READY FOR TODAY. PREPARING FOR TOMORROW. ABOUT THIS STUDY

The Joint Operating Environment is intended to inform joint concept development and experimentation throughout the Department of Defense. It provides a perspective on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field. This document is speculative in nature and does not suppose to predict what will happen in the next twenty-five years. Rather, it is intended to serve as a starting point for discussions about the future security environment at the operational level of war. Inquiries about the Joint Operating Environment should be directed to USJFCOM Public Affairs, 1562 Mitscher Avenue, Suite 200, Norfolk, VA 23551-2488, (757) 836-6555.

Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release

United States Joint Forces Command www.jfcom.mil THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (JOE)

Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release February 18, 2010 Government requests for the final approved document must be referred to: United States Joint Forces Command Joint Futures Group (J59) 112 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435. Attention: Joe Purser, 757-203-3928 FOREWORD

While U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Operating Environment (JOE) in no way constitutes U.S. government policy and must necessarily be speculative in nature, it seeks to provide the Joint Force an intellectual foundation upon which we will construct the concepts to guide our future force development. We will likely not call the future exactly right, but we must think through the nature of continuity and change in strategic trends to discern their military implications to avoid being completely wrong. These implications serve to influence the concepts that drive our services’ adaptations to the environments within which they will operate, adaptations that are essential if our leaders are to have the fewest regrets when future crises strike.

In our guardian role for our nation, it is natural that we in the military focus more on possible security challenges and threats than we do on emerging opportunities. From economic trends to climate change and vulnerability to cyber attack, we outline those trends that remind us we must stay alert to what is changing in the world if we intend to create a military as relevant and capable as we possess today. There is a strong note of urgency in our efforts to balance the force for the uncertainties that lie ahead. The JOE gives focus to those efforts which must also embrace the opportunities that are inherent in the world we imperfectly foresee.

Every military force in history that has successfully adapted to the changing character of war and the evolving threats it faced did so by sharply defining the operational problems it had to solve. With the JOE helping to frame future security problems and highlighting their military implications, the Chairman’s companion document, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), answers the problems we have defined, stating how the Joint Force will operate. Taken together, these documents will drive the concept development and experimentation that will, in turn, drive our evolutionary adaptation, while guarding against any single preclusive view of future war. None of us have a sufficiently clear crystal ball to predict fully the changing kaleidoscope of future conflicts that hover over the horizon, even as current fights, possible adversaries’ nascent capabilities, and other factors intersect.

We will update the JOE in a year or two, once we have a sufficiently different understanding to make a new edition worthwhile. If you have ideas for improving our assessment of the future security environment and the problems our military must solve to provide relevant defense for our country and like-minded nations, please forward them to J-5 (Strategy), Joint Forces Command.

J.N. Mattis General, U.S. Marines Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command TABLE OF CONTENTS

introduction 4

Part I: the constants 6 The Nature of War...... 6 The Challenge of Disruptions...... 10 The Nature of Change...... 8 Grand Strategy...... 11

Part II: trends influencing the world’s security 12 Demographics...... 12 Climate Change and Natural Disasters...32 Globalization...... 16 Pandemics...... 33 Economics...... 19 Cyber...... 34 Energy...... 24 Space...... 36 Food...... 29 Conclusion...... 37 Water...... 31

Part III: the contextual world 38 Cooperation and Competition The Middle East and Central Asia...... 49 Among Conventional Powers...... 38 Weak and Failing States...... 50 Potential Future Challenges...... 39 The Threats of Unconventional Power....52 China...... 39 Radical Ideologies...... 52 Russia...... 42 The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass The Pacific and Indian Oceans...... 45 Destruction...... 53 Europe...... 46 Technology...... 54 Central and South America...... 47 Urbanization...... 57 Africa...... 48 The Battle of Narratives...... 58

Part IV: the implications for the joint forces 60 War in the Twenty-first Century...... 60 The Conduct of Military Operations in the Preparing for War...... 62 Twenty-first Century...... 64

Part V: future opportunities 69 Professional Military Education: The Personnel System...... 71 The Critical Key to the Future...... 69 Simulation...... 71 Defense Economics & Acquisition Policies...71

Concluding Thoughts 72 introduction 4 2 1 nature beingwhatitis)willatsometimeorotherandinmuchthesamewaybe repeated inthefuture.” As ThucydidessuggestedinthefifthcenturyBC,“theeventswhichhappenedpast…(human Thinking aboutthefuture requires anunderstandingofbothwhatistimelessandwilllikelychange. caught flat-footed, reacting tonear-term crisesastheyarise,atgreat costinbloodandtreasure. exclusively onthehere andnowortopassthismissionthebureaucracy, willcertainlyresult ingetting will theJointForce havesomeoftheanswerstochallengesfuture. tofocus Thealternative, with thepossibilities,determiningleadingindicators,andthenreading thesignpostsoftimes more intheparticipationofseniorleadersanddecision-makersdiscussion. Onlybywrestling they mightemployjointforces. Thevalueofsuchefforts liesnotasmuchinthefinalproduct, butmuch in order toglimpsethepossibleenvironments where politicalandmilitaryleaderswillworkwhere Nevertheless, itisabsolutelyvitaltotryframethestrategicandoperationalcontextsoffuture, It isimpossibletopredict precisely howchallenges willemerge andwhatformtheymighttake. states tolessstableandevennon-statenetworks. destruction –from nuclear, biological,andchemicalweapons– willlikelyexpandfrom stablenation- suicide bomberstolong-rangeprecision-guided cyber, space, andmissileattacks.Thethreat ofmass engagement intheglobalcommons.Ourenemy’s capabilitieswillrangefromby explosivevestsworn regular andirregular warsinremote lands,torelief andreconstruction incrisiszones,tocooperative The nextquartercenturywillchallengeU.S.jointforces withthreats andopportunitiesrangingfrom thatitbethoroughly studied. Itruin. ismandatory War totheState; isamatterofvitalimportance theprovince or oflifeordeath;theroad tosurvival complicated inaperiodofpersistent conflict,withitstollonequipment,people,andnational will. Merely sustainingthehealthofJointForce, nevermindadaptingandtransforming, isfarmore working withlike-mindedpartners, willcontinuetobecalleduponprotect ournationalinterests. to theworld’s economy. Inthisenvironment, the presence, reach, andcapabilityofU.S.militaryforces, will trytodisruptthepoliticalstabilityanddenyfree accesstotheglobalcommonsthatiscrucial those whowillhijackandexploitreligion forextremist ends.There willcontinue tobeopponentswho combination ofcombat,security, engagement,andrelief andreconstruction. There will continue tobe Over thenextquartercentury, U.S.militaryforces willbecontinuallyengagedinsomedynamic societies, andtheinterplayamonghumansocietiesinpeaceful andwarlikecompetition. deal. Here too,thepastcan suggestmuchaboutthefuture –thenature ofchange, itsimpactonhuman and theadaptationcreativity ofouradversarieswillalterthecharacterjointoperationsagreat In contrast,changesinthestrategiclandscape,introduction andemploymentofnewtechnologies, will thefundamentalnature ofwarchange.War willremain primarilyahumanendeavor. the courseofhistory, andthere isnoreason tobelievethatthefuture willdiffer inthisrespect. Neither much ofthedevelopedworld,conflictwillnotdisappear. War hasbeenaprincipaldriverofchangeover that Americanforces havefacedoverthepasttwocenturies.Inspiteofcurrent intellectualclimatein Many features willnotchange.Thechallengesofthefuture willresemble, inmanyways,thechallenges Thucydides,TheHistory ofthePeloponnesianWar, trans.byRexWarner (London:PenguinBooks,1954), p.48. SunTzu,TheArtof War, trans.anded.bySamuel B.Griffith(Oxford,1963), p.63. INTRODUCTION 1 -Sun Tzu 2

The nature of the human condition will guarantee that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate the course of events. However carefully we think about the future; however thorough our preparations; however coherent and thoughtful our concepts, training, and doctrine; we will be surprised. Even the wisest of statesmen have found their assumptions about the future confounded by reality. The eighteenth century British leader, William Pitt, the Younger, declared in a speech before the House of Commons in February 1792: “Unquestionably there has never been a time in the history of our country when, from the situation in Europe, we might more reasonably expect fifteen years of peace, than we have at the present moment.”3 Within a matter of months, Britain would become embroiled in a conflict that would last nearly a quarter of a century and would kill more Europeans than any other war in history up to that time.

In the broadest sense, the Joint Operating Environment examines three questions: • What future trends and disruptions are likely to affect the Joint Force over the next quarter century? • How are these trends and disruptions likely to define the future contexts for joint operations? • What are the implications of these trends and contexts for the Joint Force?

By exploring these trends, contexts, and implications, the Joint Operating Environment provides a basis for thinking about the world over the next quarter century. Its purpose is not to predict, but to suggest ways leaders might think about the future.

As war at its essence is a human endeavor, then it follows that one of the most effective ways to understand human nature is by a close consideration of history. As such, rather than futuristic vignettes, the Joint Operating Environment uses history as a principal way to gain insight into the future. The discussion begins with the enduring nature of war, the causes and consequences of change and surprises, and the role of strategy. Part II then describes some trends, discontinuities and potential trouble spots that joint forces may confront. Part III analyzes how these trends and disruptions may combine into contexts that will likely define joint operations over the next quarter century. Part IV describes the implications of these contexts for the Joint Force as it confronts an uncertain future. This section also suggests how senior leaders might think about creating a force that is suited to address the challenges that these contexts will present. This is the unique contribution of the Joint Operating Environment to the broader discussion about the future. Before concluding, Part V offers some “leading questions” about topics that may fall outside the traditional purview of this study, but that nonetheless have important implications for the future Joint Force.

We will find ourselves caught off guard by changes in the political, economic, technological, strategic, and operational environments. We will find ourselves surprised by the creativity and capability of our adversaries. Our goal is not to eliminate surprise – that is impossible. Our goal is, by a careful consideration of the future, to suggest the attributes of a joint force capable of adjusting with minimum difficulty when the surprise inevitably comes. The true test of military effectiveness in the past has been the ability of a force to diagnose the conditions it actually confronts and then quickly adapt. In the end, it will be our imagination and agility to envision and prepare for the future, and then to adapt to surprises, that will determine how the Joint Force will perform over the next twenty-five years. The ability to adapt to the reality of war, its political framework, and its technical and industrial modes, and to the fact that the enemy also consists of adaptive human beings, has been the key component in military effectiveness in the past and will continue to be so in the future. n o i t c u d o r t n i

3 Quoted in Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century, (London: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 40. 5 p a r t i: t h e c o n s t a n t s 6 5 4 do so.“Whenwholecommunitiesgotowar... thereason alwaysliesinsomepoliticalsituation.” aims, pressures, andhesitationshavealwaysconditioned militaryoperations–andwillcontinueto that thefundamentalnature ofwarwillnotchange.Inademocracysuchasthe United States,political possible enemiesandtheweaponstheywillbringtofight.However, wecanstatewithcertainty States willfindthemselvesengagedinoverthenextquartercentury;wecanonlyspeculateabout We cannotpredict exactly whatkindofwar, orforwhatpurposes,thearmedforces oftheUnited The NatureofWar this way. Far from it. motives prevent usfrom doingso–security, honour, andselfinterest. And we were notthefirsttoactin accepting anempire whenitwasoffered tousandtheninrefusing togive itup. powerfulThree very other great power: “We tohumannature have in donenothingextraordinary, nothingcontrary werethey soonatwar, stakedouttheirrationalefor refusal toabandontheirpositionasGreece’s BC, Athenian negotiators,speakingtotheir In competitors,withwhom Spartan thelatefifthcentury can becomeamatterofsurvivalwhenhumanpassiontakes over. women, tointimidatecivilianpopulationswithmachetes ortoactassuicidebombersinopenmarkets.It Among these,wefaceirreconcilable enemiescapableofmobilizinglarge numbersofyoungmenand world –wholeavelittleroom fornegotiationsorcompromise. causes; enemieswhoignore nationalborders andremain unboundbytheconventions ofthedeveloped differently thanwedo.Someofourenemiesare eagertodieforradicalideological, religious, orethnic and valuesthatdriveourowncountry. Inmanypartsoftheworld, actors willjudgecostsandbenefits decades, Americansmuststruggletoresist judgingtheworldasifitoperatedalongsameprinciples The JointForce willfaceactorswhoviewtheworldthrough different lensesthanwedo.Incoming conditions maydominatechoices. in aworldwhere organizational processes, bureaucratic politics,legislativerestrictions, andeconomic makes thetrajectoryofanyconflictdifficultifnotimpossibletopredict. Rationalstrategyisoftendifficult hand andsecularorreligious ideologiesontheother, combinedwiththeimpactofpassionandchance, past andwilldosointhefuture. Thetensionbetweenrationalpoliticalcalculations ofpoweronone origins ofwarmayrest onpolicy, avarietyoffactorshaveinfluencedtheconductthatstrugglein The JointForceenvironment willoperateinaninternational where strugglepredominates. Whilethe transnational groups. political dimensioninthetwenty-firstcentury, evenwhenitoriginatesintheactionsofnon-stateand and transnationalmovementssuchasAlQaedauseforce forpoliticalends.Thus, warretains its War isapoliticalact,begunforpurposes.Indeed,both nonstateactorssuchasinsurgents Thucydides,History ofthePeloponnesianWar, trans. byRexWarner (London:PenguinBooks,1954) p.80. Carl vonClausewitz, OnWar, translatedandedited byMichaelHoward and PeterParet (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1976),p.87. PART 1:THECONSTANTS 4 -Thucydides 5

p a r t i: t h e c o n s t a n t s 7 6 The conduct of war demands a deep understanding The conduct of war demands a deep 9 Those living forces possess all the cunning and intractable possess Those living forces 8 7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 77. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, and Peter Paret translated and edited by Michael Howard Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 113. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, and Peter Paret translated and edited by Michael Howard Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 78. DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies McNair Paper #68, 2004), (Washington, War Clausewitzian Friction and Future Barry D. Watts, University), p.84. (Oxford translation by Samuel B. Griffth Sun Tzu, Art of War, 6 7 8 9 The constant fog and friction of war turns into the complex. In combat, people make mistakes. the simple Occasionally, vital to focus on the irrelevant. the basics. They become disoriented, ignoring the They forget distorts, Chance disrupts, assumptions distort situational awareness. Mistaken incompetence prevails. military dominate. Thoughtful of plans. Uncertainty and unpredictability and confuses the most careful this basic and no amount of computing power will eradicate that reality leaders have always recognized messiness. an invitation to tight tolerances, whether applied to plans, actions, or materiel are friction prevails, Where plans that make devastating for being unexpected. Operational or logistical concepts or – the more failure suspect on their face – an open invitation to of war are no allowance for the inescapable uncertainties and at times defeat. failure recognize fail to recurring fact that military leaders often of conflict lies in the Still another enduring feature a lifeless mass... upon “is not the action of a living force War their enemy as a learning, adaptive force. forces.” but always the collision of two living There are other aspects of human conflict that will not change no matter what advances in technology or that will not change no matter other aspects of human conflict are There of events. Fog will cloak, and twist the course occur: fog and friction will distort, computing power may the faulty assumptions, and the fact that and own misperceptions information overload, our from result - that almost the fog of war will be its frictions unexpected fashion. Combined with enemy will act in an It will arise “from actions that can go wrong. seemingly insignificant incidents and infinite number of of lie at the very core that unpredictabilities of the human condition and unavoidable fundamental aspects combat processes.” War, more than any other human activity, engages our senses: at times providing a “rush” of fear, horror, horror, a “rush” of fear, providing senses: at times engages our activity, any other human than more War, vagaries that It is in these anticipation, and hyper-awareness. nauseous rage, pain, helplessness, confusion, the In leaders. political and military of minds the paralyze to accumulate miscalculations and imponderables of quick decision intact.” being] who keeps his powers “It is the exceptional [human of war, cauldron characteristics human beings have enjoyed since the dawn of history. characteristics human beings have enjoyed fact of belligerence the mere a similar historical and cultural background, adversaries share Even where cultures different Where in attitudes, expectations, and behavioral norms. differences guarantees profound ways is even more adversaries will act in mutually incomprehensible come into conflict, the likelihood that the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the maxim that, “if you know Thus, Sun Tzu’s likely. battles” is easier said than done. of a hundred results of the enemy – his culture, history, geography, religious and ideological motivations, and particularly the religious geography, history, of the enemy – his culture, of the external world. in his perceptions manifest differences p a r t i: t h e c o n s t a n t s 8 capital among international marketswasapproximatelycapital amonginternational $20billion.Today, itis$1.6trillion. world seemedcaughtininescapablepoverty. Justtogiveoneexample: in1983thedailytransferof the UnitedStates,Europe, andJapan.ThetigersofSoutheastAsiawere emerging, buttherest ofthe changed. Economically, in1983globalizationwasitsfirststages andlargely involvedtradeamong One mightalsonotehowmuchtheeconomicandtechnological landscapesoutsideofthemilitaryhad Precision attackwasaproblem tobesolvedwithtacticalnuclearweapons. Center, Twenty-Nine Palms,Fallon,andNelliswere justbeginningtochangeU.S. preparations forwar. units. TheGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)didnotexist. ThetrainingrangesoftheNationalTraining The M-1Tank and theBradleyFightingVehicle were onlystartingtoreach thearmy’s forward deployed In termsofcapabilities,stealthdidnotyetexistoutsidetheresearch anddevelopmentcommunities. Goldwater-Nichols Actin1986. the timejointnesswasaconcepthonored more in the breach thanobservance.Thatsituationledtothe involved inoverthrowing the“NewJewel”movementinGrenada inOctober1983reminds usthatat underline theextentofdisruptionswithpast.Thelackcoordination amongtheforces The differences betweentheculture andorganization oftheAmericanmilitarythenandnowfurther simultaneous insurgencies inIraqandAfghanistan. major warsagainstSaddamHussein’s regime andcommitmuchofitsground powertosuppressing today. Butno onecouldhavepredicted thenthatwithin25yearstheUnitedStateswouldwagetwo To thesub-continent’s west,theMiddleEastwasasplaguedbypoliticalandreligious troubles as India remained mired inanalmostmedievallevelof poverty, from whichitappeared unlikelytoescape. enormously from today. Chinawasonlyemerging from thedarkyearsofMao’s rule.To China’s south, Beyond theconfrontation betweentheUnitedStatesandSovietUnionlayaworld thatdiffered Salvador, aSoviet-backedinsurgency wasonthebrinkof victory. Afghanistan andappeared onthebrinkofcrushinganuprisingill-equipped,ill-trained guerrillas.InEl weapons, aswellvastarmies,airforces, andnaviesacross theglobe.Sovietforces were occupying implosion oftheSovietEmpire. Theopposingsideshadeachdeployedtensofthousands ofnuclear among Sovietologistsrecognizedcrisisofconfidencethatwouldleadtothe thedeepeninginternal ideology andexpansionoftheirinfluence.Atthattime,fewintheintelligencecommunitiesoreven Union, atruculent,intractableopponentwithleadersfirmlycommittedtothespread ofMarxist-Leninist preoccupation isahistoricalrelic. Aquartercenturyago,theUnitedStatesconfronted theSoviet and preparation forconflict–from thestrategicleveltotactical. Today, thatall-consuming Twenty-five yearsagotheCold War encompassedeveryaspectoftheAmericanmilitary’s thinking decades willbring. century, tosaynothingofthepastfourthousandyears,suggestsextentchangesthatcoming and extrapolationsfrom thepresent andoccasionallythepast.Butabrieflookatpastquarter chaotic universe,humanbeingstendtoframetheirthoughtsaboutthefuture intermsofcontinuities tends tolimittheirabilityadaptquickly. Drivenbyaninherent desire tobringorder toadisorderly, character ofwar. Leadersare oftenlatetorecognize suchchanges,andevenwhentheydo,inertia in thepoliticallandscape,adaptationsbyenemy, andadvancesintechnologywillchangethe War willremain ahumanendeavor, andadaptingforces, aconflictbetweentwolearning yetchanges The Natureofchange Strategic Estimates in the Twentieth Century If you are a strategic analyst for the world’s leading power, you are British, looking warily at Britain’s 1900 age old enemy, France.

1910 You are now allied with France, and the enemy is now Germany.

Britain and its allies have won World War I, but now the British find themselves engaged in a naval 1920 race with its former allies, the United States and Japan.

For the British, naval limitation treaties are in place, the Great Depression has started, and defense 1930 planning for the next five years assumes a “ten year” rule – no war in ten years. British planners posited the main threats to the Empire as the Soviet Union and Japan, while Germany and Italy are either friendly or no threat.

A British planner now posits three great threats: Italy, Japan, and the worst, a resurgent Germany, 1936 while little help can be expected from the United States.

The collapse of France in June leaves Britain alone in a seemingly hopeless war with Germany and 1940 Italy, with a Japanese threat looming in the Pacific. The United States has only recently begun to scramble to rearm its military forces.

1950 The United States is now the world’s greatest power, the atomic age has dawned, and a “police action” begins in June in Korea that will kill over 36,500 Americans, 58,000 South Koreans, nearly 3,000 Allied soldiers, 215,000 North Koreans, 400,000 Chinese, and 2,000,000 Korean civilians before a cease-fire brings an end to the fighting in 1953. The main opponent in the conflict is China, America’s ally in the war against Japan.

Politicians in the United States are focusing on a missile gap that does not genuinely exist; massive 1960 retaliation will soon give way to flexible response, while a small insurgency in South Vietnam hardly draws American attention.

The United States is beginning to withdraw from Vietnam, its military forces in shambles. The Soviet 1970 Union has just crushed incipient rebellion in the Warsaw Pact. Détente between the Soviets and Americans has begun, while the Chinese are waiting in the wings to create an informal alliance with the United States.

The Soviets have just invaded Afghanistan, while a theocratic revolution in Iran has overthrown the 1980 Shah’s regime. “Desert One” – an attempt to free American hostages in Iran – ends in a humiliating failure, another indication of what pundits were calling “the hollow force.” America is the greatest creditor nation the world had ever seen.

The Soviet Union collapses. The supposedly hollow force shreds the vaunted Iraqi Army in less than 1990 100 hours. The United States has become the world’s greatest debtor nation. Very few outside of the Department of Defense and the academic community use the Internet. t r a p Warsaw is the capital of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nation. Terrorism is emerging as

2000 America’s greatest threat. Biotechnology, robotics, nanotechnology, HD energy, etc. are advancing i :

so fast they are beyond forecasting. e h t

2010 Take the above and plan accordingly! What will be the disruptions of the next 25 years? s t n a t s n o c

9 On the technological side, the Internet existed only in the Department of Defense, and its economic and communications possibilities and implications for the civilian world were not yet apparent. Cellular phones came equipped with briefcases and shoulder straps and only worked in select urban areas. Personal computers were beginning to come into widespread use, but their reliability was terrible. Microsoft was just emerging from Bill Gates’ garage, while Google existed only in the wilder writings of science fiction writers. In other words, the revolution in information and communications technologies, taken for granted today, was largely unimaginable in 1983. A revolution had begun, but its implications remained uncertain and unclear. Other advances in science since 1983, such as the completion of the human genome project, nano technologies, and robotics, also seemed the provenance of writers of science fiction.

In thinking about the world’s trajectory, we have reason to believe that the next twenty-five years will bring changes just as dramatic, drastic, and disruptive as those that have occurred in the past quarter century. Indeed, the pace of technological and scientific change is increasing. Changes will occur throughout the energy, financial, political, strategic, operational, and technological domains. How drastic, how disruptive and how surprising these changes might be is at present not discernible and in some cases their full impact will not be understood until they are upon us.

The interplay between continuities and disruptions will demand a Joint Force that can see both what has changed and what endures. The force must then have the ability to adapt to those changes while recognizing the value of fundamental principles. That can only result from a historically-minded mentality that can raise the right questions.

The Challenge of Disruptions Trends may suggest possibilities and potential directions, but they are unreliable for understanding the future because they interact with and are influenced by other factors. The downturn of Wall Street after the crash of 1929 might well have remained a recession, but passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs destroyed American trade with other nations and turned the recession into a catastrophic global depression. In considering the future, one should not underestimate the ability of a few individuals, even a single person, to determine the course of events. One may well predict that human beings will act in similar patterns of behavior in the future, but when, where and how remains entirely unpredictable. The rise of a future Stalin, Hitler, or Lenin is entirely possible, but completely unpredictable, and the context in which they might reach the top is unforeseeable.

