The History of South Vietnam; the Quest for Legitimacy and Stability

Home , I Corps (South Vietnam), Ngo Dinh Diem

The History of South Vietnam

This book provides an in-depth analysis of the political instability of South Vietnam between the two Republics and offers a valuable contribution to the study of the history of Vietnam as it focuses on a decisive period in the history of South Vietnam. A much-needed examination of the political environment of the Repub- lic of Vietnam between 1963–1967, this book shows how South Vietnamese leadership failed to form a stable civilian government and to secure South Vietnam against the increasing threat by North Vietnam. Through a det ailed assessment of political difficulties during the period, the book suggests that, to prevent the imminent loss of South Vietnam to the Communist forces, the United States government did not have any other option than to escalate the war by committing its combat ground forces in the South and beginning the sustained bombing in the North. Moreover, the book analyses the administration of General Khánh and Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát and includes a full account of the War Cabinet of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ. The achievements, the difficulties and the sudden death of the National High Council as well as the confrontation between the Buddhists and the Trần Văn Hương government are also explored. This book will be of interest to researchers and students of the contemporary history of Vietnam, the history of the Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnam War and Southeast Asian history and politics.

Vinh-The Lam is Librarian Emeritus at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. His previous book with Hãn Nguyên Nguyễn Nhã Vietnam, Territoriality and the South China Sea: Paracel and Spratly Islands is also published by Routledge (2019). Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series

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The History of South Vietnam The Quest for Legitimacy and Stability, 1963–1967 Vinh-The Lam

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ Routledge-Contemporary-Southeast-Asia-Series/book-series/RCSEA The History of South Vietnam The Quest for Legitimacy and Stability, 1963–1967

Vinh-The Lam First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Vinh-The Lam The right of Vinh-The Lam to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-0-367-61889-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-10800-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra Contents

List of illustrations vii Foreword ix Acknowledgments xiii List of abbreviations xv

1 Introduction 1

2 The November 1, 1963 coup aftermath 7

3 The January 30, 1964 Coup of General Nguyễn Khánh 18

4 The rise and fall of General Nguyễn Khánh 31

5 Nguyễn Khánh Government 1964: a year of total chaos 38

6 High National Council 48

7 The Buddhists and Trần Văn Hương government 58

8 Phan Huy Quát government and the cabinet crisis of May/June 1965 64

9 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ Government: the War Cabinet 75

10 Moving toward the Second Republic 101

Appendix A: Biographical sketches of the Republic of Vietnam personalities 123 Appendix B: Temporary Charter No. 1 – November 4, 1963 139 vi Contents Appendix C: Temporary Charter No. 2 – February 7, 1964. Replacing Temporary Charter No. 1 – November 4, 1963 141 Appendix D: Charter of the Republic of Vietnam – August 16, 1964 (Vũng Tàu Charter) 143 Appendix E: Provisional Charter – October 20, 1964 151 Appendix F: Provisional Constitution – June 19, 1965 161 Bibliography 167 Index 171 Illustrations

Figures 2.1 The MRC at a Press Conference chaired by Lieutenant- General Dương Văn Minh 8 7.1 Tr ần Văn Hương cabinet with Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu on January 21, 1965 after the reshuffle of January 18, 1965 58 8.1 Phan Huy Quát cabinet with Chief of State Phan Khắc Sửu on February 16, 1965 64 10.1 President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Vice-President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ at inauguration ceremony on October 31, 1967 117

Table 10.1 Election of CA – Distribution of Votes 104

Foreword

It is my great pleasure to introduce this book History of South Vietnam: The Quest for Legitimacy and Stability, 1963–1967. The work is the first study to examine politics in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the years between the fall of the First Republic under President Ngô Đình Diệm and the founding of the Second Republic under the leadership of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. This was a chaotic period that witnessed severe political instability. On one hand were ambitious colonels and generals who schemed to seize power via coups. Some succeeded and others failed. On the other hand were various religious and other civil society groups who violently protested on the streets to demand political representation and accountability. In addition, several political parties and their regional factions, which lacked mass bases of their own, sought to position themselves between the military and the Buddhist movement. None turned out to be able to stay in power for long. Amidst that political turmoil, two external forces, the Communists and the Americans, further muddied the water. The former attempted, through escalating combat and terrorist activities, to aggravate the situation to pave the way for a takeover, while the latter sought to stabilize the situation for a possible expansion of the war with a larger role for US forces. A Communist agent, Col. Pham Ngoc Thao, led a failed coup that might have resulted in a quick takeover of the South by Hanoi had it been successful. In contrast, the United States invested greatly in General Nguyen Khanh only to find out that he was inept and unreliable. Both examples suggest that external forces added to the chaos but did not achieve what they wanted. By 1965, after the departure of General Nguyen Khanh from the scene, the situation became more stable with a core group of generals, the so- called “Young Turks,” in control of government. Social unrest continued and reached a climax in 1966 when the government under General Nguyen Cao Ky confronted a popular revolt in central Vietnam led by Buddhist monks and supported by a military faction. Out of the crisis, in which the Ky government prevailed, was the move of the authorities to promulgate a new, liberal constitution and the democratic elections of a legislature and the president of the Second Republic in 1967. x Foreword Despite all the turbulence, the period between the two Republics was a significant period in the history of South Vietnam and Vietnam in general. For South Vietnam, it was a time when massive social energies were released after having been held back for many years by the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. As political parties were legalized, civil society groups proliferated and the press thrived. It was a period when the basis of a modern liberal order was created even though that order was still unstable and would face significant challenges later on. For the history of Vietnam, this period can be likened to the 1945–1946 period when a similar level of intense social and political interaction took place. In both periods a great power vacuum suddenly appeared after years of political immobility. In 1945, the Communists were able to seize power and slowly extinguished their rivals in the North by the summer of 1946 before war began at the end of the year between them and the returning French. The period 1964–1967 also took place in the middle of a war but ended with a more positive outcome: social forces were able to make the military accept a liberal political system in which their participation was legitimate and institutionalized. The literature on the RVN that existed from 1955 to 1975 is extremely lim- ited. For a long time, orthodox American historiography was influenced by propaganda from Hanoi and dismissed the Saigon regime as a mere creation of the United States in its strategy to contain communism in Asia. Lacking indigenous roots, America’s “South Vietnamese project” was considered doomed from the start. To most American diplomatic historians, there is no need to study the RVN since it can be assumed that the Americans called all the shots. Nevertheless, recent scholarship has showed that the United States was often held hostage by their South Vietnamese ally despite an asymmetry of power between them. Rather than being American puppets, Saigon elites had their own political visions and expended tremendous efforts to create a viable nation in the middle of a war not of their own choice. Rather than being mostly Communist sympathizers, South Vietnamese people held diverse political views and fought bravely to hold those in power accountable. The period of 1964–1967 arguably offers the best example of such dynamics in South Vietnamese politics. Furthermore, for all its problems, it is important to note that the turmoil in this period, or the ups and downs in politics in the RVN over its two- decade existence, was not something unique to South Vietnam, indicating something irredeemably wrong with its society or politics. After all, similar problems beset all South Vietnam’s noncommunist neighbors, including Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines, in the first decade or two after colonial rule. All experienced personal dictatorship, military coups, regional rebellions, Communist insurgencies, and periods of extreme chaos. Foreword xi South Vietnam in 1964–1966 was similar to South Korea in 1960–1961 and 1979–1980, Indonesia in 1965–1966, Thailand in 1973–1976, the Philip- pines in 1986–1987, and Burma in 1960–1962 and 1989–1990. None except South Vietnam faced an attempt of direct conquest by another country, and all, including even Burma, have gradually grown out of such precarious existence. Some have achieved economic miracles, and all now have political systems that allow political competition if not liberal democracy. While I do not suggest that the RVN would become a liberal democracy like South Korea had it continued to exist, one should avoid the notion that it was pre- destined to fail. By helping us understand better the politics of South Vietnam during the critical period between the two republics, Mr. Vinh-The Lam makes a great contribution to scholarship on Vietnamese history. Tuong Vu University of Oregon Co-editor of The Republic of Vietnam, 1955–1975: Vietnamese Perspectives on Nation-Building (2020)

Acknowledgments

This is a revised and updated version of the author’s self-published book Rep ublic of Vietnam, 1963–1967: Years of Political Chaos (Hamilton, Ontario: Hoai Viet, 2010). Permission has been granted. All photos were originally published in the journal Chính Luận which ceased publication in April 1975. The photo of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Vice-President Nguyễn Cao Kỳ at inauguration ceremony was produced by Nha Kỹ Thuật, the Republic of Vietnam’s Military Intelligence Directo- rate, which ceased to exist on April 30, 1975. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders for their permission to reprint material in this book. The publishers would be grate- ful to hear from any copyright holder who is not here acknowledged and will undertake to rectify any errors or omissions in future editions of this book.

