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Date: 29 January 2015 Speaker: Ilber Ortayli, Professor of History, Galatasaray University, Istanbul and Bilkent University, Ankara; Former Director, Topkapi Museum, Turkey Chair: David W. Ellwood, Senior Adjunct Professor of European and Eurasian Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe, Bologna, Italy
“29 October 1914: Turkish Empire, Belligerent of the First World War” Part of the World War I Series
According to Professor Ortayli, World War I monumentally changed the countries that took part, such that even today, differences between developed and underdeveloped countries may be less significant than those between participants and nonparticipants in the war. In order to explain Turkey’s role in the war, and the consequences thereof, Ortayli particularly focuses on French and German cultural influence, and the comparison of Turkey's preparedness for war with that of the other primary belligerents.
While World War I finalized the territorial dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Ortayli also highlights the significance of the remarkable casualties that eliminated some of the best and brightest young minds of the generation. Losses were so substantial that even today an education gap seems to linger. Also critical were the cultural changes that altered the way Turkey engaged with the West, which would set the stage for its future participation in international relations.
Though long balanced between the Occident and the Orient, Ortayli explains that Turkey maintained a historically Francophile inclination. By the end of the 19th century, French was a basic necessity among the intelligentsia, and it was a primary language of medicine until well into the 20th. Most institutions, from the centralized government and the military to financial, tax, and legal codes were based on a French model. This included the Romanization and secularization of the legal code that so distinguishes Turkey from the Islamic world even today. Despite this connection, as World War I approached, official feelings toward France began to sour in response to France’s increasingly close alliance with Russia.
Ortayli further suggests that around the same time, disastrous defeats in Libya (1911) and in the Balkans (1912-13) demonstrated conclusively that Turkey had fallen behind militarily, thus triggering a realignment towards Germany. In response to its destroyed reputation, the Turkish army imported German advisers and techniques. While traditionalists, particularly among the old guard on the general staff, remained anti-German, simple soldiers and younger officers tended to accept the German influence readily. This influence also manifested itself in the development of a German-speaking engineering class.
Despite such influence, Ortayli maintains the Turkish army's capabilities at the beginning of the war were probably most in line with those of the Russian army, rather than with any of the primary forces. The massive British Empire controlled a third of the world’s population and had a peerless Navy, while Germany had an exceptional 5 million-strong volunteer army with the budget and social system to support it. Turkey was simply not comparable. It had a weaker war industry than even Russia and consistent equipment shortages. Its only advantages were a recently improved agricultural sector that alleviated food scarcity, and a generally unbelievable resistance to hardship.
While its disadvantages were evident, Turkey nevertheless won three major victories against the Allies. The Gallipoli Campaign, the Siege of Kut, and the Battle of Baku were won thanks in part to the effective leadership of a well-trained general staff that included greats such as Mustafa Kemal and Esat Pasha, İsmet (İnönü), Kazım (Karabekir). While some have highlighted the importance of the Jihad declared on behalf of Turkey, Ortayli points to a widely held contemporary sentiment that this was a weapon that would have been better left unused.
Ortayli also notes that this was not a war entered upon careful strategic calculations. Rather, war became inevitable because the ineffective diplomatic corps proved unable to use standard diplomatic tools to delay the advent of hostilities. Not trusting the army to defend Turkey's neutrality, the political leadership felt forced to respond to the German call. This is particularly tragic because of all the belligerents, only Turkey made a quasi-realistic projection of its potential, refusing to believe the war would be over by Christmas as was commonly suggested.
The prospect of looming defeat began to generate increasing anger towards Germany. While leaders such as Mustafa Kemal had been anti-German since before the war, they would later capitalize on this growing resentment. American influence was also relevant in enhancing the disillusionment with Germany that would keep Turkey neutral during World War II.
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