Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V 2015 The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic stability Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1):11, pp. 1-18, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5334/sta.ez

RESEARCH ARTICLE The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic*

The international intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was intended to support conflict resolution by introducing territorial self-government and power sharing as the foundation for a governance framework that would provide for collective and individual security alignment over time. Instead, it has contributed to the ethnification of security whereby collective security in the form of an ‘ethnified state’ remains at the forefront of political discourse and practice. Social acceptance of this ethnified state as the guarantor of security—despite the fading reality of the ethnic threat in public perceptions of post-war insecurity—has been actively manufactured by the country’s ethnic elites using the very institutional means put in place by the international intervention. The result is an ‘ethnic security paradox’ in which the idea of individual safety—linked to the protection of ethnic identity in the form of an ethnified state—unsettles both collective and individual security alike.

Introduction that have guarded against a resumption of In many respects, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a community violence in line with the liberal paradigmatic case of a liberal peace-style view of security through effective democratic international intervention, aimed to ensure state institutions (Philipsen 2014). Although stability by building effective democratic the absence of widespread violence over the and economic governance and by promot- past two decades can be credited to this for- ing societal reconciliation. Anchored in mula, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political body the General Framework Agreement for Peace has been beset by demands—particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina that ended the from Bosnian Serbs and Croats—for more 1992–1995 war, international interven- territorial autonomy; an occurrence which tion has avoided a reversion to violence and has also preoccupied the reform efforts over- enabled most of the population to begin seen by international actors. These groups rebuilding their lives. The constitution estab- justify their demands by a claim that only lished as part of the Agreement has imple- rule by one’s own (ethnic) people can pro- mented territorial separation along ethnic vide protection and security following a war lines and human rights protection standards that turned the three constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina against each other. Thus, in the Bosnian post-war context, eth- * Senior Research Fellow, Department of Interna- nic identity has been securitised and the tional Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom country’s ethno-national political elites— [email protected] who still command a strong following—have Art. 11, page 2 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina identified ‘ethnic security’ as the axis of polit- the social reality makes ethnic fear relevant, ical discourse and action (Haynes 2008; Beha it is not necessarily perceived as a threat to & Visoka 2010). While this can be expected the security of ethnic groups in the sense of in the case of ethno-national parties ideo- direct violence. Were that so, it would pro- logically committed to the notion of secu- vide some foundation for the ethnic security rity as the protection of ethnic identity, it is discourse promoted by ethno-national elites, ominous that some nominally civic political and it would also serve as a straightforward parties have also embraced the idea of ethnic explanation of the enduring support for security in one form or another (McClelland ethnic parties. Instead, it is a product of the 2013; Azinovic et al. 2011; Saferworld 2012). combined effects of the discourse and prac- This suggests that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tice of ethnic elites and everyday experience ethnic security has become the social reality. in the institutional context shaped by the The main goal of this article is to concep- international intervention. tualise the relationship between (the idea of) Before I set out the structure of the paper, collective and individual security as a result of a caveat is in order. This discussion does not the liberal peace intervention, using Bosnia- attempt to deal with identity politics or the Herzegovina as an illustration. I submit that effectiveness of power sharing in post-con- the relationship between the idea of security flict divided societies. Rather, it has a much as protection of ethnic identity and individual narrower and specific focus on how interna- security is manifested as an ‘ethnic security tional intervention contributes to the pro- paradox’. Collective security in the form of duction of ideas of collective and individual an ethnified state should be accepted socially security in societies receiving support as well despite the pervasive individual insecurity as the ‘security gap’ created therein (Kaldor & that afflicts every citizen when ethnicity is Selchow 2014). instrumentalised and ethnic security is used The discussion moves in four steps. The first as a political tool. When ethnicity becomes part assesses liberal peace-style international the main organising principle of politics and interventions with a specific focus on Bosnia- the ‘all dominant social marker’, it affects the Herzegovina before elaborating on the theo- exercise of public authority by introducing retical argument with reference to critical arbitrariness and unpredictability (Simonsen peace-building scholarship. The second part 2005: 298). Consequently, every individual, explores the politics of insecurity by inves- regardless of their ethnicity, is affected by the tigating ethnic elite discourse on security manner in which power is exercised (Dyrstad and political practice. The following section 2012; Simonsen 2005; Bojicic-Dzelilovic explores the everyday experience of post-war 2013). Furthermore, this paradox—whereby (in)security and includes a discussion about the idea of individual safety unsettles and the paradox of ‘ethnic security.’ The final sec- compromises both collective and individual tion concludes by reflecting on the broader security—operates against the fading reality conceptual implications of this study with of the ethnic threat in peoples’ perceptions respect to the relationship between collec- of what makes life secure. These perceptions tive and individual security (i.e. ‘security gap’) have increasingly—albeit with some variation in international interventions. particularly between rural and urban areas, and to some degree among ethnic groups— Liberal Peace Intervention and coalesced around the priorities of livelihood Security Outcomes in and welfare (Efendic et al. 2014a; BTI 2014; Bosnia-Herzegovina Saferworld 2012; Haynes 2008). The early The origins of liberal peace-style interna- 2014 cross-ethnic mass protests against dete- tional intervention in post-conflict coun- riorating living standards and corruption tries can be traced to the publication of An are a good illustration of this. Thus, while Agenda for Peace in 1992—commissioned Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 3 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina by then United Nations Secretary General posits, ‘institution building…provides the Boutros Boutros Ghali—which explicitly link between a security based on coercive introduced post-conflict interventions to capacity (of domestic and/or external actors) ‘strengthen and solidify peace’ (Paris & Sisk to a security that derives from rule of law’, 2009: 5). The principal security function of namely a security bestowed by universal and these international interventions was to sta- non-discriminatory rules and their effective bilise countries emerging from war and to enforcement (Wolff 2011: 1780). Therefore, prevent a recurrence of armed conflict. It was the choice of institutional arrangement is some years later—and against a growing view critical in post-conflict societies whose exist- that state weakness and failure were at the ing institutions have been transformed by core of post-Cold War violence—that state the experience of war (Bastian & Luckham building took centre stage in both the theory 2003; Paris 2004; Wolff 2011). and practice of peace-building (Paris & Sisk If a choice