File:free religion ed-final1

China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activityi

Beatrice Leung, Ph.D. Associate Professor, Department of Politics and Sociology Lingnan University Tuen Mun, Hong Kong. E-mail:[email protected]

i The author is grateful to the Graduate and Research Committee of Lingnan University which gave her a research grant for this study. She is very grateful to Leo F. Goodstadt who gave very valuable comments and suggestions at different stages of writing the research. She also owes her gratitude To Ben Blain who proof read the manuscript, and two of anonymous reviewers who gave valuable suggestions to improve the quality of the paper.

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China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted a “Religious Freedom Policy” soon after it came to power in 1949. However, restrictions have been continuously imposed on religious organizations, religious personnel and religious activities.1 In discussing this paradox, I explore the State’s official interpretation of its Religious

Freedom Policy and examine how the policy is implemented in practice. In the course of study, I find out that the “Religious Freedom Policy” is only instrumental to control religions. The purpose of this study is to discussion how “Religious Freedom

Policy“ has been used as an instrument to elucidate the CCP’s desire to retain institutional and ideological control over this particular sector of Chinese society.2

The findings also highlight twists and turns of the ideological clash between religious idealism and the dialectic materialism of the CCP of Maoist period plus the economic materialism (e.g. to get rich is glorious) of Deng-Jiang era.

World Religions and the Chinese 1949 Revolution

When Mao came to power in 1949 he proclaimed that no other ideologies except his and Marxism-Leninism would be allowed.3 Social reforms were launched to eliminate imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratism, and prepare the soil for the growth of the Democratic Centralism in which the CCP could control every aspect of life.4 Apart from the ideological incompatibility between the atheist orientation of

2 Marxism-Leninism and religion, the Chinese leaders believed religion was closely linked to “foreign cultural imperialism”(Christianity) and “feudalism”(Buddhism and

Taoism).5 Thus, any religious system was regarded as a contradiction to the socialist system.6 It sets the tone of the China’s church-state relations in the context of conflicting in teaching authority between dialectic materialism and religious idealism in the coming five decades. The religious freedom policy has its origin from Mao and lasts for the last fifty more years. There were changes and continuity in the implementation of the policy. The continuity of the policy rooted at the basic thrust of the ideological incompatibility between dialectic materialism and religious idealism. However, the complexity of religions involves problems in minority nationalities, international relations, and national security7. Also the change of political landscape in Dengist China both internally and externally called for changes in the application of the policy. When Mao decided to lead the mass of Chinese people marching towards the socialist utopia, no other ideology except that of dialectic materialism was allowed. Therefore the implementation of Religious Freedom Policy aimed at the extinction of religion preparing the ground for the will-be-coming of the social utopia. In the atmosphere of relaxation of ideological matters under the open door policy of Deng Xiaoping in 1980s, the relaxation of control of religion was necessary to create a liberal atmosphere to encourage people engaging in the national reconstruction, and invite foreign investment. However, the resurrection of religion coincided with the Party’s crisis of faith, and the proliferation of religion alarmed top Party leaders8. The June 4 1989 Incident in Tiananmen

Square triggered off ideological control including religion. The Party’s fundamental contradiction in ideology by introducing market economy worsened the crisis of the faith, and the appearance of Falun Gong prompted the Party to have more control on religious matters. On the other hand, the more opening to

3 the international community, China has to face more international criticism on the violation of human rights which including freedom of religion. To strike a balance, a tight control with a sophisticated approach through

“accommodation” and ”legality” suggested by Jiang Zemin was adopted becoming the guideline of the recent implementation of the Religious Freedom

Policy.

Being a revolutionary party with a combating nature, the Bolshevik party had its organizational strategy and tactics to weaken the target organizations for the interest of the Party. The CCP adopted the Bolshevik tradition of organizational control on civil organizations once it became the ruling party.9 Buddhism and Taoism have long been part of Chinese culture.10 Without strong institutional structures, the activities of these religions, apart from some mass movement and secret society participation, have been relatively easy for the CCP to monitor and manage.11

Among the 91 millions Chinese national minorities there are 17.5 millions

Islamic adherents which Chinese called them Hui JiaoTu (believers of Islamism).They widely spread over the vast but strategically sensitive territories of northwest

(Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu and Ningxia) and southwest (Kunming) with different language and ethnic-religious traditions from that of Han12. Thus Muslim question in

China has its own characteristics because it has been associated with national minorities and national security. In the founding of People’s Republic of China government recognized 10 Muslim nationalities in China: Hui, Uygur, Kazakm

Dongxiang, Kirghir, Salar, Tadjik, Uzbek, Baonan and Tartar. Except the Hui, most of them have their own Altaic-Turisk, Indo-European languages, and they have their own counterparts scattered in the Inner Asia. Apart from ideological clash between materialism of Marxism- Leninism and religious idealism, organizational strength of some structured religions i.e. Catholicism also attributes to CCP’s control in religion

4 following the Bolshevik tradition on organizational manipulation.

China’s Religious Freedom Policy Defined

When formulating the Religious Freedom Policy, the CCP’s theorists separated the two major components of a religion, namely, religious organization and religious beliefs.14 As the CCP was made up of nonbelievers, it had no means to deal with religious beliefs and doctrine.15 It therefore adopted Bolshevik mechanism and united front tactics to manipulate the religious organizations.16 The Bolshevik strategy aims at annihilating the enemy. The strategic emphasis would be on changing its nature, structure and function, of the organization being manipulated.17 Weapons, tactics and strategies including assassination and defamation, to access to the target groups and institutions, neutralization of the opposite force, and legitimization of the communist influence, mobilization of subversion, then mobilization of the target groups for the interest of the Bolshevik.18

The Religious Affairs Bureau, was first set up to deal with religious affairs under the Bureau of National Minorities. Later, in 1951, the Religious Affairs Bureau

(RAB) was transferred to the Educational and Cultural Section of the Home Affairs

Department. The United Front Department of the Party Central was also involved in religious affairs19. It soon became apparent to the CCP that religious affairs were much more difficult and complicated than expected, when Li Weihan,


the head of United Front admitted that religions had five characteristics e.g. nationality, longevity, internationality, complexity, and communitarity then a long- term policy was set up by the Party to response to the situation.20 The United Front Policy has long been set up as the basic tactical task of the CCP by uniting the secondary enemy to combat the primary enemy for the interest of the Party21. In 1937, the CCP united with the Kuomintong (KMT), to resist the Japanese invasion. When the revolutionary situation underwent a change, Mao suggested that revolutionary tactics and methods must change

5 accordingly.22 After the crashing of the Japanese, the CCP united the non-Party members to crack down the KMT. That means, the revolving of the United Front tactics changes at various stage in Chinese politics according to the needs of the CCP. In religious matters, it was with the united front tactics that in Maoist era the “patriotic” religious association were established and staffed by renegade religious believers to monitor religious personnel and religious activities so as to split and weaken religious organizations. In Deng’s modernization, the Party requested religious believers to engage more actively in national reconstruction as well as to promote unity among national minorities.23 On international relations, Chinese believers of world religions were asked to play a diplomatic role to promote the national image in the international community. It revealed that religious work has been an important ingredient of the united front work in the modernization period.24 However, the united front work in religious affairs were handled according to the general interest of the Party as well. In 1990s, China perceived that the western anti-China force mobilized religion to westernize China and to divide China. Xe Zhongxuen


the head of the United Front work, set a limit on the religious work by refusing foreigners to work in China in assisting the religious revival. Aiming at preventing foreign infiltration as well as eliminating the growth of religion, Xi’s guideline went against the general practice in the united front tactics by welcoming joint enterprise with foreigners and overseas

Chinese in the business sector.25 Jiang Zemin in the spirit of the united front, gave a directive to mobilize religious believers to work for the social construction of the society while religions have to accommodate to the socialist regime.26

According to a leading religious cadre27 at the provincial level who worked for ten years in southern China, the “Religious Freedom Policy” was launched in

1950.28 The CCP dealt with religious matters based on ideological conflict in the context of current Party/State policy. In 1950, the PRC was at war on the Korean

Peninsula with the United States, the leader of western Imperialists and major ally of

6 Western Europe. The expulsion of foreign missionaries was part of the State’s

“anti-American imperialism” policy.29 When the nation’s main attention was focused on the Korean War (1950-54), the Party, ostensibly in the interests of “security”, sought to cut all links with foreign Christians.30 The false accusation of murdering of infants in Christian orphanages were long –planned plot to defame the Christian missionaries and gave excuse to their expulsion. Later when these orphanages were under the state care, the death rate were equally high.31

It was upon Mao’s general approach that Li Weihan presented a very sophisticated, comprehensive and dialectic interpretation of the Religious Freedom

Policy at a meeting held 4 June 1958, in Qingdao with cadres working with national minorities who are mainly adherents of Islam and Tibetan Buddhists. His interpretation was the basis of the CCP’s dialectic policy on religious matters for the next five decades with various approaches and methodology according to different socio-political climate of the particular time.

Li explained the dialectic approach of religious freedom as followed:

‘every citizen has the freedom to believe in religion, and also the freedom not to

believe in religion.33 Within a particular religion, every citizen has the freedom to

believe in this sect or that sect. A person who was previously a nonbeliever, has

the freedom to become a religious believer, and one who has been a religious

believer has the freedom to become a nonbeliever.34

Li rejected the possibility that Party members could adopt a faith, claiming,

“ Communists are atheists and must unremittingly propagate atheism”. He echoed

Mao’s non-coercive method: “We must understand that it is fruitless and extremely harmful to use simple coercion in dealing with people’s ideological and spiritual questions - and this includes religious questions”.35 He revealed the latent goal of the

7 Religious Freedom Policy when he said, “This is a comprehensive Party approach on religious matters. It is good to encourage people to change their religious beliefs because this will eventually lead them to abandon religion completely”.36 The political implications of the policy were emphasized when he said:

“The Religious Freedom Policy is a revolutionary motto. We have adopted

this motto and must enlarge its revolutionary content to end feudalism, and

prevent exploiting classes from forcing others to believe in religion. If we

thoroughly implement this motto, believers will gradually change from believing

in religion towards non-believing. In short, the Religious Freedom Policy is our

Party’s basic policy towards religion. We can adopt only this policy, not any other

policy”.37

After this candid speech of the dialectic interpretation there was no other written policy that so openly explained the Religious Freedom Policy until 1982 with the launching of Document No. 19. In reality, this dialectic “religious freedom policy” is meant to weaken religion in the course of struggle between two fundamental source of teaching authorities : dialectic materialism in

Marxism-Leninism and religious idealism.

Implementation of the Religious Freedom Policy in Maoist China

In keeping with the belief that non-believers should be protected from zealous believers, the CCP ordered all religious activities to be confined within their designated buildings and areas.38 In practice, religious activities such as Protestant

“family gatherings”, Catholic “pilgrimages”, and Buddhists/ Taoist “prayer services for the dead” held in homes or funeral homes were forbidden. For the same reasons,

Christian pastors and Catholic Clergy, Buddhist monks and nuns were asked to not wear their religious attire in public.39

Under the Religious Freedom Policy, Buddhist monks and nuns were free to

8 take meat and get married. By abandoning celibacy, the vegetarian diet and religious attire, the religious influence and discipline of Buddhism was greatly weakened.

