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Alexander of Aphrodisias on Phantasia Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia An Aristotelian account of mental representation in 2nd-3rd centuries CE By Attila Hangai Submitted to Central European University Department of Philosophy In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy CEU eTD Collection Supervisor: Dr. István Bodnár Budapest, Hungary 2016 I hereby declare that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institution or materials previously written and/or published by another person, unless otherwise noted Budapest, 24-10-2016 …………………………………………… Attila Hangai CEU eTD Collection ii Abstract I discuss the account of phantasia of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a most prominent Late-Antique Aristotelian. For Aristotle phantasia is a motion of the perceptive soul that makes possible a great amount of activities and higher cognitions beyond sense-perception. Phantasia became a fundamental psychological concept in the Hellenistic Era: in empiricist epistemology, in action theory as perceptual representation of the external world; in aesthetics as creative imagination. I argue that Alexander proceeds from an Aristotelian framework of parts and capacities of the soul, but unlike Aristotle, he distinguishes a distinct capacity for phantasia. The main reason for this comes from his polemic against the Stoics: they do not acknowledge an activity of phantasia. A distinct activity requires a distinct object, which in turn a distinct capacity. The distinct status of a phantasia-capacity in itself modifies the architecture of the soul in comparison with Aristotle. But in addition Alexander makes important changes in the framework: he makes capacities as basic (and rather modular), and parts and the soul as sets of capacities. The object of phantasia is the residue from perception in activity. The status of this as internal object needs clarification. I show that it is internal on account of being a physical process in the body. Again, I argue that it is the causal object of phantasia: it is the item that provides content to the phantasia-activity by triggering it. But the residue is not an intentional object: it is a representation of something else. I give a reconstruction of Alexander`s account how the residue may be representation. Accordingly, it is a representation in virtue of preserving fully a perceptual content (something that had been perceived); or in virtue of functioning as an equivalent of a fully preserved residue insofar as phantasia completed an incompletely preserved residue. The latter case explains a wide range of cases, in general the fact that phantasia is more prone to error than perception. Finally I analyse the activity of phantasia. I argue that its content is propositional, in CEU eTD Collection particular it is ‘S is P’: a predication of a perceptible feature P of a thing that caused a perception S. First, I show that it is implausible to construe simple cases of phantasia (or perception: for perception has the same type of content as phantasia) as non-propositional, demonstrating that the object reading of the content (x sees ‘white’) is inadequate in that at the best it reduces to existential propositions (‘there is white’). Again, I analyse two positive evidences. (1) Alexander`s account of the truth-conditions of phantasia implies propositional content: iii phantasia is about an existent thing, S; and it is such as the thing, P. (2) The account of simultaneous perception (of several perceptibles) entails propositional content, and even uses examples as ‘this is white’. The phantasia-activity is said to be krisis, which I take to be judgement: primarily because its content is propositional. I argue that it is a certain type of judgement, perceptual, in contrast to conceptual judgements of the rational soul-part: esp. opinion. However, phantasia-judgement may be distinguished from perceptual judgement only because they are concerned with different objects: internal vs. external. CEU eTD Collection iv Contents Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ viiii 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 1.1. The importance of phantasia ........................................................................................... 1 1.2. Alexander`s place in the history of philosophy .............................................................. 2 1.3. Alexander`s account of phantasia in the history of the concept ..................................... 6 1.4. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 9 1.5. Alexander`s official treatment of phantasia: DA 66.9-73.7 .......................................... 11 1.6. The argument ................................................................................................................ 14 2. Terminology ......................................................................................................................... 17 2.1. phantasia, phantaston, phantastikē/phantastikon, phantasma ....................................... 17 2.2. typos, typōsis, prosanatypoun, anazōgraphēma, enkataleimma ................................... 20 3. Phantasia as distinct faculty ................................................................................................. 27 3.1. The Aristotelian background ......................................................................................... 28 3.1.1. Faculty psychology ................................................................................................ 30 3.1.2. The identity of a capacity: Object Criterion .......................................................... 36 3.1.3. Aristotle – no distinct object for phantasia ............................................................ 42 3.2. Alexander: phantasia as distinct faculty ....................................................................... 48 3.2.1. Distinct object for phantasia (phantaston) ............................................................. 48 3.2.2. Alexander`s argument ............................................................................................ 50 3.2.2.1. Overview of the Stoic theory of phantasia ...................................................... 51 3.2.2.2. The argument .................................................................................................. 56 CEU eTD Collection 3.2.3. Alexander`s possible motivation............................................................................ 61 3.3. Reconsidering the division of soul ................................................................................ 66 3.3.1. Soul and parts ......................................................................................................... 68 3.3.2. Part and capacities – the case of the nutritive part ................................................. 70 v 3.3.3. The perceptual part ................................................................................................ 72 3.4. Objections ..................................................................................................................... 74 3.4.1. Phantasia is a movement (kinēsis) caused by perception ....................................... 74 3.4.2. Phantasia and perception are one in hypokeimenon, different only in account ..... 75 3.4.3. Phantasia in the presence of the external object .................................................... 79 4. The object of phantasia ....................................................................................................... 82 4.1. Internal (en-) ................................................................................................................. 83 4.1.1. The primary sense-organ – the seat of residues ..................................................... 84 4.1.2. Bodily Change ....................................................................................................... 88 4.1.2.1. Not typos ......................................................................................................... 89 4.1.2.2. Assimilation in perception .............................................................................. 90 4.1.2.3. Four alternatives.............................................................................................. 98 4.2. Object (-leimma) ......................................................................................................... 102 4.2.1. Intentional vs. causal object ................................................................................. 103 4.2.2. Causal continuity ................................................................................................. 105 4.2.3. Preservation.......................................................................................................... 109 4.2.3.1. Preserving truthfully ..................................................................................... 110 4.2.3.2. Preserving faithfully...................................................................................... 115 4.2.3.3. Preserving fully ............................................................................................. 117 4.2.3.3.1. Impressing further – prosanatypoun ...................................................... 118 4.2.3.3.2. Causes of error – presence
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