Moving Past the Bosnia Fallacy New Models for Understanding

BY BRIAN KREITLOW

“But [Syria] is not so much like Libya last year, where of course we had a successful interven- tion to save lives. It is looking more like Bosnia in the 1990s, being on the edge of a sectarian conflict in which neighboring villages are attacking and killing each other so I don’t think we can rule anything out.” – British Foreign Secretary William Hague1

“The way Syria is heading resembles the situation in Srebrenica.” – Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu2

s the slaughter in Syria rages on, it has become fashionable to look to Bosnia as an anal- ogy for the violent conflict. Statements from foreign ministers, politicians and respected Ajournalists highlight the similarities between the two conflicts. Headlines claim, “Syria Turning into Another Bosnia,” and “Syrian Conflict a Haunting Reminder of Bosnia,” though reading below the headlines on most articles reveals the true nature of the similarities between Bosnia and Syria. They are more circumstantial than substantive; the actual conflicts bear little similarity. In reality, the conflict in Syria is fundamentally different from Bosnia, making com- parisons with Bosnia extremely misleading. Furthermore, prescriptions which call for the forma- tion of enclaves, safe havens or statelets are based on an incomplete understanding of the conflict of Syria, and disregard many of the experiences of Bosnia – and other instances of ethnically based partition, for that matter. As Robert Jervis once noted: historical analogies “are rarely accurate and solutions based on false analogies can be devastating.”3 Policymakers and military strategists watching Syria would do well to read past the “sound bite” and embrace the lessons of other, more instructive situations, to help find appropriate approaches to the conflict in Syria. This paper first seeks to expose the logical fallacy in attempting to make serious com- parisons between the situations in Syria and Bosnia, by clearly identifying the major differ- ences between the two conflicts. While Bosnia stemmed from a top-down maneuver insti- gated by a regime seeking to exploit ethnicity to achieve its political goals, Syria began as a

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Kreitlow is a Political-Military Officer at Headquarters, United States European Command.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 69 KREITLOW bottom-up social revolution aimed at gain- and territories. Josip Tito’s model for ing greater freedoms. Despite some report- Yugoslavia was based on the Soviet model, ing to the contrary,4 Syria has remained favoring full national self-determination for generally free of the intense sectarian fight- Yugoslav nationalities, while ensuring that ing that consumed Bosnia, precisely because the strong, centralized party organization the politicization of ethnicity has not (yet) served as the sole political expression of become a useful tool. each nation’s will. This arrangement simul- Second, this paper presents three mod- taneously strengthened ethnically derived els for broadening our understanding of the states while ensuring that ethnicity was not situation in Syria: as a transition towards politicized. Prior to the conflict, Bosnia was democracy from a “sultanistic” form of an ethnically diverse society and Muslims authoritarian rule; as a battleground for were generally well represented in the competing political ideologies; and as a Bosnian government, though representation proxy war between the West and Iran. Each was skewed in favor of Serbs and Croats in of these models provides a different, com- both the Communist Party and Yugoslav plementary lens for evaluating the unfolding federal government positions. Comprising situation in Syria and helps us to build a only 15 percent of the 1981 Yugoslav popula- more complete understanding of the crisis. tion,5 Bosnian Muslims still retained a voice Using models helps us to avoid the pitfalls of in the system, aided by Tito’s 1974 recogni- individual cases, and understanding what tion of “Muslim” as a separate nationality, we are dealing with in Syria is a vital step to which opened up access to positions of determining how we deal with Syria, both influence. It was Slobodan Milošević’s advo- now and in a post-Assad environment. cacy of Serb nationalism that would politi- As there is no international legal basis cize ethnicity in Yugoslavia and set the stage for intervention in Syria, this paper offers a for the crises to come. handful of recommendations for U.S. policy Milošević was a relative political new- in Syria. The key elements are; avoiding the comer in 1987 when he took up the flag of politicization of ethnicity before, during and Serb nationalism. Vowing to protect the Serb after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime; populace from victimization in Kosovo, opposing the creation of ethnic or confes- Croatia, and Bosnia, he incited ethnic Serbs sionally-based states and starting the polit- throughout Yugoslavia by promising the ical dialogue between key actors now, to support of the federal government and the ease the pain of transition; speeding the for- Yugoslav National Army. Milošević’s goal mation of a relevant interim government; was a very deliberate move to bring ethnic and improving the consolidation of democ- Serbs into a Serb state – a move underscored racy in a legitimate ruling body. by the 1989 installation of his supporters The war in Bosnia had its origins in the into key positions in the leadership of collapse of Yugoslavia – which is, notably, Serbia’s two autonomous provinces also very different from the collapse of Syria. (Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro.6 The crisis in Yugoslavia was primarily a cri- Kosovo and Montenegro each had votes sis of government based on historical states in the Yugoslav national council,