of institutional arrangements 2009; Wolff 2011; Rocha Menocal 2011). The in post-conflict divided societies is critical result of this shift was their eventual and for both collective and individual security problematic conflation (Call & Wyeth 2008). outcomes, then the question of the nature The understanding that the state was often of societal division in a post-war country is responsible for human rights violations, paramount. The answer is inevitably linked humanitarian catastrophes and economic to the prevailing understanding of the causes mismanagement led to arguments that the of a particular conflict and its drivers. In mandate of international actors should be Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international com- to build effective systems and institutions munity sided with the view—supported by of governance, i.e. the liberal state (Paris a robust body of scholarship—that the con- 2004; Paris & Sisk 2009; Philipsen 2014). flict was about inter-ethnic violence rooted Using institutions as the main tool in post- in a history of ethnic hatred. This thinking conflict state building, international inter- was strongly attuned to the security dilemma ventions have attempted their construction logic, according to which, very crudely, eth- and consolidation across an expanding range nic identities are fixed and irreconcilable and of areas including good governance, human require a redrawing of the map (Xu 2012; rights, rule of law, democracy and market Jeffrey 2013: 69; Jenne 2012). By embracing economy. The underlying rationale is that an ethnic conflict view, international actors stable society is unlikely to emerge without adopted the security discourse generated by these institutions and their apparatuses local ethnic parties (Hansen 2006; Campbell (Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al. 2014). 1998). These were the same political parties In terms of liberal peace logic, a minimum that had led Bosnia-Herzegovina to war by level of security (i.e. the absence of direct inciting ethnic fear through a combination of physical violence) is needed to successfully inflammatory rhetoric and violent practice. build state institutions. According to Stefan Ultimately, these parties defined both the Wolff, ‘security first is an accepted para- context and content of peace negotiations digm of state building’ (Wolff 2011: 1779). that culminated in the signing of the General Although a liberal peace-style international Framework Agreement. The ‘Dayton for- intervention reflects a narrow understand- mula’ of territorial self-government and ing of security—and its priority is short term power sharing pursued stability and security stabilisation in post-conflict zones—at the through territorial and institutional separa- same time it recognises the importance of tion with an explicit focus on the pivotal role security for the legitimacy of institutions, of elites in building the state. In line with which is a necessary precondition for insti- the liberal peace and state-centric concep- tutional consolidation, effectiveness and the tions of security, decentralization on ethnic achievement of stable peace. Hence, Wolff principles was conceived as a form of statist Art. 11, page 4 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina security and therefore as the principal con- the liberal project of governing through free- flict management tool. With the stroke of a dom (Newman 2011). pen, the country was divided into entities, In reality, neither the minority nor majority cantons and municipalities around more or are free in a sense of enjoying the protection less homogenous ethnic territories carved of a rule-governed state. In post-war Bosnia- out by brutal acts of violence. The consti- Herzegovina, the organisation of political tutional categorisation of minorities from life, economy, media, security structures, among the three constituent peoples—hith- health, education and social interactions has erto unknown in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or for moved along ethnic lines. The institutional that matter in former Yugoslavia—was intro- frameworks in place have been conducive duced in recognition of ‘new demographic to a comprehensive separation of identi- realities’ (Pickering 2007). The protection of ties within imagined ‘ethnic security zones’ minority rights via an elaborate set of legal (Haynes 2008). In other words, international and institutional mechanisms was built into intervention has facilitated the development Bosnia-Herzegovina’s institutions under the of institutional means to articulate the idea premise it would guarantee security. The of ethnic security. In the critical scholarship fact that fear of becoming a minority was on peace-building, both the external vision an important factor behind the mobilisation of security and the preoccupation with for conflict—and one only sharpened by the institutional performance salient in the lib- experience of war—was overlooked (Kostic eral peace paradigm have been extensively 2007; Podunavac 2013). Of course, the impli- debated (Newman 2011). The experience of cation of recognising minorities was that the Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of the first coun- majority group was given the right to control tries where this type of international inter- the state (Pickering 2007: 8). By opting for vention was deployed has bolstered many of the constitutional arrangement of Bosnia- the most ardent critiques of the liberal peace Herzegovina around a three-way ethnic divi- thesis (Berdal 2009; Gromes 2009; Richmond sion, essentialist ideas about ethnicity, which 2011; Chandler 2010; Cooper et al. 2011). A Caroline Hughes calls an ‘ethnicised view of great deal of attention has focused on how war’, carried into an ‘ethnicised view of peace’ the institutional architecture erected by the in ‘which stability is achieved initially by the General Framework Agreement incentivised engineering of institutions to create partic- exclusive ethnic politics and ‘ethnic outbid- ular ethnic balances; and in which stability ding.’ In this tradition, the endurance of eth- subsequently gives way to “good governance” nic identity politics is primarily explained via a process of capacity building designed to through the role of institutional incentives help those institutions over the long term in shaping and hardening ethnic identities. to elevate themselves from the ethnic fray’ While the preceding discussion clearly dem- (Hughes 2011: 1493–1494). The General onstrates the importance of institutional Framework Agreement’s coupling of territo- incentives to ethnic identity politics, it is not rial separation and a multi-ethnic state— the sufficient to account for the ‘ethnic secu- latter to be recreated by the right to refugee rity paradox’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor the return stipulated in the Agreement’s Annex link between instrumental uses of ethnic VII—was grounded in this logic. According to identity politics and the social acceptance this logic, individual and collective security that is behind it. Furthermore, it offers no would eventually align and allow the citizens pathway to understand why—although in of Bosnia-Herzegovina to avoid discrimina- peoples’ perception ethnic fear is not a fore- tion regardless of their identity and be free to most concern—this form of manipulation by live and make their livelihoods wherever they ethnic elites is possible. I suggest that the chose. This would be the minimum require- critical peace-building scholarship could ment for individual safety in accordance with be enriched by recognising security as an Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 5 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina institutionally, discursively and socially con- stituted practice and individual security as collectively produced (Bubant 2005; Kaldor & Selchow 2014). Inquiry should not focus solely, or even primarily, on institutions but rather on the interplay of these three dimen- sions in the context of international inter- vention. This will facilitate a better grasp of how international intervention helps produce a particular relationship between collective and individual security. The theo- Figure 1: Elections to the Bosnia-Herzego- retical premise of this article is that in the vina House of Representatives, 1996–2014. context of an international intervention, Source: BHCEC 2015. security outcomes—including the relation- ship between collective and individual secu- the strongest social democratic party in rity—are not only defined by institutional Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb entity). designs but also by institutional interaction Since then, the SNSD has been a ruling with elite discourse and practice; therefore, political party in Republika Srpska. From the everyday experience of security is deci- 2010–2014, it enjoyed an absolute majority sive. The following two sections apply and at the entity level and governed in coalition develop this framework by using empirical with the SDS at the state level. Although its evidence from Bosnia-Herzegovina. popularity had declined, the SNSD won the mandate to form an entity government in Politics of Security: Discourse and the 2014 general election. Importantly, the Political Action SNSD removed the SDS from power on a Since 1995, the three ethno-national par- radical nationalist platform, which has hard- ties—the Party of Democratic Action ened over the years with respect to ethnic (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union of security claims. This was framed as punish- Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) and the ment of the SDS for its alleged cooperation Serb Democratic Party (SDS), representing in building central state institutions with Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs its non-Serb political counterparts from respectively—have remained active and influ- the Federation (Bosnia-Herzegovina’s other ential despite pluralisation which has dimin- entity) and the international community. The ished their popularity since the lead up to period 2000–2006 saw the implementation war and its immediate aftermath. Except for a of key reforms—under strong international brief period (2000–2002) when the Alliance pressure—to strengthen both the central for Change—a ten party coalition led by the state and multi-level government system. In Social Democratic Party (SDP)—formed the the lead up to the 2006 election, one of the government, all three ethno-national parties most prominent items on the SNSD electoral have continued to exert political influence at agenda concerned the 2004 apology from various levels (Figure 1). the Republika Srpska SDS-led government to To interpret the above data, a further the victims of the Srebrenica massacre. detail about the 2010 election results is Since the SBiH and the HDZ1990 are both important. While both the SDA and the nationalist in their ideology, and the SNSD— HDZ BiH have split to create two distinct despite its formal social democratic creden- parties—the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina tials—has become more radical than the (SBiH) and the HDZ1990 respectively—the SDS, politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina are over- SDS was challenged in 2006 by the Party of whelmingly defined by parties that espouse the Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), an ethno-national political agenda. It is these Art. 11, page 6 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina parties that speak in the name of security for et al. 2007: 10). Since the launch of interna- their respective ethnic groups, unchallenged tional intervention, the main ethno-national in any meaningful sense by weak politi- parties have defied the logic of liberal peace- cal opposition and divided civil society, and building and its promise of security through propped up by an increasingly politically- democratic institutions. They have worked controlled media. actively to preserve the war-induced sym- The agency of ethno-national elites is the bolic, institutional and territorial divisions key to understanding the ‘ethnic security par- of which they are the key beneficiaries. adox’. This can be credited to their engage- Moreover, they have been unintentionally ment in what Nils Bubant calls the active endorsed by international actors despite manufacture of ‘ontological uncertainty’, their detrimental effect on citizen security in defined as ‘socially constructed anxiety that Bosnia-Herzegovina. shapes pertinent kinds of danger, fears and Since war’s end, the most inflammatory concerns for a particular community at a par- narratives of ethnic interest protection have ticular time’ (Bubant 2005: 277). In Bosnia- emerged around elections and various delib- Herzegovina, ethno-national elites have been erations over key reforms. Much of this con- instrumental in maintaining the idea of eth- troversy concerns the reallocation of power nic security and its institutionalized exploi- among different levels of government and tation in the context of a three-way ethnic its interference with the ethno-nationalist division of power. These parties define the ideology of political self-rule. The discourse foremost security threat to be against eth- of ethnic interest protection—particularly nic identity and therefore focus primarily on among Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat the protection of this identity. This emphasis political elites—has visibly radicalised since evokes the issue of territory as illustrated by 2006, following the failed attempt to reform the following comment from Milorad Dodik, police forces and strengthen the central state the SNSD head: through constitutional change. This shift occurred during the presidential campaigns We should live in the same place and of Dodik and Haris Silajdzic (leader of the no one should eliminate the other…but pro-Bosniak SBiH). Silajdzic ran on a platform they [Bosniaks] have to have theirs and of ‘100% Bosnia-Herzegovina’, i.e. a unified we [Serbs] have ours [state] and only country without entities. His campaign was that is the way we can live normally, set against the decision of the International one beside the other (Kostovicova & Criminal Court that the 1995 Srebrenica mas- Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2014: 199). sacre was a genocide; a judgment which— according to Silajdzic’s formulation—made During the implementation of the General Republika Srpska ‘a genocide construction’. Framework Agreement, the political action Meanwhile, Dodik’s position was to call for of ethno-national parties has relied on eth- secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia- nic identity as well as social and territorial Herzegovina. This is just one example of the borders. The evocation of ethnic differences aggressive and defensive nationalism present and territorial control has been used to influ- in the discourse of ethnic elites; a dynamic ence the execution of numerous reforms to that is replicated in, and resonates with, build the central Bosnia-Herzegovina state. everyday practice at the grassroots level. Analysing the strategy employed by ethno- Bolstered by local trends, the radicalisation nationalist elites, Dino Abazovic argues that of political discourse has been caused by the political pluralism represents ‘one party…one disengagement of international actors from religion, one nation, and political and terri- the implementation of the peace agreement. torial exclusivity and hegemony on at least This reduction of international presence one part of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (Abazovic and leadership was justified by claims that Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 7 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina there should be greater local involvement desirability); state destruction and secession; in this process (Azinovic et al. 2011; Martin and the prospect of another war (Azinovic et al. 2012). Arguably, as the main source of et al. 2011: 14). All of these themes were fear underpinning uncertainty and its effect present during the October 2014 election on the relationship between collective and campaign, prompting comments that—as individual security, these two dynamics have far as party rhetoric was concerned—Bosnia- contributed to the perpetuation of post-war Herzegovina is back to the start of the war insecurity. (Kojovic 2014). Another prominent observer Following the 2009 European Court of of Bosnian politics claims this rhetoric is a Human Rights verdict that required Bosnia- reflection of a deeper problem, which is that: Herzegovina to grant equal political repre- sentation to groups other than the three …the leading nationalist parties have constitutive peoples (i.e. ‘Sejdic-Finci’ case), not succeeded to genuinely reform Bosnian Serb and the Bosnian Croat ethno- because they have never aban- national elites have increasingly unified in doned their war time ideology and their scepticism of state viability. The SNSD’s goals. […] their attitude towards war main goal is to preserve the current territo- crimes and ethnic cleansing, as the rial borders and powers of Republika Srpska key