MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA August 19, 2018 During burnout operations, a sudden wind shift and explosive fire growth occurred and cut off personnel from their escape routes.
“I didn’t know I was burned. I just thought I was hot from “The goal for the last 5-6 days running.” was to close that door off.” _ - HEQB Lee -Branch II Charlie
2 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
. The . The th
step process nor is there a single recipe there a single step is nor process - by -
changing events with coworkers and peers and events with coworkers changing you - fire. names changed. been The individuals have of the the aviation resources assigned to theFi- assigned incident.the aviation resources the of happenednally, there is awhat story from perspective Management the Incident Teams of Administrators the responsible for Agency and life the with that story to share istrust. even harder It and jurisdictions. The public, agencies across and ac- and thoughts act all is to the bravest of share without are made the moment they tions from been have could puzzling what and back looking of can be un- war Sharing the fog differently. done confusing. and comfortable pages live the three main following stories or In what of happened story perspectives. is a There the on the perspective the firefighters of from in the vicinity of the entrapment. is a ground There the perspective what of from of happened story s northeast flank was to secure dozer line north of drop dozers northeast drop to secure of was north line flank ’ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY , the fire growth had been steadily moving both south/ been moving steadily had , growth the fire th
, fire the plan the for 25) near the division break in Branch II with a firing operation. Resources from from operation. a firing Resources with II in Branch break near the division 25) th . 19 Up until August - th the Mendocino Complex. the Mendocino Complex. Map for the area of focus in Branch II of of II in Branch focus Map the area of for
for any organization, group, or agency to follow. It is an expedition filled with rabbit with trails, is to follow. dis- an organization, It any agency expedition filled or for group, through earned not easy a perspective quiet to share is moments of reflection.coveries, and It jumped containment lines. lines. containment jumped is not a unintended outcomes step Learning from partment firefighters and one CAL FIRE firefighter were injured. Two unoccupied CAL FIRE CAL injured. Two unoccupied FIRE firefighter were one and CAL partment firefighters it when transportsin from the fire the vicinity crew sustained parked damage emergency exit the area. However, six individuals farther in to run front line farther thedown dozer were forced six individuals exit the area. However, approximately road for to a nearby dirt unburned fuels front, flame the advancing through of treatment. Fire Los De- Angeles for and transported Five up picked were they one mile before tions, a sudden wind shift and explosive fire growth happened and personnel were cut off happened off growth cut personnel fire and were explosive shift and tions, wind a sudden to back to their able vehicles escape to their were move routes. Most the firefighters from of On August 19 On August (DP point 25 opera-the burnout to brought over were help operations. the with other divisions During digits. Steep terrain, poor ventilation, fire intensities and long travel times made it difficult to it times difficult made travel ventilation, long and poor digits. intensities Steep terrain, fire fire. the of in certain aircraft areas utilize and insert crews southeast and north/northeast. Most days experienced warming and drying trends very with and drying warming and north/northeast.southeast experienced Most days fuel critically and near moistures relative low single and afternoon humidities recoveries poor fires experienced significant growth during the first ten days, including growing 50,000 acres acres the during 50,000 ten including experiencedgrowing first significant days, growth fires 5 on August that started fires 27 the Ranch and River on July Mendocino consisted of Complex The
The Mendocino Com- plex Fire began July 27, 2018 eventually becoming California’s largest wildland fire at the time burning 459,123 acres. 8/19/2018: Strike Team 1880C attends morning brief- Roughly 1430: After being re- ing and is assigned to Various overhead arrive at DP- directed several times and driv- Branch II during division 25 and notice several resources ing for nearly 6 hours, 1880C breakouts. They were to at the drop point. The fire is ac- arrives at Stonyford camp and is head to DP-21. Fire was tive and has an established instructed to fuel up and head to believed to miles from DP- column below DP-25. DP-25. 25.
The fire flares up and slams Strike Team 1880C assigned to FR24N02 near DP-25 below holding and incoming Golf the dozer line and settles Strike Team assigned to light- down. Urgency to defensively ing. Strike Team 4700G de- Misc overhead near DP clines firing operations. Strike burn out the line increases in -25 develop a firing plan order to hold the fire at that Team 1880C is reassigned to
location. firing.
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA FLA COMPLEX COMPLEX MENDOCINO MENDOCINO
1733: The 6 individuals of the southern firing team get cut off 1733: Wind shifts and the One firing team burns to from their escape routes. Flame fire grows explosively. It the north, the other burns lengths estimated to be 100ft jumps the line and runs to- south toward DP-25. above the tree tops. Day light ward the southern firing turns into pitch black instantly. team.
1733: Resources at DP-25 real- ize they need to burn around the drop point for safety. The fire flanks around DP-25 trapping The firing team drops the resources in place. Priority traffic: entrapped their torches and runs ignitions team relays posi- into the green. tion, escape plan, and re- quests air support.
The escaping firefighters regroup, and identify a nearby road on their map that they can run to.
The six firefighters are picked up on FR18N02 Injuries are assessed and its ahead of the fire.
decided to fly out 2 firefighters. TIMELINE TIMELINE The remaining 4 firefighters AVIATION are transported to the medical unit. All resources near DP2-5 leave the area once the heat
subsides.
8/20/18: All 22 members of Strike Team 1880C are reunited 3 during breakfast at the Stonyford Incident Command Post.
4 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS
26 was still viable was a 26 but for only - 2 to DP - Vicinity and location of the MendocinoVicinity and Complex. The day the of entrapment
–
August 19 to II Pat(Dep. II) trying began Branch Deputy Branch his day piece of line in the northeast corner of Branch as the ultimate Branch of II piecethe northeast corner line of in as small line. keep the footprint of the fire was important It to east. the not want fire did further any as possible the team and the a when fire line prior, struggle the was construction days In blow up and run, would it a lot. firefighters and happened The to get the line about the they felt in urgency preptalked and it. the fire with also coming a competing was priority There Creek the potential to and Stonyford impact around there Happy and in Camp areas.houses the Bonnie View day or two. The Branches discussed the possibility of the fire the fire two. the possibility of Branches or The discussed day ridge The predicted. Creek the winds with getting into Cold an Creek was Cold above important because line if the to hold to the races be off likely jumped into it could thatfire drainage Everyone potentially eastand the fire. communities affect of the With firing 18th. the op- to try of night a successful wanted to St. Moun- Johns efforts their switch could eration, the IMTs everything on Brush Camp tain hold Ridge. and south stop could they the discussed where and While IMTs this fire described the the last on ground contingency plans, firefighters There were many conversations regarding line viability, many conversations the were regarding There areas on the plan,strategic eastdoable, alternative and if it was together pulled II Branch Deputy and II Branch fire. the of side that as the felt they area.for They resources as many could H section line of from A STORY FROM GROUND THE A STORY
s ’ s s Of- s ’ ’ s Office, Office, s ’
cluding CAL FIRE, Service, Nevada cluding US Forest Australia Zea- New Forestry, and of Division land. Mendocino Complex had firefighting firefighting re- had Mendocino Complex different 34 agencies in- from over sources large populations of firefighters from many many from firefighters populations of large agencies and organizations. The different edness Level was 5 and limited resources resources limited 5 and edness Level was teams firefighters and to be forced creative With come had. they fires what with large and a lack of infrared information hampered hampered infrared information of a lack and National The Prepar- efforts. intel gathering It was the biggest fire in California history history in biggest was the California fire It issues on. a Smoke lot going was there and The days prior to the entrapment Thethe days to prior
out California and other States. and out California of Forestry, Nevada Depart- ofNevada Forestry, addi- and ofment Corrections from through- tional agencies Parks, Cal Water, Lake CountyCal Parks, Nevada Bureau, Division Farm servation Corps, North Shore Corps, servation Cross,Red American Kel- Fire, State California Fire, seyville life, National Park Service, Service, life, Park National Fire, Lakeport Fire, Hopland Con- PG&E,AT&T, California of Land Management, Management, Bureau of Land Department Affairs, of Indian and US Fish Wild- of Defense, Office, California Highway Pa- Highway California Office, FPD, Australia trol, Pillsbury Fire, New Zealand Bureau and Mendocino CountySheriff Mendocino County Colusa Sheriff fice, GlennCounty Sheriff Office, Corrections and Rehabilitation, and Corrections CountySheriff Lake Valley Fire, Ukiah Fire, Califor- Ukiah Fire, Valley Office of EmergencySer- nia California Department vices, of Complex? Potter Redwood Fire, Valley Just how many agencies manyagencies Just how theon Mendocino were
5 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS -
2 that 2 25. - - to get ” s location
’ 26 and26 H 25 for tomor- 25 - - hour shift since hour -
” 25 for a burnout opera- for a burnout 25 - had worked op- worked dozer with had
1
out of the bottom of the barrel of the bottom of out “
will be a touchy spot. be awill touchy “ 1900 every day. He had also run several success- several also run He every had day. 1900 - 25, he thought about his experience the25, on he thought so far -
s shift and needed resources. He knew Division Group Group needed and Hes shift Division knew resources. ’ line. The firefighters had been working hard getting been the working had line. firefighters The the burnout. J Division resources line for in prepped and structures on burning the focusing around on the were H south division fire their from of bringing and end south between gap DP this left a big 2. However, the about asking out. to be Heneeded burned thought row not have L/M/Ndid re- any Taylor (DIVS) Supervisor in had this worked on his division. area as Taylor sources so it made a Firefighter, Fire Captain, Battalion and Chief, had sense to this new division. They to him over bump line hold. out and about of three miles to burn inversion the past to days over a prolonged Due several Pat was worried Dep.about II flights, no IR Branch and its and proximity the to the had main fire moved where figure out a gigantic puzzle; to a gigantic out place the limited where figure puzzle; I Division branch. to his assigned resources of number be established DP in vicinity the of would
25 to find to find Dep.25 II. Branch -
hour shift. They decided to switch shift.him They decided to a hour 12 -
(five of
clearance, clearance, -
Designators Type 4 Engines Type 2 Engines Type 1 Engines Type 3 Engines
sized multipurpose, 500gpm, 500gpm, multipurpose, sized size structure, 1000gpm, structure,size 1000gpm, - - Lee Lee waslater used as aqualified FIRB in charge of of one the firing operations on the linedozer north ofDP CAL FIRE Engine Strike TeamStrike CALEngine FIRE ing the price for decisions made by the crew they had replaced. They had heard the group before the group before had heard they replaced. They by the crew made had decisions the price ing for 1 On August 17, the firefighters of 1880C had a very productive and positive work period in and positive period Divi- a very productive work had 1880C the firefighters of 17, On August working way they weretheir sion G. felt on a grind They they pay- were around floating was a rumor better on the fireline. better and assignments There when the winds would push the fire from 1400 would from the the fire push winds when operations the past at days. firing over night several ful As DIVS Jordan drove the to DP Jordan hours three drove DIVS As times, been out several run In Division F, of the Mendocino had (part Complex). fire Ranch crews tion. They discussed it would be a point and tricky area because the wind it of the drop would tion. discussed They Jordan to be DIVS it careful, in He a saddle. cautioned Operations Section Chief (OPS) Trainee let DIVS Jordan know he was being moved to the other he to the other being know was Jordan moved let DIVS (OPS) Trainee Operations Chief Section to check Jordan DP the DIVS out area around of the fire. Heside wanted After taking 24 hours off to reset from working off operations working on the fire, firing night 24 hours Division taking to reset from After on the in federal Ukiah. arrived The of ICP Jordan) side at Jordan 0530 (DIVS Supervisor Group the dozers he was working with would not be on night shift. HEQB Lee searched for Dep. Branch for was searched he not beworking on night shift. would the dozers with HEQB Lee in so bad the area cell phones and were Pat the plan. radio to on discuss II the Communications from Division G to DP that he drove gan as a resource assigned to division G but there were problems finding equipment G but problems there were a heavy to division assigned as agan resource his 24 boss to replace him after Since being assigned to the fire, Heavy Equipment Boss (HEQB) Lee Boss (HEQB) Equipment to the fire, Heavy Since assigned being H be- J. divisions and his day August including 19, On divisions several erators putting in line on Helicopter Coordinator (HLCO) to take a look over the branch if the air was clear enough, to en- enough, clear over if the air a the branch was to take look (HLCO) Helicopter Coordinator on and his IAP, assigned, penciled the in resources planHe changes got sure was still viable. to out see the himself. situationheaded for
tank, 3) staffed D: Type 50gpm, (pickup 200gal frames, Type C: Type wildland high (4x4 3) tank, staffed 300gal 120gpm, (mid 3) staffed tank, 400gal 400gal tank, staffed 4) tank, staffed 400gal B: Type A: Type (full Engine Strike Teams Strike Engine type engine, battalion same one the leader) chief
6 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS
-
” 21, 21, -
t seen as good enough to fir- enough t seendo as good ’ The culture in LAFD, we are culture when The 1880C firefighter “ job. to do here are here,a good we - s attention. There had been had s attention. no relative There ’ versed crew crew versed - and build some street some build and ”
32 south of choices: of two Dip go south Blue in they had L. Division 32 this At point, -
21. There was confusion because Branch II the because the II northeast portion confusion was of was Branch There 21. - clear their name clear their “ 21 was on the northwest side of Lake Pillsbury. STEN(t) Andy told the crew told the deci- on the STEN(t) was Pillsbury. of Lake Andy side 21 northwest - s intent (division breakouts felt confusing and rushed), they were proud of the work they the work of they were rushed), proud confusing and felt s intent breakouts (division ’
contact DIVS H, DIVS J and Dep. Branch II Pat even but J and H, Dep. challenging it II the repeaterscontact was to DIVS DIVS over Branch getting work anxious of some were anyone.driving, the crews to do of hours After 6 ahold get overhanging branch became stuck in a culvert when a soft shoulder sucked it off the road. it sucked in became shoulder off Dig- a branch a culvert stuck soft when overhanging they tried to drive their Many the group times another the hour. during out engine delayed ging ing up and around the fire. up and around ing an to dodge not travel trying easy. one hours of was that At point, the engines day one 6+ of The was told to head to DP to head told was around up the back had and back all the way they come the the fire way east or of the fire side go- to keep decided They point. to the drop down and the fire the top of around and up continue which everyone was familiar structure worked on Division Ewhich because doing with they had prior finally was J and defense. the STEN(t) On way, Andy able with DIVS to establish communications sion to move them to Division J was a reflection on their work from yesterday. They were being were They yesterday. from them J a on their to Division sion to reflection was work move work to DP some because formulated route done.a travel they wanted They traded horse Before they left camp, 1880C leadership briefed the crew and let everyone know they were go- they were know let everyone and the crew briefed leadership camp, 1880C left they Before DP II, to Branch ing but DP fire rection of where to report. They began searching for more information, for began searching at to stopping the print report. They of where rection to J. Comms from Division report they should to get maps.trailer also heard it was likely They 21. 21. no travel with was a bit plan,di- plan, no real reassigned It frustrating, no communications and attended the Division D breakout. During the breakout, Deputy Branch I approached 1880C and the breakout, 1880C Branch approached Deputy I attended the Division D breakout. During they where should STEN asked Riley II. them they to Branch beingwere reassigned informed them to DP he did not know, but said later go told should I they first,report. Branch At Deputy humidity (RH) recovery overnight and the RH continued to stay low. It had been hot and dry and dry and been hot had It low. continued stay to the RH and overnight recovery (RH) humidity officersnext the main the couple After to be for predicted that of days. way briefing,was 1880C his trainee, STEN(t) Andy, and the officers of each brief- the morning of officers the engine company and attended his trainee,STEN(t) Andy, weather Riley The portionattracted STEN ating 0700. were accomplishing. were (STEN Riley), had Team Strike Riley Leader breakfastAugust at 1880C of 0630. morning 19, The tackled each assignment as if it were a test and received compliments about their work. Alt- compliments about their work. received each assignment as a test if ittackled were and of or the big direction fire the picture of not for the group did understanding have a clear hough leader that wanted to produce work. As the strike team the strike As that to produce work. wanted they day, division on a different themselves every to division, finding division from bounced cred with the IMTs. It was the IMTs. It with to the clear Team Strike cred a confident had well Leaders they and Regardless the reason, the crew wanted to work the reason, wanted hard, the crew Regardless job, a good do my assignments because they were from LA LA Fire weren and City assignments from becausemy they were be back an not take assignment operations. aing if feeling that they did was they would There to above quickly. done from work get pressure to be seemed there a and trash up lot of picking them had turned down it turned being by down an being had them to pick assigned assignment for were and punished crum- getting were they about whether also talked guys The the fire. around hose and trash up