The interplay of economic trends, vastly different cultures and historical experiences, and the idiosyncrasies of leaders, among a host of other factors, provide such complexity in their interactions as to make prediction impossible. Winston Churchill caught those complexities best in his masterful history of World War I:

One rises from the study of the causes of the Great War with a prevailing sense of the defective control of individuals upon world fortunes. It has been well said, ‘there is always more error than design in human affairs.’ The limited minds of the ablest men, their disputed authority, the climate of opinion in which they dwell, their transient and partial contributions to the mighty problem, that problem itself so far beyond their compass, so vast in scale and detail, so changing in its aspects – all this must surely be considered...10

Thus, individuals and their idiosyncrasies, genius, and incompetence, are major actors in these disruptions. Perhaps the worst president in American history, James Buchanan, was followed by possibly the greatest, Abraham Lincoln. Individuals invariably remain the prisoners of their cultural and historical c o n s t a n t s

frame of reference, which makes the ability to understand, still less to predict, the actions of other states and other leaders difficult. Yet we should not allow this to discourage us from gaining as deep t h e :

i an understanding as possible of the historical influences of potential political and military leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. p a r t 10Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (Toronto: MacMillan, 1931), p. 6.

10 Clearly, not all disruptions occur through the actions of individual leaders. Great events, involving the overthrow of regimes, the collapse of economic systems, natural disasters, and great conflicts within or among states have taken the flow of history and channeled it into new and unforeseen directions. Such disruptions are truly unpredictable, except for the fact that we can be sure that they will happen again. They will twist the future into new and unforeseen directions. Here, the only strategy that can mitigate the impact of surprise is knowledge of the past, an understanding of the present, and a balanced force that is willing and able to adapt in the future.

The Fragility of History – and the Future... The patterns and course of the past appear relatively straightforward and obvious to those living in the present, but only because some paths were not taken or the events that might have happened, did not. Nothing makes this clearer than the fates of three individuals in the first thirty plus years of the twentieth century. Adolf Hitler enlisted in the 16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment (the “List” Regiment) in early August 1914; two months later he and 35,000 ill-trained recruits were thrown against the veteran soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force. In one day of fighting the List Regiment lost one third of its men. When the Battle of Langemark was over, the Germans had suffered approximately 80% casualties. Hitler was unscratched. Seventeen years later, when Winston Churchill was visiting New York, he stepped off the curb without looking in the right direction and was seriously injured. Two years later in February 1933, Franklin Roosevelt was the target of an assassination attempt, but the bullet aimed for him hit and killed the mayor of Chicago. Can any one doubt that, had any one of these three individuals been killed, the history of the twentieth century would have followed a fundamentally different course? grand strategy As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the superstructure, is radically marred and imperfect if the foundations be insecure -- so if the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect.11 -Mahan

Future Joint Force commanders will not make grand strategy, but they must fully understand the ends it seeks to achieve. They will have a role to play in suggesting how the Joint Force might be used and the means necessary for the effective use of joint forces to protect the interests of the United States. Thus, their professional, nuanced advice as military leaders is essential to cast effective responses to strategic challenges.

In the twentieth century the relationship in the United States between political vision and military leaders responsible for the execution of policy proved crucial in winning two world wars and the Cold War. Yet the dialogue and discourse between those responsible for casting grand strategy and those responsible for conducting military operations has always involved tension because their perspectives of the world inevitably differ. In the future, Joint Force commanders must understand the ends of strategy to recommend the forces required (the means) to achieve those ends, and policy makers must be clearly aware of the strengths, limitations, and potential costs of the employment of military forces. The relationship between ends and means drives the logic of joint operations. Only clear and unfettered military advice from commanders to policy makers can provide the understanding required to employ the t r a p Joint Force effectively.

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11Robert Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 311.

11 Engage people with what they expect; it is what they are able to discern and confirms their projection. It settles them into predictable patterns of response, occupying their minds while you wait for the extraordinary moment—that which they cannot anticipate.12 -Sun Tzu

PART II: TRENDS INFLUENCING THE WORLD’S SECURITY

Trend analysis is the most fragile element of forecasting. The world’s future over the coming quarter of a century will be subject to enormous disruptions and surprises, natural as well as man-made. These disruptions, and many other contiguous forces, can easily change the trajectory of any single trend. The Joint Operating Environment recognizes that many, if not all, of the trends and trajectories of the future will be non-linear. For the purpose of analysis, however, it has used a traditional approach to examine many of the trends and utilized conservative estimates. For example, demographic trends are derived from sources such as the U.S. Census Bureau. In the final analysis, the value of the trends lies not in accurately predicting them, but in inferring how they might combine in different ways and form more enduring contexts within which future operations might be conducted. Trend analysis can also help in identifying some indicators or signposts that one can use to “check” the path that the world takes into the future and make adjustments as necessary. Nevertheless, the resource and strategic implications of even a conservative and linear rate of increase possess consequences that suggest a number of troubling challenges for U.S. national security in the future.

The reason that specific trends have been selected for inclusion in the JOE is based upon three major ideas, or themes. The first of these is how a trend might enhance or erode the power of a specific state. The second is how a trend might enhance or erode the power of the overall state system of relations relative to non-state actors. The third is how trends contribute to the emergence or suppression of global networks or ideologies that transcend the international system as we currently perceive it. Together the trends examined in JOE 2010 set the stage for more focused contexts of future conflict and war that we find in Part III of this document.

demographics A good place to begin the discussion of trends is demographics because what is happening demographically today, unless altered by some catastrophe, has predictable consequences for the populations of regions and states. Equally important, it possesses implications for future strategic postures and attitudes. In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s. Ninety-five percent of that increase will occur in developing countries. The more important point is that the world’s troubles will occur not only in the areas of abject poverty

s e c u r i t y but also, to an even greater extent, in developing countries where the combination of demographics and economy permits populations to grow, but makes meeting rising expectations difficult. Here, the performance of the global economy will be key in either dampening down or inflaming ethnically or religiously based violent movements. influencing t r e n d s : i i

p a r t 12Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated and edited by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, 1963), p. 92.

12 p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 13 The Past The Present The Future The Japan Female China Millions Russia United States 2010 States United 2030 States United Key Pyramid India Male Yemen Demographics: Population by Age · Eight billion people in the world by 2025 world. in the developing · Nearly all growth Russia, and Korea. Japan, · Absolute decline in Europe, · The U.S. will add 50 million people by 2025 (unique among the developed countries of the world). 12 6 0 0 6 12 Germany Cohort Cohort Cohort Retired Schooling Wage Earning Wage Nigeria Brazil United States United Mexico world population pyramids http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country.php A population pyramid is a demographer’s tool used A population pyramid is a demographer’s or to track the size and age composition of a country in four-year an age group Each bar represents group. with males on (youngest at the bottom) increments above the left and females on the right. The pyramids countries in populations of selected show projected is the 2030 time frame and the width of each pyramid that rivals Russia to scale. Thus, we see a 2030 Yemen in terms of population. Developed countries generally show a typical “inverted” pattern with dramatic declines This to the retired. in the raw numbers of youth relative pattern of decline will be difficult to manage as most based on an systems in the developed world are welfare Developing assumption of moderate population growth. illustrate how the countries such as Nigeria and Yemen typical population pyramid in fact got its name, and are multi-children countries with large of fast-growing clear, one-child policy are of China’s families. The effects India. The to fast-growing especially when compared United States occupies a middle position among states, stable population. yet relatively with a large, p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 14

Population in Billions 10 0 2 4 6 8 1800 SOURCE: United Nations Population Reference Bureau Population to2050:Developed andDevelopingWorld robotics aswelltheirshifttoacapital-intensiveeconomy. their demographicdecline,afactwhichexplainsmajorresearch anddevelopmentefforts inthefieldof world’s best,butfrom thecollapseofJapan’s birthrate.TheJapaneseare takingseriousstepstoaddress case ofRussiathiswillresult notfrom anyinadequacyofJapanesemedicalservices,whichare amongthe Likewise, Japan’s populationwillfallfrom 128milliontoapproximately 117millioninthe2030s,butunlike bear thecostsinvolvedinlivesandtreasure thattheuseofmilitaryforce inevitablycarrieswithit. economic growth inthatregion. ItalsohasseriousimplicationsforthewillingnessofEuropean societiesto populations willsignificantlyincreaseaboutthesustainabilityof bythe2030s.Thisraisesseriousconcerns to deathsin2007,anddespiteconsiderableefforts toreverse thosetrends, there islittlelikelihoodtheir a similar, albeitlessdisastrous, situationexists.Overall,European nationsstoppedreplacing theirlosses 13 population declinethatliterallyhasnohistoricalprecedent intheabsenceofpandemic.” Studies(CSIS)reportCenter forStrategicandInternational suggested,“Russianeedstocopewitharateof every prospect thatdeclinewillcontinue,barringadrasticshiftinsocialattitudesorpublicpolicy. Asarecent population iscurrently decliningby0.5%annually, andgivenRussianhealthwelfare profiles, there is developed worldwilllikelysloworinsomecasesdecline.Russiaparticularexemplifiesthistrend. Russia’s The developedworldfacestheoppositeproblem. Duringthenext25yearspopulationgrowth inthe Center for Strategic International Studies(CSIS),“TheGrayingofthe GreatCenter forStrategic International Powers,”(Washington, DC),p.7. 1850 1900 6.8 Billion World Population 2010 1950 Developing Developed 9.5 Billion World Population 2050 2000 2050 13 To Russia’s west, 1 Billion Countries Developed 1.4 Billion China 1.8 Billion India 5.3 Billion Rest of World p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 15 Over the next quarter century, China’s population will grow by 170 million, but its population will age population will age 170 million, but its by grow population will China’s next quarter century, Over the An additional family. of one child per edict of the government’s enforcement because of strict significantly to satisfy of many families is the choice Chinese behavior, may influence which factor, demographic and females will imbalance between young males a male child. How the resulting that limitation with few historical are external because there internal and is impossible to predict politics play out in China’s the youth in response of nationalistic feeling among we have seen exuberant displays analogues. Already behavior in Tibet. to criticisms of China’s 355 than 50 million to a total of approximately population will climb by more By the 2030s, the U.S. advantage in population may be a significant to many of its peers. This growing million, in contrast American births in current not only from will result international This growth economic competition. the Caribbean, which will Mexico and especially from continued immigration, families, but also from population of By 2030 at least 15% of the Hispanic population. in America’s lead to major increases Americans of 50%. How effective upwards in some states reaching every state will be Hispanic in origin, in will play a major role and culture politics new immigrants into the nation’s in assimilating these prove ability of the United States to assimilate immigrants into the historical In this regard, prospects. America’s willingness little display which nations, other most over advantage distinct a it gives culture and society its of their societies. into the mainstreams to incorporate immigrant populations tensions that arise from The during the next quarter of a century. by 320 million India will grow and poor could seriously impact its potential for further economic growth. divide between rich a growing huge middle class and those in between the sub-continent’s Exacerbating tensions will be the divide and Hindus. Nevertheless, India’s as well as the divide between Muslims in poverty, the villages mired poor. wide latitude for political changes to accommodate the society’s democratic system gives the country recently the Middle East and in Sub-Saharan Africa has only across The continued population growth fails to a demographic crisis in which economic growth forestall begun abating, but not fast enough to of youthful populations continued growth of abject poverty, In areas keep pace with population growth. called upon to feed the starving and mitigate the of U.S. forces has significance for the employment or for revolution fuels but does not satisfy expectations, the potential economic growth Where suffering. be significant. will including civil war, war, an acute with its youth bulge, the developed world will confront Even as the developing world copes the number of elderly people in developed countries will double. In Japan By the 2030s aging problem. The United not far behind with 59 per 100. 100 workers, with Europe will be 63 elderly for every there with 44 elderly per 100 workers. Even China will see its ratio of elderly to States will be slightly better off medical of better diet and improved 12 to 23 per 100 workers) as a result working population double (from that nations in the developed world will sacrifice will make it less likely Such demographic trends care. Regions such as the Middle East appear. threats unless extraordinary their youth in military adventures, over 50% of the population, will possess fewer the youth bulge will reach and Sub-Saharan Africa, where inhibitions about engaging in conflict. ethnic Chinese the world, humanity is on the move, with Muslims and Africans moving to Europe, Around moving into Siberia, Mexicans and other Latin Americans moving north to the United States and Canada, backbones of the the labor and small commercial and citizens of the Philippines and India providing the migrations occurring in war torn in Africa in areas economies of the Gulf States. Equally important are and Rwanda. Such migrations disrupt patterns politics, of culture, like the Sudan, Somalia, Darfur, areas and economics and in most cases carry with them the potential of further dislocations and troubles. leaving the doctors, and engineers are moving to cities. Skilled workers, people are Everywhere, these global undeveloped world as fast as they can to make a living in the developed world. Increasingly, the Internet Often, the money they diasporas connect through and telephone to their home countries. send back to their families forms major portions of the local economies back in their home communities. p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 16 developed world. In particular, thismeansengagingChinaandothernationspoliticallyculturallyastheyenterintothe civil societies.Amore peaceful,cooperativeworldispossibleonlyifthepaceofglobalizationcontinues. appearance. Oneshouldnotconfusedevelopedworldtrappingsforunderlyingstabilityandmaturityof should notignore thehistoriesandpassionsofpopularopinioninthesestatesastheymaketheir of globalization.Thesamecanbesaidforthosemovingintothedevelopedworld.Nevertheless,one For themostpart,developedworldrecognizes thatithasamajorstakeinthecontinuingprogress globalization his warsagainstownpeople killedupwards of100 thousand. against Iran resulted in approximately 250 thousand Iraqi deaths and half a million Iranian deaths, while the spaceoflessthantenyears andsparkedthree wars duringtheperiodheruled.Thefirstofhiswars must haveseemedperfectly rationalreasons, Saddam HusseininvadedtwoofIraq’s sixneighborsin often amatterofperspective –inthecultural,political,andideologicaleyeofbeholder. Forwhat in livesandtreasure that no“rational”politicalleaderwouldpursueit.Theproblem isthatrationality that waris,ifnotimpossible,thenatleastobsolete.Accordingly, anyfuture warwouldcostsomuch Today’s interlockingtradingand communicationsnetworksmaytemptleaderstoconsideronceagain and itspassions. right abouttheabsolutelydestructiveeffectswar. ofmodern Hehadbeenwrong abouthumannature political andeconomictermswastosmashglobalization forthenextseventyyears.Angellhadbeen to evengreater acclaim.Within ayeartheFirstWorld War hadbroken out.Theresult ofthatconflictin interlocking networksofglobaltrademadewarimpossible. In1913,hepublishedanimproved edition of creating material wealth, while putting much at risk. His arguments boiled down to a belief that the security represented adangerous illusion.Asforwaritself,itrepresented afutileendeavorincapable depend oncontrol ofterritory orresources. ForAngell,thebeliefthatmilitary strength wasthebasisfor argued theexpansionofglobalcommerce hadchangedthenature ofwealth,whichnolongerwould Angell, publishedaworktitledTheGreatbestseller. Illusion,whichbecameaninternational Init,he nation. Anypeacewasbetterthanthemostsuccessfulwar.” Norman In1911aBritishjournalist, Bright, aBritishindustrialist,argued that“nothingcouldbesofoolishasapolicyofwarfortrading For muchofhumanity, thiswasatimeofhopeandoptimism.Asearlyasthemid-19thcentury, John the seconddecade. organizationsorder Activistsformed119international inthefirstdecadeand112 togovernments. changes together. Again,aswithtoday, manywere notcontenttoleave the direction ofthenewworld Telegraph PostalUnionandtheInternational such astheInternational Conventions,weldedthese the aircraft in1903suggestedevengreater agreements, possibilities. Acomplexwebofinternational combustionenginewasalready internal havinganimpactontravelbyland,whiletheappearanceof communications. Railroads allowed travelers to cross continents in days rather than months. The days ratherthanweeksormonths.Telegraph cableslinkedthecontinentsfornearinstantaneous spawned revolutions intravelandcommunications.Travel across theAtlanticwasnowamatterof The worldalsosawtechnologicalandscientific revolutions unequaledinhistory, whichinturn immigrating totheUnitedStates. and apeacefuloneatthat–inhistorywastakingplace,as25millionEuropeans lefthome,most that countryopeneditsmarketsforthefirsttimeincenturies.Furthermore, thelargest migration– at unheard ofrates.Western merchants were queuinguptosupplyChina’s teemingmasses,as the Twentieth Century. TheeconomiesoftheUnitedStatesandGermanReichwere expanding of worldGDPhadreached aleveltheglobaleconomywouldnotreplicate untilthelastdecadeof a situationalteredtradeaspercentage onlyinthelate1990s.By1913valueofinternational time, Europeans didnotrequire passportstotravelfrom onecountrytoanotheronthecontinent, At leastthatwashowpoliticiansandpunditsdefineditatthestartofTwentieth Century. Atthat trade, limitedrestrictions onthemovementofpeoples,andlightregulation ontheflowofcapital. How canonebestdefineglobalization?Somemightdelineateitintermsofincreased international Lessons From theHistoryOfGlobalization p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 17 Pakistan - $6.1 billion Pakistan Indonesia - $6.0 billion - $5.9 billion Egypt - $5.7 billion Morocco - $5.5 billion Lebanon Remittance Inflows Remittance India - $27 billion - $25.7 billion China $25 billion Mexico- - $17 billion Philippines Bangladesh - $6.4 billion Remittance Outflows Remittance - $42.2 billion U.S. - $3.4 billion Japan - $25.4 billion Europe Gulf - $20.1 billion global remittance flows he inequality of rich and poor. In some worst- of rich and poor. side in the inequality portray its dark of globalization often The critics result as a direct the world violence throughout and the rise of resentment they portray case scenarios, bad as globalization both good and is likely to contain the future Not surprisingly, of globalization. its reach. of human interaction and extends accelerates the pace but often overlooked as a facet of globalization, by emigrant workers are Remittances sent home The total amount sent home by for developing nations. source the single biggest income represent aid and capital investments whole world spends on foreign exceeds the amount that the workers foreign billion, of which Bank at $318 estimated by the World were world-wide remittances combined. For 2007, formal sent through includes only remittances developing countries. This estimate $240 billion went to strategically important are Remittances greater. the actual amount is certainly much banking channels; of a source provide not the least of which is that they for a number of reasons, to developing countries times. for economies in turbulent in addition to a stabilizing force exchange foreign billion; China, $25.7 billion; and India, $27 in 2007 were: of emigrant remittances recipients The top three currency of hard source the second largest were remittances Mexico, $25 billion. In the case of Mexico, resilient in economic downturns generally and add a money are after the sale of oil. These flows of Furthermore, of poverty. that would otherwise be at or near thresholds of stability to families measure business for shop owners and other parts of providing in the local economy, spent are remittances downturn work opportunities for economic reduces as a prolonged the local middle classes. However, of the middle classes of income may also stunt the growth this key source of emigrants, the reduction for the development and support of democratization the driving force in developing countries, which are the world. states around central to the evolution of stable and orderly all of which are and the rule of law, SOURCE: Migration and Remittances Handbook, Migration Handbook, and Remittances SOURCE: Bank (2006) World Group, Prospects Development p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 18 the JointForce. organizations from different cultures mustbeinthetoolkitofcommanders, staffs, andpersonnelthroughout United Statesandregional powers.Again,theskillsofadiplomatinworkingwith otherpeopleandmilitary cases theassistingof,orinterventionin,failingstateswillrequire acooperativeengagementbetweenthe certainly provide supportinorganizing orconveningglobalcoalitionsforsometimetocome.Inmost prudent toplayacooperativeorsupportingrole inmilitaryoperationsaround theworldandwillalmost powers orregional organizations capableofleadership.Inanycase,theUnitedStateswilloftenfindit the regional troubles thatwillarise.Bythe2030s,everyregion oftheworldwilllikelycontainlocaleconomic In aglobalizedworldofgreat nations,theUnitedStatesmaynotalwayshavetotakeleadinhandling and militaryresources toestablishorsustainstability. of thesenationswillbeweakandfailingstatesrequire arrayofeconomic,diplomatic, aninternational will alsobeleftbehindbyglobalization,eitherthrough themisfortunesofgeography, culture, ordesign.Many 1930s withtheriseofNaziGermanyinEurope andJapan’s “co-prosperity sphere” inAsia.Admittedly, some individuals andnationstoscrambleforagreater share ofshrinkingwealthandresources, astheydid inthe portrayals ofthedevelopedworld,liesinareversal orhalttoglobalprosperity. Suchapossibilitywouldlead Thus, thereal dangerinaglobalizedworld,where eventhepoorest haveaccesstopictures andmedia rising expectations.Afailure ofglobalizationwouldequatetoafailure tomeetthoserisingexpectations. economic trends hasalmostinvariablyarisenwhere economicandpoliticalsystemshavefailedtomeet world’s population,particularlyforhundreds ofmillionsthepoorest. Seriousviolenceresulting from The processes propelling globalizationoverthenexttwodecadescouldimprove thelivesofmost where evenminorevents can causeacascadingseriesofunforeseen consequences. prepare toworkinanenvironment where theglobaleconomicpicture canchangesuddenly, and immediate future: “interconnectedness.” Untilanew structure emerges, strategistswillhaveto economy. There isonenewwatchword thatwillcontinuetodefinetheglobalenvironment forthe redefine therulesandinstitutionsthatunderpinfunctioning,order, andstabilityoftheglobal financial significant. Overthenextseveralyearsanewinternational orderwilllikelyarisethat Nevertheless, thelong-termstrategicconsequencesofcurrent financialcrises are likelytobe are likely. well as in every other human endeavor. Wide variations in either direction are not just feasible – they years later, they would have given a far darker picture. That is the nature of change in economics as most economistswouldhavegivenfarrosier prospects fortheAmericanandworldeconomies.Four Economic estimatesrest ontrend lineseasilydisputed bothinthepresent andthefuture. In1928 The Volatility ofTrends economics The country faces a fundamental disconnect between the services people expect the government to provide…and the tax revenues that people are willing to send to the government … The fundamental disconnect will have to be addressed in some way if the budget is to be placed on a sustainable course. -Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director of CBO, November 24, 200914

JOE 2008 reported that the emerging economic downturn and financial crises were likely to be significant events. From our vantage point in 2010 the scope and implications of the downturn are clarifying, though the perturbations both in mid and longer terms are yet unclear. Projected revenues from taxation in most plausible economic scenarios are far below that which is necessary to meet current and assumed commitments by the federal government. Furthermore, chronic trade and currency exchange imbalances in the global economic system (see graphic below) have exacerbated both U.S. current account deficits and overall government indebtedness such that the amount of U.S. government debt held by foreigners has grown from 1.3 trillion to 3.5 trillion dollars representing some 40% of total U.S. debt. Large exporting nations accept U.S. dollars for their goods and use them both to build foreign exchange reserves and to purchase U.S. treasuries (which then finance ongoing U.S. federal operations). The dollar’s “extraordinary privilege” as the primary unit of international trade allows the U.S. to borrow at relatively low rates of interest. However, the emerging scale of U.S. Government borrowing creates uncertainty about both our ability to repay the ever growing debt and the future value of the dollar. Moreover, “any sudden stop in lending…would drive the dollar down, push inflation and interest rates up, and perhaps bring on a hard landing for the United States...”15

$270 Billion 5 Billion c h i n a $25 llion e u r o p e 201 Bi $1.95 Trillion $61 Billion $ Foreign Exchange Reserves U.S. $530 Billion $2.165 Trillion Foreign Exchange Total Foreign Debt Reserves $415 Billion $798 Billion U.S. Treasuries U.S. Treasuries $811 Billion OPEC j a p a n Total Trade $330 Billion $45 Billion Foreign Exchange $1.01 Trillion Deficit Reserves Foreign Exchange $46 Billion $100 Reserves Billion $195 Billion n U.S. Treasuries $86 Billio $751 Billion U.S. Treasuries

U.S. Exports U.S. Imports

Global Trade and Finance Imbalances

SOURCES: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2008) U.S. Census Bureau(2009) Economist Intelligence Unit

14Elmendorf, Douglas W. “CBO American Association for Budget and Program Analysis: The Economic and Budget Outlook.” November 24, 2009. http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10748/11-24-09AABPA-Presenation.pdf 15C. Fred Bergsten, “The Dollar and Deficits” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2009) p. 21. 19 p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 20

p e r c e n t a g e o f GDP 10 20 30 40 50 financial fate. China demandhigherinterest rates,increasing the perception thattheU.S.nolongercontrols itsown The precise nature ofa“hard landing”ofthissortisdifficulttopredict shouldcreditor nationssuchas 16 since theendofSecondWorld War. spendingandavailablerevenuescale ofthisshortfallbetweengovernment –ashortfallunprecedented reliesupon whichthefederalgovernment forincreased taxrevenue. Thegraphaboveillustratesthe to thedebtovernextdecade,outstrippingeven mostoptimisticpredictions foreconomic growth andeventhemostoptimisticeconomicprojectionsgovernment suggestthattheU.S.willadd$9trillion year, thecumulativedeficitwasalready higherthananyprevious totalyearlydeficitrun bythefederal trillion oronetenthofU.S.economicproduction inthatyear. Forthefirsttwomonthsof2010fiscal budget deficitsandcompoundingdebt.Thefederaldeficit forthe2009fiscalyearwasabout$1.42 Domestically, thefuture oftheU.S.financial picture inboththeshortandlongtermisoneofchronic shifting powerrelationships around theworldinways unfavorabletoglobalstability. States toallocateresources fordefensepurposes, lesspurchasing powerforavailabledollars,and likewise haveimportantimplicationsforglobalsecurityalso,includingadecreased abilityoftheUnited economic actorssearchtothedollar. foralternatives Changingconditionsintheglobaleconomycould budget outlookofsome ninetrilliondollars.Paul Krugman,“AFiscalTrain Wreck” NewYork Times(11March 2003). of Management and Budget (May andBudget of Management 2009)andPeterson-Pew Commission Reform, onBudget InkRising”“Red 2009) (December SOURCE: ofReceipts,“Summary Outlays,percentages as ofDeficits andSurpluses ofGDP, oftheUnited “Budget States Government, Fiscal Year 2010, Historical Tables, Office federal spendingandrevenue 0

