Logical Dependency in Quantification: a Study Conducted Within The
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Reasoning About Knowledge in Philosophy; the Paradigm of Epistemic Logic
REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE IN PHILOSOPHY; THE PARADIGM OF EPISTEMIC LOGIC Jaakko Hintikka Department of Philosophy Florida State University Tallahassee, FL 32306 ABSTRACT Theories of knowledge representation and reasoning about knowledge in philosophy are considered from the vantage point of epistemic logic. This logic is primarily a logic of knowing that, and its semantics can be considered an explication of the well-known idea that "information means elimination of uncertainty". A number of other theories are discussed as further developments of epistemic logic. They include: (1) theory of questions and answers. (2) interplay of quantifiers and epistemic concepts. (3) representations of other kinds of knowledge than knowing that, especially those expressed by knows + an indirect wh-question and by knows + direct grammatical object: (4) the problem of cross-identification; the coexistence of different cross-identification methods. (5) the problem of logical omniscience. {6) informational independence in epistemic logic and its manifestations, including the de dicto - de re contrast and wh-questions with outside quantifiers. (7) an interrogative model of inquiry and its applications, especially the conceptualization of tacit knowledge and of range of attention. 63 64 SESSION2 Epistemic logic as a vehicle of knowledge representation The main vehicle of speaking a~d reasoning about knowledge in philosophy has recently been epistemic logic° Even though epistemic logic is not the only relevant language-game in town, it offers a useful perspective here, for certain other approaches can be thought of as improvements on epistemic logic. In its axiomatic-deductive forms, epistetnic logic is normally considered a branch of modal logic, and its semantics is usually subsumed under the misleading heading of "possible-worlds semantics". -
Quantifiers Vs. Quantification Theory
Quantifiers vs. Quantification Theory by JAAKKO HINTIKKA The syntax and semantics of quantifiers is of crucial significance in current linguistic theorizing for more than one reason. The last statement of his grammatical theories by the late Richard Montague (1973) is modestly entitled “The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English”. In the authoritative statement of his “Generative Semantics”, George Lakoff (1971, especially pp. 238-267) uses as his first and foremost testing-ground the grammar of certain English quantifiers. In particular, they serve to illustrate, and show need of, his use of global constraints governing the derivation of English sen- tences. Evidence from the behavior of quantifiers (including numerical expressions 1) has likewise played a major role in recent discussions of such vital problems as the alleged meaningdpreservation of transfor- mations, 2 co-reference, 3 the role of surface structure in semantical interpretation, and so on. In all these problems, the behavior of natural-language quantifiers is one of the main issues. Quantifiers have nevertheless entered the Methodenstreit of contemporary linguistics in another major way, too. (These two groups of problems are of course interrelated.) This is the idea that the structures studied iln the so-called quantification theory of symbolic logic-otherwise know as first-order logic, (lower) predicate calculus, or elementary logic-can serve and suffice 6 as semantical representations of English sentences. Views of this general type have been proposed by McCawley (1971)* and Lakoff (1972)’ (among others). A related theory of “Deep Structure as Logical Form” has been put forward and defended by G. Harman (1972). -
Dialetheism, Game Theoretic Semantics, and Paraconsistent
Dialetheism, Game Theoretic Semantics, and Paraconsistent Team Semantics Pietro Galliani Abstract. We introduce a variant of Dependence Logic in which truth is defined not in terms of existence of winning strategies for the Proponent (Eloise) in a semantic game, but in terms of lack of winning strategies for the Opponent (Abelard). We show that this language is a conserva- tive but paraconsistent extension of First Order Logic, that its validity problem can be reduced to that of First Order Logic, that it capable of expressing its own truth and validity predicates, and that it is expres- 1 sively equivalent to Universal Second Order Logic Π1. Furthermore, we prove that a Paraconsistent Non-dependence Logic formula is consistent if and only if it is equivalent to some First Order Logic sentence; and we show that, on the other hand, all Paraconsistent Dependence Logic sentences are equivalent to some First Order sentence with respect to truth (but not necessarily with respect to falsity). Mathematics Subject Classification (2010). Primary 03B53 ; Secondary 03B60. Keywords. Paraconsistency, Team Semantics, Game Theoretic Seman- tics. arXiv:1206.6573v2 [math.LO] 14 Mar 2014 1. Introduction Dialetheism is the philosophical position according to which there exist true contradictions. It has been proposed as a possible answer to the paradoxes of self-reference; and moreover, although this is of less relevance for the purposes of this work, it also is one potential approach to the logical treatment of vagueness and transition states.1 Even though dialetheism is not the only possible motivation for the study of paraconsistent logics, that is, logics in which the principle of explo- sion (“Ex contradictione quodlibet”: from a contradiction, everything can be The author acknowledges the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (project number DI 561/6-1). -
