our english readers today have is, his desire to identify potential volunteers Indeed, rather than turn to al-Qaìda lack of english subtitled videos and willing to create advertising banners for essential guidance and support, the if we make subtitles to important and promotional material for the Ansar Ansar al-Mujahideen administrators videos, that will be a great help to al-Mujahideen forum, his aide-de-camp relied on the pooled volunteer efforts the mujahideen, by spreading their “Insurgent” suggested, “i know a sister of their membership and each other. words to the West. mujahideen in another forum who is capable in During another private chat accidentally releases more deserved to be graphic designing. but i have to contact revealed to the world during fumbling watched by the West than arabs… it will help the muslims [sic] 11 This quote was available at www.as-ansar.com/vb/ 7 Ibid. private.php?do=showpm&pmid=62. 8 Ibid. 10 This quote was available at www.as-ansar.com/vb/ 12 This quote was available at www.as-ansar.com/vb/ 9 Ibid. private.php?do=showpm&pmid=121. private.php?do=showpm&pmid=15.

3 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 her through the administration of that Beyond the formal activities being speak about this issue, and Allah forum.”13 As promised, “Insurgent” sent organized by administrators, the murky knows that I am being honest.20 a message to the “sister” asking her for sanctuaries afforded by the private help, effusing, “im really very happy chat rooms on the Ansar al-Mujahideen Implications that you came forward to help us. May forum have also been used by seemingly The covert activities taking place allah reward you greatly for that…Good ordinary users to craft their own behind the scenes on the Ansar al- luck in your studies.”14 elaborate plans and plots. Two such Mujahideen forum reveal important users—a Moroccan and a resident of lessons about how terrorists are Offering Assistance and Facilitating Jihad Saudi Arabia—became enmeshed in a actually using the internet, and how the Abu Omar al-Maqdisi has also identified deep discussion of how best to travel to growing phenomenon of decentralized, emerging opportunities to work with nearby Somalia and join the emerging self-selecting “homegrown” terrorism nascent mujahidin organizations in the al-Shabab movement. “Nasruddin at- has found such a resilient base for itself field that lack established ties to major Tamimi” wrote to “Abu Aeisha,” “My on the web. Even now, some analysts pre-existing online jihadist logistics dear brother, I used to think you were continue to treat the denizens of Ansar groups (such as the al-Fajr Media Center from Somalia, and I ask you to contact al-Mujahideen and other similar online or the Global Islamic Media Front). In the brothers and make sure about the “troll factories” as nothing more than this sense, Abu Omar envisions Ansar journey.”18 Abu Aeisha replied: useless “armchair jihadists.” al-Mujahideen not merely as a fixed online discussion forum, but as a multi- I can arrange with one of the It is dangerous, however, to write off tiered rival to al-Fajr and the GIMF in brothers, but I don’t know this the threat posed by members of the the competitive jihadist media market. brother well, and I don’t want Ansar al-Mujahideen forum. While He contacted a representative of a to throw away what I have here their language and approach may seem fringe Palestinian militant faction in without some assurances and immature, and even juvenile at times, Gaza known as “Jaish al-Ummah” and reliability, and I am in nature very the often unsung accomplishments of the reported back that “they are in need of careful dealing with the security administrators and users are beginning support to produce their productions, aspect, and I don’t speak about to have a measurable impact in terms and they ask us for this.”15 Abu Omar these issues until I am certain. But of promoting terrorism and terrorist forwarded an excerpt from their formal with you, despite the fact that I organizations—and these young men request to other forum administrators: haven’t known you for more than a and women have repeatedly declared “Brothers, we ask you to prepare an month or so, my heart feels warmth their intention to carry their mission introductory segment for our films, and a towards you, and I ask Allah to into the real world. Their postings echo conclusion…while leaving suitable space group me with you in the highest precisely the same language of Jordanian in the introduction to write on it the name ranks of paradise. Brother, just as a doctor Humam al-Balawi (also known of each new operation we undertake.”16 reminder, I know one of the Somali as Abu Dujana al-Khurasani), who was brothers who I met in another once a prominent online “jihobbyist”21 The various endeavors undertaken country, and this brother resides in and was likewise written off as an by Abu Omar and other Ansar al- the city of Medina—can he transport eccentric until he blew himself up at Mujahideen administrators appear to be the brothers to Somalia! And since a Central Intelligence Agency base in bearing fruit and gaining momentum. you are a resident in Medina, I’ll southeastern Afghanistan at the behest An official communiqué distributed by send you the brother’s name and his of the Pakistani Taliban. the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the description so you can ask him for Afghan Taliban) on October 7, 2009 his phone number, and so I can call Certainly, the fringe threats flourishing identified the Ansar al-Mujahideen him, and Inshallah he will assist on jihadist web forums may seem a bit website as one of only three online us.19 overly ambitious and theatrical, but in discussion forums recommended as the wake of recent troubling incidents, suitable venues to obtain the latest Abu Aeisha added, such as the suicide attack by Humam al- statements and video from the Afghan Balawi and the Ft. Hood massacre, they mujahidin.17 It may not have been an I give you another piece of cannot be taken lightly. official endorsement, but it was a clear information, that I am from recognition of how high the star of Morocco, meaning from Africa, Evan Kohlmann is a co-founder and senior Ansar al-Mujahideen has risen, despite and the distance between me and consultant with Flashpoint Global Partners. its rather humble origins. Somalia isn’t easy. I had prepared Mr. Kohlmann holds a B.S.F.S. from the for this once before with another School of Foreign Service at Georgetown brother, but Allah eased our fate. University, and a J.D. from the University 13 This quote was available at www.as-ansar.com/vb/ Yes, we have adopted the methods of Pennsylvania Law School. He currently private.php?do=showpm&pmid=74. of high technology, and I ask of works as a terrorism analyst for the NEFA 14 Ibid. you brother for your address on Foundation and NBC News. 15 This quote was available at www.as-ansar.com/vb/ [Instant] Messenger so we can private.php?do=showpm&pmid=166. 20 This quote was available at www.as-ansar.com/vb/ 16 Ibid. 18 This quote was available at www.as-ansar.com/vb/ private.php?do=showpm&pmid=411. 17 This was posted on www.alfalojaweb.info/vb/ private.php?do=showpm&pmid=391. 21 “Jihobbyist” is a term coined by counterterrorism ana- showthread.php?t=87055 on October 7, 2009. 19 Ibid. lyst Jarret Brachman.

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Al-Qaìda and Hamas: al-Qaìda does not want to cooperate disavowal), and Islamic land. In al- with “moderate” Muslims who are Qaìda’s view, the leadership of Hamas The Limits of Salafi-Jihadi willing to use the electoral process to violated these unchanging constants, Pragmatism create a state—a statement that seems took itself outside the religion of Islam, reasonable, given the timing of the split. and therefore could no longer expect By Mary Habeck A further explanation for the tensions help from other Salafi-jihadis. between al-Qaìda and Hamas, however, in 2006, the salafi-jihadi world was is necessary.5 Tawhid rocked by a surprising controversy: al- After Hamas won a decisive victory Qaìda’s second-in-command, Ayman al- Understanding the reason for the in the January 2006 elections for the Zawahiri, issued a rebuke to Hamas for conflict from al-Qaìda’s perspective has Palestinian Legislative Council, al- participating in the secular government implications for determining possible Qaìda abruptly changed its earlier in Palestine. By the end of 2007, after 12 future actions by its followers. The supportive messages for the group.6 separate statements criticizing Hamas, leaders of al-Qaìda rejected an obvious In early March, al-Zawahiri issued a Usama bin Ladin announced that Hamas ally for their jihad in Hamas, showing stern warning to the Hamas leadership, had “lost its religion,” a declaration that the limits of cooperation between al- cautioning them that taking power was mirrored in combat between Salafi- Qaìda and other ideologically similar was only valid when it was used to jihadi militants aligned with al-Qaìda groups. Al-Qaìda also criticized the establish God’s rule on earth through and Hamas fighters on the streets of pathway to power taken by Hamas— implementing Sharià (Islamic law). Gaza.1 During the next two years, both participation in an electoral process. Any other form of government would be the war of words and physical clashes Al-Qaìda reaffirmed its commitment a different religion.7 Bin Ladin reiterated expanded until the conflict culminated the warning a month later, supporting in a gun battle over a Gaza mosque in “Al-Qaìda and other the objectives of Hamas while stating July 2009. Although Hamas defeated that it was impermissible to participate their al-Qaìda-affiliated, Salafi-jihadi Salafi-jihadi groups hold in “polytheistic councils.”8 In December, rivals, some observers believe that this a few core principles al-Zawahiri’s tone was more combative, was only the first round in an ongoing bluntly asserting that Hamas should war. upon which they will not never have participated in the elections compromise even if a more at all as long as there was a secular, There are multiple explanations for the rather than Islamic, constitution in friction between Hamas and al-Qaìda. pragmatic course promises Palestine.9 In March 2007, al-Zawahiri The fact that al-Qaìda and its Salafi- to lead to success.” declared that the Hamas leadership, in jihadi followers are independent from signing the Mecca agreement, was now Hamas’ control and have attempted to lost; “doctrinal deviation,” he said, “has subsume the Palestinian question might facilitated behavioral deviation.”10 be enough to explain the conflict.2 to fighting and stated through its It is also possible that the conflict is actions that it is not amenable to a The abrupt change in al-Qaìda’s view between al-Qaìda’s vision of a global more peaceful and stealthier method for of Hamas is striking and tied explicitly jihad versus Hamas’ local jihad.3 seizing control of a region or country. to the participation of the Palestinian This seems a possible explanation for The incident shows, in fact, that al- group in the elections. Yet what was it Hamas’ actions, but too weak to explain Qaìda and other Salafi-jihadi groups about the elections that caused so much why the conflict was started by al- hold a few core principles upon which consternation on the part of al-Qaìda’s Qaìda-inspired groups.4 It may be that they will not compromise even if a more leaders? Al-Zawahiri was quite clear pragmatic course promises to lead to in his first statement that the failure 1 Usama bin Ladin, “The Way to Contain the Conspira- success. of Hamas to apply Sharià, one of the cies,” al-Sahab, December 2007. 2 Yet the Hamas leadership did not initially confront the A study of the fundamentals of al- 6 See, for example, Khalid al-Hamadi, “Interview with global Salafi-jihadis active in Gaza and in fact allowed the Qaìda’s faith might help policymakers Nasir Ahmad Nasir Abdallah al-Bahri (Abu-Jandal): group to grow for some time—perhaps as long as three better understand when the group is Part Eight,” al-Quds al-Arabi, March 26, 2005; “State- years—before taking decisive action. See “Abbas Says al likely to take a stand upon principle ment From Al Qaida On The Martyrdom Of Shaykh Qaeda in Gaza,” Washington Times, March 2, 2006; Ali rather than take the realist route that Yasin,” www.jihadunspun.com, March 24, 2004; “Full Waked, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Burns Coffee Shop in Gaza outsiders might predict. The clash with Text: ‘Bin Laden Tape,’” BBC, April 15, 2004. Strip,” Israel News, October 8, 2006. Hamas has been so intense because it 7 “Al-Zawahiri Urges Hamas to Ignore Deals With Is- 3 Kim Cragin, “Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions is based on al-Qaìda’s commitment to rael,” al-Jazira, March 4, 2006. in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its Implications for not one, but four key elements: tawhid, 8 Usama bin Ladin, “Oh People of Islam,” al-Sahab, U.S. Policy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32:7 (2009): jihad, al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and April 2006. pp. 576-590, has a sophisticated discussion of the con- 9 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Realities of the Conflict Between flict. Cragin concludes that al-Qaìda’s ideological com- Ladin, and Abu Ùmar al-Baghdadi, see www.nefafoun- Islam and Unbelief,” al-Sahab, December 2006. mitments to global jihad and against democracy explain dation.org/miscellaneous/nefaabuabdullah0609.pdf. 10 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Palestine is Our Business and the conflict, although she does not delve into from where 5 Jake Lipton, “The War of Words between Hamas and the Business of Every Muslim,” audio statement, March these two commitments spring. al-Qaeda,” The Washington Institute for Near East Pol- 11, 2007. See also “Interview with Shaykh Ayman al- 4 For this claim of a relationship with Mullah Omar, Bin icy, June 28, 2007. Zawahiri,” al-Sahab, May 5, 2007.