7 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS s experience, a ’ 25, where he found where 25, - 25 to reaching out 25 before - do not want that to give plando up but will they can to see everything itdo DIVS Jordan, expecting to be through. plan a firing himself, ex- formulating Pat he II to Dep.pressed Branch Pat was too far thought in the weeds. Pat seemed upset Dep. with II Branch gether? In DIVS Jordan In gether? be would Supervisor Group Division a while planning operation the burn be looking would at Branch the big pic- wor- safety. was DIVS Jordan for ture someone his experience, when In ried. they generally plans a operation, firing this comment. The exchange betweenthis comment. exchange The
25. - The purple line illustrates 1880C route of travel to eventually arrive at travel arrive of to eventually route purple lineThe illustrates 1880C DP 25, 25, - 25. 25. - 25 earlier in the earlier day. 25 -
DIVS Jordan was surprised and thought to himself, why is a Branch putting the firing plan to- putting the firing is a Branch to himself, why thought and surprised was Jordan DIVS be? Dep. Branch II Pat told DIVS Jordan he had already made a plan and was going to the a plan going off made and was fire he had DIVS Pat Jordan already told be? Dep. II Branch saddle. Dep. Branch II Pat talking to some hand crews. DIVS Jordan let Dep. Branch II Pat know he Pat know let Dep.was Jordan II Pat hand crews. to some Branch talking DIVS Dep. II Branch an had would if he at his role asked the possible and idea what there to look operations burnout day and told them to told and keepday coming. in the working arrived DP around fire,was Jordan 1880C way their As DIVS on the road to DP on the road DP until miles north of waited a couple of were they STEN(t) Andy all heard Pat had again. them information they PatDep. the most gave II Dep. II Branch Branch then drive to DP then drive got When they finally back to Stonyford to Stonyford back Camp, up, fuel and contact with Dep. Pat who told II Branch to report the group the northeast corner the northeast corner and made the fire of Eventually, 1880C got Eventually, 1880C to the helibaseover on mation frustrat- was ing. day of driving on on of driving day roads bumpy, crummy infor- minimal with and wondering what wondering and long on. The going was
View from DP from View
8 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS
25, he 25, -
25 he noticed three or four unloaded low he noticed three four or 25 - 25 as the priority. Winds were not favorable were at as theWinds priority. 25 - 25, Road 24N02 , Dozer line and Road 18N02 intersection. line and Road 24N02 , Road Dozer 25, - DP 25 to talk to Dep. Branch II Pat to figure out their roles in Pat the their roles to out Dep. to figure to talk II Branch 25 - 26 was one of the few was places cell service, OPS on the Ty- that26 fire had - 25. They They 25. -
26. Dep.26. -
1300 there was another small briefing. Dep. Branch II Pat outlined a plan outlined of where there Pat briefing. Dep. another1300 was II small Branch - 26. 26. - at DP
2 s operations. 25 area. Around 1630, as OPS Tyler drove to drove as OPS area. DP 1630, Tyler Around 25 ’ - Battalion1 wasDIVS L/M/N for the Mendocino Complex. OnAugust 19, he did nothave resources assigned histo
2 divisionand wastoldhe wouldtakingbe over thenewly developed Division India on hisnext shift. Hecame out to familiarizehimself with the inarea preparation fortaking over. Curious, OPS Tyler drove out that way to see the ground and validate what was going on in going the and was what OPSdrove Tyler validate out that to seeCurious, the ground way DP Tyler was on the phone, he saw 6111C, an NDF strike team drive through headed to DP headed through on team the phone, an was strike NDF drive he saw 6111C, Tyler because at he they were Division confused the bottomworking of was thought J. check the fire at the fire DP check DP the plan.supported As the next needs for period. OPS burn While around to make stuck phoneler calls about resource bottom of Cold Creek yet. Cold bottom of He firing some to to do wanted them HLCO had let them had them HLCO had the fire madeknow an- not but in was the other run Branch II Pat contacted II Branch them advised and on the radio (OPS Sam) and Battalion (BC) (BC) (OPS Sam) Battalion and Taylor 1 OPS Tyler met with CAL FIRE OPS Tyler Sam Operations Chief Section with what he had seen from what with he 1530, ar- the air. Around at DP rived the fire from the ground and and the ground from the fire heard he had what validate the burn out was going going out was the burn in Di- he H. was glad vision He at a chance get to look would problems and he wanted to he wanted and problems how the planning know for to get out in the field was a welcome change. It had been hard talking to Branch II or to Dep. talking II was had been change.to get out in Branch hard field the It Branch a welcome the communications with II his experience where he could. The group resumed waiting for the ordered resources. resources. the ordered for waiting resumed group The he could. where experience his a (OPS Tyler), Operations chance IMT (CIIMT) Interagency Section the California For Chief Tyler to put fire and established the bowl south of DP of south the bowl and established to put fire to have wait. still resources. would that DIVS waiting on time they were Firing and operations opportunities to for not in with share the planning.He looked struggled feeling included Jordan day 1200 Around burn operations. DIVS Jordan was confused about what was going on going a briefing. confused wanted was about what was and operations.burn Jordan DIVS back to go decided to DP They the two did not seem to be working too well so DIVS Jordan backed off and drove away. off too well backed He ran Jordan so drove seem not and to beDIVS working did the two the for necessary the resources out worked they had Jordan DIVS told who H trainee into DIVS
9 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA
GROUND OPERATIONS - to
- (two
No, I No, I “
agency crews, agency -
Designators 25, STEN(t) Andy asked asked STEN(t) Andy 25, Restricted use which - No restriction on use
Man, I think the beastMan, is the think I “
CAL FIRE Crew Strike Team Strike CAL Crew FIRE
on the spot, mixed on the etc. Hand Crew StrikeTeams Crew Hand totaling crews 32 persons 16 person captains, strike minimum, crew at a leader) team G: Type construc- dedicated hasfireline and of consist These CDC/ tion training. USFS/BLM/NPS/BIA CYA crews, TSIand crews. Hotshot crews H: Type line fire hotline no usuallyincludes in amount the limited construction, constructcan of hour, they line per on inci- requirestraining the and go out. they before These dent crews,Volun-are Card Blue crews crews, crews organized hand teer All joking aside, joking the captains in- All Another firefighter responded, firefighter Another ” ” s the sun. flame lengths (south of the road that lengths the road to flame leads of (south ’ 25. As they As they 25. - 100’ 100’ 25). One firefighter joked, One firefighter 25). - 1880C to arrive? As they arrived the they dozer to arrive? As where arrived line 1880C DP of intersected north road and and have out get STEN to stop Riley could a so he face Dep. II. face with Branch the off, dropping STEN STEN(t) moved After Riley Andy as heading north facing off the road vehicle command During the usual chaos engines the usual chaos bunch of a turning of During the below see fire road the firefighters could around, with DP behind the smoke. that think their people up, gear, their structed to hurry grab get and all why wondered up. those tooled firefighters Several people there. for just they been Had were sitting waiting go back to the top of the hill where the line dozer to the back top the hill where leftgo of the a briefing. tie in for with them there He would road. north would be the only egress option them. be egress the for would only As he north
25 moving NE,25 close and -
25, they caught their first full their full they caught first 25, - 25 and he told them noticed he told and STEN had to reposition Riley uphill. 25 facing - 25, half a dozen buggies or golf team buses, a dozen buggies golf half a masticator,25, or various and - 25. He told the group to turn and to turn the group Hearound told 25. - 1880C Turning engines around. engines Turning 1880C several resources at DP resources several the fire and did not yet have good situational as soon as himself not yet awareness. good did Hethe fire and have kept assuring his engines be better. out a briefing of were and they doing, it Two they had what found would to around face DP turned parked the command vehicle, STEN Riley kept thinking about how they were new to this area of to this area new of they were vehicle, about how thinking the command STENparked kept Riley umn in the drainage. They met Dep. Branch II Pat as he was Dep. in met II theumn They Branch drainage. of DP out coming drove the road to DP down drove fire col- the fire. active The of with an established was view Andy consulted the map on Avenza, noting the dozer line the consulted dozer map noting on Avenza, Andy the on the east of DP side tied in the road was with umn from ICP. They had an idea of where the fire based had where was an idea of from They ICP. umn maps: close to DP on their Avenza Creek drainage. STEN drove,to the STEN(t) Riley Cold As tions. Up until now, there had been a strong inversion over been over had a inversion strong tions. until now, there Up had caught the col- of only glimpses the group the fire and As 1880C drove through Branch II, STEN Riley through II, con- was Branch drove 1880C As communica- the bad radio and about their safety cerned cluded OPS Sam. OPS Tyler got out of got his truck walked OPSand Sam.cluded OPS Tyler the group meeting. to where was over a couple golf strike teams, strike and a masticator ve- a utility with a couple golf peo- saddle. the of spotted a group hicle working OPS Tyler in- which behind a truck, huddle pleplanning in a typical boys parked along the way, as well as a large group of equip- the along groupof parked as a large as well way, boys engines, five were point. There drop the people at and ment
10 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS He He ” s assignment ’
25. Dep. Branch II Pat, Taylor, 1 Dep. II BC 25. Branch -
t have a FIRB on 1880C. BC 1 Taylor told told BC Taylor 1880C. 1 t have a FIRB on ’ 25, Dep. Branch II was building a plan building Dep. to II was 25, fire Branch - HEQB Lee understood this was a critical piece HEQB Lee of understood personnel. He was concerned about some of the ve- the about some of personnel.concerned was He a choke as cause it might downhill facing hicles around leave and to turn needed point if the group in a hurry. DP At
off the road. Towards the Towards the road. west, he noticed trees off We might have a chance to hold that dozer line. that dozer to hold a chance have We might ” “ FLA Team constructed map to illustrate points of mapof to illustrate pointsFLA Team constructed the story. interest throughout ” 2 - Get “
south to H south
3
m here if you need me. if you m here ’ I “
” term or relief refugefrom unexpectedan increase intensityin fire without theimmediate needof a -
1880C firefighter
25 and getting and the resources wran- 25 - - FIRESCOPE defines TRA(Temporary RefugeArea) as a ground fire location intended to providefirefighters with With structure we go really fast, go we but with With structure survive survive theincrease in fire behavior. 3 limitedshort shelter. fire ATRAshould provide time enoughfor responders to assess their situation and execute a planto safely firing boss and burn boss were and told him he told and didn boss boss were and burn firing Boss. Taylor the 1 Burn was BC him HEQB Lee FIRB and was STEN(t) Andy introduced himself to BC 1 1 attempted to BC and Taylor get a briefing, himself to ques- introduced asking STEN(t) Andy STEN(t) Andy told 1880C the situation. Taylor to understand tions 1 to try BC who the the asked team do Andy be STEN(T) strike holdingfiring. while would the golf would STEN(t) Andy tried to get more information but Dep. Branch II Pat indicated BC 1 Taylor and and Taylor 1 Pat to get information but indicated BC tried Dep. II more STEN(t) Branch Andy him and left. for be working they would said Branch II Pat told STEN(t) Pat told II Andy, Branch people to burn. get out and your ready burn out around the TRA out around burn approached. Dep. STEN(t)when Andy line. He was focused on getting back to back on getting line. focused He was DP up to the operation start firing to gled er. Dep. Branch II Pat assigned BC 1 Tay- 1 BC Pat assigned er. Dep. II Branch burning the task the of out dozer lor BC 1 Taylor and Dep. and Pat Taylor felt Branch 1 II BC quick- to moving things the pressure get north end of the dozer line of it end met north where the road. closer, and pushing closer With the fire contacted Dep. Branch II Pat and told him, him, told Pat and II Dep. Branch contacted on the then to Taylor went join BC 1 and HEQB Lee all agreed to the new plan. They needed to burn now if they had any chance of if they chance of any now to the plan. to burn had new needed HEQB They and Lee all agreed briefing there. a quick the fire group present.HEQB They the overhead with Lee held holding the group decided to line. best decided fire The opera- optionstarting the the firing the group dozer seemed to be along the north fire bring BC Taylor having 1 line, point the highest and thetions on dozer from HEQB DP line while south towards fire Leedozer brought settling down again. There were reports of a few spots over the road into of a few west of the road reports spots again. over were the horseshoe settling There down and atmosphere relaxed The to compressed line. plan changed. went The rapidly from the dozer line to hold the entire line ridge. to hold uphill, quickly slamming and fire of the road a finger shooting stirred, this time,About the fire Dep. Branch II discussed the firing of the road of the lines the firing discussed HEQB together. scouted Lee they as Dep. II told Branch Pat Dep. II Branch torching in the area he had been warned about earlier by the HLCO. By this time, HEQB Lee and the HLCO. time, Lee by about By this been earlier in the area and he had warned HEQB torching
with LCES,with etc. “ know we we down wildland, need to slow
11 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS ”
” You know You “ Where are we we are Where 25, the firing the firing 25, “ -
s the objective? Where is our our is objective? Where s the ’
What are we doing? Why are we burn- Why are we doing? What are we “ 1880C Firefighter
- Andy indicated he indicated STENknew. parked Andy Riley We felt like dogs coming out of a kennel. coming of out like dogs We felt ” “ with these thoughts there were many emotions there were with these thoughts
dio asking if they could could asking if they operation. thestart dio firing that they him yes, said but did reminded OPS Tyler no problem, it was anot have FIRB. He replied boss. HEQB Lee the firing was The Burnout time a steady events not follow As unfolded, did and down but slowed compressed, progression still, to cha- again. from went compressed Moments into back chaos. Among otic, and to sharp clarity happening that was everything in the area, there DP areas of activity: major are three the hilltop, opera- firing operations and from north this point on several firefighters on the dozer line, the on dozer this point firefighters on several tions south of the hilltop down the dozer line. the dozer the hilltop From tions down south of - Paired ” ”
We are really rushing this, his objectives. but, understand rushing I We are really “ doable.
25 and DIVS Jordan felt they needed to fire off the bowl. This was DIVS to fire the bowl. and Jordan This needed felt they off 25 - HEQB Lee told STEN(t) Andy 1880C would be holding and someone and bebe firing holding would else HEQB would STEN(t) Lee1880C Andy told 25, OPS Tyler turned around and saw the finger of fire running up the drainage and hitting hitting and the drainage up running fire of the saw finger and turned around Tyler OPS 25, ” - you have fire established below us? fire in have the drainage you ranging from hesitancy, frustration, anxiety, confusion, eagerness, and urgency. urgency. hesitancy, from eagerness, anxiety, frustration, and ranging confusion, STEN(t) heading up north, the road he advised drove Andy, STENEarlier when Riley on the road, and in the drop point thoughts, in similar and the drop on the road, had escape What is the a our is are really fire have feeling. bad not This good. I Where ing? routes? Its be but it might dicey doing? View from as a engine 1880C from View parked. road. OPS Tyler thought OPS Tyler to himself, road. team strike not have at this contacted still did the the ra- golf They time. Taylor them over 1 BC At DP At and add depth to put black down on that of the OPS some the road. Sam side they needed said buffer from the main fire. 9314G was already at started fire was helping from burn. the main on foot The fire. the TRA buffer 9314G up and gettingpicking closer. no longer an offensive firing operation; it was now a defensive one. Everyone began to one. gather a defensive now it operation; Everyone was firing an offensive no longer provide them a the thinking vehicles of and that would in saddle the resources middle their Back in the saddle, DIVS Jordan felt everything happened all at once. The fire was steadily mov- steadily was fire everything happened felt in DIVS The Jordan the saddle, all atBack once. the group in DP towards ing around all he saw the by hill into timberwere created around a triangle of helmets scattering the up to go. ready were members team the strike hours, six over for driving road. After line and dozer to work. of a kennel. were letting ready out was like dogs They It gear up and asked a few firefighters to grabfew a up and asked firefighters gear to continued turned When he ready. get Andy HEQBSTEN(t) and thenwith Lee. tie intorches briefed his firefighters, his firefighters, passing infor- what briefed on gathered.mation them all to he had He told TRA? TRA? as they linedburning. to start quickly needed out that guys to get his and STEN(t)needed Andy back the quazi went to rigs, STEN(t) Andy When STEN(t) Andy approached HEQB Lee, he pressed with more questions like, more with HEQBpressed approached Lee, STEN(t)When he Andy What team? the firing we we Are are stopping? Where starting?
