Moving Right? The Influence of Right-Wing Populism on Immigration Rhetoric in and the

Figure 1 A cartoon illustrating how Dutch politics has changed in the run up to the 2017 national election (cartoon by Peter Schrank).

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities University of

Author: Yasmin van Benthem Student number: 10524754

Main supervisor: prof. dr. L.A. Bialasiewicz Second supervisor: dr. M.J.M. Rensen

July 2017

Table of contents

List of figures 3

Abstract 4

Introduction 5

1. Right-wing populism: definitions and categorizations 9 1.1 'Populism': a contested concept 9 1.2 Different definitions of 'populism' 10 1.3 The historical development of right-wing populism 13 1.4 The different categorizations of 'right-wing populism' 15

2. Methodology: critical discourse analysis 18 2.1 Critical discourse analysis 18 2.2 Critical geopolitics: a framework for analysis 21

3. The Netherlands: from ethnic minority policy to assimilationist immigration policies 23 3.1 Dutch immigration policy: a brief historical overview 23 3.2 Context: the new (right-wing) face of mainstream political parties 26 3.3 Discourse analysis: the influence of right-wing populism in the Netherlands 29

4. The Politics of Immigration in France 36 4.1 The development of French immigration policy 36 4.2 Context: the 'revolutionary' French presidential election of 2017 40 4.3 Discourse analysis: the influence of right-wing populism in France 42

Conclusion 46

Bibliography 49

2 List of figures

Figure 1 A cartoon illustrating how Dutch politics has changed in the run up to the 2017 national election. Cartoon by Peter Schrank. Source: The Economist, 11 February 2017. Page 01

Figure 2 Poll displaying the electoral course of the PVV from September 2012 until March 2017. Source: Peilingwijzer 2017. Page 27

Figure 3 Poll displaying the electoral course of the VVD from September 2012 until March 2017. Source: Peilingwijzer 2017. Page 27

Figure 4 The open letter Rutte published in several Dutch newspapers, 23 January 2017. Source: NRC. Page 30

Figure 5 The political advertisement Asscher published in the Volkskrant, 10 March 2017. Source: . Page 31

Figure 6 The official first round results of the 2017 French presidential Elections, 24 April 2017. Source: The Guardian. Page 40

3 Abstract

This thesis provides an analysis of the influence of right-wing populism on the immigration- rhetoric of left- and right-wing mainstream parties in France and the Netherlands. In order to determine the extent of right-wing populist influence, a critical discourse analysis (CDA) is applied to several key political speeches (with regard to the French context) and newspaper advertisements (with regard to the Dutch context), in the run-up to the national elections held in both countries in the spring of 2017. The sources that were used for the discourse analysis were chosen from both left- and right-wing mainstream parties in the two countries, since this thesis specifically focuses on how the traditional parties have presented themselves rhetorically in the run up to national elections. The comparative analysis between the Dutch and French elections illustrates some of the ways in which national socio-political contexts are adapting to wider European political trends. The focus lies, in particular, on the shift of mainstream parties to the right side of the political spectrum with regard to immigration policy, interrogating to what extent the traditional left- and right-wing parties in France and the Netherlands have been influenced by such a shift.

4 Introduction

In the past few years, the European political landscape has witnessed the upsurge of a number of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe (Rooduijn 2013, 2). The right-wing populist United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), for example, is seen as one of the main advocates of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU), while also Donald Trump’s shocking victory in the US presidential elections has emphasized the rise of right-wing populism in the West. Even in countries whereas right-wing populist parties have not been successful in claiming power in the government, far right parties are enjoying record popularity in the polls (Bröning 2016). Especially within the context of the recent terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic State (IS) on European soil, coupled with widespread anxiety towards what was present as a ‘massive wave’ of immigrants with a Muslim background, many right-wing populist parties have succeeded in mobilizing voters and have emerged as key players in the run up to the 2017 national elections, scheduled to be held in several European countries (Mudde 2016, 25). The Dutch general elections were seen by many observers as the first big test in 2017, where the right-wing populist Partij voor de Vrijheid (‘’, PVV) of , was closely following the country’s leading Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (‘People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy’, VVD) in the polls. The Dutch election was then closely followed by Europe’s next big electoral test, which was held in April with the first round of the French presidential election, where the polls had predicted that the far-right of the Front National (‘National Front’, FN) might be a possible candidate for the second electoral round. Nevertheless, even though the increasing electoral popularity of right-wing populist parties may have important consequences for the current state of liberal democracy in Europe (and for the European project in general), perhaps an even bigger ‘risk’ to Europe is the influence of these parties on the traditional political parties and mainstream policymakers (Ward 2017). Several human rights organizations have, for example, reported that mainstream parties have increasingly begun to copy the agendas of right-wing populist parties for fear of losing voters instead of courageously confronting these parties and defending policies based on rights (Ward 2017). This ‘shift towards populism’ seems to be mainly present in the field of immigration politics, with mainstream parties appearing to increasingly adopt more and more of the right-wing populist discourse on immigration. Centre-right Dutch Prime Minister had, for example, published at the start of 2017 a much-debated open letter in several Dutch newspapers noting that people who “refuse to adapt and criticize our values”

5 should “behave normally or go away” (VVD 2017). However, also in the run up to the French elections, a number of the mainstream right candidates attempted to copy ’s tough approach towards Islam and immigration in a ploy to attract FN voters. This thesis therefore addresses the influence of right-wing populism on mainstream political parties and in particular on the rhetoric that they use with regard to the issue of immigration. The main goal is to examine whether mainstream politicians (both on the right and left side of the political spectrum) are following the path of right-wing populist politicians and are ‘swerving’ more and more to the right side of the political spectrum. Analysed is also whether this ‘strategy’ leads to failure or not (Wodak 2015, 35). This is done by analysing the immigration rhetoric of the main left- and right-wing mainstream candidates in the context of the 2017 Dutch and French elections, and comparing this to the rhetoric of their right-wing populist electoral opponents. The analysis is thereby mostly focused on Wodak’s conceptualization of right-wing populism as a ‘political ideology’ in which the framing of certain ethnic or religious minorities as a ‘danger’ or a ‘threat’ to the nation is considered very important (Wodak 2015, 2). The topic of this thesis is quite relevant in its focus on contemporary European politics, especially since it analyses how a European political trend such as right-wing populism emerges in two different national contexts. The outline of the thesis is as follows. In the first chapter, the different definitions and conceptualizations of ‘populism’ are explained. This is important, since there are several different labels used to describe the parties on the further right side of the political spectrum (Mammone 2009, 173). The chapter will also further elaborate on the historical development of right-wing populism and the different categorizations that are used within the scholarly literature on populism. In chapter two, the focus will be on the methodology that is used to analyse the influence of right-wing populism, namely the methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA). As a methodology, CDA can help to expose power relations and ideologies, which are ‘hidden’ in a certain way in all sorts of texts (Kendall 2007). Furthermore, the chapter will focus on the framework of critical geopolitics in which the methodology is embedded. A critical geopolitical framework is especially important with regard to the analysis of the thesis, since it also focuses for a large part on the impact of different geopolitical imaginations on politics in France and the Netherlands. The following two chapters – chapter three and four – will focus on the impact of right-wing populism on mainstream politicians’ rhetoric on immigration in the national contexts of France and the Netherlands.

6 Chapter three will focus on the case study of the Netherlands. It will start with a historical overview of the Dutch immigration policies from the post-war period until present- day. The emphasis in this policy overview is in particular on the electoral breakthrough of the right-wing populist parties Lijst Pim Fortuyn (‘’, LPF) and the PVV and to what extent this has led to a policy change with regard to immigration policy in the Netherlands. It will be followed by an overview of the socio-political context in relation to the Dutch parliamentary election of March 2017. In this chapter, it is argued that the mainstream political parties in the Netherlands – and especially the mainstream VVD and Partij van de Arbeid (‘Labour Party’, PvdA) – have shifted more and more towards the right side of the political spectrum. The chapter eventually finishes with a discourse analysis of the rhetoric that was used by the two mainstream politicians Mark Rutte (VVD) and (PvdA) in the run up to the parliamentary election and to what extent this matches with the immigration rhetoric used by their right-wing populist opponent Geert Wilders. CDA is therefore applied to two widely published political newspaper advertisements of Rutte and Asscher, which have been printed in several Dutch newspapers. Chapter four looks at the influence of right-wing populism on the mainstream political parties in France. Special focus is thereby paid to the political representation of the traditional Parti socialiste (‘Socialist Party’, PS) and Les Républicains (‘The Republicans’, LR) during the French presidential election rounds of April and May 2017. This chapter will also start with a brief historical overview of the development of French immigration policy and to what extent this policy field has changed as a result of the electoral rise of the FN. It will then also focus on the socio-political context of the French presidential elections, which was considered to be one of the strangest presidential elections yet in France (Henley 2017a). As for the chapter on the Netherlands, the chapter on France will also end with a discourse analysis of the rhetoric used by mainstream and right-wing populist politicians on the electoral issue of immigration. To asses whether also the mainstream politicians in France are ‘swerving’ more towards the right side of the political spectrum, several political rallies of the main candidates in the run up to the election are analysed. Among others, the analysis focuses on, for example, François Fillon’s (LR) discourse on immigration in Nice and Marine Le Pen’s (FN) political rally in Lyon. The concluding chapter of the thesis will summarize the findings with regards to the national case studies of the Netherlands and France. It will query whether – and to what extent – the increasing electoral popularity of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands and France has influenced the rhetoric of mainstream parties on a divisive issue such as

7 immigration. The findings of the discourse analysis together with a comparative analysis of two different national case studies may illustrate how a European political trend – namely right-wing populism – is developing on the national level and it also illustrates how important different geopolitical imaginations can be for the emergence of a pan-European electoral trend. The final part of the concluding chapter will also shortly discuss the outcome of the two national elections, asking whether the ‘right-wing populist’ rhetorical strategy has worked for certain parties or not.

8 1. Right-wing populism: definitions and categorizations

Populism has become an increasingly important political phenomenon in twenty-first century Europe. In particular, the emergence of a variant of right-wing populism, with well-known and controversial political leaders such as Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, has shown that the populist surge has gained a lot of clout in the European political landscape. In order to understand this new dominant position of right-wing populist parties and politicians in the contemporary European political landscape, this chapter will focus on the specific interpretations of the concept of populism. It looks at the conceptual difficulties surrounding the definition of the concept of ‘populism’ and at some of the attempts of authors to find a suitable definition to it. In addition, it will also look at the historical legacy of populism and the current form and content in which right-wing populism manifests itself today.