Dr. Krugman notedtheseimplicationsin2003when the10yeardeficitwasonly three trilliondollars, ratherthantoday’s significantlylarger 10year 1940 Spending (actual)

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17 As the graph above illustrates, interest payments are projected to grow dramatically, further dramatically, to grow projected payments are As the graph above illustrates, interest 18 spending the squeeze on discretionary Social Security Advisory Board Issue Social Security Advisory Board “The Impact of Immigration on Social Security and the National Economy,” Joel Feinleib and David Warner, p. 21. Bergsten, Brief #1 (December 2005). Rising debt and deficit financing of government operations will require ever-larger portions of government ever-larger Rising debt and deficit financing of government require operations will continue, the U.S. will be trends payments to service the debt. Indeed, if current outlays for interest simply to service its foreign output abroad of its total economic seven percent transferring approximately debt. 17 18 Although these fiscal imbalances have been severely aggravated by the recent financial crisis and recent financial aggravated by the been severely Although these fiscal imbalances have has long term components which indicate attendant global economic downturn, picture the financial financial will not be enough to right the high levels of economic growth that even a return to relatively of financial markets and slow or negative economic activity has seen U.S. The near collapse picture. to cushion banks and financial institutions, and to support troubled Government in order outlays grow a reflection of the slowdown. These unfunded liabilities are worst effects the the wider population from social program the number of those receiving increasing of an aging U.S. Baby-Boom population and Medicaid, versus the underlying working population Medicare, benefits, primarily Social Security, that pays to support these programs. exacerbated by recent efforts to stabilize and stimulate the economy, far outstripping the current tax base far outstripping the current the economy, to stabilize and stimulate efforts exacerbated by recent of Social Security and health payments, when combined with the growth shown by the black line. Interest out spending for everything else the government will crowd does, including National Defense. care, p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 22 21 20 19 November 18,2009. http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10730/DoDBudgetTestimony.1.1.shtml lower thanthe1990saverageof3.8%. the defensebudgetwilllikelyconsumebetween2.6percent and3.1percent ofGDP–significantly to rearm againstaresurgent Germany. years 1919-1939, inhibiting its ability budgetduringthe interwar Government revolution. Interest ate up 44% of the British social stresses resulted initsoverthrow by extravagances thatby1788thecontributing beset by debt due to its many wars and collapsed. BourbonFrancebecameso by high inflation until its overseas empire 14 times in 150 years and was staggered Habsburg Spain defaulted on its debt some that bodeillforfuture force planners. government debt have historic precedents The foregoing issues of trade imbalance and adequate performanceagainstabroad arrayofchallenges. the jointcommunitymustintroduce multi-purpose,multi-role, andflexiblesystemsthatcanprovide are tomaintainashockabsorber inourforces tofightdifferent formsofwaracross arangeofconflicts, for “one-size-fits-all”solutionsmay result inagreater riskof reduced flexibility duringoperations.Ifwe about thetrade-off between performanceandpriceinourcapabilities,whilerecognizing thatapush effectiveness across allfuture securityenvironments. We mustbeprepared tomakehard decisions to reduce both cost and our vulnerability to deliberate disruption, while maintaining our quest for greater part. TheDepartmentmustalwayssearch formore efficientwaysofattendingtotheNation’s defense, economic outlook is one of increasing pressure on discretionary spending of which the DOD budget is a This report describesafuture inwhichtheJointForce willbecontinuallyengaged,yetthelarger force posture andprocurement budgetsshrink. defense istobecutbyathird ormore, JointForce plannersmustcarefully explore newareas ofriskas costs deserveclosescrutinyforefficiencies.Moreover, iftheU.S.entersafinancial regimeinwhich for current operationsandthemaintenanceofsystemscapabilitiesalready intheinventory. These grow fasterthanothercomponents,crowding out investments infuture capabilitiesaswellresources construction, andfamilyhousing.MuchliketheoverallU.S.budget,personnelcostscouldcontinueto budget: operationsandmaintenance,personnel,procurement, research anddevelopment,military percent ofthetotalFederalbudget.Thegraphatrightillustratesmaincomponents ofthedefense by 2008haddroppedspending. to20%oftotalgovernment expenditures,on defense.In1962defensespendingaccountedforsome49%oftotalgovernment but A more immediateimplicationofthesetwindeficitswilllikelymeanfarfewerdollars availabletospend on themoneyborrowed tofinanceourdeficitspending. challenges, anticipatinganever-growing percentagebudgetgoingtopayinterest oftheU.S.government Goldberg, MatthewS.“CBOtestimony:Long-Term ImplicationoftheFiscalYear 2010Budget Submission.” http://www.gpoaccess.gov/USbudget/fy10/hist.html From NiallFerguson, “AnEmpire atRisk,”Newsweek(28November2009). 19 21 Unlesscurrent trends are reversed, theU.S.willfacesimilar Indeed,theDepartmentofDefensemayshrinktolessthanten commons fortradeandcommerce. the major exporters to access and use the global around theworldprovide safetyandsecurityfor a cost of 600 billion dollars a year, U.S. Joint Forces trade andtravelthatweknowas“globalization.”At underpins the open and accessible global system of States provides totheworld–armedforce that 19 overlooks one large “export” that the United The global trade and finance illustration on page U.S. DefenseSpending:The“HiddenExport” 20 Followingcurrent trend lines,by2028 p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y

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50.0% 45.0% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% Defense Spending as a % of Total Federal Outlays Federal Total of % a as Spending Defense of the total federal budget Defense as a percent http://gpoaccess.gov/USbudget/fy10/hist.html SOURCE: 1962 to budget categories from major of DOD’s relationships The graph above shows the scale and these costs budgets we should consider ways to decrease to find efficiencies in future If we are present. enterprises have Over the last two decades competitive commercial while maintaining effectiveness. use of information technologies the smart mid-level leaders through and decreased organizations resized should further adapt its The Joint Force and authorities ever downward. and by pushing responsibilities Age Industrial their from staffs military reengineering appropriate, where ways similar in organizations own Personnel and training costs agile, adaptable, and perhaps smaller structures. origins, innovating more allow or even encourage a major portion of the defense budget, yet we too frequently (part of O&M) are personnel to leave the military at the height of their experience, losing highly trained and expensively skills of retain these vital, hard-won significant opportunities to are There skills in the process. acquired the current timeline. Furthermore, expected 20 year retirement our military personnel beyond the current might be forces Reserve, and Guard Regular, between the structure balance of capabilities and force involving surprise and uncertainty described national security challenges in light of future reexamined the JOE. The joint community must bring critical judgment to bear on the question of future throughout structures. rationalization and downsizing to match our smaller 21st Century force basing, recommending to processes and acquisition should seek change in weapons procurement the Joint Force Finally, the budget achieves maximum military power for each dollar spent. Further, that our procurement ensure imposition of cost-imposing strategies against potential foes and expanding strategic and operational realities. called for in our adaptation to the emerging partnerships are p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 24 population possessesonly40million. the UnitedStatespossessesapproximately 250millioncars,whileChinawithits immenselylarger their owndifficultiesandvulnerabilities.Noneoftheseprovide much reason foroptimism.Atpresent, That production bottleneckapart,thepotentialsources offuture energy suppliesnearlyallpresent and othersdisplayinaddressing thedangerous vulnerabilities thegrowing energy crisispresents. expected demand.Thekeydeterminanthere wouldbethedegree ofcommitmenttheUnitedStates effort beguntodaytorepair thatshortage,itwould betenyearsbefore production couldcatchupwith but ratherashortageofdrillingplatforms,engineersandrefining capacity. Evenwere aconcerted upwards of60%.Thecentralproblem forthecoming decadewillnotbealackofpetroleum reserves, nations. Fossilfuelswillstillmakeup80%oftheenergy mixinthe2030s,withoilandgascomprising for EconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)countries,itwillmore thandoubleindeveloping from 86to118millionbarrels aday(MBD).Although theuseofcoalmaydeclineinOrganization energy), oilandcoalwillcontinuetodrivetheenergy train.Bythe2030s,oilrequirements couldgo insertions ofcapital,dramaticchangesintechnology, andaltered politicalattitudestoward nuclear Absent amajorincrease intherelative reliance energy onalternative sources (whichwouldrequire vast seven years. world wouldneedtoaddroughly theequivalentofSaudiArabia’s current energy production every greater thantoday. To meetthatdemand,evenassuming more effective conservationmeasures, the production wouldneedtoriseby1.3%peryear. Bythe2030s,demandisestimatedtobenearly50% To meeteventheconservativegrowth ratespositedintheeconomicssection,globalenergy energy on termsfavorabletoournation. military power. Unlessweaddress thesenewfiscal realities wewillbeunabletoengageinthiscontest ago. Moreover, theywillincreasingly havethepowertounderwritetheirownnot-so-hiddenexportof and conventionsthatwehaveencouragedsinceourownemergence asagreat poweracentury security exportersmayrise,eachhavingopinionsandobjectivesthatdiffer from theglobalnorms diminish thisservicewhichisofgreatcommunity. benefittotheinternational Inthisworld,new dramatically impactthedefensebudgetinfaceofrisingdebtandtradeimbalances.Thismay of globalsecurityforthegreat tradingnationsoftheworld,yetglobalanddomesticpressures will constraints thatare unfolding.ForoversixdecadestheU.S.hasunderwritten“hiddenexport” the federalbudgetandhowwecancontributetocontinuedsecuritywhileoperatingwithinfiscal The fundamentalissuesfortheJointForce are thelongtermsustainabilityofourcurrent allocationof demand of118millionbarrels perday. sands) andnewdiscoveries,petroleum production willbehard pressed tomeettheexpectedfuture enhanced recovery means, thedevelopmentofnon-conventionaloils(suchasoilshalesortar out to2030.Assumingthemostoptimisticscenario for improved petroleum production through As thefigure atrightshows, petroleum mustcontinuetosatisfymostofthedemandforenergy Peak Oil 700

Biomass & Other 600 Hydro Nuclear 2010 500 Gas Coal 400 Oil

300 Terajoules 200

100

0 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

projected energy resources

SOURCE: OECD/IEA World Energy Outlook

125

Development of new discoveries Non-conventional oil 100 Enhanced oil recoveries Development of existing reserves Existing capacities 75 t r a p 50

i i Million Barrels Per Day Million Per Barrels : s d n e r t 25

g n i c n e u l f n i

0 1971 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

y t i r u c e s future world oil production

SOURCE: International Energy Agency - World Energy Outlook, p. 103

25 p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 26 even more critical. Coalitionoperations wouldbecomeessentialto protecting nationalinterests. America’s militaryforces. ThepoolingofU.S.resources andcapabilities with allieswouldthenbecome enemies oftheUnitedStates, butalsothewillingnesstorecognize andacknowledgethelimitationsof dangerous missions.Shouldthathappen,adaptability wouldrequire more thanpreparations tofight the could thenfindtheircapabilities diminishedatthemomenttheymayhavetoundertakeincreasingly deep cutsindefensespending (ashappenedduringtheGreat Depression). Joint Force commanders Another potentialeffect ofanenergy crunchcouldbeaprolonged U.S.recession whichcouldleadto up withdemandandshouldstatesseetheneedtomilitarily secure dwindlingenergy resources. protect scarce resources. Theimplicationsfor future conflictare ominous,ifenergy suppliescannotkeep for protecting itsoilsupplies andcouldportendafuture inwhichotherstatesinterveneAfricato for oil.Thepresence ofChinese “civilians”intheSudantoguard oilpipelinesunderlinesChina’s concern suggestive ofhowmanymore vehiclestheyexpecttopossess,withtheconcomitantriseintheirdemand The Chineseare layingdown approximately 1,000kilometersoffour-lane highwayeveryyear, afigure exhausting theirfieldstocashinonthebonanzacreated byrapidlyrisingoilprices. technologies andrecovery methodstoachievesuchgrowth. Some,likeVenezuela andRussia,are actually 50 MBD. Significantly, no OPEC nation, except perhaps Saudi Arabia, is investingOPEC: To sufficient meetclimbingglobalrequirements, OPECwillhavetoincrease itsoutputfrom 30MBDtoatleast sums in new development ofnewnuclearplants,theirconstructioninsubstantialnumberswilltakedecades. of nuclear waste remains politically controversial. Although the U.S. seems to be committing to the the expansionofnuclearplantsfacesconsiderableoppositionbecausepublicfears,whiledisposal and agreater supplyofcheapelectricitycouldencourageelectric–powered transportation.Nevertheless, advances insafetysincethe1970s.Inparticular, itcouldplayamajorrole inreplacing coal-fired plants, Nuclear: Nuclearenergy offers oneofthemore promising technologicalpossibilities,givensignificant investments. That figure assumestheenergy from suchsources willmore than triple,whichalonewould require major Renewable: WindandSolarcombinedare unlikelytoaccountformore than1%ofglobalenergy by2030. which wouldaddanotherNationalSecuritychallengetoanalready fullmenu. even thatmodestachievementcouldcurtailthesupplyoffoodstuffs totheworld’s growing population, biofuels are unlikelytocontributemore than1%of globalenergy requirements bythe2030s.Moreover, Biofuels: Production couldincrease toapproximately 3MBD–equivalent,butstartingfrom asmallbase, the interests ofitsrichcustomersfrom itscloseneighbors. Central Europe and provide gas more directly to Western Europe – allowing it greater freedom to decouple gas flows across its own pipeline network. Furthermore, Russia will diversify its own network to bypass pipelines toaccessCentralAsiangasreserves. Russia,meanwhilewillseektoensure thatCentralAsian a reliable supplierwillencourageEurope todiversifysources ofsupplyandsupporttheconstruction Natural Gas:Europe relies onRussiaforonethird ofitsnaturalgasimports.UncertaintyaboutRussiaas for agriculture andotherhumanpurposes. already scarce water resources needed to extract energy from these formations will further limit supplies 1MBD toover4MBD,butlegalconstraintsmaydiscourageinvestment.Additionally, thediversionof recoverable naturalgasresources intheU.S.Production ofliquidfuelsfrom oilsandscouldincrease from Oil SandsandShale:Recently, shalegashasbeentheprimarysource ofgrowth intechnically- areas, theywilladdlittleadditionalcapacity. mature fieldsoverthecourseofnextquartercentury. However, withoutdrillingincurrently excluded Colombia, andnewportionsofAlaskatheContinentalshelf)couldoffset decliningproduction in Non-Organization ofPetroleum ExportingCountries(OPEC)oil:Newsources (CaspianSea,Brazil, Possible Future Energy Resources p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 27 OPEC and Energy Resources Energy OPEC and may have a vested These nations interest. of great-power a focal point will remain OPEC nations high. and to keep prices finite supplies both to conserve increases, production in inhibiting interest instability” running from of the “arc forcefully, nations choose to intervene Should one of the consumer North Africa through to Southeast Asia easily could become an “arc of chaos,” involving the military military the involving chaos,” of “arc an become could easily Asia Southeast to through Africa North several nations. of forces they While bring. exports oil that inflows cash the of much invest to difficult it find will nations OPEC investments – funds wealth sovereign through globally assets such of portions substantial invest will coupled with their – past track records, own political and strategic difficulties that come with their With the costlity of a military buildup. military weaknesses, suggest the possibi appraisal of their own commanders Force Joint increasing, availability their and decrease to expected weapons precision of opponents have even small, energy-rich where operating in environments could find themselves robotic, technological capabilities. These could include advanced cyber, with advanced military forces and even anti-space systems. Finally, presuming the forces propelling radical extremism at present do not dissipate, a portion of at present extremism radical propelling the forces presuming Finally, or into the hands of movements with coffers, windfall might well find its way into terrorist OPEC’s numbers increasing disposal their at have which movements – goals anti-Western anti-modern, deeply enemies. their perceived of unemployed young men eager to attack p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 28 economic prosperity fortheir nationsbyruthlessconquest. One shouldnotforget thattheGreat Depression spawnedanumberof totalitarian regimes thatsought production from tarsandsandshalewouldmitigatesuchaperiodofadjustmentisdifficulttopredict. conservation measures,energy investments inalternative production, andefforts toexpandpetroleum both ChinaandIndia.Atbest,itwouldleadtoperiodsof harsheconomicadjustment.To whatextent failing statesfurtherdownthepathtoward collapse,andperhapshaveseriouseconomicimpacton worlds. Suchaneconomicslowdownwouldexacerbateotherunresolved tensions, pushfragileand might produce, itsurely wouldreduce theprospects forgrowth inboththedevelopinganddeveloped While itisdifficulttopredict precisely whateconomic, political,andstrategiceffects suchashortfall A severe energy crunchisinevitablewithoutamassiveexpansionofproduction andrefining capacity. SOURCE: U.S. ofEnergy/Energy Information Department Administration world oilchokepoints = OilFlow Barrels Per of2Million Day (MBD) 0.5 Panama Canal MBD 4.5 Sumed PiplineSumed Suez Canal MBD Straits Turkish 2.4 MBD 3.3 Ceylan Pipeline Baku-Tbilisi- 1 Bab-el-Mandeb MBD MBD 17 Hormuz Strait of 15 Malacca Strait of MBD MBD p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 29 Energy Summary Energy 1.4 to find an additional us would require by the 2030s worldwide required energy generate the To then. MBD every year until energy meet to indispensable remain will gas natural and oil, coal, years, twenty-five next the During requirements. The discovery rate for new petroleum and gas fields over the past two decades (with the over the past two decades (with and gas fields new petroleum The discovery rate for requirements. major new will find efforts for optimism that future little reason of Brazil) provides possible exception fields. that production the result is only beginning to pick up, with investment in oil production At present, energy but MBD, 118 of production require will world the 2030, By plateau. prolonged a reach could investment and major changes in current are MBD unless there 100 may only be producing producers drilling capacity. and as early as 2015, the shortfall in disappear, capacity could entirely By 2012, surplus oil production MBD. nearly 10 output could reach energy if investment new significant see must infrastructure distribution and production Energy Efficient hybrid, and prosperity. with economic growth demand is to be satisfied at a cost compatible the of much and 2035 by sales vehicle light-duty dominate likely will vehicles flex-fuel and electric, in Renewed interest in biofuels production. increases may be met through in gasoline demand growth may blunt rising wind, or geothermal as solar power, such sources energy nuclear power and green capital costs in become actual investment. However, interest prices for fossil fuels should business alternative for demand global reflecting rising, also are sectors distribution and power-generation some energy sources and hindering their ability to compete effectively with relatively cheap fossil fuels. with relatively effectively and hindering their ability to compete sources energy going forward. source energy the predominant Fossil fuels will very likely remain FOOD that expands global population and prosperity a growing major factors drive food requirements: Two politically-inflicted, likely to reflect more are they While food shortages occur today, dietary preferences. could diminish the possibility of major food shortages. trends rather than natural causes. Several mitigating in demand for food, thus overall growth may reduce population growth Any slowdown in the world’s use animal protein On the other hand, increased to expand and intensify agriculture. easing pressure food on the world’s in countries with rapidly rising income levels will place considerable pressure At the same input for calories produced. much greater requires supply because animal production chance is a reasonable there time, opposition to genetically modified foods is dissipating. As a result, to sufficiently production and protein crop that would expand revolution” of sparking a new “green remain in countries on sufficient food supplies will The main pressures meet world requirements. and a lack of arable land, in most cases exacerbated by with persistently high population growth desertification and shortages in rainfall. 3500 Growing demand for grain in the developing world will require significantly more production - or higher prices to reduce demand in line with historical trends. 2025 3000 Based on a projected population of 8.2 billion 2500

2000 2010

1500 Million Tons Million

1000

500

0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2025

grain use and projected demand

SOURCE: USDA; www.ciesin.columbia.edu

In a world with adequate global supply, but localized food shortages, the real problems will stem from food distribution. How quickly the world reacts to temporary food shortages inflicted by natural disasters will also pose challenges. In such cases, the Joint Force may find itself involved in providing lift, logistics, and occasionally security to those charged with relief operations.

Natural disease also has an impact on the world’s food supply. The Irish Potato Famine was not an exceptional historical event. As recently as 1954, 40% of America’s wheat crop failed as a result of black-stem disease. There are reports of a new aggressive strain of this disease (Ug99) spreading across Africa and possibly reaching Pakistan. Blights threatening basic food crops such as potatoes and corn would have destabilizing effects on nations close to the subsistence level. Food crises have led in the past to famine, internal and external conflicts, the collapse of governing authority, migrations, and social disorder. In such cases, many people in the crisis zone may be well-armed and dangerous, making the task of the Joint Force in providing relief that much more difficult. In a society confronted with starvation, food becomes a weapon every bit as important as ammunition.

Access to fish stocks has been an important natural resource for the prosperity of nations with s e c u r i t y significant fishing fleets. Competition for access to these resources has often resulted in naval conflict. Conflicts have erupted as recently as the Cod War (1975) between Britain and Iceland and the Turbot War (1995) between Canada and Spain. In 1996, Japan and Korea engaged in a naval standoff over rocky outcroppings that would establish extended fishing rights in the Sea of Japan. These conflicts saw open hostilities between the naval forces of these states, and the use of warships and coastal influencing

protection vessels to ram and board vessels. Over-fishing and depletion of fisheries and competition over those that remain have the potential for causing serious confrontations in the future. t r e n d s : i i p a r t