12 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS and toldand the
4
26. He asked the engine operators to go back to He the engine back to go 26. asked operators - View from 24N02 road and dozer line intersection road 24N02 dozer from and View around 1733. roughly t know t know what ’
The lookout The spot wasa knob, just aslightly higherspot thanthe firefighters on theline.It wasthe spotbest he At this time 4700G arrived. BC 1 Taylor approached them asking if they were ready to burn. them asking if they ready approached arrived. The Taylor were 1 this BC At time 4700G group their escape route would be north to DP be north escape their would route group north. them facing enginestheir and reposition out the small island of green between the road and the fireline. Burning the island was not too the island was green the fireline. the of between and out small island Burning the road assigned next a lookout STEN(t) to the Andy they were road. and complicated right STEN(t) Andy felt some small relief when some felt when small relief STEN(t) Andy they indicated Taylor burning 1 were BC things yesterday and he figured STEN(t) he and figured yesterday things brief would him. Andy work already and already and he didn work Andy briefed STEN(t) had II Dep. Branch handled on, they had but how that was tied in with the road. STEN Riley was STEN was tied in Riley road. the with to going thatwere peopleconcerned ing down the dozer line while the the while other line dozer down ing line waiting where the was dozer group pack he noticed STEN(t) Andy had Andy noticed STEN(t) pack he two teams firing they were and formed hik- out. was headed group One already and wrote the lat/long wrote and his windshield. on put on his gear and his grabbed he As couldfindin the time given. geographic locations.geographic 4 Illustration showing personnel approximate and showing locations and key direction spread of Illustration of fire
13 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS Are Are “ 25 and and had 25 -
m going to stay to stay m going ’ ”
” OK, I “ Why are we firing? firing? hereWhyWho are we 25 to25 the intersection the of “ -
t have weather t have weather updates. ’ Photo taken by Casey when he arrived on scene whenPhoto taken Casey he arrived by 1630. around 25 a25 was
-
on a hotshot on a hotshot
STEN Riley said he was and STEN(t) Andy replied, STEN(t)STEN he was and said Andy Riley t know the lay of the land. of the lay don t know I ’ ” 25. They both looked at each other and walked over to Dep. Branch II Pat over walked and at to Dep. II each other Branch 25. both looked They 25. The fire began to run, pushing out from the south. began from fire out to OPS pushing Sam run, OPS The and Ty- 25. - - s plan was rapidly falling into falling begans plan positioning was rapidly place.Sam OPS and Tyler OPS ’ We need to burn the saddle theto burn saddle We need “ They did not did say DP They t knowt that the hilltopwhere everyonewas meeting wasnot the halfway Itpoint. wasonly acouple 234? Who has experience burning in timber? This [burnout] should have has [burnout] been Who timber? This should done 234? experience burning in had experience had ’ ” -
” Bump down to 25. You have a holding team behind you. You guys look guys team You behind you. You a to good. holding 25. have down Bump Casey didn hundred hundred feetsouth fromthe ona road dozer linethat stretch 0.75miles. Casey walked down the road trying to figure out to the trying on andfigure going down line. walked road was saw the dozer what Casey He and him spots a of between 1 couple HEQB told were to BC LeeTaylor the there doz- talked who 5 has had S has had don in theearlier I day. partment and he knew they were being they were partment he knew and thought he to himself, burning When he heard they were rushed. quickly took a photo of took devel- the column quickly oping. He De- Fire City the LA he joined before crew the engine and looked upthe engine looked at and the column. and not seem He right felt something did As 1880C turned around and was parking, turned was around and 1880C As of out Casey, jumped one crewmember, downhill back into back the fire.downhill OperationsNorth Firing were thinking. There was thinking. activity There major were wind began the fire sucking and below ler both said,ler NOW. out but zone that both safety they is what Dep. Branch II Pat Dep. II Branch within DP resources dozer line and the road past the horseshoe. As 1880C drove back out to the north that was the was to that out north back the drove 1880C As past the horseshoe. the road line and dozer saw them. last time OPS Tyler who asked if he should burn. They said he would pretty much have to at this point. As 1880C ar- have to pretty at this much he would 1880C if point.said As asked burn.he should They who and Dep. plan with 1880C. 1 HEQB Lee BC PatTaylor to start the told firing Dep. II rived, Branch DP pushed around and Pat them north of turned 1880C II Branch a brief conversation. The fire appeared to be across both drainages and both drainages towards its pushing way appeared fire a briefconversation. to be across The DP of north the road “ DP from downhill arrived, OPS OPSand Sam Tyler looked 1880C before Earlier, right STEN Riley asked him if he had a lookout, thinking he wanted someone watching the road and and the road watching someone wanted thinkinghe a lookout, if had him he asked STENRiley had replied they a established. SomeoneAndy lookout notified them to side.the green STEN(t) up here. the burn. was later for STEN the wind informed STEN(t) moments Riley favorable few A Andy As STEN Riley ran down the dozerline to the small hill, he approached STEN(t) Andy. STEN(t) to approached STEN(t) small hill, he the Andy. the down STEN ran dozerline Riley As the already started line and had STEN down to the Riley, gestured group asked who Andy there? going down you firing. As everyone gathered tools and torches, the wind was at their back from the north and the north gathered at tools and torches, from their everyone was back As the wind firing. the for burnout. favorable was Strike Team Leader told BC 1 Taylor they had only ever burned in juniper they burned 1 ever had not BC only Taylor comfort- were Team and told Strike Leader to 1880C reassigned and to holding assigned them quickly Taylor 1 BC timber. in the able firing
14 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS
25. 25. - wide dozer dozer wide - OK we can burn. burn. can we OK “ . He thought it would it. would He thought 5
Looking at the map, he could see the see map,the the at he could Looking ”
25, which was lined was lined timber. which with heavy STEN25, -
25 and saw fire blowing over the line between over saw and blowing them DP and fire 25 -
s group was dragging fire from from s group fire fire their Hedragging the hilltop to the watched road. north was ’ Conditions changed rapidly as a crown fire exploded around them. Trees ignited instantaneously around them. Trees exploded as a ignited instantaneously crown fire rapidly changed Conditions As he glanced around, STEN Riley saw the fire crowning over the around, line crowning STEN over he glanced saw the fire dozer behind him to the Riley As south north. Heto DP looked off cut from were escapetheir They route. lit from within by orange flames. It was hard to tell if it was in timber across the dozer line to the dozer in by orange the within flames. was hard intell it timber It if was lit across from the road. across they were at,trees where from or The lighters pushed out to the dozer line and saw a red glow in front of in glow behind them. front and HEQB line and saw a red out pushed lighters to the dozer The smoke the trees of column see through a large the line. could crossed They Lee had the fire said The trees were dense and Casey wanted to get back on the line to see what was going on, to get wanted was going and and Casey what on the dense back line trees were to seeThe they close to the road. were how torch, knew the fire they were putting down putting rushing. were because they was down effective the fire they were no knew longer torch, the line. off directly lighting Blair,dozer lighter, the other was He who began towards running The main fire began picking up speed. Suddenly the winds changed from at their backs out of the of out backs at their from changed the winds speed.up Suddenly picking began fire main The the south Lee the lighters to out of later,north into moments told to and their HEQB few faces. A start running is not lighters thinking Casey, the most interior right. something run. The while ficult juggling their tools and torches. It was getting harder to look back to check their fire and their tools was getting to look and back It fire torches. their juggling and ficult to check harder they where werewatch going. Lee kept encouraging them to move faster. They could hear the urgency faster. and almost in They his voice could to move Lee them kept encouraging it and was dif- slopethey moved The tripping jogging. as started vegetation and the lighters kept sucking in off the line well. As STEN Riley walked down the line looking their he felt back the line down dozer in well. off STEN walked sucking Riley As feet downhill it about had made 200 paralleling the dozer They operation was working. firing pick them to up the but HEQB pace. line HEQB began speed lighters walking when Lee The told enced in the wildland environment. in enced the wildland was the line. their began firing fire along south With group torches on foot just two dozer The Riley tied in with HEQB Lee and his four firefighters from 1880C, whose experience from firefighters levels inRiley tied HEQB with Lee his four and quite was experi- who assignment ever, fire to Casey, wildland from one on their first ranged As the firing operations began, STEN Riley looked up and down the double operations began, the firing up and down As looked blade STEN Riley to line DP the dozer was line. main concern His and ran in different directions. in ran and different OperationsSouth Firing The south group was roughly 200 feet down the dozer line as STEN(t) Andy watched their hard hard their watched Andy line as STEN(t) the dozer down feet 200 roughly was group south The up, stood crowned, fire the hill. athe breath, of In the crest hats disappear a mere moment, over creep around in the triangle of green. He stayed in constant communication over the 800 MHz 800 the over in He in of green. triangle stayed the constantcreep around communication fromline. the hilltop worked the south dozer as he and his group with STEN down Riley radio gathered on the hilltop and began firing south down the line. dozer south on the began hilltop and firing down gathered STEN(t) Andy We can take it slow, back it down, and create a little and it down, buffer. We can it take back slow, just and it was a the road linethought of piecesmall horseshoe of dozer both line in group the ways. fire and half Henot be rejoined dragging the dozer so bad splitting er line and the road. Casey pushed through the dense vegetation to get a look. He saw the spots the He the spots a look. through saw pushed vegetation to dense Casey road. and the er line get thought, He a little better. feel him made the litter, which through creeping just
15 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS ”
” , but it t good t good 6 ’
This ain This “ s waist and the s waist ’ Directionof SpotFire
Direction1880CRan
1880CEntrapment Site
Where are we going? What are we doing? going? are we What are we Where “
er line; it looked like a like viable er line; it looked escape option for the flames. not trees were there up through The the other on he noticed fire Then as involved. was very smoky. He looked up to the top very doz- was of line of the dozer inside the leaf litter.
”
25, which from his recollection looked very close very his recollection looked which from 25, - Dozer line (dotted line) (dotted Dozer line
Solid RedSolid Line= Flame Front
foot flame lengths stretching off the tops. stretchingthe flame lengths to pitch daylight foot went off from It It was surprisingly a calm was surprisingly moment. It - ”
Direction of MainDirectionof FireFront 24N02 Road 24N02 25 was actually25 was a¼ mile away STEN Riley STEN -
- Man this is where we are going to die. This is how it to be ends. is We are going vaporized. to die. how This going are we is where Man this DP They dumped their torches and tools and the first three firefighters leaped pile the debris three firefighters over torches their dumped tools and the first and They 6 The group was almost mesmerized by the fire and the noise it was making. Suddenly the heat the fire almost by Suddenly was the noiseand it mesmerized group making. was The them into action. slapped forcing them in the face, they could go as the heat drove them to the offside of the dozer line. There was a large jackpot a of them large line. was to the offside of the dozer There as the heatgo drove they could line of dozer on the into pushed a edge that pile came to STENdebris Riley HEQB was Lee. firefighters grouped for that unaccounted up there. only person was 1880C The chief. This is chief. This not good. around to see where minutes, into collapsed fast moving they looked seconds the eternity As of In several microscopic moments, most of the six firefighters feeling microscopic several recalled as moments,In of the six firefighters the same way most calmly said, line to very STEN and Riley up the dozer STEN came Riley. Casey power of the fire around him was unbelievable. a second, thinking, the fire around him was at for fire the of Hepower looked “ Calmly, STEN Riley looked around to a scene that etched itself in his mind. The force and the and force to a scene The that itself STEN around his mind. looked etched in Riley Calmly, STEN Riley looked down towards DP down towards STEN looked Riley background. He started heads. background. counting minutesSeconds passed like as STEN thought, Riley black night instantly. Embers and ash swirled around them. The roar of the fire silenced every- silenced the fire of roar The them. around swirled ash and instantly. Embers night black silhouetted were against the in around, fire the other firefighters thing. STEN looked As Riley from the bottom to 100 from
Illustration of entrapment of Illustration location. Man, this is where we are going to die. This is die. to This we are going Man, this is where how it to be ends. We are going vaporized. how “
16 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS Suck Suck “ Screw Screw “
HEQB Lee did not feel it was a Lee not feel it was did HEQB ”. to which to which someone responded, . Spot fires ignited around them and and them . Spot ignited around fires We are still not good. We need to not good. We are still 7 ” “
Get up and run 26. HEQB Lee declared priority traffic over the over traffic HEQB priority 26. Lee declared “ - 25 moved in ways only in time ways were25 moved There understands. -
tottered over the pileheadfirst, to his arm over out stuck tottered -
I think I broke my arm broke my I think I “
HEQB Lee pulled his phone out and looked at map. and looked HEQB his phonehis Avenza pulled out They Lee ”
The group took off took group again. running The ” and started scrambling over the debris pile in on something the debris to the de- His run. pack snagged over scrambling started and ” Firefighterscould pinpoint the moment they ran lookingby attheir personal heart ratemonitors and seeing when Just like on the dozer line, on theJust like in dozer DP the events ing each other to keep each other the paceing and keep moving. 25 Point Drop what to do, a few spot fires ignited around them could column. ignited around the group spot They see and to a few fires a large do, what to keep until pick a slow the down jog road decided someone could not feel safe.still They did began to each other, talking encourag- the group was silent,them up. first, At everyone but then the flame front. When they finally got to the road, they had to slide down a to to slide steep the road, on got they had embankment the flame front. When they finally they there, up on the As all six grouped down, deciding road. stood butts it.their to reach Once run. the road, the and through themselves towards they ran distance between As green they gained STEN Riley called STEN(t) Andy on the 800 MHz radio and toldthe and him they been off MHz on the radio had pushed 800 STEN(t) STEN Andy called Riley a compass took group headed east line and were The to started and road. another direction dozer with the situation Casey, still said, uncomfortable walking. dinates over the radio. BC 1 Taylor jumped on the radio and told HEQB on jumped Taylor told and 1 the radio to Lee BC the radio. he was on his way dinates over to. the they of meantime, In Taylor headed the road 1 were pick them up. notified BC HEQB Lee radio, reported their location, and requested air support. He informed Pat they location, their support.Dep. air II reported He Branch radio, informed requested and the out coor- and called a pin in a badwere spot. HEQB on their Avenza, Lee location In dropped As the fire came upon them again, radio traffic exploded. BC 1 Taylor contacted 4700G and contacted Taylor 1 BC 4700G exploded. came upon them the fire traffic As again, radio to DP back to terminate head and firing 1880C it to move. up. We need paralleled them and close see the main they were road. from was downhill could It to a road. a direction out of there. had They ers grouped up. STEN Riley counted everyone to ensure they were all there. Alex, who had fallen had all there. who Alex, were to they ensure everyone counted up. STEN Riley grouped ers pile, the debris the group, over told ticed large piles said, of slash next to them and large ticed have not and over, time. jumped to the log, Lee they did over ran HEQB sitesafe deployment and the six firefight- moments the green through running After firefighters. of the two other with ran fleeing deer emerged in the flame emerged front. escaped the vegetation as from deer fleeing the group He no- up the back line on theHEQB ground. Lee he saw people Moments looked earlier, when shrugged out of his snagged pack and pack and of out ran. snagged his shrugged through zigzagged the trees and brush scattered group The bris pile. Struggling to get pile. loose,bris Struggling he teeter up, the others, saw hard with impacted the ground and pain. himself a joltcatch He of looked Alex reached for his shelter, He shoulders. reached neck and the heat thought, he felt Alex burning his it At the debris pile, another firefighter, Alex, watched Alex, the facial of his companions. expressions pile, the firefighter, At debris another the hood around up.his him to grabbed Alex structure told his hood get HEQB and Lee appeared his shroud. HEQB Lee himhis shelter. told As to grab down it also up. pulled pulled and neck He ash was raining down. He felt the heat of the fire on his back, jumped up, ran a few more steps, on his back, up, jumped more He a few ran felt the raining the fire down. heatash was of again. fell up againand and kept running. He scrambled to run through the green. plantedface through on theto run over oppo- pile,the jumped Blair As and tripped he but was anyone where no idea pack. He had of his out bottles flew water and fusees site side, his a spike ina heartspike ratebegan. For the two firefighters, it was at17:35. 7
17 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS ” 25. 25.