1.1 ‘Populism’: a contested concept When analysing populism, one of the first things that occurs is the terminological confusion surrounding the concept of ‘populism’. Not only are there different definitions for the term ‘populism’, there is also a broader academic debate going on about the ideological ‘core’ of populist movements and the different labels that are used to describe the populist political parties of the right (Mammone 2009, 173). The definition of ‘populism’ that is most probably the most well-known among people is populism as a set of “political ideas and activities that are intended to get support of ordinary people by giving them what they want” (Cambridge Dictionary 2017). This definition is not very surprising since ‘populism’ comes from the Latin word ‘populous’, which means ‘people’ in English. The discussion surrounding populism concerns not only for a part what it exactly is, but also sometimes whether it exists at all (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 1). It has, for example, been defined within academic literature as an ideology, a movement or a syndrome, but some authors have also linked it to distinct political phenomena, like anti-immigration and xenophobia. Also part of the difficulty characterizing populism is that it is often considered to be a (negative) label, which is seldom claimed by politicians or movements themselves and tends to deny any identification or classification with the Right/Left dichotomy (Laclau 2005, 4). Thereafter comes the challenge that it appears in different forms and in different contexts, which makes the conceptualization of it even more difficult. Whereas for example, extreme right-wing forms of populism in Europe often refer to anti-immigration and xenophobia, on the other side of the world in Latin America, it rather alludes to certain economic policy

9 choices (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 2). There are thus many different interpretations possible of the concept of ‘populism’ and some authors have argued that it is indeed possible to create some kind of a definition that captures the ‘core’ of past and present manifestations of ‘populism’. Some of the most important attempts by authors within this field to define the ‘core’ of (right-wing) populism are mentioned below.

1.2 Different definitions of ‘populism’ One of the debates that often occur within scholarly literature on this topic is whether ‘populism’ or ‘right-wing populism’ can be seen as an ideological movement. One of the authors that offered a definition that has become increasingly influential within the study of populism is Cas Mudde. Mudde, who is a Dutch political scientist, defined populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543). Within this popular definition, populism is formulated as a thin-centred ideology instead of a real independent ideological phenomenon that is based on a set of beliefs or principles, like for example liberalism or socialism does. As Stanley pointed out, who has published a lot about populism in Central and Eastern Europe, populism should be regarded as a distinct ideology, because its thin nature makes it unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology (Stanley 2008, 95). Populism simply seems to lack the capacity to formulate a wide- ranging and coherent program in order to find a solution to important political issues. It is also therefore that the party programs of right-wing populist parties are often very succinct and lack any explanation about the implantation and further financing of their political plans. This was, for example, largely the case with the Dutch PVV whose party program for the elections of 2017 consisted of only one short piece of paper (Het Financiële Dagblad 2016). ‘Populism’ in general thus seems to lack any core ideological features, but perhaps a more important element of its ‘core’ is the relationship between what is called ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’.

‘The people’ vs. ‘the elite’ As already mentioned in Mudde’s definition, populism is often defined as a concept centred on the antagonistic relationship of two particular groups: ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. However, a lot of scholars have written about the vagueness concerning the notion of ‘the people’. Who is, for example, part of ‘the people’ and who is not? One of the authors that has also tried to define the ‘core’ of populism is Paul Taggart, a Professor of Politics at the

10 University of Sussex. Taggart came up with the alternative term of ‘the heartland’ in order to describe the idealized version of the world populists often tend to hold on to (Taggart 2000, 3). While believing in this ‘heartland’, populism excludes things that it sees as alien (e.g. immigrants) or corrupt (e.g. the European Union) and gives meaning to ‘the general will of the people’. However, then again it is rather unclear whom this exactly refers to. Taggart has defined ‘populism’ in his identically titled book as “a reaction against the ideas, institutions and practices of representative politics which celebrates an implicit heartland as a response to a sense of crisis; however, lacking universal key values, it is chameleonic, taking on attributes of its environment, and, in practice episodic” (Taggart 2000, 5). In this definition, populism is at its core very hostile towards representative politics and only comes as an accompaniment to change, crisis and political challenges, which makes it also very reluctantly political in his view (Taggart 2004, 275). If we look closer at defining this antagonistic relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ within the concept of right-wing populism, Ruth Wodak’s definition is also very influential. She defined right-wing populism as “a political ideology that rejects existing political consensus and usually combines laissez-faire liberalism and anti-elitism. It is considered populism because of its appeal to the ‘common man/woman’ as opposed to elites” (Wodak 2015, 7). She further argues that, in any case, right-wing populist parties frame certain ethnic or religious minorities as a scapegoat for most of the current woes and that this group is regularly framed as ‘dangerous’ or ‘a threat’ to the nation. This particular process and corresponding rhetoric of right-wing populist parties is what Wodak labels a ‘politics of fear’, which can often be associated with the ‘arrogance of ignorance’, meaning that these parties often appeal to a certain common sense and anti-intellectualism that provides them with simple and clear-cut answers to the fears and challenges a society is dealing with (Wodak 2015, 2). What is striking about the three above-mentioned definitions (of Mudde, Taggart and Wodak) is that the notion of ‘the people’ and what they want, referring here explicitly to ordinary citizens, is thus very important. The elite, on the other side, is framed as ‘corrupt’ and works against the general will of the pure people. It is therefore that some authors have argued that populists by definition cannot sustain themselves in power, since they are fundamentally anti-establishment in their core (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 12).

Left-wing populism vs. right-wing populism But even though the relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ seems to be the core of most forms of ‘populism’, there also needs to be a clear distinction made between what is

11 called left-wing and right-wing populism. Both forms of populism are also centred on the notion of ‘the people’, but while right-wing populism is mostly focused on ‘the people’ as a nation, in left-wing populism, ‘the people’ is mostly associated with the element of class (Kriesi 2014, 362). Left-wing political parties – or the ‘radical left’ as some call it – often hold issues concerning economic inequity and social rights as their main agenda. They can also be characterized as largely ‘anti-capitalist’ and often argue that the current political and economic woes are the result of the process of globalization. Also, left-wing populist claim that the so-called ‘political elite’ only looks after the interests of the business elite and therewith neglects the interests of the ‘common working man’, which is strongly populist in nature (March and Mudde 2005, 25). These left-wing populist parties gained great prominence in the 1960s with the emergence of the Green parties and other ecological movements in Europe. However, since the collapse of the USSR in 1989, the presence of left- wing populism in European politics seems to have strongly decreased, due to the fact that most of the successful radical left parties in the 20th century were strongly communist in nature (March and Mudde 2005, 24). Though, still today there are some successful social- populist parties in Western Europe, like the Dutch Socialistische Partij (‘Socialist Party’, SP), the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) and to a certain extent also the Irish Sinn Féin, which all strongly reject the presence of capitalism and elitism in their societies. Also in Southern Europe, left-wing radical populism is becoming more and more visible in national politics with the rise of the Spanish Podemos and electoral victory of Syriza in Greece. Right-wing populism on the other hand, can be recognized due to its commitment to authoritarianism and nativism, which is in its turn can be strongly linked to the idea that only the members of a particular ethnic nation should have the right to decide over things. All ‘other’ and non-native elements are thereby perceived as a real threat (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 62). Following Betz, right-wing populism can be first and foremost recognized in their rejection of individual and social equality and of political projects that seek to achieve it (Betz 1994, 4). Secondly, they are strongly opposed to the social integration of marginalized groups and the final characteristic according to Betz is their appeal to xenophobia (or racism). It are precisely these three characteristics that are used by right-wing populist in order to create public feelings of anxiety and to appeal to populist elements of the ‘common men and women’ and their ‘common sense’. What is also characteristic for the rise of contemporary populist movements is the strategic use of the (social) media, since right-wing populist politicians are intentionally out to provoke and create scandals by violating the publicly accepted norms (Wodak 2015, 19). Also the fact that the ‘new’ far right is very much single-

12 issue orientated is relatively new for this type of populism (Pelinka 2013, 11). Right-wing populists thus hold a very defensive agenda, which is mostly aimed at transforming the society as it once was before the processes of globalization, mass migration and Europeanization had started – a process that is in their eyes for a large part to blame on the much hated elite.

The ‘populist’ notion of citizenship According to Brubaker, citizenship is a universal and distinctive feature of the modern political landscape. It can be used as a tool to publicly define a set of persons as ‘members’ and therewith also designate all other non-citizens or aliens and contains an ideologically charged distinction between citizens and foreigners (Brubaker 1992, 21). The state is therewith perceived as a bounded entity or citizenry and populists often use this conceptualisation to claim they are expressing the will and interests of their nation. The fulfilling of certain civic integration requirements is therefore nowadays considered to be very important in several European countries when it comes to accessing naturalisation and eventually the element of citizenship. Immigrants are therefore often obliged to meet certain language requirements before they can enter the country or in some (national) cases claim things like permits or even citizenship (Wodak 2015, 89). Through this way, European countries have the ability to determine who is allowed to stay ‘inside’ their country and who does not. The rules for immigration differ from country to country in Europe and each country can thus decide on its own whether an immigrant is allowed to have access to things like working permits or citizenship. Examples of countries in Western Europe that require sufficient language skills as a necessary element for (a) entering the country; (b) getting a work permit and (c) having access to citizenship are countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Wodak 2015, 89). According to Wodak, such definitions allow for a plethora of interpretations, since the connection of citizenship to language can lead to the creation of new sorts of categories. It can lead, for example, to a categorization of new ‘real’ citizens who are contrasted against an ‘other’ – a group that is distinguished on the basis that it lacks certain features which are considered important in order to become an ‘authentic’ citizen (Wodak 2015, 89).

1.3 The historical development of right-wing populism Throughout history, populism has appeared in different places and times and also in different forms, movements and styles (Taggart 2000, 5). In order to understand the current

13 phenomenon of right-wing populism, it is therefore important to have a clear understanding of the different forms in which right-wing populism has already emerged, since nineteenth- century American populism and present-day populist mobilization in Western Europe have a number of things in common (Betz 2013, 215). Following Mudde and Kaltwasser, we can identify three important waves of populism that have emerged from the nineteenth century onwards until today (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 495). The first wave of populism can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century with the occurrence of the Russian Narodniki and the People’s Party in the United States. The Russian Narodniki can be sub-classified as ‘intellectual agrarian socialism’ as it consisted of a relatively small group of urban middle class intellectuals who believed in the moral superiority of the peasantry (Laclau 2005, 6). However, while the Narodniki was successful in educating the peasantry on their crucial role in the socialist revolution and also strongly inspired some of the Eastern European agrarian populist movements of the 20th century, it had further achieved little in its time period. Another important populist political party that was prominent in this time was the US People’s Party. For a few years, this party played a major role in opposing the existing order in the United States and aimed for a better and ‘real’ democracy (Pelinka 2013, 5). Also in Europe, these types of agrarian populist parties gained ground in the post-war period with parties like the Dutch Farmers Party and the French Union for the Defence of Merchants and Artisans. However, in contemporary European politics, this type of ‘agrarian populism’ seems to be hardly present anymore. The second wave of populism can be placed in the 1930s, in the run up to the Great Depression. This wave of populism was extremely influential in Latin America with perhaps the Argentinian populist politician Juan Domingo Péron as most well known example (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 497). This particular type of fascist populism was termed ‘Peronism’ and can be characterized by its ability to delegitimize democracy in Argentina (Wodak 2015, 9). These types of populism that had emerged in Latin America, shared a particular view on the role of the state in the economy and all of them also preferred a model that stated that Latin American countries should become more self-sufficient through the local production of industrialized goods. However, while the model was quite successful in the short term, it eventually created a growing state expansion and a huge fiscal deficit, leading to a severe financial crisis in these countries (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 497). The current form in which this form of populism manifests itself at the moment in South America, is through a strict rejection of neoliberalism – it can therefore be characterized as a type of left-wing populism.