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strengthening his influence in the federal more to do with restricted social and eco- government and triggering the failure of the nomic privileges, corruption and the 43 government. This ultimately led to declara- years of emergency rule. tions of independence by Slovenia and When Assad cracked down on the pro- Croatia, and an ill-fated referendum by the tests, an anti-regime insurgency erupted, Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović on with over 1,000 deaths in the first few an independent state of Bosnia and months. The spiral of violence has continued Herzegovina, precipitating the crisis often and expanded from there. The Assad gov- referred to as “Bosnia.”7 In the same man- ernment promised token reforms in 2012, ner as Croatia, Bosnia became a battle- but the elections were boycotted by the ground for protecting and advancing the opposition, cementing their position that rights of the ethnic Serb population and its Assad’s removal from power is their primary territory (and later for expanding Croat ter- goal. ritories) - especially as it became clear that a solution would be based on ethnic parti- In contrast to the top-down political maneuver tion. To cover his political maneuver, that instigated the conflict in Bosnia, the Syrian Milošević fed the West a steady stream of conflict sprung up from the local level. propaganda - that the conflict was an ethnic clash rooted in historic hatred - effectively presenting the conflict as one with no reso- lution.8 Instead, it was a modern concoction Despite the huge divide between the which politicized ethnic differences in order privileged Alawite leadership and the Sunni to advance an agenda which served one eth- masses, the conflict in Syria has remained nic group at the expense of others. In short, remarkably non-sectarian—in large part due tensions between ethnic groups in Bosnia to the Ba’ath Party’s ideology of secular were the result, not the cause of the war in nationalism, which has guided the regime Yugoslavia.9 for over fifty years. rely on this In contrast to the top-down political secular nationalism, because they would be maneuver that instigated the conflict in marginalized in a Sunni-dominated state Bosnia, the Syrian conflict sprung up from which combines political and religious ide- the local level. The Syrian uprising began in ologies. The Ba’ath Party’s nationalist ideol- Deraa, in southern Syria, when locals ogy allowed for a secular, if autocratic gov- demanded the release of 14 schoolchildren ernment, and provided an opportunity for arrested for graffiti-ing a popular Arab both minority Alawites and some Sunnis to Spring slogan: “The people want the down- rise to prominent government positions. fall of the regime.”10 Five protesters were Former Syrian Minister of Defense subsequently shot by security forces over Mustafa Tlas (Sunni) served as Syria’s min- the next two days, triggering more protests. ister of defense for over 30 years; his son, The original protestors are likely to have Manaf, was a general in Syria’s Republican been Sunni, but their outrage had little to do Guard until his defection in 2012. Recently with religion or religious differences and slain Sunni cleric Sheikh Mohammed

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 71 KREITLOW al-Bouti was also a fervent and long-stand- clear that the motive is due to religious, ing supporter of the Assad regime. The effec- rather than political, differences – as fine of tive result of this strategy is a focus on a line as that may be.11 Eliminating challeng- crushing political dissent rather than reli- ers to the regime (and their supporters) gious groups. Hafez al-Assad’s infamous belies an agenda in which ethnicity and 1982 massacre in did not specifically religion take a back seat to domestic politics target Sunni Muslims per se; rather it was to and clearly differentiates these atrocities blunt an anti-government insurgency by the from those perpetrated in Bosnia in the Ba’ath Party’s long-standing political and 1990s. ideological rival, the Muslim Brotherhood. After only a quick review, it is readily The growing presence of the Muslim apparent that there are few actual similari- Brotherhood, and other more extremist ties between Bosnia and Syria. Nonetheless, Islamist groups (such as the al-Qaeda- following on popular comparisons between linked al-Nusra Front) in the Syrian opposi- Syria and Bosnia, the logical next step has tion poses ideological and political chal- been to advance solutions for Syria based on lenges to the regime every bit as much as it perceived “successes” in Bosnia. A 2012 edi- introduces sectarian elements into the con- torial in the Wall Street Journal offered: “A flict. While there is an apparent trend Bosnia-style air campaign targeting elite towards “sectarian” violence, it is not overtly Syrian military units could prompt the U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Brian Schlumbohm