- - “30 negative “ 25 the fire the fire 25
- 25 and the group the group and 25 - 25. DIVS Jordan Jordan DIVS 25. - 25. There There 25. was a good - 25. They encouraged encouraged They 25. - 25 andthere. it out They25 ride -
25 allowed the25 to burn area them one was accounted for. The OPS The for. one was accounted about the resources on theasked line and road and they heard dozer buffer around DP buffer the fire weather could they knew but and warm there. was smoky It crews OK.people The doing were The accountability checks. did radio overheard about traffic group the linesomeone leaving but every- Suddenly with a rapid with shift, wind Suddenly to fire heavy the north there was they were getting and south and spots at DP - 25 by throwing grenade throwing by ignition25 over devices -
” 25 while notifying Dep. Branch II they re- pulling while Dep.were II notifying 25 Branch -
25 and getting everyone out of there once out of there so. getting it safe and everyone to do was 25 25. - - over them and cause a lot of damage. DIVS Jordan did what he what them and cause did DIVSover Jordan a lot of damage. - 25. For DIVS Jordan, DIVS the For the event his priorities ac- 25. were throughout -
s when everything went crazy. DIVS Jordan tried to get accountability of resources but to get accountability tried DIVS Jordan resources everything crazy. s when went of ’ resources trapped in DP resources everyonecountability in DP of and created a good buffer. an mission anymore, a good was no longer it had created operational This and offensive everythingto increase doing they could the they were and thebecome one safety for a defensive the bowl the fire would would the fire the bowl burn of to help the edge DP the firefighters firing could lit they well in very to gain depth. main pulled what fire The trying the hillside, into the bowl, DIVS Jordan was unable to speak to others via radio and for a while unable was lost all accountability for Jordan and except DIVS to speak radio to others via out not fire and if they did OPS OPS Tyler Sam, DIVS Jordan, along with worried 4700G. were for And that And etc. roles, organization, lookouts, because no established there was difficult it was briefly thought of conflictingthe TRA. on thought information heard a safety He Was it area? had briefly really trapped in were DP flanking them they With everyone. for the fire it was big enough whether At this time, DIVS Jordan had heard the two OPSs call the burn off. The fire had flanked the group had fire the two The off. heard OPSs call the burn had this At time, Jordan DIVS south and licking the sideson the north in was DP the timber and of stringers View from cameradash from inView DP OK. were 9314G to fire the saddle quicker. The big opening around DP around big the saddle opening quicker. The to fire 9314G rapidly. downhill fire their below sucked mainfire The quickly. enough to get back to the saddle safely, so they encouraged them to quicken to the back safely, so they to get enough pace. their encouraged saddle Mean- around DP and lighting were the saddle of 9314G the firefighters while sources because the plan was no longer viable. As resources began moving into viable. resources DP because was no longer As the plan sources fast the engines not a moving to worried were significant the south.made run were Both OPSs about staying in the TRA, they needed to pull back to the saddle while the fire made its run. They its while run. They made the to theto pull back fire saddle about staying they needed in the TRA, DP around grassy area they the brushy, burn easily could figured to to report DP began tellingresources As the fire raced up theOPS raced Sam and at mode, dis- into the fire went them,As drainage defensive OPS Tyler said corner. the OPS around Tyler escapethe TRA the viability and cussing routes of moments of rapid, yet controlled chaos punctuated with flashes of slow clarity as over a a punctuated as over chaos clarity of slow rapid, controlled yet flashes with of moments to worse. not good from it went period minute
18 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS
26. 26.
-
25 and the and 25 group - d the d making road, ’ 25. He had a quick con- a quick He had 25.
- 25, the remaining resources resources the remaining 25, - 23. Once all resources were ac- Once were 23. all resources - incident (IWI) but had started a mor- started had but incident (IWI) -
an - could get through. get could at DP Back the heat to wait for had to dissipate before the leave area. not did they could They had so Dep. the fire how run far know Pat recon II Branch the group to it enough for was cool sure to wait had leave. areas for in They few a to get a while the heat to took subside. It out. Pat was II that time,About Branch Dep. that buggies the 9314G left crew informed sustained Upon damage. had in the TRA paint, blackened examination,they found and melted stickers, lenses.burned They 20 mph winds as the fire pushed over them. over mph pushed as the fire 20 winds - within - jumped in his own truck. Both drove north out out north Both drove of jumped in his own truck.
we bailed runningwe green. the backthe side off though “ Charlie Charlie
25 tried to make radio contact with Dep. Branch II Pat they overheard radio contact Pat radio overheard they to make tried II Dep. with Branch 25 - At that moment, OPS Sam figured out what they to. out running road were figured moment, OPS Sam that At ” s truck II Branch s truck while 2’
25 to the two track. At times, they had to stop and let the fire cool down enough before enough they track. to the two times, to stop At cool down 25 let and the fire they had 25. - - When the fire exploded, BC 1 Taylor tried contacting tried Taylor 1 times with no response. BC HEQB Lee exploded, When the fire multiple separating no idea what frustrated. 100 but he had was only them Taylor yards was 1 There BC The Pickup andThe Rescue Pickup counted for, everyone was pulled down to the bottom of the fire for the for to evening down the fire until could everyone pulled the bottom they of for, was counted the new aEn back fire to ICP, OPS where plan perimeter and make route toscout was reengage. in camp. the ICs gave an he debriefed a few times and upon arrival, update on theTyler radio move resources until they knew where the fire had run to ensure they did not have another they prob- the to ensure not have until fire run did they had where resources knew move past her down DP resources she moved lem. hesitation, Without looked like hell everyone like of service. not out 1811 it to DP but safely they were made looked Around H to made contacted on the inReflecting the had significant DIVS the fire runs past, OPS Tyler DP versation with OPS Sam and OPS Tyler about the road they thought the firefighters are running are about the they thought the firefighters with OPS Samversation OPS Tyler and road could. it OPS Sam the the not think trucks drive but prettyto. did sure were engines could They injumped BC We need rescue. back Pat at arrived DP of II the chaos, in Dep. middle Somewhere Branch over the radio that did an that like incident did not sound the radio over traffic. radio they heard on Then atorium As the group at DP the group As something hear it. Jordan could DIVS for running a about neartraffic entrapment firefighters and The crews conducted accountability checks. The OPSs asked about the resources on the on accountability other conducted about OPSs the crews resources asked The The checks. was everyone OK. of the line heard side and ler helped moved the heat vehicles moved and began equipment helped as possible as far re- and other ler from buffer around DP the events on his a good was camera. There dash cording and weather could they safely. It there warm but OK. the fire knew people smoky was doing were The group in the saddle took ember showers and in 15 ember saddle the showers took group The Ty- OPS to the opposite side. everyone to shift point, had they around the drop moved fire the As Example of damage to crew carriers in the TRA in the TRA near carriers to crew Example damage of DP
19 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS s ’
re re ’ s truck for for s truck Chief weChief ’ “ 5. Correction
8 26, everyone 26, - PAR “ They have to be right to be right have They “
” s voice saying they were all offthe were they saying s voice ’
We are coming to you. coming We are “ s radio had STEN Riley ’
s voice was on the radio letting BC 1 Taylor know they were know Taylor 1 lettingon the BC radio was s voice ’ Photo taken when BC 1 Taylor arrived to pick arrived BC 1 up firefighters. Photo takenTaylor when s truck would be hard to get out. He looked around for a better option for and s truck to get be around hard out.would He looked ’ BC 1 Taylor replied, Taylor 1 BC 6”. s truck in a spot he could easily get out of. BC 1 Taylor jumped Taylor of. BC 1 in, out easily get in his cell a spot leaving he could s truck ’ s group had only lit the unburned triangle and progressed about 100 feet whenthe about 100 progressed and triangle s group lit had the unburned only ’ Suddenly, STEN(t) Andy Suddenly, ” Worried about what STEN(t) Andy was thinking, another firefighter told him, told thinking, about STEN(t)was what another Andy firefighter Worried ” PARis aPersonnel Accountability Report. the road with OPS Sam with nearby.the road 8 drove around a corner to around a corner the drove he found Branch track, two II parked (with BC in 2) Charlie and let him know he made it let and him know the fire front. Asthrough he out through the window as side through out the road.down he drove He Pat II Dep. Branch contacted were broken. BC 1 Taylor rolled Taylor 1 rolled broken. BC were looked the and window down through the dusty windshield through wipers the windshield and When the fire settled enough enough settled the fire When to start driving, BC Taylor 1 for not see he could he realized a paper map. Grabbing an older map from the back, he thought he understood where the two the where he understood map from back,an he thought older a paper Grabbing map. HEQB was. Lee describing track was relayed he was dropping a pin on his map and had a lat/long of their location. BC 1 Taylor did location. their a lat/long of not he was Taylor had a pin 1 dropping BC relayed on his map and the cab map. around HEQB Avenza Leetell his He of HEQB looked Lee not have he did HEQB Lee and the firefighters were overrun and overrun to stop. there. front fire While had was right were The HEQB Lee the firefighters and uphill past for the waited his eyes searching Taylor a settle 1 to to keep driving, fire BC enough HEQB Lee was still forhats. hard in contact on Tac who He group with looking of boulders large phone with its maps behind in his own truck. He headed downhill from the parking area and and area the parking from downhill He headed truck. own in his its maps behind phone with around the below main road to was He the horseshoe. got about thewhere area he thought drove the road, BC 1 Taylor 1 BC the road, saw HEQB Lee thoughts were on the six were thoughts entrapped firefighters. the north the dozer line met where of area end to into all the equipment jammed Due the parking line in the green moving east. All the resources in accountability east. area the unclear started checks, the resources All line moving in the green quick- everyone was. to where STEN(t) out where. Andy it a while figure was felt like took It who to DP out there. of the rest arranged get towards out crew they moved ly the As of there. not going in. fire slammed the dozer line. There was zero visibility and STEN(t) Andy stared at the edge of the at visibility the dozer the edge stared slammed zero line.fire STEN(t) was and Andy There thinking, the dozer line went south where into theroad, smoke thick 5 plus me,5 PAR STEN(t) Andy the Tac channel. BC 1 Taylor shut off all the noise of the fire, wind, and people around him, kept offnoiseshut all the him, people kept and of the fire, wind, around Taylor channel.the Tac 1 BC they running were on Tac and Taylor only on HEQB 1 focused Lee. HEQBhis radio Lee BC told accountability. asked the for 1green. BC Taylor through HEQB Lee responded was going on. going Suddenly, HEQBwas Lee traffic on priority declared Lee HEQB needed support. air he and fire, good not by it was overrun
20 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS s ’
s ’
View from helispot from looking View back the fire. towards HEQB HEQB ” HEQB Lee HEQB Lee . They drove another drove .¼ They until to ½ mile further No we are are No we ”
s truck while fire and smoke charged downhill charged fire while smoke and s truck 9 “ ’ needed and gave them gave and on the update needed a quick fire up take to four could per- location. them he He told sides of the road. HLCO called, asking what they what called, asking HLCO of the road. sides Branch II Charlie pulled forward and led led 1 and pulledBC Tay- II Charlie forward Branch the OPS drove, they Sam and As track. down two lor alongside shelter case strewn the a fire they passed road crew. the enough Theyfor long they found paused to a safer loca- to jump in kept driving the crew and tion. there saw the truck wasWhen the six firefighters the jumped into HEQBlittle Lee to no conversation. and Taylor. Two firefighters seat 1 BC front with Taylor 1 BC back of STEN piled Riley into the into another loaded OPS and Alex firefighter truck. Sam OPS and Tyler called Taylor gave behind them. 1 BC the area, they left him a PAR. dropped As the fire into on both spot fires quickly grew embers, which s truck with Alex with to arrive, s truck ’
BC 1 Taylor replied, Taylor 1 BC ” BC 1 Taylor quickly pulled quickly BC and Taylor 1 over ” m good. ’
I “ Looks like you got a little got burned. you like Looks I thought I was just from running. was hot thought I I “ “
s face still felt hot. s face still felt ’ 25 out of the division. He returned, picked up Alex and up Alex and them of the flew out to helibase.division.picked 25 the At He returned, -
s shoulder as best as possible with items from his medical kit, as as his medical slowly and as best thens shoulder drove as possible with items from ’ The FLA teamThe itthink is likely thefire sheltercase fella out of packwhile the firefighters ran down theroad. HLCO picked back up to help guide the retreating firefighters the retreating firefighters up to back help picked guide HLCO DP from 9 with HLCO. with for waited the group OPSAs Sam the two worst off, HEQB going worst the two Lee to get in were Alex, the and driving until met up kept they They helicopter HLCO. with As BC 1 Taylor he Taylor the firefighters, about 1 the of wondered rest BC As He decided ambulances. ground five and air three requested going to fly out. to fly you going the seat behind from water on HEQB to pour Lee. grabbed HEQB Lee Lee looked in the mirror and saw little red dots on his face. saw little in and red the mirror He Lee looked 1 BC Taylor, told told HEQB Lee,told surprised, was fly Alex Alex when rather than a long, out out fly his HEQB painful Leeput drive him through mentioned red there and looked at HEQB Leeover looked noticed his skin Taylor and 1 hot.face felt BC Taylor 1 BC sideburns. his below right blisters small were Alex to OPS Sam. and had Taylor Taylor decided 1 Hearing about 1 the BC injury, BC possible behind Meanwhile, Alex could barely stand the pain of the truck jostling down the rough OPS Sam jostlingroad. the down rough the truck Meanwhile,stand the pain barely could of Alex Taylor. 1 shoulder had notified BC realized a dislocated and Alex He stopped, secured quickly sonnel if they needed a transport. BC 1 Taylor initially the they would thinking drive Taylor declined a transport. 1 sonnel needed BC if they to ICP. firefighters Photo taken during drive out the 18N20 drive 18N20 out the Photo taken during road.
21 MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA GROUND OPERATIONS
con- ’
s shirt and noticed his back was was back his and noticed s shirt ’ life. Air to Ground and frequen- and the only Tac were life. to Ground Air cies that worked. contacted Taylor BC 1 HLCO the ambu- to confirm not get stilllances because in were he could route then, now and he onanyone command. Every drove, he was unable to hit Command to save his he was unable to save to hit Command drove, could hear STEN the Riley coughing the in of back could s concern was to get back with the rest of 1880C. He with was to get back the rest of 1880C. s concern ’
t a single 26 and at some point they would get back together. As BC 1 1 BC Taylor at point As together. back and get some they would 26 ’ - s thoughts while the driving off s thoughts
’ ”
Firefighter This is mother nature, this isn is nature, mother This
was when they saw Alex at breakfast the next morning. They were 22 Alex were they saw at the next again. when They strong breakfast morning. was in the hospital. Some went with the four firefighters to the hospital while others went to firefighters to the hospital others went the ho- in while the hospital. Some went the four with Everyone the best felt with driving. miles of moment tel. a late was a long day 360 and night It Stonyford ICP, there. went so they Stonyford the absence they were felt elated but immediately the one the four firefighters, of When they saw kept stopping to make calls. When they got to not the helibase, calls.kept stopping companions were there. to make When they got their and told FIRE firefighter to the them a CAL Safetyfirefighter who Officer talked anThey 1880C to the headed heard were remaining four hospitals. eventually been They to had transported hurt, while others worried it was a friend. Others focused on driving and keeping head a clear focused as a Others others worried it friend. while was hurt, Andy long and STEN(t) to the was helibase. team as possible. drive headed safely The strike The For the rest of 1880C, the ride off the fire the fire the frustrating. saw off was in They helicopter the ride low come the rest of 1880C, For thought HEQB it was Lee something was not that Some of the firefighters knew right. was and the other three firefighters should be evaluated at sent a hospital. firefighters center should tothe other three were a medical They and then burns neck and for treated head released. were they in where Williams, CA ditions were evaluated. At the time, it was just some red faces and ears. They played it off as it off played and ears. faces They the red evaluated. At time, were ditions just it was some a while, that his depart- it over for knowing mulling STEN released. After Riley, were nothing and he and small, decided type any for of burn, no matter seek care to how ment always was policy go straight to the Medical Unit Leader at Stonyford Camp and there they found the ambulances. the they found there and Camp at Stonyford Unit Leader to the Medical straight go thetook firefighters them to the medical tent,where at Medical Stonyford Unit The Leader were told to meet at the wrong intersection so they were not there when the firefighters arrived. not intersection there when to meet at so they were the told the firefighters wrong were to and Camp (East the ambulances called to Taylor told decided go 1 to Stonyford They BC ICP). truck. Unfortunately, the ground ambulances received inaccurate reporting and instructions Unfortunately, the ground truck. knew they were headed they were knew to DP after a quick medical assessment. They did not see anything other than red faces and one faces fire- than not see assessment. other red anything medical a quick did after They injuries burn his but the firefighters with messing they had concern pantfighter was leg. There treatment. medical declined STEN Riley Regional Burn Center and Alex was flown to Enloe in Chico for treatment. flown to Enloe was for in Center Alex Chico and Burn Regional II Charlie Branch and with OPS Taylor, rode Sam, 1 BC Meanwhile, remaining firefighters the four helibase, the two men were examined. They cut off HEQB cut Lee examined. They were men off helibase,two the Institute Burn Firefighters Davis to the UC Lee flown HEQB had manager helibase The burned.