Religious strength in the society as a whole was affected. This is reflected in the fact that the number of Buddhist and Taoist temples decreased from 60,000 in the 1950s to

8,000 on the eve of Cultural Revolution.40

In the Protestant tradition, believers and clergy are expected to remain with a particular denomination. Under the Religious Freedom Policy, however, Protestant clergy and adherents were encouraged to switch to other denominations by religious cadres who would like to see chaos created by internal migration within the Chinese

Protestant churches. It is because the insertion of new religious leaders led to the redistribution of power within a church sect which by nature is a closed organization.

This resulted to the desired effect of leading to internal power struggles and divisions among of Protestant churches. The “divide and rule” strategy employed by the CCP aimed at weakening the Protestant churches hoping for the eventual its extinction as an objective of the Religious Freedom Policy. This eventually made the Government to amalgamate all denominations into one Protestant Church making the Protestant

Christians easier to be manipulated. Within the Protestant Church, after the amalgamation, pro-Communist leaders like Wu Yaozhong


later Ting

Guangxuan


instigated believers to purge non-conformed pastors and preachers who refused to cooperate with the CCP and conformed to policy the Three Selfs

Policy like Wang Mingtao


and Wei Zesheng


, and condemn leading theologians Zhao Zichen


. Other major theologians like Zhao Luenhua


and Xie Fuya


fled to Taiwan and Hong Kong. Then the entire Protestant church was under the Party’s control through the Protestant leader Wu Yaozhong who was alleged as a secret party member planted into the Protestant Church.41 Within the

Protestant church, the launching of the movement of “Heart-Giving to the Party” in

9 1957 was a political purge in big scale aiming at eliminating the non-conformist

Protestants. After the political purges, Protestant church lost its vitality as a religious organization.

In Buddhism, not only non-conformist leaders were condemned, but also temple lands were confiscated. In fact the main problem between the CCP and

Chinese Buddhism and Daoism rested in the temple’s property and estates which usually covered large area of agricultural (arable) land, and Party’s perception on

Buddhism and Daoism whose temples sheltered the remnant of Kuomintang and capitalists who were Buddhist and Daoist adherents.42 It was because one of the political aims of Land Reform was the crushing of landowning class (exploiting class) and to consolidate the Communist rule in the rural area43. In the campaign of Land

Reform not only temple land was confiscated, but also Daoist priests and Buddhist monks were purged, trial and sent away from their residential temples.44 The loosely organized Buddhist and Daoist associations (for laity) were labeled as

“anti-revolutionary” and ordered to be dissolved.45. Temples were not headed by the superiors or the head monks/priests, but a managing committee headed by pro-government laity including the farm tenants. The head of national Chinese

Buddhist Association, Zhao Pucho


later admitted that the administrative reform within the Buddhist and Daoist circles forced many Buddhist monks and nuns, Daoist priests and priestesses to leave the temples.46 The Cultural Revolution saw the peak of the harsh treatment on religious personnel, resulting the mass abandonment of temples by monks and nuns. This explained why temples shrank in a large scale

(60,000 to 8,000) as mentioned above. In general, the application of the Religious

Freedom Policy in Maoist China weakened internal discipline, created contradictions within religious circles, sapped religious vitality and worked towards the extinction of religion.47

10 The eight patriotic religious associations48 which are located within the campus of religious organizations (church, temples and mosque), had their religious cadres as paid staff49 witnessed the conflicts within religious organizations orchestrated by the Party. When the turmoil within the religious groups was at its worst, resulting from internal conflict and external purges, the Party Central instructed religious cadres never to become involved or to render help in resolving these problems. On the contrary, they were advised to make use of these conflicts and contradictions within religious circles as an opportunity to further divide them and to encourage Christians to adopt the Three Selfs Religious Reform which aimed at self-supporting self-administrating and self-propagating with its latent objective to have the Party to lead the church.50 This movement aimed to shatter the ecclesiastical constituency and put religious organizations under the complete control of the Party.51

It was launched using the following methods:

1) Public assemblies were called at which non-conformists were bullied. This kind of public assembly was a meeting for public trial was a means to treat

“anti-revolutionary” in Maoist China. The crowd were gathered as audience for public trials which were held locally, they were instigated to accuse the target person with the purpose to humiliate the accused as means to crush his/her personality. Usually this was a means to defeat class enemies of major contradictory. Public trials were called to crush the influential religious leaders when resistance was led by such leaders as Catholic Bishop Gong Pinmei


, Protestant pastors Wang Mingtao, and leading Buddhist monk in south China Xueyun

. After these prominent leaders were tried, humiliated and sent to jail, their dioceses and their followers shattered, subsequently the Communist s were able to control religious adherents who were formerly under their care.

2) Political study groups were formed to train progressive religious leaders to

11 carry out State/Party policy and criticize non-conformists. Re-education was employed through group education for thought reform, to deal with those who did not pose immediate threat to the party as class enemies. This made sure non-conformist religious believers would not exert their influence to conformists, while preparing the believers to serve the revolutionary cause or the interest of the Party as suggested by the United Front Policy.52

3) Eight patriotic religious organizations staffed by Party cadres were established to take over the administration/management of the four main international religious groups (Islam, Buddhism, Protestantism and Catholicism) and one indigenous religion(Daoism). This establishment was to put government control of religious organizations on the existential scene, when these patriotic associations were put on the religious campus ( Buddhist and Daoist temples, Catholic and Protestant churches and Mosques) to monitor religious activities, religious leaders’ movements.

4) Government financed religious literature with new (State/Party) interpretations of religion doctrine were disseminated. (For example, the Protestant

Church’s Tianfeng

and Catholic’s Guangyang

were circulated for this purpose) Literature traditionally had been a powerful means to serve the revolutionary means of the Party, thus religious literature became an important channel to promulgate party’s orientation on religions.

Religious life in China was dismantled in the 1960s. Religious discipline was ridiculed, church/temple property was confiscated, church education and service institutes (orphanage, school and medical service) were nationalized, foreign missionaries were expelled, places of worship (churches, mosques and temples) were closed, religious houses (monasteries, convents, and seminaries) were disbanded, religious personnel were sent home and non-conformed religious adherents were jailed.54

12 It seemed in Maoist China, the “religious Freedom Policy” had been implemented in such a way that dialectic materialism of Marxism-Leninism was in the upper hand in the church-state struggle in exercising their teaching authority in

China, when religious organizations were completed under the Party’s control.

During the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards attacked both conformist and non-conformist religious believers. They crushed all religious objects, burned religious literature and publicly insulted, tried and jailed religious personnel. The uprooting of religions and the total silence of the jailed religious personnel and adherents made outsiders believe that religion in China had been totally eradicated.55

Chinese Muslim’s religious life was profoundly damaged by political campaigns that discouraged ”local nationality chauvinism” [difang minzu zhuyi] in favour of ‘nationality unity’ [minzhu tuanjie].56Many of religious restrictions imposed on Muslims in China began with campaigns in the later1950s including the closure of mosques, and other insults such as forcing Hui to raise pigs. Subsequently there were local Muslims uprsings in Gansu, Ningxia(1952, 1953, and 1958). In the riot in Henan in 1953 an “independent Islamic Kingdom” was declared. In the Cultural Revolution, minor protests by Hui in Beijing, Ningxia, Henan and Hebei provinces, with a major uprising (1975)(Shadian Incident) in Yunnan border with strategic importance ( a trading link with the Burma Road between Vietnam, Burma and southeast Asia) were reported. Not until Deng’s modernization policy was launch, Hui referred to this period as the “twenty lost years”.57 With an enormous damage caused by Red Guard’s hooliganism, religions in China suffered from a profound defeat in the national imposition of Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism on religious idealism.

The application of Religious Freedom Policy went along with the political pulse of China throughout the reign of the CCP. At the beginning of the PRC rule coupled with the Korean War (1950-3) a total control over the populations was deemed

13 necessary for fear that world religions could become a channel for the infiltration of the enemy and the destabilization of the society. Then the “Three Selfs” strategy strengthened the control, hoping that with CCP’s leadership in religious affairs, religious idealism would see its extinction eventually in the near future. Later, in the anti-Leftist Campaign and in the Great Leap Forward, militant approach was applied to manage religions, when massive religious personnel were put to labour camp for re-education and religious activities annihilated. The Heart Giving Campaign (1958) in the Protestant Church to purge the Rightist elements, and allowing only Leftists in religious organizations was a classical example on how the implementation of religious policy went along with the political climate58. The Cultural Revolution allowed the hooliganism of the Red Guards to destroy religious buildings, article and literature, when most religious personnel were jailed. In fact the iron bar protected the religious prisoners from the hooliganism of Red Guards.59

The mass movement of the Cultural Revolution aimed at getting rid of perceived wrong ideas- Revisionism which did not comply with the orthodoxy of the dialectic materialism. Young people voluntarily joined the Cultural Revolution because they found its ”innovative’ ideas romantic and attractive. In this political movement Mao obtained political power by appealing to individuals as well as the mass. Religion is not a symbol but also an ideological system, and when Maoist Thought prevailed all religions had to give in to the orthodox dialectic materialism.

The Revival of Religious Activities under Deng’s Open Door Policy

Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform and “open door” policies launched in 1978 were a major turning point in China’s history. They were accompanied by a revitalization of intellectual life and the scope for alternative outlooks and philosophies, including religious doctrines was enlarged. An unintended effect of the new policies was the erosion of faith within the CCP. The loosening of ideological

14 ties after 1978 led to the escalation of crime and corruption among Party members.

Within the Party, morale was low and ideological contradiction was found making the general public increasingly felt the Party lacking in credibility.60

In the context of the United Front Policy, the motives for the relaxing control over religious life were to unite the non-conformists, to break with the past, and attract foreign aid.

1) Uniting the Non-conformists

The Religious Freedom Policy was re-instituted after more than ten years as an exchange of religious relaxation for the modernization.61 In the 1980s, the United

Front Department led by Yang Qingren


, changed from focusing on class struggle, to vying for foreign investment. The CCP through the United Front

Department sought the support and cooperation from the following categories of people: non-Communist intellectuals, patriotic religious leaders, patriotic minority leaders, and Chinese from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.62

Intellectuals, professionals and religious personnel were the main targets of the

United Front Policy as defined by Yang Qingren in 1983. Intellectuals and professionals were important human resources for various modernization programmes due to their expertise and professional training. However, it was this group of people

(intellectuals, professionals and religious personnel) which were labeled as non-conformists and had suffered the most during political campaigns including the

Cultural Revolution. They were victims of repeated political purges, for nearly ten years they were known as the “cattle shed” inmates.63 They consequently had little confidence in the Party’s policy of economic reforms. It is not at all surprising that they scorned the sudden “open door” and modernization policies. They fully expected another political campaign in which militant treatment would eventually be re-imposed. Unlike intellectuals and professionals, religious leaders and adherents

15 cannot contribute their religious expertise for modernization. However, the better treatment bestowed on religious adherents is a tactics indirectly to persuade the worrying intellectuals and professionals to believe that Deng’s modernization policy was not a short-lived attempt but a long-term state policy . It is hoped that they can devote themselves wholeheartedly with peace of mind for the national reconstruction.