14 The third wave Mudde and Kaltwasser mention is the wave of ‘xenophobic populism’, which can be mostly applied to Western Europe (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 498). It is also this wave of populism that we are mostly experiencing in contemporary European politics. The origins of xenophobic populism can be placed in the 1980s, as the storyline of the “invasion” started to emerge among anti-immigrant groups (Mamadouh 2012, 387). These groups were mostly reacting to the economic crisis that emerged after the second oil crisis (1979) and the rising unemployment that a lot of Western European countries were struggling with. It is also in this particular timeframe that extreme right parties such as the French Front National (and later the Italian Northern League and Austrian Freedom Party) became prominent with their discourse of ‘migrants stealing our jobs’ (Mamadouh 2012, 388). According to Betz, the current form in which right-wing populism establishes itself can be compared to the 19th-century ‘agrarian populism’ as emerged in the United States. He argues, for example, that contemporary right-wing populist parties in Europe promote themselves – just like their American ancestors – as advocates of the interest and concerns of ordinary people against the dominant economic and political elite (Betz 2013, 215). He goes further by stating that where the American populists of the People’s Party tried to ‘defend’ their Catholic heritage, the current extreme right does basically the same with charging that Islam is incompatible with the Western ‘Judeo-Christian’ values. Characteristic for the populist parties that emerged in Europe in the past 20 years is thus that most of these parties arose in a climate of intensifying neoliberal globalisation. It is also therefore that most of the right-wing populist parties are largely focused on the perceived threats that are posed by immigration (in particular by the extremist fundamental Islam) and the unequal burden that was caused by neoliberal austerity (Hogan and Haltinner 2015, 521).

1.4 The different categorizations of ‘right-wing populism’ The right-wing populist parties across Europe cannot only be categorized as the type of populism that is – in contrast to left-wing populism – based on the generalized claim to represent ‘the people’ on the basis of a perceived nation. Also within the phenomenon of right-wing populism itself, different categorizations can be made. In her book The Politics of Fear, Wodak distinguishes four different political imaginaries in which various types of right- wing populism can be divided (Wodak 2015, 2). The first sub-categorization she mentions is the fact that some right-wing populist parties gain support through an ambivalent relationship with a fascist or a Nazi-past. An important example of this sub-category is the French Front National, of which its founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, had strong links with older traditions of

15 far-right politics and is known as a careful defender of the former Vichy-regime (Judt 2005, 745). The second sub-categorization is the category of right-wing populism that strongly focuses on a perceived threat from Islam. Parties like the Dutch PVV and the Swiss People’s Party may be included to this category. Some parties can also be distinguished on the basis that they restrict their propaganda to a perceived danger to their national identities from ethnic minorities and migrants – think, for example, of the British UKIP – and some parties also endorse a traditional Christian conservative-reactionary agenda, a type of right-wing populism that often occurs in the United States (Wodak 2015, 2). It is thus important to note that there is not one single form of ‘right-wing populism’, but that right-wing populist parties can be categorized by different political imaginaries. De Lange and Mudde have also argued that there is a wide range of terms that are used to describe this particular type of populism, including terms such as ‘extreme right’, ‘right- wing populism’ and ‘populism’ (De Lange and Mudde 2005, 479). However, it is crucial to note that these terms often suffer from conceptual slippage. The term ‘extreme right’ is probably the most commonly used term to describe this type of political parties. However, the term itself remains rather vague and only seems to refer to the political position of these parties, namely on the furthest right position of the political spectrum. The category that includes all the labels that focus on the national or ethnic element of these parties – such as ‘anti-immigrant’ or ‘nationalist’ – is also slightly problematic, according to De Lange and Mudde. They namely argue that there are (ethno-) nationalist parties that are not per se extreme right (e.g. the Sinn Féin) or right-wing parties that consider anti-immigration elements as irrelevant (De Lange and Mudde 2005, 479). Also the definition of the term ‘populism’ is rather broad, considering the different forms, categorizations and definitions that were already mentioned in this chapter. There is thus not one single form or definition of ‘populism’ and every study related to it is combined with a specific framework and content. The type of right-wing populism that is studied in this thesis is mostly linked to the type of populism defined by Wodak, namely the type of right-wing populism that mobilizes a ‘politics of fear’ with an ‘arrogance of ignorance’. This type of populism is strongly centred on the right and focuses on the populist parties that can be recognized by their strong rejection of immigration and in particular of the presence of Islam in the contemporary European societies. Even though, this type of right-wing populism has been present since the 1980s, its current rising popularity is interesting to study, since it nowadays also forces the mainstream political parties to retreat from core principles such as tolerance and diversity (Shuster 2016). Also, important political events such as the Brexit and the democratic victory of Donald

16 Trump during the most recent American elections have shown that the international wave of far-right politics has reached a new level of normalisation within the western world (Vieten and Poynting 2016, 536). But what can exactly explain the success of this current wave of right-wing populism in Western Europe? In this thesis, the interaction between populism and the extreme right is addressed by looking at how right-wing populist discourses have influenced mainstream political parties and politicians in the national contexts of France and the Netherlands. The type of populism that thereby is analysed is the phenomenon of far right parties that are currently growing in the polls, namely the type of parties that proclaim themselves as the defenders of an ‘indigenous’ Christian Europe and which aim to ‘fight’ fundamentalist Islam (Vieten and Poynting 2016, 536). The study will thereby include an analysis of the two largest far right populist parties at the moment in these countries, namely the French Front National and the Dutch PVV and the mainstream left-wing and right-wing parties of these countries. The aim is thereby overall to investigate to what extent right-wing populist rhetoric can be found in today’s policies, focusing in particular on immigration policies. How this is done from the methodological point of view, will be addressed in the next chapter.

17 2. Methodology: critical discourse analysis

This chapter develops the critical discourse analysis, the research method that will be used in this thesis to analyse the impact of right-wing populist discourses on French and Dutch immigration policies. It starts with a brief overview of the key notions and most relevant approaches within CDA to study the influence of right-wing populism. Thereafter, the research method, its relevance and the type of sources that will be used in the analysis are discussed. Lastly, I focus on the framework of critical geopolitics and the importance of geopolitical imaginations for the analysis, which can help to indicate how deep right-wing populist discourses are infiltrated into the immigration rhetoric in France and the Netherlands.

2.1 Critical discourse analysis Critical discourse analysis has entered the mainstream linguistic and social science research as a methodology that is not only interested in the use of language, but also in the social and political dimension that it behind it (Reisigl 2013, 75). It is mainly concerned with the role that discourses can play in the (re)production and challenge of dominance, which is defined here as the exercise of social power by certain groups in society (Van Dijk 1993, 249). The component of ‘critical’ in CDA thereby means that it does not take things for granted and actually tries to expose the power relations and ideologies that are ‘hidden’ in the analysed texts (Kendall 2007). Especially within contemporary European politics, in which the media has become more and more important as a source of political information, it has become much easier for right-wing populist parties to spread their discourses to wider audiences (Ellinas 2009, 216). Social media thus can create opportunities for smaller political parties to get their messages to the voters, which otherwise would have been much harder for them, due to their lack of organisational and financial resources. It is therefore rather important that CDA-researchers are aware of the social structures in which the discourses that they study are embedded, because these social contexts can on the one hand not only shape and affect the discourse in question, but they have also the ability to influence the social and political reality (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 92). Socio-political contexts are thus very important when it comes to using CDA as a methodology. As a methodology, CDA is also quite diverse with different approaches that each has their own theories and methods. It is therefore often described in scholarly literature as an interdisciplinary approach, due to the fact that it frequently crosses disciplinary boundaries when analysing the dialectical relationship between discourses and other objects (Fairclough

18 2010, 5). And even though there is not one single framework developed yet to analyse discourses in general, there are a few key notions that can be attributed to most forms of CDA. These are the notions of: • Discourse: this forms the central category of every discourse analysis • Context: this means all that comes ‘with the text’, such as the properties of the environment of the discourse • Social problems: CDA is very much problem-orientated and always starts with the orientation of a social problem that includes a linguistic dimension (Reisigl 2013, 85)

The notion of discourse is thus an important subject in all forms of discourse analysis, even though there are different theoretical conceptions of it within CDA (Reisigl 2013, 77). One of the most well known conceptualizations of ‘discourse’ and the conceptualization that will also be mostly used in this thesis is that of Norman Fairclough, one of the founders of CDA. In Fairclough’s approach, three interrelated dimensions can be found. The first one is the semiotic aspect of a written or spoken ‘text’. The second one is the fact that there is a specific ‘discursive practice’ involved; the third is the involvement of a certain social-cultural context that in its turn can be linked to the ‘discursive practice’ (Reisigl 2013, 78). The social aspect is thus considered to be very important in Fairclough’s approach. Another CDA- approach that is quite similar to this and also stresses the importance of the societal context is the discourse-historical approach (DHA), which was largely developed by Wodak and het co- researchers. Most importantly, DHA focuses on texts in which certain political discourses are present. It thereby attaches great value to the socio-political and historical context that is behind the political party or social issue in question (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 91). In essence, CDA can thus be very appropriate as a methodology to critically analyse the influence of right-wing populist discourses on immigration policies, since it allows for the understanding of how discursive strategies are used to legitimize control by powerful groups in society (Van Dijk 1993, 254). This can be the case in all sorts of texts, varying from official policies to speeches and political debates. The type of CDA-approach that is used in this thesis will be most similar to Fairclough’s approach in which the three interrelated dimensions are central. This approach will also put particular emphasis upon the ‘common sense’ assumption of which people are generally not consciously aware and which treats authority and hierarchy as natural (Fairclough 2001, 2). The approach will also contain some elements of Wodak’s DHA, though less attention will be paid in this case to the historical context of the discourses.