Abbreviations

AFC Armed Forces Council ARVN Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, or Army of the Republic of Vietnam CA Constituent Assembly CEC Central Executive Committee CIA Central Intelligence Agency CINCPAC Commander-In-Chief, Pacific GVN Government of Vietnam HNC High National Council JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff MRC Military Revolutionary Council MRS Movement for the Renaissance of the South NIE National Intelligence Estimate NLC National Legislative Council NSAM National Security Action Memorandum OPLAN Operational Plan RVN Republic of Vietnam SAVA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate USG United States Government VBUC Vietnamese Buddhist United Church

1 Introduction

From November 1963, after the November 1 military coup that overthrew the Ngô Đình Diệm regime and ended the First Republic, to November 1967, after Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were inaugurated as the first President and Vice-President of the Second Republic, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, or South Vietnam) went through a time of political instability. The five civilian and military governments during this period of time, namely, the Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, Nguyễn Khánh, Trần Văn Hương, Phan Huy Quát and Nguyễn Cao Kỳ cabinets, have successively tried really hard to re-establish the legitimacy for the new regime as well as to achieve political stability for the country. From the military viewpoint, this period witnessed the fierce escalation of the Vietnam War. In Hà Nội, at its Ninth Plenum (December 1963), Vi- etnam Workers’ Party (Đảng Lao Động Việt Nam) passed the resolution to adopt First Secretary Lê Duẩn’s strategy for General Offensive – General Uprising, mandating “a major buildup of conventional military force in the Central Highlands and the area northwest of Saigon to bring the war to a speedy end.”1,2 North Vietnam, therefore, increased the infiltration of their troops to the South along the Hồ Chí Minh Trail. According to the US Cen- tral Intelligence Agency (CIA), the level of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops to the South has gone from 35,000 in 1965 to 90,000 in 1967.3 The military situation in South Vietnam was so bad that the US Government decided to introduce combat troops to South Vietnam and to carry out sustained bombing of North Vietnam. At the end of 1963, there were only about 20,000 US military advisors in South Vietnam. By the end of 1967, the total US military force in South Vietnam was 486,000 men.4 The sustained bombing campaign of North Vietnam, codenamed Operation Rolling Thunder, started on March 2, 1965 and lasted until October 31, 1968.5 According to the joint monthly report of the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the month of January 1968, the total number of strike sorties carried out against North Vietnam of this month was 16,307.6 In addition to the US forces, there were also troops from the following Allied countries: South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. During this period of time, with military aids from the United States, the Armed Forces 2 Introduction of the Republic of Vietnam totaled 650,000 men,7 with their equipment greatly improved by modern American materiel. From the social-economic viewpoint, due to the presence of US and Al- lied military personnel, there was a tremendous impact on the daily life of the South Vietnamese people. Commodity prices went up with the galloping inflation and caused misery to people with steady incomes such as the civil servants and the soldiers. Social problems, such as prostitution and drugs, increased steadily in cities and rural areas surrounding US military bases. With the continuously increasing atrocities of the war, villages and rural communities became very much unsafe, and the peasants were forced to leave their villages for a safer life in cities. The number of displaced persons and refugees continued to increase and made urban life just more miserable. In summary, the period of 1963–1967 was a time when the RVN had to cope with all kinds of political, military, and socio-economic difficulties. This book looks only into the political situation. Occasionally, there are military and/or socio-economic details in the book and they are mentioned just to illustrate the political point being discussed. It is safe to say that during these four years of this historical period, all successive governments of the RVN took efforts, in their own way, to search for a sound legal basis for the authority and power they exercised. This was a primary political need because the legal basis that had existed for the previous eight or nine years, the Constitution promulgated on October 26, 1956, was suspended after the November 1, 1963 military coup. The Hôi Đồng Quân Nhân Cách Mạng (Military Revolutionary Coun- cil or MRC), headed by Lieutenant-General Dương Văn “Big” Minh, right after the November 1, 1963 coup, promulgated the Hiến Ước Tạm Thời số 1 (Temporary Charter No. 1) on November 4, 1963. Three months later, Lieutenant-General Nguyễn Khánh carried out another coup on January 30, 1964, and replaced it with the Hiến Ước Lâm Thời số 2 (Temporary Charter No. 2) on February 7, 1964. By the summer of 1964, thinking that the time was right to grant himself the absolute power, General Khánh gave birth to the Hiến Chương Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Charter of the Republic of Vietnam, often referred to as Vũng Tàu Charter) on August 16. However, the Charter was strongly opposed by the students and the MRC had to rescind the Charter. After this setback, General Khánh had to share power with Generals Trần Thiện Khiêm and Dương Văn Minh in the newly created tri- umvirate called the Ban Lãnh Đạo Lâm Thời Quốc Gia và Quân Lực (Pro- visional Committee for the Leadership of the Nation and the Armed Forces) with General Minh as Chairman. On September 8, General Minh signed the Resolution No. 7/BLĐQGQL to establish the Thượng Hội Đồng Quốc Gia (High National Council). After more than one month of hard work, the Council completed the Hiến Chương Lâm Thời (Provisional Charter) on October 20, which annulled the two Temporary Charters No. 1 and No. 2. On the basis of this Provisional Charter of October 20, 1964, the two civil governments of Trần Văn Hương (from November 4, 1964 to January 27, Introduction 3 1965) and Phan Huy Quát (from February 16, 1965 to June 18, 1965) were installed. The cabinet crisis of the Phan Huy Quát government, beginning on May 25, 1965, led the civil administration to an impasse and resulted in the return of the power to the generals. The Great Council of the Armed Forces of the RVN promulgated the Ước Pháp (Provisional Constitution) of June 19, 1965, which annulled the Provisional Charter of October 20, 1964. This Provisional Constitution of June 19, 1965 was in effect until the promulgation of the new Constitution of April 1, 1967. All efforts to create a legal basis for the new regime after the November 1, 1963 military coup, as described earlier, did not achieve the desired goal. The main reason for this failure could be found in the wrong way in which they were carried out. The right way should have been in the opposite di- rection. All of these temporary and provisional charters and provisional constitution were, through all of these committees and councils, “handed down” to the people from individuals or institutions that were not elected by the people. They were produced to serve those individuals in power and not the people. They were not emanating from the representatives of the people and, thus, not reflecting the aspirations of the people. As a result, it was only natural that the people opposed all of these pieces of “legislation.” During this period of time, all successive governments have promised to or- ganize elections for the Quốc Hội Lập Hiến (Constituent Assembly), which, in turn, would create the new constitution for the country. They all failed to keep that promise. It was only after the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in the summer of 1966, and under heavy pressure from the US Government that the Thiệu-Kỳ military government decided to call elections for the Constituent Assembly. The lack of a legal basis, as previously described, was not the only reason for the extreme political chaos in the RVN during that period of time. There were other factors that contributed to that extreme political chaos. The political parties of South Vietnam constituted the first factor. After the November 1, 1963 coup succeeded in the overthrow of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, all political parties and their leaders had high expectations for their roles in the new government. General “Big” Minh made a big political mistake when he appointed Mr. Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, former Vice-President under the Ngô Đình Diệm administration, to form a cabinet filled mostly by technocrats, causing tremendous disappointments among the politicians. The creation of the Hội Đồng Nhân Sĩ (Council of Notables) also did not satisfy everyone. A number of Đại Việt leaders who were not chosen to sit in the Council were unhappy and participated in the coup led by Generals Trần Thiện Khiêm and Nguyễn Khánh on January 30, 1964. When Gen- eral Nguyễn Khánh formed his government, Đại Việt Party members held a number of important cabinet posts with Dr. Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn, a Đại Việt leader from the Southern sect holding the position of Vice Prime Minister Responsible for Pacification. But not long after that, the Đại Việt Party became unhappy with General Khánh and plotted again to overthrow him, 4 Introduction but this time it failed and one of its leaders, Mr. Hà Thúc Ký, Minister of the Interior, was forced to resign from the cabinet. This kind of action by the Đại Việt Party was not unfamiliar with the political parties in South Vietnam. The main objective of all political parties was to topple the government, not to make contributions as loyal opposition parties to make the government work better because, in reality, no government in South Vietnam has ever tolerated a formal loyal opposition. The political parties, therefore, were always willing and ready to take part in any coup plot. In addition, one could not ignore the personalities, the narrow minds and visions, and the boundless ambitions of the party leaders. All of these factors caused them to continuously fight with each other. Many US classified documents used the word “bickering” with contempt to depict these fights. It was the real reason behind the cabinet crisis of the Phan Huy Quát administration that ultimately put an end to the civil government and hand the power back to the generals. The second factor contributing to the political chaos was the popular and religious forces that had participated in the struggle against the dictatorial Ngô Đình Diệm regime during the Buddhist Crisis of 1963. These forces demanded that the new government pay attention to their political views and aspirations. The most important groups among them were the students and the Buddhists. The students actively participated in all these chaotic events during this period. They organized countless political seminars, “nights without sleep,” “takes-to-the-street,” and demonstrations, and also bloody street confron- tations and violence. They were the most idealistic and the most easily in- citable crowds. For the Buddhists, to achieve the necessary strength, all regional and dogmatic sects grouped together under a unique organization called the Vi- etnamese Buddhist United Church (VBUC) and decided not to accept being discriminated and oppressed by the government again. In order to have in- fluence with the government, the Buddhists wanted to have the final word in the formation of the cabinet’s membership and policies. If these demands were not met, the Buddhists immediately exerted their pressure by incit- ing their followers, mostly students, to take to the streets and demonstrate. In some cases, like the case of opposing the Vũng Tàu Charter, they could obtain their goals just with demonstrations. If these pressuring measures did not get them results, they would use the two stronger measures: self- starvation and self-immolation. The most extreme measure of ordering their followers to bring Buddha’s altars to the streets was used only once when they were facing with the desperate situation in Huế and Đà Nẵng during the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in June 1966. The last factor causing the political chaos of this period was the military establishment. The military, traditionally, would be non-political and always under the control of the civil government. But in the RVN, at this point in time, after the military coup of November 1, 1963, the Armed Forces have Introduction 5 become a political force, and, in fact, have created a series of governments for the country. General Khánh has actually said that “The Army is the fa- ther of the nation.”8 During a period of less than two years, the RVN has witnessed four military coups (on November 1, 1963, on January 30, 1964, on September 13, 1964, and on February 19, 1965) and two coup attempts (the coup attempt by the Đại Việt against General Khánh, and the coup attempt on the night of May 20, 1965 under the Phan Huy Quát government). On top of that, there was also the boundless ambition of the generals. And, of course, General Nguyen Khánh was the most ambitious. In order to gain the absolute power within the Armed Forces, he created, in a very short period of time, a whole group of young generals, to whom the US media later gave the collective nick name of “Young Turks.” This group of young generals, with General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ as their coordinator and spokes- man, gradually became the dominant force of the Armed Forces. They have saved General Khánh during the two military coups of September 13, 1964 and February 19, 1965. They wanted to retire all “old generals” (defined by the Young Turks as having more than 25 years of service) and when the High National Council refused to go along with this plan, they took the most drastic action of abolishing the Council and incarcerating a number of the Council members. This rebellious action by the young generals was unim- aginable, unprecedented, and almost resulted in the cut off of US aid to the RVN. And finally, they did what even General Nguyễn Khánh could not have imagined: they voted him out of his position as Commander-In-Chief and forced him to leave Vietnam for good. During this period of the history of the RVN, obviously there were two opposing groups that were strong enough to dominate the political scene of South Vietnam. They were the Buddhists and the military establishment. A final showdown between the two of them was unavoidable. It happened during the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in the summer of 1966 with the decisive victory for the military. This serious political crisis, however, resulted in a very positive way: the military agreed to call for elections of the Constit- uent Assembly that ultimately produced the new Constitution of 1967 and gave birth to the Second Republic, putting an end to the period of political chaos in South Vietnam. This book consists of ten chapters. This chapter presents a synthetic view of all events during this historical period. Chapter 2 gives an account of the political situation after the November 1, 1963 coup until the January 30, 1964 coup. Chapter 3 provides details of the January 30, 1964 coup: the reasons for the coup, the preparation of the coup, the coup itself, and the outcome of the coup. Chapters 4 and 5 recount in details the administration of Gen- eral Khánh: the total political chaos and his various failing plots to hold on to power. Chapter 6 describes the achievements, the difficulties, and the sudden death of the High National Council; this chapter also gives a brief account of the confrontation between US Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and General Khánh and the Young Turks. Chapter 7 presents the confrontation 6 Introduction between the Buddhists and the Trần Văn Hương government; it concludes with the plot by General Khánh with the Buddhists to overthrow the Hương government. Chapter 8 provides insight into the administration of Prime Minister Phan Huy Quát with a focus on the cabinet crisis of May 1965, which resulted in the return of power to the military. Chapter 9 gives a full account of the War Cabinet of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, focusing on the two most important events: the Civil Revolt in Central Vietnam in the summer of 1966, and the cabinet crisis of October 1966. The last chapter, Chapter 10, retraces all events in the nation’s move toward the Second Republic: the elections of the Constituent Assembly, the drafting and promulgating of the new Constitution, and the presidential and senatorial/house elections.

