A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008 Samuel John Mullins University of Wollongong

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008 Samuel John Mullins University of Wollongong University of Wollongong Research Online University of Wollongong Thesis Collection University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 2010 A systematic analysis of Islamist terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008 Samuel John Mullins University of Wollongong Recommended Citation Mullins, Samuel John, A systematic analysis of Islamist terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, 2010. http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3442 Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact Manager Repository Services: morgan@uow.edu.au. ‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree Doctor of Philosophy from The University of Wollongong by Samuel John Mullins (MA., MSc) Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, Faculty of Law 2010 Certification I, Samuel John Mullins, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, at the Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged below. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution. Samuel J. Mullins August 25, 2010 (Re-submitted following minor corrections, November 11, 2010) ii ‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW Table of Contents List of Tables pp.viii-xix List of Figures pp.xx-xxi List of Terms & Abbreviations pp.xxii-xxiii Abstract pp.xxiv-xxvi Acknowledgments p.xxvii Chapter 1: Introduction Part 1: Working Definitions pp.1-12 1. Working Definitions pp.3-12 1.1 Terrorism pp.3-6 1.2 Islamist Terrorism pp.7-8 1.3 Home-grown Islamist Terrorism pp.9-10 Chapter 2: Research Questions and Methodology pp.13-27 2.1 Research Questions pp.15-16 2.2 Goals p.16 2.3 Justification pp.16-17 2.4 Methodology pp.17-26 2.4.1 Phase 1: Literature Review and Identification of Key Variables pp.17-20 2.4.2 Phase 2: Case Study Selection and Data Collection pp.20-24 Case Study Selection pp.20-22 Data Collection pp.22-24 Limitations of the data pp.24-25 2.4.3 Phase 3: Case Study Analysis p.25 2.4.4 Phase 4: Cross-comparison and Conclusions p.26 Chapter 3: Introduction Part 2: The Evolution of Home-Grown Islamist Terrorism in the West pp.28-62 3.1 Terror in the Middle East and the Move from Secular to ‘Spiritual’ Terrorism pp.31-32 3.2 The Iranian Revolution and the Afghan Jihad pp.33-34 3.3 The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda and the Seeds of Home-Grown Terrorism pp. 35-50 3.3.1 The Jihadi Warzones pp.35-37 3.3.2 The First Attacks in the West pp.38-40 3.3.3 Al-Qaeda Takes Centre Stage pp.40-41 3.3.4 The West as a Primary Target pp.41-44 3.3.5 Al-Qaeda as a ‘Brand Name’ and the Growth of HGIT pp.45-50 3.4 Explaining the Evolution of Global Islamist Terrorism pp.51-55 iii Chapter 4: Current Understanding of the Threat Part 1: Explaining Terrorism pp.63-97 4.1 Individual Explanations pp.65-67 4.1.1 Psychopathology pp.65-66 4.1.2 Personal Trauma pp.66-67 4.2 Societal Explanations pp.68-70 4.2.1 Root causes pp.68-69 4.2.2 Relative Deprivation pp.69-70 4.3 Social Explanations pp.71-90 4.3.1 Social Influence pp.71-76 Brainwashing pp.71-72 Top-down vs. Bottom-up Influence pp.72-75 Ideology and Behaviour pp.75-76 4.3.2 Social Identity pp.77-84 Identity ‘Crises’ pp.77-78 Theories of Identity and Terrorism pp.79-80 Theories of Identity Applied pp.80-83 Processes of Identification pp.83-84 