The cultural heritage and religious system of national minorities in the northwest and Tibet were ruined during the Cultural Revolution. If the Government wanted to mobilize the mostly Muslim and Buddhist national minorities to work for modernization, it was imperative to relax the religious controls as a first step in reducing their animosity before they can be mobilized for the modernization.

2) Breaking with the Past

Deng and his followers wanted to break away completely from the devastating past of the Cultural Revolution. Though the Party acknowledged that its previous condemnation of intellectuals as anti- Party, and religious adherents as anti-revolutionaries was wrong, it lost its moral authority vis-a-vis these ideological non-conformists. The Party was regarded with great skepticism because so many innocent people, including Deng Xiaoping, had been condemned for no valid reason.

Many religious adherents after being released from labour camps and prisons ignored the Party’s restrictions on religion, and began to be active in religious affairs.

For example, the Jesuit priests in Shanghai, as soon as they were released from the labour camps, immediately received visitors, discussed religious questions, and offered their pastoral services until re-arrested in 1981.64 In this atmosphere of reconciliation and unity for the sake of modernization it was impossible for the CCP to apply militant measures against these religious leaders. However, the CCP could not allow religion to proliferate either. Therefore the Religious Freedom Policy was re-introduced. It was necessary to keep religious activities under Party supervision

16 and there was still the hope that religious activities could be sufficiently weakened such that they might eventually fade away.

3) Attracting Foreign Aid

In order for the modernization programme to succeed it was realized that foreign aid in the form of foreign investment and technological assistance were essential. The Chinese government was aware that foreign investment was indirectly tied to China’s human rights record. Funding would not come from governments which strongly believed China was intolerant towards, or even persecuted citizens who chose to adhere to religious beliefs65.

Re-introducing the Religious Freedom Policy: Document No. 19

In the early 1980s, with the dialectic approach, the Party firstly reiterated the latent goals of the Religious Freedom Policy to pacify the anguished Leftists who complained about the self-defeating practice of allowing the revival of religious activities (“burning incense to attract the ghost”).66, and secondly, promoted a national image of tolerance by re-opening places of worship and reactivating religious organizations, while re-enforcing Party control over religious activities and preventing religious proliferation.67

After a few years of reduced restrictions on religious activities, the Party

Central in 1982 issued Document No.19 (hereafter abbreviated to “the Document”). It provides guidelines on the Religious Freedom Policy in the Modernization Era. Its intention is very similar to what Li Weihan proclaimed some thirty years ago. 68 It states:

“The basic policy of the Party towards religion is that of respect for and

protection of the freedom of religious belief. This is a long-term policy, one

which must be carried out until that future time when religion will totally

disappear.”69

17 It sums up the CCP’s experience in religious work and contains a set of viewpoints and methods in which theory and practice were closely interwoven. It emphasizes that imperialists, colonialists and feudalists as before are not to manipulate religion in the PRC. It claims there were erroneous policies, which adversely affected religious believers in the past forty years, especially during the

Cultural Revolution.

The Document discusses the Party’s policies to “win over, unite and educate

(politically) the religious professionals” as well as to redress injustices perpetrated against them. It calls on Party cadres and other officials to help religious organisations recover and restore their places of worship, but sets limits on religious activities and differentiates between the “administrative control” of the RAB and the strictly religious functions of each organization.

The CCP’s objective in training young clergy “who fervently love their homeland, support the Party leadership and the socialist system, and possess sufficient religious knowledge” is explained in the Document. It confirms that Party members cannot be religious believers, and also deals with the special problems of cadres working among ethnic nationalities that adhere to a religion.

The importance of international relations to the three world religions,

Buddhism, Islamic and Christianity, were discussed with a warning to be aware of

“hostile religious forces” from abroad infiltrating into China. It proposes that friendly relationships be developed with foreign religious groups while a policy of independence be maintained. The Document reiterates the leading role of the CCP and

State organs in handling religious questions, and the non-allowance of independent religious administrations. From the tone and contents of the Document, we can envisage that it is a more comprehensive guidelines based on “Religious Freedom

Policy” preparing for the inevitable wrestle between the dialectic materialism of

18 Mao’s era plus economic materialism of Deng era and religious belief in the modernization era of Deng.

Problematic Implementation of Document 19

Several inconsistencies were discovered in the process of formulating the

Document as well as implementing the Document. Firstly, the tone is one of institutional tolerance by granting more freedom to religious organizations and religious activities in principle. Yet considerable guidance is given to the relevant cadres to ensure adequate Party monitoring and supervision in religious matters, aimed at avoiding both ‘leftist’ tendencies and excessive freedom in policy implementation.70

Secondly, the drafting of the Document included no input from religious believers.71 It, therefore, naturally serves the interests of the Party rather than the needs of religious believers who had begun their religious activities without waiting for any orders from the Party. From the viewpoint of those most directly affected, the ‘rationality’ is questionable, because the religious believers suspected that the

Document only served the interest of the Party but did not address to the needs of religious adherents.

Thirdly, in implementing the policy the guidelines were often ambiguous. For example, his superior told a religious cadre in a southwestern province that according to the Document, only a small foreign donation to the Church could be accepted. The cadre approached a potential foreign church donor and explained that the maximum donation was RMB$5,000, but as there was no upper limit to the donations that could be accepted, he could issue any number of donation receipts for RMB$5,000.72

Another example of ambiguity pertained to superstition versus religion. It is not clear how the Party differentiates between the two, both at the conceptual and practical levels.

19 Fourthly, the guidance on restoring churches and temples was found to be irrational by peasants who needed to build a temple near their village. Their request to build a temple was not granted by local cadres who believed this would breach the

Document, while 142 government designated temples were re-built on tourist spots.

Religious ceremonies could be performed only at Party-recognised places of worship, and by religious leaders acceptable by the CCP.

In short, though the Document was meant to display the Party’s tolerant attitude towards religion, its irrationalities and ambiguities made interpretation and implementation of the Religious Freedom Policy problematic.73

Coordination in the Bureaucracy in Religious Affairs

The lack of coordination in China’s management of religion is obvious in the following two areas: the restoration and administration of churches, temples and other religious buildings, and in the training of young religious personnel.

The sixth section of the Document states clearly that the Party encourages the restoration of churches, religious buildings, and related property.74 However, the lack of administrative coordination between the central and local governments with respect to the returning of church property and land, and re-housing the occupants and their enterprises elsewhere, has greatly hindered the process. The deaths and casualties that were the result of an armed conflict in Youtong Village, Luencheng

County, Hebei Province during the return of church land and property not only harmed the local church-State relations, but also harmed the image of the State when the news was broadcast overseas.75

The lack of economic support and lateral coordination among the Government

Ministries involved with land, health and social welfare in the implementation of this policy means that Christian churches have to turn to overseas sources for the necessary funding. In concrete situation, religious organizations were encouraged by

20 religious cadres to contribute to national construction by engaging in medical service and social service in running orphanage even of small scale in rural areas to supplement the inadequate government supply. However, the foreign linked religious groups were encouraged to ask their counterparts abroad to donate institutional building, equipments and running expenses. Thus the State’s policy of having independent, self-governed and autonomous churches is defeated when economic dependence on foreign donation is created once more.76 For example, the local bishop of a diocese in a very poor southwestern Province worried that the education of the coming generation of clergy would be affected by the lack of seminarian housing. He therefore applied for the return of church property, which could be used for such housing. When the Provincial Finance Department refused to release the necessary funds to resettle the occupants of the church property, the bishop had little alternative but to request overseas funding assistance.77

The rapid growth in the size and number of RAB in the modernization period has proved problematic. Bureau at the provincial level alone increased from 16,000 in

1985 to 26,000 in 1989.78 Local officials have become overburdened with the ever-increasing paperwork. This is primarily the result of a lack of inter-departmental coordination among State and Party organs.79 The Party’s limited capacity to cope means the Document becomes of secondary importance in terms of policy implementation.

Political leaders in China and the relevant cadres in the local political hierarchy are, ipso facto, the principal implementors, while local religious leaders are their auxiliaries. Their administrative skills, abilities, and knowledge are important in the evaluation of their performance in carrying out State policy. Given the low social status of religious cadres among their atheist colleagues80, it is not surprising that local religious cadres and religious leaders have divided allegiances, and the

21 commitment of Chinese cadres to their job is less than solid.81 Their lack of training in religious studies also means their religious knowledge is inadequate to cope with the demands of their duties. This has serious implications for the quality of policy implementation.82

In all world religions, the religious leaders must come from their respective memberships. In China, however, the Party entrusts religious cadres who are not from the religious circle with implementing the Document. Unfortunately, their lack of pre-requisite knowledge not only handicaps the work of the cadres, but it also leads to unsatisfactory monitoring and interpretation. On the contrary, it provided opportunities for the speedy revival of religious life beyond the Party’s control.

Changes in the Management of Religion

The proliferation of religion in the 1980s alarmed Beijing’s top leaders. Chen

Yun, second in command to Deng Xiaoping expressed concern about the revival of religions and ordered Jiang Zemin in 1991 to tighten control over their activities. He believed that the proliferation of religions had played a decisive role in the toppling of

Communism in Europe, and that this could happen in China too.83 The Religious

Freedom Policy was not meeting its objectives as suggested by Ye Xiaowen, the head of the RAB, in eliminating the influence of religion.84

On the contrary, religious activities were propagating very rapidly. For example, in 1983 there were 300 Catholic churches in China. By 1987 the number was reported to have increased to 2,100, by 1992 to 3,900, and by 1997, 5000. The number of Catholic adherents was estimated to have risen from 3.3 million in 1986 to over 10 million in 1992 (including both the official and underground churches). In

2000 there were 2,200 priests, up from 1,500 in 1997, three quarters of which were ordained in the past 12 years.85 Protestant adherents increased steadily from 5-6 million in 1993, to 10 million in 1997, and 14 million in 2000 with 16,000 churches

22 and 32,000 meeting points (70 per cent built within 20 years) as recorded in 2001.86

A number of factors prompted the Party to tighten control over religious activities was tightened in the early 1990s. These were: 1) the June 4 Tiananmen

Incident, 2) the uncontrollable situation of religious affairs reflected in the rapid growth in religious adherents, 3) the restlessness of Muslims in Northwest after the disintegration of Soviet Union, 4) the meeting of the underground Catholic bishops in

Zhang Erce of Shaanxi Province in November 1989 and the communiqué overseas announcing the formation of the Chinese Underground Bishops’ Conference and 5) the emerge of Falun Gong in 1997.87

The Party believed that one of the means employed by the capitalist West to topple socialist States was to link religious questions with internal dissent or underground forces.88 Competing for market between CCP and religions suggested by

Chen Yun became the major argument in the church-state relations debate. The Party argued that many underground Catholic bishops appointed by the Roman Curia tried to displace the government appointed bishops, making it possible for the underground church to flourish once again.89 The Dalai Lama’s followers were also accused of having appointed the living Buddha in Tibet. The CCP believed that once the Dalai

Lama appoints a living Buddha, his clique will control a temple, and he will subsequently succeed in controlling a base which originally belonged to the CCP.90

(This was argued in internally circulated documents after 1996.91)

The Party was very alert to the fact that some local “illegal” (non-government run) religious organizations instigated by foreign supporters were engaged in separatist movements aimed at splitting the nation through religious activities.92 The periodic religious crackdowns in Tibet between 1992 and 1996, and the Muslim riots in Xinjiang Province, were blamed on those who sought to see Xinjiang Province separate from China. For example, the Eastern Turkistan Organization based in

23 Turkey, confirmed that China’s leaders believed religious activities threatened national security.93

Party theorists continue to argue that religion in China has been treated as an internal contradiction among the people to be handled by peaceful consultation means, but then, as a result of increasingly foreign influence, it is entirely possible that it should be treated as a contradiction with the enemy to be handled by confrontation.