Notes 1 Nguyễn Thị Liên-Hằng. Hanoi’s war: an international history of the war for peace in Vietnam. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 65. 2 Vietnam. Lịch sử kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước 1954–1975 (History of the resistance war against the United States to save our country, 1954–1975). (Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Chính trị quốc gia, 2013) (Hanoi: National Politics Publish- ing House, 2013). Online documents available full-text at this URL: http://www. vnmilitaryhistory.net/index.php?topic=28816.35;wap2 In vol. 9, p. 8/27: “Hội nghị lần thứ 9 Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng, thông qua hai nghị quyết quan trọng: Về tình hình thế giới và nhiệm vụ quốc tế của Đảng ta và Ra sức phấn đấu, tiến lên giành những thắng lợi ở miền Nam.” (“The Ninth Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee passed 2 resolutions: 1) World situation and the international duty of our Party; 2) Escalating the resistance, advance, and scoring new victories in the South”) …. “nhưng đã đến lúc miền Bắc phải tăng cường chi viện cho miền Nam hơn nữa.” (… “but it is already time that the North has to give more aid and support to the South.”) 3 McNamara, Robert S. and Brian VanDeMark. In retrospect: the tragedy and lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995), 244. 4 Đoàn Thêm. 1967: việc từng ngày (1967: Chronology); tựa của Lãng Nhân (preface by Lãng Nhân). (Los Alamitos, CA: Xuân Thu, 1989), 322. 5 Kutler, Stanley I., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1996), 477. 6 “An appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam through 31 January 1968,” Dec lassified Documents Reference System (from now on, referred to as DDRS), CIA and DIA joint monthly report for Jan-1968, declassified 22-Apr-1994, 16. 7 Tucker, Spencer C., ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: a political, social and military history (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 526. According to this Encyclopedia, in 1967, the ARVN forces totaled 643,000 men with the following breakdown: 303,000 Army, 16,000 Air Force, 16,000 Navy, 8,000 Marines Corps, 151,000 Regional Forces, and 149,000 Popular Forces. 8 Đoàn Thêm. Hai mươi năm qua: việc từng ngày, 1945–1964 (The past twenty years after, 1945–1964: Chronology); tựa của Lãng Nhân (preface by Lãng Nhân). (Los Alamitos, CA: Xuân Thu, 1989), 412. 1 Trần Văn Đôn. Our endless war: inside Vietnam (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 108. Less than an hour after that fateful telephone call, both Ngô brothers were killed. Most documents agree that the killer was Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung, who, as bodyguard of General Dương Văn Minh, was promoted to the rank of Major after the coup, and who was later dead (official document stating that he committed suicide) during his incarceration after the coup led by Lt.- General Nguyễn Khánh on January 30, 1964. The mystery remains who has given the order to kill the Ngô brothers. General Trần Văn Đôn, in his book, implied that it was General Minh who had given that order. General Minh never confirmed nor denied that allegation. Based on all the accounts of the military officers who were present in the convoy ordered by the Military Revolutionary Council to go pick up the Ngo brothers, it was more than likely that that order was given by General Minh. First of all, the convoy was placed under the command of General Mai Hữu Xuân, a close friend of general Minh. Second, Cap- tain Nhung, as personal bodyguard of General Minh, should have remained at the General Staff compound to protect General Minh. There was absolutely no reason why Captain Nhung should have been a member of the convoy. Captain Nhung could not have dared to commit such a high crime without firm and direct order from his boss. Finally, it was not a secret that General Minh hated the Ngô brothers very much. 2 In the history of the ARVN there were two lieutenant- generals with the same name of Trần Văn Minh. The second and much younger Minh was Commander of the Air Force, replacing Major- General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, from 1967 until 1975. At the time of the November 1, 1963 coup, the younger Minh was still a Major. After the coup, on November 4, 1963, he was promoted to Lieutenant- Colonel. 3 “Conversation between Vietnamese General Duong Van Minh and Rufus Philipps, Assistant Director of U.S. Operations Mission, topics covered: strategic hamlet program; pacification; lack of qualified Vietnamese civil or military personnel; political corruption,” DDRS, US State Dept. cable, dated 2- Dec- 1963, declassified 26- Apr- 1984. 4 “Summary of 12/20/63 conversation between Ambassador Lodge, General Minh, General Don, General Kim, Prime Minister Tho, Secretary McNamara and McCone, regarding how to accelerate the war effort,” DDRS, State Dept. cable, dated 20- Dec- 1963, declassified 14- Dec- 1987. The cable includes the following statement: Secretary McNamara then brought up the question of General Minh’s acting like a Chief of State and making some speeches to the people which would give them hope and faith in the future… Mr. McCone recalled that when Vice- President Johnson had become President, he had speedily obtained the support of the people by the speeches he had made in Congress and to the people and felt that much could be learned from his example. 5 Đoàn Thêm. Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 368. 6 Đoàn Thêm. Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 369. 7 “Situation report as of 11/5/63: announcement of new provisional government under Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho has helped ease tensions in aftermath of 11/1/63 coup and will presumably pave way for early recognition of new regime,” DDRS, CIA Cable, issued 5- Nov- 1963, declassified 10- May- 1995. Page 2 contains the following observation on Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ’s Cabinet: Big Minh and Tho were primarily responsible for selection of new cabinet. … New govt. … almost wholly southern (both Minh and Tho are southerners) … While many of new appointees are good technicians, there are few capable administrators among them. … Many of new ministers were long- standing friends of either Minh or Tho. 8 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff. In the jaws of history; foreword by Jane Hamilton- Merritt (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 106– 107. Bùi Diễm wrote: When I asked Kim who the generals were thinking of for prime minister, he answered Nguyen Ngoc Tho, the man who for years had been Diem’s vice president. When I heard this I was startled. In an agitated voice I told Kim, ‘Listen, we have a wonderful opportunity here, a historic opportunity. But what we need is a clean slate. How can you possibly think of taking this guy back?’ ‘Well’, he answered, ‘it was a given as far as Big Minh was concerned. Tho would have to get the job. 9 “Conversation between Vietnamese General Duong Van Minh and Rufus Phil- lips, Assistant Director of U.S. Operations Mission, topics covered: strategic hamlet program; pacification; lack of qualified Vietnamese civil or military personnel; political corruption,” DDRS, State Dept. Cable, issued 2- Dec- 1963, declassified 26- Apr- 1984. Mr. Phillips concluded his report with the following comment: Nothing in General Minh’s personal manner that the writer could notice, has changed since he became the Chief of State. He is as unpretentious and candid as in the past. He obviously has no illusions about the difficulties ahead or that the main task of leadership falls on him. He is still the only top Vietnamese leader, known to the writer, who projects the personal warmth and sympathy required to stir popular enthusiasm in Vietnam. The man has the necessary elements of a popular leader in his character but he will have to be pushed into assuming this role because he is essentially a humble man. 10 NGHỊ- ĐỊNH số 47- NĐ/CT (DECREE no. 47- NĐ/CT), dated 19- Dec- 1963, nominating members of the Council of Notables, printed in the Official Jour- nal of the Republic of Vietnam, Ninth Year, Number 8- 3 (New Series), (Satur- day 21- Dec- 1963), 264– 265. This Resolution was signed by Lieutenant- General DƯƠNG VĂN MINH. The total number of members was 60, including 2 women and 58 men. 11 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 107. The Council of Notables’ membership was only 60, not “seventy” as mistakenly noted in Mr. Bùi Diễm’s book at p. 107. Mr. Bùi Diễm was a member of the Council. 