4.3.3 Social Organisation pp.84-91 Structural Developments pp.84-86 Stability, Identity and Permeability pp.86-87 Islamist Terrorism as a Social Movement pp.87-89 An Alternative Social Movement Perspective pp.89-91 Chapter 5: Current Understanding of the Threat Part 2: The Radicalisation Process pp.98-118 5.1 Precipitating Risk Factors pp.101-102 5.2 Ideological and Social Progression pp.103-104 5.3 The Mechanism of the Group pp.105-106 5.4 Patterns of Radicalisation pp.106-108 5.4.1 Joining the Radical Social Scene p.106 5.4.2 Increasing militancy p.107 5.4.3 Training for Jihad pp.107-108 5.5 Going Operational pp.109-110 5.6 Recent Developments pp.111-115 5.6.1 Increased Autonomy pp.111-112 5.6.2 The Impact of the Internet pp.112-114 5.6.3 Changing Jihadi Profiles pp.114-115 Chapter 6: Islamist Terrorism in the USA pp.119-139 6.1 Historical Overview of Terrorism in America pp.121-122 6.2 Islamist Terrorism in the US pp.122-135 6.2.1 Pre-1993 pp.122-125 6.2.2 1993-2001 pp.126-132 6.2.3 Post 9/11 pp.132-135 iv ‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW Chapter 7: Islamist Terrorism in the UK pp.140-159 7.1 Historical Overview of Terrorism in Britain pp.142-144 7.2 Islamist Terrorism in the UK pp.144-155 7.2.1 Pre-9/11 pp.144-151 7.2.2 2001-2005 pp. 151-153 7.2.3 Post-7/7 pp. 153-155 Chapter 8: HGIT in the US and UK: Preliminary Comparisons pp.160-181 8.1 ‘Facts’ & Figures pp.162-171 8.2 Explaining the Difference pp.171-176 8.3 Reflecting on Current Explanations pp.177-178 8.4 The Need for Further Research p.179 Chapter 9: Case Study Analysis Part 1: Islamist Terrorism in the United States: 2001-2008 pp.182-235 9.1 Statistical Summary pp.185-186 9.2 Analysis of variables pp.187-230 9.2.1 Geographical distribution pp.187-189 9.2.2 Demographic profiles pp.189-199 Gender, Nationality & Age pp.189-191 Education pp.192-193 Occupation pp.193-194 Faith p.195 Marital Status p.196 Criminal record pp.197-199 Mental Health p.199 9.2.3 Offence date range p.200 9.2.4 Radicalisation pp.201-202 9.2.5 Group characteristics pp.203-206 Immediate group size pp.203-204 Leadership pp.205-206 9.2.6 Operational activity pp.207-218 Ideological commitment pp.207-210 Behavioural classification pp.210-212 Domestic vs. overseas focus & operation pp.213-216 Planned M.O. of attacks pp.217-218 9.2.7 International dimensions & associations pp.218-223 9.2.8 The role of the Internet pp.224-227 9.2.9 Stated motivations pp.228-229 9.2.10 Outcomes pp.229-230 9.3 Summary and conclusions pp.231-234 v Chapter 10: Case Study Analysis Part 2: Islamist Terrorism in the United Kingdom: 2001-2008 pp.236-296 10.1 Statistical Summary pp.238-240 10.2 Analysis of variables pp.241-295 10.2.1 Geographical distribution pp.241-243 10.2.2 Demographic profiles pp.244-255 Gender, Nationality & Age pp.244-246 Education pp.246-248 Occupation pp.248-250 Faith p.250 Marital Status p.251 Criminal record pp.252-253 Mental Health p.254-255 10.2.3 Offence date range pp.255-256 10.2.4 Radicalisation pp.256-258 10.2.5 Group characteristics pp.258-261 Immediate group size pp.258-260 Leadership pp.260-261 10.2.6 Operational activity pp.262-276 Ideological commitment pp.262-265 Behavioural classification pp.265-269 Domestic vs. overseas focus & operation pp.270-274 Planned M.O. of attacks pp.275-277 10.2.7 International dimensions & associations pp.276-283 10.2.8 The role of the Internet pp.284-287 10.2.9 Stated motivations pp.287-288 10.2.10 Outcomes pp.289-291 10.3 Summary and conclusions pp.291-295 vi ‘A Systematic Analysis of Islamist Terrorism in the USA and UK: 2001-2008’ Sam Mullins, 3335884, CTCP, UoW Chapter 11: Cross-Comparison and Conclusions pp.297-350 11.1 Statistical Summaries pp.299-300 11.2 Geographical distribution pp.301-302 11.3 Demographic profiles pp.302-307 Gender, Nationality & Age pp.302-303 Education pp.302-304 Occupation pp.304-305 Faith p.305 Marital Status p.306 Criminal record pp.306-307 Mental Health p.307 11.4 Offence date range p.308 11.5 Radicalisation p.309 11.6 Group characteristics pp.310-312 Immediate group size p.310 Leadership pp.311-312 11.7 Operational activity pp.313-325 Ideological commitment pp.303-314 Behavioural classification pp.315-320 Domestic vs. overseas focus & operation pp.320-324 Planned M.O. of attacks p.325 11.8 International dimensions & associations pp.326-330 11.9 The role of the Internet pp.331-333 11.10 Stated motivations pp.333-334 11.11 Outcomes pp.334-336 11.12 Comparative summary pp.337-342 11.13 Theoretical implications pp.342-343 11.14 Implications for counter-terrorism pp.343-348 11.15 Concluding remarks p.348 Bibliography pp.351-430 Appendix A Part 1: List of US Cases Included in the Sample in Chronological Order pp.431-436 Appendix A: Part 2: United States Case Summaries pp.437-495 Appendix A Part 3 List of US Cases Excluded from the Sample in Chronological Order pp.496-503 Appendix B Part 1: List of UK Cases Included in the Sample in Chronological Order pp.504-509 Appendix B: Part 2 United Kingdom Case Summaries pp.510-590 Appendix B Part 3: List of UK Cases Excluded from the Sample in Chronological Order pp.591-597 vii List of Tables Table 3.1.
Recommended publications
  • CITY of COOS BAY CITY COUNCIL Agenda Staff Report
    CITY OF COOS BAY CITY COUNCIL Agenda Staff Report MEETING DATE AGENDA ITEM NUMBER September 17, 2013 Continued from August 6, 2013 TO: Mayor Shoji and City Councilors FROM: Rodger Craddock, City Manager eJlC ISSUE: Should the City of Coos Bay enact a resolution calling for the repeal of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NOAA), and direct City employees not to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the Act. BACKGROUND On August 6, 2013, several individuals including Tom McKirgan (Coquille) and Rob Taylor (Bandon) made a presentation to the Council regarding their concerns over the constitutionality of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NOAA), and they have requested that the City of Coos Bay pass their proposed resolution which would call for the repeal of the Act as well as prohibit the City through its police force from enforcing the Act or assisting others such as the Federal Government in enforcing the Act within the City. Attached you will find a copy of the August 61h report provided to the Council which includes the following: 1. Agenda staff report prepared by City Attorney Nathan McClintock (attachment one) 2. Letter to the Council from Rob Taylor, Connie Martin, and Tom McKirgen (attachment two) 3. Proposed resolution (attachment three) During the presentation on August 6, 2013, Mr. McKirgan provided the following documents to the Council for their review and consideration: 1. Wikipedia article on Brandon Mayfield and his arrest in 2004. (attachment four) 2. Document titled "Myths and Deceptions about the NOAA FY2012" (attachment five) 3. Unsigned letter presumably to the Council (attachment six) By a majority vote, the Council decided to postpone consideration of the matter to a future meeting.