President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia initial the Dayton Peace Accords

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General Staff to reconsider its contempt for Professor Milton Esman notes that the international opinion, and perhaps its alle- creation of sub-states does not eliminate giance to the Assad family. Short of that, ethnic conflicts, as “successor states become carving out some kind of safe haven inside new venues for the pursuit and the regula- Syria would at least save lives.”12 These pre- tion of conflicting ethnic claims” through scriptions are fraught with danger, and not both civil and violent means.13 At the same only show a lack of understanding of the time, federations of co-existing ethnic com- differences between the two conflicts, but munities, in which collectivities are incor- also a lack of understanding of how these porated through consocietal or power-shar- strategies “worked” in Bosnia. Most of the ing arrangements (as in Bosnia) have solutions proposed to end the conflict in repeatedly failed.14 In short, ethnic partition Bosnia failed – even the Dayton Accords in Syria trends toward creating a situation have only had limited success in solving the like Bosnia. core problems. Where the Dayton Accords Safe havens in Bosnia were poorly succeeded was in implementing a cease-fire defined and poorly enacted, and as a result, – in part by creating two separate sub-states generally unsuccessful (Srebrenica was a along ethnic lines. These partitions limited United Nations-designated safe haven). the justification for further interethnic con- Most UN bodies and Security Council mem- flict and generally served to protect the indi- bers did not support the idea of safe havens viduals in each sub-state. In the longer term, – safe havens were to be employed only as a though, these features have proven unsus- last resort – and member nations were not tainable and have left behind a permanently willing to provide the appropriate level of crippled country incapable of self-gover- protection to make the safe havens work.15 nance. Bosnia does, however, offer some useful Introducing partitions in Syria based on lessons on the idea of safe havens. First, safe ethnic or confessional difference neither havens must be clearly defined; the interna- resolves nor addresses the core issues of the tional commitment to protecting them must conflict. Bashar al-Assad has been fighting be made clear to both the protected and the to maintain his power against an insurgency aggressors. Second, they need to be defen- – ceding territory to the insurgents is an sible and established in a manner that unacceptable solution. Additionally, since allows for protection of the civilian popu- the battle is for rightful ownership of the lace. Massive, inter-confessional cities such state of Syria and not for protection of ethnic as Homs and Hama, situated along main groups, the creation of a rump sub-state led lines of communication are simply not by Assad would be tenuous and prolong the defensible as safe havens. Third, safe havens conflict. Establishing ethnically based meant to protect civilians cannot be used as enclaves or sub-states in Syria is likely to a base for insurgent operations. Doing so produce one of two results: ethnic cleansing removes the impartiality that underpins the to consolidate power; or the introduction of sanctity of the safe haven. Fourth, sufficient constant ethnic tensions. forces must be in place on the ground to protect the zone and they must not be seen

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as combatants in their own right. Finally, Romania in 1989 and Libya in 2011, though any forces charged with securing safe- Saddam Hussein’s sultanistic regime in Iraq havens must be granted sufficiently robust offers the best mirror of Syria in terms of rules of engagement (ROE) to protect the religion, ethnicity and political distribution. area – ROE that UN personnel lacked in In April 2013, Linz and Stepan evaluated Bosnia. the Arab countries and their forms of gov- ernment, noting that none is truly sultanis- “We need to not lose sight of the fact that tic and instead introducing a “continuum of this was a populist uprising – to uproot a sultanism.”19 While Gaddafi receives their dictatorial regime – that was faced with billing for the most sultanistic of the Arab the utmost brutality and Bashar al-Assad Spring leaders (Assad, Mubarak, and Ben Ali seems like not giving up, however, we’re round out the group), they note that the not giving up either on our rights to trans- Assad regime has strong sultanistic features, form Syria into a democratic, civil state.” consistent with those identified above.20 – Yaser Tabbara, legal advisor for the There is (or has been) some internal auton- Syrian National Coalition16 omy in the Syrian business community and One way to view the conflict in Syria is state apparatus, though this does not extend through the lens of scholarship on demo- to the rigidly controlled Syrian military. cratic transitions. Juan Linz and Alfred Regardless of the degree of sultanism, the Stepan, who chronicled transitions to resultant political conditions created by the democracies throughout Latin America and extreme nature of this regime type remain Eastern Europe, identified five different consistent with the original sultanistic model types of modern regimes.17 Based on model. Lacking political moderates and soft- the models they offered, Syria would be liners within the regime, democratic transi- most-likely categorized as a “sultanistic” tions from sultanistic regimes do not usually regime, “where the private and public are occur through negotiations with the opposi- fused, there is a strong tendency toward tion, nor by the leader stepping down—they familial power and dynastic succession, often end only with the death of the leader there is no distinction between a state career through armed revolt, as readily witnessed and personal service to the ruler, there is a in Romania, Libya, and Iraq. The precarious lack of rationalized impersonal ideology, position of the Alawite minority in Syria economic success depends on a personal heightens the regime’s resistance to a nego- relationship to the ruler, and, most of all, the tiated solution, achieving the same effective ruler acts only according to his own result as a truly sultanistic regime. unchecked discretion, with no larger imper- The categorization of Syria as a sultanis- sonal goals.”18 This label is often applied to tic regime in transition has two key implica- Slobodan Milošević as well as Nicolae tions: first, it clarifies that Syria is not a Ceauşescu, Saddam Hussein, Moammar complex and intractable interethnic conflict Gaddafi, and North Korean rulers since Kim – it is a revolution seeking control of the Il-Sung. It is no surprise that the course of state. Second, it gives us a more constructive events in Syria rings eerily similar to model for analyzing the situation and