The head of the RAB acknowledged that the Roman Catholic Church and Tibetan

Buddhists were the most difficult of the religious groups to handle.94

In the long-term struggle between Marxist-Leninist dialectic materialism with religious idealism in Deng’s modernization era, Document No. 19 was drawn up to meet the current needs in the prevailing socio-political environment where economic materialism (to get rich is glorious as advocated by Deng) prevailed. However, the clumsy implementation of the Document gave opportunity for the revival of religious idealism which was not the phenomenon the Party wanted to see. Thus, in 1990 a more sophisticated approach was adopted to improve the Party’s capacity in handling religious affairs to ensure a success in the ideological struggle between Marxist-

Leninist dialectic materialism plus economic materialism with religious idealism.

In Deng’s Era, when dialectic materialism gave way to economic materialism, the society is driven by material gain, while virtues such as charity, honesty, love, uprightness, compassion and consideration which were formerly generated from dialectic materialism in Maoist era were depleted . It resulted in creating a society aiming at monetary gain only but with no compassion and sense of right and wrong.

Hospitals did not treat critical patients unless sufficient payment is obtained first is a classical example. When Marxism with virtues embedded in dialectic materialism is moving gradually away from China, and the ideological void can be easily filled with

24 religious idealism.

In the Cultural Revolution the young people felt that they were psychologically uplifted and found self worth. In the midst of the movement, they lived in a close community with group sharing and communal labour. With the conviction in

Communist morality, inspired by the social utopia, they were proud of pursuing

Communist virtues even with self-sacrifice while enriching themselves by ideological training. Their struggle in Maoist time for the success of dialectic materialism provided them a sense of mission which in return gave them immense emotional satisfaction. In Dengist Era, when wealth and prosperity replaced political struggle as the pursuit of life, it drives many to nostalgia for Maoist romantic idealism. It explained why religions including Falun Gong, a new type of religion, attract people who have experienced of the romanticism of dialectic materialism 96.

Even without clashing with dialectic materialism which gradually withered away in Deng and post Deng era, religion specially Christianity would continue its clash with economic consumerism like that in the capitalist West. It is because economic consumerism is condemned by the Catholic Church through Pope John Paul II97; while traditionally the relations between church and state have historically ranged on a scale from the relatively mild tension found in western democracies 98 to fundamental conflicts of authority in authoritarian, especially Communists states.99

Jiang Zemin’s New Approaches to Manage Religious Activities The proliferation of religion in the second half of 1980s, and the infiltration were the two main factors for Jiang Zemin to change to a new approach to manage religious activities. Foreign religious activists as described by Xi Zhongxuen,head of the United Front Department, that ten Christian Churches established its base at Hong Kong and prepare to infiltration to the Mainland. Also the underground religious activities in Hebei province caused worry of Xi because the underground church could undermine the party authority with

25 assistance coming from abroad.100 The religious infiltration which led to the proliferation of religion was not in line with the Party’s latent objective of Religious Freedom Policy which aimed at the elimination of the influence of religion101. In April 1990 Chen Yun suggested to nip the bud of religious influence among the mass of people. Apart from Chen’s suggestion and Xi’s recommendations, were two of the most important momentum to prompt Jiang Zemin to tighten up the relaxed religious policy. In other words, Jiang could not say no to these two elders, because at that time Jiang desperately needed the support from the senior leaders in the top political pinnacle soon after he was transplanted into Beijing by being uprooted from his power base - Shanghai to succeed Zhao Ziyang after the Incident in 4 June 1989. On the international level, Chinese was scrutinized by the international community on its human right record. Therefore tightening up of religious activities had to be under the cover of “ruled by law” and “accommodation” which appeared to be a rather sophisticated approach. In 1990, China under the leadership of Jiang Zemin launched three basic strategies on religion: 1) wholly and correctly implement religious freedom policy. 2) through legal means to strengthen administration of religious affairs; and 3) introducing accommodations aiming at tightening up the control of religious affairs.102 Jiang Zemin gave a special talk at a meeting of religious work in an effort to sharpen the focus of the State’s emphasis on launching the new religious management scheme based on “ruled by law” and “accommodationism”.103

New measures were launched in the 1990s such as the formulation of religious laws and regulations, demanding registration of religious groups with the Ministry of

Civil Affairs and approval of the RAB.104

The head of RAB in the National Party School explained the new emphasis on legalism and accommodationism.105 In managing religious activities the Party instrcuted its cadres with the following strategies: 1) tolerate the existence of religion, but advocate atheist materialism; 2) not assist in the development of religion, and gradually eliminate its influence; 3) implement the basic “Religious Freedom Policy” advocated by the CCP as a long term practice. There should be no deviation from this

26 policy at any time; 4) uphold religious freedom policy on one hand, but control religious activities by legal means on the other; 5) manage religious affairs without becoming involved in the internal affairs of any religious organization; 6) encourage religious organizations to contribute to societal and economic development; 7) prevent illegal religious activities, but never exaggerate the non-confrontational contradiction within the religious circle; and 8) permit the expansion of foreign contacts, but never allow religious groups to be infiltrated by foreigners.106

A national religious work meeting was called 5-9 December 1990 by the Party

Central to study this new management scheme. The fact that top leaders such as Jiang

Zemin and Li Peng were present signified its importance and the urgency of launching new religious management guidelines. Among the 236 participants were the vice provincial mayor of religious work, provincial/municipal heads of the RAB and

United Front Department. Instructions were given on implementing the Document which was still regarded as foundation of the Religious Freedom Policy in post Mao

China.

All religious cadres as well as Catholic bishops, priests, and sisters as well as

Protestant pastors, Buddhist monks and nuns were requested to study the current new management scheme on religion. The leading religious personnel were divided into two groups and sent to Beijing to participate in study sessions from November 1990 to April 1991.

However, in less than a year, the underground bishops in Zhang Erce of

Shaanxi Province were all arrested. (They were later released.) Foreign experts who had been assisting the church were not allowed to enter China.107 Thus, religious activities were once again drastically curtailed. It indicated that in the open atmosphere of Modernization Era of Deng, religious idealism found its own ways of asserting influence in the Chinese society which is saturated with economic

27 materialism (to be rich is glorious). In reality, economic materialism offers a new challenge to the development of religious idealism.

“Accomodationism” and “Ruled by Law”: An Alternative Approach to Religious

Management

At the Party Central’s meeting on United Front Policy in 1993, Jiang Zemin reiterated the accommodation of religion to socialism with greater details. This policy was almost immediately promulgated.108 He stated:

This type of accommodation does not request religious adherents to

abandon religious faith and belief in Deism, but we request them to be politically

patriotic and to support Communism and the leadership of Communist Party. At

the same time we must rid the country of religious systems and doctrines which do

not accommodate socialism. We must try to mobilize the positive elements within

religious doctrine, religious law and morality to serve socialism.109

The rules and regulations were meant to signify a magnanimous gesture of accommodation, but in reality, they greatly slowed the speed of religious development in China. The accommodation policy of the Party demands religion to bend their rules and regulations in an atmosphere that rule of law becomes an object of political pursuit. So national and provincial religious regulations and rules were launched according to the current religious policy aiming at submitting religious idealism under the dialectic materialism and economic materialism in the ideological clash in Jiang era.

The CCP has argued that religious affairs have particular ideological idiosyncrasies and complexities. Due to religion’s public nature, the government regards religious affair as a segment of public affairs. Thus religious personnel, religious activity and religious location, are all subject to public administration.110

28 The use of law in managing religious affairs has been a means for the CCP to intensify Party/State control in religion since 1990, and the Party/state set a time-table of launching the campaign.111 The Government intended to spend one-year (1996) preparing legal education, then five years (1997 to 2000) launching legal education programmes within various religious organizations. Two sets of national laws/regulations with detailed explanations were issued by the State Council, namely,

Document 144 (1994) “Guowuyuan guanyu zhongjiao huodong changsuo guanli tiaoli” [Regulations from the Council of State on Managing Religious Activities], and

Document145 (1994) “Guowuyuen guanyu zhonghua renmin gongwuguo jinnei weiguoren zhongjiao huodong guanli kuiding” [On the State Council’s Management of Foreigners Staying in the People’s Republic of China].112 These became the cornerstone of the provincial/municipal regulations which were drawn up by order of the Central government according to the special situation of each location to regulate the management of religious organization, religious activities and places of worship.113

Document No.145 demands the registration of institutes of religious activities and the establishing of a management system on religious organizations. The conditions, requirements and procedures for registrations are all listed, including a financial report, and a signed document from the civil authority on the satisfaction on the observation of religious regulations, free from foreign dominance elements.114

These measures indirectly conferred the civil authorities the power to impose much stricter control over religious organizations including their religious activities, finances, appointments, and the activities of religious personnel.115

The RAB through the State Council issued a list of 142 Buddhist temples in areas where Han people are of majority.116 However, no such list was prepared for

Catholic and Protestant churches. The cost to the Government of repairing or

29 rebuilding the 8,000 Taoist and Buddhist temples, which were ruined in the Cultural

Revolution, (in 1949 there were 60,000 Taoist and Buddhist temples) would have been enormous.117 As there are many more Buddhist and Taoist believers than

Christians, there were many more requests to have the temples restored than churches.

Therefore the government selected 142 temples with historical significance, scenic attractions and cultural heritage for reparation and maintenance.

Most of the Christian churches, except for a few in major cities (Beijing,

Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou), were not in scenic spots and had little historical or cultural significance for tourist attraction. Furthermore, foreign money had been flowing in continuously for the rebuilding of 5,000 Catholic churches/ chapels and

7,000 Protestants churches/ chapels. Most are in countryside, and half have no priest

(2,200 priests for 5,000 churches and chapels).118 Thus the CCP did not allocate State money to the repair of these Christian churches.