instigators of a brutal annihila- under the General Framework Agreement. tion of others’ ethnic and religious As a representative of the Bosnian Croat identity has not changed to this day political body, the HDZ BiH aims to achieve (Oslobodjenje 2013). more political and territorial autonomy within Federation territory via the establish- The following comment by Dodik is illus- ment of a third Bosnian Croat entity. Despite trative of anti-state rhetoric that frames its support for a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, demands for alternative political arrange- the SDA—as the strongest of the Bosnian ments, on the grounds that Republika Srpska ethno-national parties—harbours aspirations and the Bosnian Serbs are under collective for Bosniak preeminence achieved through threat, particularly from Bosniaks: a programme of constitutional reform. This struggle for territorial and political recon- It’s about whether you respect one figuration has sent ripples across other levels people, whether you strip them force- of government and is manifest in repeated fully of their legitimate rights push- demands to redraw municipal borders along ing them into a position of being an ethnic lines. At face value, this supports the object rather than subject of political claims of those scholars who cite ethnicity as and all other social processes…there one of the key factors causing the outbreak are quite serious intentions, which is of war (Weidmann 2011). less known, to steal and annul iden- Dodik and the SNSD have spearheaded tities. Almost forcibly, be it publicly the discourse of ethnic victimhood, threat- or in a concealed way, the story is ened secession from Bosnia-Herzegovina, being pushed through that we are all and thus rekindled post-war ethnic polariza- Bosnians (Azinovic et al. 2011: 19). tion. As recently as the October 2014 gen- eral election, this discourse has escalated to The prospect of ethnic identity protection an open and continuous denigration of the through the establishment of a territory or state. In their analysis of hate speech during ethnic state is also reflected in the claims of the 2010 general election, Vlado Azinovic HDZ BiH leader Dragan Covic: and colleagues identified several prominent themes in this radicalized political discourse: Bosnia has a future exclusively as a the future of the state (its durability and country of three equal people…all Art. 11, page 8 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina

those that think to create it differ- provides a fertile soil (Malesevic 2010: 78). ently, on a civic concept and a concept The constant manufacture of ethnic threat of a unitary state will absolutely have and inter-ethnic difference by ethno- condemned it to collapse (Azinovic et national elites is mirrored by political action al. 2011:15). that challenges any reform perceived as dis- ruptive to existing politico-economic power, The discourse of ethnic identity protection— itself based on the ethno-national division i.e. the protection of the rights and privileges of the country. Over time (and particularly of a particular ethnic group, with the ‘ethnic since 2006), the lack of a defined and con- state’ as its guarantor—is not limited to polit- sistent international policy towards Bosnia- ical elites but is also exploited by a range of Herzegovina has emboldened these forces other social actors. War veterans, for exam- and weakened some of the central state ple, are among the most vocal advocates of institutions erected under international ethnic homogenisation and political self- oversight. This action includes attempts to rule. The following extract from an interview change the army structure, which had been with Miro Grabovac—founder and long-time considered one of the most successful inter- president of the Bosnian Croat war veterans nationally sponsored reforms. Several exam- association—illustrates this: ples taken from public discourse illustrate the political action underlying ethnic secu- Bosnia and Herzegovina can be sta- rity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. ble and sustainable only if her three Because the implementation of the constitutive people are sovereign, aforementioned ‘Sejdic-Finci’ verdict has which means that (Bosnian) Croats been blocked for several years, Bosnia- must get their own republic. […] Those Herzegovina’s progress towards European Bosnian Croat politicians who would Union accession has been interrupted. The support the implementation of the most immediate consequence of this inac- ‘Sejdic-Finci’ verdict, and not settle tion has been the political stalemate in the the question of the Bosnian Croats as southern town of Mostar. Since 2010, the SDA a constitutive people, would be the and HDZ BiH disagreement over reorganisa- traitors (Grabovac 2013). tion has blocked the work of both municipal and cantonal governments as well as caused It is important to note that for most of the Mostar to miss municipal elections in 2012. post-war period, war veterans have been the The latest proposal calls for the establish- strongest electoral base for ethnic parties. ment of three ‘Bosniak’ and one ‘Bosnian The ideology of political self-rule necessitates Croat’ municipalities within Mostar (Bjelica- a requisite set of institutions, which—as dis- Sagovnovic 2013). Moreover, a similar pro- cussed in the previous section—were put in gramme of ethnic reorganisation has been place by the General Framework Agreement proposed in the central Bosnia municipality (Gutierrez-Sanin & Wood 2014). Explaining of Travnik (Gudelj 2013). Since 1995, numer- ethnicity as a politicized social action, Sinisa ous reforms have been deliberately blocked Malesevic argues that ethnicity is about more or delayed by the parties opposed to rebuild- than cultural and symbolic action, perspec- ing a unified, multi-ethnic, rule-governed tive, discourse or a way of understanding and state using the very institutions the inter- interpreting. In his view, ‘interpretations, national intervention helped put into place. discourses and perspectives do not float in The victims of this political strategy are the the air but are linked to specific dynamics citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose lives of political, economic and coercive power’ and livelihoods have suffered because of for which the existing institutional context the political and economic mismanagement Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 9 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina inherent to the politics of ethnic security. The number increased from 7 per month in 2007, next section examines the social practices to 9 in 2008 and 13 in 2009 (Saferworld and everyday experience of security at the 2012: 14). Azinovic reports that 60 intereth- grassroots level. It explores what makes the nic incidents were recorded in 2010 and 40 idea of ethnic security in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first three months of 2011 (Azinovic socially acceptable: whether the notion of et al. 2011: 62). This data, while not compa- ethnic security—stimulated by concern for rable, suggest that the number of incidents the protection of ethnic identity—has some appears to have escalated when the political grounding in the everyday experience of situation deteriorates and ethnic security ordinary people. rhetoric is on the rise. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been in a permanent state of political cri- Social Practices and the Everyday sis since the October 2010 general elections. Experience of Security The 2008 global recession degraded living Ethnic security discourse is sustainable only standards, increased general uncertainty and in so far as it operates in a supportive con- ultimately contributed to an environment text shaped by the interplay between institu- conducive to (inter-ethnic) violence. Since an tions and social practices. In the remainder important aspect of inter-ethnic dynamics is of this section, three aspects of insecurity the propensity to attribute the cause of vari- are explored in relation to the daily experi- ous grievances—e.g. access to certain services ence of citizens and their idea of individual or job opportunities—to one’s ethnic iden- and collective security: ethnically-motivated tity, a worsening economic environment is a physical violence as well as institutional and potent source of discontent. symbolic aspects of insecurity. However, Compared with early post-war years, the everyday experience of (in)security in more recent incidents of direct violence Bosnia-Herzegovina can only be understood have been aimed at individuals and subse- in relation to the politics of insecurity dis- quently received wide publicity. Inter-ethnic cussed above. violence is most likely to occur during mass In the immediate post-war period, direct public events such as football games, public ethnically-motivated violence—in the form gatherings around religious sites and cel- of killings, arson attacks, destruction of ebrations related to religious holidays. An property and religious sites, expulsions, ver- unprecedented case of hooliganism moti- bal attacks, threats by weapons, stoning, and vated by ethnic prejudice occurred in 2009, so on—aimed foremost at returning refu- when a Sarajevo football fan was killed dur- gees and displaced persons was common ing a match in the West Herzegovina town throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although of Siroki Brijeg. In places where the political murder rates were small in absolute terms, context is particularly acute (such as Mostar), several of these incidents were the subject of sporadic inter-ethnic clashes are typical intense public debate due to the involvement among the youth but occur less frequently of high-ranking local officials. Over time, than in the past. instances of ethnically-motivated aggres- Research conducted by Saferworld—which sion subsided with spikes in violence mir- involved 240 focus group interviews organ- roring the political situation. For example, ised in 46 localities—found that inter-ethnic the collapse of the 2006 talks on constitu- violence is not a source of concern and that tional reform ushered in a period of intensi- the public considers police response to be fied political tension which was reflected by adequate (Saferworld 2012: 14). This could increased incidences of ethnically-motivated be interpreted as inter-ethnic relations violence from 2007–2009. These incidents no longer having the same weight in peo- were not systematically recorded but their ple’s everyday lives because of improved Art. 11, page 10 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina professional standards in the police force (as Polje in Republika Srpska organized a pro- the logic of liberal peace intervention focus- test lasting several weeks outside the offices ing on institutional performance would of the Federation government and High suggest). However, Azinovic has shown the Representative in Sarajevo. Their demands police to be absent, inadequate or—often- included a national curriculum for Bosniak times in the case of refugees—instigators of children and the right to participate in the violence (Azinovic et al. 2011). Furthermore, school’s governing board; both of which the number of individuals involved in war- had been denied to them but permitted at time violence—including mass atrocities— schools attended by non-Serb children. The holding public office has undermined trust significance of this case is not only that such in the police force and ultimately proved discrimination continues but also that it is to be a strong deterrent against the return unlikely to be resolved internally given the of refugees. tacit approval of local authorities as well as Refugees and displaced people have also a general belief in the necessity of interna- had their rights infringed as part of the tional presence and intervention. Such prac- strategy to preserve the ethno-territorial re- tices coexist with other forms of inter-ethnic composition instituted during the war. Those separation including the decision of parents who have returned to their pre-war resi- to send their children to schools more geo- dences—or desire to do so—have been denied graphically distant in order to avoid class- due process in a blatant breach of existing mates of different ethnicities. legal entitlements (Haynes 2008; Jenne Job discrimination, particularly in public 2010). The authorities have also systemati- administration, is another prominent exam- cally obstructed the transfer of pension and ple that feeds into inter-ethnic tensions and welfare claims across jurisdictions. An ethni- perceptions on injustice on ethnic grounds. cally organised—and in some cases openly According to the 1991 census, employment segregated—education system has been in public administration is ostensibly based another arena of discriminatory practice upon an ethnic proportional quota system. aimed at minorities. Underscoring the depth In reality, there are huge discrepancies in how of inter-ethnic separation is the ‘two schools this law is implemented. A breakdown of pub- under one roof’ programme, in which stu- lic administration employees in the Republika dents of different ethnicities follow differ- Srpska is illustrative (See Table 1 below). ent curricula, occupy different classrooms or According to available Federation employ- attend school in different shifts. This system ment data for 2011, Bosnian Serbs accounted was introduced under the auspices of the for only 4.2 per cent of the total and 17 Organization for Security and Cooperation institutions had no Bosnian Serb employees in Europe in an attempt to encourage refu- (Breberina & Popadic 2011). gee return by providing security for students The symbolic aspects of ethnic security of different ethnicities. There are some 54 politics are hugely important for explaining schools still in existence, located mostly in the social acceptance and continuing appeal the three ethnically mixed Federation can- of ethnic protection in Bosnia-Herzegovina. tons whose governments refuse to close These aspects have been extensively dis- them. Ethnic segregation is particularly pro- cussed amongst scholars, particularly in nounced among primary school children, the context of ethnic identity construction where the right to a so-called ‘national cur- as a cause of war. Enmity amongst Bosnia- riculum’ (a set of subjects including lan- Herzegovina’s ethnic groups is also one of guage, history and geography) is frequently the most prominent micro-explanations of denied. In Autumn 2013, a high profile case wartime dynamics and was effectively rec- attracted significant public attention. A ognised as such by the General Framework group of parents and children from Konjevic Agreement (Weidmann 2011). However, little Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 11 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnian Serbs Bosniaks Bosnian Others Total Croats Ministries 9,656 445 85 0 10,186 Municipalities 3,458 92 31 19 3,600

Table 1: Ethnic Composition of Public Servants in Republika Srpska, 2004. Source: Adzajlic- Davidovic & Haskovic 2014: 58. attention has been paid to the use of sym- the reality of fear amongst different ethnic bolic instruments in rekindling ethnic stereo- groups and their perception of one another types in the post-war era and how this affects as plausible security threats, this should not relations in terms of security perceptions eclipse the myriad forms of everyday interac- and attitudes to ethno-national politics. The tion and coexistence that evidence a desire production of insecurity through symbolic for normality (Eastmond 2010). means takes a variety of forms and appeals to the respective identities of all three ethnic Explaining the Paradox of ‘Ethnic groups. This includes exclusion from public Security’ spaces by renaming streets, public buildings The previous sections discussed the role of and even town names; the choice of public ethnic identity in shaping the relationship (national) holidays as well as the location and between collective and individual security timing of memorial events; the prominent and its subsequent contribution to ethnic display of religious insignias signifying the security as social reality. These insights will dominance of one group over a certain ter- now be expounded upon with available data ritory; an insistence upon separate television on ethnic relations as well as a discussion of channels due to linguistic distinctiveness; the broader socio-economic and institutional and so on. There are other more subtle and contexts in order to explain how collective seemingly mundane forms in which the idea and individual security are compromised by of the ethnic state is refashioned and kept ethno-national rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina; present in daily life, such as the inclusion of i.e. the paradox of ‘ethnic security’. the wartime Bosnian Croat state insignia on Data on various facets of inter-ethnic rela- utility bills and the use of the Cyrillic alpha- tions are rare given the difficulty involved in bet to reaffirm ethnic identity in Republika researching the subject (Dyrstad 2012). Data Srpska. As a result, a ubiquitous dynamic of on social distance as well as ethnic tension, aggressive and defensive nationalism has fear and trust are inconsistent and rarely rekindled awareness and fear of inter-eth- cover sufficient time periods to capture the nic differences. In reality, this affects wider dynamic nature of inter-ethnic relations. understandings of social boundaries and The only available data on social distance—a territoriality that negates freedom of move- measure of relation to other social groups— ment and discourages interaction among dif- covering the general population ends in ferent ethnic groups. In many places, there 2009 (Puhalo 2009). While this study finds is tacit acceptance among the youth of ‘ours’ that social distance increased between and ‘theirs’ coffee shops and clubs. 