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understanding what comes next. Linz and the authoritarian political rule did not allow Stepan note the tendency for non-demo- for the formation of any significant orga- cratic regimes to follow the collapse of sul- nized opposition. Political opposition was tanistic regimes, and prescribe, “The best not allowed, and threats to the regime were chance for democratic transition is if revo- harshly dealt with. It would not be unfair to lutionary upheaval is led by internationally suggest the Egyptian Supreme Council of the supported, democratically inclined leaders Armed Forces effectively “stole” the who set a date for elections and allow free Egyptian revolution in 2011, as it intervened contestation of power.”21 The evolution of between the protestors and the collapsing the conflict, however, challenges the focused regime to protect its interests and shape the application of this model. The range of post-Mubarak political scene.24 Iraq never potential motives amongst actors in the experienced a revolution, but the U.S. inva- sets the stage for a battle sion triggered the same result – a power for influence during the transition time vacuum with no clear mobilized political frame, potentially “hijacking” the revolu- movements. tion. Syria shows these same symptoms, as Conditions are ripe for a stolen revolu- the lack of opposition movements has tion specifically when there is no central opened the door for motivated actors to driving force or ideology behind the revolu- seize control of the revolution. Foremost tion. The revolutions in Romania and across among these actors are the Muslim Yugoslavia (1989) were spontaneous, but the Brotherhood, various al-Qaeda affiliated style of government had not allowed for the groups, and the people in the Syrian formation of an organized political opposi- National Coalition, all of whom are jockey- tion necessary to push through the reforms ing for position in a post-Assad Syria. The the protestors sought. In each case, a moti- Syrian populace has long been disengaged vated social or government actor was able to from political dialogue, in part because there seize the controls and guide the revolution has been no room for dissent with the towards meeting its own needs. In Romania, regime – a belief reinforced by the 1982 this was Ion Iliescu, who stepped in to lead Homs massacre and the government’s harsh the movement and consolidate power, response to the initial protests in Deraa. though his supporters were primarily After more than two years of war, much of regime officials.22 Similarly, the 1989 anti- the original revolution seems to have died government protests in the Yugoslav repub- out, leaving these armed groups to carry on lic of Montenegro did not advance a particu- the fight against the regime. lar political actor to replace the government. Instead, Milo Đukanović and Momir Bulatović (members of the regime) crossed Conditions are ripe for a stolen revolution over to the opposition and then negotiated specifically when there is no central driving force their new positions as Prime Minister and or ideology behind the revolution. President, respectively.23 Similar circum- stances existed in Egypt and in Libya, where