fire. over brush. over - “ would dwelling. I hatefamily to lose guys
A STORY FROM THE AIR During the morning circuit around the fire, Helicopter Coordinator (HLCO) Parker was pre- paring for his mission for the day. Division F was to be the primary focus for the day. He re- ceived a call from Battalion Chief (BC) 1 Taylor early in his shift requesting he look at the ar- ea by DP-25 for a burnout operation they were planning. Midday, as HLCO Parker approached DP-25 in the helicopter, he could not see the entire fire but he could see where the fire was backing off the ridges, just as it had done the past several days. He contacted BC 1 Taylor on the radio and told him the burn operation was viable but needed to happen very soon. He felt if the fire spotted or became established in the bottom of the bowl to the west below DP-25, firing the line would not work. HLCO Parker also advised that if it spotted in the drainage, it would blow out over DP-25. If that happened, the smoke would reduce visibility and helicopters would be unable to work in the area. Deputy Branch II Pat asked him about the smoke column. HLCO Parker responded there was a significant column that looked ominous, but wasn’t that bad and it was blending in with other smoke in the area. He reiterated the fire was still backing down, but when it reached the bottom of the drainage, it would blow up to DP-25. FLA COMPLEX MENDOCINO Around the same time, back on the Helibase , HLCO Kelly was getting ready to transition with Parker as a HLCO for the fire. He had served in many roles over the duration of this fire, in- cluding serving as Incident Commander (IC) and division group supervisor during the early stages of the fire. He was feeling comfortable with his first shift on the incident as HLCO. His 19 years in the Stonyford area as a hotshot and Superintendent meant he knew the area very well. Talking with the pilot who had flown two days prior, HLCO Kelly knew visibility was not good but it was safe to fly. He wanted “I knew by his voice he had his hands full.” to get up and see the fire so he could get -HLCO Kelly talking about Deputy Branch II. his bearings. HLCO Kelly was flying in the smoky Lake Pillsbury area on the west side of the fire when he heard Dep. Branch II Pat on Air to Ground, saying the area around DP-25 was starting to receive spots. “I knew by his voice he [Dep. Branch II Pat] had his hands full.” As his map slowly loaded on his iPad and they picked their way over, HLCO Kelly thought about the topography of the area. He knew if this situation got busy, he would have his hands full managing the four helicopters doing bucket work in Branch I and the situation at DP-25 in Branch II. He would not be able to manage both situa- tions effectively due to communication and terrain issues. He immediately requested an air attack or another HLCO. After he ordered help, he heard another transmission from Dep.
Branch II Pat saying they were in a tight spot. AVIATION From this point on, things started moving fast and communications became confusing. When HLCO flew at a lower altitude, transmissions became broken. Due to the smoke, he could not see what was going on and was stuck visualizing what could be happening on the ground as
he caught bits and pieces over the broken radio transmissions. Listening to the radio, he en-
22 visioned spot fires compromising firefighters, and their ingress or egress dematerializing. He had no clear idea of what was actually going on but knew there were issues. He anticipated they would need help. At one point, he asked for a lat/long, but heard nothing back from Dep. Branch II Pat. It was obvious they had their “I was trying to be creative in a way that hands full. helped them without being a liability.” As HLCO Kelly and his pilot approached from - HLCO Kelly the west, they realized smoke prevented them from dropping lower in altitude. They tried two other ways into both DP-25 and DP-26 but kept hitting walls of smoke. While he searched for ways to assist the firefighters on the ground, he also struggled with not wanting their helicopter to be in danger. “I was trying to be creative in a way that would help them without being a liability.” He remembered their forward-looking infrared (FLIR) camera. With the FLIR they could get visuals of the activity on the ground. HLCO Kelly and his pilot opted to use the camera instead of dealing with the smoke. Utilizing crew resource management (CRM), HLCO Kelly and his pilot talked through what each other was doing because his head would be looking down into the camera and not watching around FLA COMPLEX MENDOCINO them for hazards. While he got the camera started, he thought about the times he had been in the Windy Gap area, where DP-25 was located. It was a low point or gap in the terrain with broken fuels, and grass. He thought, “That‘s a tough spot to burn and hold. There are going to be adverse winds.” Over the radio, he heard the firefighters were defensively firing the ridge. The pilot kept ma- neuvering the helicopter to find angles around the knob where they could use the camera to see people. They could not pick up any vehicles or people but could pick up location of the fire they lit versus the main fire to help them navigate. He could see pieces of the firing opera- tion. As he looked through the camera, he saw where the firefighters had put fire on the ground. They had not made it very far but he could tell their fire had become established. He also noted the winds were normal. His whole focus was about helping the firefighters on the ground. HLCO Kelly overheard someone requesting an air attack and four air tankers. HLCO Kelly contacted Dep. Branch II Pat to let him know the fixed wing assets would not work. HLCO Kelly was 100% sure the fixed wing assets wouldn’t be valuable because the visibility was too poor. Dep. Branch II Pat told HLCO Kelly, “Regardless I want them orbiting.” There was so much traffic on the radio HLCO Kelly struggled with trying to gain situational awareness about what was happening on the ground. When he could get a quick word on the radio,
HLCO Kelly relayed the order for tankers and air attack. He asked them to stage at the IP AVIATION (aviation reference to an initial rally point in the air above) when they arrived on scene. Throughout this exchange, they were still trying to gain access through the smoke but they could never get a good angle they were comfortable to fly in order to help the firefighters on
the ground.
23
As HLCO Kelly flew around a knob, they saw there was a possibility down low that a helicop- ter could use to access the area. He contacted Elk Creek Helibase on the Victor radio and let them know what they were trying to do. HLCO Kelly had several helicopters standing by to help. Aware of the complexity of the situation, he did his best to brief the orbiting pilots, maintain good communication, and use vertical separation to keep aircraft safe. Back at the helibase, HLCO Parker was requested to return to the fire. The cobra had been unable to get under the smoke column and was currently looking for people who had been cut off or lost. HLCO Parker and his pilot immediately got in their helicopter, flew out and be- gan looking for people as well. He had heard the request for an air attack and four tankers and added a sky crane just in case. He thought air attack was over the fire, but was unable to reach air attack while flying at the lower elevation in the bowl10. Quickly coordinating together, HLCO Parker assumed the role of East HLCO while HLCO Kelly took West HLCO to help coordinate helicopters on the west side. Communications were poor and the helicopters often needed to gain altitude to talk to other aircraft. Concerned about the number of aircraft in the area with marginal communications HLCO Kelly decided to send the helicopters back to Lake Pillsbury. With the smoky conditions, he knew he did not want a FLA COMPLEX MENDOCINO bunch of aircraft in the area. As HLCO Kelly’s group moved over to Lake Pillsbury and Division D, communications were spotty with HLCO Parker and that side of the fire. They figured HLCO Parker knew they were there and would call if he needed them. HLCO Kelly switched his resources’ frequencies to a different Air to Ground to minimize their impact to the frequency being used near DP-25. Even the command frequencies were scratchy and he eventually lost communication with the other HLCO. From what they could hear, HLCO Parker seemed calm, squared away, and taking care of things. HLCO Parker tried to contact the cut-off firefighters and was unsuccessful. He contacted Dep. Branch II Pat and was notified the separated firefighters were heading down to a two-track road. HLCO Parker believed he could see the road Dep. Branch II Pat was talking about but could not find anyone. Someone in- formed him all personnel were account- ed for but they were still in a bad spot.
At this time, the fire had a large, well- AVIATION developed, leaning column. The pilot was able to maneuver the helicopter un- HLCO Parker’s smoky view into DP-25. der the column and into the bowl area.
10HLCO Parker was unaware Air Attack was not over the fire because the visibility was too poor for fixed wing air-
craft. 24
HLCO Parker saw significant fire behavior with spot fires below DP-25 and in the bowl. The largest spot fire was around 10 acres. He then contacted BC 1 Taylor. BC 1 Taylor had the firefighters and were making their way out. With the declining air quality, HLCO Parker was worried about leaving the bowl and not being able to get back in. HLCO Parker contacted BC 1 Taylor and rec- ommended they fly out the injured personnel. The initial response was they were not going to fly any patients. The next thing he knew, they were telling him they had people with in- juries to fly. Locating a spot to meet up and get the patients was difficult. HLCO Parker kept trying to look for landmarks to communicate about something they both knew. HLCO Parker considered bringing in air medical helicop- ters11 and decided it was not safe to bring in FLA COMPLEX MENDOCINO another aircraft for fear they would be smoked out or trapped. He knew everyone was famil- iar with Pocket Dip so he flew there and wait- ed on the ground for the trucks. With the heli- copter on the ground, communications were much worse. Realizing it would be a little while before the injured firefighters arrived, they picked back up again to manage air re- HLCO Parker’s view of the fire, post sources but also to burn off fuel to lose weight. entrapment.
As they flew, HLCO Parker found two vehicles navigating the road12. They found a landing ar- ea next to the road close to the trucks and asked for a face-to-face. They had a quick discus- sion about the patients – one with seemingly minor burn injuries and another yet to arrive with a shoulder injury. While loading the burn patient, there was a radio call from Dep. Branch II Pat requesting assistance in guiding firefighters off the division due to the fire be- havior. HLCO Parker realized he could go help them while the third truck with the other in- jured firefighter worked its way to the impromptu landing area. With HEQB Lee onboard, he left to scout the road and fire behavior. HLCO Parker discovered it was just smoke crossing the road from DP-25 and told Dep. Branch II Pat they were OK to proceed. Meanwhile, he still had the sky crane orbiting in clean air. He told his pilot to bump up in elevation to look at the big picture and provide situational awareness. Then HLCO Parker’s pilot navigated their heli- AVIATION copter back to the waiting vehicles where the patient with a shoulder injury was loaded up. At that time, the column really lifted and gave them a clear path back to Elk Creek helibase.
HLCO Parker coordinated and rerouted the requested air ambulances to Elk Creek helibase.
11 The air ambulances were ordered by the Medical Unit Leader. 12The third vehicle was moving very slowly to minimize jostling the firefighter with the dislocated shoulder. 25
Once there, he called back to BC 1 Taylor to let him know he had delivered the patients to helibase. After dropping off the two injured passengers, HLCO Parker returned to where he had met up with the trucks but they were gone. They flew over the lines and checked for stragglers. They found all the equipment leaving and followed them to ensure they got out of the area safely. HLCO Parker released the orbiting air tankers because he could not use them and continued scouting, noticing the fire blowing up in multiple areas. On the other side of the fire, HLCO Kelly heard HLCO Parker over the radio stating six fire- fighters were in a good spot and they were in a pickup being driven to a safer location. HLCO Kelly heard that and noticed HLCO Parker’s voice had changed to a more calm and relaxed tone. They felt that whatever the scenario was it was starting to de-escalate, people were ac- counted for and vehicles were getting them out. Hearing the good news made them feel better. When they completed their missions for the day, they returned to Ukiah. Once on the ground, HLCO Kelly
made phone calls to inform people what FLA COMPLEX MENDOCINO had happened and to find out what he needed to do to help.
AVIATION
HLCO arriving to pick up injured firefighter.
26
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 27 UNIFIED COMMAND
. Most the of 13
cident action plan for August 19, 2018. 19, actioncident August plan for Organizational chart of of chart the OperationsOrganizational Section adapted from ICS form 203 in the corrected in- in the corrected ICS form 203 adapted from
A STORY FROM OVERHEAD THE A STORY
s focus on and s focus Potterwas Valley 2’
Cranstonhad fire 12 structures lost and2000 peopleevacuated. Whaleback, Donnell firesLions and were also utilizingsimilar numbers of resources. steadily moving both south/southeast into National north/northeast moving and the Mendocino For- steadily to it times made difficult ventilation, travel long and intensities, est. fire poor Steep terrain, 13 warming and drying trends with very poor recoveries, critically low fuel after- recoveries, moistures, and trends low poor very with critically and drying warming beenhad 19, growth the fire until near digits.noon relative August humidities single Up (SRA) comprised of state experienced of Ranch fire significant The comprised timber(SRA) private lands. and 3, 40,000 acres the approximately 30,000 on August first during growth ten growing days, flag warnings, red on and August 5. acres 4 50,000 Most experienced on August days acres tection. The emphasis was on divisions F on divisions was tection. emphasis The a State G, and towards Responsibility Area allowing the fire to to the fire burn the val- down allowing focused pro- they on structure where leys When the Ranch fire first began, NOR CAL began, first CAL When the Ranch fire NOR Team vided adequate protection for life and and life for protection adequate vided Fire, the on River property they switched to the Ranch fire. focus their dential structures and Highway 20. After and 20. dential structures Highway pro- determined had they FIRE Team 2 CAL majority of resources onFire be- resources the River of majority resi- a number of cause the fire threatened because they did not want because they did another large fire. a concentrated on, FIRE Team 2 Early CAL sources to it, containing the Eel Fire at 972 at 972 the Eel Fire it, to containing sources to button up priority was a high acres. It team 2 assisted the Forest Service by assisted ap-team the Forest Service 2 re- assigned their of a majority plying command with CAL FIRE Team 2 on the on CAL with FIRE Team 2 command north occurred fire.Ranch When a new fire CAL on August 1, NOR the Ranch fire of 31, 2018, NOR CAL Team 2 (Type 2 Team (Type Inter- CAL NOR 2 2018, 31, teamintoagency Dalrymple) went unified requested a Type 2 team to work in unified in unified work team to 2 a Type requested CAL the with FIRE team. command July On available fuels. Administrator Agency Forest Service The on, some receiving heavy national attention: Ferguson fire and the Carr and fire fire national attention: heavy Ferguson on, receiving some rapidly be- in thefires state growing were weather and conditions current cause of of the River and Ranch fires and the River became that Ju- eventually of Mendocino the Saturday Complex. On at Geographically, going 1000. there were over the team fires command several 28, took ly command to assume 27 in July area arrived Friday, on the Ukiah, FIRE California Team 2 CAL
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 28 UNIFIED COMMAND
” big box “
”
one not better
–
t telling the story in the t telling the story ’ just different. just
–
and how to do it. how and ” FLA participant
- s shoes. If the teams to separate, s shoes. were If ’ With each team comes a different culture culture a different With each team comes and method of operation of method and than the other “ insert crews and utilize aircraft in certain aircraft are- utilize and insert crews the Men- to leave the fire were If the fire. as of impact a large would Nationaldocino Forest it the complexity counties, of number increasing agencymore administrators, etc. involving by big box conceptbig box told the team weren they “
14 ers were not as familiar with it. They talked through through not it. with talked as familiar ers were They the together to how out thework beginning,In figuring busi- of doing They ways had clunky. different was it. through to work trying ness, were but both teams The teams matched their Command and General staff and staff General Command their matched teams The s bigger than s bigger ’
”
t be that different on the ’
”
On the dirt we fight fire and it we fight On the dirt CIIMT 1 IC CIIMT - shouldn teams. “ North Ops is theNorthern CaliforniaGeographic Area Coordination Center There were two sets of operational positions working the same ground. Branches now had the same two sets of ground. had now were operational working Branches There positions developing was as the plan. confusion to who and there was branches deputy 14 209. Both ICs continued to work through Both ICs continued these type arose. they of issues as 209. to work the organizationpositons down became chart past duties Further and less clear. operations, up and worked through most issues. There was a lot of give and take. For example, CIIMT1 take. and example, For through issues. was a lot of give CIIMT1 most up and worked There to get resources trying Ops butwas North concept around the fire materialized. Some were comfortable with the with comfortable materialized. Some were concept oth- the fire whereas concept around FIRE and both the IMTs discussed strategies and objectives. There was a lot of debate on how strategies objectives. debate a and on how lot of was both discussed FIRE and the IMTs There With success, go. a probabilitymetrics of lines for containment to set would where ing out. The teams could get equipment but could not get crews. equipment get teams out. buting could The could CAL administrators, together. Agency to work how out to figure everyone gathered ICs Both At this time the Ferguson, Cranston, and Carr fires were all competing for resources, in addi- resources, fires all for competing were Carr thisAt time the Ferguson, Cranston, and tim- on the Mendocino were Complex crews firestion states.Hotshot large in to several other ers could figure it too. figure out, the teams could ers could to keep rather decided the teamsThey together everyone. for an organizational unusual was thethan structure fire, zone which and cons of integrating the two teams versus versus teams the two integrating of cons and separately. They firefight- if the felt working work together. work next the teams about the day, pros The talked CIIMT 1 would end up with barely any resources. They would have 400 people for 50 miles up end people 50 400 1 resources. any would have for barely CIIMT with would They not it would that established ifanother line. so scarce was camp of were Support resources to have any equipment. teamshave would The That night after they figured out zones, the CAL FIRE IC got an uneasy out got not feeling figured FIRE they IC zones,and did the CAL after night That IC 1 input the CIIMT himself sleep to well. He tried quickly learned that the CAL FIRE Team 2 would be staying on the Mendocino Complex and and Complex that be the staying the learned would on Mendocino FIRE Team 2 quickly CAL direction the betweento zone fire the teams.they received two Interagency Incident Management Team 1 (CIIMT 1). CIIMT 1 had a perception be 1 CIIMT Managementit Incident would 1). (CIIMT Interagency Team 1 1 management the fire. of the Ranch CIIMT business over one team with as usual handing On August 3, as the fire progressed, the Agency Administrator utilizing utilizing WFDSS, the Agency Administrator the progressed, 3, as determined On August fire Team 2 replaced was CAL California 7, 2018 by NOR 1 team. a Type On August the need for
Four thousand people,that thousand Four CIIMT 1 IC talking 1 IC theaboutCIIMT the fire of size - camp. “ in. live I the town
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 29 UNIFIED COMMAND - intent of full sup- intentfull of ’ t want more acres,t want more ’
threatening position threatening where -
25. from August 19, 2018. from -
fire adopted from the operational from adopted mapfire miss. Area of concern on Branch II of the Ranch of concern on Branch of II Area planned escape routes zones or safety planned escape absent, inadequate, or compro- are not or may mised. may Entrapment forshelter fire a ofdeployment include may Entrapment itspurpose. intended acci- result fire in serious a wildland near or a dent, wildlandaccident, a fire - Definition of entrapment in entrapment of in Definition Interagency Chapterthe of 18 Fire andFire for Standards Aviation: unex- personnel A situation are where behavior in fire a pectedly caught related, life 25, the ICs talked with the Operation Section Section the Operation with talked the ICs 25, - more smoke, more communities smoke, more more or involved, was take a burnt. to forest It more decided suppression the direct linemore that involved Agency Administrators didn Agency saddle near DP saddle
”.