30 p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 31 Little or no water scarcity Little or no water scarcity water Physical estimated Not scarcity water Economic scarcity water physical Approaching world water scarcity SOURCE: International Water Management Institute Water International SOURCE: water Physical access to water is limited, or sources of water overused and overmanaged, leading to serious serious to leading overmanaged, and overused water of sources or limited, is water to access Physical Scarcity: Physical Water downstream. scarcity water of water. A population does not have adequate financial or political means to obtain adequate sources Scarcity: Economic Water As we approach the 2030s, the world’s clean water supply will be increasingly at risk. Growing populations populations Growing risk. at increasingly be will supply water clean world’s the 2030s, the approach we As acute. water shortages more likely to make nations, are pollution, especially in developing and increasing or scarcity. will experience water stress population nearly 3 billion (40%) of the world’s Most estimates indicate likely tocosts that are have human and economic and contamination water scarcity Absent new technology, reduction. and poverty in economic growth significant progress making nations from developing prevent for 70% of for water worldwide, accounting demand of greatest the source will likely remain Agriculture usage will likely remain only 20%, while domestic comparison, industry will account for total water usage. In than developing nations in using efficient more unit harvest yield, developed nations are steady at 10%. Per agricultural average. Improved r less than the 70% for agricultural irrigation and use fa available water supplies used. water of unit per yields increase and irrigation under land of amount the increase further could techniques support the world’s than sufficient water to should be more there a global perspective, In short, from The Near the story is quite different. in some regions However, population during the next quarter century. than the global average of 70% of available water dedicated to irrigation. East and North Africa use far more of their water for irrigation. could use even more By the 2030s, at least 30 developing nations in many to groundwater farmers to turn supply of rainwater has forced more of an assured The unreliability The impact meters per year. declining at rates between one and three aquifer levels are As a result, areas. may drained, once aquifers, since especially profound, be could production agricultural on declines such of rivers countries. The great of water for many is also an important source runoff for centuries. Glacial not refill are and Burma, and Thailand, Nepal, China, Pakistan, India, through flow example, for Asia, Southeast of these of headwaters the at dams of Construction Range. Himalaya the in meltwaters glacial from largely fed population stresses, the risk of water-related increasing downstream, rivers may constrict the flow of water on them. who rely for perhaps a billion people migration and agricultural failures tension, cross-border p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 32 22 but oneexampleofpotential securitychallengesthatdidnotexistinthepast. capsule containingaRussian flag.Retreating icecreating accesstopreviously unavailablenatural resources is submersibles madeanunprecedented dive2.5miles to thearctic seafloor, where one shipdropped atitanium waters.Asanearlymoveinthisnewcompetition,2007 twoRussian straitsorinternal as international zones andbetweenArctic nationsandmaritimestates overthedesignationofimportantnewwaterways exploitation, and may raise tensions between Arctic nations over the demarcation of exclusive economic between Europe andNortheast Asia.Furthermore, shrinkingseaiceopensnewareas fornaturalresource shipping routes across archipelagicRussiathatcoulddramaticallyshortentransittimes CanadaandNorthern ice hasbeenshrinkingdramaticallyinArctic regions eachsummer, andinthefuture thiscouldopennew Climate change is included as one of the ten trends most likely to impact the Joint Force. For example, sea storms andnaturaldisasters:others,thatthere willbefewer. potential effects ofclimate changeare contradictory, withsomearguing thatthere willbemore andgreater Scientificconclusionsaboutthe other harmfulphenomenasuchasrisingsealevels,has becomeaconcern. The impactofclimatechange,specificallyglobalwarming anditspotentialtocausenaturaldisasters climate changeandnatural disasters infrastructure, leave-behindwater-purification technologycouldcontributetopositiveviewsoftheU.S. In additiontoreducing boththenumberofforces and thetimerequired torebuild orimprove water only modestpowergenerationcouldlikewiseincrease theeffectiveness ofhumanitarianrelief operations. deployable, lightweightandeasilymaintainablepurificationsystemthatrequires littleinfrastructure and for interstatefrictionorstatecollapsedirectly related towaterscarcity. Thedevelopmentofarapidly the UnitedStatesanditspartnerstopurifyscarce waterresources couldservetoreduce thepotential water, providing billionsofpeoplewithaccesstocleanwaterandimproved sanitation.Theabilityof provide manynationswithmore efficient,sustainable, andaffordable meansofpurifyinganddesalinating Technology couldmitigatetheeffects ofwaterpollution.Bytheyear2030,advancesintechnologymay unable toavoiddealingwiththeconsequencesofchronic waterpollution. precisely insuchareas thatnewanddeadlypathogens are mostlikelytoarise.Hence,commandersmaybe problems directly, anyoperationsinpollutedurbanareas willcarryconsiderableriskofdisease.Indeed,itis race, tosaynothingoftheaffected ecosystems.Whilejointforces rarely willhavetoaddress pollution of wasteintotheworld’s riversandoceansthreatens thehealthandwelfare oflarge portionsofthehuman from thehumansewageexpelledbymega-citiesandslumsofworld.The dumpingofvastamounts will bethoseassociatedwithwaterpollution,whetherfrom uncontrolled industrialization,asinChina,or The latterisonlyonepotentialmanifestationofalarger problem. Beyondtheproblems ofwaterscarcity while thespecterofdiseaseresulting from unsanitaryconditionswouldhoverinthebackground. services.Anarchygovernmental couldprevail, witharmedgroups controlling orwarringoverremaining water, in acatastrophic watercrisis,theymightwellconfront chaos,withcollapsingorimpotentsocialnetworksand underlying causeofconflictsamongvariousracial,tribal,orpoliticalgroups. Were theycalledontointervene future Joint Force commanders will find conflict over water endemic to their world, whether as the spark or the Whether theUnitedStateswouldfinditselfdrawnintosuchconflictsisuncertain,butwhatcertainthat that potentialcrisesinvolvingwaterscarcity are mostlikely. on awiderscalebetweennowandthe2030s.Indeed,itisprecisely alongotherpotentialconflictfaultlines destabilize wholeregions. ContinuingcrisisinSudan’s Darfurregion isanexampleofwhatcouldhappen already reduces waterdownstream. Eventhoughlocalized,conflictssparkedbywaterscarcity easily could similar problems forSyriaandIraq.Turkish Turkey diversionofwater to irrigatemountainvalleysineastern dams ontheupperEuphratesandTigrisRivers,source ofwaterfortheMesopotamianbasinpose Jordan riverwere acontributingcauseoftheSix-DayWar betweenIsraelanditsneighbors.Today Turkish One shouldnotminimizetheprospect ofwarsoverwater. In1967, Jordanian andSyrianefforts todamthe Kerry Emanuel,Ragoth Sundaraarajan,andJohnWilliams, “HurricanesandGlobalWarming,” BulletinAmericanMeteorological Society, March 2008,pp.347-367. 22 p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 33 Should global sea levels continue to rise at current rates, these areas will see more extensive see more will rates, these areas levels continue to rise at current Should global sea 23 Science Daily, quoting authors of IEEE report, Gordon McGranahan and Bridget Anderson. McGranahan Gordon quoting authors of IEEE report, Science Daily, flooding and increased saltwater intrusion into coastal aquifers upon which coastal populations rely, rely, populations coastal aquifers upon which coastal saltwater intrusion into flooding and increased local population pressures Additionally, water. of fresh shortages impact of increasing compounding the settle farther up-country. and inundated areas as people move away from will increase catastrophes natural other and earthquakes tornadoes, hurricanes, typhoons, tsunamis, regard, this In natural where particular, In commanders. Force Joint of concern a be to continue will and been have be the final straw that human misery could urban sprawl, widespread growing disasters collide with itself occurs within the United States if such a catastrophe back of a weak state. Furthermore, the breaks U.S. military bases or key civilian economy is in a fragile state or where - particularly when the nation’s of the U.S. be considerable. Areas - the damage to U.S. security could affected broadly are infrastructure the hurricane- these natural disasters are from effects large-scale to suffer the potential is great where the along and coast west the on zones earthquake the and coasts, Atlantic and Gulf the of areas prone the victims of to relieve the past, the ability of U.S. military forces New Madrid fault. In the 2030s, as in of the United States in the world. For example, the contribution natural disasters will impact the reputation Pacific tsunami of December caused by the catastrophic the distress relieve to of U.S. and partner forces performed of America held by many Indonesians. Perhaps no other mission the perceptions 2004 reversed at so little cost. of the United States so much benefit to the interests provides by the Joint Force 23 pandemics is the appearance of a pathogen, either manmade or natural, One of the fears haunting policy makers of the in the middle Death” did in the Middle East and Europe able to devastate mankind, as the “Black population died. The second- of Europe’s a third approximately a year, Within barely Fourteenth Century. devastating. In effect, and economics were religion, of the pandemic on society, effects and third-order civilization. Medieval European undergirding the sureties the Black Death destroyed Even scale will devastate mankind over the next two decades. It is not likely that a pandemic on this the opportunities for a concentrated, increasing and more much larger though populations today are of the knowledge fact that mankind lives in a richer world with greater the new pathogen to spread, and medical treatment capability, the ability to enact quarantines, a rapid response world of microbes, of pathogens. The crucial element in any even the most dangerous suggest that authorities could control to a pandemic may be the political will to impose quarantine. response response to the 2009 H1N1 flu strain and the rapid termination of the 2003 The rapid identification and illustrate the seriousness with which medical (SARS) pandemic Acute Respiratory Syndrome Severe East Asia in February of an surfaced from authorities view these. In the case of SARS, after initial reports countries. than 8,000 cases in 30 different more disease, medical authorities reported atypical respiratory cases died. almost 10% of reported The disease itself was highly contagious and life-threatening: of local, national, and international once doctors identified the disease, the combined efforts However, and April rapidly in March reported cases increased authorities contained it within five months. Newly thereafter. and rapidly declined 2003, peaked in early May, or disruption of social disorder that the threat The H1N1 and SARS examples do not mean, however, 1918 of the capabilities is nonexistent. A repetition Joint Force requiring a viral source originating from influenza pandemic, which led to the deaths of millions world-wide, would have the most serious The dangers posed by consequences for the United States and the world politically as well as socially. but the serious enough, a disease capable of launching a global pandemic are of the natural emergence pathogen. a dangerous might acquire organization possibility exists also that a terrorist Some one-fifth of the world’s population of the world’s past 100 years. Some one-fifth on the rise for the levels have been Global sea in coastal zones less located are urban areas largest of the world’s area one-sixth of the land as well as than faster growing are areas in these coastal populations Furthermore, above sea level. than ten meters is twice that of the national this growth In places such as China and Bangladesh, national averages. average. p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 34 24 reported on thepresence ofpotential adversariesonourpower grids, viacyberspace. and respond tocontingencies.Thefirstmonthsof2009 highlightedthisemerging vulnerabilityasmedia and itsdisregard fornational borders challengeour legalsystemandcomplicateourabilitytodeterthreats greatly broaden thelist ofpotentialadversaries.Furthermore, theglobe-spanningrangeofcyberspace strategic challenges.Lowbarriers toentrycoupledwiththeanonymousnature ofactivitiesincyberspace Cyberspace represents anavenueofgreat national opportunity, butisalsoamajorsource ofcritical becoming toonetworkdependent. be capableoffunctioninginahostileinformationenvironment, soasnottocreate anAchilles’heelby degrade, anddisruptcommunicationstheflowof information. ItisalsoessentialthattheJointForce Many ofthosesameadvancesalsowillbeavailableto America’s opponents, whowillusethemtoattack, emerging instrument ofpoweritself. cyberspace amplifiesallinstrumentsofnationalpower. Infact,ourabilitytomaneuverincyberspaceisan business, purchase goods, entertainourselves,andrunourbasicutilities.Ourabilitytomaneuverfreely in the oceans,werely onnetworks piecedtogetherthrough theelectromagnetic spectrumtoconduct fundamentally ontheuseofcyberspace.Inmuchsame waythatwedependonourhighwaysand networked transportationandinventorysystems.Oursociety’s verywayoflifehascometodepend Cyberspace permeatesnearlyeveryaspectofsocietiesfrom personalcomputers andcellphonesto skills, immersivetrainingenvironments couldallowfuture jointforces topracticekeyoperationaltasks. Joint Force totrainandplanforthoseenvironments. Muchasflightsimulatorsallowpilotsto refine flight overwhelming adversary systems. The creation of virtual models of potential operational areas will allow the ranging cyberwarfare, eitherasindependentoperationsorinsupportofdeployed units,manipulatingor computation andplanningcapabilitieslocatedoutsidethetheater. Jointforces willconductglobally- forces tosupportingassetsathome.Deployedforces willbeableroutinely toaccessanalysis,research, Joint Force. Globalinformationnetworksenabledbywireless andbroadband technologieswilllinkdeployed The advancesincommunicationandinformationtechnologieswillsignificantlyimprove thecapabilitiesof appear nearlyasstrangetoustodaytheworldof2000wouldhaveanobserverfrom 1900. Century. The keywillbetheusetowhichthesetechnologiesare put.Inmanywaystheworldof2030could continues, greater changewilloccuroverthenexttwentyyearsthanoccurred inthewholeofTwentieth The paceoftechnologicalchangeisacceleratingexponentially. Ifthepaceoftechnologicaladvancement cyber them, becameindifferent toeveryruleofreligion oroflaw.” Athens: “Forthecatastrophe wassooverwhelmingthatmen,notknowingwhat would happennextto psychological dangersthataglobalpandemicwouldcauseinhisdescriptionoftheplague’s impacton personnel andfacilitiesfrom publicpanicanddislocations.Thucydidescaptured themoral,political,and they wouldalsohavetotakesevere measures topreserve thehealthoftheirforces andprotect medical enforcement andmaintainingorder. EvenasJointForce commandersconfronted anarrayofmissions, of civilauthoritiesthat,consistentwithmeetinglegalprerequisites, couldgobeyondassistinginlaw outbreak spreads totheUnitedStates,JointForce mighthavetoconductrelief operationsinsupport be profound. Americanandglobalmedicalcapabilitieswouldsoonfindthemselvesoverwhelmed.Ifthe The implicationsfortheJointForce ofapandemicaswidespread anddangerous asthatof1918would responsibility foritsappearance. complicate boththemedicalchallengeofbringingdiseaseundercontrol andthesecuritytaskoffixing different locationsinorder toincrease therateoftransmissionacross apopulation.Thiswouldseriously latter islikelytohaveasinglepointoforigin,terrorists couldseektorelease thepathogenatseveral or virulence,wouldpresent greater challengesthananaturallyoccurringdiseaselikeSARS.Whilethe The deliberaterelease ofadeadlypathogen,especiallyonegeneticallyengineered toincrease itslethality Thucydides, History ofthePeloponnesianWar, trans. byRexWarner (London:PenguinBooks,1954) p.155. 24 With the availability of so much open source material, cyber security will not just be compromised by adept hacking, but also through the systematic analysis of the activities of many millions of Internet users. The internet has evolved from the simple repository of information into a powerful social networking tool. Individuals are adding vast amounts of data, including lifelogs, blogs, and social networking information (Web 2.0) while computers are beginning to be able to understand, analyze, and interpret patterns within this mountain of data (Web 3.0). The open and free flow of information favored by the West will allow adversaries an unprecedented ability to gather intelligence. Other nations without the legal and cultural restraints found in the U.S. may excel at capturing, assessing, or even manipulating this information for military purposes as an aid to waging the “Battle of Narratives.”

The graphic below illustrates the growth of the number of calculations per second per unit cost over time. The pace of technological change in computing is accelerating at an exponential, rather than linear rate, transcending the specific method of computation. From punch cards to electromechanical relays, from vacuum tubes to transistors, from integrated circuits to future spintronics and quantum computers, the exponential growth of computing power continues. Because people tend to view change in a linear fashion, the implication of this trend means that we often overestimate what is achievable by technology in the short term, while dramatically underestimating and discounting the power and capabilities of computing power in the longer term.

1060

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1015 t r a p Calculations per Second $1,000 Calculations 10 10 i i : 105 s d n e r t

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1920 1940 1960 1980 2020 2040 2060 2080 1900 2000 2100 y t i r u c e s exponential growth of computing

Adapted from: Ray Kurzweil 35 p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 36 hidden; rather, theywillbeexposedtothescrutinyofbothadversaries andbystanders. the future JointForce commander willnotbeabletoassumethathisdeployments andoperationswillremain have, forexample,usedsuch imagerytoidentifyhundreds offacilitiesthroughout NorthKorea. Asaresult, imagery ofmuchtheglobeisalready available.Thishasempowered notonlystates,butalsocitizenswho interests similartoongoing efforts byJapan,China,India,Israel,andIran.Moreover, timelyhigh-resolution playing field. Other countries will be able to develop or acquireand satellitessatellite capabilities,for their own ascommercial well as the and development defense of anti-satelliteresearch oracquire thetechnologyandplaceitinorbit.Furthermore, theincreasing proliferation oflaunch capabilities have begun to level the increasingly available to any country or multinational corporationfor militarywith pockets and commercialdeep enough purposes.to fund the Hitherto the domain of superpowers,Over the past space several technology decades, has the become United States has enjoyed significantspace advantages in the use of space books. The iPod of 2020 • AniPodtodaycanholdsome160gigabytesofdata,or160,000books.The2020 • Thecomputingcapacityavailabletotheaverage homewillbeacomputerthatrunsat peoplewillhaveabout100,000timesmore bandwidththantoday. • Connectivitytothehome(ornodeinmilitarynetworks)grows by50%ayear. Therefore by2030, perceptions andtheAmericanpopulation. andwilloftheU.S.Government technology notonlytoplanandexecutesavageactsofterrorism, butalsotoinfluence directly the Indeed, adversarieshavealready takenadvantageofcomputernetworksandthe powerofinformation fractured thephysicalbarriersthatshieldanationfrom attacksonitscommerce andcommunication. In muchthesamewaythatairpowertransformedbattlefieldofWorld War II,cyberspacehas industry, aswellthemilitaryinair, academia,government, land,maritime,andspacedomains. unsophisticated amateurtohighlytrainedprofessional hackers.Through cyberspace,enemieswilltarget conflicts. Enemiesincyberspacewillincludebothstatesandnon-statesrangefrom the to harmournationalinterests. Cyberspacewillbecomeamainfront inbothirregular andtraditional With verylittleinvestment,andcloakedinaveilofanonymity, ouradversarieswillinevitablyattempt adapting tonewchallenges. Service cyberspaceforces hasbeenmade,cyberthreats willdemandanewmindsettoensure agilityin at machine,nothuman,speeds.Whileprogress toward defining requirements andadvocatingfor in intelligence,planning,andoperationsrequirements emphasizesanincreasing needtoactandreact There are no“protected zones”or“rear areas” becauseallare equallyvulnerable.Finally, future growth that everynetworkedcomputerisonthefront line.Everyonewhologsonisacyberdefenderfirst. As weseektoaddress thethreats from cyberspace,JointForce personnelmustalwaysunderstand managing information,securinginformationsystems,andensuringourabilitytooperatethrough attack. Addressing thecyberthreat isnosmallchallenge.Cyberthreats willdemandnewapproaches to of Congress could potentially hold some 16 terabytes of information – essentially the entire Library have required atransmissiontimeof3,900years. some 2bitspersecondacross continentaldistances,meaningthatsameLibrary ofCongress would in 128 seconds – just over two minutes’ time. The technical capacity of the telegraph in 1900, was computer wouldbecapableofdownloadingtheentirety oftoday’s LibraryofCongress (16terabytes), rate ofonemilliontimesfasterthanacomputertoday(2.5petabytesvs.2.5gigabytes).Atypicalhome p a r t i i : t r e n d s influencing s e c u r i t y 37 Event Hackers attack UK satellite Iraqi Freedom Iraq jams GPS signals during Operation to Iran jammed broadcasts of America Voice laser China attempts to blind US satellites with Libya jams mobile satellite communications a wide field of debris satellite, creating inactive weather China destroys in orbit Russian and American satellites collide Date 1999 March 2003 March July 2003 September 2006 Extended periods in 2006 January 2007 February 2009 space systems degradation of conclusion for likely to influence the security environment are that discussion outlined the major trends The previous or not, will combine to predictions whether they adhere trends, These individual the next quarter century. will contexts that will define the world in which the Joint Force robust and more in ways that form broader leaders have a way contexts, Joint Force resultant and By understanding the trends operate in the future. a This provides their implications and to identify some key indicators to watch along the way. to appreciate building and operating the towards and our progress means of assessing our assumptions and predictions, discussion of the contextual world of the 2030s. What follows then is a to meet the future. Joint Force This situation begs for increased protection capabilities that include rapid systems replenishment, that include rapid systems replenishment, capabilities protection This situation begs for increased and nonmaterial solutions to enable our and denial measures, active prevention redundancy, hardening, clear: the Joint Force The implications are contingency. to any space threat nation to detect and respond the space assets that allow the Joint and act to ensure commander must be poised to anticipate, protect, available during critical periods. the world are to operate around Force Moreover, challenges to free access to space are growing. The U.S. relies heavily on space-based assets to on space-based assets heavily The U.S. relies growing. space are access to to free challenges Moreover, networks. in highly distributed at global distance forces orient far-flung and operating environment observe the vulnerability. both advantage and This dependence creates the throughout waves shock sent weapon anti-satellite direct-ascent a commercial of a test 2009, in Then successful 2007 debris. space of China’s pieces of thousands of tens created and community international raising further collision with a defunct Russian satellite, in a satellite was destroyed telecommunications The environment. orbital congested and concerns and others highlight the need to of low-earth orbit systems. These events about the vulnerability contested a for increasingly an in target systems attractive space an our provide operate could and them on protect reliance heavy our plus assets space of vulnerability relative potential adversary. p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 38 PART III:THECONTEXTUALWORLD 25 investment inrepairing itscrumblinginfrastructure. trends, asingle-commodityeconomybasedonhydrocarbon extraction,anda lackofserious to becomericher, althoughRussia’s strength isfragile,resting asitdoesonunfavorabledemographic available tofuelthatgrowth andthefinancialcrisiscanbe resolved. RussiaandIndiaare bothlikely be thenormformuchofworldovercomingdecades, providing thatsufficientenergy remains collapse oftheSovietUnion,itisnotonlystory. Steady, ifnotrapid,economic growth appearsto While China’s riserepresents horizonsincethe themostsignificantsingleeventoninternational States asthesolesuperpowermaybecomingtoanend. course offuture events.Recognizing thatreality, present trends suggestthattheeraofUnited ideological preconceptions, andethnicreligious forces. Allwilltosome extentinfluencethe the growth ofstatesrange from warstotheeffectiveness ofpoliticalleaders, economicrealities, the UnitedStatesandmanystatesweakeningrelative totheUnitedStates.Thevariablesthataffect In thenext25years,relative balanceofpowerbetweenstateswillshift,some growing fasterthan power broker intothe2030s. pose difficultiestostatesintheirefforts topreserve theirstatus,butthestatewillendure asamajor required byitscitizens.Someaspectsofglobalization, andtherelated riseofnon-statepowers,will mechanism through whichpowerisorganized security andwhichprovidesexternal theinternal environment’sbut willmutateandadapttotheinternational changingconditionsasacentralized a workingstate.Thepowerofstateswillvarydramaticallyfrom culture toculture, region toregion the state’s structure hasbeendysfunctionalforperiodsoftime,isfurthertestimonytotheutility order ofhumanaffairs forcenturies.Thechaosinplaces suchasSomaliaandSierraLeone,where that theeraofstatesiscomingtoanend.Infact,states,inoneformoranother, havebeenthe actor.The statewillcontinuetobethemostpowerfulinternational Ithasbecomepopulartosuggest legitimate actors,behavingaccording torecognized rulesets. and monetarybankingconventions.Theseare groups thatare broadly recognized asbeing Law,Resolutions, NationalandInternational tradeagreements, international diplomaticalliances, include, butare notlimitedto,theGenevaConvention,LawofArmedConflict, UnitedNations state), financial,judiciary, businessandeconomic,academic,manymore. Conventionsmay according to,recognized normsandcodes–conventions. Suchinstitutionsmaybepolitical(the Operating Environment, a“conventionalpower”isanorganization by, thatisgoverned and behaves primary operationalcontextfortheJointForce forthenext25years.Forpurpose oftheJoint tools andmethods,cooperationcompetitionamongconventionalpowerswillcontinuetobea stabilitybyunconventionalpowersusingavarietyof Despite seriouschallengestointernational conventional powers cooperation andCompetitionamong illuminate whywarsoccurandhow mightbewaged. they Contexts ofconflictandwarare theenvironment created bytheconfluenceofmajor trends. Contexts Colin Gray, “Sovereignty ofContext”,Strategic StudiesInstitute,(2006) 25 -Colin Gray