    [Show full text]
  • “TELLING the STORY” Sources of Tension in Afghanistan & Pakistan: a Regional Perspective (2011-2016)
    “TELLING THE STORY” Sources of Tension in Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Regional Perspective (2011-2016) Emma Hooper (ed.) This monograph has been produced with the financial assistance of the Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Ministry. © 2016 CIDOB This monograph has been produced with the financial assistance of the Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Ministry. CIDOB edicions Elisabets, 12 08001 Barcelona Tel.: 933 026 495 www.cidob.org cidob@cidob.org D.L.: B 17561 - 2016 Barcelona, September 2016 CONTENTS CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES 5 FOREWORD 11 Tine Mørch Smith INTRODUCTION 13 Emma Hooper CHAPTER ONE: MAPPING THE SOURCES OF TENSION WITH REGIONAL DIMENSIONS 17 Sources of Tension in Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Regional Perspective .......... 19 Zahid Hussain Mapping the Sources of Tension and the Interests of Regional Powers in Afghanistan and Pakistan ............................................................................................. 35 Emma Hooper & Juan Garrigues CHAPTER TWO: KEY PHENOMENA: THE TALIBAN, REFUGEES , & THE BRAIN DRAIN, GOVERNANCE 57 THE TALIBAN Preamble: Third Party Roles and Insurgencies in South Asia ............................... 61 Moeed Yusuf The Pakistan Taliban Movement: An Appraisal ......................................................... 65 Michael Semple The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan .......................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Proscribed Terrorist Organisations
    PROSCRIBED TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS PROSCRIPTION CRITERIA Under the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned in terrorism. For the purposes of the Act, this means that the organisation: • commits or participates in acts of terrorism; • prepares for terrorism; • promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or • is otherwise concerned in terrorism. “Terrorism” as defined in the Act, means the use or threat which: involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person’s life (other than that of the person committing the act); creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public; or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. The use or threat of such action must be designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and be undertaken for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. If the statutory test is met, there are other factors which the Secretary of State will take into account when deciding whether or not to exercise the discretion to proscribe. These discretionary factors are: • the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; • the specific threat that it poses to the UK; • the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; • the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and • the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • Individuals and Organisations
    Designated individuals and organisations Listed below are all individuals and organisations currently designated in New Zealand as terrorist entities under the provisions of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. It includes those listed with the United Nations (UN), pursuant to relevant Security Council Resolutions, at the time of the enactment of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and which were automatically designated as terrorist entities within New Zealand by virtue of the Acts transitional provisions, and those subsequently added by virtue of Section 22 of the Act. The list currently comprises 7 parts: 1. A list of individuals belonging to or associated with the Taliban By family name: • A • B,C,D,E • F, G, H, I, J • K, L • M • N, O, P, Q • R, S • T, U, V • W, X, Y, Z 2. A list of organisations belonging to or associated with the Taliban 3. A list of individuals belonging to or associated with ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida By family name: • A • B • C, D, E • F, G, H • I, J, K, L • M, N, O, P • Q, R, S, T • U, V, W, X, Y, Z 4. A list of organisations belonging to or associated with ISIL (Daesh) and Al-Qaida 5. A list of entities where the designations have been deleted or consolidated • Individuals • Entities 6. A list of entities where the designation is pursuant to UNSCR 1373 1 7. A list of entities where the designation was pursuant to UNSCR 1373 but has since expired or been revoked Several identifiers are used throughout to categorise the information provided.
    [Show full text]
  • The Suffocation of Free Speech Under the Gravity of Danger of Terrorism
