Algorithms, Complexity, and the Sciences INAUGURAL ARTICLE
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Potential Games. Congestion Games. Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability
8803 Connections between Learning, Game Theory, and Optimization Maria-Florina Balcan Lecture 13: October 5, 2010 Reading: Algorithmic Game Theory book, Chapters 17, 18 and 19. Price of Anarchy and Price of Staility We assume a (finite) game with n players, where player i's set of possible strategies is Si. We let s = (s1; : : : ; sn) denote the (joint) vector of strategies selected by players in the space S = S1 × · · · × Sn of joint actions. The game assigns utilities ui : S ! R or costs ui : S ! R to any player i at any joint action s 2 S: any player maximizes his utility ui(s) or minimizes his cost ci(s). As we recall from the introductory lectures, any finite game has a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE), but a finite game may or may not have pure Nash equilibria. Today we focus on games with pure NE. Some NE are \better" than others, which we formalize via a social objective function f : S ! R. Two classic social objectives are: P sum social welfare f(s) = i ui(s) measures social welfare { we make sure that the av- erage satisfaction of the population is high maxmin social utility f(s) = mini ui(s) measures the satisfaction of the most unsatisfied player A social objective function quantifies the efficiency of each strategy profile. We can now measure how efficient a Nash equilibrium is in a specific game. Since a game may have many NE we have at least two natural measures, corresponding to the best and the worst NE. We first define the best possible solution in a game Definition 1. -
Curriculum Vitae
Curriculum Vitae Prof. Michal Feldman School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University Personal Details • Born: Israel, 1976 • Gender: Female • email: [email protected] Education • Ph.D.: Information Management and Systems, University of California at Berkeley, May 2005. Thesis title: Incentives for cooperation in peer-to-peer systems. • B.Sc.: Bar-Ilan University, Computer Science, Summa Cum Laude, June 1999. Academic Positions 2013 - present: Associate Professor, School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University, Israel. Associate Professor, School of Business Administration and Center for 2011 - 2013: the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. 2007 - 2011: Senior Lecturer, School of Business Administration and Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Additional Positions 2011 - 2013: Visiting Researcher (weekly visitor), Microsoft Research New England, Cambridge, MA, USA. 2011 - 2013: Visiting Professor, Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Center for Research on Computation and Society, School of Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA (Marie Curie IOF program). 2008 - 2011: Senior Researcher (part-time), Microsoft Research in Herzliya, Israel. 2007 - 2013: Member, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University. 2005 - 2007: Post-Doctoral Fellow (Lady Davis fellowship), Hebrew University, School of Computer Science and Engineering. 2004: Ph.D. Intern, HP Labs, Palo Alto, California, USA. 1 Grants (Funding ID) • European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant: \Algorithmic Mechanism Design - Beyond Truthfulness": 1.4 million Euro, 2013-2017. • FP7 Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellowship (IOF): \Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory" (IAGT): 313,473 Euro, 2011-2014. • Israel Science Foundation (ISF) grant. \Equilibria Under Coalitional Covenants in Non-Cooperative Games - Existence, Quality and Computation:" 688,000 NIS (172,000 NIS /year), 2009-2013. -
MODELING and ANALYSIS of MOBILE TELEPHONY PROTOCOLS by Chunyu Tang a DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the Stevens Instit
MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF MOBILE TELEPHONY PROTOCOLS by Chunyu Tang A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the Stevens Institute of Technology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chunyu Tang, Candidate ADVISORY COMMITTEE David A. Naumann, Chairman Date Yingying Chen Date Daniel Duchamp Date Susanne Wetzel Date STEVENS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Castle Point on Hudson Hoboken, NJ 07030 2013 c 2013, Chunyu Tang. All rights reserved. iii MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF MOBILE TELEPHONY PROTOCOLS ABSTRACT The GSM (2G), UMTS (3G), and LTE (4G) mobile telephony protocols are all in active use, giving rise to a number of interoperation situations. This poses serious challenges in ensuring authentication and other security properties. Analyzing the security of all possible interoperation scenarios by hand is, at best, tedious under- taking. Model checking techniques provide an effective way to automatically find vulnerabilities in or to prove the security properties of security protocols. Although the specifications address the interoperation cases between GSM and UMTS and the switching and mapping of established security context between LTE and previous technologies, there is not a comprehensive specification of which are the possible interoperation cases. Nor is there comprehensive specification of the procedures to establish security context (authentication and short-term keys) in the various interoperation scenarios. We systematically enumerate the cases, classifying them as allowed, disallowed, or uncertain with rationale based on detailed analysis of the specifications. We identify the authentication and key agreement procedure for each of the possible cases. We formally model the pure GSM, UMTS, LTE authentication protocols, as well as all the interoperation scenarios; we analyze their security, in the symbolic model of cryptography, using the tool ProVerif. -