Document 144 was designed to monitor the activities of foreign visitors. In

1994, the RAB issued an official interpretation on some provisions stipulated in the codes of Document 144. The term “foreigners” as defined by the Chinese Nationality

Law is defined as anyone who is not a Chinese national, including those who are residing in China on a long- or short- term basis. In other words, overseas Chinese,

Chinese in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan and even Chinese residing in China but holding a foreign passport are categorized as “foreigners”. This greatly curbs connections with foreign of Christians, Muslims and Buddhists. Yet, the religious revival of these groups in China depends greatly on assistance from overseas Chinese especially those in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.119 The introduction of the

Document 144 and 145, explicitly served the Party’s purpose to subdue religious organizations and activities to give a more conducive environment for the success of dialectic materialism in its struggle with religious idealism in a society where

30 economic materialism prevails.

Generally speaking, the provincial rules and regulations are stricter and more meticulous than the national laws because local public administrations are responsible for the implementation of state policy to ensure an independent church. Therefore practical steps have to be listed to ensure the success of the implementation. Moreover, in recent practice of campaigning against Falun Gong, local governments were to be blamed if local citizens violate laws and commit crimes even outside their jurisdiction.

Stricter laws means to encourage local governments to monitor its citizens more closely. This was very acute when no human resources from abroad could be provided to train of church personnel such as priests, pastors and nuns sufficiently.121 In theory, the restrictions on the religious activities of “foreigners” as stipulated by Document

144 were intended to eliminate religious orthodoxy and enhance political correctness in seminary education.122

In practice, not only registration was demanded before worship could take place but also annual renewal of registration. Conditions for registration were laid down by the civil authorities, and were to be observed meticulously otherwise cancellation of annual registration was possible. Some of these conditions included the submission of an annual financial report, records of the movements of religious personnel and foreign religious visitors.123 Permission from civil authorities had to be obtained before religious organizations could receive foreign visitors. Unexpected arrival of unwanted visitors without the consent of religious cadres would cause unfriendly disturbances.124 They were not allowed to visit religious institutes and meet religious personnel. Persistent offenders either had their visa cancelled or faced other immigration problems.125 According to Document 145, religious activities performed outside the institutes were illegal.

The tightening up of religious control in 1990 was resulted from the nationwide

31 ideological control after the June Fourth 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the proliferation of religion in the 1980s. The proposed relaxation of control in 2001 coincided with China’s opening to the outside world after joining the WTO and gaining the right to host the 2008 Olympic Game coupled with CCP’s intention to have drastic change in the interpretation of Marxism to suit the national mood of openness. However, the succession contests in 2001-2 distracted top leaders to launch any drastic change in sensitive questions including religion.

The Party’s Latest Re-definition on Religion: the Stabilizing Force

On 10-12 December 2001,the Politburo and the State Council jointly convened a

National Religious Work Meeting. It was regarded as one of most important meetings in religious matters since the Cultural Revolution.129 In Jiang’s speech it was for the first time in the history of PRC, that religion was admitted as a positive force to stablize the society and should be mobilized for the national development.130

Although he emphasized that the “religious Freedom Policy” remained the fundamental policy of the Party, Jiang set a new orientation of religion in his speech in which he re-defined the functional nature of religion with three characteristics. He claimed that firstly, religion has a deep historical root and it will have a long survival; secondly, religions interweave with economic, political and cultural questions, and it greatly influence the national development and social stability. And thirdly religion is always closely connected with international conflict and struggle, becoming an important component in international politics.131 In the name of the United Front

Policy, Jiang called upon the Party/state cadres to solicit the opinions of religious personnel, and have sufficient consultation with them on important religious matters.

It seems that Jiang set a new and positive orientation to the “Religious Freedom

Policy” with more flexibility and relaxation.132

Zhu Rongji, suggested some practical measures to implement Jiang’s new

32 religious policy. First, to establish a better religious management system in the context of “rule by Law”. Secondly, to lead religious adherents work for the national construction. Thirdly, to stabilize the religious cohort by following closely their new developments and to resolve their problems at the budding stage. Fourthly, to strengthen the human resource in religious work.

The speech of these two leaders was the first wave of the launching of this new strategy to implement the “Religious Freedom Policy”. The second wave comes from

Pan Yue, the Deputy Director of the State Commission for Restructuring Economy,

State Council. Pan in the Shenchen Special Economic Zone Daily in 16th December

2001 issue echoed the Party’s approach in religious question. In his long article, he candidly criticized that the traditional belief on “religion is the opium of the people” was wrong and called upon the recognition on the merit of religion. The third wave comes from the almost immediate convening of a meeting in Beijing for the leaders of religious organizations on 19 December 2001 requesting them to study the new strategies on “Religious Freedom Policy” crystallized in the speeches of Jiang and

Zhu. It is too early to comprehend how the whole religious circle to receive this message and how this new approach on religious freedom Policy will be implemented. However church researchers received this new strategy with positive gestures.133

The reasons leading to the change of this approach can be summarized into the followings: Firstly, the ideological vacuum created by the withering of

Marxism-Leninism, resulting in political corruption and socio- economic crime might lead to social instability. The appearance of Falun Gong indicated that the spiritual vacuum could not be filled by economic consumerism in Deng-Jiang era.134 When the over subdued world religions (Buddhism, Daoism, Protestantism Christianity,

Catholicism and Islam) could not satisfy the spiritual needs of people, they turned to

33 new religions and folk religions including Falun Gong. The spiritual vacuum is left by the vanishing of revolutionary romanticism and disillusion of socialism with

Chinese characteristic suggested by Deng. When three years of direct suppression of

Falun Gonghas been in vain, indirectly relaxation of the control of world religions could be a possible means to attract those who might seek Falun Gong for spiritual reasons135. Secondly, in the international arena, the granting of sufficient religious freedom might eliminate the embarrassment caused by the accusation on the violation of human rights especially by USA and the European Union. The relaxation of religious control in exchange for international respect by western countries. Thirdly, the entry to the WTO, and the Olympic Game in 2008 consolidates China’s position as a major power in international politics. Psychologically Beijing’s leaders find less threatening if they give more freedom to religious organizations. than ten years ago; Fourthly the proliferation of the research on religions in China and the change of the study “paradigm” from a mainly missiological and eurocentric to a sinological and sinocentric approach presented a more balanced view with positive as well as negative interpretations on religion including Christianity 136. Fifthly, the 11st

September 2001 catastrophe in New York opened a new horizon to Beijing leaders on the force of religion. Finally, social issues in the Chinese society which is at its transition would be a time bomb. After all when all devices from the Party aiming at curing these social diseases failed, the Party has less alternative but, allowing religion to exercise its moral authority to cure social problems. For the CCP, in the short term, to share teaching authority with religion is a” necessary evil”, however, in the long run concession would result in strengthening of CCP’s legitimacy.

The continuous arrest of religious leaders and the détente of Hong Kong business man on the smuggling of Bible, and the internal criticism of Pan Yue137 signified that the Party in practice was not ready to relax its religious control due to the following

34 major reasons. First consideration is given to social unrest as revealed in frequent worker demonstration in major industrial cities in Zhangyang, Sichuen provinces.

Urban-rural inequality resulting in rural social unrest and mass migration towards cities would lead to unrest in urban sector would cause major internal insecurity.138

The militant approach of dealing with Falun Gong revealed that Beijing leaders believed that uncontrolled religion can be a catalyst of social revolt.139 Secondly, in the sensitive period prior to transfer of top party leadership in the coming Party

Congress in September 2002, CCP major leaders in the Politburo should be extremely careful to avoid sensitive issues including religious issues to assure making no mistake in the succession contests.

The Party’s latest re-definition on religion as the stabilizing force with its refusal to loose the control of religion was a schizophrenia in treating religion.

On one hand Jiang realized the positive contribution of religions to the national construction, on the other he could not accept that proliferation of religion has not been under control. Therefore his acknowledgement on religion as the stabilizing force is only a smoke screen to cover up the enhancement of administrative control in religious sects140. He simply dressed up the same old religious problems in new rhetoric.

Religions in Deng-Jiang Era began to compete with Communism for moral authority and role models. Chen Yun feared that the Party would lose in the struggle amidst the wave of religious proliferation. His view was very prophetic141. At present, ideological control in China does not equate with the economic and societal openness.

The management of religious activities by legal means has generally not been as successful as expected. Many local authorities did not execute regulations and laws properly and foreign links have been carried on all the same. Laity, instead of religious personnel from outside have offered professional knowledge to their Chinese

35 religious counterparts in parish and convent management, leadership training, pedagogy in doctrinal teaching and so on for the revival of religion. This makes the checking of “foreigners’” religious activities more difficult. In the poor northwest region, Muslim religious schools are the only institutes to provide education, for the minorities. This makes the state policy of separation of religion with education impossible.142

Despite the new management scheme, the number of church leaders in the both the Catholic and Protestant sectors have increased, and so did the Muslim population

(14.5 millions in 1982 to 17.5 millions in 1990).143 The CCP established a special unit for the study and research of religion in the Central Party School. It seems it realizes it must try to understand more on the teaching and moral authority of religions if it is to compete, let alone dominate them.

Conclusions : Religious Freedom Policy : An Art in Religious Management

Since Maoist Era, the CCP has been exercising control of religions under the rhetoric of “religious freedom policy” with implementation of various types of control mechanism according to the change of political environment. The underground activities of Christian churches, and the condemned Falun Gong reflect that “normal” but “domesticated” religious life in China with no religious vitality and religious flavour and could not satisfy the spiritual needs of people. To deal with Falun Gong, as well as traditional religions, coercive means of suppression proved unsuccessful as warned by Mao some fifty years ago144.

This research revealed that “Religious Freedom Policy” loaded with Party’s dialectic approach in interpretations has it own connotation which is quite different from what we understand in the traditionally western context. However, “Religious

Freedom Policy” since the establishment of the PRC has been employed by the CCP firstly as a means for the control and finally for the eradication of religion. In the

36 clash of teaching authority between dialectic materialism plus economic materialism against religious idealism, the CCP tried to issue new regulations and rules to ensure the success of materialism. Religious management with different emphases at different stages of political development was launched. Deng Xiaoping’s relaxation of religious control, Document No. 19, Document 144, and 145 as well as Jiang Zimen’s policy on launching accommodationism aiming at managing religions with legal means and exerting a tight control on religion with a more sophisticated approach.

This research reveals that “Religious Freedom Policy” has played a dual role with the dialectic tradition of Marxism in the long struggle between the CCP and religion in the clash of authority. The Party first makes this policy a rhetoric to the international arena aiming at gaining worldwide respect by giving an impression that religious freedom prevails in China. Secondly the implementation itself becomes an instrument to assure its victory in the struggle, aiming at the control then the extinct of religion. In spite of CCP’s control on religions which have been proliferating all the same. However, the vitality of religion and its revival in China in Deng-Jiang period called for greater and more sophisticated Party control as a spiral of growth. However, control was possible in Maoist China with Party’s strong ideological appeal, but when the Party’s appeal gradually wanes with unresolved ideological contradiction due to economic reform, control on religions becomes more difficult since the death of Mao as revealed in statistics. It seems that the introduction of legalism and accommodationism can do very little to have a better religious management.