19 ‘Coded’ discourses and immigration policies In contemporary Europe, all sorts of discriminatory utterances have become ‘coded’ in different types of rhetoric, varying from official policies to political speeches and television debates. This is done in order to avoid sanctions related to discrimination or other negative things (Wodak 2015, 50). As a result of this, it has become much easier for right-wing populists to communicate their ‘message’ and to address a wider audience. This particular discourse can be recognized primarily by its popular ‘rhetoric of exclusion’, which is constituted by a division between what is often described as ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Wodak 2003, 133). Complex social-economic issues are thereby reduced to simple answers and easy slogans, which in its turn lack any real solutions for these issues. Right-wing populist politicians thereby also use the strategy to define the ‘other’ negatively, while attaching, sometimes quite unnoticed, all kinds of positive features to the ‘in-group’. It is therefore rather important to critically examine the language that was used by mainstream politicians in order to broaden the gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Because it is, to cite Wodak, one thing to say that politicians use a rhetoric that discriminates or alienates certain groups in society, it is another thing to actually prove this (Wodak 2003, 132). In this thesis, CDA will specifically be applied to French and Dutch immigration policy and in particular to the rhetoric of (mainstream) politicians on immigration, which is often quite complex and can be open to many different interpretations (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 85). Studying the language with regard to immigration policies can help to investigate how immigrant-receiving countries define who, in their view, belongs to their ‘nation’ and in what terms (Mavroudi and Nagel 2016, 178). This is possible, since the language that is used by the legislators or politicians to describe ‘immigrants’ in election time is often very significant. The country in question can, for example, be described as a ‘country of immigrants’ or rather as a recipient of unwanted ‘guests’. Analysing the linguistic features in the discourses on immigration during the latest elections can thus help to indicate to what extent the ‘rhetoric of exclusion’ has actually become present within this policy field in Europe. The study will therefore specifically focus on the notion of citizenship and integration, which have played a very prominent role during the most recent Dutch (March 2017) and French (April/May 2017) elections. These two immigration-related themes will be analysed on the basis of newspaper advertisements (in the Dutch case) and political speeches (in the French case). The fact that different electoral material is analysed with regard to the Dutch and French contexts is related to the quite distinct national campaigning styles of the two countries. Whereas in the Netherlands politicians mostly campaigned through the use of

20 newspaper advertisements and TV appearances, in the French case the campaigning took often place at public political rallies, where the politicians spoke directly to their audiences. The CDA of the Dutch case study thus consists more a textual discourse analysis of the actual advertisements, while the analysed speeches in the French context derived from audio-visual texts (taped video recordings of the rallies, accessed on YouTube). Alongside CDA, in examining these different immigration discourses in detail, a framework of critical geopolitics will be used in order to critically analyse the (linguistic) policy choices that were made. A more detailed description of this critical geopolitics-framework is set out below.

2.2 Critical geopolitics: a framework for analysis The right-wing populist discourses that are related to the topic of immigration often perform issues of national identity and sovereignty, which are important features of geopolitical imaginations (Mamadouh 2012, 378). A critical geopolitics framework can therefore be useful to analyse these particular narratives. One of the key authors in the field of (critical) geopolitics, Gearoid Ó Tuathail, defined critical geopolitics as “a problematizing theoretical enterprise that places existing features of power and knowledge in question” (Ó Tuathail 1999, 107). Critical geopolitics is thus for a large part concerned with the process in which states are actively ‘making space’ through all sorts of policies and practices. Spatial representation is thereby also a very important subject of critical geopolitics, since it shows how statesmen and politicians can write geography around national and international politics and therewith contribute to the creation of a ‘geopolitical order’. Whereas critical geopolitics started of in the 1980s as a reaction to the ‘culture of interventions’ (among others as direct criticism against the Reagan policies), nowadays it tends to be much more focused on the link between geographical specifications of cultural identity and the invocation of specific geographies of danger (Dalby 2008, 415). What is quite similar of the framework of critical geopolitics and the methodology of CDA is that they both focus on the narration techniques that are used in order to expose the involved (social) power structures. Combining critical geopolitics with CDA can therefore be useful in the analysis of right-wing populist discourses, since these discourses are for a large part based on unequal power relations between the well-known distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Spatial representation and the connotations that people have with a specific geographical space are thereby important and the study of right-wing populist discourses in Europe thus calls to a great extent for a critical geopolitical lens. Nowadays, more and more immigrants are being framed as ‘threats’ to the national security and critical geopolitics becomes rather

21 important, because it needs to perceive how nations as ‘imagined communities’ are reproduced in the context of everyday life (Müller 2010, 10). Geopolitical imaginations such are ‘our nation’, ‘invasion’ and ‘aliens’ are thereby frequently used in this context in order for the ‘powerful’ group to reach its political goal (Mamadouh 2012, 380). These specific geopolitical imaginations will be further analysed with regard to the Dutch and French context in chapter three and four of this thesis.

22 3. The Netherlands: from ethnic minority policy to assimilationist immigration policies

During the post-war period, the Netherlands has, just like many other countries in Western Europe, experienced a period of large-scale immigration. This chapter discusses the development of the Netherlands as a ‘country of immigration’ as well as the politics of immigration that correspond with this development. The first paragraph will provide a short overview of the broad changes that have taken place with regard to Dutch immigration policies. It will specifically focus on the development of the civic integration policies, which had changed at the turn of the millennium from ‘open’ and ‘multicultural’ to strict immigration policies. The second paragraph introduces the context in which the most recent Dutch parliamentary election of 2017 is discussed – together with an analysis of the most important parties for the research of this thesis, which are the PVV, the VVD and the PvdA. The paragraph also shortly focuses on the public debates surrounding Dutch immigration and citizenship laws and how discourses can be used as places where relations of power are exercised. The third paragraph contains a critical discourse analysis of the rhetoric that is used by mainstream parties and to what extent this is influenced by the phenomenon of right-wing populism. The Netherlands forms an interesting case study, since the country had radically changed its ‘open’ immigration policies in the 2000s and therewith set a policy-trend for the rest of (Western) Europe.

3.1 Dutch immigration policy: a brief historical overview The development of Dutch immigration policy throughout the years can be characterized by a great discontinuity. Following the important political developments that have taken place in the Netherlands, new policy narratives had emerged, with each having its own different way of defining or conceptualising the process of integration (Scholten 2011a, 75). However, three major changes can be distinguished with regard to these policies, namely the Minorities Policy (1980s), the Integration Policy (1990s) and the so-called Integration Policy New Style (2000s). These three important ‘periods’ in the development of Dutch immigration policy will be briefly explained below.

The Minorities Policy (1980s) The first groups of post-war immigrants that the Netherlands had witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly post-colonial migrants (e.g. from the former Dutch Indies, Surinam and

23 the Antilles) who had come to the ‘motherland’ to work or study and the so-called ‘guest workers’ (e.g. from Southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco), who were recruited by the Dutch government for labour in order to meet the growing demands of the booming post-war economy. This often concerned jobs in heavy sectors like textiles, mines and shipbuilding (Judt 2005, 337). However, the settlement of these post-colonial and foreign workers was not really recognized by the Dutch authorities as a permanent matter, nor were there efforts to promote the integration of these immigrants into Dutch society (Entzinger and Scholten 2015, 65). The Netherlands had not considered itself to be a country of immigration until the late 1970s. The ‘phase of denial’ ended, however, in the 1980s, when the Dutch authorities had realized that these post-colonial and foreign workers had actually come to stay in the Netherlands. As a result of this, Europe’s most prominent multiculturalism policy was pursued in which the Dutch government envisaged ‘emancipation’ for designated ‘ethnic minorities’ within their own state-supported infrastructures (Joppke 2007, 5). This precise ‘multicultural model’ was based on the belief that the cultural emancipation of immigrant minorities should be the key to their integration into Dutch society and showed some similarities with the former Dutch system of ‘pillarization’ through which the Dutch were governed from the 1920s to the 1960s (Scholten 2011b, 68). The policy became known as the ‘Ethnic Minorities Policy’, which was officially launched in 1983 and became mostly applied to the Turks, Moroccans, Southern Europeans, Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, Roma, Sintis and certain categories of refugees who were living in the Netherlands (Vasta 2007, 716). These groups were supported with special labour market programmes and training courses in order to have these people ‘integrated’ into Dutch society. A certain space was thereby left for these groups to develop their own cultural, religious and linguistic institutions. However, quite soon critique emerged with regard to the issue of integration and the corresponding immigration policies. The debate about the topic of ‘Dutch identity’ and what it exactly meant to be Dutch thereby became important, leading to a wide dissatisfaction among the Dutch people with the state of immigration policies at that time (Van Reekum 2016, 32).

The Integration Policy (1990s) By the late 1980s and 1990s, the policymakers in the Netherlands had slowly realized that the Ethnic Minority Policy had failed to reach its goals. The Dutch non-EU immigrant unemployment rate had, for example, been much higher then that of native people, the high school dropout rates among immigrant children were 2.5 times higher than for native Dutch

24 children (especially for children with a Moroccan or Turkish background) and residential segregation had also become extremely high in the Netherlands (Joppke 2007, 6). It was therefore that in the early 1990s, the Minorities Policy was reframed into the so-called Integration Policy. This policy framework was much more focused on the socio-economic participation of individual immigrants instead of the cultural emancipation of minorities, which were no longer considered a task of the government (Bertossi, Duyvendak and Scholten 2015, 67). This shift in ‘policy attitude’ was also visible in the Dutch civic integration policies, which were also strongly revised at the end of the 1990s. With the Wet Inburgering Niewkomers (‘Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers’), which went into force in 1998, immigrants were now obliged to participate in a civic integration programme and to pass a corresponding examination within a specific timeframe. With these programmes, the government hoped that the immigrants were provided with enough knowledge of the Dutch language and society whereby he or she could easily participate on the Dutch labour market (Staatsblad 1998(261), 4). The ‘new’ citizens were thereby subjected to what Tonkens and Duyvendak call the ‘culturalization of citizenship’, meaning that they are dealing with new ‘feeling rules’ that render belonging and ‘feeling at home’ as important requirements to integrate (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016, 3). Adhering to certain (Dutch) norms thereby became important and especially immigrants were expected now to demonstrate these feelings of attachment to their ‘new’ country of residence.

The Integration Policy New Style (2000s-present day) However, the biggest changes with regard to Dutch immigration took place at the turn of the millennium, when more and more anti-immigration and anti-asylum voices appeared in Europe and the West. In the Netherlands, it was especially the popularity of the right-wing populist LPF, which triggered the call for stricter immigration policies in the Netherlands. The party was founded three months prior to the 2002 Dutch elections and did extremely well in the polls, leaving the established parties in a state of confusion (De Lange and Art 2011, 1234). The party’s increasing popularity took place in the context of the September 11 attacks in the United States and Paul Scheffer’s much-debated essay Het multiculturele drama (‘The multicultural drama’), which was published in 2000 and which criticized the current state of (cultural) integration of immigrants in the Netherlands (Scheffer 2000). Within the public debate that emerged during this period, it was especially the integration of immigrants with a Muslim background that formed the topic of a heated debate, leading to an increasing electoral success of right-wing populist parties all over Europe. A new integration act, the Wet

25 Inburgering, was then adopted in 2006, which obligated immigrants to pass the civic integration exam within a fixed term (Staatsblad(2006), 11). Immigrants could now be fined if they did not succeed to pass the exam in time. Another major policy change that this law brought about was the role and responsibility of the Dutch state. The ‘integration courses’ were now opened up to the principle of the free market, meaning that the civic integration of immigrants was no longer a primary responsibility for the Dutch state, but for the individual migrant him/herself (Bonjour 2013, 841). The Dutch government now only granted integration courses to asylum migrants and religious workers, which meant that migrants who had come to the Netherlands through family reunification were responsible for their own civic integration. The law was then changed in 2013, stating that residence permits now could also be withdrawn when immigrants don’t pass the exam during the specified timeframe, which was also shortened with the period of half a year (Rijksoverheid 2013).