s spread. The teams spread. The ’ t H. Division a For hold ’
The operations group was operations was The group ” 25). -
t know if folks understand if big the firet know folks how CIIMT 1 IC CIIMT ’
- monumental effort to get that thing.monumental effort across I People were tired of this fire of People tired were To make matters worse, make were To communications team The worked to get adequatedifficult. re- for a whole other a whole ball the fire gamefor ifchecking not work. did because around 1600 the stand up 1600 would because fire around teams The each day. run themselves and braced among the teamamong re- that the get situation could if they couldn ugly ally chaos were planningmeetings the 1700 week, tardant to check the fire to tardant check the air to clear. talk for was waited There the smoky air conditions, air unablethe smoky to they were re- to put opportunities down find so or to do For several days before the entrapment near DP before the entrapment near days several For opportunities seeking Chiefs aerial to ig- utilize to from the fire. Due away nition to take energy When the fire grew to 300,000 acres, people were tired of it. The team would add an addition- it. team acres, of The tired would people to 300,000 grew were When the fire to Division with control Stonyford acres line felt the H. constructed ICs from al 100,000 The to whip west to east through Cold Creek (the Cold to eastto whip west through below DP draw looking at the area hard. If the fire got into Cold into at got Cold the fire the area hard. looking If Anderson Ridge, by to want going itCreek was don there. across was was over 40 miles of line miles of 40 over to make was construction thought a it was IC that happen. CIIMT “ down through Division Division through L.down itOn the map, possible but it in looked actuality, towards Snow Mountain Wilderness, utilizing towards system Mill Creek fire road and scar the 2012 high concern in Bonnie concern the area ifthey high View the then not check work would fire. They could Branch II, on the eastern and northern flanks of the on flanks eastern northern and II, Branch in the fire divisionshold to the fire, they wanted of residential structures were H. F, There G, and Administrators the Agency strategy for toboth overall teamsmeet was The In spreading. from the fire to keep pression “
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 30 UNIFIED COMMAND ”
WhatsApp “ to share infor- to share ”
WhatsApp “ WhatsApp group texts.WhatsApp group WhatsApp It was really scary at this point scary was really It during the entrapment using during “ Example Team communications of Incident (IWI) protocols the and (IWI) Incident s wife s wife - ’ an -
Within -
flops on his way to the hospi- on his way flops -
crew buggies damaged in the tempo- buggies damaged crew - By 1900, they had the names of all the firefighters involved and who they worked for. who and they worked involved they had the names firefighters of all the 1900, By
” him to a nearby hotel for the night but the night remained hotel for him to a nearby he was not to ensure alone. him with some shorts and flips shorts some took the Chief Alex, tal. Once the hospital released reached out to a Chief near to out a Chief in to meet Alex En- Chico reached he was sure loe to make not alone. Chief The cookies up he picked fresh and sent some along Hospital liaisons were sent to the burn center at UC sentHospital center were to the burn at liaisons Medical CenterDavis Enloe and in FIRE Chico. CAL about the two area refuge (TRA). rary cilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) so they could learn they could cilitated (FLA) so Learning Analysis found they the entrapment. next day out from The group text to make notifications as quickly as possible. Within an hour, the CIIMT 1 IC IC met text to notifications as possible. 1 make as quickly the CIIMT group an hour, Within they requested Administrators and the Agency with or Fa- (SART) Team Review astart Serious Accident ing transport. The CAL FIRE team had established a group text in a group established teamhad FIRE CAL The transport. ing the Incident mation. utilized They because we were getting scattered information and we knew we needed knew we to get there to as- we and getting information scattered because were we sist. refus- four and one injury, received burn one information they separated was shoulder The fire was still raging so they were juggling the logistics of getting the firefighters treatment they so juggling the logistics was still were getting raging the firefighters fire of commented, growth. One IC the fire stillwhile monitoring everyone understood what they had going on. They knew they had one CAL FIRE injury that on. they had FIREinjury one going TheyCAL what understood knew had they everyone long and the times were to get in out to center. and the burn drive to be The needed flown teams heard there were possible burn injuries and required an airlift. required and injuries were possible burn there heard teams so General and gathered their notified the Agency and Administrators ICs staff Command The Unfortunately, there was too much smoke Air to to get in.Attack smoke Both teamsfor too gathered much was Unfortunately, there out what taken place. had conversation to figure listenminutes later Fifteen to the the radio the area. around 1800 the fire being and of By out driven were found firefighters missing The teams received the priority traffic radio transmission declaring firefight- missing radio traffic at the priority 1732 teamsThe received tankers air one air for to be the area four was attack on standby. and from ers. The request post. accident ofDay the quickly, so time the put by was growing they a repeater it in, was butpeaters the fire set up command in the incident even difficult communications made it again. This move time to
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 31 LESSONS LEARNED
” t ’ -
aviation) for an aviation) for
-
FLA participant
Do not let urgency influence your actions. influence not let Do urgency your
“ - evaluate. -
t want to be a liability. ’ t have an answer, re ’
LESSONS LEARNED BY PARTICIPANTS THE LEARNED LESSONS
Declare an IWI and have them report to Mendo IP (initial point have (initial to and Mendo them IP an report IWI Declare “
t make things worse, i.e. compromise ourselves in poor visibility. We ordered additional in visibility. poor We ordered t make things ourselves i.e.worse, compromise ’ CREW -
” m not sure what lessons I learned could apply to the ground. It is not It job what apply guess could toto the m not sure second ground. my learned lessons I ’ Trust but verify. You will receive intel from other resources, but validate resources, that other but will verify. intel information for You receive Trust from Speak your mind if something does not feel right. Make sure your voice is heard and understood understood voice if something and not mind feel right. is heard does your Speak Make your sure so. Validate doing when passing concerns by If subordinates you the chain command. them up of don a questionare asked and Maintain transparent communication between resources and within your crew. within and resources between Maintain communication transparent Ensure you and your resources are briefed thoroughly and information is flowing. People need information and thoroughly People briefed is resources are flowing. need your and Ensure you in. buy have and the assignment to understand management profile and use Crew Resource Management. use Crew and management profile sense not questions make something to you. does when Ask INTER has a responsibility Everybody a risk to run operation (in reference to when Dep. Branch II was asking about location of the fire for the burn- for about location asking the fire Dep. II of to when was Branch operation (in reference operation).out I knew the voice on the ground so I did not provide decision points or trigger points. points just on so decision trigger gave the voice the did I not provide I or knew I ground said no to the have might seeing. someone ithe was else, based upon what was him the facts If I er. Not declaring this an IWI created a lot of the ex- created confusion not understand this an becauseer. IWI did Not declaring others tent involved. the injuries people of or try to tackle it to tackle ourselves.try Didn and so IWI protocols follow is communication clear- when are discovered an injuries IWI Declare more complexity. a life threatening There with are dealing is a situationmore balance that when you didn we and didn up additional support ordered We immediately of control. support to maintain span IWI. add potential injuries or incur or that would an of not taking damage awareness risks We had Let incoming aircraft know what type of response they are being requested. This is what it would it is type of response would what what This being know they are Let requested. aircraft incoming like, sound what folks are perspective on My job to folks them our isdoing to support what them give the ground. and input our as another tool. use help They them to succeed. AVIATION I es lesson were edited for clarity. These lessons were broken into four Aviation, Inter clarity. brokencategories: for were into lessons These es lesson edited were Overhead. Crew, and Fireline, subsequent lessons the participants shared with the FLA Team that they believetheoth- benefitthat theywith FLA Team could participantssubsequent shared the lessons of those though the a few interviewed, plac- words lessons in these written ers. were Whenpossible, conclusion of each interview, each person was asked what they learned for themselves from this forthey what themselves from was learned asked eachconclusionof each person interview, the are learn. fire following community The could they thewildland event believe and greater what Interviews were conducted with key personnel involved in the entrapment on the Fire. on the Ranch At entrapment in the with involved key personnel Interviews were conducted
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 32 LESSONS LEARNED
t [have
’
” t. ’
I was mad at mad was I ”
Hey Chief, this Hey this Chief, this highly influ- this highly
“ –
”
t do it.t do ’
t really tell you didn tell I you why t really ’ ve been reflecting on why I I beendidn why ve reflecting on ’ STEN(t) Andy STEN(t) I
ve only been in wildland for and years, 6 only been for ve in wildland “ to stop operation], the I the courage and can - ’ Multiple FLA participants
-
I wish someone would someone would said, wish have I “ shouldn we sucks
case sce-
- 206.” 206.”
to ensure everyone is accounted for? Should it at be done the is for? divi- accounted everyone to ensure ” in your mind. in your ” Roll Roll Call
“
What if? “ Fed rivalry was evident on this believe fire was a to and I it rivalry detriment the opera-Fed was -
t get a briefing, good it. for ask
’ ve been a metro firefighter for more than 30 years. more been than 30 ve I a firefighter for metro fire another on before weeks a few just protection structure some after again doing born like m ’ ’ Who can call for a can call for Who PPE. We have it for a reason. Wear it all appropriately, in particular shrouds and gloves. and in shrouds a reason. particular PPE. for Wear it all appropriately, We have it OVERHEAD (burning out around six homes, we saved five of them). I really believe of six five really them). saved I in around homes, we that out (burning mistake. to accept decision the my Huge enced assignment. I I I think we need to encourage a culture of a culture need to encourage we think I needs to be approachable. concerns in a professional manner.voicing Leadership If you you don If a briefing to thorough Make receive sure supervisors. from There was no good vantage point for the lookout. Our perception is that a lookout can see the a lookout is that perception Our the lookout. vantage point for no good was There but than location. is maybe infire desirable a less make sense? ismake state? What the end tional tempo and production. and to inquiry about supervisors use humble tactics. a discussion Help have things your Do division and branches was a contributing factor to the very rushed firing to therushed very operation. was a contributing and factor branches division FIRE CAL The Rank adds to the confusion and tension around speaking up. speaking tension around and confusion to the adds Rank was happening what intent in commanders and between the dysfunction disconnect think and I There was a perception that refusing an assignment could get you get jobs less desirable reas- an or assignment a could that perception was refusing There on the fire.signed Have the courage to turn down an to turn assignment.Have the courage down leader. a strong traits and approachability of Vulnerability key are the line. The best thing to do is ask questions for the things that are unknown and communicate and the things unknown is ask questions that are thing for the line. to do best The people frequently. your with myself for not following for in the myself the IWI communications are given. are critical.Good the you time information Validate Take to scout nario. Play the circumstance. if it fits anthe situation the IWI timeTake assess and to determine FIRELINE the worst Remain and consider vigilant Do not let urgency influence your actions. influence not let your urgency Do yourself. Gather your situationalyour Gather yourself. awareness. position experienced no matter what group, hold. they personnel on your the within Rely
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 33 LESSONS LEARNED
t com- ’
”
”
ve been thinking how I could could I have how thinking beenve ’
t safe. ’
I should have spoken up sooner. should When I I OPS Tyler “ should that up this I have more voiced drove not awas viable plan. - m blaming human nature. We have to let go of nature. human of m blaming We have to let go ’
At all costs you have to address what what to feel isn address have you all you At costs “
t use deputy branches. I will fight tooth and nail not to have a Deputy Branch again. and tooth Branch fight Next nail branches. will not at use deputy I to have Deputy t get down into the weeds. This is very difficult is there into a Branch is very when This weeds. the t get down a Deputy and ’ ’ m not blaming CAL FIREm not blaming CAL the Forest Service, or I ’ I should have forced have checkmyself forced those boxes. to help Branch I should helped. field, we cleaned up and it went better. There are definitely ways to make it work better.make to ways itare definitely cleaned work up and it better. we went field, There come up at and least unit I have notified was an there should the medical IWI. I on Command it came to how we were organized and commu- and were we it organized came to how the from feedback got we Once us. below nicated We created a hybrid of the The two of system. ICS a hybrid We created along it OPSgot got is where great. Below ICs when failures some Both teams had muddled. have to ride in the same vehicle. They cannot divide and conquer tasks tasks and conquer inbecause to the same cannot divide ride vehicle. there is confu- have They is insion about who charge. When you have two teams there can be difficulties like one team pushing for one thing and the and one thing for pushing one team like can be teams difficulties two there have you When make vocal. If we branches, more deputy they toother teamanother. pushing for be You have Drop points are not safety zones. TRAs are not safety zones or deployment or zones. are not safety zones points zones. TRAs Drop are not safety Make sure everyone has a clear plan. The basics. LCES. Where are we going? Who is in charge? is in charge? Who going? has plan. a clear are we basics. LCES. Where everyone Make The sure to bebriefing has hasty. Leaders Intent, even if Put too much time in trying to salvage a line that was already lost. a line to salvage already that time in was trying Put too much questions more need to ask I picture. to get a clearer I should have spoken up sooner. When I drove up, I should have voiced more that this was not was that this a more have voiced should up, I drove up I spoken When sooner. have should I viable plan. Sometimes we get wrapped up in the plan and fail to reassess the plan. When conditions When conditions the in fail to reassess up Sometimesand plan. the wrapped we get plan to reevaluate. needed we changed, time I can isolate branches, make them smaller or broken apart. broken or them smaller cantime make isolate I branches, how good of element the plan. the development of the plantiming of Regardless is, is a critical Branch. They need to stay up and out of weeds. of weeds. to stay up and out need They Branch. Don clearly. clearly. Don blending two teams together. We had different operational mindsets and they weren operational and different mindsets teams We had blending together. two this more two 1 teams we need to address have again ever If Type enough. we municating clearly Trying to meld two Type 1 teams is not advantageous. There are too many voices and it and muddies voices to meld too Type are many two 1 teams There is not advantageous. Trying of effect a side was this Branches Having was happeningthe water. on incident. Deputy That It was a difficult unified command. We typically go unified with an IC and an IC OPS, with maybe unified but go not We typically command. was a difficult unified It whole two with unified teams. sion or with the Team? Team? the or with sion the incident. over Command during read channel was was Weather cleared. never Command
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 34 LESSONS LEARNED m going to just takem going ’
door discussions and talk about it. This settled about it. and talk settled discussions door This - beforehand. Every time we have worked out out time worked we have Every beforehand.