Therefore it opens the suggestion of sharing of teaching authority with religions cope with societal problems which might lead to serious social unrest.

1 Li Weihan, head of the United Front Department of the CCP reiterated this policy in 1958 and 1961. See Li Weihan, Tongyi zhanxian wenti yu minzu wenti [Questions of the United Front and National

37

Minorities], pp.503-572. The same “Religious Freedom Policy” was found in Document 19 (1982). See: Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of the RAB, Xinsichi zongjiao gongzuo wensin xuanbian [Selected Documents on Religious Work in the New Age] Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Press, 1995, pp. 53-73. A great deal has been written about religious persecution in the PRC, including material published by Amnesty international; Asia Watch Committee, 1992 Freedom of Religion in China, Washington D.C. Human Rights Watch; Richard C. Bush Jr., Religion in Communist China. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1970; Ho Kai-lin, Laogaiying zhong de taianju erleu [Children of God in the Labour Camp], Taibei: Guangqi Press, 1990. 2 The discussion is built on two sources of data : the CCP and religious adherents. Firstly, interviews with current and retired religious cadres of Tianjin, Shanghai, South China, and southwestern China, searching of CCP documents including classified documents. Second, interviews with religious leaders, and religious adherents. Interviews were conducted within a long period between 1980 to 2001. 3 Ding Xue Liang, Post Communism and China (Chinese) Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 1994, pp.17-31. 4 Zhou Enlai, “Dongqian caijing xingshi he xin zhongguo jingji de jizhong guangxi” [The Present Financial and Economic Situation and Economic Relations in New China] in Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Vol. 1) pp.71-85. 5 Zhou Enlai, “Guangyu jidujiao wenti de xici tanhua” . 6 Li Weihan, “Jai huiju yisilan jiao wenti Juodanhui sheng de danhua” [Speech at Discussion Meeting on the Islam Questions of the Hui Minority] Tongyi zhanxian wenti yu minzu wenti [Questions of the United Front and National Minorities] Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981, 503-19. 7 Chinese government acknowledged the complexity of religion see : Ye Xiaowen 1996."Danqian woguode Zhongjiao wenti-guanyu Zhongjaio Wuxin de jaidantao" [The contemporary religious questions of the motherland: re-investigation on the five characters of religion] in Zhonggong Zhongyang danxiao baogao xuan [Selected Reports of the Party Central School] vol.101, no.5 pp.9-23 (internally circulated document) 8 Chen Yun”Guanyu Gaodao Zhongshi Zhongjiao Xintiao Wente de Xin”[The Letter on the Highly Concerned about Religious Infiltration] in Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy section of Religious Affair bureau.(ed) Xinsichi Zongjiao Gongzuo Wensin Xuanbiam [Selected document on Religious Work of New Age] Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Press. 1995 p. 177. 9 For the Bolshevik’s organizational control see: Philip Selznick. The Organizational Weapon.: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics. Illinois: Free Press. 1960. For CCP’s control of organizations see: Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization of Communist China. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1968. 10 I. W. Mabbett. Modern China- The Mirage of Modernity. London: Croom Helm,1985; I. W. Mabbett and David Chandler, The Khmers, London: Blackwell, 1995.

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11 Bao Wenqi, Mimi jiaomen: zhongguo minjian zhongjiao mimi shuoyuen [Secret Religious Sects: The Origins of China’s Secret Folk Religion.] Nanchang: Jiangxi People’s Press, 2000. 12 Dru C. Gladney. Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality. New York:Harcourt Brace College Publishers>1998. pp.1-32.

14 Li Weihan, “Guangyu Minju Gongzhuo Zhong Jiao Wenti” Tongyi zhanxian wenti yu minzu wenti [Questions of the United Front and National Minorities], Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981, pp.520-81. 15 The CCP mobilized “progressive” believers to re-interpret religious doctrines to the satisfaction of the Party. See: Jonathan Chao, Chinese Communist policy Toward Christianity, Hong Kong, China Evangelical Seminary Press, 1986, pp.97-104. 16 Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics, Illinois: Free Press, 1960. 17 Ibid.pp.106-7. 18 Ibid.pp.74-112. 19 The United Front Department set up a Religious Section to implement CCP’s policy on religious sector of the Chinese society. 20 Zhu Yueli, Jiyi zhongguo zhongjiao [Religion in China Today], Beijing: Today’s China Press, 1994,pp.145-57. Li Weihan acknowledged this in his speech in the seventh meeting of the United Front on 4th April, 1957. See Li Wei Han. ; Tongyi zhanxian wenti yu minzu wenti , 1981p.173. Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon. 21 On the origins of the United Front in China the basic secondary work Lyman P. Van Slyke. Enemies and friends, the United Front in Chinese Communist History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1967.Stuart Schram (ed). Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writing. v.5. London: M.E. Sharpe.1999. 22 Stuart Schram (ed). Mao’s Road to Power: Revolutionary Writing. v.5. p.94-7. 23 Lixingguo“Jinmi tuanjie xinjiao quenzhong gongtong zili yu jienshe you zhongguo teshe shehui zhuyi de weidai siye.[Closely united Religious Believers trying to establish the great work of socialism of Chinese characteristics. Catholic Church in China. 2002. no.1:11-12. For united front on religions and national minorities see : Li Riuhuan”Yaochongsi minju zhongjiao wende”[(We )should take religious and minorities problems seriously]. Zhongguo Zhongjiao (Religion in China)(2002) no.34 :4-5. 24 Yu Xiao Heng “Zhongjiao Gongzhuo Ganbu bisu zhangwo de zhongyou yuenzhe.[Important Principles that the Religious Cdres Should Grasp] Zhongguo Zhongjiao (Religion in China)(2002) no.34 :31-2.

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25 Guo Wei”Zhongjiao Gongzhuo zhanxian de jiechu lingdaoren Xi Zhongxuen tongzhi[Comrade Xi Zhongxuen : An Outstanding Leaders in the United Front Work].” Zhongguo Zhongjiao (Religion in China)(2002) no.36 :8-9.

26 Jiang Zemin”Gaodu Zhongshi Minzu Gongzhuo He Zhongjiao Gongzhuo” [Highly Regard works on Nationalities and Religion] in Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of Religious Affair Bureau.(ed) Xinsichi Zongjiao Gongzuo Wensin Xuanbiam [Selected document on Religious Work of New Age] Beijing: Zhongjiao Wenhua Press. 1995 pp.249-255. 27 Cadres are equivalent to civil servants in the public administration system of the West. religious cadres are recruited by the PRC government to be stationed at patriotic religious associations, the Religious Affairs Bureau and the Religious section of the United Front Department of the CCP to manage religious affairs making sure the CCP policy has been properly implemented within religious organizations. Sometime renegade religious adherents were recruited as religious cadres for their religious knowledge. Most of religious cadres were Party members. Religious cadres were not liked by religious leaders nor laity because they had the administrative power and they were the agents to work for the CCP for the extinction of religion. In practice they monitored religious activities and the movement of religious leaders and reported back to the government/Party in detail. 28 Xiao Feng, ”Zhonggong zenyang dueidai jiaohui he zhongjiao tu”[How the CCP Treated Church and Religious Believers] Zhishi fengi [Intellectual](Xianggang ) 65 (16 Nov.1970):13-14, part 1; 66(16 Dec.1970): 21-4 part 2; 67(16 Jan. 1971):30-2 part 3, 68 (16 Feb.1971):29-30 part 4.

29 Xiao Feng, ”Zhonggong zenyang dueidai jiaohui he zhongjiao tu”[How the CCP Treated Church and Religious Believers]. 30 Jonathan Chao, Chinese Communist Policy Toward Christianity, Hong Kong: China Evangelical Seminary Press, 1986, pp.97-104. 31 It was revealed by a retired religious cadre whose sister headed the confiscated orphanage of Gaungzhou, while he himself executed the order of the confiscation. This cadre was interviewed in June 2000. 32 Mao Zedong, “Guanyi Zhengque Chuli Renmin Neibo Maoduen de Wenti” [On Correctly Managing Internal Contradiction Among People].in Mao Zegon Chucho Xuendu[Selected Reading of Mao Zedong.]. Beijing: Renmin. 1965. pp.327-64. 33 Xiao Feng, ”Zhonggong zenyang dueidai jiaohui he zhongjiao tu” [How the CCP Treated Church and Religious Believers] Zhishi Fengi [Intellectual](Xianggang ) 65 (16 Nov.1970):13-14 part 1. Xiao Feng is the pseudonym of a senior religious cadre ( 1950-60) who headed the provincial RAB in a major city in southern China. 34 Li Weihan, “Guangyu minju gongzhuo zhong jiao wenti” Tongyi zhanxian wenti yu minzu wenti, pp.520-81.

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35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Xiao Feng, ”Zhonggong zenyang dueidai jiaohui he zhongjiao tu” [How the CCP Treated Church and Religious Believers] 39 Xiao Feng, ”Zhonggong zenyang dueidai jiaohui he zhongjiao tu” [How the CCP Treated Church and Religious Believers] 40 This figure was given in 1983 when the Chinese government rectified 142 Buddhist and Taoist temples allowing these temples to be registered as places of worship. See: Executive Yuan Mainland Committee, (ed.), Dailu diqu zhongjiao fagui weibian [Compilation of Religious Rules and Laws in the Mainland], Taiwan, Executive Yuan Mainland Committee, 1995, pp.4, 12-23. 41 Xiao Feng identified Wu’s status as secret party member. See: Xiao Feng, ”Zhonggong zenyang dueidai jiaohui he zhongjiao tu” [How the CCP Treated Church and Religious Believers] Zhishi Fengi [Intellectual](Xianggang ) 66 (Dec.1970):21-4 part 3. Deng Zhaoming identified that Wu was the only Protestant among pro-Communist intellectuals who were invited to have consultation with CCP leaders in September 1949shortly after Beijing was in the Hand of CCP. Wu took a secret trip from Hong Kong to Beijing through North Korea. See: Deng Zhaoming The Vicissitudes of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement in the 1950’s and its Predicament Today. Hong Kong:: Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture. 1997.p.8-9. Deng Zhaoming The Vicissitudes of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement in the 1950’s and its Predicament Today. pp.19-66. Ying Fuk-tsang and Leung Ka-lun The Three-Self Patriotic Movement in 1950s. Hong Kong; Alliance Bible Seminary 1996..pp.1-125 42 Zhu Yueli, Jiyi zhongguo zhongjiao [Religion in China Today], Beijing: Today’s China Press, 1994,pp.145-57 43 Frederick C. Teiwes” Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime” in Denis Twitchett and John Fairbank (ed) The Cambridge History of China., 15 vols. Roderick MacFarquhar and Fairbank (ed) 14 vol. The People’s Republic Part I: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.51-88. 44 Jiang Ping at el.Sichuan de Zhongjaio he Zhingguo gongchandang de Zhongjiao Chengce.[Tibetan Religion and the Chinese Communist Party’s Religious Policy]. Beijing;Chuanxue Press.1996.pp.102-5. Zhu Yueli. 1994 Jiyi Zhongguo Zhongjiao. [Religion in China Today]. Beijing: Today’s China Press. Pp.123-7.

45 Zhongchuan Yuen et al. Zhongguo Fojiao Fajian Shi [The Developmental History of Chinese Buddhism] tran. Yu Wenchu.Taiwan:Heavenly Totus Publishing Co. 1984. vol.2 pp.864-5. 46 Chen Bing and Deng Jimei Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Fojiao. Beijing: Minchu Press.2000.pp.55-7. 47 Mao Zedong, On Correctly Managing Internal Contradiction Among People.

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48 These are: China Daoist Association, Buddhist Association of China, Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee for the Protestant Churches of China, National Christian Conference of China, Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, Chinese Catholic Bishops College, National Administrative Commission of the Chinese Catholic Church, and Islamic Association of China. 49 Religious cadres are paid staff recruited by the government working on religious affairs and to be posted in patriotic religious associations which are all located within the compound of churches, temples and mosques. 50 Three Selfs Religious Reform was initiated in 1954 under the leadership of WuYaozhong. There are many studies on this issue, the latest one being: Ying FukTsang and Leung Kalun, Wuxi niendai sanzhi yundong de yanjao [The Three Selfs Patriotic Movement in the 1950s], Hong Kong: Alliance Bible Seminary,1996. 51 Xiao Feng,”Zhonggong zenyang dueidai jiaohui he zhongjiao tu” [How the CCP Treated Church and Religious Believers]. 52 For systematic study on the re-eduaction and thought reform of Maoist China see: Schurmann, Franz,1968. Ideology and Orgnaization in Communist China.Berkeley: University of California Press.

54 Laszlo Ladany, The Catholic church in China. New York: Freedom Press, 1987; Dominic Tang (Deng), Tianyi Moche [God’s Will is Unfathomable](private circulation) Hong Kong, 3rd ed., 1994; Gong pinmei “Letter of Appeal”( private document). Both Gong (Shanghai) and Tang (Guangzhou) were Chinese Catholic bishops who had gone through hardship in the 1950s before being thrown into jail. 55 Catholic religious orders, such as the Jesuits and Franciscans, completely lost contact with their jailed Chinese priests during Cultural Revolution. Soon after the opening of China in 1979, investigations of their jailed members were made. 56 Dru Gladney. Muslilm Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the people’s Republic. MA: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp.117-69 57 Ibid. 58 Deng Zhaoming The Vicissitudes of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement in the 1950’s and its Predicament Today. Hong Kong:: Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture. 1997.pp.66-75 59 It was remarked by the Guangzhou Archbishop Deng Yiming who spent 22 years in Jailed since 1957, and was released in 1979. He was interviewed in 1982. 60 Tang Yunchiao, Huang Kacheng. Guanyu dangfeng wenti de jianhua [Talks on Party Discipline] Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1981. See alsol Hu Yaobang’s talk on celebrating the 60th anniversary of the CCP. See Hu Yaobang, “Zai qingshu zhongguo gongchandang chengli liushe zhounian dahui shang de jianghua [A Talk on the Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the CCP], Renmin ribao, 2 July 1981.

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61 Deng Xiaoping, “ Xinzhiqi de tongyi zhenxian he renmin zhengxue de yinwu” [The Duties of the United Front and People Consultation in the New Era], in Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy section of RAB (ed.), Xin sichi zongjiao gongzuo wensin xuanbian [Selected Documents on Religious Work of New Age] Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Chubanshe, 1995, pp.5-8. 62 Yang Qingren, “Xinshiqi de tongyi zhenxin” [The United Front Policy of the New Age] Hongqi, No.7 April 1983: 2-7 63 “Cattle shed”, a breeding place for cattle: alluded to the place where purged intellectuals stayed during the political campaigns beginning with the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1958. 64 Sunday Examiner (Hong Kong) 11 Aug. 1981; 11 Dec. 1981. 65 It was revealed by a former head of US Chamber of Commerce, who also campaigned for human rights. In 1996. 66 “Women dang jai zhihui juyi xiqi zhongjiao wenti de jibian zhencher” [Our Party’s Basic Policy in Religion in the Era of Socialism] in Hongqi [Red Flag] no. 12, 1982. 67 Zhu Yueli, Jiyi zhongguo zhongjiao [Religion in China Today], Beijing: Today’s China Press, 1994, pp. 152-7. Zhu recorded that in 1978, 1-11 December the work of dormant religious meeting since 1962 was called by the Party Central.

68 Li Weihan, “Guangyu minju gongzhuo zhong jiao wenti” Tongyi zhanxian wenti yu minzu wenti [Questions of the United Front and National Minorities], pp.12,174, 503-19. 69 Donald MacInnis (ed.), Religion in China: Policy and Practice, New York: Orbis Books, pp. 19-26. 70 This remark was made by a professor of the Dept. of Public Administration Peking University. 71 Religious activities were reactivated, Document 19 was draft by CCP and the State council to confined religious activities within an orbit acceptable for the Party. Religious cadres from the Religious Affairs Bureau, the United Front Department, were summoned to draft the document with the consultation of National Security bureau. The draft was endorsed by the Politburo, and was launched by the Religious Affairs Bureau of State Council. 72 This was a true case derived from one of the interviewees. 73 Although one may find religious magazines (published by Party-sponsored religious patriotic associations) eulogising the kindness of the Party in reopening religious activities, many non-conformed religious adherents whom the authors met in China complained that the Party members want to control God. Religious cadres are not required to undertake religious studies before they take up their role of administering religion. 74 Section VI gives very full detailed instructions on the return of religious buildings to improve China's image vis-a-vis foreign religious visitors, especially temples on scenic spots. However, according to reports from visitors to Hong Kong, religious communities in China to date have not had most of the church property and land returned to them, due to lack of support and coordination from government bureaucracies.

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75 Asia Focus, June 3, 1989. 76 Donald E. MacInnis, Religion in China Today. Policy and Practice. Orbis Books. Maryknoll, New York. 1989, p. 12. 77 Conveyed to the author by the bishop of one of the dioceses in the southwest, based on his own experience in dealing with cadres in connection with the return of church property. 78 Wen Wei Pao. 6 July 1991. 79 Wen Wei Pao. 6 July 1991. 80 It was revealed by some religious cadres that within the Chinese bureaucratic system, religious work is regarded as unwelcome posts among cadres, because religion has been the laugh stock among themselves when they take religion as a superstition. 81 King Chow,." Reform of the Chinese Cadre System: Pitfalls, Issues and Implications of the Proposed Civil Service System." International Review of Administration Science 57 (1991): 25-44. 82 The RAB staff in December 1990 admitted that 70% of the religious activities, especially those in the south are beyond their control.

83 Chen Yun”Guanyu Gaodao Zhongshi Zhongjiao Xintiao Wente de Xin”[The Letter on the Highly Concerned about Religious Infiltration] in Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy section of Religious Affair bureau.(ed) Xinsichi Zongjiao Gongzuo Wensin Xuanbiam [Selected document on Religious Work of New Age] Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Press. 1995 p. 177.

84 Ye Xiaowen 1996."Danqian woguode Zhongjiao wenti" [The contemporary religious questions of the motherland] in Zhonggong Zhongyang danxiao baogao xuan [Selected Reports of the Party Central School] vol.101, no.5 pp.9-23 (internally circulated document). 85 “ A Chronology of the Catholic church in China in the Context of Selected Dates in World and Chinese History” Tripod. Vol.XIII no.76 (July-August 1993): 19-76. China Catholic Communication. 1993 Guide to the Catholic Church in China 1993. Singapore. Pp.10-8 China Catholic Communication. 1997 Guide to the Catholic Church in China 1997. Singapore. Pp.10-8.; China Catholic Communication. 2000 Guide to the Catholic Church in China 2000 Singapore. Pp.8-14. 86 China Catholic Communication. 1997 Guide to the Catholic Church in China 1997. Singapore. Pp.10-8.; China Catholic Communication. 2000 Guide to the Catholic Church in China 2000 Singapore. Pp.8-14; Cao Shengjie “Jidujiao Zai Zhongguo” Bauhinia (Hong Kong).no.126(April 2001):18-20 87 The author learned of this meeting in March 1990. Many Catholic news services reported it later. It was recorded in the chronology of the Catholic Church in China. See “ A Chronology of the Catholic Church in China in the Context of Selected Dates in World and Chinese History” Tripod (Hong Kong). Vol.XIII no. 76 (July-August 1993):19-76.

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88 Chen Yun”Guanyu Gaodao Zhongshi Zhongjiao Xintiao Wente de Xin”[The Letter on the Highly Concerned about Religious Infiltration]. 89 The Roman Curia did not actually take the initiative to appoint a Chinese bishop. However, when the non-official sector of the Chinese church asked for approval of the bishop candidate, the Roman Curia gave its approval. Luo Shu Gang.” Zhongjiao gongzuo de Yixie Redian Wenti” [ Some Popular issues in Religious Work] in Neibu Wengao (Internal Document) No. 5 (1996).:11-3 . 90 Luo Shu Gang.” Zhongjiao gongzuo de Yixie Redian Wenti” [ Some Popular issues in Religious Work] in Neibu Wengao (Internal Document) No. 5 (1996).:11-3Neibao Wengiao, no.5. 91 Luo Shu Gang.” Zhongjiao gongzuo de Yixie Redian Wenti” [ Some Popular issues in Religious Work] 92 Luo Shu Gang.” Zhongjiao gongzuo de Yixie Redian Wenti” [ Some Popular issues in Religious Work]. 93 On the religious crackdown see: South China Morning Post 14 Nov. 1996. For the Muslim riot in Xinjiang see: Hong Kong Economic Journal 12,13, 14 Feb. and 18 Sept. 1997, and Ming Pao 10 Feb. 1997. 94 Ye Xiaowen 1999 “Guanyu Zhongjiao Gongchu de Sanju hua”. [Three Sentences on the Work of Religion] in Zhonggong Zhongyang danxiao baogao xuan [Selected Reports of the Party Central School] vol.162, no.6 pp.1-18 (internally circulated document). Officials of the Chinese Atheism Society expressed privately that the CCP was very alert to the Roman Catholic Church. Reported by the informant who talked to an official of the Chinese Atheism Society in May 2000. 95 The preamble of the PRC’s Constitution 1982 stated ” the whole nation in the years to come is to concentrate its effort on socialist modernization, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism….” 96 Beatrice Leung, “China and Falun Gong : Party and Society Relations in Modern Era.” 97 John Paul II Enclycle Letter Centesimus Annus. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. 1991. 98 Dillon, Michele 1999 Catholic Identity: Balancing Reason, Faith and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Goodstadt, Leo. 1996 "Politics and Economic Modernization in 21st Century Asia: Potential Conflict and their Management" in Leung, Beatrice (ed) Church and State Relations in 21st Century Asia. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies.(Univeristy of Hong Kong).;Hanson, Eric 1987 Catholic Church and World Politics. N.J.: Princeton University Press; Moyser, G. (ed) 1990 Politics and Religion in the Modern World. London; Routlege; Robins & Robertson, 1987, Church-State Relations: Tension and Transition. Oxford & New Brunswick: Transaction Books