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The primary opposition to the ruling al-Assad (both Alawite). In supporting their Ba’ath Party has been its long-time ideo- Ba’athist policies, he was known for actively logical rival, the Muslim Brotherhood, which speaking out against the Muslim Hafez al-Assad ordered into exile in 1980, Brotherhood. As the Brotherhood gains following an assassination attempt against strength in the opposition, it is likely that him. Today, it is the largest and most orga- members of the movement will seek to nized bloc of the otherwise fragmented expand their political agenda against others, Syrian National Coalition. The Brotherhood’s meaning that the victims of anti-regime public statements evince a commitment to violence will not only be Alawites or Shi’a, a democratic social order, though its motives but will include Sunnis and Christians remain suspect. The Muslim Brotherhood’s opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood. This March 2012 Covenant and Pact called for the ideological dispute should also be borne in “institution of a State that respects human mind as a new post-Assad government rights as enshrined by divine texts and seeks to form. A dominant Muslim international instruments, such as dignity, Brotherhood could, as in Egypt, seize the equality, freedom of thought and speech; [a revolution from the hands of secular nation- state] where no citizen’s beliefs or religion alists and deliver them into the clutches of a shall be subject to prejudice.”25 This should competing vision of Syria’s future that is no sound familiar – it is nearly identical to more democratic than the last forty years Mohamed Morsi’s pre-electoral pledges of have been.27 inclusiveness in Egypt.26 This messaging “We most definitely have a proxy war in gave Morsi the political support and inter- Syria. At this point of the conflict it is dif- national backing to take power – specifically ficult not to say that the international when contrasted against the unrestrained dimension of the Syrian conflict precedes radicalism of the opposing Salafists. the domestic one.” – Ayham Kamel, Messaging aside, the Muslim Brotherhood Eurasia Group28 likely believes that democracy is a useful tool in Syria, sensing that a democratic elec- Threats to transitions do not only come tion would result in a victory for it, as hap- from within. Weak states and states in revo- pened in Egypt. lution become battlegrounds for foreign The prominent role of the Muslim actors seeking to affect the shape of the new Brotherhood should not, however, be mis- state, and Syria is no exception. To a much construed as introducing a sectarian com- greater extent than Bosnia, Syria is showing ponent to the conflict; instead, it introduces signs as a proxy battlefield for influence an important ideological and political com- between regional power brokers – or more ponent to the dispute. The recent assassina- directly, between the Gulf States and Iran. tion of Mohamed Saeed al-Bouti, the prom- While Western actors are getting much of inent pro-regime Sunni cleric, highlights the the attention, there are a number of other importance of politics over religion. The actors whose motives deserve to be Sunni cleric was a strong supporter of addressed. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Gulf Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez States are heavily supporting the Syrian

76 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL MOVING PAST THE BOSNIA FALLACY opposition. These countries are driving sup- Security Council resolutions that would port to the opposition, focused on curbing condemn Assad in any way. growing Iranian influence in the Gulf and The inherent danger of a proxy war is Middle East, and establishing a friendly gov- that the conflict is restrained only by the ernment in Syria. The Arab League has rec- limitations of the conflicting parties. In this ognized the Syrian National Coalition for case, neither Iran nor the West or Gulf States Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the seem overly constrained in the resources legitimate government of Syria, and the they are able to provide to support the Coalition’s then-president, Sheikh Moaz al- regime. This means that Syria will face con- Khatib, attended the League’s March meet- tinued destruction—the citizens and the ing in Qatar. Iran is providing political and fighters will never reach a breaking point, material support to the Syrian regime, both for they are now only the venue and the directly and via Lebanese . pawns in a larger conflict. At the same time, According to Syrian opposition leaders “Iran the proxy war can change not only the has dispatched hundreds of advisers, secu- nature of the war, but also the constitution rity officials and intelligence operatives to of its primary actors. Factions become more Syria, along with weapons, money and elec- or less powerful or coherent often because tronic surveillance equipment.29 This sup- of foreign incentives, which change the port is to ensure that the Alawite regime, a course of eventual compromise within a key Iranian ally, remains in power. The loss country. of the Syrian government would deal a sig- The point of this paper is not to label nificant blow to Iranian regional aspirations, Syria as an example of one of these indi- including the export of its own Islamic rev- vidual models, but rather to give a greater olution. Russia and China, with their own and more accurate understanding of the interests in mind, support the Syrian regime dynamics at work. Each of the models rep- in international politics, preventing UN resents a part of the overall situation, and Syrian National Coalition

Historic photo of National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces members in Doha, Qatar, 18 November 2012

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 77 KREITLOW the is a mixture of all three from the newfound availability of power, variants. Each of the proposed models rep- money and benefits as parties look to exploit resents a body of theory and discussion, and the vacuum left by the receding state. Greed each has its own formulations, expectations and traditional loyalties to families, tribes, and prescribed actions. Just as importantly, and more tangible communities will super- these models do not prescribe a clear path sede the commitment to the revolution and for external actors to successfully intervene the vague idea of a Syrian state. These in a domestic transition. Libya and Iraq do changes open the door for the politicization not provide ideal or convincing scenarios for of religious differences as budding politi- an international presence; Romania, cians scramble to mobilize support and Tunisia, Egypt, Serbia (2000) were decided build power and influence. Retribution from within. In the absence of direct action, against Alawite or Shi’a regime figures is a the most effective steps the United States likely part of this – though it may be difficult and its allies can take are ones designed to to determine if the cause is sectarian or sim- prevent the politicization of ethnicity or ply anti-regime retribution. religion, strengthen the organization of the The United States should work to pre- opposition, and help produce international vent politicization of ethnicity or religion consensus on a way ahead. prior to the transition. Thus far, the United The primary goal of the U.S. and inter- States has generally taken the right steps – national community must be preventing the identifying the Nusra Front as a terrorist politicization of ethnicity throughout the group, pressing the Syrian opposition to transition. This is certainly easier said than support democratic and inclusive ideals, done – especially as neither the United working to shut down Iranian shipments to States nor the international community the Syrian regime – though all with mixed have any role or meaningful presence inside results. The Syrian National Coalition has Syria. Instead, efforts must focus on engag- repeatedly selected broad-based ethnic ing the Syrian National Coalition, the Free minorities and secular figures for its leader- and external actors who are ship, such as former Prime Minister, involved in the conflict. The effort to prevent Ghassan Hitto, who was selected over the the politicization of ethnicity must focus on three candidates fielded by the Muslim maintaining a secular, democratic opposi- Brotherhood. Many of the former Syrian tion prior to and throughout the transition, National Coalition Presidents, such as while maintaining the territorial integrity of and Moaz al-Khatib, are the state. known for their secular political views. Should the various opposition forces Unfortunately, the Syrian National manage to succeed in overcoming the Coalition has been anything but stable and regime, the disparate goals of the various has little legitimacy inside of Syria. The only opposition factions will become more pro- real body in the opposition that has legiti- nounced, raising the likelihood for greater macy is the Muslim Brotherhood due to its violence, along political, ideological and history of opposition to the Syrian regime. confessional lines. In part, this will result Its philosophical background and endurance

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give it a legitimacy that other factions do not tolerant, representative and multi-confes- have, and (as in Egypt) by presenting a mid- sional state in Iraq, as well as in Lebanon dle ground between radical Islamist parties and Jordan. At worst, breakaway sub-states and secular democratic parties it gains com- could lead to redrawing the entire map of mand of the electorate. To this point, the the Middle East. While this is probably a Muslim Brotherhood has wielded its consid- much-needed step towards resolving the erable influence to exploit the transitional larger regional problems, it undermines the period to its advantage. U.S. Ambassador to integrity of the international system if it is Syria Robert Ford, in a meeting with the not a deliberate process undertaken by sov- in June 2012,30 made ereign states. The only way to prevent a American support contingent upon imple- disastrous overhaul of the region is to fur- mentation of reforms recommended by an ther the mythical state which is Syria, and independent committee.31 The committee’s ensure that minority groups understand that recommendations, which were eventually they will have a voice in a future govern- signed by most of the opposition forces, ment. struck at the Brotherhood’s monopoly on Even if territorial partition is avoided, power by outlining the transitional period, the new government will become a venue detailing the disposition of armed factions for competition between political actors, and criminalizing the use of money to buy and ethnicity is a proven tool for mobilizing political loyalty. Despite international oppo- and consolidating support. The United States sition, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded should not support the enshrinement of in staving off a follow-up committee and ethnic, religious or confessional-based dif- excluding the plan from the Syrian National ferences in a post-Assad government. Rather Coalition’s November 2012 founding state- than leveling representation, the allocation ments. The United States cannot fight this of government positions by ethnicity or reli- battle alone – it needs to press the Arab gion (e.g., Iraq under the Coalition League and other western donors to hold to Provisional Authority or Lebanon under the high standards in ensuring the Syrian National Pact) has been historically proven National Coalition holds to agreed principles to increase the likelihood of sectarian con- in exchange for international support. flict. While ethnic political parties are not As discussed previously, the United inherently dangerous or violent (their ulti- States should oppose the creation of ethnic mate goal is to advance the goals of their or confessional-based sub-states in Syria. ethnic / religious group); they indirectly (or The formation of ethnic states, such as an sometimes directly) threaten those outside Alawite state in the West, a Kurdish state in of their group. Special electoral processes or the northeast and a state along the arrangements that ensure diversity in gov- Jordanian border would be unsustainable ernment may alleviate the overt domination and unacceptable to other states in the of one social group, but negatively impact region. At best, the creation of ethnically or the quality of the resultant democracy. confessional-based mini-states in Syria As a final step, the United States should could undermine U.S. efforts to promote a encourage political dialogue on the future of

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Syria now. The transition to democracy will to ensure the formation of a democratic and be very complicated and will take time, inclusive government. These conditions especially given the absence of political life must become prerequisites for the delivery under Assad. Now is the time for political of aid and assistance, not only from the discussion between the Muslim Brotherhood West, but also from the Gulf States and other and secular members of the opposition on international actors. the future relationship between state and Syria is not Bosnia, nor is it necessarily religions, the nature of the transitional gov- Iraq, Egypt or Lebanon. It is not a foregone ernment, amnesty for former regime and conclusion that Syria’s day of sectarian Ba’ath Party members (and the status of the infighting is here, or that it is even coming. Ba’ath Party), and on the desired functions To help prevent that scenario, the interna- of the new government. Waiting to begin tional community must use its leverage to these discussions until Assad falls (or even avoid the mobilization of ethnic groups for months later as was the case in Egypt) political purposes, the division of territory delays the development of political society based on ethnic or religious identification, and the consolidation of a democratic alter- and the constitutional enshrinement of con- native to authoritarian rule. societal arrangements. Rather than solving Rather than pinning our Syrian fore- problems, these “solutions” only create fresh casts on naïve comparisons with select his- avenues for conflict, setting the stage for torical examples, looking to different models Syria to become another Bosnia or Iraq. provides a rich and diverse backdrop for Only by understanding and addressing the examining the multiple layers of the Syrian problem at hand, can we stop solving past conflict. These models provide us with more problems and focus on preventing their relevant examples on the role of ideology, recurrence. PRISM ethnicity and foreign involvement, which are essential ingredients of the current situ- ation. This analysis has also underscored the NOTES very important role of the Muslim Brotherhood in “hijacking” the revolution, a continuing development that will have long-lasting impacts on the future of the 1 The Telegraph. “William Hague compares revolution and the transition to a post-Assad Syria to Bosnia in 1990s,” 19 Jun 2012. http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ regime. There is no clear way for the United syria/9322600/William-Hague-compares-Syria- States to control or confront these develop- to-Bosnia-in-1990s.html ments, though efforts to require the Syrian 2 Today’s Zaman. “Davatoglu compares Syrian National Coalition to undergo review by an killings to Srebrenica massacre,” 4 March 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-273288-da- independent committee are a step in the vutoglu-compares-syrian-killings-to-srebreni- right direction. The United States must con- ca-massacre.html tinue to push for such efforts which allow 3 Jervis, Robert. Perception and the international community to maintain a Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 217. hand in the oversight of the transition, and