3.2 Context: the new (right-wing) face of mainstream political parties On 15 March 2017, the Dutch people went to the polling stations to elect all 150 members for the House of Representatives, which is also known in Dutch as the Tweede Kamer. The polls had already predicted that the ‘main battle’ to win the most seats would be fought between the conservative liberal VVD and the Dutch nationalist and right-wing populist PVV. The international media had closely followed the potential victory of the latter, since Brexit (the decision made by a majority of the British people to leave the European Union) and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States had affirmed the presence of a strong right-wing populist sentiment in the Western world. The elections in the Netherlands were therefore often labelled in the media as the first real ‘test’ to measure the contemporary state of the right-wing sentiment in Western Europe, ahead of the French presidential vote, which would be held in May 2017, and the 2017 German national elections of September (Said-Moorhouse et al. 2017). Even though several polls in the Netherlands had suggested three weeks prior to the elections that the PVV had a real chance to end up as the largest party in the Netherlands (figure 2 and 3), it was already unlikely that Wilders would actually enter government, due to the Dutch electoral system in which coalitions need to be formed. The PVV was founded by Geert Wilders in 2006 and can be classified as a right-wing populist party, due to its critical stances on Islam and its resistance against immigration and what they call the ‘Islamization of the Netherlands’ (PVV 2017). However, despite its successes as a strong anti-immigration party with controversial views on Islam and the

26 Qur’an, Wilders’ PVV was not the first party in the Netherlands to have taken such a strong stance on the integration of immigrants with a Muslim background. During the 1990s, Frits

Figure 2 Poll displaying the electoral course of the PVV from September 2012 until March 2017 (source: Peilingwijzer 2017, http://nos.nl/artikel/2159429-peilingwijzer-pvv-en-vvd-nu-even-groot.html).

Figure 3 Poll displaying the electoral course of the VVD from September 2012 until March 2017 (source: Peilingwijzer 2017, http://nos.nl/artikel/2159429-peilingwijzer-pvv-en-vvd-nu-even-groot.html).

Bolkestein of the VVD was already aware of the widespread dissatisfaction that was present among the Dutch electorate with regard to issues concerning (labour) migration and the European project and tried to politicize these issues for electoral gain (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008, 401). However, due to a difficult coalition at the time with the social democrats – who traditionally had a large immigrant-voting base – it was quite difficult for Bolkestein to actually move the VVD into this particular direction. It was the right-wing populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who eventually filled the ‘electoral gap’ with his LPF-party. Fortuyn founded the LPF three months prior to the general elections of 2002 and from the

27 moment it was founded, it was presented as a real right-wing populist party, which dared to address issues like immigration and the multicultural society without mincing their words (Akkerman 2006, 341). Fortuyn had also already spoken before Wilders of the dangers of an ‘Islamization’ of Dutch society, which in his view would leave little room for “Western” core values and posed a real threat to what he called the “original culture” of the Netherlands (Fortuyn 2002, 13). Even though the LPF had gained great electoral successes during the elections of May 2002, which were held shortly after an environmental activist had murdered Fortuyn, the LPF collapsed the same year as a result of great internal problems. With the foundation of the PVV in 2006, Geert Wilders was the next to try to fill the ‘electoral space’ that was left by the LPF. Wilders used the LPF’s experience as a warning for his own party development and made slightly better choices than Fortuyn when it came to party organisation, recruitment and training. As a result of this, the PVV became institutionalised and could develop itself as the successful anti-immigration party that it is today in the Netherlands (De Lange and Art 2011, 1230). The PVV was, however, not the only party that made use of populist rhetoric during the most recent elections. Its direct opponent the VVD, under the leadership of Mark Rutte, also made use of populist rhetoric in an apparent bid to woo PVV voters (Henley 2017b). In an open letter that Rutte had published in several Dutch newspapers (figure 3), he addressed several issues, varying from misbehaviour to Dutch norms and values. The rhetoric that he thereby used to deliver his message was criticized by many, arguing that it contained some of the populist rhetoric that is also frequently used by Wilders (NRC 2017). Rutte talked for example in the letter of “people who had come to our country for freedom, but who refuse to adapt and criticise our habits and values”, further referring to a group in society that “harass gays, whistle at women in short skirts or brand ordinary Dutch people racists” – which are generally considered to be the main integration issues with regard to second and third generation immigrants in the Netherlands (VVD 2017). About this particular group Rutte said in his letter, “behave normally, or go away”, leaving completely in the middle what ‘normal behaviour’ exactly is in his view. Even though Rutte did not mention the PVV by name, it was quite clear that his letter was an attempt to win over voters from the PVV. The VVD thus also tried to adapt to a more populist rhetoric in order to win votes during the most recent Dutch elections of 2017. The liberal-conservative VVD is, however, not the only party who moved further right on the political spectrum. The social democratic PvdA has also been responsible for stricter immigration policies. Under its previous leader, , the PvdA was largely

28 responsible for the controversial ‘refugee deal’, which decided that all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greece (starting from March 2016) will be returned to Turkey. With this EU-Turkey deal, Samson and Rutte (who was already Prime Minister of the Netherlands at the time) tried, together with several other European countries, to come up with a solution for the ‘migrant crisis’ that was at a height in 2015 and 2016. Even though the deal seemed at first sight a breakthrough in a never-ending negotiation process on the European level, several human rights organisations had actually criticized this deal for being in violation with the principle of non-refoulement and the lack of Turkey to provide effective protection to the asylum seekers and refugees on its territory (Amnesty International 2016, 5). This deal also showed that even the social democratic parties in the Netherlands had moved towards the direction of stricter immigration policies. Thus, even though the ‘electoral gap’ that was left by the LPF has been largely maintained by the PVV, each of the centre-right parties in the Netherlands – and to some extent also the social democratic parties – has tried to claim some of this electoral space (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008, 405).

3.3 Discourse analysis: the influence of right-wing populism in the Netherlands Immigration policy forms a policy field that is rather sensitive and open for interpretation. In this section, an analysis is made of how mainstream parties present themselves in terms of political correctness with regard to the issue of immigration. In January 2017, the VVD launched its electoral pre-campaign called Normaal. Doen. (‘Act. Normal.’), which focused mostly on the question ‘what kind of country does the Netherlands want to be?’ (VVD 2017). It was supported with an open letter of Mark Rutte that was published in many national newspapers stating that ‘those who don’t respect our values should leave’ (figure 4). The VVD’s main candidate further stated in a paragraph that:

“We feel a growing inconvenience when people abuse our freedom to fool around here, while they have come to our country for that freedom. People who don’t want to adjust, criticize our habits and reject our values. Those who harass gays, or whistle at women in short skirts, or brand ordinary Dutch people racists. I understand very well that people think: if you so fundamentally reject this country, then I’d prefer you to leave. I namely have that feeling too. Act normal or go away.” (VVD 2017).

29 The mainstream right-wing VVD is thus legitimising their tighter immigration policy by drawing on fundamental ‘Dutch values’ and ‘normal behaviour’, which emphasizes that the VVD makes use of a specific moral stance to legitimize the process of ‘Othering’ and to a certain extent also more restrictive immigration and integration measures. Rutte continued:

“We should never think that this behaviour is normal in this country. The solution is not to tar everyone with the same brush, or insult or expel whole groups. (…) The solution is primarily an issue of mentality. We will need to make it crystal clear what is normal, and what is not normal, in our country. We must actively defend our values.” (VVD 2017)

The passage of the open letter quoted above reveals the course that Rutte and the VVD wanted to head during the elections of 2017. He also finished with an open question: “The coming times are Figure 4 The open letter Rutte published in several Dutch newspapers, 23 January 2017. Source: NRC. determining for the course of our country. There is only one question: what kind of country do we want to be?” (VVD 2017). There thus seems to be a rather distinct stance with regard to the issues of integration and immigration. Instead of aiming the pre-election campaign on creating more solidarity (or their core principle of ‘liberty’) in the Netherlands, the VVD aims its message quite primarily at a particular group in Dutch society that doesn’t behave or acts ‘normal’. Or in short: those who don’t meet the (cultural) Dutch integration norms, according to the VVD. The VVD’s recent rhetoric of Rutte’s open letter can be categorized by the topos of burden or weighing down, which means that if a person, institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish those burdens (Wodak 2015, 53).

30 Rutte therefore finishes his letter by directly demanding what needs to be changed in terms of behaviour:

“Let’s make sure that we continue to feel ourselves at home in our beautiful country. Let’s keep it clear what’s normal here and what’s not. I’m sure that we will get this done. (…) Let’s work together to make this country even better. Because for real, we are a very beautiful country. I wouldn’t want to live anywhere else. Do you?.” (VVD 2017)

If we compare this political message to the message of the social democratic PvdA, there is only a small difference in rhetorical style visible. Whereas Rutte’s political message was mostly aimed at ‘normal behaviour’, PvdA- Lodewijk Asscher took a different course (figure 5). In a similar open letter published in De Volkskrant (a medium-sized centrist newspaper), Asscher said the following about immigration and integration:

“I don’t ignore problems with integration. I don’t want to ignore that some parents let their children misbehave, that they don’t speak the language and that they don’t know what their children are doing on the streets. Who is wrong, needs help. Whoever doesn’t want to, needs to be addressed.” (De Volkskrant 2017)

Figure 5 The political add Asscher published in the Volkskrant of 10 March 2017. Source: De Volkskrant.