12 This Group met the international reporters at a news conference organized at the Caravelle Hotel in downtown Saigon on 26- Apr- 1960 to announce the petition that had been submitted to President Ngô Đình Diệm in the morning at the Presidential Palace by Mr. Phan Khắc Sửu and Mr. Trần Văn Văn. The petition was to warn President Ngô Đình Diêm about the serious political, military, and socio- economic situation of the Republic of Vietnam. The Group consisted of 18 well- known South Vietnamese politicians: Trần Văn Văn, Phan Khắc Sửu, Trần Văn Hương, Nguyễn Lưu Viên, Huỳnh Kim Hữu, Phan Huy Quát, Trần Văn Lý, Nguyễn Tiến Hỷ, Trần Văn Đỗ, Lê Ngọc Chấn, Lê Quang Luật, Lương Trọng Tường, Nguyễn Tăng Nguyên, Phạm Hữu Chương, Trần Văn Tuyên, Tạ Chương Phùng, Trần Lê Chất, and Hồ Văn Vui. 13 “Make up [of] Council of Notables,” DDRS, State Dept. cable, issued 28- Dec- 1963, declassified 21- May- 1976. This cable lists the 12 Caravelle Group members as follows: Phan Khắc Sửu, Nguyễn Lưu Viên, Phan Huy Quát, Nguyễn Tiến Hỷ, Trần Văn Đỗ, Trần Văn Hương, Lê Quang Luật, Trần Văn Văn, Lương Trọng Tường, Nguyễn Tăng Nguyên, Phạm Hữu Chương, and Trần Văn Tuyên. 14 “South Vietnamese situation report,” DDRS, CIA report, issued 4- Jan- 1964, declassified 16- Sep- 1996, 2. 15 “Situation appraisal as of 14 December 1963,” DDRS, CIA report, issued 16- Dec-1963, declassified 15-Apr-1975. 16 Gibbons, William Conrad. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: executive and legislative roles and relationships. Part II: 1961– 1964 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 212. Defense Secretary McNamara, in his report to President Johnson after his December 19– 20, 1963 trip to Vietnam, said: Possible neutralization of Vietnam is strongly opposed by Minh, and our attitude is somewhat suspect because of editorials by the New York Times and mention by Walter Lippmann and others. We reassured them as strongly as possible on this— and in somewhat more general terms on the neutralization of Cambodia… 17 “Summary of 12/20/63 conversation between Ambassador Lodge, General Minh, General Don, General Kim, Prime Minister Tho, Secretary McNamara and McCone regarding how to accelerate the war effort,” DDRS, State Dept. cable, issued 20- Dec- 1963, declassified 14- Dec- 1987. 18 The Thơ Cabinet reshuffle had the following changes: Lt- Gen. Tôn Thất Đính was relieved of his command of the III Corps, which went to Lt- Gen. Trần Thiện Khiêm; Lt- Gen. Trần Văn Đôn was appointed Commander- In- Chief of the Armed Forces; Maj- Gen. Đỗ Mậu replaced Maj- Gen. Trần Tử Oai as Minister of Information; Lt- Gen. Lê Văn Kim was appointed Chief of the Joint General Staff; and, Maj- Gen. Nguyễn Văn Quan was appointed Chief of Military Secu- rity Service. 19 “Report on the visit of the Secretary of Defense to South Vietnam, 12/19- 12/20/63,” DDRS, Defense Dept. report, issued Dec- 1963, declassified 30- Sep- 1994. 20 McNamara, op. cit., 105. 21 “Transmittal Memorandum, McGeorge Bundy, Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Nat. Security Affairs, to the President. Dec. 30, 1963. 1 p. Encl: (1) (US assures Vi- etnam of continued support against Communism.) Draft Letter, Lyndon B. Johnson, Pres., to Gen. Duong Van Minh, Chairman, Military Revolutionary Council, Republic of Vietnam,” DDRS, White House document, issued 30- Dec- 1963, declassified 2- Mar- 1976. On p. 1, the letter contained the following paragraph: This New Year provides a fitting opportunity for me to pledge on behalf of the American Government and people a renewed partnership with your government and people in your brave struggle for freedom. The United States will continue to furnish you and your people with the fullest measure of support in this bitter fight. We shall maintain in Vietnam whatever American personnel and materiel are needed to assist you in achieving victory. 1 Huỳnh Văn Lang. Nhân chứng một chế độ: một chương hồi ký. Tập ba (Witness of a regime: memoirs. Vol. 3). (California: The Author, 2000), 259. “Tụi nó giết ông Cụ, tôi không làm sao ngăn cản được. Từ hôm qua, Minh toàn quyền quyết định tất cả, Đôn Kim Đính Đỗ Mậu … đồng lòng như vậy. Tụi nó còn muốn làm thịt tôi luôn nữa.” (They killed The Old Man, I could not stop them. Since yesterday, Minh made all decisions, Don, Kim, Dinh and Do Mau concurred with them. They even wanted to take me out too.) 2 Huỳnh Văn Lang, op. cit., 261. “Thôi, chuyện đã qua rồi, thương tiếc cũng không làm gì cho Ông Cụ, ông Nhu được nữa. Nhưng còn nữa, chưa hết đâu.” (Well, what’s done is done. Even if we have deep sorrow for The Old Man and Nhu, we could not do anything about it. But there will be more things to come, it is not over yet.) 3 Nguyễn Chánh Thi. Việt Nam: một trời tâm sự (Vietnam: from my heart). (Los Alamitos, CA: Anh Thư, 1987), 232. “Đến sáng ra, gặp lại các tay cầm đầu đảo chánh, tôi mới vở lẽ ra rằng vai chánh của âm mưu này không phải Nguyễn Khánh, mà vai chánh lại là Trần Thiện Khiêm, Tư Lệnh Quân Đòan III.” (In the morning, meeting again with the coup leaders, I was surprised to find out that Tran Thien Khiem, Commander of III Corps, not Nguyen Khanh, was in fact the principal plotter.) 4 “Summary of a meeting between U.S. intelligence officials and South Vietnam- ese General Do Mau,” DDRS, CIA document, dated 9- Nov- 1963, declassified 24- Apr- 1995, 3 p. On p. 1, we have this statement: He stated that the Council was beginning to divide between one group which was more oriented toward French techniques comprising General Duong Van Minh, General Le Van Kim, and General Mai Huu Xuan with some indications of a similar orientation by General Tran Van Don. On the other side a group oriented along American lines comprised General Tran Thien Khiem, General Nguyen Van Thieu, General Nguyen Huu Co, General Pham Xuan Chieu, and himself. 5 “Summary of a meeting between U.S. intelligence officials and South Vietnam- ese General Do Mau,” op. cit. On p. 2, we have this statement: Mau expressed concern at the fact that General Mai Huu Xuan was moving pro- French individuals into the working levels of the police services to the extent that the pro- Americans now hold only two of the eight police commis- sioner positions in Saigon. 6 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 375. 7 Gibbons, op. cit., 211. “… reports from Vietnam that the new junta was not per- forming as well as expected.” 8 Kahin, George McT. Intervention: how America became involved in Vietnam. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 189. The Minh leadership also opposed any greater American role in directing South Vietnamese army operations and refused to accept persistent proposals for increasing the number of U.S. military and civilian advisers, especially the introduction of the military down to the district and subsector levels. 9 Gibbons, op. cit., 229. General Minh argued that it would play into the hands of the VC and make the Vietnamese officials look like lackeys. There would be a colonial flavor to the whole pacification effort. Minh added that even in the worst and clumsi- est days of the French they never went into the villages or districts. 