p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 39

26 How America operates in this world of states and other conventional powers will be a major How America operates in this world 27 Transnational organizations try to ignore sovereignty. While national representatives and While national representatives sovereignty. try to ignore organizations Transnational of agents the councils, and conferences U.N. at debate endless in engage delegations the continents, spinning the webs that busily deployed across are transnational organizations link the world together. John Hamre, President, Center for Strategic and International Studies. (June 2007) President, John Hamre, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization. (London, 2004) p. 172. Realism to Globalization. Samuel Huntington, quoted in Joseph Nye (with Robert Keohane), Power in the Global Information Age: From factor in its ability to project its influence and soft power beyond the long shadow cast by its raw military its influence and soft power beyond the long shadow cast by its raw military factor in its ability to project However, political and economic strengths. first among equals because of its military, It will remain power. Thus, traditional alliances or coalitions of the willing. whether from in most endeavors it will need partners, world and to inspire to the its narrative of the unique vision we offer the United States will need to sharpen will Alliances, partnerships, and coalitions for common interests. like-minded partners to strive and sacrifice diplomacy and cultural commanders operate. This will require determine the framework in which Joint Force the example that Dwight Eisenhower and political understanding, as well as military competencies. Here, U.S. is particularly useful for future that invaded Europe displayed as overall commander of Allied Forces military leaders. In this environment, the U.S. must strive to use its tremendous powers of inspiration, not just its powers of powers of inspiration, not just must strive to use its tremendous the U.S. In this environment, intimidation. 26 27 potential future challenges China strategic question marks of the next twenty- one of the great represents The Sino-American relationship that characterizes the Sino-American confrontation of cooperation and of the mixture five years. Regardless of Joint the considerations and strategic perceptions important in China will become increasingly relationship, commanders. Force Indeed, the story around the globe is one of substantial potential rearmament. While the rise of Nigeria, the rise of Nigeria, While potential rearmament. one of substantial the globe is story around Indeed, the and East Asia, in South as what is happening may not be as dramatic and Egypt Brazil, Vietnam, Turkey, able to field unlikely to be nations are Although these remarkable. is, and will be, power their increasing events that will be used to influence in a position to build military forces they are forces, globally deployable respective areas. in U.S. considerations in their significantly and will feature in their regions the intent and national most in the past has been lie in national will. What has mattered The critical issue will United States possessed the and the Europe the 1930s, the democracies of Western goals of states. In even in light to rearm, but chose not rising Germany, to crush Hitler’s to build a force economic strength – an threat is whether some impending Europe confronting question The great of this very clear threat. or the internal of immigration, stress for resources, and expansionist hegemon, competition aggressive their security. to preserve armed force to raise a larger them – will inspire violent extremism powers with sophisticated capabilities could band of regional It is also conceivable that combinations of small, cash-rich to imagine an alliance alliance. It is not hard together to form a powerful anti-American could weapons. Such a group long-range precision countries arming themselves with high-performance to the global American access into their countries, but could also prevent access not only deny U.S. forces their borders. commons at significant ranges from behave will also organizations will be states. Many transnational Not all conventional organizations of these set of conventional rules. Samuel Huntington describes the activity to a recognized according in this way: groups p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 40 surprising, givenSunTzu’s famousaphorism: its strengths andweaknessesfarbetterthanAmericans understandtheChinese.Thisemphasisisnot represent amostserious threat totheUnitedStates, becausetheChinesecouldunderstandAmericaand growing understandingofAmericaanditsmilitary. Asapotential future militarycompetitor, Chinawould the PLAhadmore studentsinAmerica’s graduateschoolsthanthe U.S.military, givingtheChinesea The Chineseare interested inthestrategicandmilitarythinkingofUnitedStates. Intheyear2000, nation’s emerging globalinterests? Should it have a continental or maritime focus, or a mixture ofextends alsotoissuesonChina’s the strategicandoperationalchoices: Shoulditbeoffensive ordefensive? two? How can the PLA best protect the that China is not yet strong enough militarily and needs to becomeextensive stronger examination over the of long Western term. Butliterature the debate on history, strategy,renaissance inmilitarythinking, onethatdrawsnotonlyfrom theclassicsofChinesewritingsbutalsofrom an and war. The internal consensus seems to be to the military, allowing the PLA’s generals and admiralsThere toare build interesting a truly professional trends in the force. People’s This has Liberation led to a Army (PLA). The Party has ceded considerable autonomy from Western approaches, oneconsistentwiththeclassicalChinesestrategicthinkers. intelligence, submarines,cyber, andspace,oneseesanasymmetricaloperationalapproach thatisdifferent one whichtheyhaveassiduouslyfollowed.Indeed,ifexaminestheiremerging militarycapabilitiesin development attheexpenseofeconomicdevelopment.ThatispathDenglaidoutinlate1970sand From the case of the Soviets the Chinese have drawn the lesson that they must not pursue military constitute oneofthemostpopularshowsonChinesetelevision. Centuries. Thesecasestudies,writteninaseriesofbooks,were alsomadeintodocumentaryfilmsthat the Chinese:SovietUnion’s collapseandtheriseofGermanyinlateNineteenthearlyTwentieth to examineanddrawlessonsfrom theWest’s experience.Two historicalcasestudieshaveresonated with pick ideas from history or Western theoretical writings on strategyto learn fromand war, the external but world.rather Thisa contentious has been neitherdebate a blatantYet, aping of onethe ofWest the fascinating nor an effort aspects to cherryof China’s emergence over the past three decades has been its efforts prolonged periodofChina’s isolationduringMao’s rulefurtherisolatedChina. Communists, the devastating invasion and occupation of the 1930s isolation. ThecivilwarsbetweenthewarlordsandNationalists andthecentralgovernment and 1940s by the Japanese, and the world.MuchofitsTwentiethdevelopments intheexternal Centuryexperiencehadfurtherexacerbatedthat have alsoprovided anegativeside:toconsiderableextenttheyhaveisolatedChina from currents and Mesopotamian valleyswere emerging. ButthosecontinuitiesandtheculturalpowerofChina’s civilization 28 The titleofColinGray’s bookonthefuture ofwar intheTwenty-First Century. of Chinese civilization reach back to a time when the earliest civilizations in the Nile and the to a world where they are on a trajectory to become a great power. The continuities History provides somehintsaboutthechallengesChineseconfront inadapting growing strength willallowthemtodominateAsiaandtheWestern Pacific. ly their with theUnitedStatesdevelop,whilecalculatingthateventuallytheir they seem willing to see how their economic and political relations course. Rather than emphasize the future strictly in military terms, course. Ratherthanemphasizethefuture strictlyinmilitaryterms, the Chinese are thinking in the long term regarding their strategic Chinese canprovide. Whatdoesappearrelatively clearisthat hide its claws” may represent as forthright a statement as the Xiaoping’s advice for China to “disguise its ambition and to where theirstrategicpathtothefuture willlead.Deng cooperation. The Chinese themselves are uncertain as it willbe“anotherbloodycentury,” the character and nature of the 21st Century - whether the characterandnature ofthe21stCentury-whether The course that China takes will determine much about The coursethatChinatakeswilldeterminemuchabout 28 or one of peaceful p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 41 29 60% 4% Asia Asia Oceania 6% 7% Europe Africa 16% 7% Latin America Latin North America Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you be in peril. When you will never battles yourself; in a hundred enemy and know Know the equal. If losing are of winning or your chances but know yourself, enemy, ignorant of the are battle to be in peril. certain in every you are and of yourself, both of your enemy ignorant chinese overseas investment Quoted in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD, 1967), p.320. Quoted in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., SOURCE: Deutsche Bank SOURCE: 29 In the Second World War and the Cold War, victory by the Allies was achieved in part by the thorough in part by the thorough victory by the Allies was achieved and the Cold War, War In the Second World United States and its strengths. ignorant of the relatively opponents, who remained understanding of their with the United States is a military confrontation that if there to ensure working hard The Chinese are they will be ready. sometime in the future, is a sense that in certain areas, There U.S. military power. for exhibit a deep respect Chinese discussions on a near equal footing China can compete warfare, space, and cyber warfare, such as submarine goal in their force in particular seems to be a primary competing in these areas with America. Indeed, submarines to build nuclear required treasure does not devote the significant national development. One particular, global Navy in nuclear submarines and an increasingly for coastal defense. The emphasis on of oil, 80% imports energy possesses the ability to shut down China’s underlines worries that the U.S. Navy “the straits of it: straits of Malacca. As one Chinese naval strategist expressed the of which goes through – to life itself.” akin to breathing Malacca are is a window of that there subjects seem to be in agreement Chinese writers on military and strategic and during which China can focus on domestic economic growth opportunity that will last to the 2020s, China is investing significantly in power. it a truly great expanded trade with the world to make deeply skilled Chinese engineers, technicians, and scientists are human and physical capital. Indeed, its upon which the world and in building the infrastructure involved in scientific discovery around objective about their and global integration might be built. Above all, the Chinese are prosperity future for the future. and general prospects weaknesses as well as their strengths p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 42 years, is148thintheworldand placesthecountrysomewhere betweenEastTimorandHaiti. hide theconditionsofremainder ofthecountry. Thelifeexpectancy ofRussia’s malepopulation,59 current riches,thebrillianceofMoscow’s resurgence, and thetrappingsofmilitarypower, Russia cannot interest in such a course. Instead, it has placed its emphasis on Russia’s great power status. For all its to improve the welfare of its long suffering people. Nevertheless, the current leadership has displayed little andrepairoil andgas,Russiaisinapositiontomodernize itsancientanddilapidatedinfrastructure and investments inoilfieldsthatwouldincrease oilandgasproduction overthelongterm.Withitsrichesin At present, Russianleaders appeartohavechosenmaximizepetroleum revenues withoutmakingthe perspective thatbearswatching. Toof concern. aconsiderableextent,itsleaders haveemerged from theoldKGB,suggesting astrategic a significant role inthekind ofstatethatemerges. Thenature ofthecurrent Russian regime itselfisalso petroleum and natural gas. How the Russian government spends this revenue over the long term will play most Russianshavewelcomed–andontheinfluxofforeign exchangefrom Russia’s production of a considerable recovery based on Vladimir Putin’s reconstitution of rule by the security services – a move Chechnya foundered inaseaofincompetenceandfaultyassumptions.Since2000, Russiahasdisplayed a functioningeconomy. Moreover, thefirstattemptbyRussianmilitary tocrushthe rebellion in but theweakdemocraticsuccessorregime proved incapable ofcontrolling thecriminalgangsorcreating part ofthree centuries.Notonlydidthecollapsedestroy theeconomicstructure thattheSovietscreated, With thecollapseofSovietUnion,Russialostlandsandterritoriesithadcontrolled forthebetter the century.” new lowpoint,onethatthen-President VladimirPutindecriedas“thegreatest geopoliticalcatastrophe of years of “planned” economic and agricultural disasters. The 1990 implosion of the Soviet Union marked a man-made famines (6-7 million), purges (2-3 million), and World War II (27 million), accompanied by sixty collapse inthecatastrophes ofWorld War I(3-4millionmilitaryandciviliandead),civilwar(5-8million), resources andrapidgrowth through industrialization,Russiainsteadtread apathtodissipationand one of the world’s most heavily populated nations in 1914. Blessed with overwhelming stocks of natural Russia’s future remains asuncertainitspasthasbeentragic.Theworldwatcheddeclinefrom Russia sophisticated population. democratic idealstothemainlandandaweakeningofParty’s griponanincreasingly educatedand Taiwan isawildcard. Here thepicture isunclear. Areunification mightbringwithitthespread of considerable sophisticationintheleadership’s problems. understandingofitsinternal the central government in Beijing have been building. Yet withMoreover, China’s asrecent eventsinTibetandwiththeUyghurssuggest,tensionsbetweenminorities approach to strategy, there is have represented haveconfronted. thetwinpoliticalandstrategicchallengesthatChinesegovernments cannot easily dismiss. Over the course of its history, internala growing ethnicdiasporainplacessuchasSiberiaorIndonesiarepresent realities theChineseleadership stability and the threat of foreign invasions Urbanization, pollutiononamonumentalscale,watershortages,andthepossibleresponsibility toprotect demographic profile thatmakesinter-generational pensionprograms impossibletofinance. per mother, China faces a “4-2-1 problem” with four grandparentssurplus malepopulationnearing30millionby2020.Withabirthratebelowreplacement levelsof2.1children having two children and one grandchild, a policy, China may grow old before it grows rich. Furthermore,course. Thecountrywillfaceincreasing demographicpressures asitspopulationages.Dueto“onechild” a cultural preference for male heirs will create a prosperous one. China is confronting major internal problems confrontsthat could athave present an impact are on enormous, its strategic and an unsuccessful China What thenareis thepotentialcoursesthatChinamightfollow?ThechallengesChineseleadership perhaps more worrisome than a p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 43 Perhaps more than any other nation Russia has reason to fear the international environment, especially especially the international to fear environment, Russia has reason any other nation than Perhaps more in and question; in the Caucasus in serious problems: are its lands. There have washed over the invasions that considering seriously is nations oil-rich new the of stability the Asia where in Central with terrorists; pressures demographic However, them. between of eastern In 2001, on the borders Siberia. powerful, but increasingly silent, the Chinese remain the east where border the in mile 4,300 million the half a as demarcate many to as agreed (perhaps China leave and Russians Russia ethnic as tense increasingly are border this across Estimates of to the region. ethnic Chinese immigrate or 6% of the total population) and 2000-2010 time frame, 6% of the population) a low of about 480,000 (or less than Chinese in Siberia range from the number of ethnic transition to avoid ethnic manage this demographic carefully 1 million (or nearly 12%). Russia must than to more conflict with China. border erupt into a cross tensions that could is that Russia a common in have they but regions.the Black Sea, Caucasus, and Baltic across role active but less constructive more Russia is playing a character, own its has areas these of each in involvement Russian tension of its much-smaller neighbors. In each, Russia plays on ethnic and national inserting itself into the affairs to extend its influence in its “near abroad.” Russia has and South Ossetian provinces, and its Abkhazian Georgia especially In the Caucasus region, and Azerbaijan or to separatists. In other cases, such as the conflict between Armenia support direct provided support to keep these conflicts simmering. indirect of Moldova, Russia provides region in the Trans-Dnestrian They economic activity. need of investment and productive in dire These conflicts further impoverish areas lay astride new and vulnerable routes to access the oil of the Caspian Basin and beyond. They encourage corruption, organized crime, and disregard legal order and national sovereignty in a critical part of the world. In the future, they could exacerbate the establishment of frameworks for regional order and create a new “frontier of instability” around Russia.

Indeed, while many of its European neighbors have almost completely disarmed, Russia has begun a military buildup. Since 2001, the Russians have quadrupled their military budget with increases of over 20% per annum over the past several years. In 2007, the Russian parliament, with Putin’s enthusiastic support, approved even greater military appropriations through 2015. Russia cannot recreate the military machine of the old Soviet Union, but it may be attempting to make up for demographic and conventional military inferiority by modernizing. Russia’s failure to diversify its economy beyond oil and natural gas, together with its accelerating demographic collapse, will create a Russia of greatly decreased political, economic, and military power by the 2020s.

One of the potential Russias that could emerge in coming decades could be one that focuses on regaining its former provinces in the name of “freeing” the Russian minorities in those border states from the ill- treatment they are supposedly receiving. The United States and its NATO allies would then confront the challenge of summoning up sufficient resolve and deterrence to warn off such a Russia. w o r l d

Agreed Borders Equidistant Border Russian Claimed Territory Lomonosov Ridge c o n t e x t u a l

200-Mile Line t h e : i i i russian claimed territory in the arctic p a r t SOURCE: University of Durham, UN Marum