31 Both the centre-right VVD and the social democratic PvdA thus claim that an important condition for belonging to Dutch society is a certain ‘correct behaviour’. Both politicians are referring to an element of a ‘moral burden’ that defines whether a person belongs to the ‘in- group’ or not. In the case of the PvdA, the element of language – and to a certain extent also the knowledge of Dutch society – is considered to be a very important requirement to successfully immigrate. Their stance with regard to immigration was also further addressed in the letter:

“When I came with the participation act for newcomers, there was a bit of a sarcastic reception. But what’s wrong with giving newcomers our norms and values, our rules? (…) People who flee for war and violence are welcome. They deserve the opportunity to become part of our society. To learn the language, to work and to embrace the core values of our free society. Because the Netherlands of which we can all be proud of is a country where everyone accepts each other, no matter what your origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation or handicap is. Only then we will feel ourselves at home in our neighbourhood.” (De Volkskrant 2017)

Asscher is talking here about some requirements (e.g. language skills, participation on the labour market and knowledge of Dutch society) that are preferred in order to obtain full Dutch citizenship. In its recent party programme Een verbonden samenleving (‘A connected society’), the PvdA states that integration starts with an explicit choice for a living in the Netherlands (PvdA 2017). Certain knowledge of the Dutch language is therefore considered necessary in the view of the PvdA and the government should only finance the civic integration courses when people really can’t afford it. It is therefore also that the PvdA’s immigration policies are based on the same ‘tougher’ relationship that is slightly visible within the PVV’s and VVD’s discourse. Within this discourse, a relationship of power is created between those who belong to the ‘in-group’ (and can participate in Dutch society) and ‘Other’ people who are regarded as having ‘deficits’ of some kind and therefore do not belong to the national body (Wodak 2015, 90). It is a hegemonic relationship in which integration tests and measures are obligatory and can restrict a person’s access to residence or citizenship. This form of immigration policy emphasizes not only the ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship, but also exceeds to a sort of ‘repressive liberalism’ whereby illiberal temptations can be created for those who do not meet the criteria of civic integration (Joppke 2007, 14). Asscher further stated in the

32 newspaper: “The Netherlands is a beautiful country, which we all can make even more beautiful and above all more fair. I am optimistic” (De Volkskrant 2017). This is a passage that can also be interpreted as slightly ‘populist’ in tone. The type of rhetoric that is used by mainstream parties such as the conservative liberal VVD and the social democratic PvdA thus contains some rhetorical similarities with right-wing populist rhetoric when it comes to the immigration issue, even though it often seems to be more ‘hidden’ in their discourses. With regard to immigration policy in the Netherlands, the mainstream political parties – in this case the VVD and the PvdA – are for a part aligned with populist rhetoric. And even though both parties have made it clear that they don’t want to form a coalition with the PVV, they do seem to be moving more to the right side of the political spectrum when it comes to the issue of immigration. Rutte’s open letter, for example, was considered in several newspapers to be a real bid to win over voters from Wilders’ PVV (Henley 2017b). The ‘tougher’ stance on immigration issues thus seems to have become much more mainstream and also part of the political left. Not only was the social democrat Asscher responsible for the more liberal direction of the civic integration policies in the Netherlands, also under his supervision only 33% of the immigrants had successfully passed the integration exam under the new ‘liberal’ method (Algemene Rekenkamer 2017, 57). Speaking the Dutch language and being fully aware of the Dutch norms and values has therewith become a real (cultural) symbol for immigration and integration. Rutte also declared the following during an interview about his letter:

“The same message for everyone: if you don’t like it here, leave the country, go away. That’s a choice you have, isn’t’ it? If you live in a country where the way we treat each other drives you mad, then you have the choice. Go away. You don’t have to be here.” (Henley 2017b)

Dutch ‘values’ and the element of ‘freedom’ and ‘freedom of choice’ are also used here by Rutte to define what is ‘normal’ in the Netherlands and what’s not (which is a feature that is automatically ascribed to the ‘out-group’). At the same time, both politicians make use of open letters in newspapers, which can be seen as a form of political advertising that is quite direct and directly aimed at ‘the people’. The same is done by Wilders who often frames the ‘Western’ concept of ‘freedom’ as being threatened by the danger of Islam.

33 Wilders said, for example, in an interview with USA Today that:

“Dutch values are based on Christianity, on Judaism, on humanism. Islam and freedom are not compatible. You see it in almost every country where it dominates. There is a lack of total freedom, civil society, rule of law; journalists, gays, apostates – they are all in trouble in those places. And we import it.” (USA Today 2017)

In this quotation, Wilders also links several values to the Netherlands, varying from religious values (e.g. Christianity, Judaism etc.) to concepts of freedom and the rule of law. He then contrasts these with Islam, which he argues, is ‘not compatible’ with freedom and therefore forms a specific threat to ‘Dutch values’. Nevertheless, in comparison to the VVD and the PvdA, the PVV claims electoral space in a completely different way. Whereas the VVD and the PvdA make frequently use of electoral posters and newspaper ads, the PVV campaigns in a completely different way. According to of the PVV, this is mainly the result of the heavy security that is needed to protect Wilders, which makes it impossible to regularly visit TV interviews and debates. Furthermore, she mentions the lack of subsidies as a reason for the inability of the PVV to campaign the same way as other parties (NPO 2017). The tougher line on immigration has thus become more and more mainstream in the Netherlands and this happened especially from the moment Fortuyn started to have great electoral successes in 2002. The space of the ‘anti-immigration vote’ was then successfully filled by the PVV, but each of the Netherlands’ centre-right parties – and to a certain extent also the social democrats – has in its own way tried to claim some of that space (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008, 405). Immigration has therefore become increasingly framed through the threat of terrorism and the perceived integration problems with regard to immigrants with a Muslim background. The concept of norms and values (referring specifically to Western values such as freedom of speech and sexuality) have therewith become deployed more and more to contrast a certain ‘in-group’ against a different ‘out- group’, whose differences are mostly based on cultural norms. ‘Protecting our culture’ and demanding certain (cultural) adaptations of immigrants are thus nowadays more and more used in political rhetoric on both sides of the political spectrum in the Netherlands in order to deny immigrants full citizenship. Revised immigration laws and recent civic integration policies have also shown that this stricter stance on immigration is becoming stronger. Furthermore, certain parties have also usefully adopted the right-wing populist rhetoric and its tougher stance on immigration as a political strategy to regain votes that are lost by those

34 parties to the extreme right (Yeginsu 2017). During the most recent elections there thus seemed to be a certain political space that was left with regard to the ‘anti-immigration vote’ and several parties have attempted to claim this electoral gap – some more explicitly and forcefully than others and this may explain why mainstream parties like the VVD and the PvdA use parts of the populist rhetoric in order to mobilise voters. And while it seems that such mainstream parties need this type of populist rhetoric to gain votes during elections, one can be aware of the increasing influence that right-wing populism is having on sensitive issues such as immigration and integration across the political spectrum. Comparing the two statements mentioned above with the pronouncements of PVV-leader Wilders during the same electoral season, one can note, indeed, that some similarities are visible in the rhetoric of mainstream politicians in the Netherlands. While Wilders’ statements on immigration are certainly much more radical, the protection of ‘Dutch values’ and cultural assimilation are increasingly used with regard to the discourse on immigration in the Netherlands across a range of political actors.

35 4. The Politics of Immigration in France

The development of immigration policies in France has been somewhat different from other Western European countries. Nonetheless, immigration policy in France has – just as in other Western European countries – been influenced by the perceived failures to integrate certain groups successfully into society, which can be interpreted as a reaction by the mainstream parties to the electoral successes of the Front National. In the first paragraph, the development of the French immigration policies is discussed from the post-war period until today. The focus will therefore be specifically on the major turning points that have taken place that indicate a more strict course of immigration policy in France. The second paragraph will present the socio-political context with regard to the most recent French presidential elections of 2017 and its main candidates: François Fillon (Les Républicains), François Hollande (Parti Socialiste) and Marine Le Pen (Front National). The analysis will, however, not focus on the rhetoric of ‘newcomer’ Emmanuel Macron, due to the fact that his movement is rather new and hasn’t been classified as one of the French traditional political parties yet. The chapter will end with an analysis of the rhetoric that was used by the (mainstream) politicians during their campaigning for the elections and to what extent this was influenced by right-wing populism.

4.1 The development of French immigration policy France is in many ways an interesting case study for analysing the influence of right-wing populism on the immigration-discourse. Not only has France been a ‘country of immigration’ for a long time, it has also experienced both open and closed patterns of immigration policy (Schain 2008, 2). Laws and initiatives for (more restrictive) laws can be characterized by political shifts from left to right and visa versa, whereby it is of great importance which majority party is actually in power (Wihtol de Wenden 2011, 69). Indeed, several policy narratives with regard to development of immigration policy can be distinguished, whereby issues of nationality and republican identity have played an important role. Three of these most important periods for the development of this policy field are discussed below.

1980s and early 1990s: The ‘issue of nationality’ The early 1970s can be seen as the first real starting point for the development of more severe immigration acts, when the French government applied a series of harsher measures to restrict immigration (Puzzo 2003, 71). A real turning point was especially the 1974 suspension of

36 labour migration, which was mainly applied to migration coming from non-European countries. The main motivation of the French government to install the ban was to regain some control over the migratory flows, which had developed somewhat chaotically over the years – next to the economic recession the country was troubling with (Puzzo 2003, 73). However, the issue of republican integration did not play an important role yet with regard to the issue of immigration in France. Policies were in the 1970s more focussed on labour immigration and the mobility of guest workers rather than their long-term settlement and integration into French society (Bertossi 2012, 252). The relationship between immigration and French citizenship became politicized for the first time in the beginning of the 1980s, when immigration became more and more linked to questions of national identity and the much-debated nationality law (Schain 2008, 76). It was from this moment onwards that the concept of ‘assimilation’ strongly returned to French politics and the concept of cultural differentialism was brought into a sharp focus (Brubaker 2001, 536). Noteworthy thereby was the growing electoral popularity of the Front National (FN) in the early 1980s, which had made the FN a significant political player within the debate on immigration. The party, which was then under the leadership of former soldier Jean-Marie Le Pen, was known for its strong discourse on immigration, which portrayed non- European immigrants as a real threat to the French national identity (Marthaler 2008, 384). From this moment onwards, several proposals were advanced from the political Right in favour of more restrictive immigration measures and those were particularly aimed towards young North Africans, who were born in France and therefore received automatic French citizenship at the age of majority (Schain 2008, 76). Several attempts then followed in order to replace the famous 1889-law that provided automatic access to French citizenship to every child that was born in France (or in one of its overseas territories) to foreign parents and to revise it with a voluntary-element. According to the new proposed law, candidates to the French citizenship could only acquire it by submitting a voluntary request before the age of 21 (Bertossi 2012, 253). It eventually resulted in the Loi Méhaignerie (1993), which implemented the requirement for children born in France to foreign parents to voluntarily request French citizenship before majority (Legifrance 1993). This revision of the nationality law therewith ended the automatically accorded citizenship through the principle of jus soli.