t know this guy or trust him or trust t know this guy so I ’
s not the time to do that. We need to look at how both at how to look s notneed the time that. to do We ’ HOW
t be on the that teams. different ’
m a little frustrated that it took a while to get here. to get a while that it took a little frustrated m s been during a fire and that a fire s been during ’ ’ t know all the details of what has already being looked at. can being If t knowyouyou too involved looked all the details get has already what of ’ s on your shoulder [referring to the organization/agency to each other. shoulder We Talk patches]. [referring your s on ’ cauliflower. We need a universal protocol. We need a universal cauliflower. had to convince the doctor to get referral to a specialist. We also had firefighters refusing treat- to refusing a specialist. to convince the to get referral doctor firefighters had We also had like looked they and the next before day the night ears that in red went ment. had One firefighter We recognized radiant burns can be misdiagnosed or dismissed as minor superficial. dismissed Blisters or radiant can or burns be misdiagnosed We recognized burns later. The need to be can occur many hours looked at we a specialistand swelling by and OPS leadership out there at the time helped people. They had their heads down on the mission down heads their had people. at there They theOPS out leadership time helped survive. them helped have may there being OPS and Peer support is important. Having CISM there was awesome. They had a couple of therapy dogs. had therapy awesome. a couple of was They Peer is Having there support important. CISM team. on our to a permanent want have We now CISM dog and message was passed to all resources that we would shelter in place in the saddle we realized it in realized shelter place that we we would in the passed to all resources saddle message was needed they what understood calm, folks stayed a safety People not zone. thewas best place for Branch separated folks. with to deal it and to do, allowed Branch was calm when the separation happened. He handled it well. It was textbook on how to on how was textbook it well. It He handled when calm was the separationBranch happened. kept and that off calm. He running. for the are cut resources and his voice Once asked help folks more that this was not a viable plan. Looking back, we should have just fired out to have out protect peo- just that not should this back, fired a was we more viable plan. Looking going was granted on. what that was ple. for took I so I don so I have up voiced have should spoken I drove up sooner. up. When I should messed things get I On the dirt, we fight fire, fight On the dirt, we it and shouldn not to in be involved try tactics I the field overly am in me personally, as Operations For when I are going to do that we need to work out out that we to do are going work need to something it to do how and going what, it works whose the bell down rings. fire before operatesides drill and things down a bit. be might a down bestthings It practice. together in to work we are going the Anytime believe Service future. Forest FIREI that and CAL Letter of delegation is not real. You need closed real. You isLetter delegation not of When we decided to meld the teams, we asked for Agency to meld Com- the teams, Incident for Agency Administrators and decided we asked When we a believe doors. frank have discussion that I and should behind closed together to get manders happen more. later. Guys were barely at barely someone in this were to look at a team.later. the hospital I requested Guys Bring when I objectively. this on myself. days seven to you talking the too long were took honestly, we for It FLA team to get here. Quite tions, etc. If someone is a qualified division, they are qualified. Base actions on the complexity of on of are qualified. the complexity Base actions someonea is division, tions, qualified they If etc. don to I the is going instead of fire what do are good people in out there all agencies.are good in types, fuel condi- comfort and different levels people with their to determine experience Talk what there realize and to work together have we the day, of the end At a reason. for qualifications have
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 35 FROM THE FLA TEAM
g n i
r
u D
.
e n o z
h c a e
o t
m a e t
e
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g shoes when there could be no be thereshoes could when n ’ i n g i s s a
d s Perspective n ’ a
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Recognize that because you know the outcome, you are already already outcome,are you Recognize know you the that because members. There was a lack of understanding and of a the roles lack was of members. There t nor is this section passing judgement. These areThese ob- conditions this sectionis judgement. nor passing
’ n – e From theFrom Team FLA d i or the perspective that you could have predicted the outcome.or Consid- that have the predicted perspective could you c n i —
” s own perspectives, biases, and experiences. ands own experiences. perspectives, biases, e ’ h t
g n i
d i v i d
y hindsight biashindsight b “
e
n o d
y l l a c that the tension between the two IMTs was impacting on the of the decisions was ground. some the IMTs that two between the tension increased layers of bureaucracy, blurred communication,bureaucracy,lines formal replication blurred of and of of ef- layers increased was the among the troops perception was also felt where This forts. operationsat level the field rector, Safety, and other team positions. Safety,rector, other and to positions led the organization stated at of that the participants duplicating all levels Many of Chief level. Several team members expressed confusion as to who was making decisions and was and decisions as to who confusion making expressed members level. team Several Chief in duplicate those working positions, engagement Di- of for as Branch the rules were what such created tensioncreated among the teams the operational below Section and Operations in staff the teams, responsibilities the of command have had to manage their zone with only 400 total 400 with only to manage their support. had zone personnel no logistical and have structure System organizational atypical application Command creative This and of the Incident administrators preferred to do just that. However, the logistical requirements that would have have that would requirements the logistical just that. However, to do preferred administrators duplicate posts, caterers, incident and bathrooms, command including been to support required the other would was unfeasible units IMT felt been one shower zoned, the fire had at If the time. i the agency the to manage and Mendocino Complex, IMTs how the two initial about discussions (IMTs) under a single, unified under command. (IMTs) is common it fire, is typ- in complete command wildland two utilizing a unified While IMTs under A common view shared a Management common both Incident was by A Complex Teams on the Mendocino with Management integrate to entire 1 Incident two frustration Type general having Teams RESPONSIBILITIES UNIFIED COMMAND: ORGANIZATIONAL AND ROLES pervisors with the objective of sharing similar experiences, or with the objective the or of objective of de- experiences, with pervisors sharing the stimulating similar with bate dialogue. and the time. them withsu- here discuss peers, or questions presented and coworkers, Takekey the and elements affected by them at available had to involved you that those had the only er information if react how would you As you read through the following sections, pick any of the people who shared their story for this for their story shared who people any pick of the sections, following the through As you read situation. their FLA, put in yourself served that organizations interested in learning may consider in their journey toward improving towardtheir improving in may consider journey learning in interested served that organizations it, toas we story the heard only time,of work. a is snapshotthe fire relevant in system This wildland thefiltered team through knowledge of the outcome and asked themselves what made sense at the time, and why. This sectionand why. time, what This the at made themselves sense and asked outcome knowledge of the concrete not is or comprehensive ing gathered information, and as we built the FLA documents. Throughout the process, the documents. process, Throughout FLA the FLA the built information, anding gathered as we participants to the put themselvesattempted in Team members The following section summarizes the discussions the following explor- sectionThe interviews,discussions FLA team while during had summarizes the
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 36 FROM THE FLA TEAM
”
wedge, re- wedge, - t clearly com- t clearly ’
Do I know the plan? I Do “ or or ”
making processes [with regards [with regards processes making - s decision ’ pounders to provide feedback to IMTs with feedback with to IMTs to provide pounders Why are we here? are we Why - “
25? 25? -
Did you continue so, to the plan? go you If along with Did why? the outcome? What was
August, the Mendocino Complex had been a the Mendocino nearly had Complex thou- August, month, consuming for burning -
Have you ever been ever given abbreviated briefing? Have or you a compressed What is the difference between briefings given to a group of people who commonly people of to- who between towork a group commonly What is the briefings difference given people just a briefing of met? and between who agether group How did the real or perceived pressures affect sharing of information perceived information affect real or of pressures communications the and sharing did How those in and around DP for tioning the plan? Perhaps thinking to yourself, to yourself, tioning thinking the plan? Perhaps urgency to the system, that one affect might urgency how to risk]? having found an internal ques- been you conversation yourself Have in where you a situation Operating in the wildland fire system is inherently risky on its own. When a sense is inherently of system risky we add fire Operating in the wildland and provide feedback on how to better work across jurisdictions and agency boundaries? across and agency on jurisdictions to better feedback how work provide and Are there avenues within ICS that allow ground that avenues ICS there allow within Are to how are things functioning? regards you gather unit to review Operating do Annual local your Plans ? How IMT do What does or If you were an IC or OPS and were presented with a similar situation, what options could you or you OPS an optionsyou IC were presented situation, what a similar with could were If and with?work be to tasked may another and team you Administrators present to the Agency What were your thoughts when you read through the Unified Command story? through read Command story? the Unified you when thoughts your What were
do. do. for Dialogue: Questions them altogether. It can prevent resources from having adequate time to gather their own situa- own their gather adequate time from having to can preventthem altogether. It resources on thethat information isn information solely of others. If tional awareness, relying what a to not have of are being they clear may asked understanding municated, those involved fighters operate in the wildland fire system canwildland a time operate Creating be in to thefighters the pushed side. the pertinent that to skip information, lack or perceived, can people push al or briefings to give PROVIDING THE PERTINENT INFORMATION THE PERTINENT PROVIDING becomes 19, fire- aspects critical how on August the mission, of When urgency may have as it
Questions for Dialogue: that could be used to burnout. This action, if successfully completed, would likely box the fire in, likely the fire completed, box would to burnout. be used action,that This could if successfully haltingultimately its spread. was critical to protect for a number of reasons. The IMTs felt they were at a point where they they were IMTs felt atreasons. where a The point a number of critical to protect for was lines dozer and the fire possibly box roads in. indirect was to identify could Tactically, the plan sands of acres daily and civil- and daily creating significant acres economic impacts. Firefighters and social of sands an towards area the felt to IMTs for be The the fire was moving over. fire ready ians alike were URGENCY: REAL AND PERCEIVED PRESSURES AND PERCEIVED URGENCY: REAL mid By
Questions for Dialogue:
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 37 FROM THE FLA TEAM
s safety s safety ’
day struggle due to the large to the large struggle due day
-
to - command with mixed results. A few oth- few results. A command mixed with - t influence your to t influence aboutdecision whether your ’ of -
way communicationway briefings. and improving - 25, uneasiness can settle in. Several individuals were uncomfortable were settle uneasiness individuals Several 25, in. can -
s recorded history. The history. cre- pace Complex grew ats recorded the Mendocino which ’
s rank? ’ made radio communication nearly impossible in some locations. There were not not radio impossible were nearly made communication There in some locations.
” What are the minimum elements needed even in an abbreviated briefing? briefing? an abbreviated in even needed elements minimum are the What What was the situation around those circumstances? those around the situation was What
If you work within an organization where rank is important, how do you create a working en- a working create you do rank important, how is where an organization within work you If but still re- given) that people in (even encourages up tovironment contrast to orders speak spect a person If you have experienced both situations, what differences between the two experiencestwo influ- between the experienced you bothhave situations, If differences what ability to speak up? your enced rank influenced your decision your to speak influenced up? about whether rank been rank didn situation ever in where a Have you speak up? During the process, the FLA team members had candid discussions about the effects of rank rank about the of effects the process, discussions candid the FLA teamDuring members had speak to up. their and for a been situation ever desire in upon where Have firefighters you dead zones dead
three or more hours each day to get to their assignment and back. Road conditions quickly quickly conditions to theirdete- to get assignment hours each day more back. and Road or three times. drive increased the heavy further use and under riorated “ incident. driving often tactical the whole were enough channels to cover addition, resources In runs the fire made every afternoon. made the fire runs radio communication grew, times operations. drive the fire hampered and As extended Many ated many communications issues. The large size of the fire also increased travel times from times from travel also increased of the fire size issues. large ated many communications The a day was these challenges Overcoming to the fireline. camps On August acres approximately 384,568 the Mendocino was in19, Complex it size,On August the making in fire California largest COMPLEXITIES LOGISTICAL OF LARGE FIRE A is also essential to successful two is also essential to successful Questions for Dialogue: The practice and ability to speak up on a team during operations can be critical toduring to speak a team practice up on a and ability teamThe how itto and to say it are both say important, others. that Knowing what and to of but say when a fear of reprisal or looking foolish, offending those a in them, confidence their or of around offending lookinglack foolish, reprisal or a fear of speaking up. and abilities from can prevent people knowledge chance that others may not be seeing, hearing, or feeling what you what feeling are. Yetor is a there with- stigma not be hearing,chance that may seeing, others like, reputation. community cost a speaking that fire person their up might in Things the wildland ing of confusion and apprehension. and confusion of ing signal or up on every in canNo single person cue their pick environment, is so there a good cerns and asked for for more information up their and asked chain cerns around themselves. detailed scouted more for to seek out information Most a feel- ers briefly had When personnel do not have a clear understanding of the plan, as was the case for many of the of many plan, the understanding case of have a clear not When personnel for do was the as near working DP resources upspoke about as the their the assignment operationalwith con- that as well day tempo. few A SAFETY CREATING UP: PROMOTES THAT SPEAKING PSYCHOLOGICAL AN ENVIRONMENT
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 38 FROM THE FLA TEAM
fill (UTF)fill - to
-
system to meet their teams to meet system needs. The were -
. 15
s environment of large fires and minimal logistical support (especially during PL5), and minimal fires s environment support (especially logistical large during of ’ and creativity working on the fireline or when managing large fires? fires? managing working large when creativity on theand fireline or Wildland firefighters often firefighters on their and adapt being on feet toWildland pride themselves able to think experienced positives negatives any to adaptation or Have you situations fly. changing on the During times of resource scarcity, does the way you strategically manage resource times strategically the way of a differ? does scarcity, you fire During it? resources? handle critical experienced did a lack of you How Have you requests filled? your not getting prepare all of of do possibility the you an how for As IC, What alternatives can be utilized to reduce excessive drive times on large fires? times excessive on large drive to reduce What alternatives utilized be can In today In to compensate do can you what issues?communications for How does your IMT typically your issues? communication handle travel does How extended and https://www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/intelligence/2017_statssumm/annual_report_2017.pdf
people a DIVS is directly supervising is not reduced below seven. below is not reduced supervising people is directly a DIVS 15 the Incident Action Plan (IAP) for August 19. To mitigate this, grouping resources into configura- To for August 19. mitigate resources this, (IAP) grouping Action Plan the Incident to reduce used is often leader forces task that their own teams come with as strike tions or such supervising. the number is directly More of often than though, peopleDIVS not, the number of a monplace for a DIVS to than amount. example, a DIVS For monplace more be on for assigned far the recommended to it resources assigned pages in worth of the Mendocino four G of Complex, Division there were Span of control refers to the number of resources a supervisor can effectively manage. num- That can effectively resources a supervisor to the number of Span refers control of com- beingis becoming to seven; five more three optimal. itber between is typically However, teams are being forced to create large geographic divisions staffed with many ground resources. with geographic staffed ground to create divisions many large teams are being forced can cause issues of control. This adequate maintaining span they organize the response geographically. One such overhead position is supervisor the division overhead the One such response geographically. they organize positions, incident management bigger get there is an to fill DIVS As fires and inability (DIVS). Managing a fire when resources are scarce, especially overhead positions, incident overhead is forcing scarce, are especially Managing resources when a fire strategies and tactics, they develop in as well as how management creative how teams to become OF CONTROL SPAN Questions for Dialogue: years, the U.S has reached a National Preparedness Level 5 three times. During these times, During a National the times. three Preparedness Level 5 the U.Syears, has reached as UTF back can turned that being are be than the num- higher requests for resources of number 2017) filledber actually that are (NIFC could have used the fire. have staff an additionalSOFRs to truly could sixteen problem nationally. the is common past becoming In increasingly of an five lack resources A also struggling to fill overhead and crew needs. to unable crew and one overhead five At fill point,there were also struggling that she recalled the team (SOFRs), one officers and of safety line officers safety requests for teams from being able to fill all of the overhead positions that would have been required to staff to staff been required have would positions overhead the that of all able to fill being from teams teams forced and the ICS them to modify full two Due to the size and location of the Mendocino Complex, it crossed multiple jurisdictional to bounda- location of the Mendocino the size and Complex,Due it crossed structure. season the fire prevented a busy Unfortunately, command unified a ries, demanding GROUND RESOURCES DEPLETED Questions for Dialogue:
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 39 FROM THE FLA TEAM n- i
l a m i n i
m
25 were expe- were 25 d - a h
n e
t f o
s t n e m n g i
s s a
e R
. s minute assignment change there was min- was there change assignment minute t -
u
o k a e r b
l e minute changes. v - e l
n o i s i v i D
d n a
h
c n a
r B
e h hour shifts that Strike Team 1880C worked on the Mendocino worked that Complex, they hour shifts Strike Team 1880C t -
t
a
p u
minute changes are not unusual in a large complex incident, complex those inter- not in are minute a unusual changes large many of INK CHANGES: EFFECTS ON GROUND RESOURCES RESOURCES ON EFFECTS GROUND INK CHANGES: - - w assigned to a different division seven times. While the strike team was happy seven was to help times. division the team to a While different strike assigned o - l l o AND f
- l As an OPS, have you even been in a similar situation where resources are scarce? How did you are did you How resources scarce? where an beena similar situation even As OPS, you in have it? handle asked for? for? asked continue with the instead? you handle you do you Did it? plan? did What did How Have you ever carried available you than are what carried out rather ever a plan resources Have you with whatever optimal span of control? How have you you handled have it?optimalHow span control? of five to seven resources? How have you handled handled you have it? toHow resources? seven five to a their areperson beyond been you situation assigning ever resources in where a Have you How often have you experienced a situation where you are managing than are the experienced you optimalmore have you often a situationHow where a
m an assignment. Questions for Dialogue: i to commonly to for who objective report more and where overall their and formation, including While last While a last received they concerns that when shared viewed ment prevented them from building relationships with the resources they were working working as were with they relationships the resources building with ment them from prevented com- issues These further were they were working. as gaining of the ground awareness well the reassignments when pounded last were were re were that noted mission members the frequent assigned, reassign- several whatever with they were fire personnel from one geographic area of a fire of area to one another. geographic personnelfire from the six 24 During wildland fire resources. With larger fires comes geographical areas fire resources. fires this larger Combine towildland With cover. larger season, need to bounce in fire a busy of it to an and increasing leads lack resources a general with PEN that ourthe fire of lack of on canfamiliarity personnelA be are working ground an issue for Questions for Dialogue: rienced, some of the ground resources that were assigned to help carry out the mission were not; the not; assigned to help out mission were that resources carry were of the ground rienced, some in unfamiliarwere in timber. burned burning and with only brush had some However, picking the right resources for the job becomes more difficult when resources are are for the job resources difficult when becomes resources more the right picking However, near selected that to plan DP were the operation firing thescarce. While overhead Branch Directors, Division Supervisors, Engine Strike Teams, and Crews to carry out these more out to carry Teams,Strike and Crews Supervisors, Engine Division Directors, Branch operations. firing complex have specialized training and are highly experienced in burning a variety of fuel types, topogra- fuel of a variety in burning experienced highly are and training specialized have Operations the Section for select to hand Chief is conditions. weather notphy, It and uncommon The selection of the right team for the job team is to of any operation. selection for critical the success the right The of Some of these operationsplanners typically firing The of specialized. can firing, be very operations,including ROSTER YOURTEAM FROMPICKING A DEPLETED Questions for Dialogue:
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 40 FROM THE FLA TEAM s ’
level level re a re ’ - other - We “
s strengths and weak- s strengths and ’ hour resource that has hour - The reality of California reality of The ” s setting. While there are ’
hour shift, there are other possi- hour - MIXING THE MISSIONMIXING
hr shifts and hr is on the fireline every - - training to the level necessary to adapt from from to adapt necessary to the level training - hour resources themselves. every hour Working - compressed operations? compressed - hour resource to gain familiarity with a piece of ground and and with resource to familiarity gain a piecehour ground of -
round fire season is that metropolitan fire departments will assist more and will assist more departments season is that fire fire round metropolitan -
hour shift also adds complexity for 24 shift also adds complexity for hour -
HOUR SHIFTS cies? resource an unknown do of you an gain a leader, understanding how As time during nesses? that Does change a different agency than agency you? a different agen- experience, other with found working benefits your and what have you In difficulties How well do you understand the mission and training background of resources that work ofresources thatfor work understand do background you well missionHow the training and When deciding to move resources to different geographical areas, what do you consider? you areas, to different do geographical what to move resources deciding When hour shifts during their off period by pairing another 24 them with by their period shifts during off hour - -
sonnel on the Mendocino Complex noted that it was hard for them to gain noted that it of was hard sonnel Complex an on the Mendocino understanding patterns weather the trends: localized what fluctuations, activity the daily regular fire were, the each day. break even the approximateor time the would inversion day adds to the complexity for a 24 to the complexity adds for day scarcity per- and of several fireresources, to the large growth Due the associated behavior. fire day. day. 24 The to develop the same working relationship with a municipal resource, or an understanding of their of an relationship understanding a municipal or with resource, the same working to develop that a resource with 16 works capabilities, would they than the opposite schedule. This may add to the complexity of managing resources from the IMT resources from managing to the may add of complexity This the opposite schedule. additional require adjoining and may time to resources the divisions. supervisors Division down bilities for length of shift. For example, California state fire and municipal resources work 24 24 work resources municipal and state fire example, California For shift. of length bilities for of the cycle a 24 on and hours mitigate for Some Management Incident (IMTs) hours off. Teams 24 ent shift policies. typically resources wildland a 16 fire a of work While majority Mixing missions and cultures is not the only complexity that comes with working federal,with is working that comes with not the only complexity Mixing cultures missions and differ- mixing and is also the issue of utilizing There state resources. municipal and department 24 Questions for Dialogue: two distinct disciplines into its operations but no one agency can tackle these large complex fires fires complex can theseno one tackle large agency into but its distinct disciplines operations two ofthousands acres. eat of months and uphundreds for that burn mandated qualifications for all agencies, the cross the all agencies, for qualifications mandated combine to the FIRE to accomplish. has managed CAL firefighting is hard to timber fires structure Metropolitan fire departments and wildland fireengines as fire and bull- agencies are as different and wildland Metropolitan departments fire is in The training limited that receives the other each agency dozers. metropolitan department and timber fires are not really what we what are not really do. timber fires and metropolitan department almost year now suppression, types. wildfire the fuel in of large more regardless RELIANCE ON STATE AND MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATIONS MUNICIPAL ONAND RELIANCE STATE timber fires. about experience their limited talked the interviewees Some of infighting
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 41 FROM THE FLA TEAM
one air attack and and one air attack
“ Thirteen minutes later, all minutesThirteen later, ” requesting ”
) any accident or medical emergency emergency dur- medical or accident any morning quarterback an events,morning there is “ - 18 priority traffic, priority “ contact for planning and a reduction in radio a reduction and planningcontact for - of - hour shift resources? How did that affect your strate- How shiftdid that your affect resources? hour we have five individuals on individuals five the line radio have limited with we - incident (IWI) can sometimes be can obvious, butincident other (IWI) “
- INCIDENT (IWI) INCIDENT line. After the entrapment, the possibilityAfter injuries line. of and -
- an - that AN - ” 25,
- within - WITHIN -
) While some things are obvious, such as serious injuries, other events are injuries, as serious ) events obvious, some things such other While are 17
LINE (MEDICAL INCIDENT REPORT INCIDENT LINE (MEDICAL -
(NIFC 2017 (NIFC ” As an IMT, how can you clearly communicate your expectations for when and how an IWI an expectations when IWI communicate can how for an you and clearly As IMT, how your be declared? should In your experience, have the circumstances for an IWI been explained or were they assumed? were or been explained an experience, IWI the for your circumstances have In supervi- or changing a are discussionresources have you to define IWIs when can you How on a wildfire? frequently sors practice scenarios that help your unit navigate the conversation space of whether to declare whether unit navigateof space the conversation help your practice scenarios that an IWI? Without a clear definition of circumstances, how does your unit prepare for the uncertainty? unit your prepare does for circumstances, definition how a clear Without of utilized the or declaring an had around cons of IWI, unit and ever a discussion pros Has your ule than you? What benefits or difficulties did thatdid benefits present? What or difficulties ule than you? gic planninggic allocation? resource and an adjoining with that had ever shift sched- you worked a different the have resource field, In As an IC, have you ever worked with 24 with ever you worked have an As IC, The Medical The Incident Report (MIR), found in theIRPG andmany incidentIAPs from evolved the9 LineForm. The https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4C2STvEkAHo
intentof theMIR is to provide firefighters with asystem to report medicalincidents/injuries. ground ambulances.ground 17 18 was announced over the radio, there was little information being fed to the Incident Command the little announced to the Command over radio, there was being Incident was information fed began preparing for information, of With a lack Post and Medical the Medical Leader Unit. Unit three this of ambulancesair and seven case, case In in scenario. the ordering itthe worst resulted Whether a situation is declared an IWI or not, if injuries are involved and medical treatment or medical re- and not, a situation an IWI Whether if injuries is involved are declared practice to the 8 utilize itquired, is good UTILIZING THE 8 open to interpretation. Questions for Dialogue: The definition for an definition IWI is quite as for isThe general. defined It re- assigned Management Incident or involving Team personnel aning incident directly sources. through the worst; the situation had played itself out and everyone was the the well. everyone itself and doing worst; situation played out through had In hindsight, it can be easy to pronounce that those involved should have declared and and the have should IWI, that declared hindsight, it to pronounce those involved canIn be easy have been abenefits point would single which things. come other among that in felt traffic they had the moment, However, those involved contact, fire has jumped the line. Need air support to circle overhead. to circle the line.contact, Need air support has jumped fire to most for by accounted besix were thought uninjured. and initial communication on Command was a call for was Command initial on communication to division tankers Julietfour DP important discussion here around when an incident should be declared an IWI or be not. declared an an incident IWI when should here around important discussion in the escape their overrun compromised, and II route were fire by Branch When six firefighters The need to declare an incident need to declare The it easier is always Monday to times Remembering vague. AN INCIDENT DECLARING Questions for Dialogue:
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 42 FROM THE FLA TEAM -
line by incident resources? How How resources? line incident by -
PPE
-
line? -
you keep your PPE and how prepared we are for when in seconds things change from just just from change things seconds in when are for we prepared how and PPE your keep you
line ensures that those coordinating the medical response have an understanding of the of response have an the medical understanding coordinating line that those ensures - a sudden change in the middle of your operations, the of time have in to stopyour the change adjust middle you and will a sudden PPE? your How easily is it for you to access those critical items? If you tossed your pack, grabbed your your pack,you tossed your grabbed If you to access easily is it items? those critical How for you those items? still would ran have and shelter made body in If on your gear. the fire behavior and your PPE is configured how your Consider What are the items you feel would be instrumental in an survival escape shel- fire feel would in your or What are the items you deployment? ter As an IMT, does your team an your of the 8 expectAs IMT, does the utilization process? and communicate team this expectation your does How do you and your home unit prepare for an emergency situation? Does your preparation situation? home your your you unit and an Does prepare emergency do How for 8 the the use of include s words, it caused him to have to completely drain the local 911 resources. Had a local emer- a local Had resources. 911 the local drain to completely to have him it caused s words, ’
opening conversations regarding how easy it would be to access those items. those be to access it would easy how regarding conversations opening Questions for dialogue that may have led to their successful escape. For each of the firefighters and for the FLA team for the firefighters and to their each of escape. led have that successful may For eye some were equipment certain itemsthere were there that as lifesaving and resonated Consider the circumstances the burnout blew up, the fire the operation,Consider around and quickly how then and made equipment thinkand their about PPEused they time decisions firefighters critical member has resolved to go back to his crew and ensure they attach their shrouds to their hel- and to attach they his crew shrouds to their ensure back has resolved go member ifthey need them.ever down them mets so they can simply pull other interesting conversation happened regarding the individual who fell down and the the individual down whowater regarding fell other interesting happened conversation One FLA team equipment bottles scattering his gear, the various and on ground. came out of another day on the fireline to life threatening. For example, the on fireline a nomex one For participantanother was wearing threatening. day to life on his helmet. to hood in pushed around the shroud his neck addition When the fire structure his shroud. An- hood and the line, up his structure down pull pull ablethem off he was to quickly discussion about wearing PPE occurred but there also insightful about about wearing PPE were conversations discussion occurred where PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE PERSONAL the of up many participants. with the FLA usual process, topic came The the PPE Throughout of situation, allowing them to request the right type of equipment to the right location. type of equipment right the to request right situation, to the them allowing Questions for Dialogue: gency occurred, there would there been available transport occurred, have to no Utilizing respond. would gency emergency the 8 While planning for the worst in a situation planning worst the unitin protocol, While lead- medical the is like this standard for er
MENDOCINO COMPLEX FLA 43 FROM THE FLA TEAM
SME, s in- ’
—
SME,
—
SME, -
At thisAt moment
FLA Team Lead FLA Lead Facilitator (shadow) Facilitator Lead
– Lead Facilitator –
–
CAL FIRE Agency Administrator FIRE Agency CAL Writer/Editor
- –
SME, Dean Potter (Dozer Operator) PotterSME, (Dozer Dean -
CAL FIRE Labor Representative CAL
- SME, Megan Saylors (IHC) (IHC) SME,Saylors Megan - FLA TEAM FLA LA Fire Department Agency Representative Agency FireLA Department
- IN CONCLUSION s employees are paying very close attention close to s employees are paying very ’ LNU Safety/Relief, Dave Harmon (IHC Supt.) (IHC Harmon LNU Safety/Relief, Dave Interagency TeamInteragency Members Is my leader my looking my wellbeing? Is for out
—
United Firefighters of Los Angeles Union of Director United City Firefighters
– Persephone (ZFMO) Whelan . As a review team we entered this situation looking under every rock for for rock every under looking situation this entered we team areview As . saving decisions in critical moments, resulting in the successful escape in the successful in moments,saving decisions critical resulting - SME, David Andersen (Safety) SME, Andersen David specifically, are these decisions leaning more toward a report- toward are these leaning decisions specifically, more
Bryan Karchut (FFMO) Karchut Bryan – Randy Draeger (R4 SafetyRandy Draeger Director) — Heather Provencio (Forest Supervisor) Heather Provencio Doug Jones (Fire (Fire Jones Captain) Doug Adam Walker Joe Buchmeier (BC) Joe Buchmeier Patrick Butler (Asst. Chief) ButlerPatrick (Asst. Christina Anabel (Fire Tech Transfer Specialist) Specialist) (Fire Tech Transfer Anabel Christina Derek Witmer Chief (Unit Derek Santa Unit) Clara decisions made immediately following a serious a accident. following immediately made decisions anafter event, an organization the decisions learning culture? and ing The single most important time for a leader or are the or a leader single most importantlearning organization The time for Roy Jones (Safety)Roy
cooperation, support and dedication to learning from unintended outcomes. is to the team from It learning dedication and cooperation, support the each within the aim wildland agency, with to improve tent createsprocess dialogue that this environment. working system The FLA Team would like to recognize and commend the Agencies involved in this FLA for their in this FLA for involved commend and the Agencies tolike recognize FLA Team would The look for ways to improve system. for ways some of the fire are listed above look The information the wildland learning and changes. for us to look elements for as opportunities identified and extraction of employees who received injuries but are still with us to tell their story. The les- The story. their to tell us injuries with are still but received who employees of extraction and our to organizations this team tasked of leaders because sharing are are the that we sons learned ty. We want to highlight the great things that were occurring, the planning, occurring, ty. things the flexible We want to and na- were the great that highlight is also the positive behavior. There outcome responding of the employees fire ture to significant making life firefighters of interviews. By no means is this team saying everything went wrong on wrong went Mendocinothe Complex. no means isinterviews. this team By everything saying activi- to the not want fire incredible to discountWe do all the decisions, adaptability and actions, areas to improve. The reality is that a lot went well on the Mendocino on the well Complex. Key elements reality is thatareas to lot went a improve. The threads and observations the team in are common through lessons the learned identified found You what you find seek will