44 p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 45 The Pacific and Indian Oceans and Indian The Pacific potential. China nuclear of states with significant is home to a number Asian continent the great The rim of nuclear arsenals and have significant (NPT) Treaty members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation and Russia are devices, possess the capacity to detonate nuclear India and Pakistan have demonstrated at their command. are and Iran such as North Korea while others to the NPT, not party them, and are the means to deliver friends or Allies of to deliver them) as well. Several technology (and the means pursuing nuclear weapons technological states and could highly advanced are such as Japan and South Korea the United States, appears stable on the surface, political the region devices if they chose to do so. While quickly build nuclear roots, cultural, and religious these divisions, which have deep historical, few signs that are clefts exist. There will be mitigated. territorial disputes over Japan and Russia have simmering settled. China, are borders Not all of Asia’s the Siberia/Manchuria across pressures while demographic and natural resource maritime boundaries, of the of its far east. If one includes the breakup control for Moscow’s have significant implications border over brutal wars, while a simmering conflict have fought three British Raj in 1947-1948, India and Pakistan and the between the two powers. The Vietnamese relations the status of Kashmir continues to poison out into heavy fighting in the late 1970s, and China’s which broke of antipathy, Chinese have a long record islands as far afield as Malaysia are that scattered of the mainland and is a province claims that Taiwan flashpoints. a set of troublesome Chinese territory obviously represent disagreement and Pakistan over Kashmir may be the most dangerous The continuing dispute between India powers. The Chinese have backed up their claims to the Spratleys, that exists between two nuclear armed sea lane How contested claims in this important also claim, with force. and the Philippines which Vietnam of exploration, and as an area and energy have important implications for trade routes will resolved are II, remain War The Kurile Islands, occupied by the Soviets at the end of World naval competition. growing in dispute and Japan. The uninhabited islands south of Okinawa are a contentious issue between Russia Sea remains by the possibility of oil. Much of the Yellow to the area between Japan and China, both drawn Japan, and China, again because of its potential for oil. The straits of in dispute between the Koreas, of which for even a the closure the most important transit point for world commerce, Malacca represent would have a devastating impact on the global economy. short period of time relatively than India could more the region. a subtle, but sustained military buildup throughout is at present There swaths of its population will likely the next two decades, but large quadruple its wealth over the course of the rich and the poor. tensions between the 2030s. Like China, this will create in poverty through remain and nationalities, could continue to have implications its religions Such tension, added to the divides among substantial upgrades in Nevertheless, its military will receive and national security. for economic growth martial traditions and strategic location in the Indian the coming years. That fact, combined with its proud Ocean, will make India the dominant player in South Asia and the Middle East. Like India, China and Japan that modernization, also investing heavily in military force particularly with an emphasis in naval forces are the East and South Asian periphery. can challenge their neighbors for dominance in the seas surrounding has significant implications for how the United States The buildup of the navies by the powers in the region develops its strategy as well as for the deployments of its naval forces. p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 46 project militarypowerintolikelyareas ofconflict. East andSouthwestAsia.Europe isundergoing amajorculturaltransformation, makingitlesswillingto possibility, Europeans givendemographicshiftsbetween native-born andimmigrantsfrom theMiddle project themfarbeyondtheboundariesofcontinent, butthiscurrently seems arelatively unlikely standpoint, theNATO alliancewillhavethepotentialtofieldsubstantial, world-classmilitaryforces and economy asawholebythe2030swilllikelybegreater thanthatoftheUnitedStates.From asecurity For thenextquartercentury, Europe will exercise considerablecloutineconomicmatters.TheUnion’s The European Unionhas solidified Europe economicallytoadegree notseen sincetheRomanEmpire. Europe prominently infuture U.S.strategiccalculations.Asdemographictrends indicate,Indiaisoncourseto India hasaspecialplaceinthefutureenvironment. international Fewcountriesintheworldmayfigure as FOCUS: India importance of India, and the fading of old animosities borne ofthecoldwar,importance ofIndia,andthefadingoldanimositiesborne theU.S.-Indiarelationship astride keysealaneslinkingEastAsiatotheoilfieldsofMiddleEast.Perhapsreflecting thegrowing of nuclear proliferation, is a common target for radical ideological groups using terrorist tactics, and sits any otherintheregion. Itborders atroubled Pakistan,agrowing China,isinaneighborhoodathigh risk ethnically. IndiasitsontherimofanoceanpivotaltoU.S.interests, andpossessesanavylarger than andishighlydiverseculturally a domesticpoliticalsystembasedontheconsentofgoverned, be themostpopulousnationonEarthinnextdecadeandahalf.Furthermore, itshares withtheU.S. concrete platform for economic and technological cooperation between the U.S. and India. It also offers • The U.S. India Civil Nuclear Deal – Recognizes the importance of energy to India and provides a elements oftherelationship ofinterest totheJointForce commanderinclude: as theU.S.encouragesgrowth ofIndiaasaregional andevenglobalpower. Severalimportant has been developing very quickly over the past decade. The Joint Force will likely have a role to play India’s ongoing development challenge: bridging the gap between its vibrant middle class and its still decades. One of the more promising opportunities for deepening economic engagement concerns from 2004 to 2008, and this trade will likely grow – at least in relative terms – over the next several • Economicties–BilateraltradebetweentheU.S.andIndiahasdoubledfrom $21billionto$44 India’s nuclear program. a basisformovingbeyondoneofthemostseriousbarrierstoourpoliticalcooperation–status Expectations andConsequences.” 2009, openingspeechforBrookings InstitutionConference “TheU.S.-IndiaNuclearAgreement: Main pointsfrom “Remarks onIndia,byJamesB.Steinberg, DeputySecretary ofState,March 23, and well-beingofall,inapositivesumgame. player withglobalinterests hasthepotentialtoenhanceeffectiveness system oftheinternational • Inthe21stCentury, theemergence ofIndiaasastrong, stable, democratic,andoutwardly looking instability. United Statesoveranumberofregional andglobalchallengesmaybeasignificant counterbalanceto into one of the world’s leading economic and political powers, cooperation between India and the • Security–Today, theU.S.andIndiannaviesregularly exercise together. AsIndiacontinuestodevelop committed toworkingdirectly withIndiaasarobust partneronciviliannuclearenergy. have a number of opportunities for collaboration on energy generation and infrastructure. The U.S. is • Energy – In a country where 500 million people still lack access to electricity, the U.S. and India too persistenturbanandruralpoverty. under$2aday. Anestimated700millionIndiansstillearn p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 47 Central and South America rather than within states, Central America will likely arise from Military challenges in South America and will continue to challenge the continent, particularly drug cartels andbetween them. Many internal stresses lawless continent’s the of some in home a find to continue will organizations terrorist while gangs, criminal to power of criminal gangs fueled by drug money may be the primary impediment The regions. border in portions of Latin and perhaps even political stability and legitimacy social progress, economic growth, and corrupt the state, bending security and legal structures America. The cartels work to undermine criminal That the overall economic potential of the region. to their will, while distorting and damaging technologies to smuggle illicit drugs across capable of leveraging expensive and cartels are organizations Taking can bring to bear. that these groups the formidable resources serves to illustrate national borders groups these technologies, communications global and regimes finance and trade open of advantage security national the to threat real a present and control government from free spaces out carve to attempt Hemisphere. in the Western of our friends and allies interests and paramilitary death squads is notable. The assault drug cartels, success against the FARC, Colombia’s by the drug cartels on the Mexican governmentand its authority over the past several years has also of the United one how critical stability in Mexico is for the security reminds come into focus, and recently economy on Earth, significant natural Mexico has the 14th largest region. States and indeed the entire export market in the world access to the biggest industrial base, and nearly free a growing resources, immediately to its north. the shipment of drugs into the United States The U.S. and Mexico must continue to cooperate to cut off syndicates transfers, bank conventional to addition In Mexico. into cash bulk and weapons of flow the and for smuggling As traditional land routes import between $8 billion and $10 billion in bulk cash each year. a and price drug in increase an been has there US the of most in down, shut been have US the into drugs have routes maritime the now and adapted, has enemy the conflict, any in as but purity drug in decrease become critical to smugglers. For Mexico the end game is based on: • Mitigating the violence problem and order law to public security, problem a national security back from • Changing the problem • Raising the opportunity costs of doing drug business in Mexico holistic a so problem, regional greater a into expand will problem drug the successful, becomes Mexico As with the United Kingdom and Spain now the most shifting as well, is needed. The economics are approach spilling into Japan, Russia, and China. lucrative markets and the problem Perhaps this will change with the recognition of a perceived threat. The next 25 years will provide two 25 years will provide The next threat. of a perceived the recognition will change with Perhaps this Russia has been by global violent extremism. fueled continued terrorism Russia and good candidates: flashpoints remain likely will regions European Eastern and Baltic The document. this in already discussed which have led tolocation of national boundaries, issues such as ethnicity or the as a number of historical to construct a gas pipeline to Russian efforts continue to simmer under the surface. conflict in the past, suggests Eastern through Europe rather than a less costly land route under the Baltic Sea Europe Western and the Baltic countries from NATO European separate the Central and Western a deliberate aim to members of NATO. Eastern European for investing in military forces. might also spark a popular passion attacks in Europe Continued terrorist continent with increasing to attack the European persist in using this tactic Should violent extremists on a global scale this threat that includes addressing response might be a there and intensity, frequency rather than as an internal problem. security p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 48 areas ofinterest bythe developedworlddisturbedtheaffairs ofweakandpovertystrickenregions. of interference. Thispossibilityisreminiscent ofthelateNineteenthCentury, whenpursuit ofresources and will beveryhard-pressed toresist pressure bypowerfulstateandnon-stateactorswhoembarkon acourse construction ofthecapacity to address instabilitywithin theirownnations.RelativelyweakAfricanstates the JointForce mayhavearole insupportingsecuritysectorreform intheir toassistAfricangovernments as Africanstatesandsub-statetribalgroups struggleforpowerandcontrol amongthemselves.Also, main driverforJointForce involvementinAfricawillbetoaverthumanitarianandevengenocidaldisasters progress beyond elites, then true prosperity, stability and security may emerge. Until that happens, the development. If this engagement goes beyond aid to become true investment that supports economic region’s resources willensure thatthegreat powersmaintainavestedinterest intheregion’s stabilityand might followforeign expertise andinvestmentforaregion indire needofboth. Theimportanceofthe attention of several powerful states. This could represent a welcome development because in its wake The region isendowedwith agreat wealthofnaturalresources, afactwhichhasalready attractedthe drawn bythecolonialpowersinNineteenthCentury, bearlittle relation totribalandlinguisticrealities. of thepoorest nationson theglobe.Exacerbatingtheirdifficultieswillbefactthatnationalborders, progress intheregion mayoccur, butitisalmostcertainthatmanyofthesenationswillremain onanylist and mayregress asmultipleproblems tobuildthecapacityrespond. challengegovernment Some as Acquired ImmuneDeficiencySyndrome (AIDS). Evenpocketsofeconomicgrowth are underpressure interferencepowers,andhealthcrisessuch factors, oftenexacerbatedbybadgovernance, external Sub-Saharan Africapresents auniquesetofchallenges,includingeconomic,social, anddemographic Africa coalitions intheregion. global scalewiththelikesofIran,Russia,andChina,ineffect creating opportunitiestoformanti-American its oil wealth to subvert its neighbors for an extended period while pursuing anti-American activities on a have serious implications for the future. Unless Venezuela’s current regime changes direction, it could use wealth tohissupporters.Bytryingdoboth,itisshortchanginginvestmentsinitsoilinfrastructure which “Bolivarian Revolution,”whileatthesametimeconsolidatinghisregime’s holdonpowerbydistributingoil read. TheChavezregime isdivertingsubstantialamounts ofitsoilrevenues tofurtheritsanti-American Castros willcreate thepossibilityofmajorchanges inCuba’s politics.Thefuture ofVenezuela isharder to The potential major challenges to the status quo at present are Cuba and Venezuela. The demise of the difficult economicheadwindsoftheglobalfinancialcrisis. most likely see sustained growth, if they can continue prudent economic policies in the face of the economic andpoliticalpowergrow. Chile,Argentina, PeruandpossiblyColombia willalso service-based economy mean that the next several decades will see Brazil’s coast willincrease itsenergy independence,whileagrowing industrialand biofuels as well as the discovery of massive oil deposits off the Brazilian biofuels aswellthediscoveryofmassiveoildepositsoff theBrazilian player amongthegreat powersbythe2030s.Visionary investmentsin Brazil, inparticular, appearssetonacoursethatcouldmakeitmajor region couldbeinabetterpositiontodealwiththeseproblems. South America’s improving economic situation suggests that the corruption. pivotal to Mexico’s success in confronting lawlessness and defeat criminal elements involved within its borders will be defeat criminalelementsinvolvedwithinitsborders willbe the U.S. to both minimize demand for illicit drugs and to the U.S.tobothminimizedemandforillicitdrugsand non-state groups. A continuous cooperative effort by as its primary focus is its fight against these formidable The Mexican government willremain The Mexicangovernment severely challenged p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 49 31 -Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj -Muhammad Abd 30 The fight against the enemy nearest to you has precedence over the fight against the enemy over the has precedence to you the enemy nearest The fight against The enemy is the of power. the reins Muslim countries the enemy has . . . In all farther away. rulers. present Muhammad Abd Al-Salam Faraj, The Neglected Duty, sections 68-70, Muhammad Abd Al-Salam Faraj, The Neglected Duty, Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of through to Central Asia. Across this part of the globe a number of historical, dormant conflicts between states states between conflicts dormant historical, to Pakistan Morocco of region from conflict will continue to be the evidence, a principal nexus of Based on current number a globe the of part this Across Asia. Central to through and the Caucasus. rights exist, especially in Central Asia territories, and water and nations over borders, scruples and systems, weapons technology, per se, is not terrorism here and most obvious challenge. The issue the first will present Radical extremists the lack who those which by tactic a merely is terrorism because who advocate violence the world. Radical extremists of the modern their enemies throughout world can attack despite West the of underpinnings world. in the Islamic regimes that seeks to overthrow theologically-based insurgency constitute a transnational, philosophical the as well as modernity of trappings the attack bitterly They without the internet,the fact their operations could not be conducted air travel and globalized financial systems. vitalthe Middle East, a region in presence U.S. and other foreign At a minimum radical Islam seeks to eliminate Central Asia in from a Caliphate stretching of but only as a first step to the creation to U.S. and global security, and extending deeper into Africa. the East to Spain in the West The problems in the Arab-Islamic world stem from the past five centuries, during which the rise of the West of the the past five centuries, during which the rise world stem from in the Arab-Islamic The problems political and social values paralleled a concomitant decline in the power and the dissemination of Western or escaping the choice of either adapting to Islamic world confronts and appeal of their societies. Today’s by despotic rulers, addicted to the exports of Often led by the West. created a globe of interdependence from have states Islamic many modernization, extensive industrialization or modernization, and burdened little incentive for more commodities which offered therefore and education to obstacles ideological and cultural by the of resentment and media, own their of the lies of their South Asia, and East Asia. The rage of radical Islamists feeds off fallen far behind the West, falsifications the imams, radical of rhetoric the leaders, corrupt often not were past and the present developed world. If tensions between the Islamic world’s prosperous far more divisions, and political divided by tribal, religious, of Islam, remains enough, the Middle East, the Arab heartland making continued instability inevitable. A society with a long in this center of instability. role important Iran has an increasingly adversary in Iran has yet to live up to its potential to be a stabilizing force and rich history, powerful most Iran’s removed has U.S. the Although region. the continues to foment the regime the Taliban, (Saddam) and reduced Despite a population its own borders. far from instability in areas cleric- favorable to the United States, the relatively that remains its dedicating continue to ready appears regime dominated the with confrontation to capabilities military and diplomatic very of array an cultivate to and Israel, and States United in Hezbollah world. the around forces proxy capable in Afghanistan,Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, various groups and other client states Iraq, and the Caucasus, Yemen, will serve to extend and solidify Iranian influence abroad. in role large a play to continue will dynamics Internal decision-making calculus. the Iranian leadership’s the in Government Iranian the by intervention The has elections Presidential 2009 June the of outcome The Middle East and Central Asia East and Central The Middle trans. in Johannes J. G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of trans. in Johannes J. G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed in the Middle East (New York: Assassins and Islamic Resurgence Sadat’s Macmillan, 1986), p. 192. Abd Al-Salam Faraj was tried and hanged in connection with the 1981 assassination of Anwar al-Sadat. 1996). Simon and Schuster, (New York: Order, World 30 31 p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 50 “perfect storm” ofuncertaintyalonemightrequire theemployment ofU.S.andcoalitionforces inasituation bigger havenforviolentextremists, andthequestionof whatwouldhappentoitsnuclearweapons.That collapse wouldcarrywithitthe likelihoodofasustainedviolentandbloodycivilsectarian war, aneven consequences for U.S. security such weakness could create. PakistanThe erosion is especially of state under authority assault, by andextremist its Islamist groups bears consideration due to the disastrous ensuing civil war. case, a state that had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics at Sarajevo,warring then nationalities quickly became in the1990 epicenter suggests ofhow the suddenly and catastrophicallyas asurprise,hasrapidonset,andposesacuteproblems. ThecollapseofYugoslavia intoachaotictangleof state collapse can happen – in this long-term problems that allow for management over sustained periods.namely thephenomenonof“rapidcollapse.”Formost part,weakandfailingstatesrepresent chronic, The collapse of a state usually comes There isonedynamicinthe literature ofweakandfailingstatesthathasreceived relatively littleattention, have chosenotherpaths. and a willingness to embrace integration into the global system.have beenanumberofnationsthatescapedpoverty, To theirsuccesses resulting from intelligentleadership date, the remaining weak and failing nations ago, suggesting a chronic condition, which, despite considerableand NorthAfrica.Acurrent listofsuchstatesmuchresembles thelistsofsuchstatesdrawnupageneration aid, provides little hope for solution. There Many, ifnot themajority, ofweakandfailingstateswillbeinSub-SaharanAfrica,CentralAsia,theMiddleEast, forces havebeeninvolvedintheseregions. ofthetribalsocieties.Thesedysfunctionalborderspatterns haveexacerbatednearlyeveryconflictinwhichour of economic, political, or strategic necessity and paid scant attentionwhere in to the existing Nineteenth linguistic, Century racial,the European or cultural powers divided frontiers few cultural,linguistic,orevenracialtieshaveimplodedstates.ThiswasthecaseinAfricaandMiddleEast, between their colonies on the basis disastrous leadershiphaswrecked politicalandeconomic stability. Inothers,warsamongtribalgroups with Yet therefortheeconomicandpoliticaltroubles isnoclearpattern thatbesetthesestates.Insomecases, possesses thepotentialtoproject trouble throughout theglobalizedworld. suffering on a scale so large that it almost invariably spreads Such countrieswillcontinuetopresent strategicandoperationalplannersserious challenges,withhuman throughout the region, and in some cases Weak andfailingstateswillremain aconditionoftheglobalenvironment overthenextquarterofacentury. weak &failingstates portion oftheregion. China, andotherenergy importerstoallowradicalgroups togaindominanceorcontrol overanysignificant reconstruction, toengagementoperations.Theregion anditsenergy suppliesare tooimportantfortheU.S., region onnumerous missionsrangingfrom regular warfare, counterinsurgency, stabilityoperations,relief and the outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forcesThe economicimportanceoftheMiddleEastwithitsenergy supplieshardly needsemphasis.Whatever will find themselves again employed in the term orfaceinsolvency, dissensionandferment,possibleupheaval. internal future prosperity oftheIranianpeople.Iranmustcreate conditionsforitseconomicviabilitybeyondthenear eroding national revenues due to the failure of the regime tomatch diversify its nationalist the national rhetoric economy, with tangible which stiflesprogress the on the economicof anysovereign countryasameanstoitsownsecurity. However, ofIranwillalsohaveto front. theGovernment Extreme volatility in oil prices is dissension, Iranwillcontinuetoframethenuclearpowerissueasamatterofnationalistprideand“right” desire fordemocratizationandtransparency. Asonemeansof maintainingpoliticalsupportandsuppressing will tread anincreasingly finelineinmaintainingpoliticalandsocialcontrol whilesatisfyingtheirpublic’s growing reinvigorated theIranianpublic’s widespread disillusionmentwith theirrulingclass,andtheIranianleadership p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 51 32 Very High Very High Moderate Low Rated Not index political instability Risk Level Niall Ferguson, “The Next War of the World” Foreign Affairs (September 2006), p. 66. Affairs Foreign of the World” “The Next War Niall Ferguson, 32 Where might we expect to see a similar toxic mix of mismatched political governance, difficult economicWhere to further their pursuit of human differences politicians willing to use and aggressive circumstances, wars, including solved through been largely have in Europe political power? The ethnic confrontations where in new areas reemerge they may and the Balkan Conflict; however, War the Second World of is the vast arc take hold. Most problematic migration, demographic decline, and economic stress Arabs, Persians, Jews, Pashtuns, Sunnis, Kurds, Shias, and Pakistan where instability between Morocco environments, which include poorly governed tribal spaces and complex border zones, the Joint Force Force Joint the zones, border such of nuclear weapons might be lost. In possibility that control of immense complexity with the real complex and spaces tribal governed poorly include which environments, a complex set of difficult scenarios and potential adversaries. to address would be required and frighteningly common human disasters that occur as states collapse is thatOne of the most troubling state of collapse the include These factors. violence, leading to the death and displacementof ethnic cleansing and even genocide. This extreme interlocking three to traced usually is millions, potentially of the “ultimate solution” to economic turmoil, and the rise of charismatic leaders proposing severe authority, of economic or political spoils. diversity or the division of ethnic or religious the “problem” of entities has been a consistent feature political ethnically or ideologically pure The drive to create the by followed empires European the of retreat The decolonization. and self-determination of era the a world of has laid bare confrontation stable U.S.-Soviet yet relatively contraction of the dangerous, minorities ethnic keeping while power secure to attempting groups violent and diversity ethnic complex local elites compete for the benefits of power. have crumbled, of legitimate order under heel. As sources particularly high in ethnically diverse regions. The stakes are SOURCE: Economist Intelligence Unit Intelligence Economist SOURCE: p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 52 share experiences, tactics,funding,and bestpracticestomaintain aconstantflowof relatively sophisticated extreme technology, ideologieswithmodern and othermeansofcommunicationsto theyusetheInternet of weakstatestoshieldtheir operations anddissuadetheU.S.from engagingthemmilitarily. Combining of operations in the noise and complexity of cities and use internationalBecause these law andorganizations the safe havens do not along operate borders within the internationalstate control andhavethecapacity–and,mostimportantly, the will –tochallengetheauthorityofstates. diplomatic systems, they will locate bases These radical ideological groups have discovered how to form cellular, yet global networks that operate beyond the truth.Theirgoalistoforce thistruthontherest oftheworld’s population. world,andacceptnomiddleground nihilistic rageatthemodern orcompromise inpursuingtheirversionof together byacommon,transnational,andviolentideology. Thesegroups are drivenbyanuncompromising, the Taliban inthe mountainsofAfghanistanare allexamplesoflocalgroups pursuinglocalinterests, buttied society. AlQaedaterrorists, violentmilitants intheLevant,radicalSalafistgroupsofAfrica,and intheHorn We nowfaceasimilar, butevenmore radicalideologythat directly threatenssecular thefoundationofwestern opposing ideologythatdemandedthediminutionofindividual libertiestothepowerofstate:Communism. destruction ofdemocraticfreedoms: Nazism.Afterward, thesesamepowersresisted andovercame another In the1940’s theDemocraticWest faceddownandultimatelydefeatedanextreme ideology thatespoused Radical ideologies serious damageisoutofallproportion totheirsizeandresources. feedback, and modify their actions, all with considerable agilitycostly and synchronization.systems. Because ofTheir their capacity small size,to cause such groups of theemploy nichetechnologiescapableofattackingkeysystemsandproviding inexpensivecountermeasures“super-empowered” to can plan, execute, receive to cause significant damage and slaughter. Time and distanceadvanced constraints technologies, are no longerhave already in play. resulted Such ingroups individuals andOne small does groupsnot need possessing a militia increasedto wreak havoc.ability Pervasive information, combined with lower costs for many warfighting capabilitieswitha“substate”politicalandsocialstructure insidetheformalstateofLebanon. daymilitiaisHezbollah,whichcombinesstate-liketechnologicaland of states.Anexampleamodern Militias challenge the sovereignty of the state by breaking thegroups possessingtheabilitytoprovide goods,services, andsecurityalongwiththeirmilitarycapabilities. monopoly on violence traditionally the preserve areas orinweakfailingstates.Theyrangefrom ad hocorganizations withshared identitiestomore permanent Militias represent armedgroups, irregular yetrecognizable asanarmedforce, operatingwithinungoverned highlights twoexamples:militiasandsuper-empowered individuals. transnational organizations possessnoregard borders forinternational andagreements. Thediscussion below to challengestatesandutilizeterrorism againstpopulationstoachievetheiraims. Theseunconventional Some transnational organizations seek to operate beyond state control and acquire the tools and means own, theyexistandbehaveoutsidetherecognized normsandconventionsofsociety. diffusion ofpowertounconventional,nonstate,ortrans-stateactors.Whilethesegroups haverulesoftheir While states and other conventional powers will remain the principalthe threatsofunconventionalpower brokers of power, there is an undeniable religious, andtribaldifferences create thepotentialforlarge scaleatrocities. Force maybecalledupontoprovide order andsecurityinareas where simmeringpolitical,racial,ethnic, As Lebanon,Bosnia,Rwanda,andcurrent operationsinIraqandAfghanistanhaveshown,theJoint Congo beingexamplesofwhere thispathmightlead. ethnic strifeasthenotionofethnicallypure nationstatesanimateoldgrievances,withRwandaandthe Baluchs, and other groups compete with one another. Many areas of central Africa are also ripe for severe p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 53 of weapons of mass the proliferation destruction of nuclear weapons. Throughout will be the proliferation A continuing challenge to American security use of nuclear weapons both by and against U.S. planners had to consider the potential the Cold War, and issues of deterrence ignored years, Americans have largely the Soviet Union. For the past twenty nuclear 1998, India and Pakistan have created Since no longer have that luxury. We nuclear warfare. has on two occasions attempted to test nuclear devices Korea arsenals and delivery capabilities. North is likely to attempt North Korea weapons. to create required fissile material the and likely has produced its leverage with its neighbors and the United to increase to weaponize its nascent nuclear capability with its own nuclear weapons aggressively forward is pressing regime the Iranian States. Furthermore, demands external of defiance Iran’s to community international the in reaction confused The program. an incentive for others to follow this path. may provide to discontinue its nuclear development programs future a consider must Force Joint the successful, is proliferation counter to agreement global a Unless feature. a primary and use are in which issues of nuclear deterrence It is far from Some state or non-state actors may not view nuclear weapons as tools of last resort. that of the United States, and whose regime is deeply distinct from certain that a state whose culture of nuclear weapons in a fashion hostile (or both), would view the role is either unstable or unremittingly were they whether regimes, other by weapons nuclear of acquisition The strategists. American to similar the potential for the use of while increasing hostile or not, would disrupt the strategic balance further, complexity the fact that multiple nuclear powers will very likely nuclear weapons. Add to this regional view may powers nuclear rising These world. the around states other strike to reach global the have the U.S. and may be willing to employ them tactically to achieve short from use of WMD very differently states capable of global nuclear strikes will among numerous term objectives. The stability of relations based on capabilities and relations second-strike Assured be of central importance for the Joint Force. parts to access reduce effectively may but stability, greater mean may destruction mutually-assured provide may forces nuclear vulnerable and balances nuclear fragile hand, other the On world. the of armed competitors. for nuclear tempting targets volunteers for their effort. Moreover, they have made common cause with other unconventional powers and powers unconventional other with cause common made have they Moreover, effort. their for volunteers for their operations. and as fronts their efforts to shelter organizations will use these dehumanize their effectively globe-spanning “narratives” that constructing are These radical groups to civilized norms of conduct. how abhorrent in their eyes any tactic no matter opponents, legitimizing total of the world’s 16 percent 1.1 billion Muslims who are audience is the target They believe that their operational areas and silence moderate voices in their tactics to shock of terror population. The use as possible. devices to kill and maim as many explosive and improvised includes suicide bombing will achieve a weapons that some of these groups indeed likelihood, is the possibility, Most troubling the smuggling, or through knowledge, through shared (WMD) capability through of mass destruction and in the homeland of attacks both abroad an unscrupulous state. The threat deliberate design of to demonstrate chemical agents intended custom bio-weapons, and advanced using nuclear devices, account of in our planning possibilities we must take real weaknesses are dramatically our security strategies. and deterrent As the developed world can win this conflict in the near future. No one should harbor the illusion that on or complete. It will certainly not rest victory will not appear decisive is true with most insurgencies, of political, social, and economic ills can help, but in the end will not military successes. The treatment come must which of much ideas,” of “war a of winning the be will most matter will What decisive. be itself. within the Islamic world from Any discussion of weapons of mass destruction must address also the potential use of biological weapons by sovereign states as well as non-state actors. By all accounts, such weapons are becoming easier to fabricate – certainly easier than nuclear weapons – and under the right conditions they could produce mass casualties, economic disruption, and terror on the scale of a nuclear strike. The knowledge associated with developing biological weapons is widely available, and the costs for their production remain modest, easily within reach of small groups or even individuals. The U.S. ability to deter nuclear- armed states and non-state actors needs to be reconsidered and perhaps updated to reflect this changing landscape.

technology Advances in technology will continue at an exponential pace as they have over the past several decades. Some pundits have voiced worries the United States will lose its lead as the global innovator in technology or that an enemy could make technological leaps that would give it significant advantages militarily. That is possible, but by no means a foregone conclusion.

Technology, Doctrine, and Successful Adaptation Nothing more clearly illustrates the importance of imagination and an understanding of war in the incorporation of technology into military institutions than the utilization of radar over the course of the first two years of World War II. It was not until the 1930s that scientists in the major powers turned their attention to the possibility that radio waves could spot the flight of aircraft or the movement of ships at sea. The looming threat posed by enemy bombers in a period of worsening international tensions instigated investigations into such possibilities. By the late 1930s scientists in Britain, Nazi Germany, and the United States had all developed workable capabilities for identifying the height, direction, and speed of aircraft, as well as the number of aircraft.

Not surprisingly, the Germans, given their technological prowess, developed the most sophisticated radars, but the incorporation of that technological capability into their weapons systems lagged behind that of the British. It would be in the Battle of Britain that German failure in imagination would show to the greatest extent. The Luftwaffe had incorporated radar into its capabilities in the late 1930s, but only as a series of ground control intercept sites, each of which operated independently with no direct tie to a larger air defense system. It would not be until the catastrophe of Hamburg in Summer 1943 that the Luftwaffe would create an air defense system in which radar formed an integral part of a holistic approach to an air warning system of defense. But the British were already using such a system in 1940. As the scientific intelligence officer, R.V. Jones, recalled in his memoirs:

[The] German philosophy of [air defense] ran roughly along the lines that here was an equipment which was marvelous in the sense that it would enable a single station to cover a circle of a radius 150 kilometers and detect every aircraft within that range…. Where we had realized that in order to make maximum use of radar information the stations had to be backed by a communications network which could handle the information with the necessary speed, the Germans seemed simply to have grafted their radar stations on to the existing observer corps network which had neither the speed nor the w o r l d handling capacity that the radar information merited…. The British approach… was entirely different. The British radar stations formed the eyes of a systematic approach to the air defense of the British Isles, so that RAF commanders could use their information to guide large numbers of Hurricanes and Spitfires against German bomber formations.33 c o n t e x t u a l As Churchill noted in his memoirs about the Second World War, “it was the operational efficiency rather 34 t h e than novelty of equipment that was the British achievement.” : i i i

33R.V. Jones, The Wizard War, British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945 (New York, 1978), p. 199. p a r t 34Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 156

54 p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 55 High powered microwave (HPM) weapons will offer both the Joint Force and both the Joint Force (HPM) weapons will offer microwave High powered 35 Dan Wildt, Status and Operational Implications of Laser Weapons, p. 4. Dan Wildt, Status and Operational Implications of Laser Weapons, our adversaries new ways to disrupt, degrade, or even destroy unshielded electrical systems, as well as as well as systems, electrical unshielded destroy even or degrade, disrupt, to ways new adversaries our themselves systems weapon and ISR control, and command which upon circuits integrated and electronics adaptive against a variety of threats based. The non-explosive, non-lethal aspects of HPM will prove are embedded and operating among civilian populations in urban environments. 35 It is clear that technology, distinct from WMD, will proliferate. As anyone who has purchased a home home a purchased has who anyone As proliferate. will WMD, from distinct technology, that clear is It The capability. ever-greater of cost overall the down drive advances technological knows, computer conventional groups, to more will be available advanced weaponry More market is no different. weapons militias and states funded moderately relatively allow will This price. cheaper a for unconventional, and accuracy than out and with greater power farther projecting munitions, long-range precision to acquire public the with space into extends reach this that seen been already has it end, high the At before. ever cartel, cash will be able to oil-rich nation or a drug weapons. Whether a small demonstration of anti-satellite a solution for provide robotics the advances in limiting factor, lethal capabilities. If manpower is a purchase further the power of the “super- has the sobering potential to amplify the price. This those who can afford guerilla. empowered” major is less chance that there world of science and technology, In the globalized, connected issue with real by surprise. In the past, the could catch American scientists technological advances a particular nation has developed weapons far superior to those technology has not been simply that have how military organizations in nearly every case the major factor has been of its opponents. Rather, or their doctrinal and tactical system. It has been the success integrated technological advances into tanks were In 1940 French in battlefield surprise and success. that has resulted in that regard failure its unique advantage to those of the Germans. What gave the Wehrmacht superior in almost every respect of the tank into a combined-arms team. It was the development was the fact that the Germans integrated by the Germans that led to their overwhelming victory – not new, decentralized, combined-arms tactics systems. sophisticated weapons more have of imagination military organizations crucial is the degree Thus, what has been unquestionably of into their doctrine and concepts. The fact that the speed displayed in incorporating new technologies technologies new adapt to ability the make will exponentially proceeds invention and change technological critical in coming decades. framework of military capability even more into the larger adversary’s an be would deadly prove could that surprise technological of kind the of example current A a against weapons (EMP) pulse electro-magnetic as such technology, disruptive of use and deployment pulse resulting electromagnetic of an equipment. The potential effects hardened without properly force weapons EMP non-nuclear of appearance The decades. for known been have detonation nuclear a from being joint forces being developed, but are equations. They are could change operational and technological carry with it the most The impact of such weapons would to handle such a threat? adequately prepared which and computer systems on communications, reconnaissance, serious potential consequences for the every level. depends at the Joint Force the value of some military technologies. For example, directed Other technologies will also serve to reduce mortars, making an appearance in the defense against ballistic missiles, artillery, systems may begin energy to room more perhaps allowing the Joint Force attack roles, systems, and in tactical ground and rocket attack by ballistic weaponry of all types. Laser systems will from sheltered maneuver and widen areas available, enhanced by the fact not currently a potent combination of important capabilities that are provide stealthy are and distances; great at target a on energy high focused place can precise; ultra are they that be seen by the human eye). Laser systems will also have deep magazines and silent and cannot (i.e. largely development of Thus, early operational required. if multiple times at targets, and fire can rapidly retarget over take precedence speed, and volume of fire precision, laser systems will focus on applications where sheer destructive power. p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 56 autonomy -withinmissionbounds.” 37 36 leveraging the nano-technology field may be able to integrate theof “incredibleour own bodies, biochemistry as well as of bend life other with livingthe physics processes to dodecades asfuture bio-technologicaladvanceswillallow humanbeingstomanipulatethestructurework andfunction for human needs. By the 2030’s, biologists discoveries made.Themassive research anddevelopmenteffort willlikelybearsignificantfruitoverthe nexttwo Biotechnology asafieldisnow biggerthanphysicsintermsofmoneyspent,scientistsemployed, and the substanceoflife,includingsuchelementsasgenetic code,protein engineering, and artificiallife. A specialclassofnanotechnology, biotechnology, isfocusedonthemanipulation andengineeringof small bombsorcruisemissiles. and more precise rockets may improve U.S. ability to negate both athomeandabroad.foreign NEcapabilitiescreate opportunitiesfortheJointForce aswell.Forexample,faster air defense systems through the use of very to manufacture NE materials are relatively uncontrolled, creatinganti-satellite capabilitiestothreaten orbitingassetsuponwhichtheJointForce relies. Thecompoundsrequired possible holes in our counter-terrorist efforts allow more nationstoaccess spacethrough theuseofNEpropellants, possibly increasing theproliferation of them harder to detect and forcing ships to stay farther out to conventional militaryadvantages.Forexample,navalminesandtorpedoesmaybedramaticallyshrunk,making sea. More powerful and less costly propellants may only amplifiedbythenewtechnology. Foreign stateactorsmayuseNE-related technologytostrikeatU.S. The introduction ofNE-related technologiesimplies thattheU.S.JointForces mayfacefamiliardifficulties, complicate U.S.operations. yet powerfulweaponsthatcouldbeusedinmore powerfulIEDs,missiles,mortars, andcarbombstofurther decades. Moreover, the spread of NE-related knowledge to surmountable. Assuch,itisverylikelythatanumberofstateswilldeployNEtechnologiesoverthenexttwo non-state actors may allow the fabrication of crude and they can often be difficult to control and store accurately:proliferation however, of theseNE explosives technical and hurdles propellants. are probably Difficulties Theremain advance in the of abilityNE-related to mass technologies produce theis constrainedmaterials by a numberscientists inthelabtoimprove theyieldofexplosivesandpropellants byafactorofbetweentwoandten-fold. of hurdles that, for now, prevent the wide explosives andpropellants inanumberofmilitaryandspace-related areas. Nanomaterialshaveallowed Nanoenergetics (NE),forexample,hasthepotentialtodramaticallyincrease thepowerandefficiencyof sensors, armor, explosives,computingmeans,andenergy generationandstorage. build almostanymechanicaldevicecheaplyandinlarge quantity, whichcouldresult inentirely newclassesof be exploited.Theeventualapplicationsofthesespecialpurposemanufacturingsystemsincludetheabilityto growth intheabilitytoprecisely andinexpensively control matter, openingaworldofnewcapabilitiesthatcan will see the maturation of nanotechnology and engineering at moleculardramatically scales different that will fromresult those in explosiveof the materials with whichAt microscopic scale(smallerthan100nanometers)matterhaschemical,physical, andelectricalproperties we are generally familiar. The next two decades From Neil Jacobstein,InstituteforMolecular Manufacturing,UnpublishedManuscript From P.W. Singer, “Wired for War” (2009)p.133. ever-more capablehaving“somelevelofautonomy-adjustableautonomy, orsupervisedautonomy, orfull illustrate, the process of integrating robots into the force will occur over time as they become by resourceful adversariesaround theworld.AsourexperiencesinIraqandAfghanistan applications and environments, and as such, will be readily adaptable for military purposes multipurpose mobile robotic systems may be common in a wide range of civilian multipurpose mobilerobotic systemsmaybecommoninawiderangeofcivilian to avoidaccidentswhendriversare eitherinattentiveortooslowtoreact. By2030, h the car will slow applications, laterperhapsin“assisteddriving”modeswhichthecarwillslow Automobiles have begun to include robotic elements, now in parking Automobiles havebeguntoincluderobotic elements,nowinparking from fixed, single-purpose systems to mobile, multipurpose applications. from fixed,single-purposesystemstomobile,multipurposeapplications. 36 systems), intheair, andatsea.Industrialrobots are beginningtotransition found wide application in space (satellites are, in effect, rudimentary robotic military toolkit and will be present on the battlefields of 2030. Robotics first military toolkitandwillbepresent onthebattlefieldsof2030.Roboticsfirst Additionally, robotic systemsare swiftlybecomingpartofthestandard 37 of nonliving systems like semiconductors and fiber optics.”38 These techniques could enhance human senses and physical abilities, while hindering the ability of adversaries to maintain a shield of anonymity so critical to their operations. Together, this might allow the Joint Force to better catalog, track, and separate hostiles from local populations.