The 1990s and early 2000s: The nexus between immigration and integration With the growing electoral support for the right-wing populist FN, several new policy approaches were introduced. Not only was the well-debated nationality law revised in 1993

37 (after a special commission of experts was appointed by Chirac to build a national consensus around the divisive issue of immigration), also the earliest forms of French civic integration appeared during the late 1990s (Joppke 2007). However, the real political challenges and changes with regard to French immigration policy took place during the early 2000s, when Le Pen gained remarkable electoral support during the first-round vote of the 2002 presidential elections. As a result of this electoral development, the issue of immigration became the main focus of then-president Chirac and his Minister of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, who then introduced two major pieces of legislation on immigration control, nationality and integration (Marthaler 2008, 387). In November 2003, the first Loi Sarkozy (No. 2003-1119) was published, which consisted of a more restrictive approach on immigration control and emphasized the element of republican integration as necessary in order for immigrants to obtain a residence permit or permission to settle in France (Legifrance 2003). The doctrine of republican integration was now used as a legal condition of assimilation into the classical French tradition and covered now not only the dimension of nationality and republican citizenship, but also the field of immigration (Carrera 2009, 316). The centre-right adopted this new political ‘strategy’ in order to win back votes from the far right and it seemed to have worked for Sarkozy and the Union pour un movement populaire (‘Union for a Popular Movement’, UMP), which regained electoral strength in the period after 2002. Another significant political development during this period was the reconstruction of the principle of laïcité (a French variant of secularism) as an issue of national identity in France (Bertossi 2012, 259). In 2004, a much-debated law was passed that banned ostentatious religious symbols in public schools. Even though the law was presented in a religion-neutral way, it was overall interpreted as a way of keeping Muslim girls from wearing Islamic headscarves in school (Bowen 2007, 1). The 2004 ban on religious symbols was therefore largely interpreted as another way in which immigration was directly linked to integration in the sense that Islam ‘communalism’ threatened the very French tradition of laïcité.

2005-present-day: Assimilation as an issue of public order The year 2005 can be seen as a turning point with regard to the immigration-debate in France. In October and November 2005, a series of riots broke out in the suburbs of and other French cities after two teenage boys with immigrant background died from electrocution, when they were hiding from the police in an electricity substation. The riots gained a lot of attention in the media and were perceived by many as a symbolic failure of the French integration policy. These riots also provided Sarkozy with the right opportunity to bring his

38 tougher rhetoric on immigration into practice and to once again try to win back voters from the far right (Marthaler 2008, 390). It did not also take long after the riots before a new revision of the immigration and integration law was launched in 2006. This second Loi Sarkozy (No. 2006-911) provided the French government with new powers to restrict family reunification, fight illegal migration more effectively and also encouraged a different kind of immigration – namely high-skilled migration (Legifrance 2006). Sarkozy thereby tested a new political vocabulary, stating: “Je veux passer d’une immigration subie à une immigration choisie” (“I want to pass from an unwanted immigration to a selected immigration”) (Fassin 2009, 22). Immigrants were now only allowed to stay in France if they could prove that they have sufficient financial means to support family members and their eligibility for welfare benefits would be reduced (Marthaler 2008, 391). With these new ‘stricter’ measures on immigration (among others also the infamous language test), France seemed to have joined the group of countries like the Netherlands and Britain, which had also limited the family rights of their citizens in order to increase the control on immigration to their countries (Joppke 2007, 11). Sarkozy’s tougher stance on immigration during his period as Minister of Interior can be seen as a clever electoral strategy to tie the right-wing vote for the presidential elections of 2007 (Carvalho 2016, 677). Soon after Sarkozy was elected president in 2007, a new Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development was established, which had the objective of promoting French national identity. As a result of this, the Ministry of Immigration launched a debate about national identity in 2009, which problematized the immigration subie as a threat to the national identity and therewith also indirectly to the French nation (Ocak 2016, 91). In a paper prior to the start of the debate, the Ministry declared that the debate was meant to foster actions that would strengthen the French national identity and reaffirm the republican values and ‘French pride’ (Legifrance 2009). From the start of Sarkozy’s presidency, it had become clear that the element of ‘assimilation’ had returned as central component of immigration politics in France. Not only did a new debate start in 2009 with regard to the full face Islamic veil, also new normative values were brought to the fore, which related back to the civilizational conception of French national identity (Bertossi 2012, 259). Especially today, in the midst of a ‘climate of fear’ for Islamic radicalization and terrorism, new efforts to enforce values of the French national identity have been growing and this is also largely visible with regard to the issues of immigration and integration.

39 4.2 Context: The ‘revolutionary’ French presidential election of 2017 The French presidential election of 2017 was held on 23 April (first round) and 7 May (second round). As no party managed to win a majority during the first electoral round, the two candidates with the most votes – the independent Emmanuel Macron (En Marche!) and the far right Marine Le Pen (FN) – faced each other again during a run-off election in May. This round of the French presidential elections was perceived by many of the leading international newspapers as one of the strangest presidential elections yet, since the sitting first-term president François Hollande was not standing and the traditional mainstream parties had already been eliminated in the first round, while the contest also witnessed the entry of ‘newcomer’ Macron to the political race (Henley 2017a). Macron, a former investment banker at Rothschild, had served during Hollande’s government as Minister of Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs, but resigned to launch an independent bid for the French presidency. Not only was Macron the youngest of the candidates with his 39 years, his political stance was also quite exceptional, describing himself to be “ni de droite, ni de gauche” (‘neither right, nor left’) – something that was also quite revolutionary for the French political landscape ( 2017). During the first electoral round, Macron finished first with 24,01% of the votes, followed by the rightist candidates Le Pen (21,3%) and Fillon (20,01%) (figure 6). Noteworthy was the fact that Benoît Hamon, the main candidate for the PS, was left far behind with only 6,36% of the votes (The Guardian 2017). This ‘revolutionary’ shift in French politics that was visible during the most recent French presidential elections can be ascribed to several contextual factors among which the rising popularity of the populist FN-leader Marine Le Pen. As noted previously, the FN was founded in 1972 by Marine’s father Jean- Marie Le Pen, who had led the party from its foundation until 2011. The party was particularly known for its strongly articulated concerns about the ‘maintenance of French national identity’

Figure 6 The official first round results of the 2017 French presidential and the ‘non-French elections, 24 April 2017. Source: the Guardian.

40 influences’, which it blamed for the nation’s perceived demise (Davies 1999, 66-67). Even though the party wasn’t really successful during the first years of its existence, it became very successful during the local elections in the early 1980s and created an ‘electoral earthquake’ in 2002, by defeating the socialist presidential candidate in the first round of the presidential elections (Rooduijn 2013, 19). However, the extreme-right FN started to pose a real ‘threat’ to the mainstream parties in France, when Marine Le Pen succeeded her father as head of the party in 2011. Under Marine’s leadership, the party had distanced itself from some of its extreme views and was therefore more likely to attract voters than her father with his more radical stance (Godin 2013, 54). Marine Le Pen had started a real ‘de-demonization process’ of the FN, which had brought the party not only a cleaner image (she tried to reject the party’s former association with neo-fascist and neo-Nazi groups), but also reframed the party’s position within the political field. The FN’s discourse, for example, was under Marine Le Pen more and more reworked within a populist framework (as a real ‘party for the people’) instead of an extreme-right one (Godin 2013, 55). As a result, voting for the FN no longer seemed to be a taboo anymore and the FN could therefore enter the selective category of respectable ‘democratic’ and ‘Republican’ parties in French politics (Mondon 2014, 301). That the FN was gaining more and more electoral ground in France was also noticed by the centre-right. In 2002, the UMP (now: Les Républicains) was formed as a merger of several centre-right parties and became known as the biggest mainstream party of the Right. Just like the FN, the UMP performed badly in local elections in its early days and its pro- European stance was also firmly rejected during the 2005 referendum on the European constitution. The party therefore needed to be reformed in order to compete with the growing electoral successes of its direct opponent on the Right: the FN. It was within this context that the UMP started its process of la droite décomplexée, in which it tried to regain its ideological confidence and openly asserted its frontal opposition to the Left (Godin 2013, 57). That the centre-right UMP was shifting more and more to the right side of the political spectrum had also become clear by the fact that UMP ministers started to give interviews to extreme-right publications and that Sarkozy had appointed Patrick Buisson – editor of the far-right magazine – as his electoral advisor (Godin 2013, 61). However, perhaps the biggest indicator for the UMP’s shift further right was Sarkozy’s tougher stance on immigration. Sarkozy had borrowed some of the FN’s rhetoric in the run up to the 2012 elections and even threatened to pull France out of the Schengen treaty in order to reduce immigration (Sarkozy 2012). Even though the party was renamed Les Républicains in 2015, the electoral

41 development of the UMP has shown that the mainstream Right had been radicalised – perhaps even more than that the extreme-right FN had been moderated (Mondon 2014, 311). The growing influence of populism became also somewhat visible on the left side of the political spectrum. During the first round of the most recent election, Hamon’s main competition on the left came from far-left veteran Jean-Luc Mélenchon (La France insoumise), who had performed incredibly well during a set of TV debates. Mélenchon is known for making populism the centre of his campaign strategy and can therefore be considered as one of the direct rivals of right-wing candidates (Mondon 2014, 302). Mélenchon’s populist rhetoric focused mainly on denunciations of globalization and the European Union and the politician therefore presented himself as the perfect left-wing alternative for people to register a protest vote. This ‘electoral tactic’ was largely condemned by the PS-candidate Hamon, who had publicly accused Mélenchon of not working to the gathering of the left and the idea of seducing the popular electorate (Misandeau 2016). Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the PS had also used some of the populist rhetoric in the past. In 2012, Hollande had already made the popular promise that he would close the famous refugee and migrant encampment in Calais “by the end of the year” and a few years later, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in France and in the run-up to the 2017 elections, Hollande had also tried to promote himself as the ‘public’s bulwark against xenophobia’ by trying to introduce measures to strip dual nationals of their citizenship – even though this had obviously failed (The Guardian 2016). The developments during the latest presidential election and its ‘winning’ candidates may thus indicate that French politics is ‘swerving’ towards populism, whereby identity politics is dominating and mainstream parties seem to be losing more and more of their popularity.

4.3 Discourse analysis: the influence of right-wing populism in France Just like the Dutch elections, the recent presidential election in France was also largely centred on the theme of immigration. Although, the division in France with regard to the issue of immigration seemed to be more present between ‘left and right’ than it was between ‘mainstream and extreme right’. For example, the mainstream-right candidate, François Fillon, chose to take in a tougher stance on immigration and opted for the introduction of the so-called ‘immigration quotas’. During a political rally earlier this year in Nice, Fillon said the following about immigration:

42 “France is generous, but it is not a mosaic and a territory without limits. It is one nation that has a right to chose who can join it and a right that foreigners accept its rules, customs, laws and traditions.” (Fillon 2017)

The candidate of Les Républicains then formulated his measure to adopt annual quotas, which should discourage immigrant families to come to France:

“The tradition of openness must remain reasonable. We have six million unemployed and nearly nine million poor people. In this context, immigration must be firmly controlled and reduced to a strict minimum.” (Fillon 2017)

If we look at Fillon’s discourse on immigration (and integration), the topos of threat or danger becomes visible (Wodak 2015, 53). After all, Fillion mentions a certain right of the French nation (namely that ‘foreigners’ need to ‘accept its rules, customs, laws and traditions’) that is being threatened and therefore immigration should be ‘firmly controlled and reduced’. Fillon’s rhetoric on immigration is therewith quite similar to the language Rutte used in his open letter. Both mainstream right-wing politicians make use of topoi that are frequently used in right-wing rhetoric and which are thus used – even though not quite noticeably – to construct a positive self- and a negative other-presentation (Wodak 2015, 52). In their discourses, they mention a specific ‘threat’ or ‘burden’ to their nation’s values, which needs to be somehow addressed or diminished. Even though the mainstream right’s rhetoric on immigration is shifting further towards the right side of the political spectrum, the former president of the Republic of France, François Hollande (PS), has expressed his concerns with regard to the presence of right-wing populism. During a speech that was held right after the first round of the presidential election, Hollande had openly expressed his preference to vote for Macron.