Department of Computer Science
i cl i ck ! MAGAZINE click MAGAZINE 2014, VOLUME II FIVE DECADES AS A DEPARTMENT. THOUSANDS OF REMARKABLE GRADUATES. 50COUNTLESS INNOVATIONS. Department of Computer Science click! Magazine is produced twice yearly for the friends of got your CS swag? CS @ ILLINOIS to showcase the innovations of our faculty and Commemorative 50-10 Anniversary students, the accomplishments of our alumni, and to inspire our t-shirts are available! partners and peers in the field of computer science. Department Head: Editorial Board: Rob A. Rutenbar Tom Moone Colin Robertson Associate Department Heads: Rob A. Rutenbar shop now! my.cs.illinois.edu/buy Gerald DeJong Michelle Wellens Jeff Erickson David Forsyth Writers: David Cunningham CS Alumni Advisory Board: Elizabeth Innes Alex R. Bratton (BS CE ’93) Mike Koon Ira R. Cohen (BS CS ’81) Rick Kubetz Vilas S. Dhar (BS CS ’04, BS LAS BioE ’04) Leanne Lucas William M. Dunn (BS CS ‘86, MS ‘87) Tom Moone Mary Jane Irwin (MS CS ’75, PhD ’77) Michelle Rice Jennifer A. Mozen (MS CS ’97) Colin Robertson Daniel L. Peterson (BS CS ’05) Laura Schmitt Peter L. Tannenwald (BS LAS Math & CS ’85) Michelle Wellens Jill C. Zmaczinsky (BS CS ’00) Design: Contact us: SURFACE 51 [email protected] 217-333-3426 Machines take me by surprise with great frequency. Alan Turing 2 CS @ ILLINOIS Department of Computer Science College of Engineering, College of Liberal Arts & Sciences University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign shop now! my.cs.illinois.edu/buy click i MAGAZINE 2014, VOLUME II 2 Letter from the Head 4 ALUMNI NEWS 4 Alumni -
Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design By
Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design by Yaron Singer A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Christos Papadimitriou, Chair Professor Shachar Kariv Professor Scott Shenker Spring 2012 Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design Copyright 2012 by Yaron Singer 1 Abstract Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design by Yaron Singer Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Christos Papadimitriou, Chair In the past decade, a theory of manipulation-robust algorithms has been emerging to address the challenges that frequently occur in strategic environments such as the internet. The theory, known as algorithmic mechanism design, builds on the foundations of classical mechanism design from microeconomics and is based on the idea of incentive compatible pro- tocols. Such protocols achieve system-wide objectives through careful design that ensures it is in every agent's best interest to comply with the protocol. As it turns out, however, implementing incentive compatible protocols as advocated in classical mechanism design the- ory often necessitates solving intractable problems. To address this, algorithmic mechanism design focuses on designing -
Electronic Commerce (Algorithmic Game Theory) (Tentative Syllabus)
EECS 547: Electronic Commerce (Algorithmic Game Theory) (Tentative Syllabus) Lecture: Tuesday and Thursday 10:30am-Noon in 1690 BBB Section: Friday 3pm-4pm in EECS 3427 Email: [email protected] Instructor: Grant Schoenebeck Office Hours: Wednesday 3pm and by appointment; 3636 BBBB Graduate Student Instructor: Biaoshuai Tao Office Hours: 4-5pm Friday in Learning Center (between BBB and Dow in basement) Introduction: As the internet draws together strategic actors, it becomes increasingly important to understand how strategic agents interact with computational artifacts. Algorithmic game theory studies both how to models strategic agents (game theory) and how to design systems that take agent strategies into account (mechanism design). On-line auction sites (including search word auctions), cyber currencies, and crowd-sourcing are all obvious applications. However, even more exist such as designing non- monetary award systems (reputation systems, badges, leader-boards, Facebook “likes”), recommendation systems, and data-analysis when strategic agents are involved. In this particular course, we will especially focus on information elicitation mechanisms (crowd- sourcing). Description: Modeling and analysis for strategic decision environments, combining computational and economic perspectives. Essential elements of game theory, including solution concepts and equilibrium computation. Design of mechanisms for resource allocation and social choice, for example as motivated by problems in electronic commerce and social computing. Format: The two weeks will be background lectures. The next half of the class will be seminar style and will focus on crowd-sourcing, and especially information elicitation mechanisms. Each class period, the class will read a paper (or set of papers), and a pair of students will briefly present the papers and lead a class discussion. -
Lipics-ISAAC-2020-42.Pdf (0.5