It is by no means certain that the United States and its allies will maintain their overall lead in technological development over the next 25 years. America’s secondary educational system is declining in a relative sense when compared to leading technological competitors, e.g., India and China. America’s post-graduate educational programs and research laboratories remain the world’s most advanced magnets for some of the best scientific minds in the world. However, although many foreign students remain in the United States, significant numbers are now returning home. Without substantive changes to improve its educational system, the United States will pay a heavy price in the future. Furthermore, any militarily-significant technological surprise is likely to result from the combination of one or more technologies, and the novel use of the resulting combinations.

Urbanization By the 2030s, five billion of the world’s eight billion people will live in cities. Fully two billion of them will inhabit the great urban slums of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Many large urban environments will lie along the coast or in littoral environments. With so much of the world’s population crammed into dense urban areas and their immediate surroundings, future Joint Force commanders will be unable to evade operations in urban terrain. The world’s cities, with their teeming populations and slums, will be places of immense confusion and complexity, physically as well as culturally. They will also provide prime locations for diseases and the population density for pandemics to spread.

Urban Population 2030

5 to 8 Million 8 to 10 Million Over 10 Million t r a p

i i i : e h t

Major urban environments l a u t x e t n o c

SOURCE: United Nations World Urbanization Prospects

d l r o w

38Freeman Dyson, Our Biotech Future, The New York Review of Books (Volume 54, Number 12), July 2007.

57 p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 58 of AIDSthroughout theircontinentare stillreverberating inpartsofAfrica.Informationhasbeen,is,and KGB’s efforts attheendofColdWar topersuadeAfricansthatthe CIA wasresponsible for thespread how thosewhowillreceive themessagewillunderstand it.Inthisregard, theyshouldnotforget thatthe seem toAmericans,thosecharged withtheresponsibility forinformationoperationsmustunderstand commented, the bigger the lie, the greater its influence. No matter how outlandish enemy claims may involve deception,sophisticatedattemptstospinevents, andoutrightlies.AsAdolphHitlerhimselfonce attempt toinfluencetheperceptions notonlyofhisfollowers,buttheglobalcommunity. Hisefforts will The battleofnarrativesmustinvolveasophisticatedunderstan ding oftheenemyandhowhewill known intheWest, wasplacingeditorialsinmajornewspaperstheUnitedStatesandEurope. offensive duringitsinvasion ofGeorgia. Withindaysoftheinvasion,asmallcoterieRussians,well importance of dominating the media message. Russia synchronized military operations with a media a coherent strategiccommunication program. Radicalgroups are nottheonlyoneswhounderstand Sophisticated terrorists emphasize theimportanceofintegratingcombatactivities(terrorist attacks)into For terrorists,andmassmediahavebecomeforumsforachievingtheirpoliticalaims. theInternet recognized thatperception isasimportanttotheir successes astheactualevents. important of these are the media in which the “battle of narratives” will occur. Our enemies have already warsareModern foughtinmore thansimplythephysicalelementsofbattlefield. Amongthemost 40 39 the battleofnarratives opportunities. decision-making downtothelevelwhere tacticalleaderscanactindependently in response tofleeting and control, ISR,fire support,andaviation.Combat leaderswillneedtocontinuedecentralize As well,thenature ofoperationsinurbanenvironments placesapremium ondecentralizedcommand probably result inapoliticaldisaster, especiallygiventheubiquitouspresence ofthemedia. militarily effective mayalsocreate thepotentialforlarge wouldmost civiliancasualties,whichinturn with therequirements ofhumanitarian,security, andrelief andreconstruction operations.Whatmaybe Urban operationswillinevitablyrequire thebalancingofdisruptiveanddestructivemilitaryoperations utilize thatinfrastructure. sprawl thatislikelytoemerge. More thaneverbefore, itwilldemandtheculturalandpoliticalknowledgeto under thestress ofmassiveimmigration,energy demand,andfoodwatershortagesintheurban contested locations.Theeffectiveness ofthatpre-existing infrastructure maybetestedasneverbefore infrastructure through whichforces canmanagesecured areas whileconductingstabilityoperationsin easier to control than the countryside. In part, that is because cities offer a pre-existing administrativeand basicservices.AsinWorld War II,unlesscontestedbyanorganized enemy, urbanareas are always Sarajevo inthe1990s,neverthelessmanagedtosurvivewithonlybriefinterruptionsoffoodimports when thefirstsuchcitiesappeared. Citiesunderenormousstress, suchasBeirutinthe1980sand There precedent isnomodern formajorcitiescollapsing,evenintheEighteenthandNineteenthCenturies, an IslamistJordanian-Palestinian writer. FBIS Report,“Compilation ofUsamaBinLadenStatements 1994-January2004” Abu Muhammadal-Maqdisi quotefrom May 2005.AbuMuhammadal-Maqdisiis theassumednameofIsamMohammad Tahir al-Barqawi, should raiseagenerationthatcarryonebannerandinitiatejihad. The bestthingthatmujahidincanoffer isapure jihad, rightchoices,andmature media.This done. Once thetoolsforbuildingpublicopinionare obtained,everythingthatyouasked forcanbe Today’s worldisofpublicopinionandthefatesnationsare determinedthrough itspressure. 40 -BinLaden p.181. 39 -Al-Maqdisi p a r t i i i : t h e c o n t e x t u a l w o r l d 59 will continue to be a strategic and political weapon. Its power will only increase as communications communications as increase only will power Its weapon. political and strategic a be to continue will the is it day, the of end the At pervasive. more become media global of density the and technology happened. than what actually more happened that matters of what perception dividends. or otherwise, pays enormous of any operation, whether military Dominating the narrative country’s a damage actually can and operations, and policies for support undermines so do to Failure its not ignore of narratives, the United States must and position in the world. In the battle reputation the positive aspects of Joint to reinforce soft power to bear in order ability to bring its considerable safety of local populations, securing the Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, operations. Force positive just a few examples of the are and disaster relief health care, exercises, military-to-military the on might military global with respond can world the in nation no as Just offer. we that measures across relief and help provide to capacity our in unmatched we are too so States, United the of scale and confidence. in this battle to build trust All of these tools should be considered thousands of miles. with reinforced intent, narrative by conveying the truth about America’s influencing the In the future, become technologies communication As harder. even become will activities, and actions supporting opinion. The U.S. array of media will influence global public widely available, an ever-wider more our than in this area be held to a much higher standard Government will always and its Joint Forces presence, media pervasive a with deal to how with wrestle already commanders Force Joint adversaries. soldiers and e-mail, battlefield, the from videos of posting instantaneous almost blogging, widespread of profusion with a they will be confronted to base. In the future who can call home whenever they return in most complexity, add even more transmission capabilities. To new media linked to unimaginably fast time. to deal with multiple, competing narratives at the same situations the U.S. and its allies will have we will to think of every Soldier and Marine as an intelligence collector, begun Just as we have already talk about commanders Today, global communication producers. also have to start considering them as have strategic consequences if widely reported. the strategic corporal whose acts might of narratives must be in consonance with the message, evenU.S. weapons employment in this battle has always been important, but in Winning the battle targets. if it means sometimes bypassing tactical it will be decades, expected in future environment the pervasive and instantaneous communications of young in risking the lives that fact could result to recognize absolutely crucial. For commanders not Americans to no purpose. Order or disorder depends on organization; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on dispositions…Thus, those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they await him in strength. Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates.41 -Sun Tzu

PART IV: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT FORCE

In an uncertain world, which will inevitably contain enemies who aim either to attack the United States directly or to undermine the political and economic stability on which America, its allies, and the world’s economy depend, the nation’s military forces will play a crucial role. Yet, war is an inherently uncertain and costly endeavor. As the United States has discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no such thing as a rapid, decisive operation that does not generate unforeseen second and third order effects.

While the most important mission of the American military has been to fight and win the nation’s wars, the ability of U.S. forces to deter conflict has risen to equal footing. Preventing war will prove as important as winning a war. In fact, the two missions are directly linked in a symbiotic relationship. The ability to deter a potential adversary depends on the capabilities and effectiveness of U.S. forces to act across the full range of military operations. Deterrence also depends on the belief on the part of the adversary that the United States will use its military power in defense of its national interests.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the United States has conducted a global repositioning effort, removing forces from forward basing and garrisoning much of its military force structure at home. Simultaneously, the Joint Force has found itself in near-constant conflict abroad, and now forces based at home find themselves in heavy rotation, projecting forward into the Middle East and elsewhere around the world. After protracted action in Afghanistan and Iraq, the force now faces a period of reconstitution and rebalancing which will require significant physical, intellectual, and moral effort that may take a decade to complete. During this time, our forces may be located significant distances from a future fight. Thus, the Joint Force will be challenged to maintain both a deterrent posture and the capacity and capability to be forward engaged around the world, showing the flag and displaying the ability to act in ways to both prevent and win wars. f o r c e j o i n t war in the twenty-first century t h e As the discussion of trends and contexts has suggested, the roles and missions of the Joint Force will include:

the protection of the homeland; the maintenance of the global commons; the deterrence of potential enemies; f o r

reassuring partners and allies; and when necessary, fighting and winning conflicts that may occur around the world. Such challenges are by themselves daunting enough, but they will occur in a period characterized by radical technological, strategic, and economic change, all of which will add to the complexities of the international environment and the use of military force. America’s position in the world, unprecedented in almost every respect, will continue to present immense challenges to its military forces. implications t h e : i v

41Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and ed. by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford, 1963), p.93. p a r t 60 p a r t i v : t h e implications f o r t h e j o i n t f o r c e 61 42 Moisis Naim, “Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are hijacking the Global Economy.” Doubleday. 2005 Doubleday. hijacking the Global Economy.” and Copycats are Moisis Naim, “Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, Shadow Globalization: “Bazaars of Violence” Globalization: Shadow international in the boundaries travel across and human of trade, finance, The globalization commercial world has an analogous dark side as well. Criminal and terrorist networks are networks are as well. Criminal and terrorist world has an analogous dark side commercial markets, and trade and building micro their own “shadow globalization,” intermingling to construct scale. The nefarious activities on a global that will enable them to coordinate financial networks attract shadow financing legal structures access to these markets outside of ubiquity and ease of rates of innovation in tactics, In these markets, of geography. pool, irrespective larger a much from structures organizational virtual enable will and accelerate will sharing information and capabilities, these markets will allow adversaries grow, plan, attack, and dissolve. As they that quickly coalesce, ation beyond law enforcement’s at a higher level of rapidity and sophistic to generate attacks to identify Somali pirates hiring indigenous spotters For example, we have seen capability to interdict. should expect shadow globalization for hijackings. We harbors as prime targets ships leaving foreign such that with insurgencies, interface increasingly of criminality to to encourage this outsourcing thousands and groups of hundreds perhaps with scale, global a on impact will conflicts local in actors of participants. can This convergence crime will likely continue to blur. and organized The line between insurgency MEND and stolen oil, and cocaine trafficking, between the FARC be seen in the connections already will conflicts violent for funding that means convergence This production. opium and Taliban the and is markets these of size current The markets. black and gray global of growth the abet and interplay equal to potential the has it trade; commercial legal than faster growing is and trillion $2-3 already this within trade to ability the have will insurgencies violent so, If 2020. by GDP global of third a mobilize to and protection, market for exchange in resources financial amassing regime, economic ability increased the them gives This areas. many in capabilities military state rival to resources those to co-opt and corrupt state legal structures. or lease able to buy an Internet are phenomenon, as groups Shadow globalization may not be merely and fast boats, submarines, and truck fleets, and to move people aircraft, their own commercial collaboration among Moreover, legal trade regimes. outside state-controlled regions across cargo by powerful social media will likely be globally mainstream ever more younger generations through faster and more and familiarity of these technologies will enable 2025. The sophistication, ubiquity, habitual and natural both be will interaction micro-market that means This formation. market efficient legal and and symbiosis between for “flash micro-markets” opportunities to its participants, creating illicit market elements. 42 Rapidly changing trends within the contexts described in the previous section will have profound section will have profound within the contexts described in the previous Rapidly changing trends at will wage it. Yet implications for the character of war itself and the methods by which the Joint Force always are enemies Our forces. human creative two between battle a involve always will war core, its understanding similar tolearning conflicts with conceptions or adapting. They will not approach and change will globalization or conceptualization, technology, of amount No us. surprise will they And ours. will continue to be conditioned by politics – the employment of military force Moreover, those realities. not only those of the United States and its allies, but by those of its opponents. Above all, Joint Force have a clear understanding of the strategic and must and their subordinates commanders, their staffs, themselves find will they case, every almost In operations. military conduct they which for goals political understanding of U.S. working closely with partners, a factor which will demand not only a thorough political goals, but coalition goals as well. p a r t i v : t h e implications f o r t h e j o i n t f o r c e 62 43 and thorough way. regular andirregular war, future opponentswillunderstand“theAmericanwayofwar” inaparticularlydetailed Saddam Hussein’s regime wasin1991andagain2003.Having seenthecapabilitiesofU.S.forces inboth allow themselves to be deluded into believing their future opponents will prove as inept and incompetent as war intothebackground, asoccurred inthedecadesafterVietnam War. Aboveall,Americans mustnot difficulties involvedintraining tomeet regular andnuclear threats mustnotpush preparations tofightirregular is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s. The fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats The secondscenarioofparticularsignificanceconfronting theJointForce isthefailure to recognize and Musashi notedintheseventeenthcentury: that theyhavehadoverthecourseofpast30years. As theJapanesewarrior/commentatorMiyamoto conflict at their various training centers must continue to receive the same support and attention in the future effectiveness ofthoseforces willprove crucial.Here theefforts thathavegoneintopreparing U.S.forces for expensive undertakingbothinlivesandnationaltreasure. When,however, deterrence failsthenthemilitary military forces of the United States must be deterrence, for war in any form and in any context is an immensely war will in most instances prove more important than waging it. In the long term, the primary purpose of the possible conflict.AstheRomanssoaptlycommented,“ifyouwishforpeace,prepare forwar.” Preventing nuclear weapons, is the maintenance of capabilities that would allow the United States to wage and win any The oneapproach thatwoulddeteramajorconflictinvolvingU.S.militaryforces, includingaconflictinvolving toFascism. formerly democraticgovernments The possibilityofwarremained inconceivabletoBritishstatesmenuntilMarch 1939,despitethemovementof occur forthenexttenyears.Untilmid-1930s“Ten Year Rule”crippledBritishdefenseexpenditures. adoptedasitsbasicprincipleofdefenseplanningtheassumptionthatnomajorwarwould British government weapons. Whilemajorregular wariscurrentlyoneshould notforget inastate ofhibernation, thatin1929the proliferation ofnuclearweapons,there isconsiderable potentialforsuchaconflicttoinvolvetheuseof first and most devastating would be a major war with a powerful state or hostile alliance of states. Given the There are two particularly difficult scenarios that will confront joint forces between now and the 2030s. The preparing forwar the enemiesofUnitedStatesanditsAllies,indefensevitalinterests. the enemy. Theonlymatterthatiscertainjointforces willfindthemselvescommittedtoconflictagainst uncertain astotheirform,location,levelofcommitment,thecontributionpotentialallies,andnature of that confronts Americanstrategistsandmilitaryplannersistheconundrumofpreparing forwarsthatremain not only against terrorist organizations but also against those who sponsor them. One of the great problems against insurgencies. Andasthisdocumenthassuggested,theJointForce willcertainlyfinditselfengaged involved incombat.Suchinvolvementcouldcometheformofamajorregular conflictorinaseriesofwars Between nowandthe2030s,militaryforces oftheUnitedStateswillalmostcertainlyfindthemselves remains obscure anduncertain. framework, such a system will tend toward conflict. Where and how those instabilities will manifest themselves integration, willpossessconsiderableinstabilities.Lackingeitheradominantpoweroraninformalorganizing great powers creates a strategic landscape and international system, which, despite continuing economic respects nowfaceschallengesbrought aboutbytheriseofpowerfulstates.Moreover, theriseofthese States hasdominatedtheworldeconomicallysince1915andmilitarily1943.Itsdominanceinboth It isinthispolitical-strategicenvironment thatthegreatest surprisesforAmericansmaycome.TheUnited Quoted inThomas Cleary, TheJapaneseArtofWar, UnderstandingtheCulture ofStrategy(Boston,1992),p.38. rhythms yourself,producing formlessrhythmsfrom therhythmsofwisdom. without practice….Inbattle,thewaytowinisknow the opponent’s rhythmswhileusingunexpected There isarhythmineverything, buttherhythmsofartwarare especiallydifficulttomaster 43 p a r t i v : t h e implications f o r t h e j o i n t f o r c e 63 In Iraq and Afghanistan our opponents have displayed considerable capacity to learn and adapt in both the the both in adapt and learn to capacity considerable displayed have opponents our Afghanistan and Iraq In communications and space, computers, on attack American will certainly military forces opponents of U.S. sophisticated More tactical arenas. political and attacks that possible the entirely is it possess must instance, forces For those Thus, vulnerabilities. forces. U.S. of control and command degrade severely will systems scope of traditional war, Conflicts or events beyond the in degraded conditions. ability to operate effectively the Joint Force. demands that will stress use of WMD, will create such as 9/11, or non-attributable must factor two important commanders and their planners conflicts, Joint Force In planning for future will find forces military majority of America’s calculations: logistics and access. The constraints into their involved in the commitment Thus, the first set of problems based in North America. themselves largely military for its defense pundits criticized the American will be logistical. In the 1980s many of U.S. forces “tooth to tail” for its minimal logistics, and praised the German Wehrmacht on supposed over-emphasis its military forces that the United States had to project What they missed was War. World ratio in the Second the East Asia. Ultimately, and in oceans, then fight massive battles of attrition in Europe two great across defeated the Wehrmacht combat forces, translated into effective Allied forces of U.S. and logistical prowess will. Imperial Japan’s and broke in the skies over Germany, crushed the Luftwaffe Front, on the Western the confront will forces joint and wars, America’s of conduct the influence always will distance of tyranny The them with fuel, munitions, distances and then supplying over great forces associated with moving problems in to “just compared necessary, of excess is always a measure In this regard, parts, and sustenance. repair not engaged in combat supplied could lead to disaster, who are to keep joint forces Failure time” delivery. may it but planning, in step first the only represents requirement that Understanding shelves. un-stocked just the most important. well prove for the past six decades has been its military power ability to project The crucial enabler for America’s Battle of the the American standpoint, the over the global commons. From its almost complete control of U-boat menace in May 1943 was the most important victory Atlantic that saw the defeat of the German a similar enabling effort, will require of military power in the future Any projection War. the Second World global commons have now expanded to include the domains of cyber and that the and must recognize that access and to ensure built in to each of these areas have redundancy must space. The Joint Force a single point of than “single-point safe” and cannot be disrupted through more logistics support are attack by the enemy. entry into the to deny U.S. forces wars against Iraq, the enemy made no effort two recent In America’s the second constraint so accommodating. Hence, may not prove opponents, however, Future theater. planners is that the United States may not have uncontested access to bases in the immediate confronting the providing to essential be will allies case, best the in Even power. military project can it which from area access may be other cases in which uncontested But there for arriving U.S. forces. required base structure is neighborhood the because be may This forces. military of projection the for available not is bases to of America exist, or states fear hostile, smaller friendly states have been intimidated, negative perceptions might involve the host the use of bases by the Joint Force Furthermore, of sovereignty. giving up a measure the sea and air could from nation in conflict. Hence, the ability to seize bases in enemy territory by force the critical opening move of a campaign. prove arms markets, potential enemies – even of sophisticated weapons in the world’s Given the proliferation precise and more small powers – will be able to possess and deploy an array of longer-range relatively of forces the projection enemies will obviously threaten weapons. Such capabilities in the hands of America’s of will depend. Thus, the projection as well as attack the logistical flow on which U.S. forces into a theater, begin military power could become hostage to the ability to counter long-range systems even as U.S. forces not only the to move into a theater of operations and against an opponent. The battle for access ma p a r t i v : t h e implications f o r t h e j o i n t f o r c e 64 twenty-first century to thedegree thatitsnuclearforces are seenas supporting globalorder and security. To thisend,the U.S. vital interests inthefuture jointoperatingenvironment. Additionally, U.S.securityinterests willbeadvanced U.S. nuclearforces willcontinuetoplayacriticalrole indeterring,andpossibly countering,threats toour enemy’s deterrent logic. constrained by an enemy’s threat or actual use of WMD unless it can develop ways to circumvent the operations of others. As such, the U.S. may find itself in situations where its freedom of action is Third, continued proliferation of WMD will make the U.S. increasingly the subject of the deterrence means ofcommunicationsthatusuallymarkstate-to-state relations. our future deterrence operationsagainstnon-stateactorswilllikelysuffer from alackofwellestablished are alsooftendependent on theactiveandtacitsupportofstateactorstotheiroperations.Finally, recruiters) maybedeterrable asopposedtothenotionallyundeterrablesuicidebomber. Non-stateactors instance, somesupplyorsupportchainswithinanetworked adversary(suchasfacilitators,financiers,and by ideologiesortheologiesthatmakedeterrence more difficult(thoughusuallynotimpossible).For vulnerabilities. Theyoftenpossessfewcriticalphysicalasset s toholdatriskandare sometimes motivated influence through deterrence operations.Non-state actorsalsotendtohavedifferent valuestructures and perspective. Itisoftenmore difficulttodetermineprecisely whomakesthekeydecisionsoneseeksto against such adversaries. Non-state actors differ from state actors in several key ways from a deterrence mean thatU.S.deterrence operationswillhavetofindinnovativenewapproaches to“waging”deterrence Second, the increased role of transnational non-state actors in the future joint operating environment will ensure thattheuniquedecisioncalculusofindividualadversariesisinfluenced. Deterrence campaignsthatare tailored tospecificthreats andthoroughly evaluateeachoftheseelements and canprecisely ascertain“red lines”oftheenemy –aswelltransmittotheadversaryourown. approach assumes that we fully understand the thought processes, strategic culture,A “one-size-fits-all”deterrence strategywillnotsufficeinthefuture jointoperatingenvironment.an and Such value hierarchy First, U.S.deterrence strategyandoperationsmustbetailored toaddress multiplepotentialadversaries. security strategy, andwillbeprofoundly affected bythree aspectsofthefuture jointoperatingenvironment. Deterrence ofaggression andofcertainformswarfare willremain animportantelementofU.S.national persistent andeffective attack.Inthisrespect, the immediate pastisnotnecessarilyaguidetothefuture. United States,whileU.S.forces, movingthrough the globalcommons,couldfindthemselvesunder future opponents to launch both terrorist and unconventional attacks on the territory of the continental reconnaissance (ISR)capabilities,anditscommandcontrol networks.TheJointForce canexpect of conflict.Thus,theJointForce mustexpectattacksonitssustainment,intelligence, surveillanceand engaged inalifeanddeathstrugglewiththeUnitedStates,mayengageU.S.forces across thespectrum lines ofdelineationbetweenoneformconflictandanother. Evenina regular war, potentialopponents, required tosupportourvitalnationalinterests. However, there iseverylikelihoodthatthere willbefew always seektofightandoperatewithpartners,leadingwhere appropriate andprepared toactalone when The forms of future war will each present peculiar and intractable challenges to joint forces. The U.S. will the action intheirexposedpositions. increase inprecision andlongerrangemissilesthatpresence forces couldbethefirsttarget ofanenemy’s struck. Theywillcontinuetobeasignificantfactorinthefuture. Yet, there istherisingdangerwith Moreover, those forces have proven of enormous value in relief missions when natural disasters have power overthepasthalfcenturyhasbeenpresence ofitsnavalforces off thecoastsoffar-off lands. One of the major factors in America’s success in deterring potential aggressors and projecting its military