5 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 pillars of tawhid according to the àqida Jihad al-Qaìda’s messages to Hamas is that (tenets of belief) of Salafi-jihadis, meant Al-Qaìda’s conclusion that Hamas had the fight in Palestine is the business that they were no longer following the abandoned tawhid was but one of the of the entire Islamic community, not religion of Islam. Within the context of charges leveled against the group. From the prerogative of one group, and that al-Qaìda’s particular interpretation of the time of the election, al-Zawahiri and Hamas needs to carry out the jihad with the religion, known as Salafi-jihadism, other al-Qaìda leaders also warned all honest fighters (including al-Qaìda it is entirely consistent. Hamas not to succumb to U.S. pressure fighters).19 Hamas should not, as al- to stop violent resistance against Israel. Zawahiri said, isolate the mujahidin Tawhid, the belief that there is only one God There were two reasons provided for inside from the mujahidin outside.20 and He alone should be worshipped, is continuing the armed struggle. First, There should be one battle, with all the the core of Islam.11 Salafi-jihadis believe al-Zawahiri warned that “every way mujahidin fighting as one community, a correct adherence to the principle of other than jihad will only lead us to under one religion, and against one tawhid includes a literal obedience to all loss and failure,” since attempting to enemy.21 More practically, jihad in laws ordered upon man in the Qur’an free any place occupied by the infidels Afghanistan, Iraq and other theaters and sunna. To rule by anything other through elections would never liberate was jihad for Palestine, and if Hamas than what Allah has revealed, they so even “one grain of sand,” but would limited the war to its small region, the frequently argue, is an act of apostasy. simply smother the jihad and keep out enemy would surround and cut them Only God is sovereign and only He can the mujahidin.16 Far more importantly, off.22 legislate or make laws. Following this he quoted Àbdullah Àzzam to show line of reasoning, democracy is a foreign that jihad had been commanded by God Al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ religion and a form of polytheism. Any and was an individual duty on every The vision of a global jihad was Muslim who supports or engages in Muslim in places such as Palestine that related to the third principle that the democracy, including elections under were occupied by the unbelievers.17 Hamas leadership had abandoned: an a democratic system, has therefore left allegiance to other Palestinians above true tawhid and become an apostate.12 Al-Zawahiri’s use of the term “individual the overall Muslim community. Al- duty” is exceptionally important, since Qaìda leaders and allied clergy have It is only through the lens of this Salafi-jihadis believe that there are written extensively against nationalism, ideological commitment that the two forms of jihad: the “individual emphasizing that Muslims share a bond controversy in 2007 can be understood. duty” (fard àyn) and the “collective that is far more important than ethnic In June of that year, al-Zawahiri argued duty” (fard kifayya). An individual duty or national identity.23 This belief is that there were ideological constants in is a command from God, like the daily founded on a concept called al-wala’ wa’l- the current struggle and that the Hamas prayer, fasting, or giving charity, which bara’ (loyalty and disavowal), a term used leadership had crossed clear “red lines” each Muslim must carry out to avoid by Salafi-jihadis to describe the love that when it decided to abandon Sharià sinning. Collective duties, on the other a Muslim has for other Muslims and, and accept the rule of the majority hand, can be carried out by a small part conversely, the hatred and aversion for (democracy).13 Al-Qaìda operative of the community (such as a regular infidels that Muslims should display.24 Abu Yahya al-Libi’s condemnation of army) and the masses are therefore In practical terms, this principle means Hamas contrasted the infidel religion excused from participation. According that Muslims should only ally and of democracy with the true religion of to Salafi-jihadis, whenever the Islamic work with other Muslims, regardless of God, which was based on all sovereignty community is under attack or its land 14 belonging to Him. More pointedly, by occupied, it becomes an individual duty, 19 Abu Ùmar al-Baghdadi, “Message: The Religion Is participating in democratic processes, fard àyn, for every Muslim—men, women Advice,” audio statement, February 21, 2008. al-Qaìda operative Mustafa Abu’l- and children—to take up arms and fight 20 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Realities of the Conflict Between Yazid stated that the Hamas leadership jihad until its land is liberated. To refuse Islam and Unbelief,” al-Sahab, December 2006. had nullified their Islam and become to do so is at least a sin and might mean 21 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Malicious Britain and its Indian 15 18 infidels. that one is not even a Muslim at all. Slaves,” al-Sahab, July 2007. 22 “The West and the Dark Tunnel,” Part 2, al-Fajr Me- Al-Qaìda’s rejection of a peaceful dia Center and al-Sahab, September 22, 2009. 11 This is why the term is generally translated as “mono- solution for the Palestine-Israel conflict 23 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Video: The Correct Equation,” theism,” although this is a rather misleading rendition of is thus absolute, based on both practical al-Sahab, December 2006/January 2007; Ayman al- the word. A better translation would be “absolute one- and ideological reasons, as is their Zawahiri, “Tremendous Lessons and Events In the Year ness” [of God]. rejection of a limitation of the jihad to 1427 AH,” al-Sahab, February 2007; Sharià Council of 12 For the best explication of this view of tawhid, see that region alone. A constant theme in The Al-Qaìda Network in the Land of the Two Rivers, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, “Democracy – a Religion!” “Islam is Our Citizenship!” at-Tibyan Publications, unavailable at www.scribd.com/doc/18993155/Democracy- 16 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Realities of the Conflict Between dated; The Sharia Committee of Jaish Abu Bakr al-Siddiq a-Religion-Abu-Muhammad-alMaqdisi. Islam and Unbelief,” al-Sahab, December 2006. al-Salafi, “Nationalism and Jihad,” December 21, 2008, 13 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Forty Years Since the Fall of Je- 17 Al-Zawahiri, “Palestine is Our Business and the Busi- available at www.theunjustmedia.com. rusalem,” al-Sahab, June 25, 2007. ness of Every Muslim.” 24 Perhaps the first use of the term, and still one of the 14 Abu Yahya al-Libi, “Palestine, Warning Call and Cau- 18 See, for example, Àbdullah Àzzam, Defence of best explications of it, was by Muhammad Saeed al- tioning Cry,” al-Sahab, April 30, 2007. Muslim Lands. The First Obligation After Iman, especially Qahtani in his master’s thesis Al-Wala’ wa’l Bara’ (Lon- 15 “Interview with Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, General Offi- Chapter 3: Fard ‘Ayn and Fard Kifayya. This book is avail- don: al-Firdous Ltd, 1992). One of his advisers for the the- cial of al-Qa’ida in Khurasan,” al-Sahab, May 26, 2007. able at www.kalamullah.com/Books/defence.pdf. sis was Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb.

6 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 their national origin, while refusing to to the “Jews,” and taken away Palestine The Solution work with, ally with, or befriend non- from the Islamic community.29 The decision to confront Hamas was Muslims, even if they are part of one’s thus a natural conclusion given the family. The fundamental tenet that Hamas group’s rejection of these fundamental had violated, al-Qaìda argued, was principles. Throughout 2006 and 2007, In the context of the conflict with that no piece of land ever held by the al-Qaìda had a consistent message for Hamas, al-Qaìda argued that the group Muslim community—not even a grain of Hamas’ leadership: the only way to end should not put Palestinian interests sand—could be given to the infidels.30 the conflict was to return to true tawhid, above Islam or work with nationalist One might be tempted to equate this foreswear international agreements that groups such as Fatah, and it should belief with a view of Palestine accepted gave away Islamic land, take up jihad not forget that Hamas’ true friends and by Hamas—that Palestine is waqf (an once again, and work with al-Qaìda. At allies are their fellow Muslims around inalienable religious endowment), and the same time, al-Zawahiri, Abu Yahya the world.25 Abu Yahya al-Libi charged its land therefore cannot be sold or given al-Libi, Abu’l-Yazid and others reached that nationalism and Palestinian unity away.31 Al-Qaìda’s views, however, go out to the ordinary members of Hamas, had become the foundation of Hamas’ beyond this interpretation and declare making a clear distinction between the relations and ties, to the point that it every bit of territory ever held by “Islam” “honest” mujahidin—at times equated was impossible to differentiate between as inalienable. As al-Zawahiri noted, with the Qassam Brigades34—and the Hamas and secular movements.26 In corrupt leadership.35 a lengthier condemnation of Hamas, he called al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ “in doctrine, “Al-Qaìda leaders and After July 2007, as Hamas began concept, behavior, and action” the allied clergy have written cracking down on affiliates ideologically “strongest knot of faith,” and one of allied with al-Qaìda in Gaza and the most important principles on which extensively against elsewhere, the tone changed. Now the jihadist methodology was founded. nationalism, emphasizing the invective from al-Qaìda directed Loyalty meant that the Muslims were toward Hamas matched that pointed at one nation, and that nothing connected that Muslims share a bond other ideological enemies; guns were with the Muslims was an internal issue. that is far more important turned against fellow Muslims, and Disavowal implied unending hostility there were calls for insurrection by the and fighting polytheists (as Hamas was than ethnic or national “honest” mujahidin against the Hamas becoming) until all on earth submitted identity.” leadership.36 In al-Qaìda’s version of to God’s laws.27 events, doctrinal deviation had led to methodological deviation. It was Hamas Islamic Land that had sinned and rejected God: now Finally, in response to Hamas’ decision “the recovery of every land which was they would pay with open war.37 to sign international agreements once a land of Islam is the individual such as the Mecca accords, al-Qaìda duty of every Muslim. Therefore, as Dr. Mary Habeck is an Associate Professor charged the group with trading land Muslims, we cannot possibly concede in Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins for peace, betraying the cause of the to Israel so much as a hand-span of School of Advanced International Studies Palestinian jihad. In return, it received Palestine.”32 By every bit of land, al- (SAIS), where she teaches courses on nothing from the United States and the Zawahiri meant even lost Andalusia— military history and strategic thought. international community: the embargo which he and other al-Qaìda leaders still continued, Fatah received all the have consistently described as invaded aid, and the Israelis were continuing and occupied Muslim territory—let their “crimes” against Muslims.28 Al- alone more recently “lost” lands such as Zawahiri first mentioned this issue in Palestine.33 If Hamas would not change March 2006, but made it a central part of its mind about giving away Palestine, his rejection of Hamas in 2007 when the then the group needed to be opposed in leadership signed the Mecca agreement, order to follow God’s orders and liberate and it was decried by each of Hamas’ the land from the infidels. al-Qaìda critics throughout 2007. By mid-2007, al-Zawahiri would state that

Hamas had given four-fifths of Palestine 34 The Qassam Brigades is the military wing of Hamas. 29 Ibid. 35 This is a consistent theme in statements by al-Qa`ida’s 25 Abu Yahya al-Libi, “Palestine, Warning Call and 30 “Al-Zawahiri Urges Hamas to Ignore Deals With Is- leadership on the Hamas conflict between 2006-2007. Cautioning Cry,” al-Sahab, April 30, 2007; “Interview rael,” al-Jazira, March 4, 2006. 36 “Ultimatum to HAMAS, Al-Qassam Brigades,” al- of Abu Yahya al-Libi by al-Sahab Media,” al-Fajr Media 31 See, for example, Shaykh Atiyatallah, “Shaykh Ay- Sawarim Media Institute, July 2, 2007; Abu `Umar al- Center, September 10, 2007. man: We Hold Him To Be a Preacher of Right-Guidance Baghdadi, “They Plotted and Planned, and Allah Too 26 Al-Libi, “Palestine, Warning Call and Cautioning and Pure Tawhid,” March 14, 2007. Planned,” al-Furqan Media Productions, September 15, Cry.” 32 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Realities of the Conflict Between 2007; Al-Baghdadi, “Message: The Religion Is Advice.” 27 “Interview of Abu Yahya al-Libi by al-Sahab Media.” Islam and Unbelief,” al-Sahab, December 2006. 37 Abdullah Haidar Shai’, “Hamas-Shattering of the Im- 28 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Advice of One Concerned,” 33 Al-Zawahiri, “Palestine is Our Business and the Busi- age,” Global Islamic Media Front and Dar al-Murabiteen al-Sahab, July 2007. ness of Every Muslim.” Publications, December 22, 2009.