10 Kahin, op. cit., 188. General Minh mentioned two reasons: (1) bombing North Vietnam would not produce good military results; on the contrary it would do more harm to in- nocent Vietnamese; (2) by such bombing we would lose the just cause because we had [thus far] held that we were fighting a defensive war and had ascribed the role of aggressor to the communists [accusing them] of sending troops to the South, committing crimes in the South, etc. If we bombed the North, we would bring war to the North and we would lose our legitimate cause. 11 Kahin, op. cit., 190. “He (Lodge) was also disappointed by Minh’s unwillingness to meet him regularly once a week to discuss governmental policy and actions.” 12 Kahin, op. cit., 199. Harkins, in a cable to Taylor sent just after the coup had been completed on January 30, reported that two days before, at about 3:00 P.M., Wilson had come to see him at the request of General Khanh to check on whether the United States would back a pre- emptive “counter- coup” against individuals who “planned to seize control and immediately announce a position of neu tralization. Harkins states he ordered Wilson to go to Lodge and relate his story, and then, according to this cable, he himself decided to go on what he refers to as “a fieldtrip” … Harkins returned to Saigon on January 29, checked in with Lodge, and was told of Wilson’s latest meeting with Khanh. He states that at 2:15 A.M. on January 30, Lodge sent an aide to alert him that “H- hour” would be at 4:00 A.M., that Khanh would pick him up at 3:15 and that coup headquarters would be at the airborne brigade’s command post. 13 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 224. “Lẩn lộn trong những người bao quanh ông Khánh, tôi thấy có ông Cố Vấn Quân Đoàn … và nhiều người ngoại quốc khác, mặc thường phục.” (Among the crowd surrounding Khanh, I noticed the Senior Advisor of I Corps … and many other foreigners in civilian clothes.) 14 United States. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273, accessible online at this URL: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam- lbj/nsam- 273.htm. 15 McNamara, op. cit., 105. “current trends, unless reversed in the next 2- 3 months, will lead to neutralization at best or more likely to a Communist- controlled state.” 16 Gibbons, op. cit., 211– 213. 17 Logevall, Fredrik. “De Gaulle, neutralization and American involvement in Vi- etnam, 1963- 1964,” Pacific Historical Review, v. 61, no. 1 (Feb. 1992): 69– 102. The quotation was from p. 75. 18 Cable no. 15564, dated 22- Nov- 1963, from US Embassy in Phnom Penh to State De- partment: “… ACTING SECSTATE FORAFFAIRS PHURISSARA HANDED ME NOTE NOVEMBER 20 REQUESTING TERMINATION US AID.” 19 “De Gaulle proposes China join a plan to neutralize Vietnam, Laos, Cambo- dia,” The New York Times, (February 1, 1964): 1. 20 Trần Ngọc Thống, Hồ Đắc Huân, Lê Đình Thụy. Lược sử Quân Lực Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Brief history of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam). (San Jose, CA: Hương Quê Publisher, 2011), 100. 21 Phăm Văn Liễu. Trả ta sông núi: hồi ký. Tập II, 1963- 1975 (Give me back my country: memoirs. Vol. II, 1963- 175). (Houston, TX: Văn Hóa, 2003), 52– 53. Sau cuộc đảo chinh 1- 11- 1963, ông Khánh không được thăng cấp Trung tướng, hay tham gia Hội Đồng Quân Nhân Cách Mạng. Ong Khánh bèn bay vào Sài Gòn năn nỉ Tướng Dương Văn Minh xin thêm một sao. Tướng Minh bất đắc dỉ phải phong ông Khánh lên Trung tướng. Hôm sau, ông Khánh đi mua cặp lon ba sao sáng bóng, mang tới tư dinh Thủ tướng Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ xin gắn lon mới. Theo Đại tá Nhan Minh Trang, Chánh võ phòng Thủ tướng Thơ, vì ông Thơ đang bận rộn, có việc phải đi gấp, nên chỉ gắn một cái lon ba sao lên ve áo ông Khánh ngay trên cầu thang tư dinh. Cái lon còn lại, ông Thơ nhờ Đại tá Trang gắn giúp = After the 1- 11- 1963 coup, Khanh was neither promoted to Lieutenant- General nor designated member of the MRC. He flew to Saigon, imploring General Minh to give him one more star. General Minh reluctantly had to promote him to Lieutenant- General. The next day, Khanh bought a new shining pair of three- stars, and went to the private house of Prime Minister Nguyen Ngoc Tho for his official promotion. According to Colonel Nhan Minh Trang, Chief of Military Af- fairs of Prime Minister Tho, being busy and rushing to a meeting, Prime Minister had time to pin only one set of three stars on one side of the collar of Khanh’s shirt right on the stairs of his house, and asked Colonel Trang to pin the other set. 22 “Report of conversation between Gen. Nguyen Khanh and senior MAAG adviser re imminent coup d’etat by pro- neutralists, pro- French generals led by Gen. Xuan; plan must be crushed,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 29-Jan-1964. 23 Kahin, op. cit., 195. Of greater importance, following persistent pressure by Harkins and the Defense Department, who argued that he could not effectively discharge concurrently the responsibilities of two major positions (minister of secu rity and III Corps commander), General Ton That Dinh was on January 5 relieved of his command of the vital III Corps— embracing Saigon and the provinces around it. The officer that the U.S. military approved as his suc cessor, Major General Tran Thien Khiem, played a pivotal role in the events that followed… The author, Kahin, has made a mistake here: Trần Thiện Khiêm had been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant- General on November 2, 1963, right after the successful coup against the Ngô regime. 24 “Background of coup staged by General Nguyen Khanh,” DDRS, CIA cable, dated 30- Jan- 1964. On 28 January 1964 General Thieu ordered Lieutenant Colonel Duong Huu [sic] Nghia, Acting Commander of the Armored Command, to move all available armored units in Saigon to 5th Infantry Division Headquarters in Bien Hoa. However, Nghia suspected that Thieu was plotting a coup against Major General Duong Van Minh and informed Thieu that the armored units could not move as ordered using the excuse that the vehicles were inoperable. Nghia also announced his support for General Minh. By 29 January, however, Nghia apparently had switched his support to Thieu who had operational control of both the Armored Command and the Marine Corps on that date. On 30 January Nghia supported the coup group led by Major General Nguyen Khanh. There is a minor misinformation in this CIA cable: General Dương Văn Minh was a Lieutenant- General, not a Major- General. 25 Kahin, op. cit., 199. 26 Kahin, op. cit., 199– 200. 27 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit, 210. 28 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 209. 29 Phạm Văn Liễu, op. cit., 57– 65. 30 “Report of conversation between Gen. Nguyen Khanh and senior MAAG adviser re imminent coup d’etat by pro- neutralists, pro- French generals led by Gen. Xuan; plan must be crushed,” op. cit. Maj Gen Nguyen Khanh on 28 Jan told Col Jasper Wilson, Senior MAAG Advisor for I Corps, that he had info indicating that another coup would be attempted possibly as early as Friday 31 Jan. Coup, which would be of palace variety involving little or no bloodshed, would be mounted by pro- French, pro- neutralist generals with Mai Huu Xuan playing leading role. Once coup successfully carried out, perpetrators would immediately call for neutraliza- ting of SVN. Plotters in touch with Gen Nguyen Van Hinh. Khanh appeared deeply concerned, stating that if plot not immediately crushed, it stood fair chance of success. Again, a minor misinformation in this CIA cable: Nguyễn Khánh was a Lieutenant- General, not a Major- General. 31 Kahin, op. cit., 198– 200. 32 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 218– 227. 33 Phạm Văn Liễu, op. cit., 65– 74. 34 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 382. 35 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 381. 36 Trần Văn Đôn, op. cit., 127– 128. General Khanh presided over the hearing and began a five- and- one- half hour series of questions, none of which were related to the accusation of neu-