Multiparty Selection Ke Chen Department of Computer Science, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, WI, USA [email protected] Adrian Dumitrescu Department of Computer Science, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, WI, USA [email protected] Abstract Given a sequence A of n numbers and an integer (target) parameter 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the (exact) selection problem is that of finding the i-th smallest element in A. An element is said to be (i, j)-mediocre if it is neither among the top i nor among the bottom j elements of S. The approximate selection problem is that of finding an (i, j)-mediocre element for some given i, j; as such, this variant allows the algorithm to return any element in a prescribed range. In the first part, we revisit the selection problem in the two-party model introduced by Andrew Yao (1979) and then extend our study of exact selection to the multiparty model. In the second part, we deduce some communication complexity benefits that arise in approximate selection. In particular, we present a deterministic protocol for finding an approximate median among k players. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation Keywords and phrases approximate selection, mediocre element, comparison algorithm, i-th order statistic, tournaments, quantiles, communication complexity Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.ISAAC.2020.42 1 Introduction Given a sequence A of n numbers and an integer (selection) parameter 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the selection problem asks to find the i-th smallest element in A. If the n elements are distinct, the i-th smallest is larger than i − 1 elements of A and smaller than the other n − i elements of A. -
Four Results of Jon Kleinberg a Talk for St.Petersburg Mathematical Society
Four Results of Jon Kleinberg A Talk for St.Petersburg Mathematical Society Yury Lifshits Steklov Institute of Mathematics at St.Petersburg May 2007 1 / 43 2 Hubs and Authorities 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 4 Navigation in a Small World 5 Bursty Structure in Streams Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 / 43 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 4 Navigation in a Small World 5 Bursty Structure in Streams Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 Hubs and Authorities 2 / 43 4 Navigation in a Small World 5 Bursty Structure in Streams Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 Hubs and Authorities 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 2 / 43 5 Bursty Structure in Streams Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 Hubs and Authorities 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 4 Navigation in a Small World 2 / 43 Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 Hubs and Authorities 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 4 Navigation in a Small World 5 Bursty Structure in Streams 2 / 43 Part I History of Nevanlinna Prize Career of Jon Kleinberg 3 / 43 Nevanlinna Prize The Rolf Nevanlinna Prize is awarded once every 4 years at the International Congress of Mathematicians, for outstanding contributions in Mathematical Aspects of Information Sciences including: 1 All mathematical aspects of computer science, including complexity theory, logic of programming languages, analysis of algorithms, cryptography, computer vision, pattern recognition, information processing and modelling of intelligence. -
Satisfiability and Evolution
2014 IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science Satisfiability and Evolution Adi Livnat Christos Papadimitriou Aviad Rubinstein Department of Biological Sciences Computer Science Division Computer Science Division Virginia Tech. University of California at Berkeley University of California at Berkeley [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Gregory Valiant Andrew Wan Computer Science Department Simons Institute Stanford University University of California at Berkeley [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—We show that, if truth assignments on n variables genes are able to efficiently arise in polynomial populations reproduce through recombination so that satisfaction of a par- with recombination. In the standard view of evolution, a ticular Boolean function confers a small evolutionary advan- variant of a particular gene is more likely to spread across tage, then a polynomially large population over polynomially many generations (polynomial in n and the inverse of the initial a population if it makes its own contribution to the overall satisfaction probability) will end up almost surely consisting fitness, independent of the contributions of variants of other exclusively of satisfying truth assignments. We argue that this genes. How can complex, multi-gene traits spread in a theorem sheds light on the problem of the evolution of complex population? This may seem to be especially problematic adaptations. for multi-gene traits whose contribution to fitness does not Keywords-evolution; algorithms; Boolean functions decompose into small additive components associated with each gene variant —traits with the property that even if I. INTRODUCTION one gene variant is different from the one that is needed The TCS community has a long history of applying its for the right combination, there is no benefit, or even a net perspectives and tools to better understand the processes negative benefit. -