99 Ramet Pedro and Sabrina Ramet (ed) 1993 Religious Policy in the Soviet Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Goodstadt, Leo. 1996 "Politics and Economic Modernization in 21st Century Asia: Potential Conflict and their Management" in Leung, Beatrice (ed) Church and State

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Relations in 21st Century Asia. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies.(Univeristy of Hong Kong); -Eric Hanson,1980 Catholic Politics in China and Korea. New York: Orbis Book; Stchle, H. 1987. Eastern politics of the Vatican 1917-1979. Tran. S. Mmith. Ohio: Ohio State University Press; Leung, Beatrice 1992 Sino-Vatican Relations Problems of conflicting Authority. (1976-1986). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Weigel, George 1992. The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and Collapse of Communism. New York: Oxford University Press. 100 Guo Wei ”Zhongjiao Gongzhuo zhanxian de jiechu lingdaoren Xi Zhongxuen tongzhi[Comrade Xi Zhongxuen : An Outstanding Leaders in the United Front Work].” Zhongguo Zhongjiao (Religion in China)(2002) no.36 :8-9 101 Ye Xiaowen 1996."Danqian woguode Zhongjiao wenti" [The contemporary religious questions of the motherland] 102 Ye Xiaowen “Shiji Zhijiao zhongjiao gongchuo de Sikao”.[reflections on the Relious Work at the Change of Millenium] Zhongguo Zhongjiao.[Religion in China] 2000 Vol 20 no.1 :4-9

103 Zhu Yueli. Jiyi Zhongguo Zhongjiao. [Religion in China Today]. Beijing: Today’s China Press. 1994. Pp. 152-7. 104. Religious Affairs Bureau recommends the registration which is taken place in the Ministry of Civil Affairs. This double registration is common in China to ensure that civil organizations are under double layers of control. See Tony Saich, 2000 "Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China". China Quarterly. 161 March:124-42. 105 Each year in the Zhonggong Zhongyang danxiao baogao xuan [Selected Reports of the Party Central School] an internally circulated document for Party members only, has a report on the talk of the head of RAB. 106 Ye Xiaowen 1999 “Guanyu Zhongjiao Gongchu de Sanju hua”. [Three Sentences on the Work of Religion] 107 Asian Focus. Vol.7 No.26. 108 Renmin Ribao 6 Feb. 1994). 109 Jiang Zemin”Gaodu Zhongshi Minzu Gongzhuo He Zhongjiao Gongzhuo” [HighlyRegard works on Nationalities and Religion] in in Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of Religious Affair Bureau.(ed) Xinsichi Zongjiao Gongzuo Wensin Xuanbiam [Selected document on Religious Work of New Age] Beijing: Zhongjiao Wenhua Press. 1995 pp.249-255.

110 Ye Xiaowen 1999 “Guanyu Zhongjiao Gongchu de Sanju hua”. [Three Sentences on the Work of Religion] 111 Li Peng”Jinyibu Zhongshi, Guanxin he chuo hao Zhongjiao Gongzuo”[Pay Further attention, Caring About the Good Performance of Religious Work] and JiangZemin “Yiding Yao Zhuohao Zhongjiao Gongzhuo”{Must Have a Perfect Performance on Religious Work} in Documentation

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Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of Religious Affairs Bureau.(ed) Xinsichi Zongjiao Gongzuo Wensin Xuanbiam [Selected document on Religious Work of New Age] pp. 189-204. 112 Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of Religious Affairs Bureau. .(ed) Xinsichi Zongjiao Gongzuo Wensin Xuanbiam [Selected document on Religious Work of New Age] pp. 273-7). 113 Executive Yuen Mainland Committee. (ed)Dailu Diqu Zhongjiao Fagui Weibian[Compilation of Religious Rules and Laws in the Mainland]. Taiwan. Executive Yuen Mainland Committee. 1995. Yunnan Province complied a comprehensive collection of national and provincial regulations and laws for the internal use by religious cadres. See: Religious Affair Bureau of Yunnan Province (ed)Zhongiiao Fagai Zhegnce Zhongjiao Tuanti Zhangcheng Weibian.[ Collections of Religious Regulations and Constitutions of Religious Organizations]. Yunnan: Religious Affairs Bureau of People’s Government. (no date) 114 “Yingzhen Chuohao Zhongjaio Huodong Changsuo Dangji Gongchuo” [ seriously Perform the Work of Registering Place of Worship] in Executive Yuen Mainland Committee. (ed)Dailu Diqu Zhongjiao Fagui Weibian[Compilation of Religious Rules and Laws in the Mainland]. Taiwan. Executive Yuen Mainland Committee. 1995.pp.4:5-10.. 115 Ibid. 116 Executive Yuen Mainland Committee. (ed)Dailu Diqu Zhongjiao Fagui Weibian[Compilation of Religious Rules and Laws in the Mainland]. Taiwan: Executive Yuen Mainland Committee. 1995. pp.4:12-23. 117 Ibid. 118 China Catholic Communication. 2000 Guide to the Catholic Church in China 2000. Singapore. Pp.14-5. These churches are scattered around the whole nation, but the majority are in the countryside.

119 Beatrice Leung, ” Catholic’s Bridging Effort with China”. Religion, State and Society. Vol.28.no.2 (June 2000):185-196;

121 Beatrice Leung ” Communist Party-Vatican Interplay Over the Training of Church Leaders” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. Vol.4.no.4. Dec.2001. 122 Beatrice Leung “” Communist Party-Vatican Interplay Over the Training of Church Leaders” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. Vol.4.no.4. Dec.2001. “Weiguoren Zhongjiao Huodong Guanli Kuiding Yuegan Tielquan de jexi”{Explanations on some Provisions in …’On the Management of Foreigner Staying in the People’s Republic of China’} in Executive Yuen Mainland Committee. (ed) Dailu Diqu Zhongjiao Fagui Weibian[Compilation of Religious Rules and Laws in the Mainland]. Taiwan: Executive Yuen Mainland Committee. 1995. pp. 3-4-8.t)

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123 Revealed by a leading Catholic priest in a diocese in southwest China. 124 Reported recently by church travelers that this practice was adopted by religious cadres in 2 provinces. 125 In 1996, major church project directors were forbidden from visiting China for 3-5 years. 126 Ye Xiaowen “Shiji Zhijiao zhongjiao gongchuo de Sikao”.[reflections on the Relious Work at the Change of Millenium] Zhongguo Zhongjiao.[Religion in China] 2000 Vol 20 no.1 :4-9

127 Renmin Ribao 6 Feb. 1994). 128 Jiang Zemin”Gaodu Zhongshi Minzu Gongzhuo He Zhongjiao Gongzhuo” [HighlyRegard works on Nationalities and Religion] in in Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of Religious Affair Bureau.(ed) Xinsichi Zongjiao Gongzuo Wensin Xuanbiam [Selected document on Religious Work of New Age] Beijing: Zhongjiao Wenhua Press. 1995 pp.249-255.

129 Jason Kindopp’s statement quoted by Meng Yuen” Zhongguo Zhongjiao Chengce Chongxin Qibu” Hong Kong Economic Journal. 27 December 2001.p.9. Jason Kindopp is the expert in Chinese religions of Brooklin Institute, USA. 130 Xinhua News. 12 Dec. 2001. 131 Xinhua News. 12 Dec. 2001. 132 Xinhua News. 12 Dec. 2001 133 Meng Yuen,”Zhongguo Zhongjiao Zhiyao Chongxin Qibu.’[The Re-starting of Religious Freedom in China.] Hong Kong Economic Journal. 28 December 2001. 134 Kang Xiaoguang. Falun Gong Shi Jian. (an unpublished manuscript for a research project sponsored by the Division of National Phenomena, Chinese Academy of Sciences)the author read the manuscript in October 2000. pp.26-28. Beatrice Leung “China and Falun Gong: Party and society Relations in Modern Era;” Journal of Contemporary China. (forthcoming)

135 Kang Xiaoguang. Falun Gong Shi Jian. (an unpublished manuscript for a research project sponsored by the Division of National Phenomena, Chinese Academy of Sciences). Beatrice Leung” Falun gong in China: The Party and Society Relations in Modern Era.” 136 For the change of paradigm in study of Christianity and other religion, see:Nicolas Standaert”New Trends in the Historiography of Christianity in China” in Catholic Histrocial Review 83(1997) :573-613.See also Handbook of Chrisianty in China ed. By Nicolas Standaert (Leiden 2001) pp. ix f; P. Rule, “ Chinese Centred Mission History” in J. Heyndrickx (ed), Historiography of the Chinese Catholic Church (Leuven 1994)pp. 52-9; E. Zurcher, “From Jesuit Studies to History of European Sinology (London 1995), pp. 264-279.Roman Malek “Some Reparks on the Study of

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Christianity in the People’s Republic of China” a paper presented in the International Eccelesiastical and Academic Conference on Christianity in China. 22-24 November, Moscow. 137 It was reported by an informant who is close to the provincial government in Zhenshen where Pan Yue works. 138 Joshua Levin. China’s divisive Development” Harvard International Review. Fall 2001 Vol.23 no.3:40-2. Wenfeng Tang. “Political and Social Trend in the post Deng Urban China: Crisis or Stability?” The China Quarterly. Dec. 2001. vol.168:890-909 139 Beatrice Leung, “China and Falun Gong : Party and Society Relations in Modern Era.” Journal of Contemporary China vol 11, no.33, 2002:761-84. 140 For example, in Sino-Vatican negotiations, China insisted to retain its administrative power in Chinese dioceses after the normalization of the Sino-Vatican relations. In Catholic diocese of Chongqing, Sichuan, after the death of the local bishop in 1994, the government did not allow the appointment of a new bishop, and the diocese was run by the head of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association. (Information was given by church informants in 2000). 141 Documentation Centre of Party Central and Policy Section of Religious Affair Bureau. Xinshiqi Zongjiao Gongzuo Wenxian Xuanbian. [Selected Document on Religious Work of New Age] Beijing: Zongjiao Wenhua Press. 1995. p.177 142 In Art. 36, Constitution of China (1982) it clearly stipulated that religion cannot interfere with education. 143 Dru Gladney. Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality. New York:Harcourt Brace College Publishers.1998. pp.1-32. 144 Beatrice Leung” Falun gong in China: The Party and Society Relations in Modern Era.” The Journal of Contemporary China vol 11, no.33, 2002:761-84.

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