2002 and 2009, disaggregation—over time Although the discussion above provides and by ethnic group—reveals interesting only a superficial glance of the social reality inflections in social distance patterns that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it captures the intri- resonate with political dynamics during the cate and complex ways in which the ideas of same period. As discussed earlier, social dis- individual and collective security mix with tance narrowed between 2002 and 2006 but ethnic identity protection in the daily lives of increased significantly thereafter as the polit- citizens. While focus has been on illuminating ical situation deteriorated (Puhalo 2009). Art. 11, page 12 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Another important finding is that the dis- institute privileged access to opportunities tance between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian and services is an important factor affect- Serbs has reduced over time, which can be ing both collective and individual security explained by respective political leaders (McClelland 2013). Therefore, support for unifying to better negotiate constitutional ethnic parties does not necessarily indicate reforms. Concurrently, the social distance ethnic tension. A more systematic analysis of between Bosniaks and these two groups has voting patterns to establish the profile of the increased. A more recent study of high school electoral base and party strategies would be students reveals that social perceptions oper- a useful test of this claim. ate at two levels. At the collective level, there In interpreting the evidence generally used is a tendency to use ethnic stereotypes and to support the ethnic security argument, it is refrain from inter-ethnic interaction while, important to reflect upon the broader con- on a personal level, ethnic factors appear less text. One relevant issue concerns repatria- relevant (Puhalo 2013). Srdan Puhalo’s expla- tion as a key pillar of the General Framework nation reinforces the observation that inter- Agreement. This is a multifaceted problem ethnic relations are influenced primarily by that cannot be reduced, as it is often argued, relations among political elites and how they to concerns over ethnically-based discrimi- are represented in public discourse. Gallup nation. What is often downplayed is that Balkan Monitor data shows that trust among the reluctance to go back is sometimes the three ethnic groups improved between related more to strategic calculations, or 2006 and 2010 (GBM 2010). Given the ethnic what Erin Jenne calls ‘the logic of spoils’, enmity thesis, it is remarkable that interper- than fear of being a minority (Jenne 2010). sonal trust in Bosnia-Herzegovina appears to Issues related to jobs, housing, welfare and be greater than in other countries with no healthcare—which also the concern the similar experience of war (Weidmann 2011). majority population—need to be resolved In research on ethnic tensions in Bosnia- before a return may be considered viable. Herzegovina, 77.3 per cent of respondents Given the absence of these conditions, refu- reported no ethnic tension in their neigh- gees who have started their lives elsewhere bourhood while 15 per cent reported only a are reluctant to go back to their pre-war small degree of tension (Efendic et al. 2014a). places of residence. Similarly, discrimina- Whatever deficiencies the above data might tion in public administration recruitment possess, it suggests that the pervasive ethnic must be understood in the context of high fear touted by ethno-national elites is simply unemployment. As the largest employer, not evident. Recent polling data found that the public sector has to reject a huge num- 56 per cent of citizens favoured a society ber of applicants for reasons that are not with no ethnic separation, which further res- necessarily based upon ethnicity. Likewise, onates with qualitative research findings that inadequate public services are routinely ethnic issues are not the foremost security framed as ethnically-based discrimination concern (Kostrebic 2014). The recurring view by the minority population when, in reality, expressed is that employment, health, hous- they are oftentimes attributable to a lack of ing and other welfare issues are critical, and financial and technical capacity on the part that a better socio-economic situation would of relevant service providers. Although inter- improve inter-ethnic relations (Eastmond ethnic cooperation over common problems 2010: 12). For example, those who are cur- is—for a variety of reasons—absent, coopera- rently employed show a greater tolerance tion nevertheless occurs when the public is towards other ethnic groups (Efendic et al. sufficiently motivated. A recent example is 2014b). According to Benjamin McClelland, the 2013–2014 mass protests over the pro- the potential of ethnic voting and rule to posal of a unique identification number for Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 13 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina all citizens after a tragic death of an infant international intervention (Kostovicova & (Oslobodjenje 2013). Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2010). An arbitrary system Going back to the symbolic aspects of of rule, which rests on informal arrange- inter-ethnic relations, it is important to ments and extra-institutional channels, understand their deeper implications on generates inequities that feed into a general local understandings of real threats and dan- mistrust at the interpersonal, inter-group gers. Public events designed to incite ethnic and institutional levels (Bojicic-Dzelilovic tensions often are condoned, or even spon- 2013). It also inflames perceptions of dis- sored by, political elites. For example, the crimination and social injustice that, in the municipal budget funded Orthodox holiday context of politicised ethnicity, can be easily celebrations in Srebrenica and Bratunac interpreted as ethnically-motivated. If safety (both sites of genocide) which turned into means the absence of conditions where indi- massive anti-Bosniak gatherings (Krajisnik vidual life is at risk, then ethnic threat is no 2013). Although police were present at both longer a real or perceived threat at the indi- events, they failed to intervene. Such exam- vidual level. Local people consider the inher- ples are relevant in terms of what they tell ent uncertainties of post-war social, political us about trust in government, particularly in and economic dynamics to be the greatest the case of minority populations. Research threat and source of insecurity. In Bosnia- shows that minorities have more trust in Herzegovina, these forces have been ampli- their own authorities due to the ideology fied by complex governmental policy based of—and exclusionary practices instituted upon an ethnic framework that has played by—ethnically-based government (Efendic et into the hands of ethno-national parties as al. 2011). Greater trust in political authority well as the ambiguous role of international is further diminished by the public’s aware- actors in the peace-building process. ness of ethnic security as a strategy imple- mented by elites to control access to power Conclusion and resources (Azinovic et al. 2011). This This article has explored how liberal peace recognition feeds into a general mistrust of intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina has government which is shared by all ethnic produced a security gap, defined as a rela- groups and seems at odds with the logic tion between collective and individual secu- of ethnic security (UNDP 2009). According rity. One of the key questions asked in this to Azinovic, institutional dysfunction is at research is why—given the ambiguous evi- the core of the insecurity among citizens dence of ethnic threat as a source