The Epistemic Logic of IF Games
1 The epistemic logic of IF games Johan van Benthem, Amsterdam & Stanford December 2002 To appear in the Hintikka Volume, Library of Living Philosophers. Abstract We analyze IF/hyper-classical games by bringing together two viewpoints from Jaakko Hintikka's work: game semantics, and epistemic logic. In the process, we link up between logic and game theory. 1 Logic meets games Game theory and logic met in the 1950s – and Jaakko Hintikka has been a pioneer ever since in introducing game-theoretic viewpoints into logic, from his early basic evaluation games for predicate logic to his more recent ‘information-friendly’ logic based on extended games that go far beyond classical systems. The grand philosophical program behind these technical efforts is found in his books “Logic, Language Games and Information” (1973), “The Game of Language” (1985), the Handbook of Logic & Language chapter with Gabriel Sandu on ‘Game-Theoretical Semantics’ (1997), and many recent papers and manifestoes (cf. Hintikka 2002). Connections between logic and games are attracting attention these days, ranging from special-purpose ‘logic games’ to 'game logics' analyzing general game structure (cf. the general program in van Benthem 1999–2002). IF logic is intriguing in this respect, as it sits at the interface of ordinary logic games, whose players have perfect information about their position during play, and general game theory, where players may typically have imperfect information of various sorts. My aim in this paper is to explore the game content of Hintikka’s systems using tools from epistemic logic, and more generally, clarify their thrust at the interface of logic and game theory. -
Logic A-Z from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia Chapter 1
Logic A-Z From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Chapter 1 Antepredicament Antepredicaments, in logic, are certain previous matters requisite to a more easy and clear apprehension of the doctrine of predicaments or categories. Such are definitions of common terms, as equivocals, univocals, etc., with divisions of things, their differences, etc. They are thus called because Aristotle treated them before the predicaments, hoping that the thread of discourse might not afterwards be interrupted. 1.1 References • This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chambers, Ephraim, ed. (1728). "*article name needed". Cyclopædia, or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences (first ed.). James and John Knapton, et al. 2 Chapter 2 Apophasis Not to be confused with Apophysis (disambiguation), Apoptosis, or Apophis (disambiguation). Apophasis is a rhetorical device wherein the speaker or writer brings up a subject by either denying it, or denying that it should be brought up.*[1] Accordingly, it can be seen as a rhetorical relative of irony. Also called paralipsis (παράλειψις) – also spelled paraleipsis or paralepsis –, or occupatio,*[2]*[3]*[4]*[5] and known also as prae- teritio, preterition, antiphrasis (ἀντίφρασις), or parasiopesis (παρασιώπησις), apophasis is usually employed to make a subversive ad hominem attack, which makes it a frequently used tactic in political speeches to make an attack on one's opponent. Using apophasis in this way is often considered to be bad form. The device is typically used to distance -
A Compositional Game Semantics for Multi-Agent Logics of Partial Information
A Compositional Game Semantics for Multi-Agent Logics of Partial Information Samson Abramsky Oxford University Computing Laboratory Abstract We consider the following questions: What kind of logic has a natural semantics in multi-player (rather than 2-player) games? How can we express branching quantifiers, and other partial-information constructs, with a properly compositional syntax and semantics? We develop a logic in answer to these questions, with a formal semantics based on multiple concurrent strategies, formalized as closure operators on Kahn-Plotkin concrete domains. Partial information constraints are represented as co-closure operators. We address the syntactic issues by treating syntactic constituents, including quantifiers, as arrows in a category, with arities and co-arities. This enables a fully compositional account of a wide range of features in a multi-agent, concurrent setting, including IF-style quantifiers. Contents 1 Introduction 2 2 From 2-person to n-person games 3 2.1 Thenaturalnessof2-persongames . ..... 3 2.2 Background: 2-persongames . ... 3 2.3 AnAside ...................................... 4 2.4 From 2-person to n-persongames......................... 4 3 Semantics of LA 5 3.1 Static Semantics: Concrete Data Structures as Concurrent Games . 6 3.2 Dynamic Semantics: Concurrent Strategies . ........ 10 3.2.1 Inductive Construction of Strategy Sets . ...... 10 3.2.2 Local conditions on strategies . 11 3.2.3 Global definitions of strategy sets . ..... 12 3.2.4 Comparison of the local and global definitions . ....... 14 3.3 Evaluation of Strategy Profiles . ..... 16 3.4 OutcomesandValuations . 17 4 Towards environmentally friendly logic 19 4.1 SyntaxasaCategory............................... 19 4.2 Static Semantics Revisited . ..... 20 4.3 Interlude: StructuralCongruence .