The Politics, Practice and Paradox of 'Ethnic Security' in Bosnia

Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V 2015 The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic stability Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1):11, pp. 1-18, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5334/sta.ez RESEARCH ARTICLE The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic* The international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was intended to support conflict resolution by introducing territorial self-government and power sharing as the foundation for a governance framework that would provide for collective and individual security alignment over time. Instead, it has contributed to the ethnification of security whereby collective security in the form of an ‘ethnified state’ remains at the forefront of political discourse and practice. Social acceptance of this ethnified state as the guarantor of security—despite the fading reality of the ethnic threat in public perceptions of post-war insecurity—has been actively manufactured by the country’s ethnic elites using the very institutional means put in place by the international intervention. The result is an ‘ethnic security paradox’ in which the idea of individual safety—linked to the protection of ethnic identity in the form of an ethnified state—unsettles both collective and individual security alike. Introduction that have guarded against a resumption of In many respects, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a community violence in line with the liberal paradigmatic case of a liberal peace-style view of security through effective democratic international intervention, aimed to ensure state institutions (Philipsen 2014). Although stability by building effective democratic the absence of widespread violence over the and economic governance and by promot- past two decades can be credited to this for- ing societal reconciliation. Anchored in mula, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political body the General Framework Agreement for Peace has been beset by demands—particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina that ended the from Bosnian Serbs and Croats—for more 1992–1995 war, international interven- territorial autonomy; an occurrence which tion has avoided a reversion to violence and has also preoccupied the reform efforts over- enabled most of the population to begin seen by international actors. These groups rebuilding their lives. The constitution estab- justify their demands by a claim that only lished as part of the Agreement has imple- rule by one’s own (ethnic) people can pro- mented territorial separation along ethnic vide protection and security following a war lines and human rights protection standards that turned the three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina against each other. Thus, in the Bosnian post-war context, eth- * Senior Research Fellow, Department of Interna- nic identity has been securitised and the tional Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom country’s ethno-national political elites— [email protected] who still command a strong following—have Art. 11, page 2 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina identified ‘ethnic security’ as the axis of polit- the social reality makes ethnic fear relevant, ical discourse and action (Haynes 2008; Beha it is not necessarily perceived as a threat to & Visoka 2010). While this can be expected the security of ethnic groups in the sense of in the case of ethno-national parties ideo- direct violence. Were that so, it would pro- logically committed to the notion of secu- vide some foundation for the ethnic security rity as the protection of ethnic identity, it is discourse promoted by ethno-national elites, ominous that some nominally civic political and it would also serve as a straightforward parties have also embraced the idea of ethnic explanation of the enduring support for security in one form or another (McClelland ethnic parties. Instead, it is a product of the 2013; Azinovic et al. 2011; Saferworld 2012). combined effects of the discourse and prac- This suggests that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tice of ethnic elites and everyday experience ethnic security has become the social reality. in the institutional context shaped by the The main goal of this article is to concep- international intervention. tualise the relationship between (the idea of) Before I set out the structure of the paper, collective and individual security as a result of a caveat is in order. This discussion does not the liberal peace intervention, using Bosnia- attempt to deal with identity politics or the Herzegovina as an illustration. I submit that effectiveness of power sharing in post-con- the relationship between the idea of security flict divided societies. Rather, it has a much as protection of ethnic identity and individual narrower and specific focus on how interna- security is manifested as an ‘ethnic security tional intervention contributes to the pro- paradox’. Collective security in the form of duction of ideas of collective and individual an ethnified state should be accepted socially security in societies receiving support as well despite the pervasive individual insecurity as the ‘security gap’ created therein (Kaldor & that afflicts every citizen when ethnicity is Selchow 2014). instrumentalised and ethnic security is used The discussion moves in four steps. The first as a political tool. When ethnicity becomes part assesses liberal peace-style international the main organising principle of politics and interventions with a specific focus on Bosnia- the ‘all dominant social marker’, it affects the Herzegovina before elaborating on the theo- exercise of public authority by introducing retical argument with reference to critical arbitrariness and unpredictability (Simonsen peace-building scholarship. The second part 2005: 298). Consequently, every individual, explores the politics of insecurity by inves- regardless of their ethnicity, is affected by the tigating ethnic elite discourse on security manner in which power is exercised (Dyrstad and political practice. The following section 2012; Simonsen 2005; Bojicic-Dzelilovic explores the everyday experience of post-war 2013). Furthermore, this paradox—whereby (in)security and includes a discussion about the idea of individual safety unsettles and the paradox of ‘ethnic security.’ The final sec- compromises both collective and individual tion concludes by reflecting on the broader security—operates against the fading reality conceptual implications of this study with of the ethnic threat in peoples’ perceptions respect to the relationship between collec- of what makes life secure. These perceptions tive and individual security (i.e. ‘security gap’) have increasingly—albeit with some variation in international interventions. particularly between rural and urban areas, and to some degree among ethnic groups— Liberal Peace Intervention and coalesced around the priorities of livelihood Security Outcomes in and welfare (Efendic et al. 2014a; BTI 2014; Bosnia-Herzegovina Saferworld 2012; Haynes 2008). The early The origins of liberal peace-style interna- 2014 cross-ethnic mass protests against dete- tional intervention in post-conflict coun- riorating living standards and corruption tries can be traced to the publication of An are a good illustration of this. Thus, while Agenda for Peace in 1992—commissioned Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 3 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina by then United Nations Secretary General posits, ‘institution building…provides the Boutros Boutros Ghali—which explicitly link between a security based on coercive introduced post-conflict interventions to capacity (of domestic and/or external actors) ‘strengthen and solidify peace’ (Paris & Sisk to a security that derives from rule of law’, 2009: 5). The principal security function of namely a security bestowed by universal and these international interventions was to sta- non-discriminatory rules and their effective bilise countries emerging from war and to enforcement (Wolff 2011: 1780). Therefore, prevent a recurrence of armed conflict. It was the choice of institutional arrangement is some years later—and against a growing view critical in post-conflict societies whose exist- that state weakness and failure were at the ing institutions have been transformed by core of post-Cold War violence—that state the experience of war (Bastian & Luckham building took centre stage in both the theory 2003; Paris 2004; Wolff 2011). and practice of peace-building (Paris & Sisk If a choice of institutional arrangements 2009; Wolff 2011; Rocha Menocal 2011). The in post-conflict divided societies is critical result of this shift was their eventual and for both collective and individual security problematic conflation (Call & Wyeth 2008). outcomes, then the question of the nature The understanding that the state was often of societal division in a post-war country is responsible for human rights violations, paramount. The answer is inevitably linked humanitarian catastrophes and economic to the prevailing understanding of the causes mismanagement led to arguments that the of a particular conflict and its drivers. In mandate of international actors should be Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international com- to build effective systems and institutions munity sided with the view—supported by of governance, i.e. the liberal state (Paris a robust body of scholarship—that the con- 2004; Paris & Sisk 2009; Philipsen 2014). flict

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