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Language Complexity The ECB and its Clarity of Communication with the Public: Does Plain Talking Shape Engagement? Federico Maria Ferrara1 and Siria Angino2 1London School of Economics 2European Central Bank Abstract Although many central banks have made increasing efforts to communicate with the general public, we know little about how public attention responds to central bank communications. One reason why it may be challenging for central banks to engage the public is that their language is too difficult to understand for the average citizen. Focusing on the case of the European Central Bank (ECB), we hypothesise that greater communication clarity is conducive to stronger engagement. To test this hypothesis, we employ readability metrics to analyse a comprehensive dataset of ECB communication activities and assess the effects of communication clarity on media engagement, focusing on both traditional and social media. First, we show that communication clarity in ECB speeches and press conferences is a significant and robust predictor of the volume of media coverage received by the ECB. Second, we provide evidence that the clarity of digital communications plays an important role in explaining the social media engagement generated by the ECB on Twitter. Taken together, these findings have significant implications for the communication policy of central banks. 1 Introduction Like the utterings of the Delphic oracle, central bank communications with the general public used to be enigmatic and obscure. In the \ancient r´egime"of central bank communication, monetary policymakers often decided to communicate in a language that was only understood by fellow technocrats and purposely designed not to be intelligible to the average citizen. This Delphic nature of the public communication of central bankers is epitomised by an oft-cited quote attributed to Alan Greenspan, who said in a 1988 speech, early in his tenure as Federal Reserve Chair: \I guess I should warn you, if I turn out to be particularly clear, you've probably misunderstood what I said." (quoted in Norris 2005). Far from being a phenomenon limited to the American context, central bankers in Europe have for a long time displayed a similar Delphic attitude and scepticism towards the feasibility and desirability of a clear communication with the public. Almost twenty years after Greenspan's famous quote, Otmar Issing, the former Chief economist of the European Central Bank (ECB), wrote: \Transparency is not an end in itself; a central bank is not established with the primary objective of communicating with the public." (Issing 2005). Central bank communication has come a long way since then. There has been a revolu- tion over recent years, with central bank communication activities growing exponentially in volume and becoming more targeted at the general public (Haldane 2017). This revolution has also underpinned a significant change of perspective with regard to the clarity of central bank communication with the public. As Mario Draghi put it during his last press conference as ECB President in October 2019:\[W]hat happened in communication by central banks over the last ten, fifteen years is a complete transformation. Nowadays, nobody would pride himself or herself saying: if you have understood me, you are stupid. Nobody would say that today." (ECB 2019). In a similar vein, opposite to Greenspan's complacency towards unclear communications, in a recent Town Hall Meeting with educators, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell stated: \The Federal Reserve policy affects everyone. And we need to work hard, and we do work hard, at trying to communicate in a way that doesn't lapse into economic jargon, and so it can be understood by the interested public, by anyone who's interested." (Federal Reserve 2019). Despite the recent revolution in central bank communication and central bankers' chang- ing attitudes towards communication clarity and transparency, there remains a widespread belief that central banks communicate in a way that most households cannot understand. As Bank of England Chief economist Andrew Haldane put it on several occasions, \around 95% of all the words central banks utter are inaccessible to around 95% of the population" (Hal- dane 2018). This lack of clarity in the public communications of central banks is regarded as a major form of hindrance for these institutions to successfully engage the public and close the \twin deficit” of public understanding and trust in economics (Haldane, Macaulay, and McMahon 2020). Confirming the importance of communication clarity, research in political science points to its beneficial effects on citizen political understanding and civic engagement (e.g., Reilly and Richey 2011; Bischof and Senninger 2018). Also, economic research has provided ev- idence for a range of positive implications of central bank communication clarity on the behaviour and expectations of financial market actors (e.g., Jansen 2011a; Montes et al. 2016; Smales and Apergis 2017). Nonetheless, we still know very little about the effects of 1 central bank communication clarity on public attention and engagement. Focusing on the case of the ECB, this paper fills the gap by asking the following research question: does plain talking increase public engagement in the realm of central banking? The article addresses this question by analysing a comprehensive dataset of ECB speeches, press conferences and tweets using readability metrics (Flesch 1948; Gunning 1952; Kincaid et al. 1975) and assessing the impact of communication clarity on media engagement, focus- ing on both traditional and social media. First, we show that greater communication clarity of ECB speeches and press conferences is significantly and robustly correlated with a higher level of media coverage on the ECB on the day in which these communication activities take place. Second, we provide evidence that the clarity of ECB digital communications is a strong predictor of the social media engagement generated by the central bank on Twit- ter. These results are robust to controlling for several factors that may significantly affect engagement, such as the presence of conventional and unconventional policy changes during a press conference, the topics of discussion and number of speeches on a given day, and the topic and media content type of ECB tweets. Taken together, these findings shed new light on the importance of communication clarity for central banks to successfully engage the public. The next section reviews major contributions in economics and political science focusing on communication clarity and elaborates the argument we test in our empirical analysis. The third section discusses the data and methods employed in the paper. The fourth section presents the results of our analysis. The fifth section provides several robustness checks and extensions of the analysis. The final section draws conclusions and points to future avenues for research. 2 The Effects of Clarity of Central Bank Communica- tion A common observation in the academic and public debate is that, in many ways, the styles of discourse are changing radically in contemporary public communications. While the chal- lenges of policy-making have grown in complexity over the past decades, the sophistication of public speech has declined. For example, scholars across disciplines have applied measures of textual complexity developed in the field of education to find that the sophistication of the speeches given by American presidents has steadily decreased over the past 200 years (e.g., Sigelman 1996; Teten 2003; Lim 2008). Political scientists and social psychologists have advanced significantly in the study of the determinants of linguistic complexity in politi- cal communication (e.g., Spirling 2016; Lin and Osnabr¨ugge 2018; Schoonvelde et al. 2019; Rauh, Bes, and Schoonvelde 2020). Instead, the research on clarity of communication with the public is much more limited outside the domain of political communication. This topic is particularly relevant for central banks. A long-standing debate in economics has focused on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy for central banks (for a review, see Blinder et al. 2008). An important part of this debate has focused on the notion of central bank transparency. A greater degree of transparency may produce tangible benefits, such as well-anchored inflation expectations of households and businesses. At the same time, various authors have suggested that limits to transparency may exist (Cukierman and 2 Meltzer 1986; Morris and Shin 2002). Whether transparency is beneficial, and to what extent, is in the end an empirical matter. The evidence in favour of transparency has accumulated over the years. Although Geraats(2002) cautiously concluded that the available evidence \suggests that transparency tends to be beneficial”, van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger(2007) document that \the empirical results are largely in favour of more transparency." Within this body of research, several studies have argued that communication clarity constitutes a key element of central bank transparency. (e.g., Winkler 2000; Fracasso, Gen- berg, and Wyplosz 2003; Jansen 2011b). The clarity of the communication activities of central banks has been increasingly measured by applying the same metrics of textual com- plexity developed in education studies (e.g., Flesch 1948; Gunning 1952; Kincaid et al. 1975) and used by political science and psychology scholars to evaluate the complexity of political speeches. Most of the literature studying the consequences
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