7 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2

to arrive from regional battlefields4— Although the operation was a success, Lebanon at Risk from constitute the new threat in Lebanon. the enemy did not suffer a total defeat, Salafi-Jihadi Terrorist Cells It is assumed that these cells, aided by as evidenced by the fact that on the last al-Qaìda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaìda day of the battle a few dozen militants By Bilal Y. Saab in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), managed to escape. Several were caught are now pursuing al-Qaìda’s goals in in the hills to the east, but their leader lebanon faces no real danger in Lebanon: attack the United Nations the foreseeable future of al-Qaìda Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL),5 “UNIFIL continues to be establishing an organized insurgent destabilize and sow terror in the presence in the country.1 The basic, domestic political scene, and try to at risk of another terrorist societal conditions for such an ignite another war between Hizb Allah attack, the lethality of ambitious and demanding enterprise and Israel by launching rockets from are non-existent. In Lebanon, what al- southern Lebanon into northern Israel. which this time could be Qaìda represents—a takfiri ideology, a This article assesses the nature of the greater than in the past.” militant agenda, and a radical political threat posed by these terrorist cells to vision—has yet to capture the interest of the stability of Lebanon and the security the Lebanese Sunni Islamic community, of UNIFIL. with its many different factions. While Shakir al-Abssi and a few of his close al-Qaìda may have recently made Nahr al-Bared: The Day After aides, including the Saudi national headways in Yemen, Somalia, and in The 105-day battle between the Salafi- Obeid Mubarak Abd al-Kafeel,8 were other weak states around the world, jihadi group Fatah al-Islam and the able to evade the dragnet. these gains are extremely difficult if Lebanese army in the summer of 2007 not impossible to replicate in a country ended with a resounding defeat of With its leader in hiding at the time, such as Lebanon. Acknowledging the group and the destruction of the Fatah al-Islam eventually transformed the difficulty of creating a Lebanese Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al- from a centralized insurgent group franchise, it is likely that al-Qaìda Bared.6 With Fatah al-Islam crushed, into a loose network of terrorist cells.9 has switched its strategy and gone the group’s plot to create a Salafi-jihadi “The battle is over and we won,” one underground.2 insurgency in northern Lebanon and Lebanese army general stated, “but establish a radical Islamic state with the war has just started.”10 Today, a Clandestine terrorist cells—some of Tripoli as its capital was averted.7 nonstop, largely behind-the-scenes which are homegrown and remnants of intelligence war is raging between the 3 Fatah al-Islam, while others continue 4 Personal correspondence, senior Lebanese army gen- Lebanese counterterrorism services and eral who is a close aide to Deputy Director of Army In- the terrorist cells. The outcome of this telligence Abbas Ibrahim, August 2009. The army gen- war will have important repercussions 1 For more on the reasons why al-Qaìda has failed to es- eral specifically mentioned the battlefields of Iraq and the on the present and future stability tablish an insurgent base in Lebanon, please see Bilal Y. Arabian Peninsula. He also suspected that some funding of Lebanon and perhaps that of its Saab, “Al-Qaìda’s Presence and Influence in Lebanon,” was coming from private sources in the Gulf, not from of- neighbors. CTC Sentinel 1:12 (2008). ficial government bodies. 2 This is an assumption made by the author, supported 5 Originally, UNIFIL was created by the Security Coun- 8 Obeid Mubarak Abd al-Kafeel is a Saudi national and by his reading of local events on the ground before and cil in March 1978 to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from a senior member of Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon. He par- after the battle of Nahr al-Bared in summer 2007. Of Lebanon, restore international peace and security and ticipated in the battle of Nahr al-Bared and lost his left course, no leader belonging to al-Qaìda central or to assist the Lebanese government in restoring its effective eye due to a severe injury. With Shakir al-Abssi, he man- any of its franchises in the Middle East has made a pub- authority in the area. The mandate had to be adjusted aged to escape on the last day of fighting to the nearby vil- lic statement detailing a switch in strategy in Lebanon. twice, due to developments in 1982 and 2000. Following lage of Markabta and then to the northern refugee camp For more on the author’s analysis of events in Lebanon the summer 2006 war between Hizb Allah and Israel, of Baddawi, with the help of Lebanese Shaykh Hamza before and after summer 2007, please see Saab, “Al- the Council enhanced the force and decided that in addi- Kassem and Khaled Seif. Abd al-Kafeel stayed in Shaykh Qaìda’s Presence and Influence in Lebanon,” and Bilal tion to the original mandate, it would, among other tasks, Kassem’s house until his wounds healed. He later met Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: How an monitor the cessation of hostilities, accompany and sup- Abu Hajer with whom he conducted the terrorist opera- Ambitious Jihadist Project Went Awry,” The Brookings port the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy through- tions in Masaref district and al-Bahsas street. For more Institution and the Swedish National Defence College, out the south of Lebanon, and extend its assistance to on Abd al-Kafeel, please see Ali Moussawi, “Sari: The November 28, 2007. help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations Saudi al-Kafeel Executed the Damascus Bombing and 3 Fatah al-Islam is a Salafi-jihadi group that is inspired and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons. Helped Jawhar in the Making of Bombs for al-Tall and by al-Qaìda’s ideology. Its links to al-Qaìda in Iraq are As of October 31, 2009, UNIFIL’s force consists of 30 al-Bahsas,” al-Safir, November 12, 2009. verifiable and its members are mostly Arabs from vari- troop contributing countries with a total of 12,410 peace- 9 For more analysis on Fatah al-Islam’s transformation, ous Middle Eastern countries. It emerged in the Nahr al- keepers stationed in southern Lebanon. For details, visit please see Saab and Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: How an Bared Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon in November the official website of UNIFIL at www.unifil.unmissions. Ambitious Jihadist Project Went Awry”; Bilal Y. Saab 2006. Its goals are unclear but include the establishment org. and Magnus Ranstorp, “Securing Lebanon from the of an Islamic state in northern Lebanon, with Tripoli as 6 The reconstruction of Nahr al-Bared is presently un- Threat of Salafist Jihadism,” Studies in Conflict and Terror- its capital. In summer 2007, it fought the Lebanese army derway. ism 30:10 (2007): pp. 825-855. for more than three months in an effort to establish an 7 For more on Fatah al-Islam’s strategy, please see Saab 10 Personal interview, senior Lebanese military intel- insurgent presence in the north. The uprising failed and and Ranstorp, “Fatah al Islam: How an Ambitious Jihad- ligence officer who currently has a leading role in the the Lebanese army eventually crushed the group. ist Project Went Awry.” counterterrorism campaign in the north, August 2009.

8 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2

A New Threat: Salafi-Jihadi Terrorist Cells of the cells lacked the human and Muslims in general.19 Months later, Abu According to Lebanese press reports, technical resources necessary to wage Hajer stopped teaching and decided soon after he fled the battlefield on any sustained terrorist campaign to more deeply involve himself in the September 2, 2007, Shakir al-Abssi against the Lebanese authorities.16 Most Salafi-jihadi movement in Lebanon. handed over the leadership of Fatah al- importantly, the remaining terrorists’ Unable to travel to Iraq due to security Islam to Abdel Rahman Mohamad Awad drive and determination were low. One reasons, he went to Ain al-Hilwah to (also known as Abu Mohamad Shahrour), notable exception was Abdel Ghani Ali mingle with fellow Salafi-jihadis.20 Ousama Amine al-Shahabi (also known Jawhar (also known as Abu Hajer) who as Abu al-Zahra), and Ghazi Faysal Once at the camp, Abu Hajer reportedly Abdullah, three suspected Palestinian “The assumption is that underwent intensive military training at terrorists based in the refugee camp of the hands of Jund al-Sham,21 a militant Ain al-Hilwah.11 The northern region, as long as Jund al-Sham Islamist group, learning how to engage al-Abssi possibly calculated, was exists, Fatah al-Islam’s in combat and plant explosives.22 now under heavy surveillance by the Soon after his preparations, he was Lebanese military intelligence services cells in the north, led by appointed by Fatah al-Islam’s three and was clearly not a favorable location terrorist-at-large Abu leaders in the camp as the group’s point for any terrorist re-mobilization man in the north.23 During a period of campaign. Ain al-Hilwah was an ideal, Hajer, will continue to two months, Abu Hajer would form his although temporary spot where the receive supplies of men own 11-person cell by enlisting young, terrorists could uninterruptedly plan poor, and alienated recruits from his ways to regroup.12 and materiel, making it hometown of Bibnine, starting with more difficult for Lebanese his brother Mohamad Ali Jawhar and The instructions from al-Abssi, whose including Isaac al-Sayyed al-Sabsabi, fate is unclear to this day,13 were clear counterterrorism services Imama al-Sayyed al-Sabsabi, Omar and simple: to avenge the deaths of the to combat the threat.” al-Sabsabi, Abdel Karim Mustapha, Muslim fighters who died waging jihad Rashid Mustapha, Razan al-Khaled, against the “crusader” Lebanese army Ayman al-Hindawi, Rabi’ al-‘Ouweyid in Nahr al-Bared.14 The three men’s and Marwan al-Khaled.24 Abu Hajer first job was to “test the pulse” of the would eventually become the leading indoctrinated his followers at the Salafi-jihadi scene in the north and re- coordinator of the terrorist cells in the “Islah” mosque in Bibnine, explaining awaken the cells that were lying low in north. Abu Hajer’s role is crucial to to them the need to fight the “infidels,” Tripoli.15 What they found, however, the mobilization and re-activation of be they Lebanese Shi`a Muslims or the was not necessarily reassuring: many the Salafi-jihadi movement in Lebanon Lebanese army.25 following the battle of Nahr al-Bared. 11 Ali Moussawi, “Mezher Orders Capital Punishment After receiving the news of Abu Hajer for Members of Fatah al-Islam Including Awad, Shaha- Abu Hajer is a 32-year-old Lebanese and what he was able to accomplish bi, and Jawhar,” al-Safir, September 14, 2009. Sunni Muslim from the small northern in his hometown, Fatah al-Islam’s 17 12 The Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp is re- town of Bibnine. After earning a leadership in Ain al-Hilwah decided 26 portedly a recruiting ground for Salafi-jihadi currents in diploma in laboratory studies at the to offer him extra help. Mohamad Lebanon. Located in the southeastern part of Sidon’s port age of 21 from a technical school in Mahmoud Azzam, an explosives expert and reputed to be the most impoverished and radical Pal- Qobbeh, Tripoli, he taught Salafism in who participated in the war in Iraq and estinian refugee camp in the Arab world, Ain al-Hilwah several religious institutes and private is home to about 75,000 refugees. The four entrances to households based in the Wadi al-Jamous 19 Personal interview, Shaykh Abdullah Mas’oud, Trip- 18 Ain al-Hilwah are controlled by the Lebanese army. In- area. According to Shaykh Abdullah oli, Lebanon, July 2009. ternal security, however, is maintained by rival Palestin- Mas’oud, who has lived in Bibnine for 20 “Biography of Abu Hajer.” ian groups, ranging from the extreme left to the extreme more than 64 years, very few students 21 Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by several Sunni Is- right. Since Ain al-Hilwah’s creation, it has been the pol- attended Abu Hajer’s class, often citing lamic extremist entities, all or none of which may be con- icy of successive Lebanese governments to instruct the to their friends his uncompromising nected. These entities mostly operate in Lebanon, Syria army to refrain from entering the area for fear of clashing style of teaching and his extremist views and Jordan, and their goals include the establishment of with reportedly more than a dozen militant factions all on Shi`a Muslims in particular and non- an Islamic caliphate throughout the Levant. During the competing for influence inside the camp. battle of Nahr al-Bared, Jund al-Sham fighters joined Fa- 13 Since the end of the battle of Nahr al-Bared, conflict- 16 This is the story recounted by captured terrorist Isaac tah al-Islam in their fight against the Lebanese army. ing reports have circulated in the Arab and foreign media al-Sabsabi, parts of which were covered in al-Safir news- 22 “Biography of Abu Hajer.” concerning the fate of al-Abssi. It is still unclear whether paper on September 14, 2009. See Moussawi, “Mezher 23 Ibid. al-Abssi was captured or killed by Syrian forces while Orders Capital Punishment for Members of Fatah al- 24 Moussawi, “Sari: The Saudi al-Kafeel Executed the trying to cross the Lebanese-Syrian border. For more Islam Including Awad, Shahabi, and Jawhar.” Damascus Bombing and Helped Jawhar in the Making of details, see “Fatah al-Islam Says Leader Ambushed in 17 The author was offered a copy of the biography of Abu Bombs for al-Tall and al-Bahsas.” Syria,” al-Arabiya, December 10, 2008. Hajer during a meeting in summer 2009 with several 25 Ibid. 14 Moussawi, “Mezher Orders Capital Punishment for military intelligence officers in Yarzeh, the headquarters 26 This information is based on a report released by the Members of Fatah al-Islam Including Awad, Shahabi, of the Lebanese Ministry of Defense. Subsequent refer- Lebanese military intelligence services, parts of which and Jawhar.” ences are marked “Biography of Abu Hajer.” were covered in al-Safir newspaper on December 2, 15 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 2009.

9 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 who allegedly was a confidant of the late The Link to Ain al-Hilwah end to the “problem of Jund al-Sham” AQI amir Abu Musàb al-Zarqawi,27 was While Abu Hajer was planning and in the camp. Jund al-Sham, a network sent from the camp to Bibnine to meet conducting terrorist operations with of freelance Salafi-jihadi fighters that with Abu Hajer, hand him a modest his aides in the north, the cells in Ain has a presence in Lebanon, Syria and amount of money and teach him how to al-Hilwah were also actively involved Jordan, was the only Islamist force to plant sophisticated plastic explosives in the campaign against the Lebanese heed Fatah al-Islam’s call for support and roadside bombs for the purpose of authorities. In August 2009, the during its battle in Nahr al-Bared. On attacking UNIFIL and Lebanese army Lebanese military intelligence services several occasions, Asbat al-Ansar tried bases.28 On May 31, 2008, Abu Hajer arrested Hamza al-Kasem, an aide to to contain Jund al-Sham by offering managed to place six plastic explosives Abdel Rahman Mohamad Awad, one of membership to its fighters, but with in the Lebanese military intelligence the three men now in charge of Fatah little success.38 Jund al-Sham accused base of Abdeh at 3:50 AM, only one of al-Islam’s cells in Ain al-Hilwah.34 Asbat al-Ansar of compromising its own which exploded effectively, killing one Following interrogations with al-Kasem, Islamist credentials by cooperating with soldier and injuring two during their he admitted that his boss was behind the “apostate” Lebanese authorities for sleep.29 Approximately a month later, the December 12, 2007 assassination of material political fortunes. Abu Hajer asked two of his aides to Lebanese army general and director of plant another bomb on the road leading operations Francois Hajj and the attacks Today, Jund al-Sham’s network and to the Qolei’at Lebanese air force base against the Tanzanian, Spanish, and Fatah al-Islam’s cells in Ain al-Hilwah where many army vehicles pass by on a Colombian peacekeepers in June and July are allied and uneasily co-existing with daily basis.30 Fortunately, the bomb did 2007.35 Awad’s cells are also suspected the other Palestinian factions in the not explode and was eventually detected of killing Industry Minister Pierre camp including Fatah, Hamas, Asbat and deactivated. Gemayel in November 2006, Member al-Ansar, and al-Haraka al-Islamiyya of Parliament Walid Eido in June 2007, al-Moujahida led by Jamal Khattab. The On August 13, 2008, two cells linked and Lebanese Internal Security Forces assumption is that as long as Jund al- to Abu Hajer led by Saudi national Abd Captain Wissam Eid in January 2008; Sham exists, Fatah al-Islam’s cells in al-Kafeel (who later conducted a suicide no hard evidence, however, has so far the north, led by terrorist-at-large Abu attack in Syria) assaulted Lebanese army surfaced linking Awad or Abu Hajer to Hajer, will continue to receive supplies bases in the Masaref district and Bahsas these three assassinations.36 of men and materiel, making it more neighborhood in Tripoli.31 On January difficult for Lebanese counterterrorism 15, 2009, Abu Hajer, according to local Soon after the battle of Nahr al-Bared services to combat the threat. media, personally shot and killed George ended, Lebanese Deputy Chief of Atieh, a Lebanese Christian drugstore Military Intelligence Abbas Ibrahim Conclusion owner, for selling alcoholic beverages.32 entered Ain al-Hilwah with two of his Despite the substantial evidence that has Following interrogations with Azzam aides to meet with leaders of Asbat al- recently been released by the Lebanese and Isaac al-Sabsabi, who Lebanese Ansar.37 The meeting was anything authorities following interrogations military intelligence services arrested but cordial, but its purpose was to with captured terrorists, a number of in two sophisticated operations in May discuss a plan that would bring an influential Lebanese commentators and September 2009, the two terrorists and editorialists continue to treat the confessed that Abu Hajer also had 34 Khodr Taleb, “An Important Catch: The Army Ar- issue of al-Qaìda-related terrorism in detailed plans to assassinate Lebanese rests Fatah al-Islam Member Hamza al-Kassem,” al-Sa- Lebanon with great suspicion. In their Internal Security Forces Director fir, August 2, 2009. minds, al-Qaìda’s global network has Ashraf Rifi and to conduct high-profile 35 On June 24, 2007, three Spanish and three Colombian no independent presence in the country. operations against UNIFIL with the UN soldiers were killed when a bomb destroyed their They view the threat as a fabrication by 33 help of his allies in Ain al-Hilwah. armored troop carrier. A month later, another bomb ex- the Syrian intelligence services intended ploded near a UNIFIL position, causing no casualties. On to destabilize Lebanon and restore January 8, 2008, two members of the Irish contingent Damascus’ political control that was were wounded when their vehicle was hit by a roadside lost after it was forced to withdraw its bomb near Rmaileh village, 22 miles south of Beirut. See troops from the country in May 2005. Hassan Oleik, “Naim Abbas Killed Francois Hajj,” al- While this is possible given the negative 27 Moussawi, “Sari: The Saudi al-Kafeel Executed the Akhbar, August 29, 2009. role Syria’s intelligence services have Damascus Bombing and Helped Jawhar in the Making of 36 Zeina Karam, “Fatah al-Islam Assassinated Lebanese played in Lebanon, the theory remains Bombs for al-Tall and al-Bahsas.” Minister Gemayel,” Ya Libnan, July 8, 2007. unsupported by hard evidence. What is 28 Ibid. 37 Asbat al-Ansar is a Palestinian Salafi-jihadi group that encouraging is the fact that the official 29 Ibid. was involved in a number of terrorist operations against establishment, including many formerly 30 Ibid. Lebanese official targets in the past, including the killings anti-Syrian politicians who were once 31 Ibid. of four judges in a courtroom in Sidon in June 1999. Re- skeptical of the al-Qaìda threat, are now 32 This is the story recounted by captured terrorist Mo- cently, it reached a permanent truce with the Lebanese revisiting their views and appreciating hamad Mahmoud Azzam, parts of which were covered in authorities in return for its intelligence cooperation on the gravity of the problem, allowing al-Safirnewspaper on September 14, 2009. al-Qaìda elements in the Ain al-Hilwah camp. These de- 33 Moussawi, “Sari: The Saudi al-Kafeel Executed the tails are based on the author’s personal interviews with 38 Fidaa Itani, “Jund al-Sham to the Forefront from the Damascus Bombing and Helped Jawhar in the Making of mid-level sources inside Lebanon’s military intelligence Gate of Terror and Terrorism,” al-Akhbar, January 2, Bombs for al-Tall and al-Bahsas.” services in summer 2009. 2010.

10 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 the security apparatus to operate under made because al-Muhajiroun was fewer political constraints. The Changing Scene in “another name for both Al Ghurabaa Londonistan and The Saved Sect,”3 two descendent Underfunded and ill-equipped, the groups of al-Muhajiroun that had been Lebanese military intelligence services, By Raffaello Pantucci banned in July 2006. The reason for the often in coordination with the internal apparently back-to-front nature of the security forces, have so far done a in the first month of 2010, the world proscription was that al-Muhajiroun remarkable job in fighting the terrorism was reminded of the terrorism threat had officially disbanded itself in threat. Yet the threat is now arguably in the United Kingdom. Umar Farouk October 2004, likely out of concerns of too big for a small country like Lebanon Abdulmuttalab’s partial radicalization impending proscription at the time.4 It to handle on its own. The Lebanese in London, the decision to finally rapidly re-established itself in a series government also has a legal responsibility proscribe the extremist group al- of different groups, most prominent to protect UNIFIL, but it cannot do this Muhajiroun and the ratcheting up of of which were al-Ghurabaa (The crucial job by itself. The newly-shaped the terrorism threat level ahead of the Strangers), The Saved Sect, and Ahlus Lebanese counterterrorism apparatus Summit on Afghanistan all highlighted Sunnah wal Jamaah (The Followers of needs financial and technical help from once again how the United Kingdom the Sunna). The first two were banned its regional friends and from those remains the focus of the terrorism soon after they were linked to protests countries that have a vested interest threat to the West.1 The nature of this at the Danish Embassy in London in in preserving the fragile calm along threat, however, has changed since the February 2006, which resulted in the Lebanese-Israeli border. With a days before 9/11, when London was some individuals being prosecuted for few terrorist leaders still at large and often called “Londonistan” due to the inciting racial hatred.5 The third name, an unknown number of cells actively heavy presence of extremist groups Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah, remains plotting attacks, UNIFIL continues to in the city.2 Today, radicalization and theoretically active, but has not yet been be at risk of another terrorist attack, extremist activity in the United Kingdom banned.6 Al-Muhajiroun, on the other the lethality of which this time could be no longer occurs at the level it once did. hand, simply went silent, although greater than in the past.39 Nevertheless, the activity still taking individuals in the group described al- place is harder to legislate against and Muhajiroun as the overarching umbrella Bilal Y. Saab is a senior Middle East and more difficult to combat. under which the other groups operated. counterterrorism consultant with Centra More recently, the group marshaled its Technology Inc. and Oxford Analytica. This article will explain how forces under the banner “Islam4UK,” He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in “Londonistan” has changed during the which was among the groups banned Government and Politics at the University last decade. Overtly violent extremist under the latest proscription order. of Maryland, College Park. preaching has become much more discrete, while the internet has become The actual decision to ban al-Muhajiroun a major feature in radicalizing young was surprisingly controversial. The people. The article will also show group had announced its intention how old and new threats have melded to march through Wootton Bassett, a together to create a threat matrix village that has become synonymous that presents a new set of legislative with British war dead due to the challenges for British authorities. regular processions of coffins along the high street, and the public perception The Banning of Al-Muhajiroun is that the ban was a reaction to One of the most visible parts of this announcement. The British Londonistan was laid to rest in January government, however, claimed that the 2010 when the British government decision was the product of a review finally took the step of adding al- of al-Muhajiroun’s status by the Joint Muhajiroun to the list of banned Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC).7 organizations under the UK Terrorism Act of 2000. The decision was officially

1 Sean O’Neill and Giles Whittell, “Al Qaeda ‘Groomed 3 The official proscription order can be found at www. Abdulmutallab in London,’” Times [London], December opsi.gov.uk/si/si2010/uksi_20100034_en_1. 30, 2009; Dominic Casciani, “Analysis: Does Banning 4 Omar Bakri Mohammed, “An Official Declaration Dis- Terror Groups Work?” BBC, January 12, 2010; “UK Ter- solving Al Muhajiroun,” www.almuhajiroun.net, Octo- rorist Threat Level Raised to ‘Severe,’” BBC, January 23, ber 8, 2004. 2010. 5 “Four Men Jailed Over Cartoon Demo,” BBC, July 18, 2 The term “Londonistan” was coined by the French se- 2007. curity services who were angry at the volume of jihadist 6 “Theoretically” because the al-Muhajiroun descendent groups and individuals who found safe sanctuary in the groups tend to operate using many different fronts, mak- 39 Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, “Terror Alert: United Kingdom and in its apparently lax legislation to ing it hard to ascertain which one is behind any particu- Let Us Protect UNIFIL and Fast,” Daily Star, February counter radical groups not threatening British soil. Most lar activity. 1, 2010. were in London, hence the term Londonistan. 7 Casciani.

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Regardless of the true reasons, the away, while the radical preachers who Instead, recruiting networks appear impact was minimal. While extremists poisoned the minds of Britain’s youth to operate on the periphery of the retired the al-Muhajiroun name and have been expelled from the country more anti-establishment groups that closed down its most widely known (such as Omar Bakri Mohammed) or protest against the war on terrorism website, www.islam4uk.com, they are behind bars (such as Abu Hamza and ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan quite openly said that the decision and Abu Qatada). The younger men and Iraq. Clearly, the overwhelming was not going to affect them. “Unless who aspire to fill these individuals’ majority of protestors are peaceful and the government can prove that you shoes are also facing legal trouble and are merely expressing opinions. Yet are ostensibly exactly the same lack the experience on the battlefield this peaceful activism can provide cover organization, doing the same things at or religious credibility that made the for more extremist elements to seek the same time, it’s very difficult to clamp earlier generations so inspirational. recruits, and the defining line can be hard down,” explained al-Muhajiroun’s co- to distinguish. Key individuals in a variety founder.8 In fact, new websites are This has dulled one of the primary of plots have appeared to be involved in already operating that provide the same functions of Londonistan as a global organizations that ostensibly claim to sort of services as www.islam4uk.com, threat: the United Kingdom is no longer offer support for Muslim prisoners or to including providing speeches, videos an environment in which extremist be channeling aid to South Asia. Others and books by radical preachers such as ideologies can flourish and active have been involved in student politics, Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Mohammed recruiters can easily find individuals to with four cases of student presidents of and Anwar al-Àwlaqi, alongside the rally to the cause. For example, Djamel university Islamic organizations being work of new younger preachers who Beghal, who allegedly operated out of charged with terrorist plotting. This claim to have trained at the feet of such the Finsbury Park Mosque and recruited would appear to be where Umar Farouk men.9 Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui and Abdulmutallab was sped along the path Nizar Trablesi,11 and Abu Munthir, that led to him attempting to blow up This is the reality of the “new who allegedly played a critical role in a commercial airliner on December 25, Londonistan,” where a group of jihadists the formation of the cell codenamed 2009. As an activist in London’s student continue to espouse extremist rhetoric “Crevice,”12 used the networks fostered politics and Islamist scene, he was also within the constraints of the British by radical preachers to seek recruits. in contact with extremists who may legal system, even if they are not as able Some individuals who make up this have provided him with connections in to openly support terrorism as before. shadow network continue to live in Yemen. While to outsiders this might simply the United Kingdom and appear on seem an extension of previous British the periphery of counterterrorism Londonistan Goes Viral policy of placating extremists so that operations, and a few are under The biggest threat from Londonistan, they do not undertake violent actions controversial “control orders.” however, was the incubation of extremist in the United Kingdom, the truth is that ideologies that it provided. According to British counterterrorism policy has Either way, the pools from which they al-Qaìda theorist Abu Musàb al-Suri, moved far beyond this. The problem is might attempt to fish for recruits have in the 1990s “being in London would that the threat has now evolved in a new been dried up to some extent. Previously, place you at the centre of the events.”14 direction. sessions organized by radical clerics The concentration of extremists, would have provided fertile ground according to al-Suri, meant that he The New Londonistan from which they might find excitable “found that there was an opportunity Unlike the 1990s, today London is not young men interested in graduating to resume my contribution [to jihad], a hub of openly jihadist international from vacuous preaching into physical and my participation in writing, by activity. The Finsbury Park Mosque violence. An openly radical fringe staying in London.”15 This function is no longer a training ground and remains—as was mentioned earlier, al- still exists in some form, with openly supply shop where terrorists can Muhajiroun has merely morphed under radical and influential individuals still come and equip themselves with fake new nomenclature—but the attention operating within the United Kingdom, identification papers, currency and they attract from the security services but much of the dangerous rhetoric and invitation letters to go to military and media makes it hard to imagine radicalization has migrated online. training camps in Afghanistan.10 The that serious terrorist elements would be wide Algerian network that used to drawn to their meetings.13 It is in the online world that individuals operate with impunity from British such as Aabid Khan and Younis shores has been for the most part chased 11 Steve Bird, “Quiet Existence in Leicester Suburb Tsouli operated; both young men were Masked a Complex Terrorist Network,” Times, April 2, 8 Fiona Hamilton, “Islam4UK’s Radical Spokesman An- 2003. mer head of al-Muhajiroun in Ireland, Khalid Kelly, who jem Choudary Pledges to Keep Preaching,” Times, Janu- 12 Emily Flynn Vencatt and Mark Hosenball, “Pyrrhic claimed to be training in Pakistan’s Swat to kill foreign ary 16, 2010. Victory?” Newsweek, May 1, 2007. For more on Abu soldiers. See “Irishman Wants to Kill for Islam,” Sunday 9 One of these websites, for example, can be found at Munthir’s role, see Regina v. Mohammed Momin Khwaja, Times, November 15, 2009. Furthermore, a number of www.salafimedia.com. Ontario Superior Court, October 29, 2008. members have been arrested for various breaches of the 10 Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory 13 This is not to discount them altogether, aside from the peace and for charges linked to terrorism legislation. (London: Harper Perennial, 2006) provides a compre- fact that the government believes they are involved in ter- 14 Quoted in Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad (Lon- hensive account of Abu Hamza and his activities at the rorism and has hence proscribed them. In late 2009, the don: Hurst & Co., 2007), p. 121. Finsbury Park Mosque. Sunday Times ran an interview from Pakistan with a for- 15 Ibid.

12 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 convicted of involvement in terrorism Finally, some cases, such as the one Political Islam in Central and were key instigators in a global against the young Mohammed Gul terrorist network operating from the who stands accused of disseminating Asia: The Role of Hizb al- internet in the United Kingdom.16 Other extremist material by e-mail, remain on Tahrir individuals such as Nicky Reilly17 and the docket.23 Isa Ibrahim18 were instead apparently By Emmanuel Karagiannis drawn in by material they found online Conclusion and tried to build explosive devices Radicalization remains an issue in one of the fastest growing global, on their own. Ibrahim was interdicted the United Kingdom, although the Sunni Islamic political organizations is before he could execute his plot, but threat has evolved away from the old Hizb al-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Reilly was only prevented by his own structures that used to make up the Party, HT).1 HT often escapes in- incompetence when his bomb failed to infamous Londonistan. Radicalization depth analysis because the group itself detonate properly in the middle of a today is more difficult for policymakers does not use violence to seek political restaurant in Exeter in May 2008. to legislate against. Dangerous extremist change. As a result, it is not on the activities online are hard to distinguish U.S. government’s list of terrorist It is also on the internet that security from the vast mass of meaningless organizations. Nevertheless, HT is services are increasingly concentrating extremism on the internet, while parts pursuing an agenda at odds with the their efforts, attempting to identify of the real-world portion have melded West, and eventually the group could threats through the internet or finding into the mainstream of British political pose an active threat to the United legal ways of charging people who discourse. This makes it difficult to craft States and its allies. step beyond the boundary with online legislation that targets groups specifically extremism. These include individuals that does not also catch harmless and Profiling HT is important as the group such as Krenar Lusha, who was legitimate forms of political discourse. is one of the most popular pan-Islamic identified through a network of online organizations, counting tens of thousands extremists and later convicted while Physical jihad continues to hold sway, of members.2 While it rejects violence at in possession of an assortment of with events in Afghanistan and East this time, it is open to waging jihad once radical material as well as 71.8 liters of Africa drawing young men into their a proper Islamic state is established with petrol and potassium nitrate,19 or Bilal thrall,24 but the networks and extremist the purpose of creating a global Islamic Mohammed and Rizwan Ditta who both rhetoric that were previously responsible caliphate. To establish this initial Islamic pled guilty to charges of distributing for the stream of individuals going to state, HT is pursuing an agenda to make extremist material obtained online.20 training camps have been forced into a society more “Islamist” so that such Other cases have proved more difficult, less prominent position. Unfortunately, a state can be established peacefully. however, with a group of cases linked however, a hardcore of jihadist thinking Nevertheless, the group ascribes to a little to the internet in Lancashire largely remains, making what happens in the discussed strategy called nusra, which dropping off the radar for legal United Kingdom still relevant for the means it could support a coup d’etat by reasons.21 Moreover, part of the case global fight against terrorism. an armed force if that force is pursuing against Mohammed Atif Siddique an Islamist agenda. that stated he was involved in actual Raffaello Pantucci is a Consulting Research terrorist planning was overturned and Associate at the International Institute for This article will provide background on he was released from prison, although Strategic Studies (IISS) and an Associate HT, including its strategy to establish other charges against him stood.22 Fellow at the International Center for the an Islamic caliphate. It will then profile Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King’s HT’s role in Central Asia, the region in 16 For more on this network, please see Evan Kohlmann, College. which it is most active. “Anatomy of a Modern Homegrown Terror Cell: Aabid Khan et al,” NEFA Foundation, September 2008; Raf- Background on Hizb al-Tahrir faello Pantucci, “Operation Praline: The Realization of HT was founded in East Jerusalem in Al-Suri’s Nizam la Tanzim?” Perspectives on Terrorism 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, an 2:12 (2008). Islamic scholar of Palestinian origin. In 17 Adam Fresno, “Nicky Reilly, Muslim Convert, Jailed the decades since its establishment, HT for 18 Years for Exeter Bomb Attack,” Times, January 31, 2009. 1 Hizb al-Tahrir is more commonly transliterated as 18 Raffaello Pantucci, “Britain Jails ‘Lone Wolf’ Terrorist material online, as he was linked into the broader Khan/ Hizb ut-Tahrir. Isa Ibrahim,” Terrorism Monitor 7:23 (2009). Tsouli network. See “Siddique Terrorism Charges in De- 2 HT’s total numbers in Central Asia are not known 19 “Man Sentenced to Seven Years for Terrorism Offenc- tail,” BBC, February 9, 2010. because the group operates clandestinely. There are, es,” Derbyshire Constabulary, December 15, 2009. 23 “Man Charged With Sending Terrorist Material by however, some 6,000 HT members and sympathizers 20 “Muslim Man Who Sold DVDs Glorifying the 9/11 Email,” Daily Mail, February 24, 2009. serving time in Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik pris- Atrocities Jailed Under New Terror Laws,” Daily Mail, 24 The case of Mohammed Abushamma is instructive in ons. The U.S. State Department claims, for example, that March 20, 2008. the case of Afghanistan. See “Student Jailed for Trying to as many as 4,500 HT members are currently jailed in 21 “PM Death Plot Suspects in Court,” Derby Evening Fight British in Afghanistan,” London Evening Standard, Uzbekistan alone. See the Bureau of Democracy, Human Telegraph, October 4, 2008; “Jury in Blackburn Terrorist June 18, 2009. The Somali case is increasingly a concern. Rights, and Labor, Uzbekistan – International Religious Trial Discharged,” Lancashire Telegraph, July 27, 2009. See Richard Kerbaj, “UK Students Recruited for Somali Freedom Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 22 The charges that held include spreading extremist Jihad,” Sunday Times, January 24, 2010. State, 2007).

13 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 has become an international movement3 To achieve this strategy, HT does not help. This is the method that the with tens of thousands of followers want to seize control of the state by Prophet Muhammad adopted to worldwide. Although the group is force and coerce society into accepting establish the State of Islam and to primarily active in Central Asia, it also has its political agenda. Rather, HT wants implement the Islamic rules.10 a large following in a number of Western to persuade society to accept its ideas countries, including in the United States. willingly, which would then inevitably In practice, this means that HT could Today, HT is led by Ata Abu Rashta, a lead to a regime change. Yet even in these support a coup organized by a military Palestinian civil engineer who studied circumstances, it is likely that HT would that would have first embraced in Cairo and previously served as the use some form of pressure to remove Islamism as its ideology. For example, party’s spokesman in Jordan. recalcitrant regimes; party ideologues HT encouraged elements within the have often implied that regimes could be Jordanian armed forces to overthrow HT does not view itself as a religious overthrown by acts of civil disobedience, the Jordanian government in 1968 and organization, but as a political party based such as demonstrations and strikes. For 1969. Moreover, there are indications on Islamic values. HT’s political doctrine example, the media representative of HT that some members of HT were linked to is founded on two principles. The first in Britain, Imran Waheed, once wrote: a failed coup attempt in Egypt in 1974.11 is the need for Islamic law, or Shari`a, The objectives of seeking nusra for the to regulate all aspects of human life— a day will come when the Muslims re-establishment of the caliphate are politics, economics, science and ethics. will take revenge against all twofold: first, to enable HT to continue The second principle is the need for an those who participated in their its political struggle without risking a authentic Islamic state, which would oppression [i.e. the Karimov regime military confrontation with authorities; pave the way for the re-establishment of in Uzbekistan]. Hizb ut-Tahrir does second, to propagate its ideology to the the Islamic caliphate. According to HT, not use weapons or resort to violence, security forces so that they overthrow a “just” society can only be achieved nor uses any physical means in existing regimes and establish an within such a political entity. its call…However, do not expect, Islamic state. that these rulers and their regimes HT’s goal is to create an Islamic state will collapse all by themselves. On It is important to note, however, that that will first absorb all Muslim- the contrary, patient believers are HT never developed a paramilitary wing populated territories into its borders to required to shake these regimes and and its members did not provide military establish a caliphate, and then spread uproot them.7 support for the coup attempts in Jordan Islam worldwide through jihad. For and Egypt, although these coups were instance, al-Nabhani wrote in Article Moreover, HT has also developed the aimed at establishing an Islamic state. 183 of his proposed constitution for the concept of seeking outside support Moreover, HT has not been involved in future Islamic state that “conveying (nusra) to remove a regime from power. any other violent or velvet coups in the the Islamic da’wah [to the world] is the HT compares this strategy to how the Muslim world since the mid-1970s. axis around which the foreign policy Prophet Muhammad received support revolves, and the basis upon which the from Arab tribes in his conquest of HT’s Role in Central Asia relation between the [Islamic] state and Medina after he fled Mecca for fear of Although HT has influence globally— other states is built.”4 Moreover, “this persecution by the pagan leaders.8 HT including in the United States and in the policy is implemented by a defined has interpreted the conquest of Medina West—it is most active in Central Asia method that never changes, which is as a coup d’etat orchestrated by the because it has faced little competition jihad, regardless of who is in authority. Prophet Muhammad and his allies that from other Islamist groups in this region. Jihad is the call to Islam which involves took their local opponents by surprise. There are a number of factors that led fighting or the contribution of money, According to the group’s literature, to HT’s rise in Central Asia, not least opinions, or literature towards the of which is the fact that Central Asia is fighting.”5 To achieve these goals, if the land was a land of Kufr and predominately Muslim.12 Poor economic HT envisages a three-stage program the rules of Islam were not put in conditions in post-Soviet Central Asia of action, modeled after the three implementation, then removing the provided fertile soil for Islamist groups stages that the Prophet Muhammad ruler who governs over the Muslims to achieve support in changing the experienced on his path to establishing would be through using the method 9 the first Islamic state: of Nusrah, i.e. seeking [military] caliphate must be armed. On more than one occasion, HT has openly asked the armed forces of Muslim countries Stage One: Recruitment of members. Re-establish the Khilafah and Resume the Islamic Way of Life to intervene in certain states. Therefore, it must be em- Stage Two: Islamization of society. (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 2000), p. 32. phasized that HT is interested in those who are militarily Stage Three: Takeover of the state and 7 Imrad Waheed, “Who Killed Farhad Usmanov?” Ca- (not politically) capable. 6 jihad against non-believers. liphate, July 2002. 10 The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change, p. 22. 8 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for 11 S. Taji-Farouk, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb ut-Tahrir 3 The terms group, party, organization and movement Change (London: al-Khilafah Publications, 1999), p. 22. and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, are used interchangeably in this article. 9 HT refers to the “people of support” (ahl un-Nusra) 1996), pp. 27, 168. 4 Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, The Islamic State (London: al- who were physically powerful enough not only to help 12 According to the CIA World Factbook, the Muslim Khilafah Publications, 1998), p. 275. establish the first Islamic state, but also to defend it populations in the four Central Asian republics are: Ta- 5 Ibid., pp. 143-144. against enemies. They were the equivalent of an army. By jikistan (90%), Uzbekistan (88%), Kazakhstan (47%), 6 Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, The Method to definition, those who now can help in re-establishing the and Kyrgyzstan (75%).

14 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 current social order. Governments in have responded to the emergence of HT pursues a different strategy in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan HT with repressive measures against each Central Asian country where it is exclude Uzbek minorities, which has its members and supporters. These active. In Uzbekistan, HT spreads its allowed HT to recruit among this class punitive measures, however, are having message clandestinely. In Kyrgyzstan, in these countries. Furthermore, many the opposite effect: HT is growing it takes advantage of the country’s in the population are attracted to the in popularity, as can be measured relatively relaxed political atmosphere prospect of an Islamic government, by its ability to recruit across broad to launch public relations campaigns. In primarily due to the lack of legitimate swathes of society, including students, Kazakhstan, HT is still growing its cadres channels for protest against the region’s businessmen, intellectuals and women. while avoiding a confrontation with the authoritarian governments. Only in Turkmenistan does HT have a authorities. In Tajikistan, HT chooses minimal presence, which is probably to confront both the authorities and Moreover, the collapse of communism due to severe state repression. the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, produced an ideological vacuum in its main political competitor. While Central Asia, which HT has attempted HT differs considerably from other maintaining a coherent and concrete to fill with religious rhetoric. The clandestine Islamist groups when agenda, HT has tactically focused on group appeals to individuals who want it comes to recruitment. The group each country’s unique problems. to believe in a coherent ideology that welcomes as members both men and provides ready answers not only for women. HT is more likely to use its Prospects for the Future spiritual questions, but also practical female members for demonstrations and HT does not constitute an immediate issues. HT’s vision of a universal protests in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, threat to the security of Central Asian Islamic state also appeals to Central based on the belief that security services states. Nevertheless, HT may in the Asians who feel nostalgia for the loss in these countries are less likely to medium- to long-term ally itself with of Soviet society, which theoretically abuse them physically or arrest them. radical elements within the security promoted values of “solidarity” and Also, HT has been active in recruiting services or armed forces to overthrow “justice.” There are widespread feelings prisoners in Central Asia. Jailed HT one or more governments in the Central of mistrust in the capability of Central members propagate their ideology to Asian region in line with the group’s Asian governments to cater to the fellow convicts who, due to the harsh nusra strategy. HT’s rejection of political citizens’ needs. The application of prison conditions, are susceptible to violence is conditional on the prevailing Shari`a, propagated by HT, promises to Islamist messaging. This has become political circumstances: when nusra is a fraction of the population a legitimate such a problem that in Uzbekistan, for not an option, the group aims at the blueprint for a “just” society. Its radical example, authorities tend to isolate HT Islamization of society and the eventual calls to overthrow regimes through members from common prisoners.14 peaceful overthrow of the regime. peaceful measures are well received by many people who, while rejecting Although HT cannot be classified as violence as a method for political change, a terrorist organization, the political have lost hope in the Central Asian implications of its growing influence regimes’ ability to reform themselves. Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), HT has managed to establish in the region are serious. The group a presence in the country. The first HT cells in Tajiki- constitutes an obstacle to the emergence HT’s emergence in Central Asia was stan were established by Uzbek citizens who moved into of democracy in Central Asia, since its initially an “Uzbek phenomenon.” northern Tajikistan in the late 1990s. A rough estimate growing popularity has allowed regional The early development of a mosque- of HT membership in Tajikistan is about 3,000 mem- leaders to solidify their positions and centered faith in Uzbek-populated bers. In Kazakhstan, the first HT members appeared in resist Western calls for political and areas means that the local population 1998. As in Tajikistan, the first generation of members economic reforms. Moreover, if HT were is accustomed to thinking that Islam in southern Kazakhstan were ethnic Uzbeks. In recent to collaborate with an armed force to can provide solutions to problems. years, however, a large number of members are ethnic establish an Islamic state in a country, Since the late 1990s, however, HT Kazakhs. HT likely has about 2,000 members in Kazakh- its next goal would be to re-establish the succeeded in spreading its message stan, mostly active in the south in areas such as Shymkent Islamic caliphate, which would clearly throughout Central Asia. As a result, and Kentau. In Kyrgyzstan, HT is strong in the southern set this new state up for conflict with its HT is the leading Islamist group in provinces of Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken. According to regional neighbors. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and security sources, there are around 4,000 HT members in Kyrgyzstan, with thousands of members Kyrgyzstan. These details are based on: “Hizb ut-Tahrir: Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis is an Assistant 13 in each country. These governments Extremistskaya Organizatsiya,” Shyt [Dushanbe], Janu- Professor of Russian and post-Soviet ary 27, 2005; Personal interview, Igor Savin, director of Politics at the University of Macedonia in 13 Based on interviews with security officials and group NGO Dialogue, Shymkent, Kazakhstan, February 2004; Thessaloniki, Greece and an Investigator at members, as well as extrapolating from the number of ar- Personal interview, Kazakh diplomat, Washington, D.C., the University of Maryland’s START Center. rested members in the country, the author estimates that September 2009; Personal interview, Kazakh security His new book on Hizb al-Tahrir in Central there are around 10,000-15,000 members and many official, Astana, Kazakhstan, February 2009; Personal Asia, Political Islam in Central Asia: The more sympathizers in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan, the interview, Sadykdzhan Mahmoudov, director of NGO Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir, has just been majority of HT members appear to be from the Ferghana Rays of Solomon, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, May 2004. published by Routledge in New York. Valley and Tashkent—as assessed by the number of ar- 14 Personal interview, member of Hizb al-Tahrir, name rested members from these areas. In Tajikistan, despite withheld at request, Namangan, Uzbekistan, August the existence of a legal Islamic party, the Islamic Revival 2005.

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How Terrorist Groups End While some groups pursued their aims internal collapse, public rejection and through violence for decades—such success. With the exception of the latter, By Leonard Weinberg and Arie Perliger as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) these causes are not mutually exclusive. and the Revolutionary Armed Forces One cause may, in reality, reinforce the the current fight against al-Qaìda of Colombia (FARC)—these seem to other. appears to have no end. Various tactics be exceptional cases. Other observers, have been employed to defeat the such as David Rapoport, suggest the Through the work of Audrey Cronin, terrorist group, including assassinating median duration of terrorist groups is along with the authors’ own categories, cell leaders and “re-educating” only about one year.5 it is possible to calculate the frequencies members. Yet the network persists of how terrorist groups end, as seen in and bombs continue to be detonated in Yet are these figures irrelevant if the Table 1. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen, causes for which the terrorist group among other countries.1 struggles persist? The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria, for example, To assess the future of Salafi-jihadi may have been beaten back by the terrorism, it is important to take the authorities, but it was replaced by history of modern terrorism into the Salafist Group for Preaching and consideration. By examining the past, Combat (GSPC) which, in turn, gave it is clear that almost all terrorist rise to al-Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb groups and all terrorist campaigns (AQIM).6 According to Rapoport, these that appeared so menacing in previous causes have come in a series of distinct decades have passed from the scene. “waves.” Since the advent of modern At the end of the 19th and beginning terrorism during the last third of the of the 20th century, for example, the 19th century, he believes there have public in much of the Western world been four such waves. Anarchism was gripped by fear that anarchist was the dominant cause of the first. bands posed a serious challenge to The pursuit of national independence the prevailing social and political defined the second, while left-wing order.2 Kings, presidents, government revolutionary objectives of the 1960s ministers, captains of industry and and 1970s characterized the third. The members of the general public were world now faces a fourth wave whose murdered with some frequency. The leitmotif is religious revivalism, Islamism leading newspapers of the era stressed especially.7 Each of the previous three Table 1. How Terrorist Groups End.8 the extreme danger represented by waves lasted about a generation, or anarchist conspirators. In the United 30-40 years, before receding. If this is As depicted in Table 1, terrorist groups States, the Sacco and Vanzetti case (two true, is there any evidence to suggest rarely achieve their goals. For instance, anarchists who were convicted and the current wave of terrorism will none of the “urban guerrilla” groups executed for murder and bank robbery last longer? This article addresses active in Europe and Latin America in Massachusetts) probably received as that question, first by calculating much worldwide attention as have the frequencies of how past terrorist 8 The table is based on a dataset that was constructed detainees in Guantanamo Bay.3 Yet with groups have ended, and then examining with information gathered from three well-known and the exception of a handful of eccentrics whether al-Qaìda-related terrorism is reliable sources in the field of terrorism studies: 1) Alex (such as the Unabomber), violent a unique phenomenon in the history of P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New anarchism now seems a historical terrorism. Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and curiosity. In fact, by Audrey Cronin’s Literature (Edison, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005); 2) estimate, the lifespan of individual How Terrorist Groups End The MIPT terrorism knowledge base; and 3) The U.S. terrorist groups in general is on average How have terrorist groups ended in the Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Proj- (median) between five and ten years.4 past? Observers have tended to stress ect. The dataset contains groups whose activities met four general causes: external repression, four criteria, which are accepted by the academic community as describing terrorist activity: 1) The group’s ac- 1 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (Philadelphia, PA: Uni- tivities included violent acts, 2) which were perpetrated versity of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Bruce Hoffman, (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2009). Cronin used data in some type of political context, 3) included a symbolic “Al Qaeda Has a Plan — Where’s Ours?” Washington compiled by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of or psychological effect geared toward influencing a wider Post, January 15, 2010. Terrorism. audience than the immediate victims, and 4) were aimed 2 Pyotr Kropotkin, “The Spirit of Revolt,” in Walter La- 5 David Rapoport, “Terrorism,” in Mary Hawkeworth against non-combatants or civilians. Based on these stan- queur ed., The Terrorism Reader (New York: New Ameri- and Maurice Kogan ed., Encyclopedia of Government and dards, the authors compiled a list of 430 political groups can Library, 1978). Politics, Volume 2 (London: Routledge, 1992). that warranted the “terrorist” label. Of these, a total of 3 Paul Avrich, Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of An- 6 Fawaz Gerges, “The Decline of Revolutionary Islam in 232 are not active any more as terrorist groups. To detect archism in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Algeria and Egypt,” Survival 41:1 (1999): pp. 113-125. exactly what led to the groups abandoning terrorism, Press, 1996). 7 David Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave: September 11 the authors used governmental reports, court protocols, 4 Audrey K. Cronin, Ending Terrorism: Lessons for Poli- in the History of Terrorism,” Current History 100:650 online and regular media resources, as well as academic cymakers from the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups (2001): pp. 419-429. books and articles.

16 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 during the 1960s and 1970s succeeded its bloody attack on tourists in Luxor.10 as the Tupamaros in Uruguay.11 In any in igniting a revolution. None of the Nevertheless, at least in the short-run event, repression is a common way by Palestinian groups, secular or religious public opinion does not make a major which terrorist groups come to an end. (Fatah or Hamas), have achieved their contribution in the abandonment of ultimate aim of destroying Israel.9 terrorism. Terrorist groups are often Is Al-Qaìda-led Terrorism Unique able to insulate themselves from Historically? Some groups have achieved their external realities, particularly if they There are three reasons why al-Qaìda- tactical goals. In Lebanon, Hizb Allah’s regard themselves as acting in the name led terrorism might differ from previous precursors managed to persuade France of God. trends. First, unlike previous waves, and the United States to withdraw their the current one is to a large extent forces from Beirut following a series The most common single explanations driven by religion. Religious beliefs of suicide bombings in 1983. About for the end of terrorist group activity often have the power to elicit powerful the same might be said in connection are repression by the authorities emotions usually unavailable to such with Israel’s decision to withdraw (military or police) and the arrest or secular causes as Marxism-Leninism from Lebanon in 2000. Although there killing of a group’s leaders and top and Maoism. Second, al-Qaìda and its are a handful of exceptions, the use of echelon. “Targeted killings,” by the various components are part of a broad terrorism is not a successful means to Israeli government for example, or the social and political Islamist movement, achieve long-term goals. arrest of such key terrorist luminaries not an isolated band of fanatics detached as Abimael Guzman in Peru and physically and emotionally from the Since failure is the most common result Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey, have been rest of society. Third, today’s religious for terrorist groups, what are the criticized on the grounds that they terrorists have access to the internet. No alternatives their leaders confront once only infuriate a group’s members and previous generation of terrorist groups they realize this probability? One option cause them to escalate violence. Yet, had this tool available to publicize their is to abandon the gun for the ballot there should be a distinction between perspectives to an attentive public, box. In some cases—such as the IRA motivation and capacity. The desire to recruit followers and communicate with and the Muslim Brotherhood—leaders raise the level of terrorism may increase adherents on a worldwide basis. make a “strategic decision” to enter in these instances, but the ability to do negotiations with their adversaries and so declines. Terrorist groups are rarely These seem like exceptionally powerful enter or re-enter the political arena. democratic organizations. New leaders factors. Yet there is another side to Rarer still are groups that manage to may not possess the skills or allure of consider. Periods of intense religious escalate their violence from terrorism to their predecessors—as followers of excitement have come and gone over full-scale internal warfare. In Vietnam, Abu Musàb al-Zarqawi in Iraq and the centuries. During the 1880s, for the Viet Cong managed to transform Chechen followers of Shamil Basayev example, a mahdi appeared in Sudan their insurgency along these lines. discovered. Although arresting a key whose goals and those of his followers figure is preferred, it is not always were to eliminate all Western influence A number of variables measure the a possible outcome, especially when from Muslim society.12 Among East impact of internal group dynamics the individual prefers to die rather European Jews during the 18th and terrorism’s reception by the than surrender, or where the terrain century, Shabbetai Zevi was believed public. If taken together, the internal is inaccessible to conventional law by his thousands of followers to be the fragmentation of terrorist groups and enforcement operations. messiah to lead the children of Israel their inability to pass their dreams to a back to the “Promised Land.”13 Over the new generation(s) of militants account for Repression certainly has its critics as course of its history, the United States a relatively small number of outcomes. well. In democracies, critics frequently has been the locale for multiple “Great The same observation applies in the case object to repressive tactics on the Awakenings.”14 In all three instances, of the groups’ external environment. grounds that they violate important The loss of state support, as Libya used constitutional safeguards both at home 11 Arturo Porzcekanski, Uruguay’s Tupamaros (New to provide, has rarely caused groups to and abroad. Other critics stress the York: Praeger Publishers, 1973). The Tupamaros were end their careers. When a state ends self-defeating nature of repression. an urban guerrilla group active in the late 1960s and ear- support for a terrorist group, other Overly indiscriminate acts of repression ly 1970s that sought to provoke the Uruguayan military sources of funding are pursued, such as by the police or military, especially into staging a crackdown and thereby disclose the repres- private philanthropy and bank robbery. foreign forces, act as recruiting tools sive nature of the authorities in Montevideo. The masses On a few occasions, public disapproval for terrorists. This appears to be true would then become committed to the cause of revolution. plays a significant role in ending the in some cases, such as for Palestinian The Tupamaros succeeded in provoking the military to use of terrorist violence—such as with militant groups, but not others, such stage a coup d’etat. The result of the ensuing repression the Egyptian Islamic Group following was the end of the Tupamaros. The country’s masses re- 10 On November 17, 1997, members of the Islamic Group mained largely indifferent to these occurrences. killed 62 people, mostly foreign tourists, visiting the 12 Peter M. Holt, The Mahdist State in Sudan (Oxford: 9 They have, however, achieved some level of political ancient site of Luxor in Egypt. The group had hoped to Clarendon Press, 1958). autonomy to the Palestinian population living in the weaken Egypt’s economy by scaring away foreign tour- 13 Avraham Elqayam, “The Horizon of Reason: The Di- West Bank and Gaza Strip; whether these achievements ists, but they succeeded instead in horrifying the Egyp- vine Madness of Sabbatai Sevi,” Kabbalah 9 (2003): pp. are more a result of international diplomacy and foreign tian public. See Gilles Keppel, Jihad (Cambridge, MA: 7-61. public opinion than terrorism is a matter of debate. Belknap-Harvard, 2002), pp. 276-277. 14 See, for example, Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectual-

17 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 these periods of religious excitement have had some effect, rhetoric aside, in eventually dissipated. demoralizing key figures. Most of al- Recent Highlights in Qaìda’s “nodes” in Southeast Asia, for Terrorist Activity The fact that al-Qaìda is embedded example, have been eliminated. in a broad movement does not make it January 1, 2010 (DENMARK): A Somali immune to decline and defeat either. None of al-Qaìda’s ostensible goals man broke into the home of Kurt Mass protest movements typically have been achieved. Governments in Westergaard, the Danish cartoonist whose have a beginning, middle and end. Cairo, Riyadh and Amman continue to caricature of the Prophet Muhammad was According to many of their observers, function. Jews and “Crusaders” are still published by Jyllands-Posten in 2005. The protest movements end when their present in the Middle East and elsewhere Somali man, who is a Danish resident, was “opportunity structure” narrows— in the House of Islam. The prospects carrying an axe and a knife, and Danish that is, when the authorities become of al-Qaìda creating a new caliphate authorities claim that he was an assassin more effective in dealing with them remain in the realm of the fantastic. In with links to the Somali insurgent and and when the movements themselves short, while the end may not be near, it terrorist group al-Shabab. He was shot become institutionalized as their might not be far off either. and wounded by police before he could leaders transform them into largely reach Westergaard, who was home at the conventional political parties or similar As a result, while no “silver bullet” will time. – The Observer, January 3; AFP, January organizations.15 The history of the bring an end to al-Qaìda, a combination 2; New York Times, January 3 Palestinian group Fatah could serve as of external pressure exerted by the an example, or the role of the Muslim relevant authorities and internal decay January 1, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt brought on by organizational woes bomber detonated an explosives-laden where they are now represented in their should reduce the threat to a manageable vehicle amid a crowd of spectators countries’ parliaments. level.16 What particular mix of “carrots” watching a volleyball game in Lakki and “sticks” is most effective is likely Marwat District of the North-West Another powerful factor possibly to vary with the different national Frontier Province. The bombing killed affecting longevity today is the impact contexts in which the various al-Qaìda 101 people. – AFP, January 3 of the internet. On the other hand, both components operate. As various U.S. Europe and North America abound with political leaders have pointed out, the January 1, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A roadside far right, racist and anti-Semitic groups world is simply not going to move in the bomb killed five people, including an anti- that make extensive use of the internet direction al-Qaìda’s luminaries wish Taliban tribal elder, in Bajaur Agency of in the hope of setting off a racial holy to take it. the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. war and, in their minds, save the Aryan The bomb was detonated remotely. – AFP, race from extinction. Yet despite a Dr. Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of January 1 myriad of websites and chat rooms, no Political Science at the University of Nevada and right-wing holy war appears imminent. a senior fellow at the National Security Studies January 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A In the absence of a critical mass of Center at the University of Haifa in Israel. He has suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone followers, the effect of the internet is been a Fulbright senior research fellow for Italy, killed five alleged militants near Mir distinctly limited and is a tool rather a visiting scholar at UCLA, a guest professor at Ali in North Waziristan Agency of the than a cause. the University of Florence, and the recipient of Federally Administered Tribal Areas. an H.F. Guggenheim Foundation grant for the – al-Jazira, January 4 The Future of Al-Qaìda? study of political violence. He has also served as When assessing the future of al-Qaìda, a consultant to the United Nations Office for the January 6, 2010 (PAKISTAN): U.S. no single factor seems likely to bring Prevention of Terrorism. unmanned aerial drones targeted a Taliban about its demise. It will likely take a training center in North Waziristan combination of the items mentioned Dr. Arie Perliger received his Ph.D. in political Agency of the Federally Administered above. There are, however, some science at the University of Haifa in Israel, Tribal Areas, killing at least 13 militants. favorable signs. According to public where he also taught until 2008. From 2002 to – AFP, January 6; Washington Post, January 7 opinion polls conducted by Pew and 2008, he served as a fellow at the University of Gallup, al-Qaìda enjoys declining levels Haifa’s National Security Studies Center, during January 6, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide of support among sampled respondents which he managed the Terrorism Research bomber killed four Pakistani soldiers in in the Middle East and South Asia, in Project team. In 2007, Dr. Perliger became a Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan- Pakistan especially. Leading clerics Golda Meir Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hebrew administered Kashmir. – Dawn, January 6 have begun to preach that al-Qaìda’s University of Jerusalem and currently serves as a indiscriminate attacks against civilians, visiting assistant professor in the Political Science January 6, 2010 (RUSSIA): A suicide Muslims in particular, conflict with the Department at the State University of New York, bomber in a vehicle killed six police teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Stony Brook. officers in Makhachkala, Dagestan. – New Leadership decapitations appear to York Times, January 6 ism in American Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). 16 For a useful review of how past terrorist groups end- January 7, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A 15 On the concept and theories of “Political Opportunity ed, see Robert Art, “Conclusion,” in Louise Richardson suicide bomber killed 10 people in Gardez, Structure,” see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New ed., Democracy and Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C.: the capital of Paktia Province. The target York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). USIP, 2007). of the attack, pro-government militia

18 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2 commander Nasir Paray, was killed in the faces other charges, such as conspiring to detonating truck bombs outside the blast. – New York Times, January 7 attack a Danish newspaper for publishing Toronto Stock Exchange, the Toronto caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. offices of Canada’s spy agency, and an January 8, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Two – National Post, January 14 Ontario military base. The plot was alleged associates of Najibullah Zazi, an disrupted by Canadian authorities. – ABC Afghan immigrant charged with plotting January 14, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A News, January 18 a series of bombings in New York, suicide bomber attacked a market in the were arrested. The two men have been Dehrawood district of Uruzgan Province, January 18, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): identified as Zarein Ahmedzay and Adis killing 20 civilians. – New York Times, Taliban fighters launched a coordinated Medunjanin. – AFP, January 8 January 14 attack in Kabul, setting off explosives and taking over buildings. Approximately 12 January 8, 2010 (PAKISTAN): An January 14, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. people were killed in the fighting, seven of accidental explosion killed eight unmanned aerial drone targeted Tehrik- whom were militants. – Wall Street Journal, suspected militants at a safe house in i-Taliban Pakistan leader Hakimullah January 18; Los Angeles Times, January 19 Karachi. Authorities suspect that the Mehsud in South Waziristan Agency of explosives—which included suicide the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. January 19, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A jackets—were being stored in the building Approximately 10 people were killed in suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone for future terrorist attacks. The safe house the attack. It is believed that Hakimullah killed five people in the Deegan area of was located in Baldia district, an area of Mehsud eventually died from injuries North Waziristan Agency in Pakistan’s Karachi that is primarily home to Pashtun sustained in the strike. – CNN, January 15; Federally Administered Tribal Areas. migrants from Pakistan’s northwest. CNN, February 9; AP, February 10 – AP, January 19 – Wall Street Journal, January 8 January 14, 2010 (JORDAN): A roadside January 21, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide January 9, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. bomb exploded next to a convoy of vehicles bomber blew up a truck near an Iraqi unmanned aerial drone killed at least four carrying Israeli diplomats in Jordan, yet military base in Baaj, Ninawa Province. militants in Ismail Khel village, located in there were no injuries. – Wall Street Journal, One Iraqi soldier was wounded. – Reuters, North Waziristan Agency of the Federally January 15 January 22 Administered Tribal Areas. It is believed that the strike killed Jamal Saeed Abdul January 15, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. January 21, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Rahim, wanted for his alleged role in unmanned aerial drone killed five people intelligence officials said that a U.S. the September 5, 1986 hijacking of Pan in Zarini village in North Waziristan unmanned aerial drone strike earlier in American World Airways Flight 73. Agency of the Federally Administered January killed Abdul Basit Usman, an – AFP, January 9; AP, January 15 Tribal Areas. – CNN, January 15 alleged Abu Sayyaf Group demolition expert. Usman was captured by Philippine January 10, 2010 (INDIA): Two alleged January 15, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni forces authorities in 2002, but managed to members of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba were killed six alleged al-Qaìda militants in an escape months later. He also was linked killed by Indian Army troops in Reasi airstrike near the Saudi Arabian border. to Jemaah Islamiya. – Philippine Inquirer, district of Indian-administered Kashmir. The airstrike targeted two vehicles on the January 23; New York Times, January 21 – Indian Express, January 11 border between the Yemeni provinces of Saada and al-Jawf. Authorities believe January 22, 2010 (IRAQ): U.S. military January 13, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide that Qasim al-Raymi, the military chief of forces killed Abu Khalaf, identified as a bomber blew up a truck outside a police al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula, was senior al-Qaìda operative and a facilitator station in Anbar Province, killing seven among the dead. – Washington Post, January for the transit of foreign fighters from people. – Reuters, January 13 16; Voice of America, January 15 Syria into Iraq. He was killed in Mosul, Ninawa Province. – UPI, January 28 January 13, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni January 16, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide security forces killed a suspected al- bomber attacked a military vehicle in January 22, 2010 (TURKEY): In a major Qaìda leader and arrested four al-Qaìda Pakistan-administered Kashmir, wounding operation involving 16 provinces, Turkish fighters in eastern Shabwa Province. The two soldiers. – Reuters, January 16 police arrested 120 people with suspected leader of the al-Qaìda cell was identified ties to al-Qaìda. – Guardian, January 22 as Abdullah Mehdar. – Los Angeles Times, January 17, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. January 14; Voice of America, January 13 unmanned aerial drone killed 15 people January 23, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): in the Shaktu area of South Waziristan Taliban militants attempted to kill the January 14, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Agency in the Federally Administered governor of Wardak Province by setting Tahawwur Hussain Rana was indicted Tribal Areas. The strikes targeted a off a hidden bomb as he traveled to a by a U.S. grand jury for his alleged role compound owned by a member of the school building inspection. The governor in the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Mehsud tribe. – New York Times, January 17 escaped injury, but four of his Afghan India. Rana was charged with providing military guards were killed. – New York material support to both the Mumbai January 18, 2010 (CANADA): Zakaria Times, January 23 attacks and to Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, Amara, the ringleader of the so-called the Pakistani terrorist group believed “Toronto 18” terrorist cell, was sentenced January 23, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide responsible for the operation. Rana also to life in prison. The 2006 plot involved bomber attacked a police station in Gomal,

19 february 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 2

located south of Tank in the North-West January 27, 2010 (MALAYSIA): CTC Sentinel Staff Frontier Province. At least five people Authorities in Malaysia announced the were killed by the blast. – RIA Novosti, detention of 10 people with suspected Editor-in-Chief January 23 ties to international terrorist groups, Erich Marquardt including Jemaah Islamiya. Nine of the Senior Editor, CTC January 23, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Taliban 10 detained individuals are foreigners. militants killed seven Pakistani tribesmen – Reuters, January 27 Editorial Board accused of spying for the United States. COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. The killings occurred in North Waziristan January 29, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Department Head Agency of the Federally Administered Taliban fighters, disguised in Afghan Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Tribal Areas. – Reuters, January 24 Army and police uniforms, launched an assault on United Nations and COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. January 24, 2010 (GLOBAL): Usama government buildings in Lashkar Gah, Deputy Department Head bin Ladin purportedly released a the capital of Helmand Province. At Department of Social Sciences (West Point) new audiotape claiming credit for the least five militants were killed, along December 25, 2009 attempted bombing with one civilian. The attack was similar LTC Reid Sawyer of a commercial airliner in the United to the January 18 coordinated Taliban Director, CTC States. The statement read, “The message assault in Kabul. – al-Jazira, January 30; delivered to you through the plane New York Times, January 29 Christopher Heffelfinger of the heroic warrior Umar Farouk FBI Fellow, CTC Abdulmutallab was a confirmation of the January 29, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. previous messages sent by the heroes of unmanned aerial drone killed five the September 11. America will never suspected militants in Muhammad Khel, dream of security unless we will have it located in North Waziristan Agency in reality in Palestine. God willing, our of the Federally Administered Tribal Contact raids on you will continue as long as your Areas. – AFP, January 29 Combating Terrorism Center support for the Israelis continues.” – BBC, U.S. Military Academy January 24; Australian, January 25 January 30, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall bomber detonated his explosives at West Point, NY 10996 January 25, 2010 (IRAQ): Suicide a restaurant in Samara, Salah al-Din Phone: (845) 667-6383 bombers attacked three landmark hotels Province, killing at least two people. Email: [email protected] in Baghdad near-simultaneously, killing The restaurant was reportedly popular Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ at least 36 people. The targeted hotels among Iraqi police. – Voice of America, include the Sheraton, the Hamra, and the January 30 * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 Babylon. The Islamic State of Iraq later claimed credit for the bombings. – Los January 30, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A Angeles Times, January 25; Voice of America, suicide bomber killed 16 people at a January 27 police checkpoint in Bajaur Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal January 26, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A Areas. – AP, January 30 support bomb exploded outside the main gate at The Combating Terrorism Center would Camp Phoenix, a U.S. military base on January 30, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni like to express its gratitude to its financial the outskirts of Kabul. There were no security forces detained an alleged al- supporters, for without their support and confirmed reports of fatalities, although Qa`ida militant wearing an explosives shared vision of the Center products like Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid belt. Authorities charge that the man the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If claimed that the bomb killed 25 soldiers. was planning a suicide bombing on you are interested in learning more about – CNN, January 26; New York Times, January 26 “economic facilities” in Hadramawt. how to support the Combating Terrorism – Reuters, January 30 Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. January 26, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at bomber in a vehicle exploded outside January 31, 2010 (PAKISTAN): West Point’s Association of Graduates at the Iraqi Interior Ministry’s forensics Pakistani forces killed 15 Taliban 845-446-1553. department in Baghdad, killing at least 18 militants in Bajaur Agency of the people. – Christian Science Monitor, January 26 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The fighting erupted after Taliban January 27, 2010 (PAKISTAN): The fighters attacked a military checkpoint body of anti-Taliban militia leader Malik and convoy. – Reuters, February 1 Manaris Khan was found in Bajaur Agency of the Federally Administered The views expressed in this report are those of Tribal Areas. Khan, who was kidnapped the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, on January 25, had been shot to death. the Department of the Army, or any other agency – AFP, January 27 of the U.S. Government.