conduct

of

military

operations

in

the p a r t i v : t h e implications f o r t h e j o i n t f o r c e 65 must remain committed to its moral obligations and the rule of law among nations. It must provide an It must provide rule of law among nations. and the to its moral obligations committed must remain a to available is technology nuclear where world a in power nuclear ethical and responsible a of example global the of support in forces, nuclear U.S. powerful of existence the will then Only actors. of array wide capabilities nuclear own their pursue not need they that confidence the with allies and friends provide order, the world. around challenges proliferation in the face of growing adversaries by implacable on U.S. vital interests also think the unthinkable – attacks we must Unfortunately, WMD. For both deterrence the use of nuclear weapons or other could involve to be deterred who refuse provide a operationally flexible to must be sufficiently diverse and forces our future and defense purposes, and capability to survive must also have the recognized Our joint forces for response. wide range of options and effective both deterrence This capability is essential to environment. nuclear, fight in a WMD, including environment. joint operating in the future combat operations nuclear weapons by commander to consider the potential use of for the Joint Force is reason If there two other warring is also the possibility that sometime in the future there adversaries against U.S. forces, past, India and Pakistan have come In the recent each other. states might use nuclear weapons against Given skirmishing that occurs along their Kashmir frontier. close to armed conflict beyond the perennial to believe such a conflict could is considerable reason there immense conventional superiority, India’s be massive could be true of any use of nuclear weapons, the result lead to nuclear exchanges. As would Given 24/7 flows, and social collapse – all in all, a horrific human catastrophe. carnage, refugee uncontrolled would be of U.S. and other international to mitigate the suffering forces news coverage, the introduction almost inevitable. could confront, Force the most important conflicts the Joint may represent war Nuclear and major regular just as conflicts will prove and winning such likely, more wars are Irregular the least likely. but they remain the maintenance of global stability. and vital interests of America’s important to the protection are which actors major of presence the be will environment operating future the of component significant A to order as threats emerged have already networked organizations not states. A number of transnational the world networks exist because communications networks around the globe. These parasitic across to transcend and connect. A common desire train, organize, to recruit, enable such groups or challenge the traditional power of and international the local, regional, order and politics. As such, established laws and states characterizes their culture to their actions and activities. These no barrier conventions provide sophisticated, well- also becoming increasingly are organizations media global integrate better they As well-armed. and connected, cultural greater potentially and weaponry, lethal sophistication, and intelligence, they will pose a considerably greater awareness by bureaucratic unburdened Moreover, than at present. threat showing already are transnational groups processes, themselves to be highly adaptive and agile. world’s developed the use will adversaries Irregular On them. against inhibitions moral and conventions and respect to obligated is Force Joint the hand, one and war of laws accepted internationally to adhere is States United the which to treaties binding legally enemies, On the other hand, America’s a signatory. find not will actors, non-state the particularly use likely will they fact, In constrained. so themselves law and conventions against the U.S. and its partners. p a r t i v : t h e implications f o r t h e j o i n t f o r c e 66 across thespectrumofconflict andconsidertheproper balanceamongcapabilitieswhileencouraging capabilities traditionally associated with state actors. The Joint Force must retain military capabilities and intimidate,aswellconflictsinwhichnon-stateactorsuseoperationalconceptshigh-end modern military technologies to protracted forms of conflict, including the use of proxy forces to coerce In lightofthesetrends, theJointForce mustprepare forconflictsinwhichstateadversariesadapt broad-based intelligenceefforts, aswellourability torapidlyinnovateandadapt. complicate ourplans.Suchapproaches willbeobscure anddifficulttodetect,placingapremium on to energy resources andmarkets,exploitperceived economicanddiplomaticleverageinorder to adversaries willworkthrough surrogates, including terrorist andcriminalnetworks,manipulateaccess environment, theJointForce mustanticipatetheemployment ofyetotheruniquemethods.Future While hybrid approaches constitute the most notable pressing challenge in the contemporary security the protracted andpopulation-centricnature ofcontemporary conflicts. makes today’s hybridchallengesparticularlythreatening isthecombinationoflethaltechnologyand adversaries haveemployeduniqueapproaches tounbalanceanenemythroughout history. What rapidly toeachspecificthreat, andnotnarrowly focusonlyonpreferred modesofwarfare. failed states,destabilizedelementsandhighendasymmetric threats. We mustbeprepared toadapt predicated uponasingle or preclusive visionofconflictatoneextreme orthe other. We faceaneraof the process ofenhancing andrebalancing ourcapabilityinirregular warfare. Thefuture cannotbe within theJointForce are astabilizingforcesystemthatcannotbeoverlookedin intheinternational adaptive forces intheface ofcomplexchallenges.Theoverwhelmingconventionalcapabilities categories ofconflict.Theusehybridapproaches isnotnew. Innovativeandlearning The Future Adversary complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between simple U.S. forces faceadynamicandchallengingoperationallandscapethatrequires joint The term“hybrid”hadrecently beenusedtoexpress theseemingincreased forces abletofunctionandsucceedacross awidespectrumofconflict.U.S. defense planningmustbetteraddress changesinhowadversariesapproach sophisticated ways. warfare, the contested nature of the global commons, and the challenges capabilities in smart adversarieswilltailortheirstrategiesandemploycapabilitiesin posed byweakandfailingstates. improvised explosivedevicesthatposegravethreats toourtroops, operations, to states employing unconventional technologies, to the Ongoing operations and potential future conflicts are likely to be on highly advancedmilitarytechnologyandsophisticatedinformation methods designedtooffset ourstrengths. From non-stateactorsusing increasingly multidimensional,asagreater numberofstateandnon- state actors employ a range and mix of military and non-military warfare provides powerfulincentivesforadversariestoemploy dominance of America’s armed forces in large-scale force-on-force instruments inorder toachievetheirobjectives.Thecontinued p a r t i v : t h e implications f o r t h e j o i n t f o r c e 67 In the end, irregular war remains subject to the same fundamental dynamics of all wars: political aims, dynamics of all same fundamental subject to the war remains irregular In the end, does occurs it which within context the Nevertheless, passion. human and frailties, human friction, general a be must war irregular in approach initial the suggested, Mao As differences. substantial contain the attack should they him, to according Rather, confront. they forces regular the engage to unwillingness is It structures. security and political his striking involves this cases most in and weakest, is he where enemy important the governing or who are authority will attack those individuals who represent likely that the enemy teachers; and business security officials; tribal leaders; school administrators; structure: in the local economic themselves find forces joint If locals. the among popular are who those particularly others, among leaders the political situation will be and local culture a deep understanding of the engaged in such situations, fundamental to success. enemies must by irregular confronted military organizations wars have suggested is that What past irregular of the conflict, but the “human is to understand not just the nature the issue Here, understand the “other.” will confront difficulty U.S. forces enemy swims. The great within which the analogy, sea,” to use Mao’s religious, understanding of the cultural, a thorough require is that such conflicts warfare in facing irregular and threatened are being fought. When U.S. interests which they are political, and historical context within of “boots on the ground” a substantial commitment security, the host nation is incapable of maintaining warfare irregular in operations” decisive “rapid no are There required. be will time of periods sustained for can only achieve victory by Instead of short decisive campaigns, U.S. forces that can achieve swift victory. strategic, and political approach. coherent, patient, long-term commitment to a consistent, must also take into account the capabilities of other elements of government. Often, approach This coherent between the Department of resources relative imbalance of of the interagency cooperation is difficult because tasks that can expect tension to exist between the Joint Force Defense and other agencies. For this reason, mission, and enabling the interagency community to engage effectively. must be completed to accomplish the the the most important role often As a result, won only by local security forces. can be insurgencies Ultimately, forces combatant, but rather as the ally or partner of the local security U.S. military will play is not as the chief fewer counter-intuitive: the indices of success are Moreover, as they defend themselves and their society. fewer enemy dead, not more. not more; arms captured, fewer engagements, not more; with security to the local population war is the ability to provide What is of critical importance in irregular military and police local allowing people, the among survive to ability the enemy the denying of purpose the should the Joint Force Moreover, responsibility. of their area to control strength to build up sufficient forces acting with are legitimacy so that local police and military forces contribute to the development of political a deep not against it. The security side of the mission requires the support of the local population and a be will firepower of use the cases all In language. and history, politics, culture, local of understanding of but will be balanced with non-lethal activities. Equally important will be the provision necessary feature, nor can neither win a counterinsurgency, U.S. forces Ultimately, high quality advisors to indigenous forces. Only the locals can put in as the legitimate governing authority. regarded are that indigenous forces ensure place the elements guaranteed to achieve lasting victory. importance increasing the underline globe the around shifts population and trends demographic current The filled with and slums are while its streets in complexity, of cities. The urban landscape is steadily growing is subject to water a youthful population that has few connections to their elders. The urban environment little have workers which in markets labor and costs, living and food soaring pollution, increasing scarcity, for trouble. is a recipe Such a volatile mixture power. leverage or bargaining p a r t i v : t h e implications f o r t h e j o i n t f o r c e 68 perceptual lensesthrough whichothersviewtheworld. social fabric will complicate such efforts. This puts at a premiumto create andcommunicatetheirownnarratives.Theenemy’s abilitytooperatewithinthelocalculturaland the ability of Americans to understand the that narrative. Moreover, he must be alert and ready to counterJoint Force commandermustunderstandthatheshouldplaceparticularemphasis oncreating andinfluencing the efforts of the enemies of the United States in the situations in which force is being employed will be the thenarrative use of thatforce, plays will on influencethe world’s and be stage.influenced The by U.S. militaryFinally, weshould underlinethatpersistentmediacoverage,coupledwithchangingWestern attitudesabout operations. What will be of great importance the needforimmediateaction,whichmayrequire employment ofsignificantconventionalcapabilities. activity intersectswithenergy suppliesorweaponsofmassdestruction,JointForce commanderswillconfront on terrorism willnotcontinueonitscurrent levels,but couldactuallyintensify. Where anincrease interrorist supporting andcomplementaryroles. IftheMiddleEastcontinuesonitstroubled path,itislikelythewar Operations againstterrorists willkeepSpecialForces busy, withconventionalforces increasingly activein activities willmaketerrorism andcriminalcartelsonlymore dangerous andeffective. and terrorist organizations with criminal cartels like the drugbureaucratic trade to finance hindrances their found activities. in nation Such states. cooperative One must also noteTerrorists the growing willconvergence be able toof internalizearmed groups lessons rapidly from their predecessors and colleagues without the erosion ofpoliticalsupportforthewar. indiscriminate violence reverberated throughout the United Statesoffensive thatAmericanforces “hadtodestroy avillagetosaveit.”Thatthoughtprocess andsuggestion of and was one contributing factor to the political implicationsissuggestedbytheresults ofaremark anAmericanofficermadeduringthe Tet in winning the “battle of narratives.” How crucial is the connectionSuch inhibitionsbetween collateral could increase damage and U.S. disastrous casualties. Additionally,the useoflethalmeans,givenpotentialforcollateraldamageandlarge numbersofciviliancasualties. any collateral damage carries with it difficulties Force commanderswithanumberofconundrums.Theverydensitybuildingsandpopulationwillinhibit which couldconsumemanpoweratastartlingrate.Moreover, operations inurbanterrainwillconfront Joint which ease the conduct of operations. Any urban military operationenemies withalandscapeofdensebuildings,anintenseinformationenvironment, andcomplexity, will allof require a large number of troops terrain to launch attacks on infrastructure nodes with cascading of innocentcivilianstomasktheiroperations.Theywillalsobeableexploittheinterconnections ofurban political effects. Urban geography will provide provide adversarieswithenvironments thatallowthemtohide,mass,anddisperse,whileusingthecover Joint forces willverylikelyfindthemselvesinvolvedincombatand relief operationsincities.Suchareas will p a r t v: f u t u r e opportunities 69 45 44 critical

the : education

military

If the Department of Defense can’t figure out a way to defend the United States on a budget of States on United the out a way to defend figure can’t the Department of Defense If than anything that much bigger are then our problems a trillion dollars a year, than a half more Robert Gates Secretary -Defense ships and planes…” a few more by buying can be cured There are two great difficulties with which the professional soldier, sailor, or airman has to or airman has sailor, soldier, difficulties with which the professional two great are There is almost unique in that he First, his profession contend in equipping himself as commander. had it once in his lifetime, if indeed that often. It is as if a surgeon may only have to exercise operation; or a barrister only appeared his life on dummies for one real to practice throughout swimmer had to or a professional the close of his career; once or twice in court towards spend his life practicing on dry land for the Olympic Championship on which the fortunes of of running a [military service] at the complex problem nation depended. Secondly, his entire run for. what it is being all is liable to occupy his mind so completely that it is easy to forget Secretary Gates quoted in Todd Harrison, “Avoiding a DOD Bailout” CSBA Perspective (October 2009). a DOD Bailout” CSBA Perspective (October Harrison, “Avoiding Gates quoted in Todd Secretary Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 107 (1962), p. 6. “The Uses and Abuses of Military History,” Sir Michael Howard, PART V: FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES PART V: 44 45 While the preparation of these young officers and NCO’s must begin with their training as military of these young officers and NCO’s While the preparation change, the challenges of war, it must also include their intellectual education to confront professionals, difficult they must master the extraordinarily In the space of twenty-five years, cultures. and differing But equally important, they by joint warfare. tasks of their military specialties as well as those required of military force. by war and the projection themselves for the challenges presented must prepare key to the future professional already are of the 2030s and the Service Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairmen of the The future or Lieutenant. The Combatant Commanders and all the future on active duty in the rank of Captain The Command on active duty. are currently military in the 2030s flag and general officers of the U.S. in uniform. In other words, in 2030 are Major and Command Master Chiefs of the Joint Force Sergeants begun! leaders of the 2030s has already of the senior military preparation is not only the most demanding commented, the military profession once As Sir Michael Howard that no other a problem it confronts Moreover, but the most demanding intellectually. physically, possesses: profession Despite the uncertainties and ambiguities involved in the future security environment there are four are there security environment future and ambiguities involved in the Despite the uncertainties leaders to meet the and its future its forces U.S. military can better prepare in which the specific areas suggested at the beginning, perhaps the most important cultural challenges that will come. As this study the abilities to innovate in peacetime and to adapt in war to are require attributes military organizations of the structures cultural and bureaucratic the present Unfortunately, of the battlefield. the actual realities innovation and adaptation. in the path of future Department of Defense place major hurdles but is obvious, or phrases. What needs reform in simple words One can encapsulate those obstacles against sustained efforts will require reform to,” of any effective the actual execution, the important “how and the demands of the within the military, sub-cultures bureaucracies, comfortable, deeply entrenched present. p a r t v: f u t u r e opportunities 70 engagement byofficersthroughout theircareers. must notremain confined totheschoolhouse,butmustinvolveself-directed studyandintellectual with theirimplications.Inotherwords, theeducationaldevelopmentofAmerica’s future militaryleaders such programs. Officers cannot masterallthesedisciplines,buttheycanandmustbecomefamiliar cultural studies,the‘hard’ sciences,law, andstrategiccommunication. Theirbestofficersshouldattend of educationinarangerelevant disciplinestoincludehistory, anthropology, economics,geopolitics, operations andacquisitionresource allocation. TheServicesshoulddrawfrom abreadth anddepth education mustimparttheabilitytothinkcriticallyandcreatively inboththeconduct ofmilitary staff andwarcolleges,butshouldextendtotheworld’s bestgraduateschools.Professional military The complexityofthefuture suggeststhattheeducationofseniorofficersmust not remain limitedto 46 expressed thelarger purposeofprofessional militaryeducation: Stansfield Turner, initiatoroftheintellectual revolution attheNaval War Collegeintheearly1970s,best world, aswellpossessathorough grounding in thenature ofwar, past,present, andfuture. Admiral leaders canunderstandthepolitical,strategic,historical,andculturalframeworkofamore complex This isthefundamentalchallengeU.S.militarywillconfront: providing theeducationsothatfuture changing conditions. situations andunderconditionswhere cleardirection from abovemaybelackingorovercome by part. Allmilitaryleadersmustbeequippedwiththeconfidencetodecideandactinambiguous United States may or may not be the leading actor, but in which partners will invariably play an important officer. Bothofficersandenlistedleaderswillfindthemselvesparticipatingincoalitionswhichthe peoples astheywillundoubtedlyconfront challengesequivalenttothosefacedbytoday’s midgrade require thatNCOsmustalsounderstandthefundamentalnature ofwaraswellothercultures and The nature ofthedecentralizedoperationsrequired bymanyofthechallengesdescribedthusfarwill The worldofthe2030swilldemandmore thanmasteryofthetechnicalandoperationalaspectswar. politically, culturally, and psychologically. of intellectualpursuitbecauseitdemandsanabilitytounderstandthe“other”inhisterms,historically, must haveleaderswhocanformandleadeffective coalitions.Suchapreparation willtakealifetime teams isasimportanttacticaloroperationalprowess, perhapsevenmore so.Thefuture JointForce At thislevelofleadership,theskillsforbuildingtrustthatwillserveasfoundationharmonious must developaholisticgraspoftheirprofessional sphere anditsrelationship tostrategyandpolicy. rarely decisive.Aboveall,officerswhoholdtheseniorpositionsinAmericanmilitary2030s more thananyotherfactor. There are otherdimensions,includingtechnology, thatare important, but The recent experiencesofAfghanistanandIraqhavemadeclearthatinwar, humanbeingsmatter Quoted inWilliamson Murray, “GradingtheWar Colleges,”The NationalInterest, no.6 (Winter 1986–87),pp.12–19. operational issuesthatconfront ourmilitaryandnation. horizons oftheofficerswhoattend,sothattheyhaveaconceptionlarger strategicand thus fardemanded.Aboveallthewarcollegesshouldbroaden theintellectual andmilitary intellectual curriculumtothinkinwidertermsthantheirbusyoperationalcareers have strategic issuesthatconfront America…Theyshouldeducatetheseofficers byademanding War collegesare placestoeducate theseniorofficercorpsinlarger militaryand 46

p a r t v: f u t u r e opportunities 71 simulation Lessons from forces. over 86% of our casualties have been ground War, Since the Second World and contexts is continuing. The trends campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that this trend will face increasing forces describe a world in which ground described in the Joint Operating Environment risk of casualties. Just as the United States has invested heavily in simulation capabilities to train aircraft so forces, combat for our armored intensity ground high and to replicate pilots, to simulate naval warfare, we must make similar commitments to simulations for our infantry and their supporting arms. The complex as forces to virtual simulations for our ground urban and human terrain will demand new approaches as well as the tactical and operational the cultural environment well. These simulations should replicate relief, and engagement as it engages in combat, stability, will confront Joint Force difficulties that the future the globe. operations around the personnel system leaders has to do with a future in preparing the Joint Force confronting difficulty Perhaps the greatest conducted between reforms and instrumental basis from personnel system that derives its philosophical these a considerable degree, in 1947, 1954, and 1986. To 1899 and 1904 and laws passed by Congress and eventually retiring training, promoting, to recruiting, Service approaches and laws still drive reforms their personnel. systems in long outdated mobilization leader development system has its roots personnel and The current 35 years, for the United States has had an all-volunteer force for mass armies in world wars. And while age, mobilization-based leader development an industrial still “thinks” and “acts” from the bureaucracy training and education, often continues to shape how the Services approach paradigm. That approach must change. confusing the two. That state of affairs If we expect to develop and sustain a military that operates at a higher level of strategic and operational education, training, incentive, and promotion the recruiting, understanding, the time has come to address Joint Force. for the future consistent with the intellectual requirements systems so that they are policies acquisition and economics defense by of power the asymmetric application about spoken thoroughly has Operating Environment The Joint to the defense with respect is also an asymmetry There against U.S. military forces. potential enemies contexts. One needs particularly in irregular States and its potential opponents, spending of the United posed by the threat United States has made to counter the enormous expenditures only to consider the counter these crude, States has spent literally billions to explosive devices (IED). The United improvised enemy, to multiply this ratio against a global devices. If one were effective inexpensive, and extraordinarily it applies to more against the low-end threat, While this asymmetry is most dramatic it becomes untenable. spends far less than the United economics indicate that China likely as well. Current sophisticated threats raw labor market, the cost of many of the For instance, because of its capability. States for the same costs space program engineering technologies, the Chinese savings gained by reverse materials, and the States. of magnitude less than that of the United an order have groups reform for decades; and while a number of calls for acquisition have been justified There has taken place. This is no longer reform forthright, and intelligent studies, little actual clear, produced in the Given the potential for disruptive technologies strategic effects. issue: it is having a bureaucratic how will not be whether the United States possesses such technologies, but the crucial issue near future, technologies not only into can incorporate those joint forces and how effectively how quickly, affordably, into the units and commands that will have to but actually to war, their concepts, doctrine, and approach battlefields. use those technologies on future is the considerable prospect there of the acquisition processes, reform and coherent Without a thorough with and effectively quickly, affordably, advances more an opponent could incorporate technological joint forces. serious implications for future Do make it clear that generalship, at least in my case, came of understanding, of hard study and brain- work and concentration. Had it come easy to me, I should not have done [command] so well. If your book could persuade some of our new soldiers to read and mark and learn things outside drill manuals and tactical diagrams, it would do a good work. I feel a fundamental crippling in curiousness about our officers. Too much body and too little head. The perfect general would know everything in heaven and earth.

So please, if you see me that way and agree with me, do use me as a text to preach for more study of books and history, a greater seriousness in military art. With two thousand years of example behind us, we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well…47 -T.E. Lawrence to B.H. Liddell Hart, 1933

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The ability to innovate in peacetime and adapt during wars requires institutional and individual agility. This agility is the product of rigorous education, appropriate application of technology, and a rich understanding of the social and political context in which military operations are conducted. But above all, innovation and adaptation require imagination and the ability to ask the right questions and represent two of the most important aspects of military effectiveness. The former occurs during peace, when there is time available to think through critical issues. However, in peacetime, military organizations cannot replicate the actual conditions of combat, when a human opponent is trying his best to destroy U.S. forces. Thus, there must be a premium on studying the military from an evidence-based perspective, using history, current operations, wargames, and experiments to better understand the present and future. There must be a connection between lessons learned in the schools and those learned in experimentation. Above all, there must be rigorous, honest red teaming and questioning of assumptions. “All the objectives were met” is a guarantee of intellectual dishonesty as well as a recipe for future military disaster.

Adaptation provides little time for reflection because of the immediate demands of combat. Here the patterns of thought developed in peacetime are crucial because adaptation requires questioning the assumptions with which military organizations have entered the conflict. In the past, military organizations that have ruthlessly examined and honestly evaluated their assumptions in peacetime have done the same in war. Those that have not have invariably paid a terrible price in lives. Those commanders who have listened and absorbed what their subordinates had to say were those who recognized what was actually happening in combat, because they had acculturated themselves to learning from the experiences of others.

The defining element in military effectiveness in war lies in the ability to recognize when prewar visions and understanding of war are wrong and must change. Unfortunately, in terms of what history suggests, most military and political leaders have attempted to impose their vision of future war on the realities of the conflict in which they find themselves engaged, rather than adapting to the actual conditions they confront. The fog and friction that characterize the battle space invariably make the task of seeing, much less understanding what has actually happened, extraordinarily difficult. Moreover, the lessons of today, t h o u g h t s

no matter how accurately recorded and then learned, may no longer prove relevant tomorrow. The enemy is human and will consequently learn and adapt as well. The challenges of the future demand leaders who possess rigorous intellectual understanding. Providing such grounding for the generals and admirals, sergeants and chiefs of the 2030s will ensure that the United States is as prepared as possible to meet the threats and seize the opportunities of the future. c o n c l u d i n g 47As quoted in Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows, The Guerrilla in History, vol. 1 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1975), p. 270.

72 notes g n i d u l c n o c

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73 UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND