Liisa Tuomela VIRTUES OF MAN, WOMAN – OR HUMAN BEING? An Intellectual Historical Study on the Views of the Later Stoics Seneca the Younger, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Hierocles and Marcus Aurelius on the Sameness of the Virtues of Man and Woman Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki in auditorium XII, on the 10th of September, 2014 at 12 o’clock. ISBN 978-951-51-0073-3 (paperback) ISBN 978-951-51-0074-0 (PDF) ABSTRACT The aim of this intellectual historical study is (using, modified for the purposes of the study, (con)textual analysis, philological method and approaches of women’s/gender history) to examine the views of the later Stoics Seneca the Younger, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, Hierocles and Marcus Aurelius on the sameness of the virtues of man and woman, a question which gives a very non-anachronistic perspective on sameness, otherness, equality and inequality in Greek and Roman thinking. The basis of the study consists of two ideas found in Stoicism since its beginning: that the individual virtues are common to all human beings and that virtue as such is natural and possible to all. At the same time, other authors and material discussing women’s virtues are used as an ideological background and context, i.e. views emphasising difference/ inequality (or, in short, “otherness”) and views emphasising sameness/equality at least more than on average. Thus, it is an important aspect of this study to examine the proportion of these kinds of attitudes in the later Stoics, and how consistently they follow the two above-mentioned Stoic ideas in their construction of ‘woman’ in relation to ‘man’ and ‘human being’ It is obvious that the sameness of the virtues of man and woman, discussed most intentionally and consistently by Musonius, who also most unambiguously equates ‘woman’ with ‘human being’, means two things also for the later Stoics: that everyone has at least in principle capacity to acquire virtue and that the virtues of both sexes are the so-called cardinal virtues, i.e. prudence, bravery, self-control and justice. Thus, even bravery is not a masculine but a human virtue, and the sameness of man and woman does not mean that a woman becomes “masculine”, but their sameness is based on their common (rational) humanhood. Equality resulting from sameness is especially in Musonius not only theoretical but also practical in a wider sense and on a larger scale than usual, above all in the division of tasks, whereas Seneca, advocating many traditional ideals, constructs the gender of women mostly very conservatively and even reacts negatively to contemporary changes in women’s social/societal roles and spheres. He also refers to women’s emotional “weakness”, but does not, however, see it as specific only to women and seems to be convinced that women, too, can overcome it and be (at least in principle) equal in virtue - emphasising thus, after all, the fundamental sameness rather than otherness of women. The views of the later Stoics provide a rather exceptional and ungendered perspective on individual virtues, capacity for virtue and philosophical education, as well as on sameness, otherness, equality and inequality, and what is “masculine”, “feminine” or “human”. Thus, their views are also an important contribution to discussions of who a “full” human being is, in an era when a “human being” was in the first place a (free) man. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1. The aim of the study 1 1.2. The basis of the study: Two aspects of the sameness of the virtues of man and woman 3 1.2.1. “ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ ἀνδρός, ἄλλαι δὲ γυναικός, ῥᾴδιον μαθεῖν” 3 1.2.2. “σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν” 5 1.3. The most important sources and earlier research 8 2. SOME BASIC STOIC THOUGHTS CONCERNING VIRTUES 11 . 3. IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND: A SURVEY OF THE VIEWS ON THE SAMENESS OF MAN'S AND WOMAN'S VIRTUES IN ANTIQUITY 14 3.1. Thinking emphasising sameness/equality 14 3.2. Conservative thinking emphasising difference/inequality 20 4. THE LATER STOICS ON THE SAMENESS OF THE VIRTUES OF MAN AND WOMAN 27 4.1. The individual virtues - “ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ ἀνδρός, ἄλλαι δὲ γυναικός, ῥᾴδιον μαθεῖν” 27 4.1.1. The sameness of the contents of the virtues 27 4.1.1.1. Prudence and bravery 28 4.1.1.2. Self-control and justice 34 4.1.1.3. Masculine women, masculine virtues? 40 4.1.2. Virtues in practical life 52 4.1.2 1. Seneca 54 4.1.2 2. Musonius, Epictetus, and Hierocles 60 1. Conservative ideals? 60 2. Practical equality and division of tasks 67 i Within the household 67 ii Outside the household 81 4.2. The capacity for virtue in man and woman - “σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν” 93 4.2.1.The innate capacity for virtue 94 4.2.1.1. Musonius and Epictetus on the same capacity for virtue in man and woman 94 4.2.1.2. Seneca on the emotional “weakness” of women 102 . 4.2.2. Educating the innate capacity for virtue 113 4.2.2.1. The content of the philosophical education 113 4.2.2.2. The result of the philosophical education 122 5. CONCLUSION 132 COLLECTIONS OF FRAGMENTS AND INSCRIPTIONS 140 BIBLIOGRAPHY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study is now finally completed, not in the early 2000’s, as was intended, but after a long pause due to eye disease. We do not live, after 2000 years, in a world without otherness and inequality, and some are still regarded as more “full” human beings than others. I think that views of antiquity can give some historical perspective. I would like to thank the Institutum Classicum of the University of Helsinki, especially Professor Olli Salomies and Professor Heikki Solin for encouragement. This has been a long process. I would like to thank Intellectual Historian Markku Hyrkkänen for his encouragement when I was preparing my first thesis on this subject. I am also grateful to my late supervisor before my obligatory pause, Professor Juha Sihvola. He also encouraged me to focus still more intensively on the practical equality in the views of the later Stoics. And, of course, I would like to thank my pre-examiners, Docent Marja-Leena Hänninen and Academy Research Fellow Miira Tuominen for their valuable comments. I dedicate this study to my loved ones, with gratitude. 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. The aim of the study The aim of this doctoral dissertation is to examine what the later Stoics Seneca the Younger (c. 5 BC – 65 AD), Musonius Rufus (c. 30 – c. 100), Epictetus (c. 55 – 135), Hierocles (2nd cent.) and Marcus Aurelius (121 – 180) have understood by the sameness of the virtues of man and woman. It had been discussed since Plato (427 – 347 BC) and Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) whether (or to what extent) human virtues are also women’s virtues, but the later Stoics, with their strong emphasis on practical ethics, offer exceptionally rich material both in its extensivity and versatility: Musonius Rufus treats the virtues of women in more detail than any other author in antiquity, and Seneca wrote even two philosophical consolations to women, to a certain Marcia and to his mother Helvia. The basis of this study consists of two fundamental Stoic thoughts set forth in Stoicism since its beginning: that the individual virtues are common to all human beings, both men and women, and that virtue as such is natural and possible to all. At the same time views of other authors, too, are used as an ideological background and context; these include two main types of attitudes, i.e. conservative1 attitudes (emphasising difference/inequality, or, in short, “otherness”) and attitudes emphasising sameness/equality at least more than on average. Thus, it is an important aspect to examine the proportion of such attitudes in the later Stoics - and how consistently they follow (using also strategies of inclusion/exclusion and categories such as ‘we’, ‘human being’, ‘men - women’, or, as in Seneca, ‘men – exceptional women – other women’) the two above-mentioned Stoic ideas in their construction of ‘woman’ in relation to ‘man’ and ‘human being’. The era itself is also rather interesting because in the first and second centuries AD both conservative and more “egalitarian” attitudes and trends appeared side by side and interacted with each other. And it is also interesting that Musonius’ views on women have been interpreted even in opposite ways: some scholars consider him a feminist, whereas more argue that he to a great extent advocates conservative attitudes2 - an interpretation supported by most scholars also regarding Stoicism and __________________ 1 ‘Conservative’ is used to refer to (old, traditional, etc.) attitudes emphasising difference/inequality. 2 For the former view, e.g., Favez 1933 and Klassen 1984, for the latter view below pp. 53 – 54. 2 especially later Stoicism as a whole: despite ideas and ideals of theoretical equality the Stoics are thought to be conservatives who are not interested in the practical equality of women.1 So, it is also one aim of this study to investigate where this interpretation does not seem to be valid - and how conservatively these Stoics, after all, construct ‘woman’ and women’s gender and roles in this respect, i.e. discuss women’s social/societal “sameness” and “otherness” in this respect. This perspective is of crucial importance because if the later Stoics refer to changes in women’s social/societal role(s), they deviate from Stoicism, for the Stoics thought that one can acquire virtue and happiness regardless of one’s external circumstances, including one’s position and role(s).