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by bepress Legal Repository First Amendment Tim Davis Prof. Raskin The Suffocation of Free Speech under the Gravity of Danger of Terrorism I. Introduction Ali al -Timimi (“al- Timimi”) is an outspoken Muslim scholar who is well respected in the worldwide Muslim community. In his fervent support of Muslims everywhere, he has openly proclaimed that America is one of the chief enemies of the Muslim populace. 1 He has proclaimed that the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia was a sign for Muslims to take action.2 He has urged young Muslim men to jihad, to wage armed conflict with the enemies of Islam. 3 It is safe to say that al -Timimi has made numerous speeches that most Americans would find highly objectionable. On September 23, 2004, the Federal government charged al -Timimi with a six -co unt indictment4, which was later superceded by the present ten -count indictment. 5 During the trial in April 2005, the prosecution introduced over 250 evidentiary exhibits 6, testimony from several expert witnesses on radical Islamism 7, and testimony from various government agents. In 1 Presentencing Report for Muhammed Aatique at 17, United States v. Khan, (No. 03 -296 -A). 2 Presentencing Report for Muhammed Aatique at 17, United States v. Khan, (No. 03 -296 -A). 3 Transcripts, Rebuttal Argument by Mr. Kromberg, Pleading 123 at 14, United States v. Al -Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385). 4 Indictment, United States v. Al -Timimi, (No. 1:04cr385), available at http://www.altimimi.org.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic Radicalization in the Uk: Index of Radicalization
    ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN THE UK: INDEX OF RADICALIZATION Anna Wojtowicz, (Research Assistant, ICT) Sumer 2012 ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to analyze the process of radicalization amongst British Muslims in the United Kingdom. It begins with a review of the Muslim population, demographics and community structure. Further presenting several internal and external indicators that influenced and led to radicalization of Muslim youth in Britain. The paper concludes that there is no one certainty for what causes radicalization amongst Muslims in United Kingdom. However, it is certain that Islamic radicalization and the emergence of a homegrown threat is a growing trend that jeopardizes the countries security, peace and stability. Radicalization in the United Kingdom is an existing concern that needs to be addressed and acted upon immediately. Misunderstanding or underestimating the threat may lead to further and long term consequences. * The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). 2 I. Introduction 4 II. Background 5 History of the Muslim Community in the United Kingdom 5 Population 7 Geographical Concentration of Muslims 8 Ethnic Background 10 Age Estimate 11 Occupation and Socio-Economic Conditions 11 Religious and Cultural Aspects 13 Multiculturalism 17 Islamophobia 20 Converts 21 Case Studies –London, Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds, Leicester 22 III. Organizations 28 Organizations within the United Kingdom 28 Mosques, Koranic Schools and Islamic Centers 34 Student Groups 40 Islamic Websites and TV 43 IV. Radicalization in Britain 43 Theoretical Background and Causes of Radicalization 43 Recruitment and Radicalization: Overlook 47 Radicalization Process 49 Forms of Financing 51 Radical Groups and Movements in the UK 53 Influential Leaders in the UK 60 Inspiration and Influence from Abroad 67 Sunni 67 Shia 70 3 V.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamist and Middle Eastern Terrorism: a Threat to Europe?
    © Rubbettino Centro Militare di Studi Strategici - Roma © Rubbettino Islamist and Middle Eastern Terrorism: A threat to Europe? Maria do Céu Pinto (University of Minho Portugal) Rubbettino © Rubbettino Copyright © by CeMiSS Centro Militare di Studi Strategici Piazza della Rovere, 83 - 00165 Roma (RM) e-mail: relest.cemiss@casd.difesa.it © 2004 - Rubbettino Editore 88049 Soveria Mannelli - Viale Rosario Rubbettino, 10 -Tel. (0968) 662034 www.rubbettino.it © Rubbettino Index Abstract: 7 Introduction 9 I Islamist and Middle Eastern Terrorism in Europe: The Background 11 I.1. Palestinian Terrorism 11 I.2. Iranian Terrorism 17 II New Patterns of Islamist Terrorism in the 1990s 21 II.1. A New Age of Terrorism 21 II.2. Religious Terrorism 22 III The Web of Terror in Europe 31 III.1. Interlocking Terror Plots 31 III.2. Al-Qaeda: an Umbrella Network 32 III.3. Mosques: Recruitment and Indoctrination 36 IV Groups and Activities of Islamic Terrorists in Europe 41 IV.1. England 41 IV.2. France And Belgium 49 IV.3. Italy 53 IV.4. Germany 62 IV.5. Spain 65 IV.6. The Netherlands 71 V Evaluating the Terrorist Threat to Europe’s Security 75 V.1. Al-Qaeda’s European Infrastructure after 11th September 75 V.2. Islamic Communities in Europe: A Breeding Ground of Terrorists? 76 Conclusion 77 Bibliography 79 © Rubbettino 5 © Rubbettino Abstract During three decades Middle Eastern terrorism in Europe was largely a spillover from problems in the Middle East. Europe was a preferential oper- ational area for Arab, Palestinian and Iranian terrorists fighting each other. In the 1990s, a new Islamic threat emerged as a result of the activities of “ad hoc” terrorist groups, which lack a well-established organisational identity and tend to decentralise and compartmentalise their activities.