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4 Sherlock, Ruth. “Syrian Rebels Accused of Democracy, Authoritarianism, Totalitarianism, Sectarian Murders,” 11 August 2013. http://www. Post-Totalitarianism and Sultanism. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ 18 Ibid., p. 52. syria/10236362/Syrian-rebels-accused-of- 19 Linz Juan and Alfred Stepan. sectarian-murders.html “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’”, 5 Ramet, Sabrina P. The Three Yugoslavias: Journal of Democracy 24:2, April 2013, p. 26. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005. 20 Ibid., p. 28. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2006), 21 Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 58 p. 304. 22 Darmanović, Srđan. “Demokratske 6 Sell, Louis. Slobodan Milosevic and the Tranzicije u Južnoj i Istočnoj Evropi,” Doktorska Destruction of Yugoslavia. (Durham & London: Disertacija. (Podgorica: Univerzitet Crne Gore, Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 57-59, 63-64, 2002), pp. 166-167. 108-110; Dania, Robert J. and John. M.A. Fine, Jr. 23 Ibid., pp. 185-187. Bosnia: A Tradition Betrayed. (New York: Columbia 24 Dobson, William J. The Dictator’s Learning University Press, 1994), p. 205. Curve. (New York: Doubleday, 2012), pp. 209, 7 Ibid., pp. 143-165. Owen, David. Balkan 211-212. Odyssey. (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1995), p. 25 Carnegie Middle East Center. “The Muslim 46. Brotherhood in Syria” http://carnegie-mec.org/ 8 Popović, Srdja. “Milošević’s Motiveless publications/?fa=48370 Malignancy” in Blitz, Brad, ed. War and Change in 26 Kirkpatrick, David D. “Named Egypt’s the Balkans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Winner, Islamist Makes History” The New York Press, 2006), pp. 52-53. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/ 9 Dania and Fine 1994, pp. 220-221. world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim- 10 BBC News – Middle East. “Guide: Syria brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html Crisis,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-mid- 27 Ajami, Fouad. “The Arab Spring at One: A dle-east-13855203 Year of Living Dangerously” Foreign Affairs, March/ 11 Sterling, Joe, Saad Abedine and Salma April 2012. Abdelaziz. “Syria fight now ‘overtly sectarian,’ U.N. 28 Nakhoul, Samia. “Analysis: No happy Says,” 20 Dec 2012. http://edition.cnn. outcome in Syria as conflict turns into proxy war” com/2012/12/20/world/meast/syria-civil-war; August 1, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/arti- Cheterian, Vicken. The Syrian War Is Not Only cle/2012/08/01/us-syria-crisis-scenario-idUS- Sectarian, Al-Hayat, 19 May 2013. http://www. BRE8700S420120801 al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/05/syrian- conflict-failed-sectarian-analysis.html 29 Warrick, Joby and Liz Sly. “U.S. officials: 12 The Wall Street Journal. “Syria’s Cease-Fire Iran is stepping up lethal aid to Syria” The of the Grave,” June 15, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/ Washington Post, March 3, 2012. http://articles. article/SB100014240527023037539045774527422017 washingtonpost.com/2012-03-03/ 22640.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_AboveLEFTTop world/35449594_1_homs-bab-amr-intelligence- 13 Esman, Milton J. Ethnic Politics. (Ithaca: reports Cornell University, 1994), p. 217. 30 The Syrian National Council was the 14 Ibid., 1994, p. 223. predecessor to the current National Syrian political 15 Honig, Jan W. and Norbert Both. Srebrenica: opposition, The Syrian National Coalition, formed Record of a War Crime. (London: Penguin Books, in November, 2012. 1996), pp. 99-103. 31 Hasssan, Hassan. “How the Muslim 16 Al-jazeera.com. “Where is the Syrian Brotherhood Hijacked Syria’s Revolution” Foreign Conflict Heading?” http://www.aljazeera.com/ Policy.com. March 13, 2013. http://www.foreign- programmes/inside- policy.com/articles/2013/03/13/how_the_mus- syria/2013/03/20133177557742685.html lim_brotherhood_hijacked_syria_s_revolution 17 Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996), p. 44. The five types of modern regimes they identified are:

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 81 DESIGNING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-WAR SYRIA This graphic incorporates information and insights provided by Ambassador Donald Planty FROM Pre-War Power Structure Concentric Circles of Loyalty Around Bashar al-Assad*

Note: Size of figure and distance Assad from Assad correspond to relative power and level of direct contact and influence with regime leaders.

National Security Council

Ba’ath Party Machine Intelligence Agencies

Syrian Armed Forces

Local Municipal Workers Politcal Security Local Ba’ath Offices Air Force Intelligence Governors State Security Political Bureaus “” Military Intelligence Provincial Governance (paid armed gangs) Syrian Arab Air Defense Syrian Arab Navy Syrian Arab Army Syrian Arab Air Force THE GOAL TO Post-War Security Sector Democratic, Institutionalized Separation of Powers

The security sector transition process creates the space for new institutions to succeed. Good habits will be reinforced by an engaged electorate.

Civilian-Elected National Leadership

Ministry of Interior Ministry of Defense Elected Provincial Leadership

Army National Civilian Police Navy Border Patrol Air Force Elected Muncipal Leadership Immigration Patrol National Intelligency Agency Political Parties Local Municipal Workers

*Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) DESIGNING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-WAR SYRIA

500,000 fighters 400,000 in the 70,000 in the 30,000 in the Islamic Fronts THE PROCESS

>1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons 2 million Refugees in Camps .5 million Armed Fighters 14 million Addt’l Civilians In-Country >15 million Living in Diaspora *Pre-war pop: 20.3 million

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Priorities, metrics, and timetable for transition

Newly elected government

© 2013 Zoe Bockius-Suwyn & Nathaniel Rosenblatt, Caerus Associates wikimedia.org

Afghan village destroyed by the Soviets