of insecu- irrespective of their ethnicity, a finding cor- rity in the post-war period and the existing, roborated in broader scholarship (Azinovic et robust institutional mechanisms of minor- al. 2011). Respondents to Marita Eastmond ity rights protection—the notion of ethnic characterised their view of security as ‘pre- security prevails in international and local carious’; understood locally as encompassing narratives as well as international interven- vulnerability, fear of the future, disempow- tion practices. In conceiving the security erment due to socio-economic deprivation gap as a result of international interven- and lack of opportunity attributable mostly tion, I am not attempting to qualify the rela- to poor socio-economic conditions and tionship between collective and individual governance (Eastmond 2010). According security in terms of distance, direction or to Kostovicova & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, weak ‘levels’. Instead, I want to highlight that, in institutions and pervasive corruption inher- the post-conflict context of politicised eth- ent to ethno-national rule have turned the nicity, the two are linked in complex and state into a source of insecurity for its own dynamic ways. In some sense, one can speak people, in contrast to the intentions of the of a certain hierarchy of security needs or Art. 11, page 14 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina concerns that are shaped by contextual fac- Human and Minority Rights in the Life tors and produce an ambiguous and shift- Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts, 3 October 2010. ing relationship between the perceptions of Available at https://www.scribd.com/ collective and individual security. In Bosnia- doc/38614246/Ethno-Mobilization-and- Herzegovina, international intervention has the-Organized-Production-of-Violence-in- enabled ethno-national elites to actively Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-Conscious-Prep- manufacture ethnic fear through institu- arations [Last accessed 8 February 2015]. tional and symbolic means. The result is one Adzajlic-Davidovic, A and Haskovic, E in which an incline towards group security 2014 Dugi putevi pravde. In: Lalic, V Kako shapes how collective and individual secu- prevazici govor mrznje. Banja Luka: Defen- rity coalesce despite the fact that basic needs dologija centar. pp. 58–75. remain unmet. This conclusion was reflected Azinovic, V, Bassuener, K and Weber, B by a comment from one respondent, who 2011 Assessing Potential for Renewed Eth- stated: ‘We have to separate first so that we nic Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A can come together again.’ Security Risk Analysis. Washington, D.C.: The narrative of ethnic security remains Atlantic Initiative Democratization Policy ingrained in public consciousness despite Council. wider awareness of its instrumental use and Bastian, S and Luckham, R (eds.) 2003 Can victimization by ethnically-based rule; a phe- Democracy be Designed?: The Politics of nomenon I have called the ‘ethnic security Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Socie- paradox’. However, as this research suggests, ties. London: Zed Books. there are complex reasons for the contin- Beha, A and Visoka, G 2010 Human Secu- ued endorsement of ethnic security. Above rity as ‘Ethnic Security’ in Kosovo. Human all, they concern uncertainty in regard to Security Perspectives, 7(1): 83–101. Avail- pending political settlement, daily economic able at http://www.etc-graz.at/typo3/ hardship, expectations that the state will index.php?id=1160 [Last accessed 8 Feb- provide solutions, and the changing modal- ruary 2015]. ity of international involvement in the coun- Berdal, M 2009 Building Peace After War. try’s long term viability. As Günther Pallaver London: International Institute of Strate- shows convincingly in the case of South Tyrol, gic Studies. ‘security concepts are only successful when a Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014 BTI 2014 – variety of different forms of threats become Bosnia­ and Herzegovina Country Report. increasingly improbable’ (Pallaver 2014: 8). Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it appears Stiftung. that ethnic fear is an improbable justifica- Bjelica-Sagovnovic, S 2013 Nova podjela tion for ethnic security discourse. Instead, Mostara: cetiri opstine- tribosnjacke, policymakers should refocus their attention jedna hrvatska, 23 August. Available at on what exactly is being secured through ter- http://www.bhmagazin.mazalica.com/ ritorial demarcation in the context of post- bih-index/item/14963-nova-pod- war politicised ethnicity and where and how jela-mostara-%C4%8Detiri- individuals find security therein. op%C4%87ine-%E2%80%93-tri- bo%C5%A1nja%C4%8Dke-i-jedna-hrvat- References ska.html [Last accessed 21 February 2015]. Abazovic, D, Curak, N, Seizovic, Z, Sacic, Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V 2013 Informality, Ine- N and Turcalo, S 2007 Ethno-Mobiliza- quality and Social Reintegration in Post- tion and the Organized Production of War Transition. Studies in Social Justice, Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina - 7(2): 211–228. Available at http://brock. Conscious Preparations. MIRICO Project: scholarsportal.info/journals/index. Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 15 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina

php/SSJ/article/view/1044/1014 [Last Eastmond, M 2010 Introduction: Reconcili- accessed 8 February 2015]. ation, Reconstruction, and Everyday Life Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V, Kostovicova, D and in War-torn Societies. Focaal-Journal of Rampton, D 2014 State-Building, Nation- Global and Historical Anthropology, 57: Building, and Reconstruction. In: Kaldor, 3–26. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/ M and Rangelov, I The Handbook of fcl.2010.570101 Global Security Policy. Chichester: Black- Efendic, A, Pugh, G and Adnett, N 2011 well. pp. 263–282. DOI: http://dx.doi. Confidence in Formal Institutions and org/10.1002/9781118442975.ch15 Reliance on Informal Institutions in Bos- Bosnia-Herzegovina Central Election nia-Herzegovina: An Empirical Analysis Commission 2015 Utvrdeni Rezul- Using Survey Data. Economics of Transi- tati Posrednih Izbora Za Predsjednika I tion, 19(3): 521–540. DOI: http://dx.doi. Potpredsjednike Federacije BiH, 9 Feb­ org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2010.00408.x ruary. Available at http://www.izbori. Effendic, A, Silajdzic, S and Atanasovska, ba/default.aspx?Lang=3&CategoryID=38 V 2014a Ethnic Tensions and Economic [Last accessed 21 February 2015]. Performance. Saarbrucken: Lambert Aca- Breberina, N and Popadic, S 2011 Srba demic Publishing. svega cetiri odsto u drzavnoj upravi FBiH. Efendic, A, Mickiewicz, T and Rebmann, Blic, 24 October. Available at http://www. A 2014b Growth Aspirations and Social blic.rs/Vesti/Republika-Srpska/285101/ Capital: Young Firms in a Post-Conflict Srba-svega-cetiri-odsto-u-drzavnoj- Environment. International Small Busi- upravi-FBiH [Last accessed 8 February ness Journal. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 2015]. 10.1177/0266242613516987 Bubant, N 2005 Vernacular Security: The Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010 Insights Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans and Local Worlds. Security Dialogue, 2010 Summary of Findings. Available at 36(3): 275–296. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ http://www.esiweb.org/enlargement/ 10.1177/0967010605057015 wp-content/uploads/2009/02/2010_ Call, C and Wyeth, V (eds.) 2008 Building Summary_of_Findings.pdf [Last accessed States to Build Peace. London: Lynne 21 February 2015]. Rienner Publishers. Grabovac, M T 2013 Hrvati moraju dobiti Campbell, D 1998 National Deconstruction: svoju republiku, 19 August. Available at Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia. Min- http://mojusk.ba/vijesti.php?id=15783 neapolis: University of Minnesota Press. [Last accessed 21 February 2015]. Chandler, D 2010 International Statebuild- Gromes, T 2009 A Case Study in ‘Institution- ing: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance. alisation before Liberalisation’: Lessons Abingdon: Routledge. from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal Cooper, N, Turner, M and Pugh, M 2011 The of Intervention and Statebuilding, 3(1): End of History and the Last Liberal Peace- 94–114. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ builder: A Reply to Roland Paris. Review 17502970802608407 of International Studies, 37(4): 1995– Gudelj, J 2013 Podjela Mostara i Travnika 2007. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ na opcine, 22 October 2013. Available at S0260210511000143 http://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/ Dyrstad, K 2012 After Ethnic Civil War: uskoro-i-konacan-dogovor-sda-i-hdza- Ethno-Nationalism in the Western Bal- bih-podjela-mostara-i-travnika-na-opcine kans. Journal of Peace Research, 49(6): [Last accessed 8 February 2015]. 817–831. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ Gutierrez-Sanin, F and Wood, E J 2014 Ide- 10.1177/0022343312439202 ology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption Art. 11, page 16 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina

and Beyond. Journal of Peace Research, Transnational Networks. In: Wolfgang, B 51(20): 213–226. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ et al Transnational Terrorism, Organised 10.1177/0022343313514073 Crime and Peace Building: Human Secu- Hansen, L 2006 Security as Practice: Dis- rity in the Western Balkans. Basingstoke: course Analysis and the Bosnian War. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 38–54. Abingdon: Routledge. Kostovicova, D and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V Haynes, D F (ed.) 2008 Deconstructing the 2014 Ethnicity Pays: The Political Econ- Reconstruction: Human Rights and Rule of omy of Post-Conflict Nationalism in Law in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Kissane, B After Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Civil War: Division, Reconstruction, and Hughes, C 2011 The Politics of Knowledge: Reconciliation in Contemporary Europe. Ethnicity, Capacity and Return in Post-­ Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Conflict Reconstruction Policy. Review Press. pp. 187–213. of International Studies, 37(4): 1493– Kostrebic, K 2014 Gradjani ne zele etnicke 1514. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ podjele, 7 April. Available at: http://www. S0260210511000210 valicon.net/uploads/Saopstenje_za_ Jeffrey, A 2013 The Improvised State: Sover- javnost_2014_04_07.pdf [Last accessed eignty, Performance and Agency in Dayton 21 February 2015]. Bosnia. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Krajisnik, D 2013 Fasizam na Drini-opet. Jenne, E K 2010 Barriers to Reintegration Bosanskohercegovacki Dani, 23 August. after Ethnic Civil Wars: Lessons from Available at https://www.bhdani.ba/ Minority Returns and Restitution in the portal/clanak/845/fokus/fasizam-na- Balkans. Civil Wars, 12(4): 370–394. DOI: drini-opet [Last accessed 8 February http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.20 2015]. 10.534622 Malesevic, S 2010 Ethnicity in Time and Jenne, E K 2012 When Will We Part with Space: A Conceptual Analysis. Critical the Partition Theory? Flawed Premises Sociology, 37(1): 67–82. DOI: http:// and Improbable Longevity of the The- dx.doi.org/10.1177/0896920510378763 ory of Ethnic Partition. Ethnopolitics, Martin, M, Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V, Kostovi- 11(3): 255–267. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ cova, D, Wittman, A and Moser, S 2012 10.1080/17449057.2011.587956 Exiting Conflict, Owning the Peace: Local Kaldor, M and Selchow, S 2014 Critically Ownership in International Peace Opera- Assessing International Intervention tions. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. into Conflicts: A Suggestion for a New McClelland, B 2013 Ethnic Voters and Non- Approach. Unpublished paper. Ethnic Parties: Evidence from Bosnia- Kojovic, P 2014 Bojim se da ce nam prima- Herzegovina. In: Columbia University rna zadaca u mandatu biti kako sprijeciti Political Science Department Mini-APSA pakao, 17 November 2014. Available at Student Conference, New York, NY on 26 http://www.vijesti.ba/intervjui/247018- April 2013, pp. 1–27. Available at http:// BOJIM-NAM-PRIMARNA-ZADACA-MAN- polisci.columbia.edu/files/polisci/ DATU-BITI-KAKO-SPRIJECITI-PAKAO.html content/pdf/students/McClelland_ [Last accessed 8 February 2015]. thnic%20Voters%20and%20Non- Kostic, R 2007 Ambivalent Peace, Extended Ethnic%20Parties.pdf [Last accessed 8 Peacebuilding, Threatened Identity and February 2015]. Reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Newman, E 2011 A Human Security Peace- Unpublished thesis (PhD), Uppsala Building Agenda. Third World Quarterly, University. 32(10): 1737–1756. DOI: http://dx.doi. Kostovicova, D and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610568 V 2010 Human Security in a Weak Oslobodjenje 2013 Suljagic: Smrt bebe ide State in the Balkans: Globalisation and na dusu Sredoja Novica. Oslobodjenje, 16 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of Art. 11, page 17 of 18 ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina

June. Available at http://www.oslobod- Richmond, O 2011 Post-Liberal Peace. Lon- jenje.ba/vijesti/bih/suljagic-smrt-bebe- don: Routledge. ide-na-dusu-sredoja-novica [Last accessed Rocha Menocal, A 2011 Statebuilding for 21 February 2015. Peace: A New Paradigm for International Pallaver, G 2014 South Tyrol’s Changing Engagement in Post-Conflict Fragile Political System: From Dissociative on States? Third World Quarterly, 32(10): the Road to Associative Conflict Resolu- 1715–1736. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.10 tion. Nationalities Papers: The Journal of 80/01436597.2011.610567 Nationalism and Ethnicity, 42(3): 376– Saferworld 2012 The Missing Peace: The 398. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/ Need for a Long Term Strategy in Bosnia 00905992.2013.856393 and Herzegovina. Sarajevo, Bosnia and Paris, R 2004 At War’s End: Building Peace Herzegovina: Nansen Dialogue Centre After Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cam- and Saferworld. bridge University Press. DOI: http:// Simonsen, S G 2005 Addressing Ethnic Divi- dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790836 sions in Post-Conflict Institution-Build- Paris, R and Sisk, T (eds.) 2009 The Dilem- ing: Lessons from Recent Cases. Security mas of Peacebuilding: Confronting the Dialogue, 36(3): 297–318. DOI: http:// Contradictions of Postwar Peace Opera- dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010605057017 tions. Abingdon: Routledge. United Nations Development Programme Philipsen, L 2014 When Liberal Peacebuild- 2009 National Human Development ing Fails: Paradoxes of Implementing Report - The Ties that Bind: Social Capital Ownership and Accountability in the in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo, Bos- Integrated Approach. Journal of Interven- nia and Herzegovina: UNDP. tion and Statebuilding, 8(1): 42–67. DOI: Weidmann, N B 2011 Violence “from above” http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.20 or “from below”? The Role of Ethnicity in 14.877628 Bosnia’s Civil War. The Journal of Politics, Pickering, P 2007 Peacebuilding in the Bal- 73(4): 1178–1190. DOI: http://dx.doi. kans: The View from the Ground Floor. org/10.1017/S0022381611000831 Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Wolff, S 2011 Managing Ethno-National Podunavac, M 2013 Introduction to the Issue Conflict: Towards an Analytical Frame- ‘Fear in the Balkans’. Southeastern Europe, work. Commonwealth & Comparative Poli- 37(2): 129–136. DOI: http://dx.doi. tics, 49(2): 162–195. DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.1163/18763332-03702001 org/10.1080/14662043.2011.564471 Puhalo, S 2009 Etnicka distanca i (auto)ste- Xu, J 2012 The Ethnic Security Dilemma and reotipi gradana Bosne i Hercegovine. Sara- Ethnic Violence: An Alternative Empiri- jevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. cal Model and its Explanatory Power. Puhalo, S 2013 Kako opazamo druge etnicke Res Publica – Journal of Undergraduate grupe I njihove clanove: socijalna percep- Research, 17(1). Available at http://digi- cija I etnicka pripadnost kod srednjoskol- talcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol17/ aca u Bosni i Hercegovini. iss1/9 [Last accessed 8 February 2015]. Art. 11, page 18 of 18 Bojicic-Dzelilovic: The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina

How to cite this article: Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V 2015 The Politics, Practice and Paradox of ‘Ethnic Security’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 11, pp. 1-18, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ez

Published: 12 March 2015

Copyright: © 2015 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License (CC-BY 3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.

Stability: International Journal of Security & Development is a OPEN ACCESS peer-reviewed open access journal published by Ubiquity Press