    [Show full text]
  • National Security Case Studies Special
    National Security Case Studies Special Case-Management Challenges Robert Timothy Reagan Federal Judicial Center June 25, 2013 This Federal Judicial Center publication was undertaken in furtherance of the Center’s statutory mission to develop and conduct research and education programs for the judicial branch. While the Center regards the content as responsible and valuable, it does not reflect policy or recommendations of the Board of the Federal Judicial Center. Contents Table of Challenges .......................................................................................................... xi Table of Judges ............................................................................................................... xiii INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 2 TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS ..................................................................................... 3 First World Trade Center Bombing United States v. Salameh (Kevin Thomas Duffy) and United States v. Abdel Rahman (Michael B. Mukasey) (S.D.N.Y.) ....................................................................... 5 Challenge: Interpreters ............................................................................................. 24 Challenge: Court Security ......................................................................................... 24 Challenge: Pro Se Defendants ................................................................................. 24 Challenge: Jury
    [Show full text]
  • The Militant Pipeline Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West
    New America Foundation National Security Studies Program Policy Paper The Militant Pipeline Between the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region and the West Paul Cruickshank Second Edition July 2011; First Edition February 2010 Of the 32 “serious” jihadist terrorist plots against the West between 2004 and 2011, 53 percent had operational or training links to established jihadist groups in Pakistan and just 6 percent to Yemen. A decade after 9/11, despite growing concerns over Yemen, entry to join the fighting in Afghanistan, the presence of al Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Qaeda, and its sustained ability to train recruits and swaths of the country’s northwest arguably remain al Qaeda persuade them to launch attacks in the West, continue to ’s main safe haven, and the area from which it can hatch its make the FATA what President Obama called in 2009 “the most dangerous plots against the West. 1 Al Qaeda’s most dangerous place in the world.” 4 presence in these areas has long threatened international security. It was in Peshawar in Pakistan’s northwest that al U.S. officials have recently suggested that when it comes to Qaeda was founded in 1988, and ever since Pakistan’s the U.S. homeland, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen – al Qaeda border region with Afghanistan has been a gateway for in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – could now pose a recruits joining the terrorist network and its affiliates, and greater threat than “al Qaeda Central” in the tribal areas of an area in which its senior figures have felt comfortable Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Il Caso Al-Muhajiroun: L’Opportunismo Come Mezzo Di Indottrinamento Jihadista
    Corso di Laurea in Lingue, Economie e Istituzioni dell’Asia e dell’Africa Mediterranea LM40-15 Tesi di Laurea Il caso al-Muhajiroun: L’opportunismo come mezzo di indottrinamento jihadista Relatore Ch. Prof. Marco Salati Correlatore Ch. Prof. Barbara De Poli Laureando Irene Favalli Matricola 841700 Anno Accademico 2016 / 2017 ~ 1 ~ Indice p. 3. اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻤﺔ Introduzione . .p. 9 Capitolo I: Basi di pensiero salafita. .p. 12 Capitolo II: Nascita, crescita e diffusione di un gruppo jihadista. .p. 27 Biografia di Omar Bakri Muhammad. .p. 92 Biografia di Anjem Choudary. .p. 95 Capitolo III Ideologie, interpretazioni e contrasti. .p. 97 Bibliografia. .p. 124 Sitografia. .p. 126 Articoli in lingua araba. .p. 143 ~ 2 ~ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﺗﺘﺤــــــــــــــــــﺪث ﻫــــــــــــــــــﺬە اﻷﻃﺮوﺣــــــــــــــــــﺔ ﻋــــــــــــــــــﻦ ﺣﺮﻛــــــــــــــــــﺔ "اﻟﻤﻬــــــــــــــــــﺎﺟﺮون" اﻟﻄﺎﻧــــــــــــــــــﺔ اﻷﺻــــــــــــــــــﻮﻟﺔ واـــــــﺪﻳﻮﻟﻮﺟﺎﻫﺎ وﺸـــــــﺄﺗﻬﺎ وﺗﺎرﺨﻬـــــــﺎ ﺣـــــــ اﻟﻴـــــــﻮم. ﺳـــــــﻤﻌﺖ اﺳـــــــﻢ ﻫـــــــﺪە اﻟﺤﺮﻛـــــــﺔ اﻟﻤـــــــﺮة اﻷو ﻋــــــﺎم 2013 ﺗﻘــــــﺎ، ﻋﻨــــــﺪﻣﺎ ﻗــــــﺮأت ﺻــــــﺤﻔﺔ ﺑﻄﺎﻧــــــﺔ ﻋــــــﻦ ﺣــــــﺎدث ﻋﺠــــــﺐ ﺟــــــﺪا ﻣــــــﻦ ﻧﻈــــــﺮي ﻣﺮﻛـــــــﺰ ﻣﺪﻳﻨـــــــﺔ ﻟﻨـــــــﺪن، ﺣـــــــﺚ أزﻋﺠـــــــﺖ ﻓﺮﻗـــــــﺔ ﻟﻠﻄﺠـــــــﺔ ﻌـــــــﺾ اﻷﺷـــــــﺨﺎص اﻟﺸـــــــﺎرع وﻛـــــــوا زﺟﺎﺟـــــــﺎت ﺑـــــــﺗﻬﻢ وأﻫـــــــﺎﻧﻮا ﻌــــــــﺾ اﻟﻔﺘـــــــﺎت ﺴـــــــﺐ ﻟﺎﺳــــــــﻬﻦ اﻟﻔﺎﺿـــــــﺢ وأﻀـــــــﺎ زوﺟـــــــﺎن ﺎﻧــــــــﺎ ﻤﺸـــــﺎن ا ﻟـــــﺪ اﻟـــــﺪ أﻣـــــﺎم ﻣﺴـــــﺠﺪ اﻟﺤـــــﺎرة "ﺗـــــﺎوﺮ ﺣـــــﺎﻣﻠﻴ"
    [Show full text]
  • Download Thepdf
    Volume 59, Issue 5 Page 1395 Stanford Law Review KEEPING CONTROL OF TERRORISTS WITHOUT LOSING CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM Clive Walker © 2007 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, from the Stanford Law Review at 59 STAN. L. REV. 1395 (2007). For information visit http://lawreview.stanford.edu. KEEPING CONTROL OF TERRORISTS WITHOUT LOSING CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM Clive Walker* INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS OF COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES AND LAWS................................................................................................ 1395 I. CONTROL ORDERS ..................................................................................... 1403 A. Background to the Enactment of Control Orders............................... 1403 B. The Replacement System..................................................................... 1408 1. Control orders—outline................................................................ 1408 2. Control orders—contents and issuance........................................ 1411 3. Non-derogating control orders..................................................... 1416 4. Derogating control orders............................................................ 1424 5. Criminal prosecution.................................................................... 1429 6. Ancillary issues............................................................................. 1433 7. Review by Parliament and the Executive...................................... 1443 C. Judicial Review..................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • OUSSAMA ABDULLAH KASSIR, A/K/A "Abu Abdullah," A/K/A "Abu Khadi Ja, "
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -X UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -v. - INDICTMENT MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA, S2 04 Cr. 356 (JFK) a/k/a "Abu Hamza, " a/k/a "Abu Hamza al-Masri , " a/k/a "Mustafa Kamel," a/k/a "Mostafa Kamel Mostafa, ": OUSSAMA ABDULLAH KASSIR, a/k/a "Abu Abdullah," a/k/a "Abu Khadi ja, " and HAROON RASHID ASWAT, a/k/a "Haroon, " a/k/a "Haroon Aswat, " Defendants. COUNT ONE CONSPIRACY TO TAKE HOSTAGES (THE ATTACK IN YEMEN) The Grand Jury charges: 1. ~romon or about December 23, 1998, up to and including on or about December 29, 1998, in an offense begun out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA, a/k/a "Abu Hamza, " a/k/a "Abu Hamza al-Masri, " a/k/a "Mustafa Karnel," a/k/a "Mostafa Karnel Mostafa," the defendant, and others known and unknown, at least one of whom'was first brought to - -- ,' and arrested in the Southern District of New York, unlawfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Section 1203 of Title 18, United States Code. 2. It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA, the defendant, and others known and unknown, - : would and did, inside and outside the United States, unlawfully and knowingly seize and detain and threaten to kill, to injure, and to continue to detain other persons, including two U.S. nationals, in - order compel a third person and a governmental organization, wit, the government of Yemen, to do and abstain fxom doing any act explicit and implicit condition for the release the persons detained.
    [Show full text]