- tralism that had been raised against us. … Khanh asked us, on behalf of the entire group, not to take vengeance on anyone when we once again began serving in the army. Then they all gathered around to congratulate us. 37 Gibbons, op. cit., 229. “… Khanh not only agreed to this latter suggestion (he ac cepted U.S. advisers in 13 districts in the delta)…” 38 McNamara, op. cit., 321. 1 “Khanh coup: coup accomplished quickly and without bloodshed; Prime Minister Tho and generals detained or arrested; Thieu, Mau, Co and Tri have supported coup; explanation of Khanh’s political rationale re coup; Khanh to assume title, Chief of State; Gen. Minh will not be in new govt,” DDRS, cable from US Embassy in Saigon, issued 30- Jan- 1964, declassified 20- Mar- 1975. 2 “1. Khanh coup group considers selection of younger civilian as Prime Minister; 2. Four generals flown to Da Nang where they will be imprisoned [Khanh con- sidering assuming control of govt. if no suitable civilian can be found],” DDRS, CIA cable, issued 30- Jan- 1964, declassified date not given. The cable contained the following statement:“… Major Generals Ton That Dinh, Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim, and Mai Huu Xuan were sent by air to Da Nang where they will be detained, probably at My Khe Base.” Another mistake in this CIA cable: all of these generals were actually Lieutenant- Generals. 3 “CIA cable on Major General Nguyen Khanh’s assumption of responsibility for a new government in South Vietnam,” DDRS, CIA cable, issued 31- Jan- 1964, declassified 16- Sep- 1996. The cable contained the following statement: “Khanh … had offered Major General Duong Van Minh the chairmanship of the new government if he would discharge Generals Tran Van Don, Ton That Dinh, Mai Huu Xuan, and Le Van Kim, which Minh refused to do.” Again, we see the same mistake in this CIA cable: all these generals were actually Lieutenant- Generals. 4 “1. Khanh Coup Group Considers Selection of Younger Civilian as Prime Min- ister,” DDRS, op. cit. 5 Đỗ Mậu. Việt Nam máu lửa quê hương tôi: hồi ký chính trị: bổ túc hồ sơ về sự sụp đổ của Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Vietnam: my country in blood and fire: political memoirs: supplementary file on the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam). (Cali- fornia: The Author, 1986), 835– 836. 6 “The situation in South Vietnam (21– 28 February 1964). Weekly Report to increase their power within the government and eventually usurp Khanh; some meetings allegedly have been held to devise strategy. Dai Viet leader. Hoan, embittered, as he had assumed he would become Prime Minister instead of Khanh,” DDRS, CIA cable, issued 29- Feb- 1964, declassified 26- Jun- 1975. The cable begins with a Summary as follows: By late February 1964 Dai Viet leaders were planning to increase their power within the government with the ultimate objective of replacing Major Gen- eral Nguyen Khanh. Dai Viet leader Nguyen Ton Hoan was embittered because he had been recalled from Paris with the understanding that he would become Prime Minister but instead Khanh had assumed this post. There is the same mistake in this CIA cable: General Khánh was a Lieutenant- General, not Major- General. 7 “The situation in South Vietnam (21– 28 February 1964),” op. cit. This report included a 3- page Annex that provided a short history of the Đại Việt Party, with some emphasis on Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn. 8 Đỗ Mậu, op. cit., 839. 9 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 383, 386, 391, 400, and 412. 10 “Identification of the “Young Turk” group of military commanders and their views concerning General Nguyen Khan (sic) and other matters (Nguyen Cao Ky advises against the use of force to overthrow the govt. until Khanh refuses to implement the “Young Turk” program),” DDRS, CIA cable, issued 2- Oct- 1964, declassified 27- Jul- 1976. 11 “Identification of the “Young Turk” group of military commanders would like to sweep away the deadwood in military hierarchy; they are calling for the removal of the Dalat generals; Khanh relies on the support of his young generals,” DDRS, CIA memo, issued 8- Oct- 1964, declassified 30- Jun- 1976. This Memo contained biographical sketches of the prominent members of this “Young Turks” Group. 12 “Alleged plotting of Nguyen Khanh with the Buddhists in order to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong (use of force will be necessary because the US is allegedly supporting Huong),” DDRS, CIA cable, issued 8- Jan- 1965, declassified 27- Sep- 1976. 13 “Pham Ngoc Thao: biographic summary and personality analysis. Situation appraisal as of 29 August 1964,” DDRS, CIA cable, no. TDCS- 314/02346- 64, 8 p., issued 29- Aug- 1964, declassified 24- May- 1976. This intelligence cable gives suffi- cient information on activities of Colonel Thao before and after 1954, including even his plot to overthrow the Ngô Đình Diệm regime. It also includes assess- ments of Thảo by South Vietnamese authorities as well as theirs doubts about his being a potential Communist agent. The cable, however, does not reach any clear conclusion regarding these doubts. After April 30, 1975, the Communists revealed that Thao indeed had been one of their agents. 14 “Armed Forces Council’s plans to remove General Nguyen Khanh as Com- mander in Chief and severely punish the leaders of the abortive coup,” Declas- sified Documents Quarterly Catalog, 1975, microfiche no. 48A, CIA cable, no. TDCS- 314/02340- 65, dated 21- Feb- 1965, declassified 24- Dec- 1975, 1 p.; Ky said that Khanh became aware that his days were numbered at the meeting at Bien Hoa on the afternoon of 20 February. Khanh was present at the beginning of the meeting when Brigadier General Nguyen Chanh Thi stated frankly and very bluntly that Khanh’s usefulness had come to an end. Ac- cording to Ky, at this point, Khanh excused himself from the meeting with the offer, which he had made previously, that he would be willing to make any sacrifice for the good of the country, including relinquishing his post as Commander in Chief and leaving the country, if the AFC considered these steps necessary. This CIA cable has a minor misinformation: General Nguyễn Chánh Thi was already a Major- General, no longer a Brigadier- General on 20- February- 1965. 15 General Trần Văn Minh was usually called “General Little Minh” by the US media to distinguish him from General Dương Văn “Big” Minh. Also, he should not be mistaken for another General Trần Văn Minh, who would become Com- mander of the South Vietnamese Air Force (replacing General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ) under the Second Republic (1967– 1975). 16 Đoàn Thêm. 1965: việc từng ngày (1965: Chronology). (Alamitos, CA: Xuân Thu, 1989), 38. 1 Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing war: the lost chance for peace and the escalation of war in Vietnam. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 99. 2 Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a war: Vietnam, the United States, and the modern historical experience. (New York: New Press, 1994), 119. “Washington gave solid support to General Nguyen Khanh’s bloodless coup at the end of January 1964, allegedly to head- off pro- French neutralist officers ready to take power.” 3 Gibbons, William Conrad, op. cit., 229. “Khanh not only agreed to this latter suggestion (he accepted U.S. advisers in 13 districts in the delta), but went so far as to ask Lodge to recommend Vietnamese for the position of Prime Minister and for the Cabinet.” 4 “Assessment of Khanh’s selection of administrators for his new govt.,” DDRS, US Embassy cable no. 1510, 6 p., dated 7- Apr- 1964, declassified 20- Mar- 1975. “Called on General Khanh at his invitation … The purpose of inviting me was to tell me about the make– up of the new government.” 5 McNamara, op. cit., 112. “Bob, I want to see about a thousand pictures of you with General Khanh, smiling and waving your arms and showing the people out there that this country is behind Khanh all the way.” 6 Gibbons, op. cit., 240. “To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coups.” 7 Porter, Gareth, ed. Vietnam: the definitive documentation of human decisions. Vol. 2. (Stanfordville, NY: E.M. Coleman Enterprises, 1979), 241. Memo from Asst. Sec. of Defense William P. Bundy to President Johnson, dated 1- Mar- 1964. The great weakness in the present situation is the extremely shaky position of the Khanh government. Khanh himself is probably the ablest man in the country, but he does not yet have wide political appeal and his control of the Army itself is uncertain. 8 Kahin, op. cit., 208. Despite substantially increased US military and economic backing, Khanh was never able to establish anything like a viable political base; nor could he even maintain that little cohesion his regime had initially enjoyed. It grew progressively weaker— both internally and vis- a-vis the NLF. 9 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 412. 10 “Special report on the Buddhists in South Vietnam,” DDRS, CIA special report, no. SC No. 00598/63A, 9 p., dated 28- Jun- 1963, declassified 4- Dec- 1996. 11 “Short- term prospects in South Vietnam,” DDRS, CIA document, SNIE 53- 65, 12 p., dated 4- Feb- 1965, declassified 20- Jul- 1995. On p. 4, section 6, Among these leaders, Tri Quang is the most influential and politically skill- ful. He seems to have outmaneuvered all existing or potential rivals within the Buddhist movement and is not likely to be deposed from within the movement itself. … Tri Quang is vain and hyper- nationalistic; thus, he probably resents the extent of US involvement in Vietnamese affairs. Although he rec- ognizes the present need for US support, he regards the US as incapable of understanding the political situation in South Vietnam and, over the long run, would like to see the US out of the country. 12 Moyar, Mark, “Political monks: the militant Buddhist movement during the Vi- etnam War,” Modern Asian Studies, v. 38, no. 4 (2004): 749– 784. On p. 754, Some of his initial replacements were pro- Diem officials who had been ousted in November 1963. … Tri Quang and other militant Buddhists made baseless claims that Khanh— who was a Buddhist— and his predominantly Buddhist government were reverting to Diemist persecution of Buddhists. Inexperienced and easily intimidated, Khanh succumbed to this pressure. He stopped appointing pro- Diem officials, sacked some of those already in office, and put more Diem supporters in jail. 13 “The situation in South Vietnam,” DDRS, CIA weekly report, OCI No. 1061/64, 14 p., dated 28- Feb- 1964, declassified 26- Jun- 1975. He [Khanh] has made more arrests among Diem’s former ministers, and apparently plans to bring those accused of malfeasance to early trial. In addition, the new regime has closed some newspapers alleged to be in sympathy with the former Diem regime. Khanh has been suspected in some quarters of sympathy for the Diem regime, and these moves are designed in part to demonstrate a clean sweep. 14 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 382, 385, 387, 389– 390, 392– 395. 15 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 395. 16 Đỗ Mậu, op. cit., 841. 17 Đỗ Mậu, op. cit., 844. 18 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 397– 398. 19 Gibbons, op. cit., 281. “During July 19– 23, there was new agitation by South Viet- namese leaders for ‘marching North.’” 20 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 400. 21 Quách Thị Trang was a 15- year- old Buddhist school girl shot dead by police at the August 25, 1963 student demonstration in front of Bến Thành Central Mar- ket to protest the Ngô Đình Diệm’s martial law during the 1963 Buddhist Crisis. 22 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 403– 404. 23 Ahern, Thomas L., Jr. CIA and the generals: covert support to military government in South Vietnam. (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, [n.d.]), 33. This secret document has been declassified and is now accessible at this URL: http://today.ttu.edu/wp- content/ uploads/2009/03/01- cia- and- the- generals.pdf. 1 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 405. Membership of the High National Council included the 16 following individuals: Phan Khắc Sửu, Lê Văn Thu, Nguyễn Văn Huyền, Trần Đình Nam, Trần Văn Văn, Trần Văn Quế, Nguyễn Văn Lực, Nguyễn Xuân Chữ, Hồ Văn Nhựt, Mai Thọ Truyền, Ngô Gia Hy, Lê Khắc Quyến, Tôn Thất Hanh, Lương Trọng Tường, Nguyễn Đình Luyện, and Hồ Đắc Thắng. Đoàn Thêm’s book missed one member: Trần Quang Vinh. The correct total number of members was 17. 2 “SNIE 53- 2-64: the situation in South Vietnam,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 1- Oct- 1964, declassified 4- Nov- 1975, 12 p. Since our estimate of September 8, 1964, the situation in South Vietnam has continued to deteriorate. … It is possible that the civilian government promised for the end of October could improve GVN esprit and effectiveness, but on the basis of present indications, this is unlikely. … Khanh’s authority, already weakened by the Buddhist- student crisis in August, has been further diminished, and the degree of his support within the military establishment is increasingly in question. 3 “Agreement between Nguyen Khanh and the “Young Turks” to join together to solve the political problems of the colony [sic],” DDRS, CIA cable, dated 1- Oct- 1964, declassified 24- Sep- 1985, 5 p. 4 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 412. 5 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 400. 6 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 410, 413. 7 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 415. 8 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 416. 9 “Formation of provisional government discussed,” DDRS, Saigon US Embassy cable to State Dept., dated 20- Oct- 1964, declassified 30- Nov- 1984, 2 p. “Thus, we have made every effort to get the Council back to our preferred formula: Minh a ceremonial Head of State, Khanh the Commander- In- Chief and perhaps Minister of Defense and a civilian Prime Minister with strong executive powers.” 10 “Progress in moving toward a civilian government outlined,” DDRS, Saigon US Embassy cable to State Dept., dated 27- Oct- 1964, declassified 30- Nov- 1984, 3 p. We are not too happy over the choice of Suu who was slipped in ahead of Minh at the last minute by pressure on the High National Council by a delegation composed of Buddhist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai leaders.