Navigability of Small World Networks
Navigability of Small World Networks Pierre Fraigniaud CNRS and University Paris Sud http://www.lri.fr/~pierre Introduction Interaction Networks • Communication networks – Internet – Ad hoc and sensor networks • Societal networks – The Web – P2P networks (the unstructured ones) • Social network – Acquaintance – Mail exchanges • Biology (Interactome network), linguistics, etc. Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 3 Common statistical properties • Low density • “Small world” properties: – Average distance between two nodes is small, typically O(log n) – The probability p that two distinct neighbors u1 and u2 of a same node v are neighbors is large. p = clustering coefficient • “Scale free” properties: – Heavy tailed probability distributions (e.g., of the degrees) Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 4 Gaussian vs. Heavy tail Example : human sizes Example : salaries µ Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 5 Power law loglog ppk prob{prob{ X=kX=k }} ≈≈ kk-α loglog kk Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 6 Random graphs vs. Interaction networks • Random graphs: prob{e exists} ≈ log(n)/n – low clustering coefficient – Gaussian distribution of the degrees • Interaction networks – High clustering coefficient – Heavy tailed distribution of the degrees Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 7 New problematic • Why these networks share these properties? • What model for – Performance analysis of these networks – Algorithm design for these networks • Impact of the measures? • This lecture addresses navigability Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 8 Navigability Milgram Experiment • Source person s (e.g., in Wichita) • Target person t (e.g., in Cambridge) – Name, professional occupation, city of living, etc. • Letter transmitted via a chain of individuals related on a personal basis • Result: “six degrees of separation” Dec. -
A Decade of Lattice Cryptography
Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0400000074 A Decade of Lattice Cryptography Chris Peikert Computer Science and Engineering University of Michigan, United States Boston — Delft Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0400000074 Foundations and Trends R in Theoretical Computer Science Published, sold and distributed by: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 1024 Hanover, MA 02339 United States Tel. +1-781-985-4510 www.nowpublishers.com [email protected] Outside North America: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 179 2600 AD Delft The Netherlands Tel. +31-6-51115274 The preferred citation for this publication is C. Peikert. A Decade of Lattice Cryptography. Foundations and Trends R in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 283–424, 2014. R This Foundations and Trends issue was typeset in LATEX using a class file designed by Neal Parikh. Printed on acid-free paper. ISBN: 978-1-68083-113-9 c 2016 C. Peikert All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Photocopying. In the USA: This journal is registered at the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. Authorization to photocopy items for in- ternal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by now Publishers Inc for users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC). The ‘services’ for users can be found on the internet at: www.copyright.com For those organizations that have been granted a photocopy license, a separate system of payment has been arranged. -
The Best Nurturers in Computer Science Research
The Best Nurturers in Computer Science Research Bharath Kumar M. Y. N. Srikant IISc-CSA-TR-2004-10 http://archive.csa.iisc.ernet.in/TR/2004/10/ Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science, India October 2004 The Best Nurturers in Computer Science Research Bharath Kumar M.∗ Y. N. Srikant† Abstract The paper presents a heuristic for mining nurturers in temporally organized collaboration networks: people who facilitate the growth and success of the young ones. Specifically, this heuristic is applied to the computer science bibliographic data to find the best nurturers in computer science research. The measure of success is parameterized, and the paper demonstrates experiments and results with publication count and citations as success metrics. Rather than just the nurturer’s success, the heuristic captures the influence he has had in the indepen- dent success of the relatively young in the network. These results can hence be a useful resource to graduate students and post-doctoral can- didates. The heuristic is extended to accurately yield ranked nurturers inside a particular time period. Interestingly, there is a recognizable deviation between the rankings of the most successful researchers and the best nurturers, which although is obvious from a social perspective has not been statistically demonstrated. Keywords: Social Network Analysis, Bibliometrics, Temporal Data Mining. 1 Introduction Consider a student Arjun, who has finished his under-graduate degree in Computer Science, and is seeking a PhD degree followed by a successful career in Computer Science research. How does he choose his research advisor? He has the following options with him: 1. Look up the rankings of various universities [1], and apply to any “rea- sonably good” professor in any of the top universities.