“The presence of the extreme right once again poses a risk to our country. Finally, faced with the terrorist threat that demands solidarity and also the cohesion of our country, the extreme right would divide France deeply, stigmatize some of our citizens from our citizens with regard to their origins or their religion. It would call the freedoms and principles on which the Republic was founded into question.” ( 2017)

43 In this quotation of Hollande’s speech, it becomes evident that he tries to warn people of the consequences of voting for Le Pen, even though he does not mention her by name, and does this overall by linking this to the issue of immigration and integration. He further stated:

“That is why, facing such a risk, it is not possible to remain silent, nor to take refuge in indifference. Mobilization is necessary, but also the clarity of choice. That is why I will vote for Emmanuel Macron.” (Le Point 2017)

Hollande uses here the same type of rhetoric of the topos of threat or danger, even though he frames the extreme right as the main threat instead of immigration (Wodak 2015, 53). Hollande’s rhetoric towards immigration and integration is much more reluctant than, for example, the rhetoric of Fillon and Rutte. To some extent, it is also more open towards immigration and integration than the rhetoric of his Dutch left-wing colleague Asscher, whose immigration rhetoric in the newspaper advertisement in De Volkskrant was quite similar to that of Fillon and Rutte. Nontheless, Hollande’s political position can be considered much more limited, due to the ending of his very unpopular mandate and his withdrawal from the election. Hollande’s statements can therefore be interpreted as a possible way to redefine the social-democratic discourse on immigration. In the analysis of the French presidential election, the socio-political context and France’s terrorism problem are also very important factors. The recent terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic State on French soil has contributed to the strengthening of the harsh rhetoric on the representation of Islam and made it easier for right-wing populist politicians to marginalize Muslims and to frame Islam as incompatible with values like secular democracy (Noack 2017). Marine Le Pen, for example, stated during a two-day political rally in Lyon to kick-off her presidential campaign the following:

“I am a woman, and as a woman I feel an extreme violence of the restriction of freedoms, which multiplies in our country through the development of Islamist fundamentalism” (Le Pen 2017).

Fillon also responded to the issue of Islamic terrorism during his campaign and said:

“Radical Islam is corrupting some of our Muslim fellow citizens. This radical Islam challenges us in the community. I want a strict control of the Muslim worship

44 administrative. (…) Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism don’t denounce the values of the Republic.” (Fillon 2016)

In the passage of the speech citied above, Fillon’s discourse on the terrorist attacks in France is, at its core, quite similar to the rhetoric of Le Pen. Both link the terrorist attacks of IS to the issue of immigration and frame radical Islam as a direct threat to the values of the French Republic. Comparing the two above-mentioned statements, one can argue that there is similarity in how mainstream right and extreme right rhetorically approach the issue of immigration in the run up to the 2017 election. These two candidates are therefore in contrast to the social democratic Hollande, who reacted quite differently with regard to terrorism. After the 2016 Nice attack, for example, the former president of France referred to the suspected terrorists as ‘fanatics’ and ‘those who wish to hurt us’ (Sky News 2016). Even though Hollande was in a different position as Fillon and Le Pen as president of the nation, his rhetoric on immigration and integration seems to be much more moderate than that of the right-wing candidates. However, just like in the Dutch context, the question of protecting national values and cultural assimilation form important elements in the immigration rhetoric of both mainstream left and right in France. It thus appears that the influence of right-wing populism has also been largely influential within the French political landscape.

45 Conclusion

In today’s Europe, the phenomenon of right-wing populism has become a mainstream political force in many European countries (Wodak 2015, 181). Especially with regard to the current socio-political context – in which fear and anxiety seem to be dominating – many right-wing populist parties have succeeded in mobilizing voters and appeared as key players in the run up to a series of national elections. The Dutch right-wing populist PVV and the French far-right FN, for example, were closely following the mainstream parties in the polls and were, at one point, even seen as possible candidates to win the elections. However, even though the actual prospect of right-wing parties coming to power has been limited (due to the political systems of some countries), their growing influence on mainstream parties has raised concerns among political commentators and various human rights organizations. It has been argued, for example, that centre-right and centre-left parties seem to be implementing right- wing populist policies in an attempt to retain their voters (Wodak 2015, 184). This ‘move right’ seems to be particularly pronounced within the field of immigration, whereas in the past few years, many new rules and regulations have made it much more difficult for immigrants to obtain citizenship across a number of EU Member States. The main question of this thesis was therefore in what ways does the increasing electoral popularity of right-wing populist parties influence the immigration rhetoric of mainstream politicians in the Netherlands and France, respectively. The focus lay specifically on the socio-political contexts of the elections that were held in both countries in early 2017 and which have been combined in a comparative discourse analysis. In the context of the Dutch parliamentary elections, two political newspaper advertisements of the conservative-liberal VVD (Rutte) and the social democratic PvdA (Asscher) have been analysed by the use of CDA. The discourse analysis has shown that both politicians use a similar immigration rhetoric in which ‘Dutch norms and values’ should be protected. In particular, then-Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s open letter, in which he urged people who don’t want to adjust to “act normal or go away”, has been widely debated and was interpreted by some as a way to show right-wing voters that he could be as tough on immigration as the PVV (Taylor 2017). The social democratic candidate Lodewijk Asscher also adopted some of the PVV’s exclusionary rhetoric, when he linked the giving of “our norms and values” to newcomers as an “opportunity to become part of our society” (De Volkskrant 2017). The immigration rhetoric of the two Dutch mainstream politicians can thus

46 in a way be interpreted as ‘populist’, since both politicians mark ‘Dutch values’ in their rhetoric as a cultural criterion of belonging to the Dutch nation. In the context of the French elections, the political speeches of the right-wing candidates Fillon and Le Pen have been analysed, together with a speech of former President Hollande. The discourse analysis of these speeches has also indicated that the mainstream political parties in France have become more populist in their rhetoric in the past few years. In the French context, it seems to be especially the populist topos of ‘threat’ or ‘danger’ that is regularly used in the speeches. In this rhetorical strategy, a specific danger or threat is framed, against which a reaction is necessary (Wodak 2015, 53). In the speeches of Fillon and Le Pen, the issue of immigration has been framed as the very ‘threat’ to the nation, while Le Pen went a step further by emphatically linking it to Islam. Within the French context, the mainstream right’s (LR) immigration rhetoric thus seems to be much more shifting towards right-wing populism, than the rhetoric of the mainstream left (PS). However, the PS has – in contrast to LR – experienced a strong electoral downfall in the 2017 election. Based on the comparative discourse analysis of the mainstream’ immigration rhetoric in France and the Netherlands, one can note that their immigration rhetoric has in a way been influenced by the increasing electoral popularity of their opposing right-wing populist parties. The fact that the PVV was closely following the VVD in the polls appears to have encouraged Rutte to adopt more right-wing populist rhetoric with regard to immigration, appealing to defend “Dutch” values against an alleged threat – just as Wilders. However, it was Rutte’s VVD that claimed a resounding victory in the parliamentary elections with 33 seats. The right-wing populist PVV finished second with 20 seats, while the social democratic PvdA slumped to a historic low of nine seats (Kiesraad 2017). If we compare this to the French case, there is a similar political trend visible. In France, the mainstream right/Fillon’s discourse on immigration is in a way quite similar to that of the right-wing populist FN. Both have campaigned for a tougher stance on immigration and they both also used the type of rhetoric in which the ‘values of the Republic’ should be defended. However, the main difference between the mainstream left in France and the Netherlands is that Hollande (PS) particularly framed the far right as the main ‘threat’ to the nation, instead of linking it to problems with immigration. Nevertheless, Hamon, the mainstream left-wing candidate of the PS, came in fourth place and had – just like the Dutch PvdA – finished with a very low score (Chrisafis 2017). In the comparison between France and the Netherlands, once can thus indeed note that there appears to be a general shift of the countries’ political spectrum to the right.

47 The 2017 Dutch and French elections also suggest, perhaps, that right-wing populism is still developing itself as a mainstream force in European politics, resulting in an increasing manifestation of the ‘politics of exclusion’ (Wodak 2015, 182). The political trend in Western Europe with regards to immigration appears to indicate that there is a progressively wider consensus on keeping more and more immigrants or ‘out-groups’ outside the national community. Increasingly, also (mainstream) politicians in Western Europe are invoking the need to protect their countries’ real as well as symbolic borders, drawing dividing lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as mode of claiming power (DeChaine 2012, 1). The instalment of language and citizenship tests, for example, together with other rules and regulations that emphasize the process of (cultural) assimilation, can be understood as such a ‘power tool’, whereby symbolic borders are reinstated that allow only certain groups to become part of the ‘in-group’, while others are denied access to this ‘imagined community’ (Wodak 2015, 182). This particular development in European politics has also been illustrated on the basis the Dutch and French case studies, where the policy overview has shown that in both cases requirements of cultural assimilation have become more and more the norm for immigrants. In order for politicians to convince voters in election times, power needs to be legitimized and the discourse analysis of the mainstream politicians in France and the Netherlands has shown that this is often accompanied by the use of right-wing populist rhetorical strategies. However, one can ask whether the influence of the current populist wave in Europe can remain powerful in the long run. Several authors have already argued that populism is an episodic phenomenon and the recent elections in France and the Netherlands have also shown that the strategy of moving towards a stronger ‘populist rhetoric’ with regard to divisive issues such as immigration has backfired for some. This was especially demonstrated with the electoral results of the mainstream left-wing PvdA and PS. Despite the fact that the current state of Western European politics seems to be dominated by a normalization of right-wing populist policies and rhetoric, French voters have shown that it is indeed possible to find a counterbalance (Wodak 2015, 184). The recent victory of the centrist Emmanuel Macron in the French presidential election has, indeed, shown that a ‘different voice’ can be possible within the contemporary European political landscape. However, only time will tell, and for now the German election of October 2017 appears to be the next big ‘test’ for Europe in gauging the continuing influence of right-wing populism.

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