- 11 “Political situation in South Vietnam: High National Council approval of the appointment and program of Premier- designate Huong,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 2- Nov- 1964, declassified 8- Nov- 1977, 4 p. “Huong reportedly was approved by a vote of 11 of the now 16- member Council, with one blank ballot and four mem bers not present.” 12 Lâm Vĩnh Thế. “Phật Giáo và chính phủ Trần Văn Hương (The Buddhists and the Trần Văn Hương government)”, in Bạch hóa tài liệu mật của Hoa Kỳ về Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Declassifying classified US Government documents on the Re- public of Vietnam). (Hamilton: Hoài Việt, 2008), 181– 206. 13 “Nguyen Xuan Chu. “President of Vietnamese High National Council, Resigns Over Formation of Cabinet,” DDRS; Saigon US Embassy cable to State Dept., dated 5- Nov- 1964, declassified 28- Aug- 1979, 2 p. He mentions having stressed importance and necessity of participation of political parties in formation of government to Suu on November 3. Now having seen composition of cabinet Chu contends that it will not rpt not be able to rally people’s confidence because it does not rpt not attach enough importance to political parties. 14 Đỗ Mậu, op. cit., 850. 15 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 420. 16 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 422. 17 “Comments of the Marine Commander on the unity of the Young Turks and his statement attributing the decision to dissolve the High National Council to the Council’s declaration of illegality of the military retirement plan,” DDRS, CIA cable, dated 23- Dec- 1964, declassified 24- Sep- 1976, 4 p. “…an announcement on 18 December that the HNC had ruled that the plan to retire military officers after 25 years service was illegal and thus could not be carried out.” 18 Phạm Văn Liễu, op. cit., 201. 19 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 281. 20 Phạm Văn Liễu, op. cit., 197. 21 “Memorandum for the President. Subject: Political developments in South Viet- nam (fifth report),”DDRS , White House memo, by Chester L. Cooper, on behalf of McGeorge Bundy, to President Johnson, dated 21- Dec- 1964, declassified 6- Jul- 1978, 1 p. Taylor is trying to get Huong to stand firm and is urging him to use the threat of resigning to extract concessions from the military. Taylor hopes to get a retraction of the decree dissolving the HNC; to arrange a reconstituted HNC acceptable to the military; to obtain the release of all persons arrested yesterday; and to get a specific promise of support for Huong’s government by the military commanders. 22 “Các cụ Thượng đã được thả về cùng với các sinh viên và chính khách (The High National Council members were released with students and other politicians),” Chính Luận (Political Discussion), issued Tuesday (12/Jan/1965): 1. 23 Gibbons, op. cit., 365– 375. 24 McNamara, op. cit., 163– 164. 25 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 121– 122. Bùi Diễm wrote: “With West- moreland and Deputy Ambassador Alexis Johnson present, Taylor admonished the young officers in very strong language, telling them the United States simply could not go on supporting South Vietnam as long as the government was so unsteady.” 26 Nguyễn Cao Kỳ and Marvin J. Wolf. Buddha’s child: my fight to save Vietnam. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 110– 111. 27 Nguyễn Chánh Thi, op. cit., 283– 284. The recounting of the event by General Thi was not accurate when he wrote: “Chúng tôi nói chuyện với ông Đại sứ Taylor bằng tiếng Pháp.” (We had the conversation with Ambassador Taylor in French). The conversation, in fact, was in English, with Ambassador Taylor starting with this question: “Do all of you understand English?” 28 Glennon, John P., Edward C. Keefer, and Charles S. Sampson. Foreign relations of the United States, 1964- 1968. Volume I: Vietnam 1964. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), 1014– 1016. Saigon US Embassy telegram to State Dept., 12- Dec- 1964, 5 PM, reporting the meeting between Ambassador Taylor and Deputy Ambassador Alexis Johnson with Prime Minister Hương at 9 AM, and the meeting immediately after that at the Embassy with generals Thiệu, Thi, Kỳ, and Cang. 29 “Summary of conversation, Sunday, December 20, Amb Taylor questions Gens Ky and Thieu about the military dissolution of the High National Council and arrest of its members,” DDRS, Saigon US Embassy Airgram A- 493, dated 24- Dec- 1964, declassified 12- Apr- 1978, 7 p. Detailed report of the conversation between Ambassador Taylor and Deputy Ambassador John with generals Thiệu, Thi, Kỳ, and Cang. 30 “Discourteous attitude and abuse of power of Amb Maxwell Taylor,” DDRS, Saigon US Embassy cable to State Dept., dated 26- Dec- 1964, declassified 12- Apr- 1978, 4 p. English translation of the Memo sent by the AFC to Head of State Sửu and Prime Minister Hương, showing that the Memo was signed by General Khanh, and below his signature was a list of 32 generals and 1 colonel. 1 Đoàn Thêm, Hai mươi năm qua, op. cit., 414. 2 “General Taylor reports on 3 noteworthy events,” DDRS, cable from Ambassa- dor Taylor to State Dept., dated 4- Nov- 1964, declassified 30- Nov- 1984, 3 p.; …as of yesterday afternoon, he thought that he had completed his slate only to have two key members defect at the last minute, apparently because of Buddhist pressures. We had been hearing for the last few days that the Bud- dhist leaders were grumbling about Huong and might try to sabotage his government. 3 “Nguyen Xuan Chu, President of Vietnamese High Council, resigns over formation of cabinet,” DDRS, cable from US Embassy in Saigon to State Dept., dated 5- Nov- 1964, declassified 28- Aug- 1979, 2 p. He mentions having stressed importance and necessity of participation of political parties in formation of government to Suu on November 3. Now having seen composition of cabinet Chu contends that it will not rpt not be able to rally people’s confidence because it does not rpt not attach enough importance to political parties. 4 Đỗ Mậu, op. cit., 850. 5 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 17. 6 “Thich Tri Quang’s campaign to bring down the Tran Van Huong government,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 21- Jan- 1965, declassified 12- Dec- 1975; … Quang thinks that Chief of State Phan Khac Suu should name a new High National Council (HNC) which could dissolve the Huong government. Then Suu, with the support of the HNC and of the Buddhists could name a new Premier. Quang claims to have discussed this plan with Suu. He claims his plan has the backing of Buddhist students in Hue, of I Corps Commander Nguyen Chanh Thi and of Air Vice Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky. Quang said the Buddhists will continue their fight against Huong through the hunger strike of ranking Buddhist priests which started on 20 January. 7 “Deliberations of South Vietnam’s Armed Forces Council 1/24/65 resulting in military decision to back Tran Van Huong temporarily with the proviso that Huong must restore government stability,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 24- Jan- 1965, declassified 1984; A parallel proposal to remove Huong was made, since Huong is the target of the opposition to the government. The question was then raised as to who should replace Huong - a civilian or a military man. Generals Vinh Loc, Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky spoke up for a military Prime Min ister. Two officers were asked to take the job. Thieu, of the two, declined on grounds that he was Catholic and therefore unacceptable to the Buddhists. The second nominee, Nguyen Chanh Thi, at first said he was willing. Dong then asked Thi if Thi could form a civilian government. Thi said no, but he believed he could form one with military men. Dong argued that this was not feasible since there were not enough qualified military men available. It was at this point that Dong proposed that the AFC continue to support Huong… 8 “Alleged plotting of Nguyen Khanh with the Buddhists in order to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Tran Van Huong,” DDRS, CIA report, dated 8- Jan- 1965, declassified 27- Sep- 1976; Khanh then said that following the overthrow of the Huong government, the country would be without government for a while; during that period Khanh’s men would create disorders and the Buddhist Institute would also prepare lists of people who would be arrested including those opposed to Khanh, those opposed to the Buddhist Institute, and those who were pro- Americans. 9 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 22. 1 Lâm Vĩnh Thế. “Một nội các chết non của V.N.C.H.” (A stillborn government of the Republic of Vietnam), in Bạch hóa tài liệu mật của Hoa Kỳ về Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Declassifying classified US Government documents on the Republic of Vietnam). (Hamilton: Hoài Việt, 2008), 118– 129. During this period of political maneuvering, Dr. Nguyễn Lưu Viên, Deputy Prime Minister under the recently dissolved Trần Văn Hương government, was invited by the AFC to form a new government. This was never materialized because Dr. Viên refused to offer Major- General Nguyễn Chánh Thi the position of Minister of the Interior as required by the Buddhists. 2 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 33– 34. 3 Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: a history. (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), 385. 4 “General Le Nguyen Khang’s review of the meeting of AFC executive session on 14 February and the discussion of Phan Huy Quat’s cabinet,” Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, 1975, microfiche 46B, CIA cable, no. TDCS- 314/02012- 65, dated 15- Feb- 1965, declassified 8- Dec- 1975, 6 p. 5 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 38. 6 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 34– 35. 7 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 131. Bùi Diễm wrote: Early on the morning of March 8 I received a phone call from Dr. Quat, asking me in a strained voice to come to his house immediately, something urgent had come up. When I arrived, I found Melvin Manfull already there. The American diplomat looked all business, but Quat was obviously nerv- ous. Without asking me to sit down, Quat said the marines were at that mo- ment coming ashore at Danang to take up defensive positions around the base. Manfull and I were to write a joint communiqué announcing the landing. “Be as brief as possible.” Quat told me. “Just describe the facts and af- firm our concurrence.” The news itself was not an overwhelming surprise, because in the back of my mind I knew that Westmoreland would soon be pushing for something like this. But the abruptness of the thing and the lack of preparation for it were upsetting, to say the least. 8 Lâm Vĩnh Thế. “Thủy quân lục chiến Hoa Kỳ đổ bộ vào Đà Nẵng ngày 8 tháng 3 năm 1965,” (US Marines landing in Danang on March 8, 1965), in Bạch hóa tài liệu mật của Hoa Kỳ về Việt Nam Cộng Hòa (Declassifying classified US Gov- ernment documents on the Republic of Vietnam), op. cit., 153– 176. In this paper, the author found that, in reality, the government of South Vietnam was fully informed of the imminent US Marines landing in Danang on March 8, 1965. US Embassy in Saigon sent to the State Department Cable no. 2798, dated 1- Mar- 1965, telling in detail the meeting between Ambassador Taylor and Deputy Ambassador Johnson with Prime Minister Quat about the coming landing in Danang of the two US Marines battalions. Another Cable, no. 2810, dated 2- Mar- 1965, also from Ambassador Taylor to the State Department, gave account of the meeting of General Westmoreland with Generals Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Armed Forces, and General Trần Văn Minh, Commander- in- Chief of the Armed Forces, and of General West- moreland’s intention to go to Danang the next day to inform General Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Commander of I Corps, about the landing of the two US Marines battalions. 9 Lâm Vĩnh Thế, “Tìm hiểu thêm về việc Thủy Quân Lục Chiến Hoa Kỳ đổ bộ vào Đà Nẵng ngày 8- 3-1965,” (Further research study on US Marines landing in Danang on March 8, 1965), online article accessible full- text in Website Nam Kỳ Lục Tỉnh (Six Provinces of Cochinchina) at this URL: https://sites.google.com/ site/namkyluctinhorg/tac- gia- tac- pham/i- j-k- l-m/lam- vinh- the/tim- hieu- them- ve- viec- thuy- quan- luc- chien- hoa- ky- do- bo- vao- dha- nang- ngay- 8-3- 1965. This research study included photos published in Life Magazine showing Vietnamese school girls, with garlands of flowers, on the beach to welcome the Marines. In another photo, Major- General Nguyễn Chánh Thi, Commander of I Corps, was standing by Brigadier- General Frederick J. Karch, Commander of the US Ma- rines brigade. 10 “General Tran Van Minh’s concern over General Nguyen Chanh Thi’s uncoor- dinated actions taken in name of AFC,” Declassified Documents Quarterly Cat- alog, 1975, microfiche no. 48D, CIA cable, No. TDCS DB- 315/00654- 65, dated 23- Feb- 1965, declassified 24- Dec- 1975, 3 p. … Thi has issued notices and taken actions during the past several days in the name of the AFC even though for the past two days there have been no meetings of the AFC. Minh said he should be heir to the post of Chairman of the AFC, but Thi has declared that he will handle the talks and responsibilities of Chairman on a unofficial basis and for an undetermined period. … Minh said that Thi is preparing a list of military personnel changes which Thi in- sists will be implemented. It is not known exactly what these changes will be. The changes would bring strong Thi supporters into command positions. … Minh recommended … the US Ambassador should advise senior military advisers to counsel AFC members that the AFC should be dissolved. Minh is certain that the majority of the generals are in accord with this step, but they need the support and encouragement of US personnel. Minh is confident that if the proper groundwork can be laid, he could ask for an AFC meeting in his capacity as Commander in Chief for the purpose of discussing the dissolution… 11 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 145. 12 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 78. 13 “The situation in South Vietnam: 20 May – 26 May 1965,” DDRS, CIA weekly report, OCI No. 621/65, 17 p. On pp. 1– 2, Details surrounding the coup attempt, reportedly nipped in the bud by police arrests on 20 May of some 40 persons in the Saigon area, are still obscure. The coup ringleader, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao— already under a death sentence for organizing the abortive coup of 19 February— has again eluded capture, suggesting that he may have well- placed protectors…. A government communique, issued on 23 May following a meeting between Quat and senior military officers, described the coup attempt as a Communist plot to exploit discontented elements. No evidence was cited, but government sources have stated privately that a Communist was picked up in the raids…. Some aspects of the government’s account of the coup plot are questionable, and it is probable that the Viet Cong role, in particular, is being stressed in order to reassure the suspicious Vietnamese Catholic community that the arrests are not directed at them. 14 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 84. 15 Đoàn Thêm, 1965: việc từng ngày, op. cit., 85. 16 “PM Quat’s presentation of the new cabinet ministers was accompanied by back- stage maneuvering centering around Chief of State Phan Khac Suu,” DDRS, cable no. 3884, from Saigon US Embassy to State Dept., dated 25- May- 1965, declassified 14- June- 1979, 2 p. On p. 1, “According Secstate at Presidency Bui Diem, Quat saw Suu privately for fifteen minutes before Quat appeared before NLC. At that time, Suu did not rpt not mention his reservations to Quat.” 17 “Prime Minister Quat informs Alex Johnson, General Westmoreland and Am- bassador Taylor of reaction of pressure groups to presentation of Quat’s new cabinet,” DDRS, cable no. 3981, from Saigon US Embassy to State Dept., dated 28- May- 1965, declassified 24- Feb- 1987, 3 p. On p. 2: “Quat will try again to per- suade ministers Vinh and Hiep to submit their resignations. Vinh at one time was agreeable to doing so but was dissuaded by Suu.” 18 “PM Quat’s presentation…” DDRS, cable no. 3884, op. cit. On pp.1– 2: Explicit ref to matter occur in Article 11 key clauses of which state (informal translation from French text): “President of govt (i.e. PriMin) proposes to Chief of State nomination of vice presidents, ministers, and secretaries of state.“ “Chief of State puts an end to function of president of govt and of members of govt in case where their offer of resignation is accepted by Na- tional Congress or in cases envisioned in Article 32 and 33 below.” On p. 2, “Applicable portion of Article 32 reads as follows: “National Congress can, by majority of two thirds of its total membership, vote motion of censure against one or of several ministers or secretaries of state. Minister or secretary having been made object of motion of censure is considered “ipso facto” as having resigned.” Article 33 refers to right of PriMin to pose questions of confidence. 19 “The cabinet crisis in South Vietnam,” DDRS, US State Dept. intelligence memo, dated 28- May- 1965, declassified 20- 4-1980, 4 p. On p. 3: During a press conference at that time, Suu, as Chairman of the HNC, stated that since the Premier proposes the appointment and removal of ministers to the Chief of State, ministers are appointed or dismissed according to the proposals of the Premier. 20 “A Catholic delegation has presented Chief of State Suu with a resolution call ing for the replacement of the Quat government,” DDRS, cable from Saigon US Embassy to State Dept., dated 29- May- 1965, declassified 2- Apr- 1980, 5 p. 21 Bùi Diễm with David Chanoff, op. cit., 146– 147. Bibliography

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